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A TREATISE

ON

EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE,

AS ADMINISTERED IN

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

ADAPTED FOR ALL THE STATES,

AND

TO THE UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES UNDER THE REFORMED PROCEDURE

BY JOHN NORTON POMEROY, LL.D.

FOURTH EDITION

ВΥ

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TREATISE

ON

EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE

PART THIRD

TREATISE

ON

EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE.

PART THIRD.

THE EQUITABLE ESTATES, INTERESTS, AND PRIMARY RIGHTS RECOGNIZED AND PRO-TECTED BY THE EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE.

PRELIMINARY PARAGRAPH.

§ 975. The general nature of equitable estates and interests, as distinguished on the one side from legal estates, and on the other from mere equitable remedial rights or "equities," has been sufficiently described in the preceding volume.¹ In contemplation of courts of equity, equitable estates, according to their various degrees, are as truly property or ownership as legal estates are property in contemplation of courts of law. In fact, the entire dealing of equity with the subject of equitable estates, and the fundamental distinctions between equitable and legal conceptions and modes, are based upon the notion that equitable estates are in the truest sense property, and not mere rights of action,-not mere rights to obtain certain equitable remedies. Even when the equitable estate is the result of some positive wrongdoing, when the legal estate has been vested in a third person by fraud, undue influence. breach of fiduciary duty, and the like, so that the original owner can only regain the title by means of a cancellation.

§ 975, 1 See vol. 1, §§ 146-149.

(2117)

he is nevertheless, in contemplation of equity, the equitable and true owner; his equitable estate in the subject-matter is a true property, capable of being devised and otherwise dealt with.² In short, the equitable estate is often regarded by a court of equity as the real, beneficial, substantial ownership, while the corresponding legal estate is a mere form and shadow. Many important incidents connected with equitable estates have been considered in the preceding chapters, such as the relations of equitable with legal estates in the sections on "merger," "priorities," "bona fide purchase," some of the modes in which equitable estates may arise in the sections on "fraud," "mistake," and "accident," and the like. I purpose now to describe more directly the nature and characteristics of equitable estates, interests, and primary rights, and to state the rights and obligations with respect to them which devolve upon their owners. The entire discussion will comprise the following subjects: Trusts: equitable interests of married women; equitable interests arising from succession to a decedent; equitable conversion; mortgage of real and per-

§ 975, ² Stump v. Gaby, ² De Gex, M. & G. 623, 630; Gresley v. Mousley, 4 De Gex & J. 78, 90, 92, 93, per Turner, L. J.; Uppington v. Bullen, 2 Dru. & War. 184; Dickinson v. Burrell, L. R. 1 Eq. 337. In Stump v. Gaby, A, an owner of land, conveyed to his attorney, and subsequently by will confirmed the conveyance. After A's death, his heir at law brought a suit to set aside the conveyance as voidable. Lord St. Leonards said: "I will assume that the conveyance might have been set aside in equity for fraud. What, then, is the interest of a party in an estate which he has conveyed to his attorney under circumstances which would give a right in this court to have the conveyance set aside? In the view of this court he remains the owner; and the consequence is, that he may devise the estate, not as a legal estate, but as an equitable estate, wholly irrespective of all question as to any rights of entry or action, leaving the conveyance to have its full operation at law, but looking at the equitable right to have it set aside in this court." In Gresley v. Mousley, supra, A conveyed lands to his attorney under such circumstance that the deed could be set aside in equity. He afterwards died, having devised all his real estate to the plaintiff. Held, that the equitable estate passed by the devise to the plaintiff, and the full relief was granted.

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sonal property; equitable liens; interests arising from equitable assignments; and contracts in equity.³ To these will be added an account of the equitable jurisdiction over persons *non sui juris*.

§ 975, 3 "Trusts" and "mortgages" are subjects of such vast extent, embracing such a multitude of details, and each requiring volumes for their adequate treatment, that I shall endeavor to present only their general and fundamental principles and doctrines; the attempt to do anything more within the limits of this treatise would be both unnecessary and unavailing.

CHAPTER I. TRUSTS.

SECTION I.

ORIGIN OF USES AND TRUSTS.

ANALYSIS.

- § 976. The testament in the Roman law.
- § 977. Fidei commissa in the Roman law.
- § 978. Origin of uses.
- § 979. The use at law.
- § 980. The use in equity.
- § 981. Resulting uses; equitable theory of consideration.
- § 982. Double nature of property in land the use and the seisin.
- § 983. The "statute of uses."
- § 984. Kinds of uses not embraced within the statute.
- § 985. A use upon a use not executed by the statute.
- § 986. Trusts after the statute; effect of the statute in the American states.

§ 976. The Roman Law Testament.-To explain the nature and extent of the equitable jurisdiction and jurisprudence with respect to trusts, some historical account of trusts themselves, of their introduction into the law of England under the name of "uses," and of the enormous changes which they made in the primitive conceptions of property in land, is necessary. The *elementary* notion of trusts, like so many other doctrines of equity, was borrowed from the Roman law. The Roman testament was quite unlike the last will of our own law. Its essential feature consisted in the naming or appointing some person or persons as heir, upon whom the entire inheritance of the testator devolved. This inheritance included not only the property of the deceased, but also his liabilities. The heir thus became the "universal successor" to the testator, acquiring title to all his assets, and becoming liable for all his debts. The fundamental conception was, that the legal condition of the deceased, consisting both of rights and liabilities, was prolonged and imposed upon the heir; that death made no real break in the continuity of the testator's legal personality. Partly from rules of the ancient law, and partly from prohibitory statutes, the Roman citizen was much restricted with respect to the persons whom he might appoint as his testamentary heir. He could not give his inheritance to an alien or *peregrinus* (i. e., one not strictly a citizen), nor to a person prescribed, nor to a posthumous child not belonging to his own family, nor, with certain exceptions, to a woman.¹ To evade these restrictions, the method was contrived, during the latter period of the republic, of appointing a qualified person as heir, upon whom the inheritance would devolve according to legal rules, and of accompanying the appointment by a direction or request that this heir would, as soon as he obtained the inheritance, transfer it to another specified person who was the real object of the testator's bounty, and who, although prohibited from being made heir, was not prohibited from receiving a transfer of property from a living person by way of gift. At first, the fulfillment of the testator's direction was left wholly to the heir's sense of honor, but in process of time the claim of the beneficiary was recognized and enforced by a magistrate.²

§ 976, 1 Concerning the Roman testament, see Just. Inst., b. 2, tit. 10, secs. 1-14; tit. 13, secs. 1-7; tit. 14, secs. 1-6; Sandars's Trans., pp. 245-280.

§ 976, 2 Just. Inst., b. 2, tit. 23, sec. 1; Sandars's Trans., pp. 337, 338; Gaius's Inst., b. 2, secs. 246-259. Justinian's Institutes thus describe the progress of the beneficiary's right: "At first, *fidei-commissa* were of little force; for no one could be compelled against his will to perform what he was only requested to do. When testators were desirous of giving an inheritance or legacy to persons to whom they could not directly give either, they then intrusted them to the good faith of some person capable of taking by testaments; and *fidei-commissa* were so called hecause their performance could not be enforced hy law, but depended solely upon the good faith of the person to whom they were intrusted. Afterwards the Emperor Augustus, having been frequently moved by consideration for certain persons, or on account of some striking instance of perfidy, commanded the

§ 977. Fidei-commissa.—The inheritance thus given to the appointed heir, in trust for another person, was termed a fidei-commissum, the heir or trustee the fiduciarius, and the beneficiary the *fidei-commissarius.*¹ As the heir trustee, although he might surrender the whole estate to the beneficiary, would still remain legally liable for all the debts of the deceased, since a transfer of the inheritance inter vivos would not transfer the liabilities, he was accustomed to take from the beneficiary a contract of indemnity. To obviate the necessity of such a contract, "during the reign of Nero (A. D. 62) a statute known as the senatus consultum Trebellianum provided that all actions which might by law be brought by or against the heir [trustee] should be permitted for or against the beneficiary. After this the prætor began to give equitable actions for or against the beneficiary as if he were the heir."² By this legislation, the equitable estate of the beneficiary was fully established and protected.³ Although it is plain that the conception of a "use" was borrowed from this *fidei-commissum* of the Roman law, and that the English chancellor followed in the footsteps of the Roman magistrate, yet beyond this mere elementary notion or suggestion there is little resem-

consuls to interpose their authority. Their intervention being favored as just by public opinion, it gradually assumed the character of a regular jurisdiction, and *fidei-commissa* grew into such favor that soon a special prætor was appointed to adjudicate in these cases." The proceedings before this prætor to enforce the trust did not belong to his "ordinary" jurisdiction, and were not conducted by means of *formulæ*, but fell under his "extraordinary" (i. e., equity) jurisdiction, and were decided by the magistrate himself, without the aid of any *judex or arbiter*: See *ante*, vol. 1, Introductory Chapter, §§ 4, 6.

§ 977, 1 The English word "fiduciary" should therefore always designate the trustee; to apply it to the heneficiary, as has been done by some writers, is clearly improper. The Latin fidei-commissarius cannot be easily anglicized.

§ 977, ² Just. Inst., b. 2, tit. 23, sec. 4.

§ 977, 3 Subsequent statutes were passed limiting the power of testators, with respect to the persons to whom as beneficiaries *fidei-commissa* might he given, and providing that a fourth part of the inheritance might blance between the two species of ownership. Their essential differences are as marked as their superficial similarity; and it is a grave error to represent the entire equity jurisprudence concerning uses and trusts as derived from the Roman law.⁴

§ 978. Origin of Uses.—Uses, in the ordinary meaning of the term, as designating those which are passive, seem to have been invented during the latter part of the reign of Edward III.¹ Like the Roman *fidei-commissa*, they were designed to evade the law; but, unlike them, they were resorted to at first for mere purposes of fraud,—by the clergy to defraud the statutes of mortmain, and by the laity to defraud creditors or feudal superiors. Being free from many heavy feudal burdens, uses grew rapidly into favor, and it is said that during the reign of Henry V. the greater part of the land in England was held in this manner.² At

be retained by the heir: Just. Inst., b. 2, tit. 24. The law also permitted a testator to give any particular thing, as a slave, a piece of land, etc., as a *fidei-commissum*. Justinian added stringent provisions for enforcing secret trusts by means of an oath administered to the heir: Just. Inst., b. 2, tit. 23, sec. 12. This, it will be seen, resembles the "discovery" of the English chancery procedure.

§ 977, 4 In the ancient use and modern trust there are of necessity two distinct estates, the legal and the equitable, vested in different persons, and these *must* continue as long as the trust relation exists. In the Roman law there was no such division of ownership, no double simultaneous estates. Until he had transferred the inheritance, the heir possessed the only estate, and the beneficiary had only a right of action. After the inheritance was transferred, the beneficiary obtained, in turn, the whole and only estate in the portion thus transferred, while the heir, under the Trebillianian act at least, was left without either interest or liability.

§ 978, 11 Spence's Eq. Jur. 439-442.

§ 978, ² 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 439-442, 442-444. There were two forms of conveyance to use, which should be carefully distinguished. By the one form land was conveyed upon a trust that the feoffee was to exercise acts of dominion over it for the benefit of the feoffor or of a third person, as, for example, receiving the rents and profits and paying the feoffor's debts therewith. Such conveyances, made upon an *active* trust, had probably been known from a very early day. They were not regarded as objectionable, they were not referred to when the phrase "conveyance to use"

the very outset these conveyances to use were made for the benefit of third persons. This mode having been established, conveyances were made for the benefit of the original owner, the feoffor. Thus A, being seised in fee, would convey the land by a legal feoffment to B to the use of himself, A. In this manner the owner in fee would convert his legal estate, which was subject to all the feudal burdens and common-law liabilities, into an equitable estate unknown to the common law, which was freed from these burdens and restrictions, which could be devised by will and aliened without livery of seisin, and which, under the doctrines subsequently established by the court of chancery, gave him all the dominion, possession, rights, and powers belonging to the legal estate.³

§ 979. The Use at Law.—For a while the cestui que use had no means of redress in any court. The law courts, as a necessary consequence of common-law doctrines, recognized no other estate than the legal one vested in the feoffee. If the cestui que use had any legal right at all, it was neither a jus ad rem nor a jus in re, and so there was no common-law form of real action by which he could recover possession of or enforce any claim upon the land itself. His only possible remedy would be an action for damages, upon contract express or implied, against the feoffee for the latter's violation of the trust.¹ Even this

was ordinarily employed, and they were not included in the provisions of the statute of uses. By the second form, a conveyance was made to a feoffee to the use of some religious corporation or of some private person, with no expectation that the feoffee was to exercise any dominion over the land, but with the assumption that the *cestui que use* was to have and enjoy all the rights and privileges of an owner, except that of holding the naked legal title, and that, to complete this arrangement, the feoffee was to convey the legal title whenever and to whomsoever the *cestui que use* should direct. It is this latter form of *passive* use which grew to be so important, and which is generally referred to under the designation of a "use" or "conveyance to use," and against which the statute of uses was directed.

§ 978, 31 Spence's Eq. Jur. 439-444, 447-449.

§ 979, 1 All the common-law actions for the recovery of land, or for the maintenance of any interest therein, were based upon the assumption

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action was not generally maintainable upon common-law principles, since there was no *privity* between the feoffee and the *cestui que use* when the latter was a third person; whatever promise the feoffee had made, whatever legal obligation he had incurred, was to the feoffor, and not to the *cestui que use*.² It was formally decided in the fourth year of Edward IV. that the common-law courts had no jurisdiction over the use.³

§ 980. The Use in Equity.—There being no commonlaw actions to which resort could be had, the rights of the *cestui que use* were for a considerable time purely moral, and were protected only through the authority of the clergy, acting as confessors, upon the consciences of those who held the legal title of land for the use of others.¹ No traces of applications to the court of chancery have been found in the early records prior to Henry V., but during his reign the court began to entertain such suits and to decree relief. In the reigns of Henry VI. and of Edward IV. the chancery jurisdiction was fully established, and was also recognized

that the plaintiff either had some *property* absolute or qualified in the land $(jus \ ad \ rem)$, or that he had a right to some particular use of land belonging to another,—an easement or servitude $(jus \ in \ re)$. As the interest of the *cestui que use* was neither of these, he could enforce it by none of the common-law *real* actions, and was therefore shut up to actions *ex contractu* for damages; but, as I show, even such a personal action could only be maintained by him under one special state of facts.

§ 979, 2 There are in the early records some traces of such actions brought in the common-law courts; but I presume it will be found that they are all confined to cases where the use was declared for the benefit of the *feoffor* himself, where A conveyed to B to the use of A. In such a case alone would there be any *legal* liability of the feoffee to the *cestui que use*. Whenever A, upon a consideration moving from B, promises B to do something for the benefit of C, the English courts have uniformly maintained the rule that C can have no action on the contract against A, because there is no privity between them. The modern rule has been settled otherwise in most of the American states.

§ 979, 31 Spence's Eq. Jur. 445, 446.

§ 980, 1 This authority would be especially exerted where lands were conveyed to the use of religious corporations or persons.

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by the courts of law. In other words, the law courts, while refusing themselves to protect the estates of cestui que usent, admitted the fact that such estates existed and were protected by the court of chancery.² The passive or permanent use as established in equity is thus described by Bacon when it is created in favor of the feoffor himself. and the description would apply to the case where it is created for the benefit of a third person by a slight change of language. He says: "The use consisted of three parts: 1. That the feoffee (trustee) would suffer the feoffor (cestui que use) to receive the profits; 2. That the feoffee, upon request of the feoffor (cestui que use), would execute (i. e., convey) the estates to the feoffor (cestui que use), or his heirs, or to any other by his directions; 3. That if the feoffee were disseised, and so the feoffor (cestui que use) disturbed, the feoffee would re-enter or bring an action to recover the possession."³

Resulting Uses-Equitable Theory of Considera-§ 981. tion.-In addition to these express uses created by the intentional words of parties, courts of equity soon invented another class, consisting of several different species, but all depending upon the same fundamental principle, and to which the names "implied," "resulting," and "constructive" have been given. The underlying principle upon which all these species were based is the equitable doctrine concerning consideration. This theory of consideration, adopted and promulgated by the chancellors, is one of the most just, most productive, and most beneficial conceptions of equity jurisprudence. It accomplished more, perhaps, than any other single doctrine in overthrowing the arbitrary dogmas of the common law concerning real property, and in building up the distinctive system of equitable estates and ownership. It is certainly very remark-

^{§ 980, 2 1} Spence's Eq. Jur. 445, 446. For an explanation of the theory upon which the early chancellors proceeded in awarding relief, see ante, vol. 1, §§ 428-431.

^{§ 980, &}lt;sup>3</sup> Bacon's Reading on Uses, 9.

able that the early chancellors, in the very infancy of equity jurisprudence, should formulate a principle so admirably comprehensive and wise, that it has been sufficient, in its subsequent development, to meet all the wants of an advancing civilization, and all the requirements of modern society. The common-law notions of title and ownership rested mainly upon the observance of external forms. Equity first introduced the principle that in all the transactions of men concerning land,—their transfers and bargains, the consideration is the essential fact which determines the real beneficial ownership, wherever the legal title may be vested. The consideration draws to it the equitable right of property; the person from whom the consideration actually comes, under whatever form or appearance, is the true and beneficial owner. This grand principle extends not only to dealings which are intentional and rightful, but to those which are fraudulent, or in any manner wrongful or unconscientious.^a When once introduced, it was easily carried through all those branches of equity jurisprudence which relate to property, real or personal, and it underlies all the modern doctrines of resulting and constructive trusts, and all the remedies by which the beneficial owner is enabled to follow his equitable property in the hands of third persons. In its origin, the principle was applied to valuable or pecuniary consideration, but it was soon extended, with all of its legitimate results, to the good consideration of blood or love and affection between near relatives of the same family.¹ The theory as to consideration

§ 981, 1 It thus appears that the special rules which regulate resulting trusts from the payment of the purchase price between parent and child, etc., are not, as they have been regarded by some writers, exceptions to the general doctrine; they are the necessary consequences of the one universal principle which regards valuable consideration between strangers, and good consideration between members of the same family, as the sources of equitable rights of ownership. A beautiful consistency runs through all the rules of equity concerning resulting trusts.

§ 981, (a) Text quoted in Watson v. Harris, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 263, 130 S. W. 237.

operated in the development of uses in the following manner: Prior to the statute of uses in the reign of Henry VIII., a gift of land to a person and his heirs accompanied by livery of seisin-that is, a transfer by feoffment-was effectual in *law* to convey the entire estate without any consideration. The law did not require a consideration, and moreover, if a deed or charter of feoffment was delivered, its seal raised a conclusive presumption of a consideration.² Equity broke through this doctrine by means of its principle concerning consideration. It established the rule that if a conveyance of the fee was made without any use being declared, and without any consideration, although the legal title passed to the feoffee, a use ipso facto arose and resulted in favor of the feoffor, so that, having parted with the legal estate, he remained clothed with all the equitable interests, rights, and authority which the court of chancery gave to the *cestui que use*; the equitable estate in fee vested in him.³ This rule, however, did not apply to conveyances between parent and child, and other near family relatives, since the "good" consideration of blood or marriage relationship operated between such persons, in the same manner as valuable consideration between strangers, to transfer the whole estate, legal and equitable, free from any resulting use.⁴ As a corollary to the foregoing rule, it was further settled that whenever an owner conveyed land to a feoffee upon some particular use declared in favor of a third person, so much of the use as had not been disposed of resulted back to himself. In other words, if the use declared in favor of the third person did not, for any reason, equal in extent and exhaust the legal estate given to or held by the feoffee, then a use for the residue or surplus of such estate resulted to the feoffor.⁵ Carrying out

§ 981, 21 Spence's Eq. Jur. 449, 450.

- § 981, 3 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 450, 453.
- § 981, 41 Spence's Eq. Jur. 450.

§ 981, 5 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 451-453. This particular rule applied to every condition of circumstances, both where the use in favor of the third

the same principle of consideration in cases of *purchase*, equity also established the doctrine, that where no declaration of use was made so as to control, a use arose in favor of the person from whom the consideration came, whatever position he might occupy with respect to the legal title. In pursuance of this doctrine, where a purchase was made by one person in the name of another, the party receiving the legal title held it for the use of the one who advanced or paid the price. Here, also, an apparent, but not a real, exception arose from the fact that good consideration of blood and marriage operated between near relatives in the same manner as a money consideration between strangers. In case of a purchase by a parent in the name of his child, no use was held to result for the benefit of the parent paying the price, but the purchase was presumptively regarded as an advancement.⁶ b As a second illustration of the same general doctrine, whenever an owner agreed for a valuable consideration to sell his estate, although there was no conveyance, and there were no words of inheritance in the contract, equity declared that a use was created in favor of the vendee, by means of the consideration, and that the vendor held the legal title as his trustee. The same rule was extended to cases between near relatives, where the consideration was that of marriage or blood. If a person, on consideration of marriage or blood, covenanted to settle an estate on an intended husband or wife, or on his children, or other nearest blood relatives, equity held that a use was thereby created in favor of the husband, wife, children, or relatives, and treated the covenantor as a trustee for their benefit.⁷ Finally, the principle of consideration was extended by analogy to cases of fraud, actual or con-

person *wholly* failed, for any reason, to be operative, and where it partially failed to exhaust the estate held by the feoffee.

§ 981, 61 Spence's Eq. Jur. 451-453.

§ 981, 71 Spence's Eq. Jur. 451-453.

§ 981, (b) Text cited, Herbert v. 946; Chandler v. Roe, 46 Okl. 349, Alvord, 75 N. J. Eq. 428, 72 Atl. 148 Pac. 1026. III-134 structive, accident, and mistake.⁸ This last application of the doctrine became, in time, the most efficient means in the hands of courts of equity for working substantial justice in disregard of legal forms. Whenever one person, through mistake or fraud, or in violation of fiduciary relations, obtained the legal title and apparent ownership of property which in justice and good conscience belonged to another, such property was immediately impressed with a use in favor of the latter equitable owner.⁹

§ 982. Double Nature of Property in Land-The Use and the Seisin.-From these doctrines concerning express uses, and especially concerning those implied from the acts or omissions of parties, it appears that equity at an early day introduced the notion of a use connected with and forming a part of every ownership of land. The very conception of property in land was thus changed from its primitive unity and simplicity, and it was made to involve, as an essential element, the notion of the use in connection with the mere legal proprietorship and seisin. According to this theory, every ownership-property itself-consisted of a legal title and of a use. These two might be combined and held by the same person, and their union would thus constitute the highest or ideal dominion; or they might be. and often were, separated, and held by different persons; but of the two the use was the more important, since it represented the real, substantial usufructuary proprietorship, while the other might be the naked legal estate, drawing after it or conferring no beneficial rights of enjoyment whatsoever. While the legal title and seisin always existed in some person, and remained subject to the common-law dogmas, the use, being a creature of equity, was entirely free from the feudal burdens, and from the restrictions growing out of the common-law theory as to seisin.¹ It

§ 981, 8 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 453, 454.

§ 981, 91 Spence's Eq. Jur. 453, 454.

§ 982, 1 For example, the use might be devised or aliened without livery of seisin; it might be cut up into different parts; it might be created or even lacked some other common-law incidents, like dower. It was descendible, like the legal estate; but this was substantially the only feature of uses in which the early chancellors applied the maxim, $\mathcal{E}quitas \ sequitur \ legem.^2$ In every other respect they disregarded the narrow dogmas of the common law, and seemed intent on building up a system of landed ownership which should, as far as practicable, satisfy the needs of commerce, and at the same time maintain the dignity of families and the supremacy of the aristocracy.³

§ 983. The Statute of Uses.^a—Several statutes were enacted, from time to time, designed to prevent some of the particular effects produced by uses, and especially the statutes of mortmain were extended so as to prohibit uses in favor of ecclesiastical corporations; but it was not until the reign of Henry VIII. that any legislative attempt was made to destroy them. That monarch became exceedingly displeased at his losses of revenue resulting from the practical abrogation of wardships and other feudal incidents, and determined to cut up the cause of the evil, as he regarded it, from the very roots. In the twenty-third year

conveyed so as to take effect upon future contingencies; it might be limited in fee after a prior limitation in fee. A use could be declared to commence *in futuro*; provision could be made for revoking uses declared in favor of certain persons or for certain objects, even though in fee, and for substituting others in their place; a use could be declared by a husband for the benefit of and given to his wife; and even could be created by an owner in his own favor, and so as to take effect in himself. While the use could thus be created and conveyed upon future and contingent limitations, in violation of the strict common-law rules respecting the creation of legal estates as contingent remainders, the *legal* title and seisin were conceived of as always vested in some person, ready at the proper time to be united with the use, and thus to produce in the holder of the two a perfected and complete ownership.

§ 982, ² See ante, vol. 1, §§ 425-427. § 982, ³ 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 454-456.

§ 983, (a) This section is cited in McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 Ill. 281, 86 N. E. 139.

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of his reign, he procured a bill to be introduced into Parliament which would have limited the power of conveying land to uses; it passed the House of Lords, but was rejected by the Commons.¹ In the twenty-seventh year of his reign (A. D. 1535) he introduced a second bill, which he doubtless supposed would be effectual. It was drawn up with great care by some of the most distinguished lawyers of the time. The preamble with which it opens describes the evil nature and effects of uses, from the monarch's point of view, in the most sweeping and condemnatory manner.²

§ 983, 11 Spence's Eq. Jur. 461, 462-465.

§ 983, ² The preamble represents uses as an unmitigated evil, as a constant source of fraud and covin; it recites the effects which they produce in abolishing the feudal incidents of property, and stigmatizes them as crying grievances; it laments "the trouble and unquietness and utter subversion of the ancient laws of the realm" resulting from "the imaginations and subtle inventions and practices" which were known as uses and confidences.

I have said in the text, that no sufficient reason for the halting nature of the enacting clause as compared with the fierce assaults of this preamble has ever been given by the text-writers. It is certainly impossible that the learned lawyers who drew up the statute did not or could not foresee the construction which would be put upon it by the courts; they knew, of course, the cases which were omitted from its operation, and they must have anticipated the contrivance by which the court of chancery so soon evaded the only restrictive provision which they introduced. I venture to suggest, as a solution of the difficulty, and as an explanation of the whole statute, that while the preamble expressed the feelings and wishes of the king, the whole act was intentionally and most carefully drawn, so as to blind him, and lead him to suppose that his old feudal privileges would be restored, but at the same time to accomplish no real change in a system of land ownership which had become firmly established, and was sustained by an overwhelming preponderance of public opinion throughout the realm. The history of the time shows that Parliament seldom, if ever, dared openly to resist and defeat the clearly expressed will of Henry VIII. The quibble by which the court of chancery, taking advantage of the narrowness of the common-law tribunals, evaded the intent of the statute as expressed in its preamble, and restored, or rather preserved, the whole system of equitable trust estates, substantially as they existed before the act, would never have been endured unless the system itself had been fully approved by the general opinion of the nation and by the Parliament itself. This From the vigorous denunciations of the preamble, we should naturally suppose that the enacting part would have been equally violent and sweeping; that, like statutes of many American states, it would, in express terms, have abolished all uses or confidences, and have prohibited the conveyance of land upon trust or to the use of any one, or in any other manner than by the common-law mode of feoffment and livery of seisin. For some reason, which has never been explained by the legal writers, the statute attempted no such thing. It did not forbid conveyances to uses, but, on the contrary, assumed that they would continue as before. The only change or relief which it proposed was a contrivance "to turn the equitable estates of the cestuis que usent into legal estates." This it accomplished by a provision that in certain classes of conveyances to use, a legal estate of the same kind and extent as the use should by virtue of the statute immediately pass to and vest in the *cestui que use*, so that he would at once acquire the legal title and ownership of the same degree. in place of the mere equitable title and ownership which he would formerly have held under the name of "the use." And. what is still more strange, the operation of this provision was confined to cases where the land was so conveyed or held that the feoffee or other holder of the legal estate was seised of it to the use of another,-that is, where the feoffee or other holder of the legal estate had the land in fee, feetail, or for life; all other possible cases were left untouched by an enactment which promised so much in its preamble.³

is evident from the fact that Parliament did not in the least interfere to check the legislative work of chancery by which the statute was virtually avoided. All these facts prove most conclusively that the clerical chancellors had huilt up an harmonious and consistent system of equitable land ownership, founded upon general and just principles, which was greatly preferred by the nation itself to the harsh and narrow doctrines of the common law. The only important doctrine of the common law which the chancellors shrank from attacking was that concerning descent and inheritance.

§ 983, 3 The following is the operative clause, unnecessary repetitions only omitted: Be it enacted, "where any person or persons stand or be § 984. Uses not Embraced Within the Statute.^a—Notwithstanding this statute, the equitable estates of the same nature as uses continued under the name of trusts. In the first place, many species of existing uses were wholly untouched by the statute. The general doctrine was established, that when any control or discretion is given to the feoffee or trustee in the application of the rents and profits, or where he is required to do any specific acts in regard to the land, and in all similar instances of *express active* trust, the legal estate remains in the feoffee or trustee to enable him to perform the trust reposed.¹ b All such cases, though perhaps within the letter, were held not to be within the

seised of any lands, tenements, or other hereditaments, to the use, confidence, or trust of any other person or persons, by reason of any bargain, sale, feoffment, etc., ... that in every such case all such person or persons that have ... any such use, confidence, or trust in feesimple, fee-tail, for life, or for years, or otherwise, ... shall from henceforth stand and be seised and adjudged in lawful seisin, estate, and possession of and in the same lands, tenements, and hereditaments ... of and in such like estates, as they had or shall have in use, trust, or confidence of or in the same; and the estate that was in such person or persons that were or shall be seised of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments to the use or trust of any such person or persons shall be from henceforth adjudged to be in him or them that have, or hereafter shall have, such use or trust, after such quality, manner, etc., as they had before in or to the use or trust that was in them."

§ 984, 1 As examples where the trustee is directed or empowered to pay annuities, or to make repairs, or to maintain the *cestui que use*; or the trust is to reconvey the land to another, or to sell it for the purpose of raising a fund to pay debts or legacies, and the like: Wright v. Pearson, 1 Eden, 119, 125, per Lord Northington; Nevil v. Saunders, 1 Vern. 415; Pybus v. Smith, 3 Brown Ch. 340; Shapland v. Smith, 1 Brown Ch. 75; Harton v. Harton, 7 Term Rep. 652, 654; Silvester v. Wilson, 2 Term Rep. 444, 450.

§ 984, (a) This section is cited in Laughlin v. Page, 108 Me. 307, 80 Atl. 753.

§ 984, (b) And to the same effect are the American decisions: McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 Ill. 281, 86 N. E. 139 (trust to convey); Webb v. Hayden, 166 Mo. 39, 65 S. W. 760; People's Loan & Ex. Bk. v. Garlington, 54 S. C. 413, 71 Am. St. Rep. 800, 32 S. E. 513; Ure v. Ure, 185 Ill. 216, 56 N. E. 1087; but see Appeal of Clark, 70 Conn. 195, 39 Atl. 155.

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design and scope of the statute. Secondly, where only a term of years is conveyed, or assigned to, or is held by one person to the use of another, it was decided that the statute does not operate, but that the legal and equitable estates remain distinct; since the language is, "where any person is *seised* to the use of," and the courts gave the most technical and narrow interpretation to the word "seised."² Thirdly, the statute did not purport to interfere with uses or trusts of things in action, or in other kinds of personal property.³ Finally, the jurisdiction of chancery over the various uses which are created by implication or operation of law-the resulting and constructive uses-was held to be unaffected by the statute.⁴ The operation of the statute was thus confined to one class of uses,-passive uses in land, where the feoffee or holder of the legal title was seised of the land to the use of another,---that is, held an estate in fee, fee-tail, or for life; but the use itself might be for a term of years, or for any higher interest.

§ 985. A Use upon a Use not Executed by the Statute.^a Even the operation of the statute in this single class of express passive uses was soon defeated by the combined action of the law and equity courts. If an estate was given to A in fee, to the use of B in fee, then by the express command of the statute the legal estate passed through A as a mere conduit, and became vested in the *cestui que use*, B. The statute said nothing, in terms, of a conveyance in fee to A, to the use of B in fee, to the use of or in trust for C

§ 984, 2 Bacon's Reading on Uses, 42; Dyer, 369 a. This must not be confounded with the case where the holder of the legal estate is seised, but the use declared thereon in favor of some person is only for a term of years; e. g., A, being owner in fee, "bargains and sells" to B, a term of years.

§ 984, 3 Bacon's Reading on Uses, 43.

§ 984, 4 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 466, 467, 493-512; Sugden's Gilbert on Uses, introd., pp. lx., lxi., 75, note 5; Rigden v. Vallier, 2 Ves. Sr. 252, 257, per Lord Hardwicke.

§ 985, (a) Cited in Haley v. Palmer, 107 Me. 311, 78 Atl. 368.

Such a form of conveyance, or one identified with in fee. it in legal import, having arisen, the courts of law, either from a narrowness of construction most astonishing, or, which is probably the true explanation, from a deliberate design of interpreting the statute so as to give an opportunity for its complete evasion, held that there could be no use executed upon a use,¹ but that when the legal estate was carried, by virtue of the statute, to the first cestui que use, it must there remain vested in him. By virtue of this ruling, the legal estate in the case supposed passed through A and became vested in B, while C, who was intended by the conveyance to be the final and actual beneficiary, took nothing.² Here was an opportunity which the court of chancery could not overlook. It seized hold of the construction thus given by the law courts, and declared that, although the legal title was vested in B by virtue of the statute, he could not, in good conscience, hold it for his own benefit, but he must hold it for the benefit of and in trust for C, who thereby obtained an equitable estate through the conveyance, which the court of chancery would maintain and protect.^{3 b} This doctrine of chancery was acquiesced in at once, and has remained unquestioned by the courts to the present day. The practical result was, that by making a slight alteration in the formal language of conveyances,

§ 985, 1 It may be proper to remark that the word "executed," in these old decisions, and as a technical term in English conveyancing, simply designates the passing of the legal estate through the first holder (the trustee), and vesting it in the person described as the *cestui que use*, performed by operation of the statute. In this sense of the word, the use is "executed" when the legal estate is vested in the *cestui que use*.

§ 985, ² See Tyrrel's Case, Dyer, 155 a; 1 Coke, 136 b, 137; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 581, 590, 592, per Lord Hardwicke; Sanders on Uses, 92, 93.

§ 985, ³ Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 581, 590, 591, per Lord Hardwicke; Willet v. Sanford, 1 Ves. Sr. 186, per Lord Hardwicke.

§ 985, (b) See In re Brooke, the ancient use and the modern [1894] 1 Ch. 43, for a late case com- trust. menting on the difference between so that an estate should be conveyed to or held by one person, to the use of a second, to the use of or in trust for a third, this third person would acquire an equitable estate distinct from the legal estate, vested by operation of the statute in the second party; and the whole system of express passive uses was thus restored, or revived to the same extent as before the passage of the act.⁴

§ 985, ⁴ As a matter of fact, in creating these express passive uses by conveyances inter vivos, the old form of feoffment to A, to the use of B, to the use of C, was seldom, if ever, employed after the "statute of uses," since it still required livery of seisin to be made to the feoffee, A. Other forms of conveyance became universal, in which the use upon a use was created by means of the equitable principle concerning the use arising and following the consideration. In family settlements, where the good consideration of blood or affection is sufficient, if A, the owner of land, covenanted to stand seised of it for his son B, then a use thereby arose in favor of B, and the statute executed this use by passing the legal estate directly to B, who thereby became seised in law. If, however, A wished to create a passive trust for his son B, he covenanted to stand seised of the land for C to the use of or in trust for his son B, and the legal estate was thereby vested by the statute in C, but was held by him simply as a trustee for the intended beneficiary, B. This came to be the universal form of deed for the purpose of creating passive trusts in family or marriage settlements. Wherever the conveyance was hetween strangers, so that a pecuniary consideration was requisite, another form of deed was adopted. As has already been stated, the doctrine had long been settled that if A, the owner of land, agreed to sell it to B for a valuable consideration, a use was raised by the consideration in B's favor. Carrying out this doctrine, if a deed of conveyance from A, the owner, to B recited or admitted that a consideration had been received, this recital was regarded as evidence of the fact sufficient to raise a use in B's favor. Finally, it was settled that if in a deed of conveyance the words "bargain and sell" were employed as operative words of transfer, they conclusively imported a pecuniary consideration, and a use arose therefrom in favor of the grantee. A deed, therefore, from A, by which he bargained and sold land to B, created the use in B's favor, which the statute executed by transferring the legal estate. If, bowever, A designed to create a passive trust for B as the beneficiary, his deed would be modified in form. so as to be a bargain and sale of the land to C to the use of or in trust for B. By operation of the statute the legal estate would thereby be vested in C. but would be held by him as a trustee for B. the intended beneficiary. This became the common form of deeds creating express pas§ 986. Trusts After the Statute.—Although the beneficial or equitable interests which had existed under the denomination of "uses" prior to the statute were thus kept in existence, and continued to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of chancery, it was found convenient to give them a new name. The "use" had, by virtue of the statute, passed within the cognizance of the law courts, and thenceforth it played a most important part in the English theory and practice of conveyancing; and, as such, it does not fall within the scope of a treatise upon equity jurisprudence.¹

sive trusts *inter vivos*, where the parties were not near family relatives. Wherever an estate was given by will, and the testator wished to create a passive trust which should be valid notwithstanding the statute, express words were necessary declaring or creating in some manner one use upon another.

§ 986, 1 The foregoing account of the text shows the origin of trusts as they exist in England under the statute of uses, and its judicial interpretation. The question then arises, How far does the statute exist in this country, and affect the creation of trusts? Since the statute never applied to personal property, and under the judicial construction never embraced active uses and trusts, it follows that the question suggestedpractically means, how far do express passive trusts in lands exist in the states of this country? and how far does their creation depend upon the statute of uses? As such express passive trusts are very rare indeed in the United States, and are opposed to our prevailing notions of landed property and modes of dealing with it, this question is plainly more theoretical than practical. Still, the operation of the statute has sometimes been discussed by American courts, and in one state in particular it has been a frequent subject for judicial inquiry. In several of the states, as will more fully appear in a subsequent paragraph, all express passive trusts in land, and all express active trusts, with the exception of certain specified species, have been completely abrogated and abolished. The statute of uses clearly has no operation in those states, since it has been superseded by more destructive legislation. In some of them certainly, and doubtless in all, an attempt to create a passive trust-a conveyance or devise to A in trust for B-would vest the whole estate directly in the beneficiary, B; while an attempt to create an active trust not authorized by the statute would simply be void, except so far as it might operate as a valid "power in trust": See post, § 1002. In most of the remaining states, as Mr. Perry shows in his admirable treatise, the statute of uses has either been substantially re-enacted, or adopted and held to be in force as a part of the English legislation regarded as operative and binding in

The beneficial interests which equity recognized and protected—both those kinds which were held not to have been

this country. He gives an abstract of the statutes in various states. Vermont, Ohio, Tennessee, and perhaps a few others, seem to be either wholly or partially excepted from this statement: See Perry on Trusts, sec. 299, and note, containing abstract of statutes; Gorham v. Daniels, 23 Vt. 600; Helfenstine v. Garrard, 7 Ohio, 274; Hutchins v. Heywood, 50 N. H. 491; French v. French, 3 N. H. 234; New Parish v. Odiorne, 1 N. H. 232, 236;ª Witham v. Brooner, 63 Ill. 344.^b In this class of states, therefore, there can be no doubt that a conveyance of land to A, for the use of or in trust for B, would operate to transfer the legal estate, and vest it directly in B. For example, it is held, in Georgia, since a statute of 1866 concerning married women's separate estate, that a conveyance to a trustee for her in fee, with no remainder over, and no active duties prescribed for the trustee to perform, passes the legal title to ber immediately; the trust is thus at once executed: Sutton v. Aiken, 62 Ga. 733. In Alabama it is held that under the statute of uses (27 Henry VIII.), which forms a part of the common law of the state, the extent of the trustee's legal estate is to be determined, not by words of inheritance, but by the whole object and extent of the trust upon which the land is conveyed; and when the objects of the trust are fully accomplished, the estate of the trustee ceases, and the whole title, legal and equitable, thereupon vests by operation of law in the beneficiary: Schaffer v. Lavretta, 57 Ala. 14; Tindal v. Drake, 51 Ala. 574; see Booker v. Carlile, 14 Bush, 154. In states where the statute 27 Henry VIII. has not been re-enacted, or treated as actually in force, the same result is reached; mere passive uses are executed by virtue of the common law prevailing in those commonwealths, since the notion of the actual beneficial ownership kept permanently separated from the dry legal estate is repugnant to American modes of dealing with real property: See Sherman v. Dodge, 28 Vt. 26, 31; Gorham v. Daniels, 23 Vt. 600; Bryan v. Bradley, 16 Conn. 474, 483; McNab v. Young, 81 Ill.

§ 986, (a) See, also, Fellows v. Ripley, 69 N. H. 410, 45 Atl. 138.

§ 986, (b) But see Silverman v. Kirstufek, 162 III. 222, 44 N. E. 430, to the effect that a partnership is not a person within the meaning of the statute. See, also, Speed v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 86 Fed. 325; Holmes v. Pickett, 51 S. C. 271, 29 S. E. 82; Simms v. Buist, 52 S. C. 554, 30 S. E. 400; Hughes v. Farmer's Sav. Bldg., etc., Ass'n, (Tenn.) 46 S. W. 362; Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1147, 61 S. E. 410 (English statute of uses not in force in Virginia or West Virginia; statute of uses of the latter state executes only the uses mentioned therein). See, further, note, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1147, classifying cases under the statute of uses by states. The statute is in force in Colorado: Teller v Hill, (Colo. App.) 72 Pac. 811; in Maryland: Graham v. Whitridge, (Md.) 58 Atl. 36. affected at all by the statute, and those which were rescued from its operation by the construction described in the last

11, 14; Guest v. Farley, 19 Mo. 147, 149; Coughlin v. Seago, 53 Ga. 250; Adams v. Guerard, 29 Ga. 651, 76 Am. Dec. 624; Bowman v. Long, 26 Ga. 142, 147; Booker v. Carlile, 14 Bush, 154.^c Can an express passive trust in land be created in the American states? In several of the states, as has already been shown, it would be impossible, being expressly prohibited by statute. In other states, where the statute 27 Henry VIII. prevails, would the interpretation first given in Tyrrell's Case, that a use upon a use is not executed, be followed? By some American courts the rule of Tyrrell's Case has been disapproved: See Thatcher v. Omans, 3 Pick. 521, 528; by other courts it has been approved. It has been held that where land was conveyed by a deed of bargain and sale to the use of a third person, the use was not executed, and so remained valid as a trust: See Guest v. Farley, 19 Mo. 147; Jackson v. Cary, 16 Johns. 302; Jackson v. Myers, 3 Johns. 388, 396, 3 Am. Dec. 504; Price v. Sisson, 13 N. J. Eq. 168, 173; Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 268, 282.d I would remark, that to give this effect to deeds in which the operative words are "bargain and sale," in my opinion, violates the theory of conveyancing and of the effect and operation of deeds as established by modern statutes in a majority of the states. By modern statutes, in many if not most of the states. deeds of land operate as grants to convey the entire legal estate and seisin, by force of their words of transfer, and sometimes their being recorded: and it is a misapprehension, in the face of such legislation, to regard any deeds in these states as transferring the legal estate by virtue of the

§ 986, (c) Passive Trusts in Land Executed .--- See Hinton v. Farmer, 148 Ala. 211, 122 Am. St. Rep. 63, 42 South. 563; Prince v. Prince, 162 Ala. 114, 49 South. 873; Trustees etc. v. Laird, 10 Del. Ch. 118, 85 Atl. 1082; Drake v. Steele, 242 Ill. 301, 89 N. E. 1018; Smith v. Smith, 254 Ill. 488, 98 N. E. 950; Commonwealth v. Louisville Public Library, 151 Ky. 420, 152 S. W. 262 (no escheat because trustee's charter forfeited, beneficiary may demand conveyance); Lima v. Cook, 197 Mass. 11, 83 N. E. 12; Rothschild v. Dickinson, 169 Mich. 200, 134 N. W. 1035; Jones v. Jones, 223 Mo. 424, 123 S. W. 29 (criticised in note, 25 L. B. A. (N. S.) 424); Blumenthal

v. Blumenthal, 251 Mo. 693, 158 S. W. 648 (title "passes like water through sieve"); Jacoby v. Jacoby, 188 N. Y. 124, 80 N. E. 676; McAfee v. Green, 143 N. C. 411, 55 S. E. 828 (where land is left to one with remainder over, statute of uses will not execute the use); Darling v. Witherbee, 36 R. I. 459, 90 Atl. 751; Breeden v. Moore, 82 S. C. 534, 64 S. E. 604 (though trust was to permit beneficiary to use and occupy land); Schumacher v. Draeger, 137 Wis. 618, 119 N. W. 305.

See, also, post, § 988, notes.

§ 986, (d) See, also, Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1147, 61 S. E. 410. paragraph—were styled trusts; the person holding the legal title was termed the trustee; while the holder of the

statute of uses. To say, therefore, in most of our states, that a deed of bargain and sale raises a use which the statute of uses executes, and that where a use or trust is expressly limited by a deed of bargain and sale, it is not executed by the statute, are, as it seems to me, wholly inconsistent with the simplicity of the law as now established by statute throughout the larger part of the United States. This view is not, however, at all antagonistic to the conclusion that an owner may, by deed or by will, give land in express terms to A, to the use of B, to the use of C, and that such a form of limitation would create a valid *passive* trust in C's favor. In some states, where there is no hostile legislation, this result may still be possible, although the question is almost entirely speculative and theoretical.

With regard to the cases held not to be within the force and operation of the statute 27 Henry VIII., the American law is generally in harmony with that settled by the English courts. Trusts of personal property were not embraced within the statute, and such trusts are generally valid in this country, as in England, except so far as they have been regulated or restricted by statutes of various states: See Perry on Trusts, sec. 303; Denton v. Denton, 17 Md. 403.^e Express active trusts in land were also untouched by the statute, and they are generally valid in the United States as in England, with special statutory restriction, however, in several of the states: See Perry on Trusts, sec. 306; Morton v. Barrett, 22 Me. 257, 261; 39 Am. Dec. 575; New Parish v. Odiorne, 1 N. H. 232; Chapin v. Univ. Soc., 8 Gray, 580; Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. 119, 168.^e

To this last statement concerning active trusts there is one marked exception. A doctrine has been settled by the courts of Pennsylvania very different in some respects from that prevailing in other states and in Eng-

§ 986, (e) Passive Trusts of Personal Property, Valid.—See Smith v. Smith, 254 Ill. 488, 98 N. E. 950; Owens v. Crow, 62 Md. 491; In re Hagerstown Trust Co., 119 Md. 224, 86 Atl. 982; In re Gourley's Estate, 238 Pa. 62, 85 Atl. 999; Van Zandt v. Garretson, 21 R. I. 352, 43 Atl. 633.

§ 986, (1) Active Trusts in Land. See Silverman v. Kirstufek, 162 Ill. 222, 44 N. E. 430; Lord v. Comstock, 240 Ill. 492, 88 N. E. 1012 (trust to convey after event); Leary v. Kerber, 255 Ill. 433, 99 N. E. 662 (to receive and pay income); Laughlin v. Page, 108 Me. 307, 80 Atl. 753; Dakin v. Savage, 172 Mass. 23, 51 N. E. 186; Lummus v. Davidson, 160 N. C. 484, 76 S. E. 474; Colonial Trust Co. v. Central Trust Co., 243 Pa. 268, 90 Atl. 189 (trust to convey); Koehne v. Beattie, 36 R. I. 316, 90 Atl. 211 (to hold for life of one, permitting him to take rents and profits, on his death to convey to his children); Pope v. Patterson, 78 S. C. 334, 58 S. E. 945.

For further cases, see post, § 991, notes.

beneficial or equitable estate was ordinarily known as the

land, and unless this fact is carefully observed, the Pennsylvania decisions would be quite misleading as general authorities. Without entering into any examination of them, I shall merely state these important points of difference, and cite some of the decisions by which they are illustrated.

One special rule established in Pennsylvania is, that an express trust for the separate use of a woman, even where active duties are given to the trustee, so that the trust is really active, cannot be created, unless she is already married, or unless it is made in contemplation of her marriage: See Pickering v. Coates, 10 Phila. 65; Ash v. Bowen, 10 Phila. 96; Ogden's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 501; and cases cited below. This particular rule often operates in connection with others which are to be mentioned. The two main points of peculiarity in the law as settled in Pennsylvania are the following: 1. Some species of trusts are treated as executed by the statute as though they were wholly passive, so that the entire estate, legal and equitable, vests at once in the beneficiary, which by the general law of England and of this country are not thus executed, on the ground that they are in reality active trusts; as, for example, where land is given upon trust to convey it to the cestui que trust: See Bacon's Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 504; Rife v. Geyer, 59 Pa. St. 393, 98 Am. Dec. 351; Yarnall's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 335; Nice's Appeal, 50 Pa. St. 143; Barnett's Appeal, 46 Pa. St. 392, 86 Am. Dec. 502. 2. Several species of trusts are treated as passive, which by the general doctrine are undoubtedly active. Certain trusts which require active duties by the trustees are held to be passive, and the whole estate to vest in the beneficiary. For example, a trust to receive rents and profits and pay them over is clearly active, while a trust to "permit and suffer" the beneficiary to receive is passive by the English law: Wagstaff v. Smith, 9 Ves. 520; but this distinction seems to be denied in Pennsylvania, and both are held to be passive: See Rife v. Geyer, 59 Pa. St. 393, 98 Am. Dec. 351, and cases cited below. From the combination of these rules, it follows that there may be trusts strictly active which are not affected by the statute, and in which the legal and equitable estates are kept separate. But the leaning is strongly to regard trusts as passive. Many instances are treated as passive which by the generally received law are active; and especially where an active trust for any reason fails of its purpose, or its purpose is accomplished, the tendency is strongly in favor of holding it executed, and the estate as vested in the beneficiary. The following cases illustrate these tendencies: Keene's Estate, 81 Pa. St. 133; Pickering v. Coates, 10 Phila. 65; Ash v. Bowen, 10 Phila. 96; Williams's Appeals, 83 Pa. St. 377; Hnber's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 348; Phillips's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 472; Ash's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 497; Deibert's Appeal, 78 Pa. St. 296; Delbert's Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 462; Ashurst's Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 464; Earp's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 119; Tucker's Appeal, 75 Pa. St.

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cestui que trust, or, in more modern nomenclature, as the beneficiary.

SECTION II.

EXPRESS PRIVATE TRUSTS.

ANALYSIS.

§ 987. Classes of trusts.

§§ 988-990. Express passive trusts.

§ 989. Estates of the two parties; liability for beneficiary's debts, etc. § 990. Rules of descent, succession, and alienation.

§§ 991-995. Express active trusts.

- § 992. Classes of active trusts.
- § 993. Voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors; English doctrine.
- § 994. The same; American doctrine.

§ 995. Deeds of trust to secure debts.

§§ 996-999. Voluntary trusts.

- § 997. The general doctrine; incomplete voluntary trusts not enforced.
- § 998. When the donor is the legal owner.

§ 999. When the donor is the equitable owner.

354; Yarnall's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 335; Ogden's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 501; Westcott v. Edmunds, 68 Pa. St. 34; Megargee v. Naglee, 64 Pa. St. 216; Parker's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 478; Dodson v. Ball, 60 Pa. St. 492, 100 Am. Dec. 586; Bacon's Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 504; Koenig's Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 352; Freyvogle v. Hughes, 56 Pa. St. 228; Wickham v. Berry, 55 Pa. St. 70; Shankland's Appeal, 47 Pa. St. 113; Barnett's Appeal, 46 Pa. St. 392, 86 Am. Dec. 502.^g

In earlier decisions these views were carried to a still greater length: See Kuhn v. Newman, 26 Pa. St. 227; Whichcote v. Lyle's Ex'r, 28 Pa. St. 73; Williams v. Leech, 28 Pa. St. 89; Price v. Taylor, 28 Pa. St. 95, 70 Am. Dec. 105; Bush's Appeal, 33 Pa. St. 85; Naglee's Appeal, 33 Pa. St. 89; McKee v. McKinley, 33 Pa. St. 92; Kay v. Scates, 37 Pa. St. 31, 78 Am. Dec. 399; Rush v. Lewis, 21 Pa. St. 72. The foregoing *résumé* shows that the Pennsylvania cases cannot always be taken as safe authority in other states upon the subject of active and passive trusts, and the extent to which they are executed by the "statute of uses."

§ 986, (s) Philadelphia Trust Co.'s Appeal, 93 Pa. St. 209; Bristor v. Tasker, 135 Pa. St. 110, 20 Am. St. Rep. 853, 19 Atl. 851; McCormick v. Sypher, 238 Pa. 185, 85 Atl. 1096. For examples of trusts held active, see Stanbaugh's Estate, 135 Pa. St. 585, 19 Atl. 1058; Livezey's Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 201.

§§ 1000, 1001.	Executed and executory trusts.
§ 1001.	Definition and description.
§ 1002.	Powers in trust.
§§ 1003-1005.	Legislation of various states.
§ 1004.	Judicial interpretation; validity of trust

§ 1005. Interest, rights, and liabilities of the beneficiary.

§ 987. Classes of Trusts.-Having thus explained the origin of trusts and their historical development until the jurisdiction substantially as it now exists had become firmly established, I shall now proceed to consider the various kinds and classes which are recognized by equity and form a part of its jurisprudence. All possible trusts, whether of real or of personal property, are separated by a principal line of division into two great classes: Those created by the intentional act of some party having dominion over the property, done with a view to the creation of a trust, which are express trusts; those created by operation of law, where the acts of the parties may have had no intentional reference to the existence of any trust,-implied, or resulting. and constructive trusts.^a Express trusts are again separated into two general classes,-private and public. Private trusts are those created by some written instrument. or in some trusts of personal property by a mere verbal declaration, for the benefit of certain and designated individuals, in which the *cestui que trust* is a known person or class of persons. Public, or, as they are frequently termed, charitable, trusts are those created for the benefit of an unascertained, uncertain, and sometimes fluctuating. body of individuals, in which the cestuis que trustent may be a portion or class of a public community,-as, for example, the poor or the children of a particular town or parish. As a general rule, property of every kind and form, real and personal, may be made the subject of an express trust or of one arising by operation of law. All persons who have the capacity to hold and dispose of prop-

§ 987, (a) The text is quoted in Heil v. Heil, (Mo.) 84 S. W. 45, and in Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S. W. 634. Sections 987 et seq. are cited in Flcenor v. Hensley, (Va.) 93 S. E. 582.

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erty can impress a trust upon it;^b and, generally, all persons capable of holding property may be made trustees.¹

§ 987, 1 It might not be expedient to appoint married women or infants trustees; but they may discharge the duties of the office: Lake v. De Lambert, 4 Ves. 593, 595; Smith v. Smith, 21 Beav. 385; In re Kaye, L. R. 1 Ch. 387.^c Property subject to an express or implied trust might de-

§ 987, (b) The text is quoted in Fleenor v. Hensley, (Va.) 93 S. E. 582. An infant may create a trust which is valid until avoided; Eldriedge v. Hoefer, 52 Ariz. 241, 93 Pac. 246.

§ 987, (c) Infants as Trustees.---See, also, ---- v. Hancock, 17 Ves. 384; Nordholt v. Nordholt, 87 Cal. 552, 22 Am. St. Rep. 268, 26 Pac. 599 (an infant cannot disaffirm, on the ground of his minority, his deed made in execution of a trust, which a court of equity would have compelled him to perform); Elliott v. Horn, 10 Ala. 348, 44 Am. Dec. 488; Starr v. Wright, 20 Ohio St. 97; Prouty v. Edgar, 6 Iowa, 353; Thompson v. Dulles, 5 Rich. Eq. 370; Bridges v. Bidwell, 20 Neb. 185, 29 N. W. 302. As the decree of an equity court did not operate in rem, there was, at common law, no means of divesting an infant trustee of his title though the property was being injured by his mismanagement: See Anonymous, 3 P. Wms. 389, n, (a), where the infant trustee was ordered to convey when he became of age unless cause was shown to the contrary within six months of his majority; to the same effect, Perry v. Perry, 65 Me. 399; Whitney v. Stearns, 11 Met. 319; Coffin v. Heath, 6 Met. 76. But the infant may be enjoined from interfering with the property: Sutphen v. Fowler, 9 Paige 280. Though not liable for mismanagement of the property, an infant trustee was liable for any property gained by his wrongful act: Overton v. Banister, 3 Hare 503; Lempriere v. Lange, 12 Ch. Div. 675; see the cases in connection with trusts ex maleficio, § 1053; see Jeron v. Bush, 1 Vern. 342, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 217, where the breach was after the trustee attained his majority. In a proper case the court may now generally divest the infant trustee of the title to property held in trust; this is due to statute alone: See In re Follen, 14 N, J. Eq. 147 (the statute does not extend to resulting nor constructive trusts); Livingston v. Livingston, 2 Johns. Ch. 537; Thompson v. Dulles, 5 Rich. Eq. 370 (though the infant was not a bare, naked trustee).

Married Women as Trustees .--- A married woman, as trustee, may deal with the property as she could with her individual estate and no more freely, except where allowed by statute: Kinard v. Kaelin, 22 Cal. App. 383, 134 Pac. 370 (may be a trustee for her husband); Still v. Ruby, 35 Pa. St. 373, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 219; Wallace v. Bowen, 28 Vt. 638; Springer v. Berry, 47 Me. 330; Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314, 67 Am. Dec. 622 (citing cases to show that she could not be a trustee for her husband at common law); Holman v. Houston Oil Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 885; Insurance Co. of Tennessee v. Waller, 116 Tenn. 1, 115 Am. St. Rep. 763, 7

All persons capable of holding property, even those *non* sui juris, and such persons only, may be beneficiaries.²

volve upon a person wholly non sui juris, as an idiot; equity would either enforce the trust against the property, or appoint another trustee.^d

§ 987, ² Wherever the common-law rule prevails forbidding aliens from acquiring or holding real estate by an absolute right, they cannot be made beneficiaries, and hold the equitable interest under a trust in their favor; but this rule does not prohibit trusts of personal property on behalf of aliens: Du Hourmelin v. Sheldon, 4 Mylne & C. 525; 1 Beav. 79; Sharp v. St. Sauveur, L. R. 7 Ch. 343, 352; Leggett v. Dubois, 5 Paige, 114, 28

Ann. Cas. 1078, 95 S. W. 11; People v. Webster, 10 Wend. 554 (aside from statute, a husband should join in actions in regard to the property). A *feme covert* was appointed a trustee in Milbank v. Crane, 25 How. Pr. 193.

§ 987, (d) Lunatics.-The original rule in regard to lunatics or those physically unable to convey property was the same as in the case of infants: In Pegge v. Skynner, 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 23, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 218, the court ordered one afflicted with paralysis to convey "when he should be capable of so doing"; see, also, Hall v. Warren, 9 Ves. 605. The rule has since been changed by statute in some jurisdictions: See Swartwout v. Burr, 1 Barb. 495; Re Wadsworth, 2 Barb. Ch. 381. For the vesting of title to trust property by order of court, under the English statutes, see In re Trubee's Trusts, [1892] 3 Ch. 55; In re Leon, [1892] 1 Ch. 348; In re Gregson, [1893] 3 Ch. 233; London & County Banking Co. v. Goddard, [1897] 1 Ch. 642.

Corporations.—It was formerly contended that a corporation could not be a trustee: Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. 122, a; the reason given was that "it is a dead body, although it consists of natural persons; and in this dead body confidences can not

be put, but in bodies naturall": Popham, 72. But a corporation may now generally be a trustee, either by the appointment of the settler, or by the court: Atty.-General v. Landisfield, 9 Mod. Rep. 286, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 216; Hoosack v. Ottawa Development Ass'n, 244 Ill. 274, 91 N. E. 439 (if trusts are within scope of corporate purposes); Chambers v. City of St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Trustees of the South Newmarket Methodist S. v. Peaslee, 15 N. H. 317 (recognizing the rule but refusing to allow the corporation to act as trustee because it was "foreign to their institutions"); Sheldon ν. Chappell, 47 Hun, 59; Stearns v. Newport Hospital, 27 R. I. 309, 8 Ann. Cas. 1176, 62 Atl. 132 (charitable trust); Ex parte Greenville, 7 Rich. Eq. 471; Bell County v. Alexander, 22 Tex. 350, 73 Am. Dec. 268. See In re Franklin's Estate, 150 Pa. St. 437, 30 Am. St. Rep. 817, 24 Atl. 626, holding that a municipal corporation is not capable of executing a purely private trust and quoting from Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169, to the effect that the liabilities of such a trust are inconsistent with the proper administration of the public duties imposed upon the corporation. Contra, Doe v. Roe, 1 Boyce (24 Del.), 216, 75

Equity will enforce all lawful trusts. If a trust should be created for an illegal or fraudulent purpose, equity will not

Am. Dec. 413; Hubbard v. Goodwin, 3 Leigh, 492; Atkins v. Kron, 5 Ired. Eq. 207; Taylor v. Benham, 5 How. 233.^e

Atl. 704; Atlantic City v. Associated Realties Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 721; 70 Atl. 345, 17 Ann. Cas. 743, and note.

Beneficiary as Trustee .--- There has been some discussion as to whether a cestui can also he a trustee and it is generally held that if there are several trustees there is no objection: Rankin v. Metzger, 69 App. Div. 264, 74 N. Y. Supp. 649; Summers v. Higley, 191 Ill. 193, 60 N. E. 969; Nellis v. Rickard, 133 Cal. 617, 85 Am. St. Rep. 227, 66 Pac. 32; Burbach v. Burbach, 217 Ill. 547, 75 N. E. 519; Boyce v. McLeod, 107 Md. 1, 68 Atl. 135. But if a cestui hecome a sole trustee he should apply for the appointment of another trustee, or proceed under the direction of the court: Irving v. Irving, 21 Misc. Rep. 743, 47 N. Y. Supp. 1052; see, also, Woodbridge v. Bockes, 170 N. Y. 596, 63 N. E. 362. See, also, Cahlan v. Bank of Lassen Co., 11 Cal. App. 533, 105 Pac. 765; Kinard v. Kaelin, 22 Cal. App. 383, 134 Pac. 370; Weeks v. Frankel, 197 N. Y. 304, 90 N. E. 969.

Executor as Trustee.—It has been held that an *executor* may also be a trustee: Appeal of Shey, 73 Conn. 122, 46 Atl. 832. In re Post's Estate, 30 Mise. Rep. 551, 64 N. Y. Supp. 369. But the general rule seems to be that an executor cannot he deemed to hold a fund as trustee until the trust fund has been in some way legally ascertained, identified, and separated from the funds of the estate, and the trustee has entered upon the duties of his office as trustee as distinct and separate from his functions as executor: Evans v. Moore, [1891] 3 Ch. 119; In re Williams, 26 Misc. Rep. 636, 57 N. Y. Supp. 943 (citing In re Hood's Estate, 98 N. Y. 363; Cluff v. Day, 124 N. Y. 203, 26 N. E. 306; In re Underhill, 35 App. Div. 434, 54 N. Y. Supp. 967; Johnson v. Lawrence, 95 N. Y. 165); Bemmesly v. Woodward, 136 Cal. 326, 68 Pac. 1017; Tuckerman v. Currier, 54 Colo. 25, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 599, 129 Pac. 210. See Leonard v. Haworth, 171 Mass. 496, 51 N. E. 7, to the effect that executor, and trustee, have not the same meaning. Executor under will of beneficiary may be trustee under will of trustor: Wiegand v. Woerner, 155 Mo. App. 227, 134 S. W. 596.

It has been held that a court of equity cannot he a trustee: Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 Ill. 243, 54 N. E. 918. But by statute there is a different rule in New York: Correll v. Lauterbach, 159 N. Y. 553, 54 N. E. 1089, 12 App. Div. 531, 42 N. Y. Supp. 143; Tonnele v. Wetmore, 195 N. Y. 436, 88 N. E. 1068 (on death of surviving trustee trust, by statute, vests in supreme court).

Death of Sole Trustee.—It has been held that on the death of a sole trustee, the title to the trust property descends to his eldest son as common-law heir: St. Stephons Evangelical Church v. Pierce, 8 Del. Ch. 179, 68 Atl. 194; McAfee v. Green, 143 N. C. 411, 55 S. E. 828; Breeden v. Moore, 82 S. C. 534, 64 S. E. 604; Cone v. Cone, 61 S. C. 512, 39 S. E. 748.

See post, § 1060.

§ 987, (e) Nor can they be trustees in such case: King v. Bays, enforce it, nor, it seems, relieve the person creating it by setting aside the conveyance.³ When, however, a trust is unlawful because it is one which the statute forbids, or which conflicts with the statute concerning perpetuities, and the like, the whole disposition is void.⁴

§ 988. Express Passive Trusts.^a—Express private trusts are of two kinds,—passive or simple, and active or special. An express passive or simple, or, as it is sometimes called, pure, trust exists when land is conveyed to or held by A in trust for B, without any power expressly or impliedly given to A to take the actual possession and management of the land, or to exercise acts of government over it except by the direction of B.¹ In such a case the naked legal

§ 987, ³ Unless, perhaps, the illegal purpose wholly fails to take effect: See Symes v. Hughes, L. R. 9 Eq. 475; Brackenbury v. Brackenbury, 2 Jacob & W. 391; Childers v. Childers, 1 De Gex & J. 482.⁴

§ 987, 4 See *post*, §§ 1003-1005, concerning the legislative system in many of the states.^g

§ 988, 1 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 495-497; Cook v. Fountain, 3 Swanst. 585, 591, 592, per Lord Nottingham; Lloyd v. Spillet, 2 Atk. 148. A trust

Dyer, 283b, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 216. In support of the text, see In re Federal Biscuit Co., 214 Fed. 221, 130 C. C. A. 635.

§ 987, (f) Trust for Illegal or Fraudulent Purpose.-The text is cited to this effect in Fleenor v. Hensley, (Va.) 93 S. E. 582. See the following cases, dealing with trusts that were invalid in part only, or were held wholly invalid because the valid and invalid clauses and dispositions were inseparably connected: In re Piercy, [1895] 1 Ch. 83; In re Willey's Estate, 128 Cal. 1, 60 Pac. 471; Carpenter v. Cook, 132 Cal. 621, 84 Am. St. Rep. 118, 64 Pac. 997; Nellis v. Rickard, 133 Cal. 617, 85 Am. St. Rep. 227, 66 Pac. 32; Cross v. United States Trust Co., 131 N. Y. 330, 27 Am. St. Rep. 597, 15 L. R. A. 606, 30 N. E. 125; Fishblate v. Fishblate, 238 Pa. 450, 86 Atl. 469 (if trust can be shown without going into illegality of source of fund, it will be sustained); In re Denis' Estate, 201 Pa. 616, 51 Atl. 335. See Tilden v. Green, 130 N. Y. 29, 27 Am. St. Rep. 487, 28 N. E. 880; Estate of Fair, 132 Cal. 523, 84 Am. St. Rep. 70, 60 Pac. 453, 64 Pac. 1000, to the effect that if the entire disposition is a general scheme and is void in part the entire trust fails.

§ 987, (g) See, also, the cases supra, note f, and Whittfield v. Foster, 124 Cal. 418, 57 Pac. 219; Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. St. 179, 64 Am. St. Rep. 621, 39 Atl. 879.

§ 988, (a) This section is cited in Hill v. Hill, 90 Neb. 43, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 198, 132 N. W. 738; Mook v. Akron Savings & Loan Co., 87 Ohio, 273, 101 N. E. 278.

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title alone is vested in the trustee, while the equitable estate of the *cestui que trust* is to all intents the beneficial ownership, entitling him to the possession, the rents and profits, and the management and control, according to the extent of his estate. These passive trusts are considered in equity as virtually equivalent to the corresponding legal ownerships; the trust is regarded rather as fastened upon the estate than upon the person of the trustee;² it is-never suffered to fail for want of a trustee, either when the designated trustee dies, or refuses to act, or is an improper person.³ As a general principle, the rules of law, excepting

merely to "permit and suffer" the *cestui que trust* to receive the rents and profits is not an active trust: Wagstaff v. Smith, 9 Ves. 520.^b For peculiar doctrine in Pennsylvania concerning passive trusts, see *ante*, note under § 986, and cases cited.

§ 988, ² Adair v. Shaw, 1 Schoales & L. 262, per Lord Redesdale.

§ 988, 3 Gravenor v. Hallam, Amb. 643; Pitt v. Pelham, 1 Cas. Ch. 176; Brown v. Higgs, 8 Ves. 561, 569; Newlands v. Paynter, 4 Mylne & C. 408; Attorney-General v. Stephens, 3 Mylne & K. 347; Lewis v. Lewis, 1 Cox, 162; and although no trustee was ever expressly appointed, or from any

§ 988, (b) See, also, Farmers' National Bank v. Moran, 30 Minn. 165, 14 N. W. 805. See the following cases, as mere examples of what have been held passive trusts: In re Cunningham and Frayling, [1891] 2 Ch. 567; Numsen v. Lyons, 97 Md. 31, 39 Atl. 533; Carpenter v. Cook, 132 Cal. 621, 84 Am. St. Rep. 62, 64 Pac. 997; Marvel v. Wilmington Trust Co., 10 Del. Ch. 163, 87 Atl. 1014 (though beneficiary is a married woman); Drake v. Steele, 242 Ill. 301, 89 N. E. 1018 (if trustee has no active duties, statute of uses will execute the trust); McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 Ill. 281, 86 N. E. 139 (if trustee is to convey on contingency, there is an active duty; query, whether statute will operate when active duty has ended); Rothschild v. Dickinson, 169 Mich. 200, 134 N. W. 1035 (declaration that land is

held in trust for another, conveyance directed): Hill v. Hill, 90 Neb. 43, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 198, 132 N. W. 738, citing this section of the text; Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Rutzler, (N. J. Eq.) 100 Atl. 198; Mook v. Akron Savings & Loan Co., 87 Ohio St. 273, 101 N. E. 278; Mc-Cormick v. Sypher, 238 Pa. 185, 85 Atl. 1096. For further cases see ante, § 986, notes. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 61 S. C. 243, 39 S. E. 391, for a case of active trust; McComb v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 36 Misc. Rep. 370, 73 N. Y. Supp. 554: Huntington v. Spear, 131 Ala. 414. 30 South. 787; Perkins v. Brinkley, 133 N. C. 154, 45 S. E. 541. For a good statement of the distinction between active and passive trusts, see Holmes v. Walter, 118 Wis. 409, 95 N. W. 380.

those growing out of the doctrine of tenure, have been applied by analogy as far as practicable to these corresponding passive trust estates.⁴ A person cannot hold property under a passive trust for himself, for generally, when the legal estate and an equal or less equitable estate unite in the same owner, a merger takes place; ^d but this rule is not universal, since the two estates may be kept separate and subsisting, in order to protect the equitable interests of the owner.⁵ Such express passive trusts in land are certainly very infrequent in this country, although they may occasionally exist, where not prohibited by statute.⁶ Trusts in

cause there may be no acting trustee, the person acquiring the legal interest in the property will be bound by the trust to which it is subject: Id. It is a fundamental principle of equity that "the trust follows the legal estate wherever it goes, except it comes into the hands of a *bona fide* purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice": Attorney-General v. Lady Downing, Wilm. 1, 21, per Wilmot, C. J.^c

§ 988, 4 Watts v. Ball, 1 P. Wms. 108; Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 177, 184, 195, per Sir T. Clarke; p. 223, per Lord Mansfield; p. 250, per Lord Northington; Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 4 Bligh, 1, 115, per Lord Redesdale.

§ 988, ⁵ Brydges v. Brydges, 3 Ves. 120, 126; Wade v. Paget, 1 Brown Ch. 363; Badgett v. Keating, 31 Ark. 400; Bolles v. State Trust Co., 27 N. J. Eq. 308; and see *ante*, section on merger, §§ 787, 788. A trust is not rendered void by the court appointing the *cestui que trust* the trustee: Rogers v. Rogers, 18 Hun, 409.

§ 988, ⁶ They would probably most often appear in connection with the separate estates of married women: See Boyd v. England, 56 Ga. 598; Sutton v. Aiken, 62 Ga. 733.^e

§ 988, (c) To the effect that the court will appoint new trustees to prevent the trust from failing, see Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pendleton, 37 Misc. 356, 75 N. Y. Supp. 294; Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497, 32 S. E. 809; Willis v. Alvey, 30 Tcx. Civ. App. 96, 69 S. W. 1035.

§ 988, (d) This section is cited to this effect in Tilton v. Davidson, 98 Me. 55, 56 Atl. 215. See Doan v. Vestry of Ascension Parish, 103 Md. 662, 115 Am. St. Rep. 379, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1119, 64 Atl. 314; Langley v. Conlan, 212 Mass. 135, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 421, 98 N. E. 1064.

§ 988, (e) Dean v. Long, 122 Ill. 447, 14 N. E. 34; or of minors; Turner v. Barber, 131 Ga. 444, 62 S. E. 587.

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personal property, however, which are essentially passive, are not at all uncommon.⁷

§ 989. Estates of the Two Parties.—The estate of the naked trustee in a passive trust, and *a fortiori* of the trustee in an active trust, is the only legal ownership,^a although it must be used, in equity, only for the purposes of carrying out the trust and protecting the rights of the beneficiary.^b The trustee, having the legal interest, is the proper person to bring actions at law,^c and to do other things

§ 988, 7 For example, A may deposit money in a bank, in "trust for B," or may deposit in the name of B, "in trust for C," and thus create a valid trust which is really passive, since the trustee is not charged with any duties of management, such as receiving the interest and paying it over; in fact, he holds the *corpus* of the property in trust for the beneficiary. As illustrations, see Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134, 31 Am. Rep. 446; Boone v. Citizens' Sav. Bank, 84 N. Y. 83, 38 Am. Dec. 498; Weber v. Weber, 58 How. Pr. 225; Stone v. Bishop, 4 Cliff. 593; Rogers Locomotive Works v. Kelly, 19 Hun, 399.⁴

§ 988, (1) Leighton v. Bowen, 75 Me. 504.

§ 989, (a) Ownership of Trustee in Passive Trust .--- As to whether the trustee is the "owner" within the meaning of statutes see In re Barney, [1894] 3 Ch. 562; Hornsey Distriet Council v. Smith, [1897] 1 Ch. 843. To the effect that the trustee gets the legal title see Van Grutten v. Foxwell, [1897] A. C. 658; In re Paget, [1898] 1 Ch. 290; In re Averill, [1898] 1 Ch. 523; Gandy v. Fortner, 119 Ala. 303, 24 South. 425; In re Willey's Trust, 128 Cal. 1, 60 Pac. 471; Kelly v. Hoey, 35 App. Div. 273, 55 N. Y. Supp. 94; Bloodgood v. Mass, B. & L. Ass'n, 19 Misc. Rep. 460, 44 N. Y. Supp. 63; Simpson v. Eriseur, 155 Mo. 157, 55 S. W. 1029; Schiffman v. Schmidt, 154 Mo. 204, 55 S. W. 451; Brace v. Van Elps, 13 S. D. 452, 83 N. W. 572. See, also, Wright v. Keasbey, (N. J. Eq.) 100 Atl. 172.

§ 989, (b) See the following cases holding that the trustee does not enjoy the property beneficially. Sterling v. Sterling, 77 Minn. 12, 79 N. W. 525; Hafner v. City of St. Louis, 161 Mo. 34, 61 S. W. 632; Smith v. Security L. & T. Co. of Cass, 8 N. D. 451, 79 N. W. 981; Brown v. Richter, 25 App. Div. 239, 49 N. Y. Supp. 368; Neal v. Bleckly, 51 S. C. 506, 29 S. E. 249; Perkins v. Burlington Land and Imp. Co., 112 Wis. 509, 88 N. W. 648; In re Foster's Estate, 179 Pa. St. 610, 36 Atl. 343.

§ 989, (c) Trustee Proper Person to Sue.—As recognizing this, see Barker v. Furlong, [1891] 2 Ch. 172; Simpson v. Eriseur, 155 Mo. 157, 55 S. W. 1029; Price v. Krasuoff, 60 S. C. 172, 38 S. E. 413 (the trustee is the only necessary party to the suit). See, also, Dalton v. Hazelet, 182 Fed. 561, 105 C. C. A. 99. If the suit by the trustee is barred, suit by the which can be done only by one having the legal estate.¹ The estate of the *cestui que trust*, while regarded in equity as the real ownership,^d is governed, so far as practicable, by the legal rules applicable to similar estates at law. The language of the instrument creating or declaring the trust

§ 989, 1 May v. Taylor, 6 Man. & G. 261. When money is deposited in a bank to the credit of A, in trust for B, A, or upon his death his administrator, is *prima facie* the proper person to demand and receive payment from the bank: Boone v. Citizens' Sav. Bank, 84 N. Y. 83, 38 Am. Dec. 498; Stone v. Bishop, 4 Cliff. 593.

cestui is also barred; Schiffman v. Schmidt, 154 Mo. 204, 55 S. W. 451; Hafner v. City of St. Louis, 161 Mo. 34, 61 S. W. 632; Webb v. Borden, 145 N. C. 188, 58 S. E. 1083. See the case of Snelling v. American F. L. & T. Co., 107 Ga. 852, 73 Am. St. Rep. 160, 33 S. E. 634, recognizing the rule but holding that the cestui was not bound in a case where the trustee was liable personally and had been sued by his creditors. See Williams v. Papworth, [1900] A. C. 563, which is governed by statute. As regarding the right of the cestui to sue see Butler v. Butler, 41 App. Div. 477, 58 N. Y. Supp. 1094; Thompson v. Remsen, 27 Misc. Rep. 279, 58 N. Y. Supp. 424; Zimmerman v. Makepeace, 152 Ind. 199, 52 N. E. 992; Anderson v. Daly, 38 App. Div. 505, 56 N. Y. Supp. 511.

§ 989, (d) Cestui Que Trust the True Owner.—Obviously, this statement is not intended to apply to those cases of passive trusts that are governed by statutes analogous to the statutes of uses, and in which the legal title is passed immediately to the cestui que trust: See, for example, Hallyburton v. Slagle, 130 N. C. 482, 41 S. E. 877; Jordan v. Philips and Crew Co., 126 Ala. 561, 29 South. 831; Mook v. Akron Savings & Loan Co., 87 Ohio St. 273, 101 N. E. 278, citing this section; Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Rutzler, (N. J. Eq.) 100 Atl. 189. See In re Mills' Trusts, [1895] 2 Ch. 564, to the effect that the cestui is the "true owner" within the meaning of a statute. See generally Dalrymple v. Security L. & T. Co., 9 N. D. 306, 83 N. W. 245; Trask v. Sturges, 31 Misc. Rep. 195, 63 N. Y. Supp. 1084. It is held in such cases that the cestui may obtain possession of the property: In re Morrey Kyrles Settlement, [1900] 2 Ch. 839; In re Richardson, [1900] 2 Ch. 778; Wade v. Powers, 20 Ga. 645. See notes 1 and d to § 991. See the following cases dealing with the state of the cestui's title: Buel v. Odell, 19 App. Div. 605, 46 N. Y. Supp. 306 (inalienable by statute); First Nat. Bank v. Miller, 24 App. Div. 551, 49 N. Y. Supp. 981; Narron v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 122 N. C. 856, 40 L. R. A. 415, 29 S. E. 356; Johnson v. Blake, 124 N. C. 106, 32 S. E. 397; Davis v. Heppert, 96 Va. 775, 32 S. E. 467; Atkins v. Atkins, 70 Vt. 565, 41 Atl. 503; Cornwell v. Wulff, 148 Mo. 542, 45 L. R. A. 53, 50 S. W. 439; Ryland v. Banks, 151 Mo. 1, 51 S. W. 720; McDougall v. Dixon, 19 App. Div. 420, 46 N. Y. Supp. 280.

is interpreted by courts of equity in accordance with the rules followed by courts of law. The interest of the cestui que trust is alienable; if real estate, it may be conveyed by ordinary deed; if personal, it may be assigned; e but the rule is established in England that notice must be given to the trustee, in order to perfect an assignment by a cestui que trust of personalty, and to protect the assignee.² The estate cannot, by any restrictions annexed to the trust, be rendered inalienable, nor can it be stripped of other incidental rights of ownership.³ It is also liable for the debts of the beneficiary.⁴ It cannot be so created that, while it is subsisting and enjoyed by the beneficiary, it shall be absolutely free from such liability. The trust may be so limited that it shall not take effect unless the beneficiary is free from debt, or that his estate shall cease upon his becoming insolvent, or upon a judgment being recovered against him, and shall thereupon vest in another person; but the cestui que trust cannot hold and enjoy his interest entirely free from the claims of creditors.^{5 f} These rules

§ 989, ² This rule is adopted in only a portion of the American states: See *ante*, \S 695-697, where the English and American cases are cited.

§ 989, ³ Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429; Rochford v. Hackman, 9 Hare, 475.

§ 989, 4 Pratt v. Colt, 2 Freem. Ch. 139; Forth v. Duke of Norfolk, 4 Madd. 503; Hutchins v. Heywood, 50 N. H. 491; Kennedy v. Nunan, 52 Cal. 326.

§ 989, 5 Nichols v. Levy, 5 Wall. 433, 441; Hallett v. Thompson, 5 Paige, 583; Bramhall v. Ferris, 14 N. Y. 41; 67 Am. Dec. 113; Easterly v. Keney, 36 Conn. 18, 22; Dick v. Pitchford, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 480. In Nichols v. Levy, *supra*, Swayne, J., said: "It is a settled rule of law that

§ 989, (e) See post, § 1005. Riordan v. Schlicher, 146 Ala. 615, 41 South. 842.

§ 989, (f) Quoted in Honnett v. Williams, 66 Ark. 148, 49 S. W. 495.

"Spendthrift Trusts."—In many instances, particularly of late years, those possessed of property have desired to place all or a portion of it in trust in such manner that certain intended beneficiaries would receive the benefit of the income for their maintenance. The fact that in a large number of these cases the beneficiary has been a person of profligate habits or not possessed of sound business ability, has led the legal profession to refer to such dispositions of property as "Spendthrift Trusts." The failure of some are subject to a most important exception in the case of the married woman's separate estate,—property held upon

the beneficial interest of the cestui que trust, whatever it may be, is liable for the payment of his debts. It cannot be so fenced about by inhibitions and restrictions as to secure to it the inconsistent characteristics of right and enjoyment to the beneficiary and immunity for his creditors. A condition precedent that the provision shall not vest until bis debts are paid, and a condition subsequent that it shall be divested and forfeited by his insolvency with a limitation over to a third person, are valid, and the law will give them full effect. Beyond this, protection from the claims of creditors is not allowed to go." In the more recent case of Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, the court went somewhat further. A trust was created to pay income to A during his life; if he became insolvent, his interest was instantly to cease, and was to pass to and vest in another person; but in that case the trustees were authorized, in their discretion, but without it being obligatory upon them, to apply a portion of the income to A's use. The court held that the discretion and authority thus given to the trustees did not render the disposition and limitation over void, nor the income liable to the claims of A's creditors after his insolvency. While the rule stated in the text is general, it has been adopted by some courts only in a modified form. In Pennsylvania, prop-

of the courts to notice the difference in the wording of the various instruments under discussion, and the general, unclassified manner in which the subject has frequently been treated has led to considerable confusion.

The English Cases .- If the interest given the beneficiary in such cases is an absolute vested right to property which he may reach if he so desires, any attempt to restrain his right as to alienation or to defeat the right of his creditors, is unavailing: Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429; Graves v. Dolphin, 1 Sim. 66; Woodmester v. Walker, 2 Russ. & M. 194; Jones v. Salter, 2 Russ. & M. 208; Brown v. Pocock, 2 Russ. & M. 210; and see Gray, Restraint on Alienation, Par. 167j. In any case where the trustee cannot exclude the beneficiary from the receipt of the money and the direction

is "to pay," the creditor or assignee may obtain the money: Rippon v. Norton, 2 Beav. 63; Page v. Way, 3 Beav. 20; Kearsley v. Woodcock, 3 Hare, 185; Wallace v. Anderson, 16 Beav. 533. In such case, however, the assignee or creditor should obtain only the amount which the *cestui* could demand.

But if the trustee has a discretionary power either to pay the cestui que trust or to exclude him altogether the assignee or creditor can obtain nothing: In re Bullock, 60 L. J. (Ch.) 341; Twopenny v. Peyton, 10 Sim. 487. The reason of this is clear. The cestui has no property right until the trustee, in his discretion, decides to pay over the money. If the cestui has become bankrupt, the trustee will not decide to pay it to the cestui's creditors.

Some authorities have stated that when the trustee is to "apply" the

trust for her separate use. It is the familiar doctrine with reference to such separate estate,—the very essential ele-

erty may be given by a third person to A upon such a trust for his life that he has no control whatever over the property, and a proviso attached that his interest is to be free from all liability to his creditors is held to be valid and operative. The same result may be accomplished in the creation of the trust, by clothing the trustees with a discretion as to the amount of income which they shall apply to the use of the beneficiary, A: Keyser v. Mitchell, 67 Pa. St. 473; Rife v. Geyer, 59 Pa. St. 393, 396, 98 Am. Dec. 35; Shryock v. Waggoner, 28 Pa. St. 430; Brown v. Williamson's Ex'rs, 36 Pa. St. 338; Eyrick v. Hetrick, 13 Pa. St. 438; Shankland's Appeal, 47 Pa. St. 113; Girard L. Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 46 Pa. St. 485, 86 Am. Dec. 513; Norris v. Johnston, 5 Pa. St. 287; Vanx v. Parke, 7 Watts & S. 19; Fisher v. Taylor, 2 Rawle, 33. But a person sui juris cannot convey his property upon trusts for himself free from the claims of his creditors: Ashurst's Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 464; Mackason's Appeal, 42 Pa. St. 330, 82 Am. Dec. 517. See, also, as to the extent to which the beneficiary's estate may be made free from liability, Leavitt v. Beirne. 21 Conn. 1, 8; Johnston v. Zane's Trustees, 11 Gratt. 552, 570; Markham v. Gnerrant, 4 Leigh, 279; Hill v. McRae, 27 Ala. 175; McIlvaine v. Smith. 42 Mo. 45, 97 Am. Dec. 295; Pope's Ex'rs v. Elliott, 8 B. Mon. 56.

income for the support of the cestui and has no authority to pay elsewhere, the creditors or assignee can obtain the income. In support of the statement are cited Green v. Spicer, 1 Russ. & M. 395; Snowden v. Dales, 6 Sim. 524; Rippon v. Norton, 2 Beav. 63; Page v. Way, 3 Beav. 20; Kearsley v. Woodcock, 3 Hare, 185; Wallace v. Anderson, 16 Beav. 533. On close examination, it is found that the cases cited do not support the contention; while there are other English cases, both early and late, that are contra. Thus, in Green v. Spicer, the words were "pay and apply"; in Snowden v. Dales "allow and pay"; in Younghusband v. Gisborne "to pay"; in Rippon v. Norton, "pay and apply"; in Kearsley v. Woodcock, "pay, apply and dispose." It is obvious that from cases with such wording, no proper infer-

ence can be drawn as to the distinction to be made between the terms ' "to pay" and "to apply," for the testator evidently used them as synonymous. When the trustees are "to apply" for the support of the cestui at their discretion, or apply to other purposes, and they apply it all for other purposes, it is obvious that the assignee has no cause for complaint: Lord v. Bunn, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 98; Holmes v. Penny, 3 K. & J. 90; and see Twopenny v. Peyton, supra. But in the cases last mentioned it is said that the trustee cannot pay to the cestui after receiving notice of the assignment: See Lord v. Bunn, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 98; In re Coleman, 39 Ch. D. 443; In re Neil, 62 L. T. R. 649. The support of such holding must be that as soon as the trustee decides to pay to the cestui there arises a right on the part of the

ment that it may be settled to her own separate use so as to be held by her entirely free from her husband's control

cestui to obtain that which the trustee has decided to pay. The trustee's having exercised his discretion and decided "to pay" the cestui gives that person a vested property right to which the assignment attaches. But it should be borne in mind that the assignment cannot, of itself, create any rights in favor of the cestui and the assignee is still restricted to that which the cestui could demand.

But where the cestui has not such an estate that he can demand a conveyance, the trustee may "apply" a portion for the support of the cestui even after notice of an assignment, and the assignee has no right for complaint: In re Coleman, 39 Ch. D. 443. This is the leading English case dealing with the distinction between the terms "to pay" and "to apply"; the court says: "If the trustee were to pay an hotel keeper to give him a dinner he would get only the right to eat the dinner and that is not property which would pass by assignment. But if they pay or deliver money or goods to him, or appropriate money or goods to be paid or delivered to him, the money or goods would pass by assignment." Referring to Green v. Spicer and Younghusband v. Gisborne, supra, the court says: "In those cases the income was directed to be applied solely for the bencfit of the insolvent, which made it his property, and an attempt was then made to prevent its being dealt with as his property if he became bank-The case of In re Coleman rupt." is in exact accord with the early English case of Godden v. Crowhurst, 10 Sim. 642, wherein the court

in speaking of the trust said: "Nothing was of necessity to be 'paid.' but the property was to be 'applied,' and this might be done without receiving any money at all. The result is that the assignees are not entitled to anything at all." The distinction was thus nicely made in 1842 after the decision of Green v. Spicer and Snowden v. Dale, supra, and furnishes a precedent which prevents In re Coleman from being a departure from the supposed rule of those cases. The late case of In re Bullock, 60 L. J. Ch. 341, is a strong support to this distinction and shows clearly the present state of the English law.

The line on which the cases divide is clear and distinct and is simply this: Has the cestui such vested interest, or such absolute property rights that he can force the trustee to pay him or deliver goods or property to him? If he has such interest the assignce or creditor can obtain it, and if he has not, the assignee or creditor can obtain nothing. The point is, not that one cannot be given an interest that will be beyond the reach of his creditors, but rather that one cannot be given an absolute property interest that will be beyond the reach of those creditors. This absolute property interest is the interest spoken of when it is said that a cestui's interest is subject to the demands of his creditors.

It is well settled that the estate may be given to the *cestui* subject to a condition that he will not become bankrupt or assign or alienate the property, and that upon the happening of any of the specified events the property is to pass to another: and from the claims of his creditors. It is also the established doctrine, designed to protect her from the moral in-

See the author's text, supra; In re Bullock, 60 L. J. Ch. 341. See, also, Metcalfe v. Metcalfe, [1891] 3 Ch. 1; In re Sartoris, [1892] 1 Ch. 11; In re Loftus-Otwey, [1895] 2 Ch. 235. It is equally well settled, however, that a person cannot convey his property to trustees to hold for his own benefit until he becomes bankrupt and thereby defeat the rights of his creditors. In re Brewer's Settlement, [1896] 2 Ch. 503. A valuable discussion of this subject will be found in Gray's Restraints on Alienation, Pars. 134 to 277. On the distinction between the English and American rule, see Shelton v. King, 229 U. S. 90, 57 L. Ed. 1086, 33 Sup. Ct. 686.

American Cases. — "Spendthrift" trusts in some form have been recognized and upheld, either by decision or statute, in most of the states:

Arkansas.—See Fortner v. Phillips, 124 Ark. 395, 187 S. W. 318.

California. - Section 859 of the Civil Code provides: "Where a trust is created to receive the rents and profits of real property, and no valid direction for accumulation is given, the surplus of such rents and profits, beyond the sum that may be necessary for the education and support of the person for whose benefit the trust is created, is liable to the claims of the creditors of such person in the same manner as personal property which cannot be reached by execution." See Magner v. Crooks, 139 Cal. 640, 73 Pac. 585. Spendthrift trusts were valid before the statute: Seymour v. McAvoy, 121 Cal. 438, 41 L. R. A. 544, 53 Pac. 946; McColgan v. Walter Magee, Inc., 172 Cal. 182, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1050, 155 Pac. 995.

Connecticut.-Where the trustee is given an uncontrollable discretion, the creditors of the cestui cannot reach the fund. Where, however, the trustee is obliged to apply the whole income to the support of the cestui, creditors may reach it: Huntington v. Jones, 72 Conn. 45, 43 Atl. 564. See, also, Donalds v. Plumb, 8 Conn. 447; Leavitt v. Burns, 21 Conn. 1; Farmers' Sav. Bank v. Brewer, 27 Conn. 600; Easterly v. Kenney, 36 Conn. 18; Talland Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 50 Conn. 493; Tarrant v. Backus, 63 Conn. 277, 28 Atl. 46; Mason v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 78 Conn. 81, 3 Ann. Cas. 586, and note 61 Atl. 57, (trustees to pay over part or whole at discretion); Holmes (Parker, Holmes & Co.) v. Bushnell, 80 Conn. 233, 67 Atl. 479.

Delaware.—Gray v. Corbett, 4 Del. Ch. 135 (semble).

Florida.—Croom v. Ocala Plumbing & Electric Co., 62 Fla. 460, 57 South. 243 (provision that trustee should convey to *cestui* at his request prevents it being a spendthrift trust).

Georgia.—Sinnott v. Moore, 113 Ga. 908, 39 S. E. 415; Moore v. Sinnott, 117 Ga. 1010, 44 S. E. 810.

Illinois.—Steib v. Whitehead, 111 Ill. 247; Wagner v. Wagner, 244 Ill. 101, 18 Ann. Cas. 490, 91 N. E. 66, and note; Wallace v. Foxwell, 250 Ill. 616, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 632, 95 N. E. 985; Anderson v. Williams, 262 Ill. 308, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 720, 104 N. E. 659 (trust given effect regardless of whether *cestui* is really a spendthrift); Bennett v. Bennett, 217 Ill. 434, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 470, 75 N. E. 339 (intent to preclude creditors may be inferred from whole instrument). fluence of her husband, that in creating the trust a clause

Indiana.—Thompson v. Murphy, 10 Ind. App. 464, 37 N. E. 1094 (sem--3 ble).

Iowa.—Olsen v. Youngerman, 136 Iowa, 404, 113 N. W. 938 (trust to cease and income to go to children of *cestui* if creditors attack trust fund).

Kentucky .--- "Estates of every kind held or possessed in trust shall be subject to the debts or charges of the person to whose use, or for whose benefit, they shall be respectively held or possessed, as they would be subject if those persons owned the like interest in the property held or possessed as they own or shall own in the use or trust thereof"; Gen. St., sec. 21, art. 1, c. 63. Accordingly, the interest of the cestui will be subjected to the payment of his debts unless a discretionary power is given to the trustee to withhold all payment or benefit from him. In the following cases it was held that creditors could reach the fund: Bland v. Bland, 90 Ky. 400, 29 Am. St. Rep. 390, 9 L. R. A. 599, 14 S. W. 423; Hancock v. Twyman, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 2006, 45 S. W. 68; Knefler v. Shreve, 78 Ky. 297; Wooley v. Preston, 82 Ky. 415; Parsons v. Spencer, 83 Ky. 305; Eastland v. Jordan, 3 Bibb, 186; Jones v. Langhorn, 3 Bibb, 453. In the following case the creditors were not given relief: Davidson v. Kemper, 79 Ky. 5. In Marshall's Trustee v. Rash, 87 Ky. 117, 12 Am. St. Rep. 467, 7 S. W. 879, it was held that a discretion as to management, as to amount to be paid, and as to manner of payment, will not deprive creditors of their rights. A gift with a cesser clause is valid: Bull v. Kentucky Nat. Bank, 90 Ky. 452, 12 L. R. A. 37, 14 S. W. 425. See, also, the following recent cases: Hubbard v. Hayes, 30

Ky. Law Rep. 406, 98 S. W. 1034 (trust to support cestui and his family. On death of family, creditors may attach); Bottom v. Fultz, 124 Ky. 302, 98 S. W. 1037; Adair v. Adair's Trustee, 30 Ky. Law Rep. '857, 99 S. W. 925; Ratliff's Ex'rs v. Commonwealth, 3 Ky. Law Rep. 154, 101 S. W. 978; Cecil's Trustee v. Robertson & Bro., 32 Ky. Law Rep. 357, 105 S. W. 926 (to prevent creditors getting fund, trustee must have discretion to withhold); Hackett's Trustee v. Hackett, 146 Ky. 408, 142 S. W. 673; Bank of Taylorsville v. Vandyke, 159 Ky. 201, 166 S. W. 1024 (trust for cestui and his family, creditors must show that fund is more than adequate for family); Brock v. Brock, 168 Ky. 847, 183 S. W. 213 (provision prohibiting liability held void).

Maine.—Roberts v. Stevens, 84 Me. 325, 17 L. R. A. 266, 24 Atl. 873.

Maryland.-Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 Atl. 497, 15 Atl. 92; Maryland Grange Agency v. Lee, 72 Md. 161, 19 Atl. 534; Jackson Square L. & S. Ass'n v. Bartlett, 95 Md. 661, 93 Am. St. Rep. 416, 53 Atl. 426; Houghton v. Tiffany, 116 Md. 655, 82 Atl. 831 (where there is no denial of anticipation, not a spendthrift trust). A trust was supported on the ground of implied cesser in Cherbonnier v. Bussey, 92 Md. 413, 48 Atl. 923. A spendthrift trust cannot be created in the donor's favor: Warner v. Rice, 66 Md. 436, 8 Atl. 84; Brown v. McGill, 87 Md. 161, 67 Am. St. Rep. 334, 39 L. R. A. 806, 39 Atl. 613; Wenzel v. Powder, (Md.) 59 Atl. 194. See Carroll v. Smith, 99 Md. App. 653, 59 Atl. 131.

Massachusetts.—"A testator who makes a gift of income to a beneficiary may provide that it shall not

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may be inserted against "anticipation," by which her power

be alienable in advance by him, or be subject to be taken by his creditors. But in order to give such a qualified estate, instead of an absolute one, the language of the testator must be such as to clearly import an intention to do so": Maynard v. Cleaves, 149 Mass. 307, 21 N. E. 376; Sears v. Choate, 146 Mass. 395, 4 Am. St. Rep. 320, 15 N. E. 786. The distinction between the two classes is well stated in Evans v. Wall, 159 Mass. 164, 38 Am. St. Rep. 406, 34 N. E. 183: "In applying this rule it has been held that, when one is entitled to the whole income, his creditors may reach it, even though it is mentioned that it is given for his support; but, when one is entitled merely to be supported out of a trust fund, the value of his support cannot be reached." In the following cases the language was held sufficient to create a spendthrift trust: Broadway Nat. Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 43 Am. Rep. 504; Foster v. Foster, 133 Mass. 179; Slattery v. Wason, 151 Mass. 266, 21 Am. St. Rep. 448, 7 L. R. A. 393, 23 N. E. 843; Baker v. Brown, 146 Mass. 369, 15 N. E. 783; Wemyss v. White, 159 Mass. 484, 34 N. E. 718; Minot v. Tappan, 127 Mass. 333; Billings v. Marsh, 153 Mass. 311, 25 Am. St. Rep. 635, 10 L. R. A. 764, 26 N. E. 1000; Munroe v. Dewey, 176 Mass. 184, 79 Am. St. Rep. 304, 57 N. E. 340. In the following cases the language was not sufficient to create a spendthrift trust: Maynard v. Cleaves, 149 Mass. 307, 21 N. E. 376; Evans v. Wall, 159 Mass. 164, 38 Am. St. Rep. 406, 34 N. E. 183. In general, see the following earlier cases: Braman v. Stiles, 2 Pick. 460, 13 Am. Dec. 445; Perkins v. Hayes,

3 Gray, 405; Palmer v. Stevens, 15 Gray, 343; Ames v. Clark, 106 Mass. 573; Hall v. Williams, 120 Mass. 344; Bridgen v. Gill, 16 Mass. 522; Chase v. Chase, 2 Allen, 101; Williams v. Bradley, 3 Allen, 270; Loring v. Loring, 100 Mass. 340; Sparhawk v. Cloon, 125 Mass. 263. Α spendthrift trust in favor of the settlor is invalid: Pacific Bank v. Windram, 133 Mass. 175; Jackson v. Sedlitz, 136 Mass. 342. On the general subject see the following recent cases: Huntress v. Allen, 195 Mass. 226, 122 Am. St. Rep. 243, 80 N. E. 949 (right of trustor to protect from creditors at time of final distribution); Berry v. Dunham, 202 Mass. 133, 88 N. E. 904 (good discussion; spendthrift trust upheld); Lathrop -v. Merrill, 207 Mass. 6, 92 N. E. 1019 (trust in equitable estate); Leverett v. Barnwell, 214 Mass. 105, 101 N. E. 75 (trustees not bound by assignment of accrued income by remaindermen. They may pay debts of life tenant or direct to remaindermen); Hale v. Bowler, 215 Mass. 354, 102 N. E. 415; Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Collier, 222 Mass. 390, 111 N. E. 163.

Michigan.—Fleming v. Wood, 147 Mich. 513, 111 N. W. 80 (conveyance to father as agent to provide for son and family, is exempt from son's creditors): Hackley v. Littell, 150 Mich. 106, 113 N. W. 787 (attempted trust for donor's own benefit invalid).

Mississippi.—Leigh v. Harrison, 69 Miss. 923, 18 L. R. A. 49, 11 South. 604; Cady v. Lincoln, 100 Miss. 765, 57 South. 213 (gift of income, on death principal to return to estate); Mitchell v. Choctaw Bank, 107 Miss. 314, 65 South. 278 (trust for minor

of aliening her interest is taken away during her marriage;

children; each to get his share on attaining majority. Interest held too contingent to be attached by ereditors).

Missouri.-Partridge v. Cavender, 96 Mo. 457, 9 S. W. 785; Lampert v. Haydell, 20 Mo. App. 216; affirmed, 96 Mo. 439, 9 Am. St. Rep. 358, 2 L. R. A. 113, 9 S. W. 780; Jarboe v. Hey, 122 Mo. 341, 26 S. W. 968. A spendthrift trust cannot be created in the donor's favor: McIlvane v. Smith, 42 Mo. 45, 97 Am. Dec. 295. And the court has gone so far as to hold that when there is any valuable consideration moving from the beneficiary, the trust is invalid: Bank of Commerce v. Chambers, 96 Mo. 459, 10 S. W. 38. In general, see Graham v. More, (Mo.) 189 S. W. 1186.

New Hampshire.—Abbott v. Abbott, 76 N. H. 225, 81 Atl. 699 (purchase of interest at execution sale of no avail. Trustce still has discretion as to payment of income); Wolfman v. Webster, 77 N. H. 24, 86 Atl. 259 (discretion as to amount of payments).

New Jersey .-- Under the statute in this state, creditors cannot reach trust property where the trust "has been created by, or the fund so held in trust has proceeded from some person other than the debtor himself": See Hardenburgh v. Blair, 30 N. J. Eq. 645; Lippincott v. Evans, 35 N. J. Eq. 553; Force v. Brown, 32 N. J. Eq. 118; Frazier v. Barnum, 19 N. J. Eq. 316, 97 Am. Dec. 666; Hunterdon Freeholders v. Henry, 41 N. J. Eq. 388, 4 Atl. 858; Halstead v. Westervelt, 41 N. J. Eq. 100, 3 Atl. 270; Wright v. Leupp, 70 N. J. Eq. 130, 62 Atl. 464 (income may be assigned as it accrues); Castree v. Shotwell, 73 N. J. 590, 68 Atl. 774 (distinction drawn between trust and married woman's separate estate); Ward v. Marie, 73 N. J. Eq. 510, 68 Atl. 1084 (attempted trust for donor); Camden Trust Co. v. Schellenger, 78 N. J. Eq. 138, 78 Atl. 672.

New York .- The statute provides: "Where a trust is created to receive the rents and profits of lands, and no valid direction for accumulation is given, the surplus of such rents and profits, beyond the sum that may be necessary for the education and support of the person for whose benefit the trust is created, shall be liable, in equity, to the claims of the creditors of such person, in the same manner as other personal property, which cannot be reached by an execution at law": 1 Rev. Stats., p. 729, § 57. See, also, Everett v. Peyton, 167 N. Y. 117, 60 N. E. 423; Keeney v. Morse, 71 App. Div. 104, 75 N. Y. Supp. 728; Schuler v. Post, 46 N. Y. Supp. 18, 18 App. Div. 374. See, in general, the following earlier cases: Bryan v. Knickerbacker, 1 Barb. Ch. 409 (independently of statute); Horeas v. Healy, 15 Barb. 296; Bramhall v. Ferris, 14 N. Y. 41, 67 Am. Dec. 113 (cesser clause valid); Graff v. Bonnett, 31 N. Y. 9, 88 Am. Dec. 236; Brown v. Harris, 25 Barb. 134; Ireland v. Ireland, 18 Hun, 362; Wetmore v. Truslow, 51 N. Y. 339; and the following recent cases: Re McKay, 143 Fed. 671 (rights of trustee in bankruptcy of cestui); Ullman v. Cameron, 186 N. Y. 339, 116 Am. St. Rep. 553, 78 N. E. 1074 (if cestui can demand possession his creditors can get the fund); Re Ungrich, 201 N. Y. 415, 94 N. E. 999 (discusses New York statute as to

and, as the rule is generally accepted, the restraint of such

rights of creditors); Brearley School v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 358, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 251, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1215, 94 N. E. 1001, (though trust was then in existence statute of 1908 held to permit creditors getting ten per cent of income). By statute of 1908 ten per cent of the income from a spendthrift trust may be taken by creditors, even though the trust was then in existence: Brearley School v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. 358. See note, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1215.

North Carolina .--- "It shall and may be lawful for any person by deed or will to convey any property to any other person in trust to receive and pay the profits annually or oftener for the support and maintenance of any child, grandchild or other relation of the grantor, for the life of such child, grandchild or other relation, with remainder as the grantor shall provide; and the property so conveyed shall not be liable for or subject to be seized or taken in any manner for the debts of such child, grandchild or other relation, whether the same be contracted or incurred before or after the grant: provided that this section shall apply only to grants and conveyances where the property conveyed does not yield at the time of the conveyance a clear annual income exceeding five hundred dollars": Code of 1883, see. 1335. See Monroe v. Trenholm, 112 N. C. 634, 17 S. E. 439, 114 N. C. 590, 19 S. E. 377; Gray v. Hawkins, 133 N. C. 1, 45 S. E. 363; Vaughan v. Wise, 152 N. C. 31, 67 S. E. 33 (language not sufficient to create such a trust); Fowler & Lee v. Webster, 173 N. C. 442, 92 S. E. 157.

Oregon.—Mattison v. Mattison, 53 Or. 254, 133 Am. St. Rep. 829, 18 Ann. Cas. 218, 100 Pac. 4 (spendthrift trust may be implied from general intention of will).

Pennsylvania .- Board of Charities and Corrections v. Lockard, 198 Pa. St. 572, 82 Am. St. Rep. 817, 48 Atl. 496; Winthrop Co. v. Clinton, 196 Pa. St. 472, 79 Am. St. Rep. 729, 46 Atl. 435; In re Moore's Estate, 198 Pa. St. 611, 48 Atl. 884; In re Barker's Estate, 159 Pa. St. 518, 28 Atl. 365; In re Hibb's Estate, 143 Pa. St. 217, 22 Atl. 882; In re Mehaffey's Estate, 139 Pa. St. 276, 20 Atl. 1056; In re Stambaugh's Estate, 135 Pa. St. 585, 19 Atl. 1058; In re Mannerback's Estate, 133 Pa. St. 342, 19 Atl. 552; In re Brooks' Estate, 140 Pa. St. 84, 21 Atl. 240; Eberly's Appeal, 110 Pa. St. 95, 1 Atl. 330; In re Minnich's Estate, 206 Pa. St. 405, 55 Atl. 1067; Shankland's Appeal, 47 Pa. St. 113; Fisher v. Taylor, 2 Rawle 33; Holdship v. Patterson, 7 Watts, 547; Ashurst v. Given, 5 W. & S. 323; Vaux v. Parke, 7 W. & S. 19; Norris v. Johnson, 5 Pa. 287; Brown v. Williamson, 36 Pa. St. 338; Rees v. Livingston, 41 Pa. St. 113; Still v. Spear, 45 Pa. St. 168; Barnett's Appeal, 46 Pa. St. 392, 86 Am. Dec. 502; Girard Life Ins., etc., Co. v. Chambers, 46 Pa. St. 485, 86 Am. Dec. 513 (trust insufficient); Rife v. Geyser, 59 Pa. St. 393, 98 Am. Dec. 351; Keyser v. Mitchell, 67 Pa. St. 473; Huber's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 348; Overman's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 276. The extent of the doctrine in this state is illustrated by In re Beck's Estate, 133 Pa. St. 51, 19 Am. St. Rep. 623, 19 Atl. 302. The will directed that a sum "be paid directly to the said E. B. by my executor,

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clause may operate during any future as well as present marriage.⁶ g

§ 989, 6 Hawkes v. Hubback, L. R. 11 Eq. 5; In re Gaffee's Trusts, 1 Macn. & G. 541; Rennie v. Ritchie, 12 Clark & F. 204; Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 Mylne & C. 377, 1 Beav. 1; Baggett v. Meux, 1 Phill. Ch. 627, 1 Coll. C. C. 138; Shirley v. Shirley, 9 Paige, 363; Waters v. Tazewell, 9 Md. 291; Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195, 197; Fellows v. Tann, 9 Ala. 999, 1003. By some American courts the clause against anticipation has been held valid only during the existing marriage: See Dubs v. Dubs, 31 Pa. St. 149; Wells v. McCall, 64 Pa. St. 207; Apple v. Allen, 3 Jones' Eq. 120; Miller v. Bingham, 1 Ired. Eq. 423, 36 Am. Dec. 58.

without diminution for the payment of her said indebtedness." It was held that creditors could not reach the sum so long as it remained in the executor's hands. See, also, In re Goe's Estate, 146 Pa. St. 431, 28 Am. St. Rep. 805, 23 Atl. 383. A spendthrift trust cannot be created in favor of the donor: Ghormley v. Smith, 139 Pa. St. 584, 23 Am. St. Rep. 215, 11 L. R. A. 565, 21 Atl. 135; Mackason's Appeal, 42 Pa. St. 330, 82 Am. Dec. 517. The trustee cannot be the cestui: Hahn v. Hutchinson, 159 Pa. St. 133, 28 Atl. 167. A good illustration of what has been held not sufficient to constitute a spendthrift trust is found in Park v. Matthews, 36 Pa. St. 28. "Testatrix bequeathed \$5000 to her brother, to be received and held by trustees, and the interest or proceeds to be annually paid over to the legatee for his use and benefit. The legatee's creditor attached the interest. We hold that it was attachable, because it was his, in law and equity. If the trustees had withheld it from him, he could have sued for and recovered it. Wherever a party has a right of action, his creditors may attach the debt, unless it be for wages." Sce, also, Nolan v. Nolan, 218 Pa. 135, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 369, 67 Atl. 52 (cannot be for benefit of trustor); In re Spring's Estate, 216 Pa. 529, 66 Atl. 110 (income to be paid to *cestwi* from time to time as his best interests should require; valid); In re Fleming's Estate, 219 Pa. 422, 68 Atl. 960; Van Leer v. Van Leer, 221 Pa. 195, 70 Atl. 716; In re Morgan's Estate, 223 Pa. 228, 132 Am. St. Rep. 732, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 236, 72 Atl. 498 (good discussion; not such a trust).

Rhode Island.—Where the cestui takes no vested interest and there is merely a discretionary power in the executors to apply it for his benefit, creditors cannot reach the fund: Stone v. Westcott, 18 R. I. 685, 29 Atl. 838; Nightingale v. Phillips, 29 R. I. 175, 72 Atl. 220 (spendthrift trust; rule in Shelley's case not applied).

§ 989, (g) In a trust for benefit of married woman, terms of trust will be strictly followed. When she dies trust ends and title vests in remainderman. Glasgow v. Missouri Car & Foundry Co., 229 Mo. 585, 129 S. W. 900 (widow). As to trust for maintenance of wife and children, see Talley v. Ferguson, 64 W. Va. 328, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1215, 62 Atl. 456, and note. § 990. Rules of Descent and Succession.—The rules concerning descent, devolution, and succession, applied to the

Where the *cestui* has a vested equitable interest, the creditors can reach it: Tillinghast v. Bradford, 5 R. I. 205.

South Carolina.—Where the cestui has a vested interest, it is subject to his debts; but where there is a pure and absolute discretion in the trustee with power to appoint to other uses, there is nothing that can be subjected to payment of debts: Heath v. Bishop, 4 Rich. Eq. 46, 55 Am. Dec. 654; Wiley v. White, 10 Rich. Eq. 294.

Tennessee .--- Staub v. Williams, 5 Lea, 458; Jourolman v. Massengill, 86 Tenn. 81, 5 S. W. 719 (overruling earlier cases). The statute in this state is very broad. Code, § 4283, provides: "The creditor whose execution has been returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, may file a bill in chancery against the defendant in the execution, and any other person or corporation, to compel the discovery of any property, including stock, choses in action, or money due to such defendant, or held in trust for him, except when the trust has been created by, or the property so held has proceeded from, some person other than the defendant himself, and the trust has been declared by will duly recorded, or deed duly registered." This has been interpreted to deprive the creditor of his right to proceed against the trust estate: Porter v. Lee, 88 Tenn. 782, 14 S. W. 218. Under the statute, it is held that although the creditors may not be able to reach the *eestui's* interest either at law or in equity, it may still be alienable: Henson v. Wright, 88 Tenn. 501, 12 S. W. 1035. A trust with a cesser clause is valid: First National Bank v. Nashville Trust Co., (Tenn. Ch. App.) 62 S. W. 392.

Texas.—Wood v. McClelland, (Tex. Civ. App.) 53 S. W. 381; McClelland v. McClelland, (Tex. Civ. App.) 37 S. W. 350; Patten v. Herring, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 640, 29 S. W. 388.

Vermont.---Wales v. Bowdish, 61 Vt. 23, 4 L. R. A. 819, 17 Atl. 1000; Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 530, 10 Atl. 258; White v. White, 30 Vt. 338.

Virginia .--- The statute makes estates of every kind subject to debts: Code of 1887, § 2428. Accordingly, it is held that "where trustees are directed to apply the income of a trust fund for the support and benefit of the debtor, and for other purposes, but have no right to exclude the debtor, then the assignee and the creditors can claim from the trustee the amount which the debtor could have claimed should have been applied to his benefit": Hutchinson v. Maxwell, 100 Va. 169, 93 Am. St. Rep. 944, 57 L. R. A. 384, 40 S. E. 655, qualifying the earlier case of Garland v. Garland, 87 Va. 758, 24 Am. St. Rep. 682, 13 L. R. A. 212, 13 S. E. 478. See, also, S. N. Honaker & Sons v. Duff, 101 Va. 675, 44 S. E. 900. It would seem from the discussion that if the trustee has the right to exclude the cestui, the fund cannot be reached by creditors. See, also, Petty v. Moores Brook Sanitarium, 110 Va. 815, 19 Ann. Cas. 271, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 800, 67 S. E. 355 (attempted trust for benefit of donor, invalid).

West Virginia.—Hoffman v. Beltzhoover, 71 W. Va. 72, 76 S. E. 968 (înstrument need not contain all the restrictions and qualifications incident to such a trust). equitable estates of beneficiaries, are generally the same which regulate corresponding legal estates.^{1 a} Those rules, however, which result from the doctrine of tenure do not apply, and therefore it is settled in England that the equitable estate of the beneficiary in lands held in trust for him is not subject to escheat, but the trustee holds the land absolutely.² As a consequence of the general doctrine, estates of inheritance held in trust for the wife are subject

§ 990, 1 Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 177; Trash v. Wood, 4 Mylne & C. 324, 328 (descent); Price v. Sisson, 13 N. J. 168, 174; Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 267, 281. The rule in Shelley's case extends to trust estates: Jones v. Morgan, 1 Brown Ch. 206, 222.

§ 990, ² Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 177; Onslow v. Wallis, 1 Macn. & G. 506; Sweeting v. Sweeting, 33 L. J. Ch. 211. It is doubtful whether this particular rule prevails in the United States; it should not, upon principle, since with us the doctrine of escheat to the state is not in the least based upon the notion of tenure: See Matthews v. Ward, 10 Gill & J. 443, 454. Where the trust is one of personalty, on the death of the beneficiary intestate and without any next of kin, the crown or the state succeeds to his property, upon other grounds than that of common-law escheat: Burgess v. Wheate, *supra*; Williams v. Lonsdale, 3 Ves. 752; Taylor v. Haygarth, 14 Sim. 8; Cradock v. Owen, 2 Smale & G. 241.^b

§ 990, (a) Lord v. Comstock, 240 Ill. 492, 88 N. E. 1012 (does not apply to personalty); McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 Ill. 281, 86 N. E. 139; Sprague v. Sprague, 13 R. I. 701; Taylor v. Lindsay, 14 R. I. 518; Lindsey v. Eckles, 99 Va. 668, 40 S. E. 23. See as to the English rule, Banks v. Sutton, 2 P. Wms. 700; The King v. Ex'rs of Sir John Deccombe, Cro. Jac. 512, Ames Cas. on Trusts 353 (chattel interests of the cestui were forfeited to the crown on his being attainted of felony); Anonymous, reported in Year Book, 5 Edw. IV., 7, pl. 18, Ames Cas. on Trusts 352. See King's Atty. v. Sands, Freeman's Ch. Cas. 129, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 354, for an illustration of the operation of the rule; Middleton

v. Spicer, 1 Br. Ch. Cas. 201 (the crown took a chattel real on failure of heirs).

§ 990, (b) See, also, Johnston v. Spicer, 107 N. Y. 198, 13 N. E. 753: Commonwealth v. Naile, 88 Pa. St. 429 (the "escheat" was due to statutory provision); Smith v. McCann, 24 How. 405 (approving Matthews v. Ward, supra). In Fox v. Horsh, 1 Ir. Eq. 358, the court admitted the right of the state to succeed to personalty, held in trust for a corporation, when the corporation was dissolved, but held the choses in action became extinct as no one could demand the money; it would seem the state could have done so; see the English case of Bishop v. Curtis, 18 Q. B. 878.

to the husband's curtesy;^{3 c} but by a strange inconsistency of the English law, the wife had no dower in similar estates held in trust for her husband.^{4 d}

§ 991. Express Active Trusts.—Active or special trusts are those in which, either from the express directions of the language creating the trust, or from the very nature of the trust itself, the trustees are charged with the performance of active and substantial duties with respect to the control, management, and disposition of the trust property for the benefit of the *cestuis que trustent*. They may, except when restricted by statute, be created for every purpose not unlawful, and, as a general rule, may extend to

§ 990, ³ Roberts v. Dixwell, 1 Atk. 607; D'Arcy v. Blake, 2 Schoales. & L. 387; Cooper v. Macdonald, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 288; Appleton v. Rowley, L. R. 8 Eq. 139; Follett v. Tyrer, 14 Sim. 125; Morgan v. Morgan, 5 Madd. 408; Dubs v. Dubs, 31 Pa. St. 149; Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689.

§ 990, 4 D'Arcy v. Blake, 2 Schoales & L. 387; Dixon v. Saville, 1 Brown Ch. 325. A different rule generally prevails in the United States: See Cushing v. Blake, *supra*.

§ 990, (c) Curtesy.—Sweetapple v. Bindon, 2 Vern. 536, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 379; Watts v. Ball, 1 P. Wms. 108, Ames Cas. on Trusts 379; Jackson v. Becktold Painting etc. Co., 86 Ark. 591, 112 S. W. 161; Rawlings v. Adams, 7 Md. 26; Houghton v. Hopgood, 13 Pick. 154; Alexander v. Warrance, 17 Mo. 228 ("the law is clearly settled, that a husband is entitled to curtesy in the equitable estate of his wife"); Dubs v. Dubs, 31 Pa. St. 149; Norman v. Cunningham, 5 Gratt. 63.

§ 990, (d) Dower.—See, also, Bottomly v. Lord Fairfax, Precedents in Ch. 336 ("the court hath never yet gone so far as to allow her dower in such case"); Atty-Gen. v. Scott, Cas. Temp. Talb. 138 ("How the difference now received, between

tenant by the curtesy and tenant in dower, ever came to be established. I cannot tell; but that it is established is certain"). The difference in the United States is generally due to statute: See Reed v. Whitney, 7 Gray, 533; Bush v. Bush, 5 Del. Ch. 144; In re Ransom, 17 Fed. 331. See, as following the original rule, Hamlin v. Hamlin, 19 Me. 141; Cornog v. Cornog, 3 Del. Ch. 407 (semble, but dower allowed in mortgaged property, on the ground that the mortgagee got a legal estate); Kenyon v. Kenyon, 17 R. I. 539, 23 Atl. 101, 24 Atl. 787; see, also, Hopkinson v. Dumas, 42 N. H. 296; Johnston v. Jickling, 141 Iowa, 444, 119 N. W. 746; Seaman v. Harmon, 192 Mass, 5, 78 N. E. 301.

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every kind of property, real and personal.^a In this class the interest of the trustee is not a mere naked legal title, and that of the *cestui que trust* is not the real ownership of the subject-matter. The extent and incidents of the rights held by the respective parties must, of course, vary with the nature of the trust itself and the duties which the trustee is called upon to perform. It is a universal rule, however, that the trustee's estate and power over the subject-matter are commensurate with the duties which the trust devolves upon him, and are sufficient to enable him to perform all those duties.¹ b The trustee is generally

§ 991, 1 1 Spence's Eq. Jur. 496, 497; Lord Glenorchy v. Bosville, Cas. t. Talb. 3; Williams's Appeals, 83 Pa. St. 377, 387; Delbert's Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 462. For the somewhat exceptional views maintained in some states concerning active trusts, see *ante*, note under § 986. Trusts once active may be accomplished and become passive, and a question may then arise, whether the legal estate of the trustee still continues, or whether it passes to and vests in the beneficiary by operation of the statute of uses. If the existence and separation of the two estates did not originally depend alone upon the trustee's having active duties to perform, that is, if the trust was originally created for some other purpose beside the active duties on behalf of the beneficiary,—then, upon the accomplishment or ceasing of these active duties, the legal estate will not *ipso*

§ 991, (a) The text is quoted in In re Spring's Estate, 216 Pa. 529, 66 Atl. 110.

§ 991, (b) Trustee's Estate Commensurate With Duties.-See In re Dyson and Fawke, [1896] 2 Ch. 720; In re Montagu, [1897] 2 Ch. 8; Williamson v. Grider, 97 Ark. 588, 135 S. W. 361 (till debts were paid); In re Spreckels' Estate, 162 Cal. 559, 123 Pac. 371 (to pay income to beneficiary for life: estate per auter vie); Aldersley v. McCloud, 35 Cal. App. 17, 168 Pac. 1153 (a power of sale necessarily carries with it the right to convey the fce although the trustee's estate is merely per auter vie); Christopher v. Munger, 61 Fla. 513, 534, 55 South. 273 (life estate, though

deed runs to him and his heirs); Vernoy v. Robinson, 133 Ga. 653, 66 S. E. 928 (life estate, though power to convey fee); Bergman v. Arnhold, 242 Ill. 218, 89 N. E. 1000 (fee); Harvey v. Ballard, 252 Ill. 57, 96 N. E. 558 (to pay rents to beneficiary for life: estate per auter vie); Yates v. Yates, 255 Ill. 66, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 143, 99 N. E. 360; Lord v. Comstock, 240 Ill. 492, 88 N. E. 1012; Reichert v. Missouri & I. Coal Co., 231 Ill. 238, 121 Am. St. Rep. 307, 83 N. E. 166; Lewis v. Curnutt, 130 Iowa, 423, 106 N. W. 914; Bank of Taylorsville v. Van Dyke, 159 Ky. 201, 166 S. W. 1024; Glynn v. Maxfield, 75 N. H. 482, 76 Atl. 196 (fee); Wright v. Keasbey, (N. J.

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facto vest in the beneficiary by operation of the statute: Perry on Trusts, sec. 351. But the beneficiary may then be entitled to a conveyance of the legal estate from the trustee: Sherman v. Dodge, 28 Vt. 26, 30; Leonard's Lessee v. Diamond, 31 Md. 536, 541. After a great lapse of time and a long-continued possession by the beneficiary or person representing his interests, a conveyance may be presumed: Leonard's Lessee v. Diamond, supra; Den v. Bordine, 20 N. J. L. 394; Aiken v. Smith, 1 Sneed, 304. On the other hand, where the active duties conferred upon the trustee constituted the only ground for keeping the two estates separate and distinct, upon the ceasing of those duties the legal title will vest in the *cestui que trust* by operation of the statute: Perry on Trusts, sec. 351; Welles v. Castles, 3 Gray, 323.^e It is said that if all the beneficiaries are in existence and sui juris, and consent, a court may decree the conveyance of the trust property to them, although the trust has not been completed nor ceased; Perry on Trusts, secs. 274, 922; Smith v. Harrington, 4 Allen,

Eq.), 100 Atl. 172 (fee and power of sale); In re L'Hommedieu, (N. Y.) 138 Fed. 606; Breeden v. Moore, 82 S. C. 534, 64 S. E. 604; Montgomery v. Trueheart, (Tex. , Civ. App.) 146 S. W. 284 (citing this section); Martin v. Moore (Preston), 49 Wash. 288, 94 Pac. 1087; In re Cole's Estate, 102 Wis. 1, 72 Am. St. Rep. 854, 78 N. W. 402 (discussing the power to repair and tax corpus of estate in repairs). See, generally, Zabriskie v. Morris, etc., R. R. Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 22; East Rome Town Co. v. Cothran, 81 Ga. 359, 8 S. E. 737; In re Bellinger, [1898] 2 Ch. 534.

As to What Constitutes an Active Trust, see Eldred v. Meek, 183 Ill. 26, 75 Am. St. Rep. 86, 55 N. E. 536; Smith v. Smith, 254 Ill. 488, 98 N. E. 950; Breidenbach v. Walter's Ex'rs, (Ky.) 119 S. W. 204; Walton v. Ketchum, 147 Mo. 209, 48 S. W. 924; Easton v. Demuth, 179 Mo. App. 722, 162 S. W. 294; Rosenbaum v. Garrett, 57 N. J. Eq. 186, 41 Atl. 252; Webb v. Borden, 145 N. C. 188, 58 S. E. 1083; In re Gourley's Estate, 238 Pa. 62, 85 Atl. 999; Carney v. Byron, 19 R. I. 283, 36 Atl. 5; Hayward v. Tacoma Savings Bk. & Trust Co., 88 Wash. 542, 153 Pac. 352. To the effect that a discretion on the part of the trustee makes the trust active, see In re Kreb's Estate, 184 Pa. St. 222, 39 Atl. 66; Danahy v. Noonan, 176 Mass. 467, 57 N. E. 679.

§ 991, (c) Vesting of Legal Title in Beneficiary on Termination of Duties .-- Reichert v. Missouri & I. Coal Co., 231 Ill. 238, 121 Am. St. Rep. 307. 83 N. E. 166; Lang v. Lang, 62 Md. 33; Potomac Lodge v. Miller, 118 Md. 405, 84 Atl. 554 (gift of a house to one in trust for his children. On his death title passes without conveyance); Glasgow v. Missouri Car & Foundry Co., 229 Mo. 585, 129 S. W. 900 (trust for married woman, on death of husband she gets fee); Ottomeyer v. Pritchett, 178 Mo. 160, 77 S. W. 62; McNeer v. Patrick, 93 Neb. 746, 142 N. W. 283 (trust for married woman, on divorce she gets fee); Temple v. Ferguson, 110 Tenn. 84, 100 Am. St. Rep. 791, 72 S. W. 455 (trust for married women).

erty,º and to the receipt of its rents and profits; and in

566; Bowditch v. Andrew, 8 Allen, 339; Culbertson's Appeal, 76 Pa. St. 145, 148; but see Douglas v. Cruger, 80 N. Y. 15, which holds that a court of equity has no power to decree the determination of an existing and valid trust. Such a conveyance is prohibited by the statutes of New York and of the other states which have followed the New York type of legislation.^d

§ 991, (d) Termination of Existing Trust.-In Sanders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 454, the court said: "Where a legacy is directed to accumulate for a certain period, or where the payment is postponed, the legatee, if he has an absolute, indefeasible interest in the legacy, is not bound to wait until the expiration of that period, but may require payment the moment he is able to give a valid discharge." This principle is expressly approved in Harbin v. Masterman, [1894] 2 Ch. 184; In re Johnston, [1894] 3 Ch. 204 (even to the extent of refusing to allow the trustee to exercise a discretion given by the will). In the case of In re Stone, 138 Mass. 476, the cestui for life obtained a conveyance of a logal estate and terminated a trust that was intended for the benefit of her children after her death. In Sears v. Choate, 146Mass. 395, 4 Am. St. Rep. 320, 15 N. E. 786, the court allowed the cestui to obtain a conveyance, not provided for by the trust will, on

§ 991, (e) In the case of Tidd v. Lister, 5 Mad. 429, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 465, a *cestui que trust* of a life estate, where the trustee was bound to perform active duties, sought the possession of the estate and it was refused, though the court admitted that there might be special circumstances in some cases that would vary the rule; a receiver was appointed instead. The right of the cestui que trust of a life estate to the possession of the property is affected largely by statute in England, and possession is frequently given him: West v. Wythes, [1893] 2 Ch. . 369; In re Bently, 64 L. J. Ch. 782; In re Bagat, [1894] 1 Ch. 177 (though it is still largely within the discretion of the court); In re Newen, [1894] 2 Ch. 297. In Williamson v. Wilkins, 14 Ga. 416, where the cestui of a life estate was allowed to collect the dividends of stock, and thereby save the trustee's . commission, it was said: "And courts in deciding this question, will be governed mainly by the general scope and object of the trust, and the nature of the duties which the trustee is required to discharge. . . . If a court of equity will put the tenant for life in the personal possession and occupation of property, if it be beneficial or requisite for its due enjoyment, as in the case of a family residence or slaves, as it undoubtedly will, much more will it do that which asks no surrender of the corpus"; Wade v. Power, 20 Ga. 645 (if the trust is passive, the equitable life tenant may have possession); Young v. Miles, 10 B. Mon. 287. In Wickham v. Berry, 55 Pa. St. 70, the ccstui for life was not allowed the possession of land on the ground that the trustee had special active duties to perform.

many cases he has, from the very nature of the trust, au-

his reaching the age of thirty years. The court said: "There is no doubt of the power and duty of the court to decree the termination of the trust, where all its objects and purposes have been accomplished, where the interests under it have all vested, and where all parties beneficially interested desire its termination. Where property is given to certain persons for their benefit, and in such manner that no other person has or can have an interest in it, they are in effect the absolute owners of it and it is reasonable and just that they should have the control and disposal of it unless some good cause appears to the contrary." The court cited Smith v. Harrington, 4 Allen, 566; Bowditch v. Andrew, 8 Allen, 339; Inches v. Hill, 106 Mass. 575; Stone, Petitioner, 138 Mass. 476; Underwood v. Boston etc., Bank, 141 Mass. 305, 4 N. E. 822; and the above statement is quoted with approval in Hunt v. Hunt, 124 Mich. 502, 83 N. W. 371. But see, contra, Dunn v. Dobson, 198 Mass. 142, 84 N. E. 327 (all beneficiaries must consent); Claffin v. Claffin, 149 Mass. 19, 14 Am. St. Rep. 393, 3 L. R. A. 370, 20 N. E. 454, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 455, where the court states: "We have found no expression of any opinion in our reports that provisions requiring a trustee to hold and manage the trust property until the beneficiary reached an age let youd that of twenty-one years are necessarily void if the interest of the beneficiary is vested and absolute"; the cestui was therefore refused a conveyance although able to give a valid discharge; and see the case of Lent v. Howard, 89 N. Y. 169, depending on statute; Ackerman

v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 90 Conn. 63, 96 Atl. 149 (must appear that every reasonable ultimate purpose of the trust's creation has been accomplished); Miller Ex'rs v. Miller's Heirs & Creditors, 172 Ky. 519, 189 S. W. 417 (although every one consented, whole design of trust had not been accomplished); Easton v. DeMuth, 179 Mo. App. 722, 162 S. W. 294 (trust for education of children); Hill v. Hill, 49 Okl. 424, 152 Pac. 1122 (refused where some of the beneficiaries were minors); Hayward v. . Tacoma Savings Bank & Trust Co., 88 Wash. 542, 153 Pac. 352. See the cases cited in the note to sec. 1065. In order to obtain a conveyance, before the settlor intended the cestui to have the property, it is generally essential that the cestui have the entire beneficial interest and that there be no discretion on the part of the trustee to exclude him from taking: Weatherall v. Thornburg, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 261; Harbin v. Masterman, supra; Russell v. Grinnell, 105 Mass. 425; Cooper v. Cooper, 36 N. J. Eq. 121. In accord with the rule of Sears v. Choate, supra, see Anderson v. Williams, 262 Ill. 308, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 720, 104 N. E. 659 (where all parties in interest are adults and desire the trust to be terminated and all its proper purposes have been accomplished, this may be done); Olsen v. Youngerman, 136 Iowa, 404, 113 N. W. 938 (good discussion); Kimball v. Blanchard, 101 Me. 383, 64 Atl. 645 (rule only applies to passive trusts); Tilton v. Davidson, 98 Me. 55, 56 Atl. 215; Simmons v. Northwestern Trust Co., 136 Minn. 357, 162 N. W. 450; Eakle v. Ingram, 142 Cal. 15, 100 Am. St. Rep. 99, 75 Pac, 566.

thority to sell or otherwise dispose of it. The interest of the beneficiary is necessarily more limited than in passive trusts, and it sometimes cannot with accuracy be called an equitable *estate.*^f He always has the right, however, to compel a performance of the trust according to its terms and intent.^g

§ 992. Classes of Active Trusts.^a—Although active trusts may be created for a great number of special purposes, those which are the most frequent and important may be reduced to the four following generic classes: 1. Where the trust is simply to convey the property to some designated person, or class of persons.¹ 2. Where the primary object is to sell or dispose of the entire trust property in some manner and to use the proceeds for some ulterior purposes.² In all instances of this class, where the trust

§ 992, 1 This species is often found in connection with other kinds. Trusts for investment and accumulation almost invariably terminate with a trust to convey the accumulations to specified beneficiaries; in trusts for applying rents and profits to particular uses, there is generally a provision for conveying the capital fund, at the expiration of the period limited, to some designated persons by way of remainder. Trusts merely to convey the property, unaccompanied by any other duties of the trustee, are uncommon.^b Such dispositions are very frequent in English marriage settlements, but they are usually accomplished by means of powers, rather than by trusts.

§ 992, ² Among the most important instances belonging to this class are conveyances or assignments by a debtor upon trust to sell the property and pay debts with the proceeds, including the official assignments made

§ 991, (f) As to provisions imposing a restraint on alienation, and freeing the interest of the beneficiary from the claims of his creditors, see *ante*, § 989, cases cited in note.

§ 991, (g) See Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U. S. 461, 45 L. Ed. 1183, 21 Sup. Ct. 845; Higbee v. Brockenbrough, (Mo.) 191 S. W. 994 (trust to pay income from rented house; cestui que trust has no alienable interest in the house, but merely an equitable interest in the income:) Goble v. Swobe, 64 Neb. 838, 90 N. W. 919.

§ 992, (a) This section is cited in Roberts v. Stevens, 84 Me. 325, 17 L. B. A. 266, 24 Atl. 873; Oregon Timber & Cruising Co. v. Seton, 59 Or. 64, 111 Pac. 376, 115 Pac. 1121. § 992, (b) For example, see Preachers' Aid Society v. England, 106 Ill. 125. is to sell the *corpus* of the property and to distribute the proceeds among creditors, legatees, and the like, the beneficiaries plainly acquire no proper estate in the original trust fund prior to its sale; their right and interest attach to the proceeds of this fund, which are to be paid to or distributed among them. In order to make their right fully available, and to guard their interest as much as possible against the large authority given to the trustees, equity has invented in such cases the doctrine of *conversion*, by which real property is regarded as personal, and personal property as real.^{3 c} 3. This class includes all those trusts where the primary object is to hold and invest the entire prop-

to assignees in bankruptcy, insolvency, and other analogous proceedings. Also, a devise or bequest of property by will, upon trust to sell, mortgage, or lease the same, and with the proceeds to pay the testator's debts, or legacies, or annuities, or other charges and liabilities, or to pay "portions" to daughters and younger sons. This last object, which is very common in England, is often found in family settlements as well as in wills. A trust to exchange lands, or to dispose of property, and with the proceeds purchase other kinds or forms, falls under the same class.

§ 992, ³ It is in trusts of this form, to sell land and pay over the proceeds, and in those exactly opposite, to use money in the purchase of land which is then to be conveyed, that the doctrine of conversion finds its special field of operation: See Fletcher v. Ashburner, 1 Brown Ch. 497; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1118; Greenhill v. Greenhill, 2 Vern. 679; Guidot v. Guidot, 3 Atk. 254, 256; Wheldale v. Partridge, 5 Ves. 388, 396; Biddulph v. Biddulph, 12 Ves. 161; Stead v. Newdigate, 2 Mer. 521; Ashby v. Palmer, 1 Mer. 296; Elliott v. Fisher, 12 Sim. 505; Griffith v. Ricketts, 7 Hare, 299; Farrar v. Earl of Winterton, 5 Beav. 1; Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 563; Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. 532, 534, 563; Gott v. Cooke, 7 Paige, 521, 523, 534; Lorillard v. Coster, 5 Paige, 173, 218.

§ 992, 4 Sometimes land or personal property is given on trust to receive the income, and continually to invest it in the purchase of other lands, or interest-hearing securities, during the period of the trust; sometimes land is given on trust to sell and to invest the proceeds in securi-

§ 992, (c) The text is cited in case involving a trust of this char-McCulloch v. Chatfield, 67 Fed. 877, acter. 15 C. C. A. 48, 32 U. S. App. 323, a of which the primary object is to hold the *corpus* of the property, receive its rents, profits, and income, and apply them to some prescribed uses.⁵ More than one of these four general objects may be embraced in the same trust. In instances of the third and fourth classes, the beneficiaries may have a direct equitable interest in the trust property itself, which is plainly more than a *mere* right of action, but is not so substantial an estate as that held by the *cestui que trust* under a simple passive trust.

§ 993. Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors.^a— Among the active trusts which are quite frequent in this country are voluntary and general assignments by failing debtors of their property to trustees upon trust to pay the creditors of the assignor.¹ The doctrine is settled in England that, primarily, such assignments do not create a trust nor clothe the creditors with the character of *cestuis que*

ties, and to reinvest the income in the same manner; sometimes personal property is directed to be converted into money, and the proceeds to be invested in lands, the income of which is to be accumulated by the constant purchase of other lands, etc. In all these forms provision is made for the disposition of the accumulated fund at the expiration of the period, in some manner on behalf of the beneficiaries. The periods for which such trusts may be created are now limited by statute in England and in this country, so as to prevent a "perpetuity."

§ 992, ⁵ The forms of this class also are various. Real or personal property, or both, is sometimes given by will upon trust to hold the capital and apply the income to the payment of debts, legacies, annuities, etc.; property, real or personal, or both, is given by will or hy deed in trust to receive the rents and profits and pay the same to, or apply them to the use of, designated beneficiaries during their lives, or for some specified period. In this manner provision is often made for wives in marriage settlements, and for widows and children by will.

§ 993, 1 These general assignments are not common in England, since they interfere with the modern bankrupt laws; so far as they do not conflict with those laws they are valid. In some of the states the whole ground is covered by local insolvent laws; in others, assignments for the benefit of creditors are strictly regulated and limited by statutes.

§ 993, (a) This paragraph is cited Seton, 59 Or. 64, 111 Pac. 376, 115 in Oregon Timber & Cruising Co. v. Pac. 1121. trustent; they rather confer a power upon the trustee, and make him an agent for the debtor to dispose of the property under the debtor's directions. It follows from this view that until the assignment has been communicated to the creditors, it may be revoked, or altered, or superseded by the assignor, at his own will.² But when the fact of such assignment has been communicated to creditors, and their position is altered by it, and especially if they have assented to it, then it becomes irrevocable as to such creditors, and they can enforce its trusts and take the benefit of its provisions in their behalf.³ If creditors make themselves actual parties by executing the deed of assignment, it of course becomes irrevocable as to them; their rights under it are fixed.⁴

§ 993, ² Garrard v. Lauderdale, 3 Sim. 1; 2 Russ. & M. 451; Walwyn v. Coutts, 3 Mer. 707; 3 Sim. 14; Acton v. Woodgate, 2 Mylne & K. 492; Browne v. Cavendish, 1 Jones & L. 606; and see Brooks v. Marbury, 11 Wheat. 78.

§ 993, ³ There is some discrepancy in the language of different decisions upon this point. Some seem to require that a creditor should do some affirmative act showing his assent; others appear to hold that after information of the assignment is communicated to a creditor his assent will be presumed, unless the contrary is shown,—unless he indicates his dissent in some manner: Actou v. Woodgate, 2 Mylne & K. 492; Browne v. Cavendish, 1 Jones & L. 606; Simmonds v. Palles, 2 Jones & L. 489; Field v. Lord Donoughmore, 1 Dru. & War. 227; Biron v. Mount, 24 Beav. 642; Nicholson v. Tutin, 2 Kay & J. 18; Kirwan v. Daniel, 5 Hare, 493, 499; Griffith v. Ricketts, 7 Hare, 299, 307; Smith v. Hurst, 10 Hare, 30; Cornthwaite v. Frith, 4 De Gex & S. 552; Cosser v. Radford, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 585; Synnot v. Simpson, 5 H. L. Cas. 121, 133;^b Glegg v. Rees, L. R. 7 Ch. 71.

§ 993, 4 Mackinnon v. Stewart, 1 Sim., N. S., 76, 88; Le Touche v. Earl of Lucan, 7 Clark & F. 772; Montefiore v. Browne, 7 H. L. Cas. 241, 266. If the assignment prescribes a time within which it must be executed by the creditors, those who refuse to execute, and those who claim adversely to it, or act inconsistently with it, will be excluded from its benefits: Johnson v. Kershaw, 1 De Gex & S. 260; Watson v. Knight, 19 Beav. 369; Field v. Lord Donoughmore, 1 Dru. & War. 227; Forbes v. Limond, 4

§ 993, (b) This case is followed on this point by Priestly v. Ellis, [1897] 1 Ch. 489.

§ 994. The American Doctrine.—With a few exceptions, the American courts have not adopted this English theory with respect to the nature of such assignments. The doctrine is generally settled in this country that voluntary general assignments for the benefit of creditors, if otherwise valid, are not mere agencies of the debtor; they create true trust relations, and the creditors are true beneficiaries. When once duly executed, they are irrevocable, and the creditors, on being informed of their existence, may take advantage of the provisions in their own favor, and may enforce the trusts declared without making themselves parties, or doing any act indicating their own acceptance or assent.¹ Although the assignee is thus a trustee for the

De Gex, M. & G. 298. But mere delay in executing the deed will not debar those creditors who do not act under it or accept it: Nicholson v. Tutin, 2 Kay & J. 18; Raworth v. Parker, 2 Kay & J. 163; Whitmore v. Turquand, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 107; In re Baber's Trusts, L. R. 10 Eq. 554; Biron v. Mount, 24 Beav. 642.

§ 994, 1 Ellison v. Ellison, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. Ed., 423; Moses v. Murgatroyd, 1 Johns. Ch. 119, 129, 7 Am. Dec. 478; Shepherd v. McEvers, 4 Johns. Ch. 136, 138, 8 Am. Dec. 561; Nicoll v. Mumford, 4 Johns. Ch. 522, 529; Pratt v. Thornton, 28 Me. 355, 48 Am. Dec. 492; Ward v. Lewis, 4 Pick. 518, 523; New England Bank v. Lewis, 8 Pick. 113, 118; Pingree v. Comstock, 18 Pick. 46, 50; Read v. Robinson, 6

§ 994, (a) This section is cited generally in Howell v. Moores, 127 Ill. 67, 19 N. E. 863; Oregon Timber & Cruising Co. v. Seton, 59 Or. 64, 111 Pac. 376, 113 Pac. 4121. In support of this proposition of the text, see Golden's Appeal, 110 Pa. St. 581, 1 Atl. 660; Cohen v. Morris, 70 Ga. 313: McIlhenny v. Todd, 71 Tex. 400, 10 Am. St. Rep. 753, 9 S. W. 445; Fuller v. Hasbrouck, 46 Mich. 78, 8 N. W. 697; Wilhelm v. Byles, 60 Mich. 561, 27 N. W. 847, 29 N. W. 113; Preston v. Spaulding, 120 Ill. 209, 10 N. E. 903; Weider v. Maddox, 66 Tex. 372, 59 Am. Rep. 617; Wynne v. Hardware Co., 67 Tex. 40 (assignee liable for refusing to perform); Howell v. Moores, 127 Ill. 67,

19 N. E. 863 (creditor may maintain bill against personal representative of deceased assignee for enforcement of the trust). Where paper purports to convey only part of assets, and is given with reference to a specific indebtedness, it is a mortgage and not an assignment for creditors: Williamson v. Bitting, (Ga.) 74 S. E. 808. Suit to enforce an assignment is not a judgment creditor's action: L. B. Brockett & Sons v. Lewis, 144 Mich. 560, 108 N. W. 429. Assignment is a trust: Wheeler v. Ocker & Ford Mfg. Co., 162 Mich. 204, 127 N. W. 332; City of Boston v. Turner, 201 Mass. 190, 87 N. E. 634.

creditors, yet he is at the same time so far a representative of the debtor that he must be governed by the express terms of the trust; he cannot indirectly modify the provisions of the assignment.² The doctrine generally prevails in the American states, that unless prohibited by statutes, voluntary general assignments by failing debtors for the benefit of their creditors, even when preferring individuals or classes among the beneficiaries, are valid. The necessary delay incident to the execution of the trust is not within the meaning and scope of the statute which avoids transfers in fraud of creditors.³ c

Watts & S. 329; McKinney v. Rhoads, 5 Watts, 343; Ingram v. Kirkpatrick, 6 Ired. Eq. 463, 51 Am. Dec. 428; Stimpson v. Fries, 2 Jones Eq. 156; Tennant v. Stoney, 1 Rich. Eq. 222, 44 Am. Dec. 213; England v. Reynolds, 38 Ala. 370; Pearson v. Rockhill, 4 B. Mon. 296; Furman v. Fisher, 4 Cold. 626, 94 Am. Dec. 210. But see Gibson v. Rees, 50 Ill. 383. The doctrine which generally prevails, in the absence of statutory regulations, seems to be as follows: A creditor is not bound to accept the provision made in his behalf, nor does the assignment preclude him from suing the debtor and obtaining a judgment upon his claim; but he cannot reach the assigned property in satisfaction of his judgment, unless he is able to procure the assignment to be set aside as frandulent against creditors. In many of the states the acceptance by the creditor of the provision made in the assignment in part payment of his demand will not prevent him from subsequently enforcing the balance of the claim against the debtor's after-acquired property, since the assignment is purely voluntary, and is not per se a composition with creditors, nor does it operate as a discharge in bankruptcy. A clause inserted in the assignment to the effect that a creditor must release and discharge his entire demand as a condition to his claiming any benefits under the trust is held in many states to render the whole assignment void, on the ground that it necessarily hinders and delays creditors. Such provisions, however, seem to be sustained as valid and operative by the courts of other states.^b

§ 994, 2 In re Lewis, 81 N. Y. 421; Nicholson v. Leavitt, 6 N. Y. 510, 519, 57 Am. Dec. 499. In the first case, it was held that an assignce could not prefer a particular debt not preferred by the terms of the assignment.

§ 994, 3 Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 283; Nicholson v. Leavitt, 6 N. Y. 510, 57 Am. Dec. 499; Hauselt v. Vilmar, 76 N. Y. 630; Halsey

§ 994, (b) Clayton v. Johnson, 36 Ark. 406, 38 Am. Rep. 40 (valid); Collier v. Davis, 47 Ark. 367, 58 Am. Rep. 758 (void). § 994, (c) See, also, Richardson v. Marqueze, 59 Miss. 80, 42 Am. Rep. 353; Kyle v. Harvey, 25 W. Va. 716, 52 Am. Rep. 235. As to preferences § 995. Deeds of Trust to Secure Debts.—A special form of trust for the benefit of creditors peculiar to the law of this country has become quite common in several of the states, and requires a brief description. A "deed of trust

v. Whitney, 4 Mason, 206, 227-230; Ogden v. Larrabee, 57 Ill. 389. The validity of the assignment depends upon the question whether it falls within the inhibitions of the statute of 13 Eliz., c. 5, and analogous statutes of the American states. If executed with an actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, as shown by extrinsic evidence, or if it contains provisions which necessarily operate to hinder or delay creditors, and therefore raise a conclusive presumption of such an intent, the assignment will be declared void. Various provisions have been thus condemned by the courts, although there is not a perfect uniformity among the decisions. A provision which creates a trust in favor of the debtor himself, to be operative before all the creditors are fully paid, will always render the assignment void:d See Stickney v. Crane, 35 Vt. 89; Therasson v. Hickok, 37 Vt. 454; McGregor v. Chase, 37 Vt. 225; Frink v. Buss, 45 N. H. 325; Fairchild v. Hunt, 14 N. J. Eq. 367; Hyslop v. Clarke, 14 Johns. 458; Austin v. Bell, 20 Johns. 442, 11 Am. Dec. 297; Seaving v. Brinkerhoff, 5 Johns. Ch. 329; Sheldon v. Dodge, 4 Denio, 217; Lentilhon v. Moffat, 1 Edw. Ch. 451; Grover v. Wakeman, 11 Wend. 187, 201, 203, 25 Am. Dec. 624, 4 Paige, 23; Halstead v. Gordon, 34 Barb. 422; Schlussel v. Willett, 34 Barb. 615; Barney v. Griffin, 2 N. Y. 365; Leitch v. Hollister, 4 N. Y. 211; Litchfield v. White, 7 N. Y. 438, 57 Am. Dec. 534; Kellogg v. Slawsen, 11 N. Y. 302, 304; Nichols v. McEwen, 17 N. Y. 22; Campbell v. Woodworth, 24 N. Y. 304, 33 Barb. 425; Dunham v. Waterman, 17 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 406; Nicholson v. Leavitt, 6 N. Y. 510, 57 Am. Dec. 499; Brigham v. Tillinghast, 13 N. Y. 215; Rapalee v. Stewart, 27 N. Y. 310: Ogden v. Peters, 21 N. Y. 23, 78 Am. Dec. 122: Griffin v. Marquardt, 21 N. Y. 121; Jessup v. Hulse, 21 N. Y. 16S; Wilson v. Robertson, 21 N. Y. 587; Coyne v. Weaver, 84 N. Y. 386; McConnell v. Sherwood, 84 N. Y. 522, 38 Am. Rep. 537; Townsend v. Stearns, 32 N. Y. 209; Benedict v. Huntington, 32 N. Y. 219; Spaulding v. Strang, 37 N. Y. 135, 38 N. Y. 9; Cuyler v. McCartney, 40 N. Y. 221; Putnam v. Huhhell, 42 N. Y. 106; and see 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 56-75. An assignment including property of the debtor which has been levied on by exe-

not invalidating the assignment, see Albany, etc., Steel Co. v. Southern Agrl. Works, 76 Ga. 135, 2 Am. St. Rep. 26; Estes v. Gunter, 122 U. S. 450, 30 L. Ed. 1228, 7 Sup. Ct. 1275; Pyles v. Riverside Furniture Co., 30 W. Va. 123, 2 S. E. 909. § 994, (d) Knapp v. McGowan, 96 N. Y. 75; Bagley v. Bowe, 105 N. Y. 171, 59 Am. Rep. 488, 11 N. E. 386; De Wolf v. Sprague Mfg. Co., 49 Conn. 282. to secure a debt" is a conveyance made to a trustee as security for a debt owing to the beneficiary,-a creditor of the grantor,-and conditioned to be void on payment of the debt by a certain time, but if not paid the trustee to sell the land and apply the proceeds in extinguishing the debt, paying over any surplus to the grantor. The object of such deeds is, by means of the introduction of trustees, as impartial agents of the creditor and debtor, to provide a convenient, cheap, and speedy mode of satisfying debts on default of payment.¹ A distinction, however, should be noted, in this connection, between unconditional deeds of trust to raise funds for the payment of debts, and deeds of trust in the nature of mortgages, the former being absolute and indefeasible conveyances for the purposes of the trust, while the latter are conveyances by way of security, subject to a condition of defeasance.^{2 a} In many states, deeds of trust to secure debts are much favored, either on account of the intervention of disinterested third parties. whose position as trustees secures to the debtor fair deal-

cution against him is valid, and passes the title, subject to the lien of the levy: Mumper v. Rushmore, 79 N. Y. 19. An assignment may be made by a debtor of a part of his property, in trust, to pay some particular creditor or creditors; its validity would depend upon the same question, whether it was made with a fraudulent intent: See State v. Benoist, 37 Mo. 500; Robbins v. Fitz, 33 N. Y. 420.^e

§ 995, 1 Taylor v. Stearns, 18 Gratt. 244, 278.

§ 995, ² Hoffman v. Mackall, 5 Ohio St. 124, 130, 64 Am. Dec. 637; Newman v. Samuels, 17 Iowa, 528; Turner v. Watkins, 31 Ark. 429; Soutter v. Miller, 15 Fla. 625. But see State Bank v. Chapelle, 40 Mich. 447, when a conveyance to a trustee for sale and payment of debts was treated as a mortgage.

§ 994, (e) As to preferences rendering the assignment invalid, see Preston v. Spaulding, 120 Ill. 209, 10 N. E. 903; Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208, 59 Am. Rep. 439, 30 N. W. 855.

§ 995, (a) The text is quoted in Sandusky v. Faris, 49 W. Va. 150, 38 S. E. 563, 573, a case involving a deed of trust of the former character. See, also, Catlett v. Storr, 70 Tex. 485, 7 S. W. 844; McDonald v. Kellogg, 30 Kan. 170, 2 Pac. 507; Doane v. California Land Co., 243 Fed. 67, 155 C. C. A. 597; Bier v. Leisle, 172 Cal. 432, 156 Pac. 870; Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., (Ind.) 109 N. E. 766.

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ing, or the absence of any necessity for the intervention of the courts; though in some states they are required to be judicially foreclosed, and are therefore of no practical advantage.³ Indeed, in a majority of the states, this form of security has come into general, and in some instances universal, use. An intimate relation exists between deeds of trust to secure debts and mortgages, especially mortgages containing powers of sale; in fact, the former are generally considered as being in legal effect mortgages.⁴ b Where a mortgage is regarded as a conveyance of the legal estate, a deed of trust can be no less a conveyance of the legal estate, and where a mortgage is considered as but a mere lien, a deed of trust is generally considered as noth-

§ 995, ³ Iowa: Code 1880, sec. 3319; Ingle v. Culbertson, 43 Iowa, 265. Kansas: Samuel v. Holladay, 1 Woolw. 400. Kentucky: Campbell v. Johnston, 4 Dana, 178.

§ 995, 4 Woodruff v. Robb, 19 Ohio, 212; Sargent v. Howe, 21 Ill. 148; Newman v. Samuels, 17 Iowa, 528, 535; Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan. 223, 227; Webb v. Hoselton, 4 Neb. 308, 19 Am. Rep. 638; Wright v. Bundy, 11 Ind. 398, 405 (where it was held a railroad might make a deed of trust under an authority to mortgage its property); Bennett v. Union Bank, 5 Humph. 612 (a bank authorized to hold land mortgaged to it for security may take a deed of trust); Turner v. Watkins, 31 Ark. 429; Blackwell v. Barnett, 52 Tex. 326. *Contra*, Koch v. Briggs, 14 Cal. 256, 73 Am. Dec. 651; Grant v. Burr, 54 Cal. 298; Bateman v. Burr, 57 Cal. 480. See, also, Wilkins v. Wright, 6 McLean, 340; Bank of Commerce v. Lanahan, 45 Md. 396.^e

§ 995, (b) Trust Deed in Legal Effect a Mortgage.—See, also, Curtin v. Krohn, 4 Cal. App. 131, 87 Pac. 243 (text and note 4 cited); Ainsa v. Mercantile Trust Co. of San Francisco, 174 Cal. 504, 163 Pac. 898; Barth v. Deuel, 11 Colo. 494, 19 Pac. 471; Neikirk v. Boulder Nat. Bank, 53 Colo. 350, 127 Pac. 137 (if there is a right to redeem, there is a right to foreclose); Christopher v. Mungen, 61 Fla. 513, 534, 55 South. 273; Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37, 100 N. E. 376; Fiske v. Mayhew, 90 Neb. 196, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1043, 133 N. W. 195; Marquam v. Ross, 47 Or. 374, 78 Pac. 698, 53 Pac. 852; Austin v. Spragne Mfg. Co., 14 R. I. 464; Jackson v. Harby, 65 Tex. 710.

§ 995, (c) Partridge v. Shepard, 71 Cal. 470, 12 Pac. 480; Kinard v. Kaelin, 22 Cal. App. 383, 134 Pac. 370 (deed of trust may contain power of sale); Sprague v. Hart, 11 Cal. App. 782, 106 Pac. 590 (if there is no power of sale, court of equity has power to foreclose); Stanhope v. Dodge, 52 Md. 483. ing more than a lien.⁵ A reconveyance, as a general rule, is not necessary on payment of the debt secured by a deed of trust, satisfaction being entered in the margin, as in the case of a mortgage.⁶ Statutes relating to the recording of mortgages embrace deeds of trust, without special mention of the latter,⁷ as also do those relating to powers of

§ 995, ⁵ Iowa: Newman v. Samuels, 17 Iowa, 528, 535. Kansas: Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan. 223, 227. Nebraska: Webh v. Hoselton, 4 Neb. 308.⁴ Michigan: Flint etc. R'y. Co. v. Auditor-General, 41 Mich. 635.^e Texas: Wright v. Henderson, 12 Tex. 43; Walker v. Johnson, 37 Tex. 127, 129; McLane v. Paschal, 47 Tex. 365; Blackwell v. Barnett, 52 Tex. 326. California: A deed of trust is not a mortgage: Koch v. Briggs, 14 Cal. 256, 73 Am. Dec. 651; Grant v. Burr, 54 Cal. 298; Bateman v. Burr, 57 Cal. 480.⁴ As to the distinction hetween mortgages and deeds of trust, see Wilkins v. Wright, 6 McLean, 340, Fed. Cas. No. 17,666; Bank of Commerce v. Lanahan, 45 Md. 396.

§ 995, 6 Ingle v. Culbertson, 43 Iowa, 265; Smith v. Doe, 26 Miss. 291; Crosby v. Huston, 1 Tex. 203.^g But see Wilkins v. Wright, 6 McLean, 340, Fed. Cas. No. 17,666. An entry of satisfaction by one who fraudulently pretends to be the holder of all the notes described in the deed does not discharge the property as against an innocent holder for value of a note so secured: Gottschalk v. Neal, 6 Mo. App. 596.

§ 995, 7 Woodruff v. Robb, 19 Ohio, 212; Crosby v. Huston, 1 Tex. 203, 239; Magee v. Carpenter, 4 Ala. 469; Wood v. Lake, 62 Ala. 489; Schultze v. Houfes, 96 Ill. 335.

§ 995, (d) Nebraska: Fiske v. Mayhew, 90 Neb. 196, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1043, 133 N. W. 195 (deed of trust with power of sale cannot be foreclosed by strict foreelosure).

§ 995, (e) Oregon.—Marquam v. Ross, 47 Or. 374, 83 Pac. 852 (trust deed creates a mere lien).

South Dakota.—Brown v. Hall, 32 S. D. 225, 142 N. W. 854 (no title vested in trustee).

Wisconsin.—Wisconsin Central R. R. Co. v. Wisconsin River Land Co., 71 Wis. 94, 36 N. W. 837.

§ 995, (1) California.—Partridge v. Shepard, 71 Cal. 470, 12 Pac. 480; Charles A. Warren Co. v. All Persons, etc. (San Francisco Savings Union), 153 Cal. 771, 96 Pac. 807 (passes title to trustees, but grantor retains interest he can transfer, and may bring suit to quiet title); Curtin v. Krohn, 4 Cal. App. 131, 87 Pac. 243; Hollywood Lumber Co. v. Love, 155 Cal. 210, 100 Pac. 698 (legal title passes for security, leaving in trustors a legal title against all but trustees and those claiming under them); Weber v. McCleverty, 149 Cal. 316, 86 Pac. 706 (legal title passes for purposes of trust).

Colorado.—Empire Ranch & Cattle Co. v. Howell, 22 Colo. App. 584, 126 Pac. 1097 (as regards other persons than the trustee, the trustor has legal title, which he may convey, subject to the deed of trust, or on which he may sue for trespass).

§ 995 (g) Contra, Roberts v. True, 7 Cal. App. 379, 94 Pac. 392.

sale contained in mortgages.⁸ While a mortgage with power of sale may be assigned, in the absence of words

§ 995, 8 Alabama: Code 1876, secs. 2198, 2877-2889.h California: Civ. Code, sec. 2932; but see Koch v. Briggs, 14 Cal. 256, 73 Am. Dec. 651; Grant v. Burr, 54 Cal. 298; Bateman v. Burr, 57 Cal. 480.¹ Dakota: Rev. Code 1877, pp. 613-616, 275. Illinois: Rev. Stats. 1877, p. 676;^j and see Bloom v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Ill. 503; Farrar v. Payne, 73 Ill. 82. Indiana: 2 Rev. 1876, p. 261; k and see Rowe v. Beckett, 30 Ind. 154, 95 Am. Dec. 676; Martin v. Reed, 30 Ind. 218. Iowa: Code 1873, sec. 3319; see, also, Pope v. Durant, 26 Iowa, 233; Fanning v. Kerr, 7 Iowa, 450. Kansas: Gen. Stats. 1868, c. 114, sec. 18; 2 Dassler's Stats. 1876, sec. 5631. Kentucky: Rev. Stats. 1873, p. 588;¹ sce, also, Campbell v. Johnston, 4 Dana, 178; Lyons v. Field, 17 B. Mon. 543, 549; Smith v. Vertrees, 2 Bush, 63; Reid v. Welsh, 11 Bush, 450. Maryland: Code 1860, p. 445.^m Massachusetts: Gen. Stats., c. 140, secs. 38-44;ⁿ Stats. 1868, c. 197.º Michigan: Comp. Laws 1871, pp. 1921-1925.P Minnesota: Rev. 1866, pp. 562-565; Stats. at Large 1873, pp. 900-907.ª Mississippi: Laws 1876, p. 37. Missouri: Wagner's Stats. 1870, p. 954, sec. 2; also, pp. 94, 956, 1347; see, also, Lass v. Sternberg, 50 Mo. 124; McKnight v. Wimer, 38 Mo. 132; Tatum v. Holliday, 59 Mo. 422. Nevada: Comp. Laws 1873, secs. 1292-1295, 1309-1311.r New York: 2 Fay's Dig. of Laws 1876, pp. 65-67;^s and see Elliott v. Wood, 45 N. Y. 71, 53 Barb. 285; Sherwood v. Reade, 7 Hill, 431; reversing 8 Paige, 633; Hubbell v. Sibley, 5 Lans. 51; Cohoes Co. v. Goss, 13 Barb. 137; Lawrence v. Farmers' etc. Co., 13 N. Y. 200. Rhode Island: Gen. Stats., c. 165, sec. 15.* Tennessee: Code 1858, secs. 2124-2127;" and see Caldwell v. Bowen, 4 Sneed, 415. Virginia: Code 1873, c. 113, secs. 5, 6. This state has legislated

§ 995, (h) Alabama. — Code 1886, secs. 1844, 1879-1891.

§ 995, (1) California.—Partridge v. Shepard, 71 Cal. 470, 12 Pac. 480.

§ 995, (J) Illinois. — Hurd's Rev. Stats. 1889, c. 95.

§ 995, (12) Indiana.—1 Rev. Stats. 1888, secs. 1096, 1097.

§ 995, (1) Kentucky.—C. 63, art. 1. § 995, (m) Maryland.—2 Pub. Gen. Laws 1888, art. 66.

§ 995, (n) Massachusetts. — Pub. Stats. 1882, c. 181, secs. 14-20.

§ 995, (o) Massachusetts. — Pub. Stats. 1882, c. 24, sec. 19.

§ 995, (P) Michigan. — Howell's Stats. 1882, c. 293.

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§ 995, (a) Minnesota. — 2 Kelly's Stats. 1891, c. 76, tit. 1.

§ 995, (r) Nevada. --- Gen. Stats. 1885, secs. 3253-3256, 3270-3272.

§ 995, (s) New York. — Code Civ. •Proc. secs. 2387-2409.

§ 995, (t) *Rhode Island.*—Pub. Stats. 1882, c. 176, sec. 15; and see Austin v. Sprague Mfg. Co., 14 R. I. 464.

§ 995, (u) Tennessee. — Code 1884, secs. 2947-2950.

§ 995, (v) *Virginia*. — Code 1887, secs. 2441, 2442, 2465-2468, 2498, 2935. restricting an assignment, and the power of sale passes thereby to the assignee, a deed of trust to secure a debt, being a confidence reposed, cannot be delegated, and no assignment is possible, without an express and positive permission in the deed.⁹ ^x The duties of the trustee of a deed of trust require the utmost good faith and impartiality as regards both the debtor and the creditor.^y He is personally liable, in a suit at law for damages to the party aggrieved, for a failure to use reasonable diligence, or an abuse of his discretionary powers;¹⁰ and a sale may be enjoined or set aside at the instance of the injured party.¹¹

to some extent on deeds of trust; as also West Virginia: Code 1870, c. 72, secs. 5-10; and Amendments 1870, c. 51. Wisconsin: 2 Rev. Stats. 1871, pp. 1777-1782.

§ 995, ⁹ Whittelsey v. Hughes, 39 Mo. 13; McKnight v. Wimer, 38 Mo. 132; and see Pickett v. Jones, 63 Mo. 195, 199.

§ 995, 10 Sherwood v. Saxton, 63 Mo. 78; State v. Griffith, 63 Mo. 545; Ballinger v. Bourland, 87 Ill. 513, 29 Am. Rep. 69; the remedy is at law, and not in equity, for a failure to pay over to the proper party the excess of the proceeds over and above the debt and reasonable expenses.

§ 995, 11 Terry v. Fitzgerald, 32 Gratt. 843; Meyer v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 5 Mo. App. 245; Eitelgeorge v. Mutual etc. Ass'n, 69 Mo. 52; Cassidy v. Cook, 99 Ill. 385, 389: "A trustee's duties are not merely formal. It is his duty, in the faithful discharge of his trust, to inform himself as to the condition of the property which he is about to sell, and to adopt that course which, in his judgment, will bring the highest price." But the fact that the property was bought on behalf of the creditor, or that the price bid was low, does not necessarily invalidate the sale: Landrum v. Union Bank, 63 Mo. 48. But a sale will not be set aside, as against innocent remote purchasers without notice, for such irregularities as over-

§ 995, (w) Wisconsin. — Sanborn and Berryman's Stats. 1889, secs. 3523-3543; and see Wisconsin Central R. R. Co. v. Wisconsin River Land Co., 71 Wis. 94, 36 N. W. 837.

§ 995, (x) City of St. Louis v. Priest, 88 Mo. 612. The deed may provide for a successor to the trustee named; Irish v. Antioch College, 126 Ill. 638, 9 Am. St. Rep. 638, 18 N. E. 768.

§ 995, (y) Ainsa v. Mercantile

Trust Co. of San Francisco, 174 Cal. 504, 163 Pac. 898; Hampshire v. Greeves, 104 Tex. 620, 143 S. W. 147 (he is a special agent of hoth mortgagor and mortgagee); New York Trust Co. v. Michigan Traction Co., (Mich.) 193 Fed. 175 (trustee may file hill in equity if necessary, for the preservation of the property even against objection of both parties). It is not necessary that the person who is to execute the power in a trust deed should join in the deed, or execute any formal writing showing his acceptance of the trust;¹² nor is it necessary that the beneficiary should signify his assent by any formal writing, for his assent is presumed, since the deed is for his benefit.¹³ Where a trustee has accepted the trust, he cannot renounce it without the consent of the beneficiary, or of a court of equity;¹⁴ and he may be compelled to discharge the trust.¹⁵ aa

statement of the account of indebtedness, or a sale, if *bona fide*, of lots *en masse*: Fairman v. Peck, 87 Ill. 156; Farrar v. Payne, 73 Ill. 82. And if the face of the deed does not show that it was made contrary to the terms of the deed of trust, a subsequent grantee, without actual notice of any defects in the sale, will acquire such title as will not be set aside: Gunnell v. Cockerill, 84 Ill. 319; Watson v. Sherman, 84 Ill. 263. But only a party to or person interested in a trust deed can complain of irregularities in the execution of the trust: Wade v. Thompson, 52 Miss. 367.[#]

§ 995, 1² Leffler v. Armstrong, 4 Iowa, 482, 68 Am. Dec. 672; Crocker v. Lowenthal, 83 Ill. 579.

§ 995, 13 Wiswall v. Ross, 4 Port. 321; Shearer v. Loftin, 26 Ala. 703.
§ 995, 14 Drane v. Gunter, 19 Ala. 731.
§ 995, 15 Sargent v. Howe, 21 Ill. 148.

§ 995, (z) See, in general, Grover v. Hale, 107 Ill. 638; Williamson v. Stone, 128 Ill. 129, 22 N. E. 1005; Clary v. Schaack, 253 Ill. 471, 97 N. E. 1070 (sale without the notice required by the deed, though in violation of the trust, passes legal title and is voidable only in equity); Hurt v. Cooper, 63 Tex. 362; Muller's Adm'r v. Stone, 84 Va. 834, 10 Am. St. Rep. 889, and note, 6 S. E. 223; Merryman v. Blount, 79 Ark. 1, 94 S. W. 714 (beneficiaries may buy on sale); Hanson v. Neal, 215 Mo. 256, 114 S. W. 1073 (sale set aside when trustee sold at unusual hour for inadequate price); Jones v. Lynch, (Tex. Civ. App.) 137 S. W. 395 (fraud, not to give beneficiaries notice of sale); Gay v. Young Men's Consolidated Co-operative Mercantile Institute, 37 Utah, 280, 107 Pac.

237 (purchaser who buys with notice of violation of trust is liable as trustee); Washington Nat. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Buser, 61 W. Va. 590, 57 S. E. 40 (if there is dispute as to debt, sale should be postponed).

§ 995, (aa) Commonwealth v. Susquehanna, etc., R. R. Co., 122 Pa. St. 306, 1 L. R. A. 225, 15 Atl. 448. Or he may be removed; Lewis' Adm'r v. Glenn, 84 Va. 947. See, further, Washington Nat. Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Buser, 61 W. Va. 590, 57 S. E. 40 (either creditor or trustee may file a bill in equity where the debt is in dispute); Ware v. Hewett, 63 W. Va. 47, 59 S. E. 756 (where such bill by trustee is improper); Rexroad v. Raines, 63 W. Va. 511, 60 S. E. 495 (suit by trustee to remove impediments to sale).

§ 996. Voluntary Trusts.^a—The particular question to be examined under this head, and which renders it one of such great practical importance, is, When will trusts, and transactions in the nature of trusts, which are purely voluntary, virtual gifts be treated as binding and enforceable in equity? The answer, it will be seen, turns upon the distinction between trusts which are executed—that is, completely created or declared—and those which are merely executory, incomplete,-that is, promises to create a trust. The full discussion of the subject also involves the difference between assignments perfect and imperfect, and declarations of trust. Underlying the whole theory of voluntary trusts is the principle that while the maxim, Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio, operates in equity even more strictly than at the common law, so that a promise without any valuable consideration has no binding efficacy, still a valid trust may be created without any valuable consideration; if a trust has been completely declared, the absence of a valuable consideration is entirely immaterial.^{1 b} Another

§ 996, 1 Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. 656; Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft, 18 Ves. 84; Ex parte Pye, 18 Ves. 140; Kekewich v. Manning, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 176, 190; Dickinson v. Burrell, L. R. 1 Eq. 337, 343.

§ 996, (a) This section is cited in Watson v. Payne, 143 Mo. App. 721, 128 S. W. 238; Taylor v. Welch, 168 Mo. App. 223, 153 S. W. 490. Sections 996, 997, are cited in Schumacher v. Dolan, 154 Iowa, 207, 134 N. W. 624; Harris Banking Co. v. Miller, 190 Mo. 640, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 790, 89 S. W. 629; § 996 et seq., cited in Pennell v. Ennis, 126 Mo. App. 355, 103 S. W. 147.

§ 996, (b) The text is quoted in Fleenor v. Hensley, (Va.) 93 S. E. 582. See In re Knapps' Settlement, [1895] 1 Ch. 91; Nichols v. Emery, 109 Cal. 323, 50 Am. St. Rep. 43, 41 Pac. 1089 (trust for the management of realty, and division of the proceeds among the beneficiaries); Ta-

ber v. Bailey, 22 Cal. App. 617, 135 Pac. 975 (if no power of revocation reserved, no consideration needed); Noble v. Learned, 153 Cal. 245, 94 Pae. 1047 (reservation of partial or total power of revocation not inconsistent with establishment of trust): Massey v. Huntington, 118 Ill. 80, 7 N. E. 269; Lynn v. Lynn, 135 Ill. 19, 25 N. E. 634; Chilvers v. Race, 196 Ill. 71, 63 N. E. 701; Haulman v. Haulman, 164 Iowa, 471, 145 N. W. 930 (executed trust is irrevoeable); Schumaeher v. Dolan, 154 Iowa, 207, 134 N. W. 624 (eiting this section); Lewis v. Curnutt, 130 Iowa, 423, 106 N. W. 914 (executed trust, no consideration necessary); In re Podhajsky's Estate, 137 Iowa, 742, 115 principle frequently applicable in cases of this kind is, that equity generally regards an imperfect conveyance or assignment as a contract to convey or assign; but whether such contract is binding or not must depend upon the circumstances.²

§ 996, ² Parker v. Taswell, 2 De Gex & J. 559.

N. W. 590 (same); Jones' Adm'rs v. Moore, 102 Ky. 591, 44 S. W. 126 (account-book the subject of the gift); Williamson v. Yager, 91 Ky. 282, 34 Am. St. Rep. 184, 15 S. W. 660 (a voluntary, undelivered assignment of notes upheld). In Bath Sav. Inst v. Haythorn, 88 Me. 122, 51 Am. St. Rep. 382, 32 L. R. A. 377, 33 Atl. 836, the court, in upholding a voluntary bank deposit, on the intention to create a trust as gathered from the entire circumstances, said: "It is not necessary, therefore, that he who declares a trust should divest himself of the legal title, if, perchance, he so does it as to transfer the real or equitable title to the cestui; for then he creates an estate no longer his own. He may retain the legal title giving him the control, but for the benefit of the cestui, according to the terms of the trust. His control becomes subject to the direction of courts of equity, that always supervise the administration of trusts"; see, also, Dresser v. Dresser, 46 Me. 48; Dayton v. Stewart, 99 Md. 643, 59 Atl. 281 (absence of power of revocation may be explained by circumstances. Trust cannot be revoked if settler understood terms, though some contingency was overlooked); Gerrish v. New Bedford Inst. for Sav., 128 Mass. 159, 35 Am. Rep. 370; Taylor v. Buttrick, 165 Mass. 547, 52 Am. St. Rep. 530, 43 N. E. 507 (refusing to set aside a voluntary trust settle-

ment); Scrivens v. North Eastern S. B., 166 Mass. 255, 44 N. E. 251 (the donee having allowed the donor to retain possession of the bank-book and use part of the money); Alger v. North End Sav. Bank, 146 Mass. 418, 4 Am. St. Rep. 331, 15 N. E. 916 (deposit in bank); Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575, 12 Ann. Cas. 837, 81 N. E. 300, (absence of power of revocation creates no presumption against trust); Thorp v. Lund, 227 Mass. 474, 116 N. E. 946; Northrip v. Burge, 255 Mo. 641, 164 S. W. 584; Sims v. Brown, 252 Mo. 58, 158 S. W. 624 (absence of power of revocation is suspicious); Watson v. Payne, 143 Mo. App. 721, 128 S. W. 238 (citing this section); Taylor v. Welch, 168 Mo. App. 223, 153 S. W. 490 (citing this section); Hoboken Bk. of Sav. v. Schwoon, 62 N. J. Eq. 503, 50 Atl. 490; Tarbox v. Grant, 56 N. J. Eq. 199, 39 Atl. 378; Hammerstein v. Equitable Trust Co., 209 N. Y. 429, 103 N. E. 706; Witherington v. Herring, 140 N. C. 495, 6 Ann. Cas. 188, 53 S. E. 303 (power of revocation reserved); Fishblate v. Fishblate, 238 Pa. 450, 86 Atl. 469; Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. St. 149, 24 Am. St. Rep. 487, 21 Atl. 809 (trust of personalty); Estate of Smith, 144 Pa. St. 428, 27 Am. St. Rep. 641, 22 Atl. 916 (bonds, in the possession of the testator, were marked "Held for K," and the testator had informed third parties of his intention to give to "K");

§ 997. The General Doctrine — Incomplete Voluntary Trusts not Enforceable.—The general doctrine is well settled. A perfect or completed trust is valid and enforceable, although purely voluntary. A voluntary trust which is still executory, incomplete, imperfect, or promissory will neither be enforced nor aided.^{1 a} In order to render the

§ 997, 1 It seems appropriate, in order to illustrate this general doctrine, of which all the decided cases are mere applications, to quote the language of a few leading and modern cases in which the subject was fully examined and the conclusions accurately stated. In Milroy v. Lord, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 264, 274, Turner, L. J., thus formulated the doctrine, and his statement has been approved by nearly every subsequent decision: "I take the law of this court to be well settled, that in order to render a voluntary settlement valid and effectual, the settlor must have done everything which, according to the nature of the property comprised in the settlement, was necessary to be done, in order to transfer the property and render the settlement binding upon him. He may, of course, do this by actually transferring the property to the persons for whom he intends to provide, and the provision will then be effectual, and it will be equally effectual if he transfers the property to a trustee for the purposes of the settlement, or declares that he himself holds it in trust for those purposes; and if the property be personal, the trust may, as I apprehend, be declared either in writing or by parol; but in order to render the settlement binding, one or other of these modes must, as I understand the law of this court, be resorted to, for there is no equity in this court to perfect an imperfect gift. The cases, I think, go further, to this extent, that if the settlement is intended to be effectuated by one of these

Wagoner's Estate, 174 Pa. St. 558, 52 Am. St. Rep. 828, 32 L. R. A. 766, 34 Atl. 114 (see as to a contingent trust); Potter v. Fidelity Ins., T. & S. D. Co., 199 Pa. St. 360, 49 Atl. 85; Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Hunt, (Tex. Civ. App.) 38 S. W. 1134; Connecticut R. Sav. Bank v. Albee, 64 Vt. 571, 33 Am. St. Rep. 944, 25 Atl. 487 (citing the text and recent cases supporting it); Holmes v. Holmes, 65 Wash. 572, Ann Cas. 1913B, 1021, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 645, 118 Pac. 733.

§ 997, (a) The text is cited in Schumacher v. Dolan, 154 Iowa, 207,

134 N. W. 624; Dick v. Harris' Ex'r, 145 Ky. 739, 141 S. W. 56; Brown v. Brown's Adm'r, 129 Ky. 138, 110 S. W. 831; Krankel v. Krankel, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 901, 47 S. W. 1084; Harris Bkg. Co. v. Miller, 190 Mo. 640, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 790, 89 S. W. 629; Fleenor v. Hensley, (Va.) 93 S. E. 582. See In re Breton's Estate, 17 Ch. Div. 416 (following Milroy v. Lord, and apparently disapproving Fox v. Hawkes, post); see In re Vernon, 32 Ch. Div. 165 (entries in an account book taken as a declaration of trust); Gannon v. Merguire, 22 App. Div. 43, 47 N. Y. Supp. 870; Goodvoluntary trust valid and effectual, the party creating it, either by direct transfer or by declaration, must have done everything which, according to the nature of the property comprised in it, was necessary to be done in order to transfer the property and render the transaction binding upon him. A person holding property, real or personal, and

modes to which I have referred, the court will not give effect to it by applying another of those modes. If it is intended to take effect by transfer, the court will not hold the intended transfer to operate as a declaration of trust, for then every imperfect instrument would be made effectual by being converted into a perfect trust. These are the principles by which the case must be tried." In Richards v. Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. 11, 13, Sir George Jessel, M. R., said: "The principle is a very simple one. A man may transfer his property without valuable consideration in one of two ways: he may either do such acts as amount in law to a conveyance or assignment of the property, and thus completely divest

man v. Crawley, 161 Mo. 657, 61 S. W. 850; McDonald v. Am. Nat. Bank, 25 Mont. 456, 65 Pac. 896; Skeen v. Morriott, 22 Utah, 73, 61 Pac. 296, and Krankel's Executors v. Krankel, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 901, 42 S. W. 1084 (citing the text); Fisher v. Hampton Transp. Co., (Mich.) 98 N. W. 1012; Weaver v. Weaver, 182 Ill. 287, 74 Am. St. Rep. 173, 55 N. E. 338 (the settlor had voluntarily assigned a policy of insurance to his mother, acknowledged it before a notary, and sent a copy to the company; he notified the mother that he would "keep it" for her, but subsequently assigned it to a third party; the court held the delivery, and therefore the assignment, incomplete, and no trust created. The case contains a valuable discussion of delivery, which is often of importance in determining whether a trust has been established under such circumstances); Badgelcy v. Votrain, 68 Ill. 25, 18 Am. Rep. 541; McCartney v. Ridgway, 160 Ill. 129, 32 L. R. A. 555, 43 N. E. 826; Williams v. Chamberlain, 165 Ill. 210, 46 N. E. 250 (where the policy was assigned and no notice given to the insuring company). In Barnum v. Reed, 136 Ill. 398, $\mathbf{26}$ N. E. 572, it being uncertain whether a bank deposit was intended as a trust, or a gift to take effect upon the death of the donor, it was not enforced. See, also, Cella v. Brown, 144 Fed. 742, 75 C. C. A. 608; Brannock v. Magoon, 141 Mo. App. 316, 125 S. W. 535; Citizens' Natl. Bank v. McKenna, 168 Mo. App. 254, 153 S. W. 521; Rousseau v. Call, 169 N. C. 173, 85 S. E. 414.

Bank Deposits.—The cases cited in regard to complete and incomplete voluntary trusts are many of them cases of the transfer of, or creation of bank deposits; in addition to them it has been deemed advisable to place the following cases in a separate group.

1. The creation held complete: Thomas v. Lamb, 11 Cal. App. 717, 106 Pac. 254; Culver v. Lompoc Valley Savings Bank, 22 Cal. App. 379, intending to make a voluntary disposition thereof for the benefit of another, may do so in either one of three modes: 1. He may make a simple conveyance or assignment of it directly to the donee, so as to vest in the latter whatever interest and title the donor has, without the intervention of any trust; 2. He may make a transfer of it to a third

himself of the legal ownership, in which case the person who by those acts acquires the property takes it beneficially or on trust, as the case may be; or the legal owner of the property may, by one or other of the modes recognized as amounting to a valid declaration of trust, constitute himself a trustee, and without an actual transfer of the legal title may so deal with the property as to deprive himself of its legal ownership, and declare that he will hold it from that time forward on trust for the other person. It is true, he need not use the words, 'I declare myself a trustee,' but he must do something which is equivalent to it, and use expressions which have that meaning; for however anxious the court may be to

134 Pac. 355 (case of joint account where donor stated that in event of death he wished other party to have fund, and donor retained passbook); Trubey v. Pease, 240 Ill. 513, 16 Ann. Cas. 370, 88 N. E. 1005 (trust fully created is irrevocable); In re Podhajsky's Will, 137 Iowa, 742, 115 N. W. 590 (deposit in trust for A. and declaration that deposit was to go to A. on donor's death); Bath Sav. Inst. v. Hathorn, 88 Me. 122, 51 Am. St. Rep. 382, 32 L. R. A. 377, 33 Atl. 836 (deposit in trust for A. B. F., but additional facts aided the result); Curtis v. Portland Sav. Bk., 77 Me. 151, 52 Am. Rep. 750 (the bank-book was delivered and it was held a trust attached to the gift causa mortis); Northrop v. Hale, 72 Me. 275 (money deposited in the name of N. and the bank-book retained; held, extrinsie evidence could be introduced to show N.'s rights); Mulfinger v. Mulfinger, 114 Md. 463, 79 Atl. 1089 (deposit in trust for donor and another as joint owners subject to order of either,

balance to survivor, held an irrevocable trust); Baker v. Baker, 123 Md. 32, 90 Atl. 776; Alger v. North End Sav. Bk., 146 Mass. 418, 4 Am. St. Rep. 331, 15 N. E. 916; Scott v. Berkshire Bk., 140 Mass. 457, 2 N. E. 925; Harris Banking Co. v. Miller, 190 Mo. 640, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 790, 89 S. W. 629, eiting this section (certificate of deposit indorsed to donee but retained by donor); Fishblate v. Fishblate, 238 Pa. 450, 86 Atl. 469 (voluntary deposit by husband held irrevocable trust); Baker v. Baker, 123 Md. 32, 90 Atl. 776 (deposit to credit of A and B, payable after death of both to C, D and E. Held irrevocable); Gobeille v. Allison, 30 R. I. 525, 76 Atl. 354 (trust in name of donor for daughter, and delivery of pass-book to her, held irrevocable); Connectieut River Saving Bk. v. Albee, 64 Vt. 571, 33 Am. St. Rep. 944, 25 Atl. 487 (the deposit was in the depositor's name in trust for the donce but the intention was really to evade a tax, and not to pass the benefit to

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person upon trusts declared in favor of the donee; 3. He
may retain the title, and declare himself a trustee for the donee, and thus clothe the donee with the beneficial estate. In either of these modes, if the transaction is imperfect and executory, equity will not aid nor enforce it; and if the in-

tention of the party is to adopt one of the methods, a court

carry out a man's intention, it is not at liberty to construe words otherwise than according to their proper meaning. The cases in which the question has arisen are nearly all cases in which a man, by documents insufficient to pass a legal interest, has said, 'I give or grant certain property to A B.'" He cites Morgan v. Malleson, L. R. 10 Eq. 475, and Richardson v. Richardson, L. R. 3 Eq. 686. "The true distinction appears to me to be plain, and heyond dispute; for a man to make himself a trustee there must be an expression of *intention to become a trustee*, whereas words of present gift show an intention to give over property to another, and not retain it in the donor's own hands for any purpose,

the donce; the court cites Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 996-998, with approval). See the following cases in which it was held that the deposit in bank created a trust in favor of the intended beneficiary: Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 44 L. R. A. 205, 43 Atl. 43; Hallowell Sav. Inst. v. Titcomb, 96 Me. 62, 51 Atl. 249; Becker v. Union Dime Sav. Inst., 15 App. Div. 553, 44 N. Y. Supp. 521; Proseus v. Porter, 20 App. Div. 44, 46 N. Y. Supp. 656; Farleigh v. Cadman, 159 N. Y. 169, 53 N. E. 808; Bishop v. Seamans Bk. for Savings, 33 App. Div. 181, 53 N. Y. Supp. 488; Jennings v. Hennessey, 26 Misc. Rep. 265, 55 N. Y. Supp. 833 (see as to the revocation of such trusts); Martin v. Martin, 46 App. Div. 445, 61 N. Y. Supp. 813; Williams v. Brooklyn Sav. Bk., 51 App. Div. 332, 64 N. Y. Supp. 1021; Board of Dom. Missions of R. Ch. in Am. v. Mechanics' Sav. Bk., 40 App. Div. 120, 54 N. Y. Supp. 28, 57 N. Y. Supp. 582 (though the bank-book was retained); Robinson v. Appleby, 69 App. Div. 509, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1;

Booth v. Oakland Bk. of Savings, 122 Cal. 19, 54 Pac. 370.

2. The creation held incomplete: Augusta Saving Bk. v. Fogg, 82 Me. 538, 20 Atl. 92 (failure to deliver the bank-book); Littig v. Vestry of Mt. Calvary P. E. Church, 100 Md. 494, 61 Atl. 635 (deposit to account of church, subject to order of trustee, held a revocable trust); Noyes v. Inst. for Sav., etc., 164 Mass. 583, 49 Am. St. Rep. 484, 42 N. E. 103 (deposit in name of depositor and another, payable "to either or survivor," and bank-book retained; early Massachusetts cases cited): Supple v. Suffolk Savings Bank, 198 Mass. 393, 126 Am. St. Rep. 451, 84 N. E. 432, and note (deposit in trust for F. without delivery of passbook); Citizens Natl. Bank v. Mc-Kenna, 168 Mo. App. 254, 153 S. W. 521 (deposit by A to order of A and B, and statement by A that he wished B to have it on his death; Nicklas v. Parker, 71 N. J. Eq. 777, 14 Ann. Cas. 927, and note, 61 Atl. 267, affirmed 71 Atl. 1135 (deposit in

of equity will not resort to either of the other methods for the purpose of carrying it into effect. Whenever the party intends to make a transfer directly to the donee, he must do all that is necessary, according to the nature of the property, to pass and vest the title, by valid conveyance in case of real property, and by valid assignment in case

fiduciary or otherwise." He then quotes and approves the language cited above from Milroy v. Lord. "If the decisions in Morgan v. Malleson and Richardson v. Richardson were right, there never could be a case where an expression of present gift would not amount to an effectual declaration of trust, which would be carrying the doctrine on that subject too far. It appears to me that these cases of voluntary gifts should not be confounded with another class of cases in which words of present transfer for valuable consideration are held to be evidence of a contract which the court will enforce." The case of Kekewich v. Manning, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 176, is also a most important one, and contains an examination of

trust for A, but depositor exercising complete control); Schippers v. Kempkes, (N. J. Eq.) 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 355, 67 Atl. 74; Hemmerich v. Union Dime Savings Inst., 205 N. Y. 366, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 514, 98 N. E. 499 (deposit in trust for daughter, merely a tentative trust); Beaver v. Bcaver, 117 N. Y. 421, 18 Am. St. Rep. 531, 6 L. R. A. 403, 22 N. E. 940 (deposit by father in the name of his son, and the pass-book retained, held not alone enough to indicate a trust); Cunningham v. Davenport, 147 N. Y. 43, 49 Am. St. Rep. 641, 32 L. R. A. 373, 41 N. E. 412 (deposit in bank in A's name was changed to B's name, but there was no intention that B should have the fund); Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235, 69 Atl. 807 (deposit in trust for A, subsequent deposits and drafts by donor); O'Gorman v. Jolley, 34 S. D. 26, 147 N. W. 78 (certificate of deposit, indorsed to be distributed to certain persons after donor's death, delivered and taken back and retained by donor till death); Pope v.

Burlington Sav. Bk., 56 Vt. 284, 48 Am. Rep. 781 (deposit was in the name of the donee but subject to control by donor during his life; citing the text at § 996 et seq.); Branch v. Dawson, 36 Minn. 193, 30 N. W. 545 (stating that acceptance by the donce is necessary, and that cases holding otherwise are those in case of death only); Sherman v. New Bedford, etc., Bk., 138 Mass. 581 (the deposit and the pass-book were in B's name, but A retained the book and drew the interest; the court concluded that, as A had not intended a present gift, the trust was not complete); Cummings v. Bramhall, 120 Mass. 552 (transfer of bank shares to self as trustee, and the donee not notified); Nutt v. Morse, 142 Mass. 1, 6 N. E. 763 (deposit in the name of donees and notice given them); Norway Savings Bank v. Merriam, 88 Me. 146, 33 Atl. 840 (the donor of a bank deposit having retained the bank-book); see Noyes v. Inst. for S. in N., 164 Mass. 583, 49 Am. St. Rep. 484, 42 N. E.

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of personal property, and generally accompanied by an actual delivery of chattels and things in action where the donor is the legal owner. Where the donor shows an intention to adopt this first method, and thus to vest the property directly in the donee, and the act of donation is simply an assignment of any form, but is imperfect so that

nearly all the previous authorities. See, also, Warriner v. Rogers, L. R. 16 Eq. 340; Heartley v. Nicholson, L. R. 19 Eq. 233; Jones v. Lock, L. R. 1 Ch. 25. The decisions of Page Wood, V. C., in Richardson v. Richardson, L. R. 3 Eq. 686, and of Lord Romilly, M. R., in Morgan v. Malleson, L. R. 10 Eq. 475, have been greatly shaken, even if not entirely overruled, by the subsequent cases cited above in the sixteenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth volumes of Equity Cases; but they are approved in the still more recent case of Baddeley v. Baddeley, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 113.

In the recent case of Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 422, 436, 36 Am. Rep. 634, the subject was examined in an exhaustive manner by Rapallo, J. I quote his very instructive opinion.^b "The only question remaining is, whether a valid declaration of trust is made out. . . . The difficulty in establishing such a trust is, that the donor did not undertake or attempt

103 (bank deposit); Welch v. Henshaw, 170 Mass. 409, 64 Am. St. Rep. 309, 49 N. E. 659 (citing many Massachusetts cases); Sherman v. New Bedford, etc., Bank, 138 Mass. 581 (deposit in bank with no delivery of the bank-book); Lane v. Ewing, 31 Mo. 75, 77 Am. Dec. 632; approved in Leeper v. Taylor, 111 Mo. 312, 19 S. W. 955, citing the text; Wadd v. Hazelton, 137 N. Y. 215, 33 Am. St. Rep. 707, 21 L. R. A. 693, 33 N. E. 143.

' In the following cases it was held that no trust arose on the facts of the various cases, though the same principle that governed the preceding cases was expressly recognized: Yorkshire Inv. & Am. Mortgage Co. v. Fowler, 78 Fed. 56; McNamara v. McDonald, 69 Conn. 484, 61 Am. St. Rep. 48, 38 Atl. 54; People's Sav. Bk. v. Webb, 21 R. I. 218, 42 Atl. 874; Jenkins v. Baker, 36 Misc. Rep. 55, 72 N. Y. Supp. 546 (a very valuable case for general discussion); Lee v. Kennedy, 25 Misc. Rep. 140, 54 N.Y. Supp. 155; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 39 App. Div. 99, 56 N. Y. Supp. 693; Schwind v. Ibert, 60 App. Div. 378, 69 N. Y. Supp. 921; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 161 N. Y. 554, 56 N. E. 116; Harrison v. Totten, 29 Misc. Rep. 700, 62 N. Y. Supp. 754. In nearly all of the above cases the case of Martin v. Funk, supra, was cited with approval. See Ames Cas. on Trusts, p. 43, note.

§997, (b) The case of Young v. Young, supra, has been generally approved: see Wadd v. Hazelton, 137 N. Y. 215, 33 Am. St. Rep. 707, 21 L. R. A. 693, 33 N. E. 143; Barnum v. Reid, 136 III. 389, 26 N. E. 572; Hurlbut v. Hurlbut, 49 Hun, 189, 1 N. Y. Supp. 854; Estate of Smith, 144 Pa. St. 428, 27 Am. St. Rep. 641, 22 Atl. 916; Schwind v. Ibert, 60 App. Div. 378, 69 N. Y. Supp. 921. ; it does not pass the title, a court of equity will not treat it as a declaration of trust constituting the donor himself a trustee for the donee; an imperfect voluntary assignment will not be regarded in equity as an agreement to assign for the purpose of raising a trust. If the donor adopts the second or third mode, he need not use any technical words,

to create it, but to vest the property directly in the donces. He simply signed a paper certifying that the bonds belonged to his sons. He did not declare that he held them in trust for the donees, but that they owned them, subject to the reservation, and were at his death to have them absolutely. If this instrument had been founded upon a valuable consideration, equity might have interfered and effectuated its intent by compelling the execution of a declaration of trust, or by charging the bonds, while in his hands, with a trust in favor of the equitable owner: Day v. Roth. 18 N. Y. 448. But it is well settled that equity will not interpose to perfect a defective gift, or voluntary settlement made without consideration. If legally made, it will be upheld, but it must stand as made, or not at all. When, therefore, it is found that the gift which the deceased attempted to make failed to take effect for want of delivery or of a sufficient transfer, and it is sought to supply this defect and carry out the intent of the donor by declaring a trust which he did not himself declare. we are encountered by the rule above referred to [citing many cases]. It is established as unquestionable law that a court of equity cannot, by its authority, render that gift perfect which the donor has left imperfect. and cannot convert an imperfect gift into a declaration of trust merely on account of that imperfection: Heartley v. Nicholson, L. R. 19 Eq. 233. It has, in some cases, been attempted to establish an exception in favor of a wife and children, on the ground that the moral obligation of the donor to provide for them constituted what was called a meritorious consideration for the gift; but Judge Story says the doctrine seems now to be overthrown (Eq. Jur., sees. 433, 987), and that the general principle is established that in no case whatever will courts of equity interfere in favor of mere volunteers, whether it be upon a voluntary contract, or a covenant, or a settlement, however meritorious may be the consideration. and although the beneficiaries stand in the relation of a wife or child: Holloway v. Headington, 8 Sim. 325; Jefferys v. Jefferys, 1 Craig & P. 138, 141. These positions are sustained by many authorities. To create a trust, the acts or words relied upon must be unequivocal, implying that the person holds the property as trustee for another: Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134, 31 Am. Rep. 446. Though it is not necessary that the declaration of trust be in terms explicit, the donor must have evinced, by acts which admit of no other interpretation, that such legal right as he or language in express terms creating or declaring a trust, but he must employ language which shows unequivocally an intention on his part to create a trust in a third person or to declare a trust in himself. It is not essential, how-

retains is held by him as trustee for the donee: Heartley v. Nicholson, L. R. 19 Eq. 233; Richards v. Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. 11. The settlor must transfer the property to a trustee, or declare that he holds it himself in trust: Milroy v. Lord, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 264. In cases of voluntary settlements or gifts, the court will not impute a trust, where a trust was not in fact the thing contemplated. . . . The words of the donor in the present case are, that the bonds are owned by the donees, but that the interest to accrue thereon is owned and reserved by the donor for so long as he shall live, and at his death they belong absolutely to the donees. No intention is here expressed to hold any legal title to the bonds in trust for the donees. Whatever interest was intended to be vested in them was transferred to them directly, subject to the reservation in favor of the donor during his life, and free from that reservation at his death. Nothing was reserved to the donor to be held, in trust or otherwise, except his right to the accruing interest which should become payable during his life. It could only be by reforming or supplementing the language used that a trust could be created, and this will not be done in case of a voluntary settlement without consideration. [Mr. Justice Rapallo then reviews the two cases of Richardson v. Richardson and Morgan v. Malleson, supra, and declares that they have been overruled.] In Moore v. Moore, 43 L. J. Ch., N. S., 623, Hall, V. C., says: 'I think it very important, indeed, to keep a clear and definite distinction between these cases of imperfect gifts and cases of declarations of trust, and that we should not extend beyond what the authorities have already established the doctrine of declarations of trust, so as to supplement what would otherwise be mere imperfect gifts.' If the settlement is intended to be effectuated by gift, the court will not give it effect by construing it as a trust. If it is intended to take effect by transfer, the court will not hold the intended transfer to operate as a declaration of trust, for then every imperfect instrument would be made effectual by being converted into a perfect trust. The case of Martin v. Funk, and kindred cases, cannot aid the respondent. In all those cases there was an express declaration of trust. In the one named, the donor delivered the money to the bank, taking back its obligation to herself in the character of trustee for the donee, thus parting with all beneficial interest in the fund, and having the legal title vested in her in the character of trustee only. No interposition on the part of the court was necessary to confer that character upon her; nor was it necessary, by construction or otherwise, to change or supplement the actual transaction." In Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134, 137, 31 Am. Rep. 446, Church, ever, that the donor should part with the possession in the cases where he thus creates or declares a trust. These conclusions are sustained by the decided weight of authority, and must be regarded as the settled rules of equity juris-

C. J., c thus sums up the doctrine: "It is clear that a person sui juris, acting freely and with full knowledge, has the power to make a voluntary gift of the whole or any part of his property, while it is well settled that a mere intention, whether expressed or not, is not sufficient, and a voluntary promise to make a gift is nudum pactum, and of no binding force. The act constituting the transfer must be consummated, and not remain incomplete, or rest in mere intention; and this is the rule, whether the gift is by delivery only, or by the creation of a trust in a third person, or in creating the donor himself a trustee. Enough must be done to pass the title, although when a trust is declared, whether in a third person or in the donor, it is not essential that the property should be actually possessed by the cestui que trust, nor is it even essential that the latter should even be informed of the trust." In Estate of Webb, 49 Cal. 541, 545, Crockett, J., said: "In such cases the point to be determined is, whether the trust has been perfectly created,-that is to say, whether the title has passed and the trust been declared,-and the trust being executed, nothing remains for the court but to enforce it. In discussing this question, the court say in Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray, 227: 'It is certainly true that a court of equity will lend no assistance toward perfecting a voluntary contract or agreement for the creation of a trust, nor regard it as binding, so long as it remains executory. But it is equally true that if such a contract he executed by a conveyance of property in trust, so that nothing remains to be done by the grantor or donor to complete the transfer of title, the relation of trustee and cestui que trust is deemed to be established, and the equitable rights and interests arising out of the conveyance, though made without consideration, will be enforced in chancery.' This was not an executed trust, but, at most, nothing more than a voluntary executory agreement to create a trust in futuro, and such agreements cannot be enforced in equity."

In Bond v. Bunting, 78 Pa. St. 210, an opinion by Hare, J., contains a valuable discussion of the doctrine, but bis conclusions are somewhat broader than seems to be sustained by the course of recent authority: \mathbf{d}

§ 997, .(c) The case of Martin v. Funk, has been frequently approved: see, for example merely, Hoboken Bk. of Sav. v. Schwoon, 62 N. J. Eq. 503, 50 Atl. 490; Gannon v. Mc-Guire, 22 App. Div. 43, 47 N. Y. Supp. III-138 870; and see, *supra*, note a. See also, the cases cited in the note to § 1009, *infra*.

§ 997, (d) See, also, Breton v. Woollven, 17 Ch. Div. 418; Allen v. Withrow, 110 U. S. 130, 28 L. Ed. prudence upon the subject.^e The general doctrine which has thus been explained may find its application under two different conditions of fact: 1. Where the donor is the absolute owner of the property, holding the legal and equi-

Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. 656; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. Ed., 382, 389, 415; Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft, 18 Ves. 84; Ex parte Pye, 18 Ves. 140; Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves. 39; Edwards v. Jones, 1 Mylne & C. 226; Fortescue v. Barnett, 3 Mylne & K. 36; Colman v. Sarrel, 3 Brown Ch. 12, 1 Ves. 50; Blakely v. Brady, 2 Dru. & Walsh, 311; Wheatley v. Purr. 1 Keen, 551; Colyear v. Lady Mulgrave, 2 Keen, 81; Godsal v. Wehb, 2 Keen, 99; Holloway v. Headington, 8 Sim. 324; Beatson v. Beatson, 12 Sim. 281, 294; Searle v. Law, 15 Sim. 95; Dillou v. Coppin, 4 Mylne & C. 647; Jefferys v. Jefferys, 1 Craig & P. 138; Bayley v. Bouleott, 4 Russ. 345; Farquharson v. Cave, 1 Coll. C. C. 356; Meek v. Kettlewell, 1 Hare, 464, 1 Phill. Ch. 342; Paterson v. Murphy, 11 Hare, 88; Ward

90, 3 Sup. Ct. 517; Miller v. Clark, 40 Fed. 15; Willis v. Smyth, 91 N. Y. 297: Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N.Y. 52, 10 N. E. 257; Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421, 15 Am. St. Rep. 531, 6 L. R. A. 403, 22 N. E. 940; Bartlett v. Remington, 59 N. H. 364; Sargent v. Baldwin, 60 Vt. 17, 13 Atl. 854; Keyes v. Carleton, 141 Mass. 49, 55 Am. Rep. 446, 6 N. E. 524; Wittingham v. Lighthipe; 46 N. J. Eq. 429, 19 Atl. 611; Titchenell v. Jackson, 26 W. Va. 460; Wimbish v. Montgomery, etc., Ass'n, 69 Ala. 575; Cotton v. Graham, 84 Ky. 672, 2 S. W. 647; Flanders v. Blandy, 45 Ohio St. 108, 12 N. E. 321; Hellman v. McWilliams, 70 Cal. 449, 11 Pac. 659. On sufficiency of declaration to establish voluntary trust, see Crocker v. Hall, 154 Cal. 527, 98 Pac. 269; Carr v. Carr, 15 Cal. App. 480, 115 Pac. 261; Cooley v. Gilliam, 80 Kan. 278, 102 Pac. 1091; Mitchell v. Bilderback, 159 Mich. 483, 124 N. W. 557 (where donor retains property, acts or words must be unequivocal); Citizens' Natl. Bk. v. McKenna, 168 Mo. App. 254, 153 S. W. 521; McKee

v. Allen, 204 Mo. 655, 103 S. W. 76; Northrip v. Burge, 255 Mo. 641, 164 S. W. 584; Paine v. Paine, 28 R. I. 307, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 547, 67 Atl. 127.

§ 997, (e) See Janes v. Falk, 50 N. J. Eq. 468, 35 Am. St. Rep. 783, 26 Atl. 138, quoting the text with approval, and citing a number of recent cases to illustrate the application of the rule; Noble v. Learned, 153 Cal. 245, 94 Pac. 1047 (equity will not perfect imperfect gift: Bliss v. Bliss, 20 Idaho, 467, 119 Pac. will not perfect imperfect gift), mere declaration of intention will not suffice); Trubey v. Pease, 240 Ill. 513, 16 Ann. Cas. 370, 88 N. E. 1005 (equity will not construe imperfect gift as declaration of trust); Brown v. Brown's Adm'rs, 129 Ky. 138, 110 S. W. 831 (mcre declaration of inteution to create a trust); Godard v. Conrad, 125 Mo. App. 165, 101 S. W. 1108 (imperfect gift will not be construed as declaration \mathbf{of} trust); Re Ashman's Estate, 223 Pa. 543, 72 Atl. 899 (imperfect gift not treated as a declaration of trust).

table title thereof; 2. Where the donor is only the equitable owner, holding only the equitable estate, the legal title being vested in some third person as his trustee. These two conditions will be examined separately.

v. Audland, 8 Beav. 201; James v. Bydder, 4 Beav. 600; Dening v. Ware, 22 Beav. 184; Bridge v. Bridge, 16 Beav. 315, 327; Beech v. Keep, 18 Beav. 285; Donaldson v. Donaldson, Kay, 711; Voyle v. Hughes, 2 Smale & G. 18; Airey v. Hall, 3 Smale & G. 315; Parnell v. Hingston, 3 Smale & G. 337; In re Patterson's Estate, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 422; In re Way's Trust, 2 De Gex, J. & S. 365; Dillwyn v. Llewelyn, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 517; Crouch v. Waller, 4 De Gex & J. 302; Scales v. Maude, 6 De Gex, M. & G. 43; Lister v. Hodgson, L. R. 4 Eq. 30; Baddeley v. Baddeley, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 113; Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 196; Adams v. Adams, 21 Wall. 185; Blanchard v. Sheldon, 43 Vt. 512; Davis v. Ney, 125 Mass. 590; 28 Am. Rep. 272; Hunt v. Hunt, 119 Mass. 474; Clark v. Clark, 108 Mass. 522; Brabrook v. Five Cent Sav. Bank, 104 Mass. 228, 6 Am. Rep. 222; Wason v. Colburn, 99 Mass. 342; Sherwood v. Andrews, 2 Allen, 79, 81; Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray, 227; Ray v. Simmons, 11 R. I. 266, 23 Am. Rep. 447; Taylor v. Staples, 8 R. I. 170, 176, 5 Am. Rep. 558; Stone v. King, 7 R. I. 358, 84 Am. Dec. 557; Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn. 512, 16 Am. Rep. 69; Trow v. Shannon, 78 N. Y. 446; Curry v. Powers, 70 N. Y. 212, 219, 26 Am. Rep. 577; Wright v. Miller, 8 N. Y. 9, 59 Am. Dec. 438; Hunter v. Hunter, 19 Barb. 631; Gilchrist v. Stevenson, 9 Barb. 9; Acker v. Phoenix, 4 Paige, 305; Hayes v. Kershow, 1 Sand. Ch. 258, 261; Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 Johns. Ch. 329, 337; Souverbye v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 240; Minturn v. Seymour, 4 Johns. Ch. 497; Ownes v. Ownes, 23 N. J. Eq. 60, 62; Vreeland v. Van Horn, 17 N. J. Eq. 137. 139; Carhart's Appeal, 78 Pa. St. 100, 119; Trough's Estate, 75 Pa. St. 115; Zimmerman v. Streeper, 75 Pa. St. 147; Dellinger's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 425; Crawford's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 52, 100 Am. Dec. 609; Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. St. 281; Ritter's Appeal, 59 Pa. St. 9; Cressman's Appeal, 42 Pa. St. 147, 82 Am. Dec. 498; Lonsdale's Estate, 29 Pa. St. 407; Dennison v. Goehring, 7 Pa. St. 175, 178, 47 Am. Dec. 505; Jones v. Obenchain, 10 Gratt. 259; Dunbar v. Woodcock, 10 Leigh, 628; Reed v. Vannorsdale, 2 Leigh, 569; Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550, 30 Am. Rep. 486; Cox v. Hill, 6 Md. 274; McNulty v. Cooper, 3 Gill & J. 214; Tolar v. Tolar, 1 Dev. Eq. 460, 18 Am. Dec. 598; Dawson v. Dawson, 1 Dev. Eq. 93, 400, 18 Am. Dec. 573; Andrews v. Hobson, 23 Ala. 219; Pinckard v. Pinckard, 23 Ala. •649; Crompton v. Vesser, 19 Ala. 259; Evans v. Battle, 19 Ala. 398; Lane v. Ewing, 31 Mo. 75, 77 Am. Dec. 632: Henderson v. Henderson, 21 Mo. 379; Otis v. Beckwith, 49 Ill. 121, 128; Olney v. Howe, 89 Ill. 556, 31 Am. Rep. 105; Clarke v. Lott, 11 Ill. 105; Huston v. Markley, 49 Iowa, 162; Wyble v. McPheters, 52 Ind. 393.

§ 998. Donor the Legal Owner.—The foregoing general conclusions determine all particular questions which can arise under this condition of fact. If the donor makes a complete conveyance of real property or assignment of personal property sufficient to vest the legal title in the donee; or if he completely conveys or assigns the property to a trustee upon trusts effectually created on behalf of the donee; or if he retains the legal title, but effectually declares himself a trustee for the donee, thus clothing the donee with all of the beneficial estate,—then, in each of these instances, the gift is valid although voluntary; the donee's rights are perfect, and equity will enforce them against the donor, and all persons claiming under him as volunteers.¹ Where the donor has the legal title, and the

§ 998, 1 The practical question always is, whether the conveyance or assignment is sufficient to pass the legal title; or whether a trust has been effectually created or declared. While no particular express words are necessary either to create a trust in third persons, or to declare the donor a trustee, some words unequivocally showing such intent are indispensable. A mere imperfect assignment, without words indicating an intent to create a trust or to declare the donor a trustee, cannot be construed as a declaration of trust, so as to raise a trust in the donee's favor, which equity may enforce. Where the subject-matter is personal property, a parol declaration of trust, if otherwise sufficient, is effectual: See the cases cited in the last note, and especially the quotations. I add the facts of a few instructive cases by way of illustration.

In Mitchell v. Smith, In re Patterson's Estate, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 422, A, the payee of certain promissory notes, brought them to his nephew, B, and said, "I give you these notes," and added that B should have them at A's death, but the latter would like to be master of them as long as he lived. A then indorsed the notes as follows: "I hequeath,—pay the within contents to B, or his order, at my death." A retained possession of the notes until his death, a few months afterwards. Held, that B had obtained no rights whatever in the notes. This case is a good illustration of an attempted assignment which fails to pass the legal title. In Milroy v. Lord, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 264, A owned fifty shares of stock of a bank, which stood upon the books of the hank in his name. By the charter of the bank its shares were transferable only by entry made in the transfer-books of the corporation. A executed a voluntary deed, hy which he purported to assign these shares to B, in trust for the plaintiff, C, but no transfer was made upon the bank's books. Held, that, as the assignproperty is of such a nature that a legal estate can be transferred,—that is, is land, chattels, money, and some species of things in action,—an imperfect conveyance or assignment, which does not pass the legal title, will not be

ment was incomplete and inoperative to pass the legal title to the trustee. B, no trust was effectually created in C's favor; and, also, since the plain intention was to vest the trust in B, and not to constitute the donor a trustee, the assignment could not be construed as a declaration of trust binding the shares in the donor's hands.^a In Scales v. Maude, 6 De Gex, M. & G. 43, a mortgagee had written various letters to the mortgagor about the mortgage, in which he said: "I now give this gift to become due at my death, unconnected with my will"; "I hereby request my executors to cancel the mortgage deed"; "I again direct and promise that my executors shall comply with my former request; that is, to cancel all deeds and papers I may have chargeable on the R. estate," etc. Held, that these expressions did not constitute a valid gift nor operate as a declaration of trust. In his opinion Lord Cranworth said: "Mere declaration of trust by the owner of property, in favor of a volunteer, is inoperative, and this court will not interfere in such a case." This broad dictum is clearly erroneous, for a mere declaration of trust by the owner. in favor of a volunteer, if effectually made, is operative. In the subsequent case of Jones v. Lock, Lord Cranworth frankly admitted his mistake. In Jones v. Lock, L. R. 1 Ch. 25, 28, a father put a check into the hand of his infant son, and said, "I give this to baby for himself," and then took it back and put it away. He also expressed the intention of giving the amount of it to his son. Shortly afterwards the father died, and the check was found among his papers. Held, that there was no valid gift, and no declaration of trust constituting the donor a trustee. Lord Cranworth said that the owner of property may by a declaration of trust constitute himself a trustee on behalf of a volunteer, and that a parol declaration of trust of personalty may be valid in such a case. When there has been a declaration of trust, it will be enforced even in favor of volunteers; but an imperfect gift cannot be enforced. In Richardson v. Richardson, L. R. 3 Eq. 686, E., by a voluntary deed, assigned certain specific property, and "all other the personal estate, whatsoever and wheresoever," of the assignor to R. absolutely. At the date of the assignment, E. was owner of certain promissory notes. These were not mentioned in the assignment. On R.'s death these notes were found in his possession.

§ 998, (a) In Talbot v. Talbot, 32 R. I. 72, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1221, 78 Atl. 535, a very carefully considered case, the court refused to follow the holding in Milroy v. Lord, requiring a transfer of the shares on the books of the corporation. aided or enforced in equity. But if the property is not of such a nature that the legal title can be transferred, then, if nothing more remains to be done or can be done by the grantor or donor,—if, as far as he is concerned, the con-

but not indorsed by E., and there was no evidence of any delivery of the notes by E. to R. Page Wood, V. C., held that although the assignment did not operate as such to pass the legal title to the notes, still it operated as a declaration of trust by E. in R.'s favor, and R. thereby became entitled to the notes. In Morgan v. Malleson, L. R. 10 Eq. 475, S., the owner of a certain India bond, signed the following voluntary instrument and delivered it to M., but did not deliver the bond itself: "I hereby give and make over to M. an India bond, value one thousand pounds." On the death of S., a contest arose between M. and the executors of S., and Lord Romilly held that the assignment was operative as an effectual declaration of trust in M.'s favor, and he was entitled to the bond. The judge said that the assignment was equivalent to the words "I undertake to hold the hond for you." These two cases have been severely criticised both in England and in this country; they must be regarded as contrary to the doctrine settled by the weight of authority, and as virtually overruled. In Warriner v. Rogers, L. R. 16 Eq. 340, a wealthy lady gave her servant, the plaintiff, a box, which she locked and handed to him, saying that it would be of service to him, but that it must not be opened until after her death, and she retained the key. At her death the box was opened, and in it was found a writing signed by the lady, addressed to the plaintiff, stating that the contents of the box were a deed of gift of certain real and personal estate specified. The box also contained certain title deeds of real property, but no deed to the plaintiff, and no instrument of any sort purporting to assign property to him, further than the firstmentioned writing. There was also another paper left by the deceased, to the effect that the deeds were to be given to the plaintiff. Held, that all these writings did not constitute a valid declaration of trust in plaintiff's favor. Bacon, V. C., in his opinion strongly dissented from the two last-mentioned cases. In Richards v. Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. 11, D., who owned leasehold premises and a stock in trade, purported to make a voluntary transfer or gift of the whole to his grandson, E., by means of the following memorandum, which he wrote upon the lease and signed: "This deed, and all thereto belonging, I give to E. from this time forth, with all the stock in trade." The lease with the memorandum was then delivered to E.'s mother, and the donor soon afterwards died. Held, that there was no valid assignment so as to constitute a perfected gift, and that there was no valid declaration of trust: See the extract from the opinion of Jessel, M. R., quoted in the preceding note. In Heartley v. Nicholson, L. R. 19 Eq. 233, the owner of a share in a coal mine, in let-

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veyance or assignment is complete, and he has done all that is necessary to be done, having regard to the nature of the property,—the conveyance or assignment will be effectual in equity, and will be enforced on behalf of the

ters and by a brief written memorandum indicated his intention to give the share to the plaintiff, his daughter, and some of the writings spoke of the share as already given. Nothing was done, however, sufficient to transfer the legal title to the share. Held, that these expressions of gift, or of an intention to give, did not amount to a declaration of trust, and did not constitute the father a trustee of the share for his daughter. Notwithstanding these criticisms, the supreme court of Pennsylvania, in Bond v. Bunting, 78 Pa. St. 210, seem to have accepted and followed the decisions in Richardson v. Richardson and Morgan v. Malleson, as correct.

In Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134, 31 Am. Rep. 446, Mrs. Susan B. deposited in a savings bank a sum of money belonging to her, declaring at the time that she wanted the account to be in trust for the plaintiff. The account was so entered in the books of the bank, and a pass-book was delivered to her, containing the following: "The Citizens' Savings Bank, in account with Susan Boone, in trust for Lillie Willard, five hundred dollars." Mrs. B. retained possession of the pass-book, and the money remained in the bank until her death. Plaintiff was ignorant of the deposit until after the donor's death. Held, that the transaction was an effectual declaration of trust, constituting the donor a trustee for the plaintiff, and clothing the plaintiff with the beneficial ownership of the money; that the donor's retention of the pass-book was not inconsistent with her position as a trustee, and that notice to the cestui que trust was not necessary in order to constitute a valid trust: See extract from the able opinion of Church, C. J., in the preceding note. In Minor v. Rogers. 40 Conn. 512, 16 Am. Rep. 69, and Ray v. Simmons, 11 R. I. 266, 23 Am. Rep. 447, the facts were quite similar, and the trusts were upheld.^b In Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 422, 36 Am. Rep. 634, Young placed certain bonds in two envelopes, and wrote on each envelope a memorandum, signed by him, that a specified number of the bonds therein belonged to his son W., and the residue to his son J., but that the interest to become due thereon was "owned and reserved" by himself during his life, and that at his death "they belong absolutely and entirely to W. and J. and their

§ 998, (b) Also in Willis v. Smyth, 91 N. Y. 297. See Connecticut River Sav. Bk. v. Albee, 64 Vt. 571, 33 Am. St. Rep. 944, 25 Atl. 487 (citing the text); Tusch v. German Sav. Bk., 20 Misc. Rep. 571, 46 N. Y. Supp. 422 (the intention of a settlor, to create a trust, may control though the trust be expressed in the form of a power of attorney that, as such, was revoked).

donee.² It should be observed however, that by recent statutes nearly all, if not quite all, legal things in action have been rendered assignable at law, so that the cases in

heirs." The donor showed these envelopes and memoranda to the wives of his sons, and made statements to them expressing his intention that the gift was to be complete and valid. The donor retained possession of the envelopes and contents until his death, about a year afterwards. Held, that there was no executed and valid gift passing the legal title, and no valid declaration of trust constituting the father a trustee for the donees: See opinion of Rapallo, J., quoted in previous note. In Estate of Webb, 49 Cal. 541, a person had written a letter to his sister, in which he promised to assign some securities to her, and this was held not an executed gift nor a valid trust. In Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550, one H. deposited in a bank a sum of money, belonging to himself, to the credit of himself and his sister M., so that the account was entered, "H., M., and the survivor of them, subject to the order of either, received \$1,850." A short time after. H. drew out fifty dollars, and died in about a month, leaving the eighteen hundred dollars on deposit. Held, that since H. retained the power and dominion over the money, there was not a complete gift, and the transaction did not constitute a valid declaration of trust in M.'s favor. See, also, Boykin v. Pace's Ex'r, 64 Ala. 68; Hill v. Den, 54 Cal. 6; Gadsden v. Whaley, 14 S. C. 210.

§ 998, ² Illustrations of the first class, where the assignment was incomplete, and the donee acquired no right:^c Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves. 39; Searle v. Law, 15 Sim. 95. Examples of the second class, where the donor did all that the vature of the property admitted:^d Edwards v. Jones, 1

§ 998, (c) Brown v. Crafts, 98 Me. 40, 56 Atl. 213; Clay v. Layton, (Mich.) 96 N. W. 459 (grantor made deeds and directed that they should be delivered after his death; no trust). Where A had B draw up an assignment of a bond and mortgage to C, declaring his intention to give them to C, but kept them a month and then had B deposit them in bank where they remained until A's death, the court held, after considering the leading cases on the subject, that the assignment was incomplete; it said, "It is also true that there must be evidence of such acts done or words used on the part of the creator of the alleged trust that the intention to create it arises as a necessary inference therefrom and is unequivocal. The acts must be of that character which will admit of no other interpretation than that such legal rights as the settlor retains are held by him as trustee for the donee." Wadd v. Hazleton, 137 N. Y. 215, 33 Am. St. Rep. 707, 21 L. R. A. 693, 33 N. E. 143.

§ 998, (d) Fox v. Hawks, 13 Ch. Div. 822 (an apparently voluntary assignment was held to be a declaration of trust with the husband as trustee); Thomas v. Lamb, 11 Cal. App. 717, 106 Pac. 254 (gift of key to safe and request to pay bills and send balance to sister); Wells v.

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which the last-mentioned rule can apply have been very much limited.

§ 999. Donor the Equitable Owner.—Where the donor is only the equitable owner, the legal estate being vested in a third person, he may make a voluntary transfer of his interest by conveyance or assignment; and if he has done all that is within his power to pass the property directly to the donee, or to declare a trust in favor of the donee,

Mylne & C. 226, 238; Fortescue v. Barnett, 3 Mylne & K. 36; Pearson v. Amicable Ass. Co., 27 Beav. 229; Weale v. Ollive, 17 Beav. 252; Pedder v. Mosely, 31 Beav. 159; Woodford v. Charnley, 28 Beav. 96; Blakely v. Brady, 2 Dru. & Walsh, 311; Kiddill v. Farnell, 3 Smale & G. 428.

German Ins. Co., 128 Iowa, 649, 105 N. W. 123 (delivery to beneficiary sufficient though trustee never knew of 'it and repudiated trust); Marshall's Adm'r v. Marshall, 156 Ky. 20, 160 S. W. 775 (assignment by indorsement of note, and direction that it be given to beneficiary on donor's death. Note kept in donor's bank). An owner of an insurance policy, being indebted to an estate of which he was executor, placed the policy with the papers of the estate, and with it put a letter saying that the policy was collateral for his indebtedness to the estate; later he said he did not regard the policy as his property but as held in trust for the estate; this was considered a good declaration of trust, though the policy had remained in his possession. Janes v. Falk, 50 N. J. Eq. 468, 26 Atl. 138; Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College, 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. E. 359 (where trust deed was delivered, no need to deliver property). In Richardson v. White, 167 Mass. 58, 44 N. E. 1072, A took out a life insurance policy to secure B for money advanced; he indorsed, on the face of the policy, "Payable in case of death, to Wm. H. Richardson (B)

as his interest may appear"; the policy was not delivered to B and the company was not notified, as required, but the assignment was held complete and A's administrator liable (the case was not a voluntary assignment but is inserted as an apt illustration of what equity may regard as a completed assignment); Kimball v. Leland, 110 Mass. 325, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 155, note (a delivery of a pass-book with power to collect the money); approved in Foss v. Lowell Bk., 111 Mass. 285, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 155, note (delivery of a bank-book and notice given the bank is a "complete assignment"); approved in Davis v. Ney, 125 Mass. 590 (bank-book delivered); Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Me. 364 (the delivery of the pass-book without other assignment, is complete, though there is no power to compel the bank to pay without an order from the donor); Talbot v. Talbot, 32 R. I. 72, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1221, 78 Atl. 535 (trust may be created in shares of stock by assignment without indorsement or transfer on the books of the company); and see the cases cited in the note to § 997, supra.

the donee's rights will be protected and enforced by a court of equity.¹ Also, the donor holding the equitable estate may direct the trustee in whom is vested the legal title to hold the property in trust for the donee; and this will create a valid trust in favor of the donee, and will clothe him with the beneficial interest, even though the direction is voluntary; and it is not necessary that the trustee should give his assent.² Finally, the holder of the equitable es-

§ 999, 1 Kekewich v. Manning, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 176; In re Way's Trusts, 2 De Gex, J. & S. 365; Baddeley v. Baddeley, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 113; Gilbert v. Overton, 2 Hem. & M. 110; Donaldson v. Donaldson, Kay, 711; Voyle v. Hughes, 2 Smale & G. 18; Pearson v. Amicable Ass. Co., 27 Beav. 229; and see Bridge v. Bridge, 16 Beav. 315; Beech v. Keep, 18 Beav. 285. Notice to the trustee is not necessary to perfect the trust: Donaldson v. Donaldson, *supra*; Tierney v. Wood, 19 Beav. 330; but may he necessary to protect the donee against third persons: Donaldson v. Donaldson, Kay, 711, 719.

§ 999, ² McFadden v. Jenkyns, 1 Phill. Ch. 153; Meek v. Kettlewell, 1 Phill. Ch. 342; Bill v. Cureton, 2 Mylne & K. 503; Rycroft v. Christy, 3 Beav. 238; Bentley v. Mackay, 15 Beav. 12; Gilbert v. Overton, 2 Hem. & M. 110. A receipt in the form, "Received of B, for the use of A, one hundred pounds, to be paid to A at B's death," is a sufficient declaration of trust: Moore v. Darton, 4 De Gex & S. 517; Grant v. Grant, 34 Beav. 623, 626; Paterson v. Murphy, 11 Hare, 88. A banker who debits himself in his books with money on behalf of another person thereby declares himself a trustee of it: Stapleton v. Stapleton, 14 Sim. 186; and a declaration of trust otherwise sufficient will be valid, although the donor retain possession and control of the fund: Wheatley v. Purr, 1 Keen, 551; Vandenberg v. Palmer, 4 Kay & J. 204.^a

§ 999, (a) But in such cases as McFadden v. Jenkyns, *supra*, where a debt is attempted to be changed into a trust, it must be horne in mind that ordinarily there is no specific *res* set aside; this may prevent the ereation of a trust in many such cases, and Lord Lyndhurst scems to have given the subject less notice than it deserved: See Burrowes v. Gore, 6 H. L. Cas. 907, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 48, note 1, for a discussion of the point; see, also, In re Caplen's Estate, 45 L. J. Rep. 280; Eaton v. Cooke, 25 N. J. Eq. 55. If, in the attempt to change the nature of the obligation, a novation takes place, the beneficiary obtains an enforceable right: See Hurlbut v. Hurlbut, 49 Hun, 189, 1 N. Y. Supp. 854. In either case it should be borne in mind that one party alone eannot change the relation: Marshall v. Marshall, 11 Colo. App. 505, 53 Pac. 617. But if both the debtor and ereditor release their previous rights the trust created would be founded upon a valuable consideration; if the tate may, by a sufficient declaration of trust, constitute himself a trustee for the donee with respect to the property, subject to the same limitations which apply to such declarations of trust by a donor who holds the legal estate. In conclusion, it may be truly said that each case of voluntary trust or transfer depends largely upon an interpretation of the language used by the donor; whether the language operates as a complete transfer, or is an effectual declaration of trust, must always be the vital question.

§ 1000. Executed and Executory Trusts.^a—This distinction between "executory" and "executed" trusts is solely concerned with questions of construction and interpretation of the instrument creating the trust, and of enforcement of the trust thus created,-namely, whether the strict rules of law governing limitations, and especially the rule in Shelley's case, are or are not to be applied in such construction, interpretation, and enforcement. Whenever a trust is executed, it is always construed in conformity with the strict legal rules concerning limitations of estates, and the rule in Shelley's case is made operative if the terms of the successive trusts bring it within that rule, even though the apparent intention of the one creating the trust is thereby defeated. Wherever a trust is executory, the intention of the party is followed in its construction and enforcement, the strict legal rules concerning limitations are not invoked, and the rule in Shelley's case is not permitted to operate. Executory trusts and questions concerning them ordinarily arise from marriage articles or inchoate marriage agreements in which a complete settlement is not made, but the party covenants that he will settle property or convey property upon trusts for the benefit of his family, and from wills in which the testator does not devise property upon completed trusts, but de-

trust relation is changed to a legal right, the same is true: Topham v. Morecraft, 8 El. & B. 972; Roper v. Holland, 3 Adol. & El. 99. § 1000 (a) This paragraph is cited in Mook v. Akron Savings & Loan Co., 87 Ohio, 273, 101 N. E. 278. vises to trustees upon trusts for them to settle it. In these and similar instances a court of equity is called upon to determine the nature of the settlements to be made, and in doing so it carries out the intention of the covenantor or testator, actual or presumed, without regard to the strict legal rules of limitation. As such instruments are comparatively infrequent in this country, and the subject rarely comes before the American courts, it will be sufficient to state the more general doctrines as established by decisions, without going into any minute detail of special rules.¹

§ 1001. Definition and Description.—A trust is executed when no act is necessary to be done to give effect to it when the trust is fully and finally declared in the instrument creating it.² A conveyance of land to A in trust for B, a devise of land to A in trust to receive the rents and profits and apply them to the use of B, are examples. It is plain that all ordinary express passive or active trusts are thus executed. A trust is *executory* when some further act is directed to be done, in order to complete and perfect the trust intended to be created.^b A misconcep-

§ 1000, ¹ The doctrine of executory trusts is one of great practical importance in England. It is fully discussed in Lord Glenorchy v. Bosville, Cas. t. Talb. 3; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. Ed., 1, 13, 36, and the editor's notes.

§1001, (a) Cited, with approval, in Massey v. Huntington, 118 Ill. 80, 7 N. E. 269; Commonwealth v. Louisville Public Library, 151 Ky. 420, 152 S. W. 262; Mook v. Akron Savings & Loan Co., 87 Ohio, 273, 101 N. E. 278; Carr v. Carr, 15 Cal. App. 480, 115 Pac. 261. See the following cases as examples of executed trusts: Riggins v. Adair, 105 Ga. 727, 31 S. E. 743; Parrott v. Dyer, 105 Ga. 93, 31 S. E. 417; Morris v. Linton, 74 Neb. 411, 104 N. W. 927 (distinction between executed and executory trusts); Stratton v. Gildersleeve, (N. J. Eq.) 41 Atl. 1117.

§1001, (b) The text is quoted in Miles v. Miles, 78 Kan. 382, 96 Pac. 481. See Pratt v. Tuttle, 136 Mass. 233, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 32, seems a good illustration of an executory trust; in that case B was to purchase patents, and, to that end, was to make and sell patented articles and pay over one-half the net profits to A, until the whole agreed price was paid, whereupon the patents were to be transferred: Baker v. Nall, 59 Mo. 268; Fisher v. Wister, 154 Pa. St. 65, 25 Atl. 1009. See the following cases as examples of what have been held executory trusts:

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tion should here be guarded against. When, by the terms of the trust as created, and for the purpose of carrying it into effect, the trustee is directed to do some act with the property, the trust is not thereby executory. Giving property to a trustee upon trust to convey to a person, or upon trust to convey it upon certain specified trusts, does not e render the trust executory. In all express active trusts the trustee is directed to do some acts with the property. The essence of an executory trust does not consist in acts directed to be done by the trustee with respect to the property, but in acts directed to be done in perfecting and completing the trust itself which was not fully declared in the original instrument of creation. "If the scheme has been imperfectly declared at the outset, and the creator of the trust has merely denoted his ultimate object imposing on the trustee or on the court the duty of effectuating it in the most convenient way, the trust is called executory."¹ "All trusts are in a sense executory, because a trust cannot be executed except by conveyance, and therefore there is something always to be done. But that is not the sense which a court of equity puts upon the term 'executory trust.' A court of equity considers an executory trust as distinguished from a trust executing itself, and distinguishes the two in this manner: Has the testator [or settlor] been what is called, and very properly called, his own conveyancer? Has he left it to the court to make out from *general expressions* what his intention is? or has he

§ 1001, 1 This very accurate statement is quoted from the text of Adams's Equity, 127, m. p. 40.

Boyd v. England, 56 Ga. 598; Taylor v. Brown, 112 Ga. 758, 38 S. E. 66; Clark v. East Atlanta Land Co., 113 Ga. 21, 38 S. E. 323; Sanders v. Houston Guano & Warehouse Co., 107 Ga. 49, 32 S. E. 610; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 61 S. C. 243, 39 S. E. 391; Steele v. Smith, 84 S. C. 464, 29 L. E. A. (N. S.) 939, 66 S. E. 200 (rule in Shelley's case does not apply); Highland Park Mfg. Co. v. Steele, 232 Fed. 10 (S. Car.), 146 C. C. A. 202 (same); Laguerenne v. Farrar, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 404, 61 S. W. 953.

§ 1001, (c) In the first edition of this work, the word "not," which, obviously, is necessary to the sense of the passage, was, by typographical error, omitted. so defined that intention that you have nothing to do but to take the limitations he has given you, and to convert them into legal estates?"^{2 d} In a word, the distinction

§1001, ² Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H. L. Cas. 1, 210, per Lord St. Leonards. The whole subject was very fully and ably discussed in the recent case of Cushing v. Blake, 30 N. J. Eq. 689, and as such discussions are comparatively rare in our reports, it may be proper to quote from the case at some length. William Durhridge, contemplating marriage, conveyed certain lands to Blake, for the benefit of his intended wife, a daughter of Blake. Mr. Blake executed a deed, reciting the intended marriage. the conveyance of the property to himself in trust for the future wife's sole use and henefit, etc., and declaring that he held the premises only in trust for the sole and separate use of the intended wife. The deed went on to declare specific trusts in favor of the wife; that she should have possession, should receive the rents and profits, etc., and added, "on the further trust that he would, whenever required by her, in writing, during her lifetime, convey the property to such person as she should appoint, and at her death to such person as she should by her will have appointed, and on failure of such will, to her heirs at law, to hold to them, their heirs and assigns, forever." The marriage took place; the wife died, leaving one child, and without having disposed of any part of the property during her lifetime, and without making a will. Her husband survived her, and after her death conveyed his life estate in the land to the complainant, who filed a hill for a decree declaring that the husband obtained an equitable estate by the curtesy in the premises, and establishing his own title thereto. From the decree in favor of the complainant the defendant appealed. Depue, J., after discussing the nature of equitable estates, and whether dower and curtesy are allowed in them, says (p. 697): "Iu the present case the limitation over after the death of the wife, in default of an appointment by her, is to her heirs at law, to hold to them their heirs and assigns forever. Under the rule in Shelley's case, such a limitation gives to the wife an estate in fee-simple, in which the husband, having issue by her, would be entitled to curtesy, if her estate was a legal estate. The rule in Shelley's case is applicable to equitable as well as to legal estates: Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 268; and in no case whatever, of a trust executed, have the words 'heirs' or 'heirs of the hody,' following a limitation to the ancestor for life, received a construction in equitable estates different from that which the same limitations would receive in legal estates: 1 Preston on Estates, 386. The counsel for the defendant has therefore placed his denial of the right of the husband to curtesy on

§1001, (d) Quoted in In re Fair, Pac. 442, 64 Pac. 1000; Miles v. 132 Cal. 593, 84 Am. St. Rep. 70, 60 Miles, 78 Kan. 382, 96 Pac. 481.

consists in the manner in which the trust is declared. The doctrine of executory trusts finds one of its most striking applications in the mode of carrying into effect and enforcing marriage articles. Where such articles or agreements

the ground that the trust in this instance was an executory trust. In some cases, and for certain purposes, a court of equity, where the trust is what is known as an executory trust, will so deal with it as to give effect to the general intent of the creator of it, without adherence to the strict legal effect of the terms in which it is expressed. In one sense, every trust is executory. At common law every use was a trust. But by the statute of uses certain uses were converted into legal estates, and, strictly speaking, every trust executed is a legal estate. In this sense the trust must be executory, to bring the case at all within the jurisdiction of chancery: Bagshaw v. Spencer, 1 Ves. Sr. 142, 152. But this is not the sense in which the term 'executory trust' is used as applicable to that class of cases in which equity will deal with the subject without regard to the legal signification of the terms in which the trust is declared. The earliest reported case in which the distinction is taken between executed and executory trusts as administered in the court of chancery is Leonard v. Countess of Snssex, 2 Vern. 526. This difference was first fully explained by Lord Chancellor Cowper in Earl of Stamford v. Hobart, 3 Brown Parl. C. 31; and notwithstanding the doubt expressed by Lord Hardwicke in Bagshaw v. Spencer, this distinction is completely settled in the English courts. The leading cases on the subject are Wright v. Pearson, 1 Eden, 119; Austen v. Taylor, 1 Eden, 361; Jervoise v. Duke of Northumberland, 1 Jacoh & W. 559; Boswell v. Dillon, Dru. 291, and Rochfort v. Fitzmanrice, 2 Drn. & War. 1, in which Lord Chancellor Sugden discusses the earlier cases on the subject. From an examination of these cases and others, the distinction will be found to rest on the manner in which the trust is declared. Where the limitations and trusts are fully and perfectly declared, the trust is regarded as an executed trust. In such a case equity will not interfere and give effect to it on a construction different from what it would receive in a court of law. It is only where the limitations are imperfectly declared, and the intent of the creator is expressed in general terms, leaving the manner in which his intent is to be carried into effect substantially in the discretion of trustees, that a court of equity regards the trust as an executory trust, and will assume jurisdiction to direct the trust to be executed upon a construction different from that which the instrument creating it would receive in a court of law. These principles are so clearly and fully stated by Lord Chancellor Sugden in Boswell v. Dillon, supra, that the following quotation may be profitably made from his opinion: 'By the term "executory trust," when used in its proper sense, we mean a trust in which some further act is directed to

to settle are general in their terms, a court of equity presumes that it was the intention of the parties to provide for the issue of the marriage, and will therefore direct a settlement to be made which does provide for the children;

be done. Executory trusts in this way may be divided into two classes; one, in which though something is required to be done (for example, a settlement to be executed), yet the testator has acted as his own conveyancer, as it is called, and defined the settlement to be made, and the court has nothing to do but to follow out and execute the intention of the party as appearing in the instrument. Such trusts, though executory, do not differ from ordinary limitations, and must be construed according to the principles applicable to legal estates depending upon the same words. ٢T would remark that it seems to be alike unnecessary and confusing to call such trusts executory; if they are so called, then all trusts to convey or to sell, and the like, should also be included under the same name.] The other species of executory trust is, where the testator, directing a further act, has imperfectly stated what is to be done. In such cases the court is invested with a larger discretion, and gives to the words a more liberal interpretation than they would have borne if they had stood by themselves."" Mr. Justice Depue then cites and quotes from earlier New Jersey decisions in which the distinction had been adopted,-viz.: Mullany v. Mullany, 4 N. J. Eq. 16, 31 Am. Dec. 238; Price v. Sisson, 13 N. J. Eq. 168; Weehawken Ferry Co. v. Sisson, 17 N. J. Eq. 475,-and proceeds: "It is obvious from what has already been said that a mere direction to the trustee to convey in accordance with trusts which have been fully defined will not convert a trust into an executory trust in the true sense of the term: Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H. L. Cas. l, 210. In Price v. Sisson, supra, the deed creating the trust contained a direction to the trustee to convey, and yet the chancellor and this court regarded it as creating an executed trust, and subject to have its limitations construed by rules applicable to legal estates. The cases to the contrary are those in which the intent is expressed in general language, and the trusts are therefore imperfectly declared, so that it is apparent on the face of the instrument that it was contemplated that they should be executed by the trustees in a more accurate manner, to give effect to the intent expressed: Lord Glenorchy v. Bosville, Cas. t. Talb. 3; Leonard v. Lady Sussex, 2 Vern. 526; Rochfort v. Fitzmaurice, 2 Dru. & War. 1. Or where some of the limitations are illegal, and the court is called upon to carry into effect the trusts declared as far as the rules of law will permit: Earl of Stamford v. Hobart, 3 Brown Parl. C. 31; Humbertson v. Humbertson, 2 Vern. 737. A conveyance by the trustee may be necessary for the purpose of investing the cestui que trust with the legal estate; but if the trusts are fully and accurately expressed, the rights of the beneficiaries are not affected and if the agreement contains technical terms, which in a fully executed trust would admit the operation of the rule in Shelley's case, and thus render the limitations in favor of the children liable to be destroyed, the court will order

by the direction to convey; the conveyance must conform to their rights as declared, and the equitable estate immediately vests accordingly: Stanley v. Stanley, 16 Ves. 491; Phipps v. Ackers, 9 Clark & F. 583, 594, 599, 601, 604; Bowen v. Chase, 94 U. S. 812, 818. It was further contended that this case is excepted out of these rules for the construction of trusts in a court of equity, by the fact that the trust in question was in the nature of a marriage settlement. There is a difference in one respect between marriage articles and a devise by will. Under the artificial rule in Shelley's case, a gift to the ancestor for life, with a limitation over to heirs or heirs of the body, creates in him an estate in fee-simple or in tail, and the limitation over is capable of destruction by him, by conveyance or devise if the estate be a fee-simple, or by fine and common recovery if it be a fee-bail. When these technical terms are used in an agreement for a settlement in view of marriage, the court will infer, from the nature of the agreement, that the parties contemplated provisions for the issue of the marriage, which should not be liable to immediate destruction by the act of the parties, and will direct the settlement to be made in such a manner as will prevent the destruction of the limitations over to issue: Blackburn v. Stables, 2 Ves. & B. 367; Jervoise v. Duke of Northumberland, 1 Jacob & W. 559; Rochfort v. Fitzmaurice, 2 Dru. & War. 1, 18; Sackville-West v. Viscount Holmesdale, L. R. 4 H. L. 543. But this doctrine is applicable only so long as the agreement for a settlement remains a matter of contract. If the parties have themselves completed the settlement by a deed complete in itself and perfect, so that it requires only to be obeyed and fulfilled by the trustees, according to the provisions of the settlement, the trust will be construed in the same manner as similar trusts created for other purposes: Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 196: Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, 7 R. I. 383; Carroll v. Renich, 7 Smedes & M. 798." The court held that the settlement was a final deed of settlement, and not a mere agreement to settle; that the trusts were executed. and therefore that the husband was entitled to curtesy in his wife's equitable estate in fee-simple: See, also,e Lord Glenorchy v. Bosville. Cas. t.

§ 1001, (c) See, also, Cockrell v. Earl of Essex, 26 Ch. Div. 538; Nash v. Allen, 42 Ch. Div. 54; Ballance v. Lonphier, 42 Ch. Div. 62; Pillot v. Landon, 46 N. J. Eq. 310, 19 Atl. 25; Petition of Angell, 12 R. I. 630; III-139 and see Gaylord v. City of Lafayette, 115 Ind. 423, 17 N. E. 899. In Lynn v. Lynn, 135 Ill. 19, 25 N. E. 634, the court said: "The gist of the Ellison Case (Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. 656), which may be regarded as

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the settlement to be made in such a manner as to prevent the operation of that rule and the destruction of the limitations to the issue. This doctrine is applicable, however, only when the marriage articles are an agreement for a settlement, and not when the settlement has been completed. In the case of a will there is no presumption of an intent to provide for children; the provisions of the will itself are the only guide in construing its terms. "If technical words are used, and are not modified or explained by the context, it seems that the trusts, whether

Talb. 3; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1, 13, 36; Egerton v. Earl of Brownlow, 4 H. L. Cas. 1; Sackville-West v. Viscount Holmesdale, L. R. 4 H. L. 543; Phipps v. Ackers, 9 Clark & F. 583, 594, 599, 601, 604; Thompson v. Fisher, L. R. 10 Eq. 207; Phillips v. James, 3 De Gex, J. & S. 72; Viscount Holmesdale v. West, L. R. 12 Eq. 280; Magrath v. Morehead, L. R. 12 Eq. 491; Loch v. Bagley, L. R. 4. Eq. 122; In re Bellasis's Trust, L. R. 12 Eq. 218; Rochfort v. Fitzmaurice, 2 Dru. & War. 1; Boswell v. Dillon, Dru. 291; Leonard v. Lady Sussex, 2 Vern. 526; Earl of Stamford v. Hobart, 3 Brown Parl. C. 31; Humbertson v. Humbertson, 2 Vern. 737; Wright v. Pearson, 1 Eden, 119; Austen v. Taylor, 1 Eden, 361; Sweetapple v. Bindon, 2 Vern. 536; Papillon v. Voice, 2 P. Wms. 471; Lord Deerburst v. Duke of St. Albans, 5 Madd. 232, 260; Jervoise v. Duke of Northumberland, 1 Jacob & W. 559; Bowen v. Chase, 94 U. S. 812, 818; Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 268, 281; Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 196; Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, 7 R. I. 383; Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn. 146, 162; Wood v. Burnham, 6 Paige, 513, 518; Tallman v. Wood, 26 Wend. 9, 19; Wagstaff v. Lowerre, 23 Barb. 209, 215; Mullany v. Mullany, 4 N. J. Eq. 10, 31 Am. Dec. 238; Price v. Sisson, 13 N. J. Eq. 168; Weehawken F. Co. v. Sisson, 17 N. J. Eq. 475; Dennison v. Goehring, 7 Pa. St. 175, 177, 47 Am. Dec. 505; Lessee of Findlay v. Riddle, 3 Binn. 139, 152, 5 Am. Dec. 355; Horne v. Lyeth, 4 Har. & J. 431, 434; Saunders v. Edwards, 2 Jones Eq. 134; Porter v. Doby, 2 Rich. Eq. 49; Garner v. Garner, 1 Desaus. Eq. 437, 444; Berry v. Williamson, 11 B. Mon. 245, 251; Riddle v. Cutter, 49 Iowa, 547.

a leading authority on the subject, seems to be that, where the relation of trust and *cestui que trust* has been created by the deed the transaction will be regarded as an executed trust": Estate of Smith, 144 Pa. St. 428, 27 Am. St. Bep. 641, 22 Atl. 916 ("an executory trust, properly so called, is one in which the limitations are imperfectly declared, and the donor's intention is expressed in such general terms that something not fully declared is required to be done in order to complete and perfect the trust, and to give it effect").

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executory or not, must be construed in accordance with their technical sense. Still, in the case of an executory trust created by a will, the intention so to modify the terms may be collected from slighter indications than would be sufficient in that of an executed trust."³ It should be observed, in this connection, that the statutory abrogation of the rule in Shelley's case has removed one of the most important occasions for applying the distinction between

§ 1001, ³ Adams's Equity, 129; see Blackburn v. Stables, 2 Ves. & B.
367; Jervoise v. Duke of Northumberland, 1 Jacob & W. 559; Rochfort v. Fitzmaurice, 2 Drn. & War. 1, 18; Sackville-West v. Lord Holmesdale, L. R. 4 H. L. 543; Trevor v. Trevor, 1 P. Wms. 622; Austen v. Taylor, 1 Eden, 361; Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 196; Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, 7 R. I. 383; Carroll v. Renich, 7 Smedes & M. 798; Berry v. Williamson, 11 B. Mon. 245, 251; Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn. 146;^f and cases in last note.

As to executory trusts of chattels and other personal property, see Duke of Newcastle v. Countess of Lincoln, 3 Ves. 387; 12 Ves. 218; Stanley v. Leigh, 2 P. Wms. 686, 690; Lord Deerhurst v. Duke of St. Albans, 5 Madd. 232; Rowland v. Morgan, 2 Phill. Ch. 764; Lord Scarsdale v. Curzon, 1 Johns. & H. 40; Shelley v. Shelley, L. R. 6 Eq. 540, 546.

English courts of equity exercise the very high jurisdiction of setting aside or modifying a settlement which does not carry out the presumptive intention of the articles, and is not such a one as ought to have been made, and also a settlement made by a young woman which does not contain the provisions usually inserted to protect the rights of the wife or children. No fraud or undue influence or mistake need be shown; the power is a part of the jurisdiction of equity over married women and infants, with respect to their property. It is used to prevent improvident settlements made without advice, or without a due regard for the rights of the wife or children. A settlement may therefore be set aside and modified after the death of the husband. If this particular jurisdiction is ever exercised by American courts of equity, the occasions for it must be extremely rare: Smith v. Iliffe, L. R. 20 Eq. 666, 668; Wolterbeek v. Barrow, 23 Beav. 423; Hobson v. Ferraby, 2 Coll. C. C. 412; Harbidge v. Wogan, 5 Hare, 258; Torre v. Torre, 1 Smale & G. 518; Cogan v. Duffield, L. R. 20 Eq. 789; Taggart v. Taggart, 1 Schoales & L. 84; Warwick v. Warwick, 3 Atk. 291, 293; see Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 196; Garnsev v. Mundv, 24 N. J. Eq. 243 (a conveyance in trust was set aside because improvident, etc., even though infant children of the grantor were beneficiaries).

§1001, (f) Petition of Angell, 13 R. I. 630.

executed and executory trusts in many of the American states.

§ 1002. Powers in Trust.—Analogous to trusts proper, but differing from them in one essential feature, are powers in trust. In a true trust the legal title is in and by its creation always vested in the trustee, but to be held for the benefit of the beneficiary. In a trust power, as distinguished from a trust, the legal title is vested, not in the trustee, but in a third person, and the trustee has authority to convey or dispose of the property to or for or among the beneficiaries. A power generally is an authority given to A to convey or dispose of an interest which he does not himself hold, and of which the complete legal title is vested in another person, B^{1} Where the power is not coupled with a trust. A is clothed with a complete discretion whether he will or will not execute it; courts of equity do not control that discretion; if he utterly fails to make any appointment, they do not relieve the expected beneficiaries to or among whom the disposition might have been made. Where the power is in trust, A may have some discretion with respect to the mode in which he shall exercise it, with respect to the amounts distributed among a designated class of beneficiaries, and the like; but he has no discretion as to whether he will or will not exercise it at all. Tt. partakes so much of the nature of a trust, that an obligation rests upon him, and an equitable right is held by the beneficiaries,—a right which equity recognizes, and to a certain extent protects; so that if A does not discharge the duty resting upon him, a court of equity will, to a certain extent, discharge the duty in his stead. A trust power may therefore be defined as follows: It is an authority given to

§ 1002, ¹ There are various species of powers, in part depending upon the question whether the donee, A, has *any* interest in the property. Thus he might have a life estate and have power to dispose of the fee; or he might have no interest whatever, and be clothed with a naked power to dispose of property entirely held by another. It is unnecessary to go into the classification of powers.

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A to dispose of property of which the legal title is held by B, to or among a specified beneficiary or class of beneficiaries, conferred in such terms that a fiduciary or trust obligation rests upon A to make the disposition, although he may be clothed with some discretion as to the amounts or shares which he shall confer upon the individuals constituting a class of beneficiaries, or even as to the persons whom he shall select from the class to receive the entire benefit. On the other hand, the beneficiaries may be so specified that no discretion with respect to them exists.² When the trust power is of such a nature that the doneetrustee is authorized to dispose of the property among a class, and is clothed with a discretion, a court of equity will not interfere to control that discretion, or interfere with the mode of exercising it, if he does in fact make an appointment. If, however, the donee-trustee fails to act at all, and makes no appointment, it is a settled rule that a court of equity, in enforcing the power on behalf of the beneficiaries, will always decree an equal distribution of the property among all the persons constituting the class.^a In New York, and other states which have followed the New York type of legislation, the subject of powers in trust has assumed a considerable importance. The statutes, while abolishing all express trusts, with few specified exceptions, provide that a disposition in the form of a trust, but not valid as a true trust under the statute, may still be valid and take effect as a power in trust. It follows

§ 1002, ² In the leading case, Brown v. Higgs, 8 Ves. 561, 570, Lord Eldon said: "There are not only a mere trust and a mere power, but there is also known to this court a power which the party to whom it is given is intrusted and required to execute; and without regard to that species of power the court considers it as partaking so much of the nature and qualities of a trust, that if the person who has that duty imposed upon him does not discharge it, the court will, to a certain extent, discharge the duty in his own room and place."

§ 1002, (a) The text is quoted in Wetmore v. Henry, 259 Ill. 80, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 247, 102 N. E. 189; and cited in Stoughton v. Liscomb, 39 R. I. 487, 98 Atl. 183. that every kind of express active trust possible under the former system may now be created and made effectual as a power in trust.^{3 b}

§ 1003. Legislation of Various States.—Trusts have been regulated and limited by statute in several of the leading states, and this statutory system is so important that it demands a separate notice, and at least a general descrip-

§ 1002, ³ Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. Ed., 1833, 1848, 1857; Burrough v. Philcox, 5 Mylue & C. 72; Grant v. Lynam, 4 Russ. 292; Penny v. Turner, 2 Phill. Ch. 493; Fordyce v. Bridges, 2 Phill. Ch. 497; Gough v. Bult, 16 Sim. 45; Brown v. Pocock, 6 Sim. 257; Croft v. Adam, 12 Sim. 639; Cole v. Wade, 16 Ves. 27, 42; Izod v. Izod, 32 Beav. 242; In re White's Trusts, Johns, 656; Brook v. Brook, 3 Smale & G. 280; Gude v. Worthington, 3 De Gex & S. 389; Salusbury v. Denton, 3 Kay & J. 529; Minors v. Battison, L. R. 1 App. C. 428; Willis v. Keymer, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 181 (the trustee's discretion); Smith v. Bowen, 35 N. Y. 83; Whiting v. Whiting, 4 Gray, 236, 240; Chase v. Chase, 2 Allen, 101; Miller v. Meetch, 8 Pa. St. 417; Whitehurst v. Harker, 2 Ired. Eq. 292; Withers v. Yeadon, 1 Rich. Eq. 324; Collins v. Carlisle, 7 B. Mon. 13; Gibbs v. Marsh, 2 Met. 243. In many of the English cases the appointment is to be made by way of a testamentary disposition, and the beneficiaries are aided after the death of the donee-trustee without making any appointment. Under the legislation of American states, where an express active trust takes effect only as a power in trust, the power may clearly be enforced inter vivos against the trustee himself, under the same circumstances in which a true trust might be enforced. Examples will be found post, under § 1003, in connection with this modern legislation.c

§ 1002, (b) This section is cited in Condit v. Bigalow, 64 N. J. Eq. 504, 54 Atl. 160. See, also, Kintner v. Jones, 122 Ind. 148, 23 N. E. 701; Read v. Patterson, 44 N. J. Eq. 211, 6 Am. St. Rep. 877, 14 Atl. 490; Tempest v. Lord Camoys, 21 Ch. Div. 571; Read v. Williams, 125 N. Y. 560, 21 Am. St. Rep. 748, 26 N. E. 730 (a power in trust to distribute the residue of an estate among such charities as certain persons named shall choose is void for uncertainty, as no class is designated from which to make a choice); In re Weekes' Settlement, [1897] 1 Ch. 289 (a mere power, not exercised, will not necessarily be treated as a trust).

§ 1002, (c) And see Henderson v. Henderson, 113 N. Y. 1, 20 N. E. 814; Syracuse Savings Bank v. Holden, 105 N. Y. 415, 11 N. E. 950; Randall v. Constans, 33 Minn. 329, 23 N. W. 530; Townshend v. Frommer, 125 N. Y. 446, 26 N. E. 805. In general on the subject of this paragraph, see §§ 835, 920.

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tion.¹ The prevailing type originated in New York, and has been followed in Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, and Dakota. The important and distinctive features which constitute this type, so far as it deals with

§ 1003, 1 N. Y. Rev. Stats., pt. 2, tit. 2, c. 1, art. 2, sec. 45: Uses and trusts abolished, except as herein authorized. Secs. 46-49: In passive trusts by will or deed, the whole estate passes directly to the beneficiary. Sec. 55: Express trusts may be created for any or either of the following purposes: 1. To sell lands for the henefit of creditors; 2. To sell, mortgage, or lease lands for the benefit of legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon; 3. To receive the rents and profits of land, and apply them to the use of any person, during the life of such person, or for any shorter term, subject to the rules concerning the suspension of the power of alicnation; 4. To receive rents and profits of lands, and to accumulate the same for the benefit of minors, for and during their minority. Sec. 60: In all these express trusts the whole estate is vested in the trustee; the heneficiary takes no estate in the land, but only the right to enforce a performance by the trustee. Sec. 63: In the third and fourth classes, the beneficiary cannot assign or in any manner dispose of his interest. Sec. 65: And the trustee is also unable to convey his interest if the trust is expressed in the instrument from which he derives his estate. Secs. 75, 77, 78: Express trusts not valid under this statute are valid and effectual as powers in trust.

In the same chapter (secs. 1-21) it is provided that the power of alienation cannot be suspended by a trust or other disposition, longer than during the continuance of *two* lives in being at the time when the trust or other disposition commences. The foregoing provisions concerning express trusts relate exclusively to trusts of real property. Trusts of personal property, with respect to their form and kind and object, are not restricted, except that they are all subject to the limitations concerning the suspension of the power of alienation.

Michigan.—2 Comp. Laws 1871, p. 1331:^a The system is substantially the same as that of New York, with some additions to the express trusts allowed. Sec. 11: The following express trusts are authorized: The first, second, and third classes are identical with the corresponding classes of the New York statute: 4. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to accumulate the same for the benefit of any married woman, or for the benefit of minors during their minority. 5. For the beneficial interest of any person or persons, when such trust is fully expressed and clearly defined upon the face of the instrument creating it, subject to the limitations concerning the suspension of the power of alienation. 2 Comp.

§ 1003, (a) Michigan. - Howell's Stats. 1882, c. 214.

express trusts of land, are the following: 1. All uses, and all express *passive* trusts, and all express *active* trusts except certain enumerated kinds, are abolished. 2. Certain kinds of express active trusts are allowed, wherein the

Laws 1871, p. 1326, sec. 15:^b The power of alienation can only be suspended during two lives in being, as in New York.

Wisconsin.-2 Taylor's Rev. Stats. 1872, p. 1129, sec. 11:^c The express trusts authorized are identical with those of the Michigan statute.^d 2 Taylor's Rev. Stats. 1872, p. 1124, secs. 15, 16:^e The limitations upon the suspension of the power of alienation are the same as in New York and Michigan.

Minnesota.—Young's Gen. Stats. 1878, p. 553, sec. 11:^f The four classes of express trusts of land authorized are the same as the four classes of the New York statute. To these is added: 5. To receive and take charge of any money, stocks, bonds, or valuable chattels of any kind, and to invest and loan the same for the benefit of the beneficiaries of such trust, subject to the control of the courts over the acts of the trustee.

California.-Civ. Code: The general system is the same as that of New York. Sec. 847: No trusts permitted, except those authorized. Sec. 863: In all express trusts, the whole estate vests in the trustee. Sec. 867: The beneficiary may be restrained from disposing of his interest. Secs. 869, 879: If the trust is declared in the conveyance to the trustce, every act or transfer of his in contravention of the trust is absolutely void; if the trust is not so declared, it is invalid as against a bona fide purchaser from the trustee. The express trusts authorized are somewhat broader than those of the New York statute. Sec. 857: The following classes of express trusts are authorized: 1. To sell real property and apply or dispose of the proceeds in accordance with the instrument creating the trust; 2. To mortgage or lease real property as in same class of the New York statute; 3. To receive the rents and profits of real property, and pay them to or apply them to the use of any person, whether ascertained at the time of the creation of the trust or not, for himself or for his family, during the life of such person, or for any shorter time, subject to the rules concerning the suspension of the power of alienation; 4. To receive rents and profits and accumulate the same for minors, as in New York. Secs. 715, 716, 722-726, 771: Suspension of the power of alienation can only last

§ 1003, (b) Howell's Stats. 1882, sec. 5531.

§ 1003, (c) Wisconsin.—1 Sanborn and Berryman's Stats. 1889, sec. 2081.

§1003, (d) Subdivision 6 authorizes trusts for the perpetual preservation and repair of tombs and cemeteries.

§ 1003, (e) 1 Sanborn and Berryman's Stats. 1889, secs. 2039, 2040.

§ 1003, (f) Minnesota. — Kelly's Stats. 1891, sec. 4013.

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trustee has the whole estate and management,^h and the beneficiary has no estate, equitable or legal, but only the right to enforce the performance of the trust according to its terms against the trustee. These permitted species are all made subject to the rules concerning perpetuities, or the periods during which the absolute power of alienation may be suspended. 3. Trusts of personal property are not embraced within this scheme, and are not substantially modified or limited, except that they are subject to the rules concerning perpetuities.ⁱ 4. When the trust is declared in the instrument by which the estate is conveyed to the trustee, any transfer or other act of his in contravention of the trust is absolutely void; when the trust is not declared in that conveyance, it becomes inoperative as against a *bona fide* purchaser for valuable consideration

during the continuance of *lives in being* (not *two* lives) at the creation of the trust. Sec. 2220: Express trusts of personal property are allowed for any purpose for which a contract may lawfully be made.

Dakota.—Civ. Code 1880, p. 243, sec. 282: Identical with that of California.

Georgia.—Although the legislation of this state does not follow the foregoing type, the code contains the following provisions, which may limit the extent to which express trusts can be created. Code 1873, p. 399, sec. 2305: "Estates may be created, not for the benefit of the grantee, but for the use of some other person. They are termed trust estates. No formal words are necessary to create such an estate. Whenever a manifest intention is exhibited that another person shall have the benefit of the property, the grantee shall be declared a trustee. Sec. 2306: Trust estates may be created for the benefit of any female, or minor, or person non compos mentis." \cong See Gordon v. Green, 10 Ga. 534; Russell v. Kearney, 27 Ga. 96; Ingram v. Fraley, 29 Ga. 553; Logan v. Goodall, 42 Ga. 95; Sutton v. Aiken, 62 Ga. 733; Coughlin v. Seago, 53 Ga. 250; Adams v. Guerard. 29 Ga. 651, 76 Am. Dec. 624; Bowman v. Long, 26 Ga. 142; Boyd v. England, 56 Ga. 598.

§ 1003, (S) Georgia.—Also, on compliance with certain requisites, for the benefit of persons mentally weak, intemperate, profligate, etc.. Acts of 1876, p. 26; Code 1882, sec. 2306.

§1003, (h) Culbertson v. Witbeck

Co. (Mich.), 127 U. S. 335, 32 L. Ed. 134, 8 Sup. Ct. 1136.

§ 1003, (i) See Gilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y. 451, 52 Am. Rep. 41, 2 N. E. 464; In re Wilkin, 183 N. Y. 104, 75 N. E. 1105; In re Evenson's Will, 161 Wis. 627, 155 N. W. 145. and without notice of the trust. 5. In those species which are for the permanent benefit of the beneficiary,—that is, those which are not trusts to sell or dispose of the property,—the beneficiary either is or may be made unable to assign or transfer his interest. 6. The general powers, duties, and liabilities of the trustees as established by the doctrines of equity jurisprudence are not otherwise altered. The portions of this system which relate to trusts arising by operation of law—resulting and constructive—will be described in a subsequent section.

§ 1004. Judicial Interpretation — Validity of Trusts.— The following are among the most important results of the judicial interpretation given to these statutory provisions: Since all passive trusts of land are abolished, a conveyance or devise of real property to A, merely in trust for or to the use of B, would not be void, but would vest the entire estate, legal and equitable, in B, as though the transfer had been made directly to him; and the same effect would be produced if the grantor should attempt to create a trust upon a trust, by any form of limitation, to A to the use of B, in trust for C.¹ The first class of express trusts, ac-

§ 1004, 1 This has been expressly settled in New York, and there can be no doubt that the same result would take place in the other states.^a Even if the statute of uses of Henry VIII. is not regarded as re-enacted, the provisions of the modern statutes abolishing passive uses and trusts are based upon the same policy as the original legislation. And since these state statutes are more mandatory in their language, there seems to be no room left for the interpretation which permitted a passive trust to be created by means of a use limited upon a use: Knight v. Weatherwax, 7 Paige, 182; Braker v. Deveraux, 8 Paige, 513, 518; Johnson v. Fleet,

§ 1004, (a) See the following cases, referring to the New York statute and its operation: Salisbury v. Slade, 48 N. Y. Supp. 55, 22 App. Div. 346; Staples v. Hawes, 39 App. Div. 548, 57 N. Y. Supp. 452; Seidelbach v. Knaggs, 60 N. Y. Supp. 774, 44 App. Div. 169. See Farmers & Yorchants' Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 58 Neb. 522, 44 L. R. A. 862, 78 N. W. 1054, for a valuable case discussing the reasons for holding the statute of uses a part of the common law of the state. See Walton v. Drumtra, 152 Mo. 489, 54 S. W. 233, for the holdings in regard to the Missouri statute. cording to the form of the New York statute, is strictly confined to sales for the benefit of creditors; by the form of the California statute, the class clearly includes every kind of active trust which empowers the trustee to sell or convey the trust land.² The second class permits a trust

14 Wend. 176, 180, per Nelson, J.; Rathbun v. Rathbun, 6 Barb. 98; Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Hill, 3 Hun, 577; Rawson v. Lampman, 5 N. Y. 456; Wright v. Douglass, 7 N. Y. 564; Astor v. L'Amoreux, 4 Sand. 524; and see Hill v. Den, 54 Cal. 6; Wormouth v. Johnson, 58 Cal. 621; Patton v. Chamberlain, 44 Mich. 5; Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552.^b

§ 1004, ² In New York a trust to sell for any other purpose than payment of creditors is void as a trust, but valid and effectual as a power in trust: Selden v. Vermilyea, 1 Barb. 58. In California, the following are illustrations: Sale for benefit of creditors: Grant v. Burr, 54 Cal. 298; Bateman v. Burr, 57 Cal. 480; Gschwend v. Estes, 51 Cal. 134; Sharp v. Goodwin, 51 Cal. 219; Tyler v. Granger, 48 Cal. 259; Thompson v. McKay, 41 Cal. 221, 230; Learned v. Welton, 40 Cal. 349; Handley v. Pfister, 39 Cal. 283, 2 Am. Rep. 449. For benefit of legatees: Estate of Delaney, 49 Cal. 76, 86; Auguisola v. Arnaz, 51 Cal. 435, 438.° In my opinion, this form would include a trust simply to convey the land to some designated person or class, for the validity of the trust cannot depend upon the amount of the proceeds.

§ 1004, (b) See, also, Syracuse Savings Bank v. Holden, 105 N. Y. 415, 11 N. E. 950; Crook v. Rindskoff, 105 N. Y. 476, 12 N. E. 174; Sullivan v. Bruhling, 66 Wis. 472, 29 N. W. 211; Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Moran, 30 Minn. 165, 14 N. W. 805; Townshend v. Frommer, 125 N. Y. 446, 26 N. E. 805 (a trust to convey on the happening of a specified event is active, and will be validated as a power).

§ 1004, (c) See, also, Cook v. Platt, 98 N. Y. 35 (it is essential to the validity of trusts of this class that the power conferred shall be absolute and imperative).

See the following cases, as examples of what may be allowed under the Cal. Code: In re Walkerly, 108 Cal. 627, 49 Am. St. Rep. 97, 41 Pac. 772; Nellis v. Rickard, 132 Cal.

617, 85 Am. St. Rep. 227, 66 Pac. 32; In re Sanford's Estate, 136 Cal. 97, 68 Pac. 494; Carpenter v. Cook, 132 Cal. 621, 84 Am. St. Rep. 118, 64 Pac. 997; Estate of Fair, 132 Cal. 523, 84 Am. St. Rep. 70, 60 Pac. 453, 64 Pac. 1000 (by this case it was held that under the Cal. Code a direction to "transfer and convey" was not the equivalent of to "sell and convey"); In re Spreckels' Estate, 162 Cal. 559, 123 Pac. 371. A trust to convey was not valid in California: Hofsas v. Cummings, 141 Cal. 525, 75 Pac. 110; In re Pichoir's Estate, 139 Cal. 682, 73 Pac. 606; In re Dixon's Estate, (Cal.) 77 Pac. 412; see, also, Sacramento Bank v. Montgomery, 146 Cal. 745, 81 Pac. 138 (the void remainder remains in trustor); In re Blake's Estate, 157 Cal. 448, 108 Pac. 287 (both express and to mortgage or lease lands, and with the money raised by the mortgage, or the rents from the leasing, to pay any kind of testamentary gift, or to pay off any encumbrance which may be on the land, but not for the purpose of paying general creditors.³ The third class authorizes a most useful kind of trust in marriage and family settlements, and in testamentary provisions for widows and children. If the provisions of the trust unduly suspend the power of alienation, it is void. It should be observed that attempted trusts not valid as conforming to this class may be effectual as powers in trust.^{4 d} By one form of the fourth class a

§ 1004, 3 Lang v. Ropke, 5 Sand. 363.

§ 1004, 4 The number of New York decisions concerning this species is great, discussing and settling many questions of detail. The following are the most important: Lorillard's Case, 14 Wend. 265; Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61; Kane v. Gott, 24 Wend. 641, 35 Am. Dec. 641; Hone's Ex'rs v. Van Schaick, 20 Wend. 564; Moore v. Moore, 47 Barb. 257; Burke v. Valentine, 52 Barb. 412; Killam v. Allen, 52 Barb. 605; Leggett v. Perkins, 2 N. Y. 297; Amory v. Lord, 9 N. Y. 403; Savage v. Burnham, 17 N. Y. 561; Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298, 80 Am. Dec. 269; Downing v. Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366, 80 Am. Dec. 290; Gilman v. Reddington, 24 N. Y. 9; Everitt v. Everitt, 29 N. Y. 39; Post v. Hover, 33 N. Y. 593; Harrison v. Harrison, 36 N. Y. 543; Schettler v. Smith, 41 N. Y. 328; Manice v. Manice, 43 N. Y. 303; Vernon v. Vernon, 53 N. Y. 351; Kiah v. Grenier, 56 N. Y. 220; Heermans v. Robertson, 64 N. Y. 332; Provost v. Provost, 70 N. Y. 141; Stevenson v. Lesley, 70 N. Y. 512; Verdin v. Slocum, 71 N. Y. 345; Garvey v. McDevitt, 72 N. Y. 556; Low v. Harmony, 72 N. Y. 408; Moore v. Hegeman, 72 N. Y. 376; Heermans v. Burt, 78 N. Y. 259; Donovan v. Van de Mark, 78 N. Y. 244; Ireland v. Ireland, 84 N. Y. 321; Delaney v. Van Aulen, 84 N. Y. 16; Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552; Meth. Church etc. v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730; Lyle v. Burke, 40 Mich. 499; Smith v. Ford, 48 Wis. 115; White v. Fitzgerald.

implied trusts to convey to beneficiaries are void); Lauricella v. Lauricella, 161 Cal. 61, 118 Pac. 430; In re Leavitt, 8 Cal. App. 756, 97 Pac. 916. This rule was changed by statute in 1913.

§ 1004, (d) To the effect that there are no powers in trust in California, see Estate of Fair, 132 Cal. 523, 84 Am. St. Rep. 70, 60 Pac. 453, 64 Pac. 1000; McCurdy v. Otto, 140 Cal. 48, 73 Pac. 748. For an elaborate discussion of the validity of trusts to lease lands for the purpose of discharging incumbrances, and a review of the New York cases, see Hascall v. King, 162 N. Y. 134, 76 Am. St. Rep. 302, 56 N. E. 515, by Parker, C. J.

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trust is authorized to accumulate income for the benefit of minors in being, and not longer than during their minority; every other form of accumulation is prohibited. By the other form the accumulation is permitted for the benefit of married women as well as minors.⁵

§ 1005. Interest, Rights, and Liabilities of the Beneficiary.—Although the beneficiary in all these classes of express trusts takes no estate, this does not prevent him from taking or holding the estate, or being vested with the ultimate estate, after the trust is ended.¹ He also has a right,—a thing in action; and how far this is assignable, or may be reached by his creditors, depends upon the nature and particular provisions of the trust.² The entire

19 Wis. 480; Goodrich v. City of Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 422; overruling Marvin v. Titsworth, 10 Wis. 320; Cutter v. Hardy, 48 Cal. 568; Estate of Delaney, 49 Cal. 76.^e

§ 1004, ⁵ For construction, see Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61; Vail v. Vail, 4 Paige, 317, 328; Morgan v. Masterton, 4 Sand. 442; Harris v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 242; Kilpatrick v. Johnson, 15 N. Y. 322; Dodge v. Pond, 23 N. Y. 69; Gilman v. Reddington, 24 N. Y. 9; Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552.^f

§ 1005, 1 Stevenson v. Lesley, 70 N. Y. 512.

§ 1005, ² In all trusts of the first and second classes, where a fixed sum is to be paid to the beneficiary, as to the creditor, a legatee, etc., he may clearly assign his right, so that the assignce would become entitled to the payment. The interest of the beneficiary in these kinds is also plainly subject to be reached by his creditors. In trusts of the third and fourth classes, even without any statutory prohibition, it seems inconsistent with the whole scheme that the rights of the beneficiary should be assignable. In several of the states following the New York type, his power to assign is expressly taken away; in California he may be restrained from assigning by the terms of the trust: Civ. Code, sec. $867.^{a}$

In trusts of the third class, to receive rents and profits for the beneficiary, if there is no valid provision for their accumulation, the surplus

§ 1004, (e) Woodward v. James, 115 N. Y. 346, 22 N. E. 150; Cooke v. Platt, 98 N. Y. 35; In re Heywood's Estate, 148 Cal. 184, 82 Pac. 755.

§1004, (f) Pray v. Hegeman, 92

N. Y. 508; Barbour v. De Forest, 95 N. Y. 13.

§ 1005, (a) See, generally, In re Foster's Estate, 37 Misc. Rep. 581, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1067; Cheyney v. Geary, 194 Pa. St. 427, 45 Atl. 369; McColestate is vested in the trustee, but his power to make a valid sale and conveyance will depend upon the nature of the trust and the form of the instrument by which it is declared.³

of the income over what is reasonably necessary, under all the circumstances, for his support, education, etc., may be reached by the creditors of the beneficiary, by means of a proper equitable action. The trust may authorize the application of the income for the support of the beneficiary's family as well as of himself; in such a case only the surplus over what was needed for both could be reached. It is also settled by the decisions that a provision to the effect that the rights of the beneficiary should cease, and the trust should shift on behalf of another person-e.g., the beneficiary's wife-in case a judgment was recovered against him, or in case his interest became liable to the claims of creditors, is valid and operative: b See Noyes v. Blakeman, 3 Sand. 531, 6 N. Y. 567; Bramball v. Ferris, 14 N. Y. 41, 67 Am. Dec. 113; Graff v. Bonnett, 31 N. Y. 9, 88 Am. Dec. 236; Campbell v. Foster, 35 N. Y. 361; Williams v. Thorn, 70 N. Y. 270; 81 N. Y. 381; Cruger v. Jones, 18 Barb. 467; Genet v. Beckman, 45 Barb. 382; Kennedy v. Nunan, 52 Cal. 326. In trusts of the fourth class, to accumulate for the benefit of minors, the interest of the beneficiaries is clearly beyond the reach of their creditors during the existence of the trust.

§ 1005, ³ In trusts of the first class, being expressly created for the purpose of a sale, the trustee may, of course, sell and convey a good title: See Learned v. Welton, 40 Cal. 349; Thompson v. McKay, 41 Cal. 221, 230; Sprague v. Edwards, 48 Cal. 239; Saunders v. Schmælzle, 49 Cal. 59. In trusts of the other kinds, the trustee had no authority to sell or convey. Still, if the trust is not declared in the same instrument by which the land is conveyed to the trustee, a purchaser from him without notice of the trust; a purchaser with notice, or without a valuable consideration, takes the land subject to the trust, and becomes himself a trustee: Holden v. New York and Erie Bank, 72 N. Y. 286; New v. Nicoll, 73 N. Y. 127, 29 Am. Rep. 111; Griffin v. Blanchar, 17 Cal. 70; Thompson v. Toland, 48 Cal. 99; Sharp v. Goodwin, 51 Cal. 219; Scott v. Umbarger, 41 Cal. 410; Price v. Reeves, 38 Cal. 457; Lathrop v. Bampton, 31 Cal. 17, 89 Am. Dec. 141. When the trust is declared in the same instrument

gan v. Walter Magee, Inc., 172 Cal. 182, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1050, 155 Pac. 995; Wright & Kimbrough v. Carly, 11 Cal. App. 325, 104 Pac. 1009; Stringer v. Young, 191 N. Y. 157, 83 N. E. 690. And see, ante, § 989, and notes.

§ 1005, (b) Cited to this effect in Jourolman v. Massengill, 86 Tenn. 81, 5 S. W. 719.

§ 1006

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SECTION III.

HOW EXPRESS TRUSTS ARE CREATED.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1006. Trusts of real property; statute of frauds; writing necessary.
- \$1007. Written declaration by the grantor; ditto, by the trustee; examples.
- § 1008. Trusts of personal property may be created verbally; what trusts are not within the statute.
- § 1009. Words and dispositions sufficient to create a trust; examples.
- §§ 1010-1017. Express trusts inferred by construction, sometimes improperly called "implied trusts."
 - § 1011. 1. From the powers given to the trustee.
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 - § 1015. Modern tendency to restrict this doctrine; in the United States.
 - § 1016. What intention necessary to create the trust; the general criterion; examples.
 - § 1017. Objections to the doctrine.

§ 1006. Trusts of Real Property—Statute of Frauds.— Before the statute of frauds, trusts of real as well as personal property could be created or declared—technically *averred*—verbally.¹ The original statute of frauds provides that "all declarations or creations of trusts, or confidences in any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall be *manifested* and *proved* by some writing signed by the party

by which the land is conveyed to the trustee, every sale or other act by him in contravention of the trust is absolutely void; a purchaser or grantee would obtain no title whatever: Powers v. Bergen, 6 N. Y. 358; Belmont v. O'Brien, 12 N. Y. 394; Smith v. Bowen, 35 N. Y. 83; Briggs v. Palmer, 20 Barb. 392; Cruger v. Jones, 18 Barb. 467; Leitch v. Wells, 48 Barb. 637.

§ 1006, ¹ It seems, however, that this power of declaring a trust of land verbally did not exist when the land was conveyed by a deed absolute on its face; only applying to conveyances hy feoffment without a deed: See Fordyce v. Willis, 3 Brown Ch. 577, 587; Adlington v. Cann, 3 Atk. 141, 149, 151; Osterman v. Baldwin, 6 Wall. 116; Murphy v. Hubert, 7 Pa. St. 420; Shelton v. Shelton, 5 Jones Eq. 292; Anding v. Davis, 38 Miss. 574, 77 Am. Dec. 658; but see Dean v. Dean, 6 Conn. 285. who is by law enabled to declare the trust, or by his last will in writing, or else they shall be utterly void"; also, that "all grants and assignments of any trust or confidence shall likewise be in writing, signed by the party granting or assigning the same, or by such last will or devise [as mentioned in § 5], or else shall likewise be utterly void." This last clause refers to assignments by the *cestui que trust*. Analogous statutes have been enacted in the American states.² ^a It is the settled doctrine, in interpreting this

§ 1006, 2 29 Car. II., c. 3, secs. 7-9. The § 5 referred to in the clause above quoted, prescribed the mode of executing a will of land. The American statutes differ considerably from the English, and among themselves, in their language. Still, unless the terms of a particular statute are *radically* a departure from the original type, and are mandatory in form, requiring the trust to be *created* by the conveyance itself, the interpretation adopted by the English courts prevails through the American states. The various statutes are regarded as substantially the same: Perry on Trusts, sec. 81.

§1006, (a) To the effect that an express trust in lands must be proved by a writing, see Oden v. Lockwood, 136 Ala. 514, 33 South. 895; Tillman v. Kifer, 166 Ala. 403, 52 South. 309; Kinley v. Thelen, 158 Cal. 175, 110 Pac. 513; Taylor v. Morris, 163 Cal. 717, 127 Pac. 66 (contra); Wilder v. Wilder, 138 Ga. 573, 75 S. E. 654; Marie M. E. Church v. Trinity M. E. Church, (III.) 69 N. E. 73; Potter v. Clapp, 203 Ill. 592, 96 Am. St. Rep. 322, 68 N. E. 81 (an express agreement by a husband to hold property conveyed by his wife to him in trust for her is within the statute of frauds); Byers v. McEniry, 117 Iowa, 499, 91 N. W. 797; Luckhart v. Luckhart, 120 Iowa, 248, 94 N.W. 461; Willis v. Robertson, 121 Iowa, 380, 96 N. W. 900; McClenahan v. Stevenson, 118 Iowa, 106, 91 N. W. 925; Re Mahin's Estate, 161 Iowa, 459, 143 N. W. 420; Schurz v. Schurz, (Iowa) 128 N. W. 944; Greff v. Hobbs, (Iowa) 159 N. W. 429;

Rogers v. Richards, 67 Kan. 706, 74 Pac. 255; Tourtillotte v. Tourtillotte, 205 Mass. 547, 91 N. E. 909; Chace v. Gardner, (Mass.) 117 N. E. 841; Rothschild v. Dickinson, 169 Mich. 200, 134 N. W. 1035; Longe v. Kinney, 171 Mich. 312, 137 N. W. 119; Ferguson v. Robinson, 258 Mo. 113, 167 S. W. 447; Watson v. Payne, 143 Mo. App. 721, 128 S. W. 238; Ewing v. Parrish, 148 Mo. App. 492, 128 S. W. 538; Wolfskill v. Wells, 154 Mo. App. 302, 134 S. W. 51; Pollard v. McKenney, (Neb.) 96 N. W. 679; Marvel v. Marvel, (Neb.) 97 N. W. 640; Cardiff v. Marquis, 17 N. D. 110, 114 N. W. 1088.

The statutes of frouds in a number of the states have omitted the paragraph relating to the creation or declaration of trusts. Mr. Perry enumerates Connecticut, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana. To these should be added West Virginia: See Perry on 2225

legislation, that a trust of land need not be created nor declared by a writing; it need only be manifested and proved

Trusts, sec. 78, note; see, also, Pierson v. Pierson, 5 Del. Ch. 11; Harvey v. Gardner, 41 Ohio St. 642; Clark v. Haney, 62 Tex. 511, 50 Am. Rep. 536; Hamilton v. McKinney, 52 W. Va. 317, 43 S. E'. 83; Sykes v. Boone, 132 N. C. 199, 95 Am. St. Rep. 619, 43 S. E. 645; Boughman v. Boughman, 69 Ohio St. 273, 69 N. E. 430 (proof must be clear and convineing).

In North Carolina, if the title is passed to a third party a trust may be declared by parol: Shelton v. Shelton, 5 Jones Eq. (58 N. C.) 292; see, also, Leggett v. Leggett, 88 N. C. 108; Jones v. Jones, 164 N. C. 320, 80 S. E. 430; Anderson v. Harrington, 163 N. C. 140, 79 S. E. 426; Taylor v. Wahab, 154 N. C. 219, 70 S. E. 173 (subject to power of court to supervise); Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222, 63 S. E. 1028 (but not to contradict a writing). But when the legal title does not pass out of the grantor, as in a covenant to stand seised, a parol declaration has been held insufficient: Frey v. Ramsour, 66 N. C. 466 (approving Shelton v. Shelton (supra); see, also, Owens v. Williams, 130 N. C. 165, 41 S. E. 93: Pittman v. Pittman, 107 N. C. 159, 11 L. R. A. 456, 12 S. E. 61 (containing a discussion of the creation of a trust on a declaration. or covenant to stand seised). In West Virginia a distinction seems to be made between eases where the oral trust is for the benefit of the grantor and where it is for a third party: Hardman v. Orr, 5 W. Va. 71 (the object of the trust was proved by parol evidence); see Nease v. Capehart, 8 W. Va. 95, discussing the difference between cases where the title is retained by the grantor and where it is passed to a third party; Troll v. Carter, 15 W. Va. 567 (the statement of the court, that where one voluntarily obtains land to be held in trust for a third party, and the trust is declared by parol only, the party so holding should be considered a trustee by reason of his inequitable position, seems a just and equitable deduction); approved in Zane v. Fink, 18 W. Va. 693; Cain v. Cox, 23 W. Va. 594 (where the oral agreement was to hold the land for the grantor instead of a third party, the parol agreement did not create a trust); Titchenell v. Jackson, 26 W. Va. 460 (gift of realty). See, also, In re Henderson, (W. Va.) 142 Fed. 568; Swick v. Rease, 62 W. Va. 557, 59 S. E. 510; Criss v. Criss, 65 W. Va. 683, 64 S. E. 905; Floyd v. Duffy, 68 W. Va. 339, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 883, and note, 69 S. E. 993; but see Crawford v. Workman, 64 W. Va. 19, 61 S. E. 322.

Some courts have held that, in the absence of statute, a parol declaration of trust relating to realty is insufficient: Dean v. Dcan, 6 Conn. 285(in trust for the grantor); Vail's App., 37 Conn. 185 (semble); Todd v. Munson, 53 Conn. 579, 4 Atl. 99 (approving the cases eited); Appeal of Wilson, 84 Conn. 560, 80 Atl. 718; see Church v. Sterling, 16 Conn. 388, as to a resulting trust in such cases. The rule seems to be the same in Kentucky: Chiles v. Woodson; 2 Bibb, 71; Parker v.

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by some writing duly signed or subscribed by the proper party; and, as a consequence, this written evidence may be a separate instrument, either simultaneous with or sub-

Bodley, 4 Bibb, 102. In other jurisdictions it has been properly held that in the absence of statute no writing is required; this would seem to be the general rule; Hall v. Livingston, 3 Del. Ch. 348 (parol evidence was admitted to establish the trust where a deed was absolute on its face); Soggins v. Heard, 31 Miss. 426 (the rule is now changed by statute); Miller v. Stokely, 5 Ohio St. 197 (but it is said, "To establish an express trust in the case of a conveyance by deed absolute on its face, it is requisite that the evidence should be clear, certain, and conclusive, in proof not only of the existence of the trust, and that, too, at the time of the conveyance, but also as to its terms and conditions"); Mathews v. Leaman, 24 Ohio St. 615; Harvey v. Gardner, supra; Lingenfelter v. Ritchey, 58 Pa. St. 485, 98 Am. Dec. 308 (the case arose hefore the passage of the statute in that state); Murphy v. Hubert, 7 Pa. St. 420; Meason v. Kaine, 63 Pa. St. 335. The rule is now different and a parol declaration of trust is nugatory: Longdon v. Crouse, (Pa.) 1 Atl. 600. An agreement concerning a trust of realty need not be in writing in Texas: James v. Fulcrod, 5 Tex. 512, 55 Am. Dec. 743; Williams v. Emberson, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 522, 55 S. W. 595; Branch v. De Blanc, (Tex. Civ. App.) 62 S. W. 134; Whitfield v. Diffie, (Tex. Civ. App.) 105 S. W. 324; Henderson v. Rushing, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 485, 105 S. W. 840; Salter v. Gentry, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 526, 130 S. W. 627; Smalley v. Paine, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 52, 130 S. W. 739; Sullivan v. Fant, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 6, 110 S. W. 507; Allen v. Allen, 101 Tex. 362, 107 S. W. 528; Irwin v. Johnson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 79 S. W. 405 (evidence must he clear and satisfactory); Ryan v. Lofton, (Tex. Civ. App.) 190 S. W. 752; Larrabee v. Porter, (Tex. Civ. App.) 166 S. W. 395; Smalley v. Paine, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 52, 130 S. W. 739 (prior or subsequent declarations admissible); Mead v. Randelph, 8 Tex. 191 (the court recognized the principle that the contract or conveyance should be enforced or upheld according to the intention of the parties at the time they executed the conveyance in order to prevent the accomplishment of fraud; for the consideration of which see, post, § 1053); the court of Virginia was not influenced by such reason in the case of Sprinkle v. Hayworth, 26 Gratt. 384; but see Borst v. Nalle, 28 Gratt. 423; Currence v. Ward, 43 W. Va. 367, 27 S. E. 329. For the rule in Tennessee see Renshaw v. First Nat. Bank, (Tenn. Ch. App.) 63 S. W. 194; Insurance Co. of Tennessce v. Waller, 116 Tenn. 1, 115 Am. St. Rep. 763, and note, 7 Ann. Cas. 1078, 95 S. W. 811 (trust created hy parol agreement on part of grantee). In Virginia, express trust in land may he created by parol: Shield v. E. S. Adkins & Co., 117 Va. 616, 85 S. E. 492.

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§ 1007

sequent to the deed of conveyance, and may be very informal.^{3 b}

§ 1007. Written Declaration by the Grantor, or by the Trustee.—The written evidence of the trust which will satisfy the statute may come from the grantor,—the one who intends that a trust shall be created for a certain beneficiary,—or from the trustee,—the grantee to whom the land is conveyed for the purposes of the trust, but not from the cestui que trust.^a The grantor may declare the trust in the will or the deed by which the land is conveyed or devised, or in an instrument separate and distinct from the conveyance; or he may declare himself a trustee, and that he holds the land in trust, without conveying the legal title.¹ b When the trust is not created in and by the instru-

§ 1006, ³ Forster v. Hale, ³ Ves. 696; Denton v. Davies, 18 Ves. 499, 503; Ambrose v. Ambrose, 1 P. Wms. 322; Davies v. Otty, 33 Beav. 540; Gardner v. Rowe, 2 Sim. & St. 346; 5 Russ. 258; Smith v. Matthews, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 139; Movan v. Hays, 1 Johns. Ch. 339, 342; Pinney v. Fellows, 15 Vt. 525; Sime v. Howard, 4 Nev. 473, 483; Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sum. 4°6; Cornclius v. Smith, 55 Mo. 528.

§ 1007, ¹ Patton v. Beecher, 62 Ala. 579 (an express trust cannot be created by parol on a deed absolute on its face); Wallace v. Wainwright, 87 Pa. St. 263; Hearst v. Pujol, 44 Cal. 230, 235; Miles v. Thorne, 38 Cal. 335, 99 Am. Dec. 384; Taylor v. Sayles, 57 N. H. 465; Barnes v.

§ 1006, (b) Wiser v. Allen, 92 Pa. St. 317; Gordon v. McCulloh, 66 Md. 245, 7 Atl. 457; Stratton v. Edwards, 174 Mass. 374, 54 N. E. 886; Phillips v. South Park Com., 119 Ill. 626, 10 N. E. 230 (the trust was not established); Hall v. Farmers & Merchants' Bank, 145 Mo. 418, 46 S. W. 1000.

§ 1007, (a) The text is cited to this effect in Richards v. Wilson, (Ind.) 112 N. E. 780.

§ 1007, (b) The text is cited in Marie M. E. Church of Chicago v. Trinity M. E. Church of Chicago, 253 Ill. 21, 97 N. E. 262; Fleenor v. Hensley, (Va.) 93 S. E. 582. "The

declaration must contain the substantial terms of the trust, or at least sufficient to identify the subject-matter by writing": Renz v. Stoll, 94 Mich. 377, 34 Am. St. Rep. 358, 54 N. W. 276; Heidenheimer v. Bauman, 84 Tex. 174, 31 Am. St. Rep. 29, 19 S. W. 382 (the residue of property was, by will, left to X. in trust "to be disposed of by him as I have heretofore or may hereafter direct him to do"; it was held that the trust could not be established by parol evidence). The mere fact that the grantor remained in possession and expended money in improvements will not ingraft a

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ment of conveyance, it may be sufficiently declared and evidenced by the trustee to whom the land is conveyed, or who becomes holder of the legal title; and this may be done

Taylor, 27 N. J. Eq. 259; Tanner v. Skinner, 11 Bush, 120 (a party declaring himself a trustee); Urann v. Coates, 109 Mass. 581 (a memorandum signed by a decedent, not addressed to any person, found among his papers, a sufficient declaration of trust with respect to certain land, constituting him a trustee); Lynch v. Clements, 24 N. J. Eq. 431 (while a grantor may declare a trust in a separate instrument accompanying the deed, a testator who devises land cannot declare a trust in a valid manner by means of a separate writing which is not duly executed with the formalities required for the execution of a will, even though the writing is referred to in the will); Homer v. Homer, 107 Mass. 82 (a mere memorandum in a ledger is not sufficient); Bragg v. Paulk, 42 Me. 502; Bates v. Hurd, 65 Me. 180; McClellan v. McClellan, 65 Me. 500; Packard v. Putnam, 57 N. H. 43; Faxon v. Folvey, 110 Mass. 392; Movan v. Hays, 1 Johns. Ch. 339; Gomez v. Tradesmen's Bank, 4 Sand. 102, 106; Harrison v. McMennomy, 2 Edw. Ch. 251; Wright v. Douglass, 7 N. Y. 564; Cook v. Barr, 44 N. Y. 156; Duffy v. Masterson, 44 N. Y. 557; Berrien v. Berrien, 4 N. J. Eq. 37; Ivory v. Burns, 56 Pa. St. 300; Raybold v. Raybold, 20 Pa. St. 308; Macubbin v. Cromwell, 7 Gill & J. 164; Johnson v. Ronald, 4 Munf. 77; Skipwith's Ex'r v. Cunningham, 8 Leigh, 271, 31 Am. Dec. 642 (the *cestui que trust* need not join in executing the writing); Reid v. Reid, 12 Rich. Eq. 213; Gibson v. Foote, 40 Miss. 788; Kingsbury

trust on land absolutely conveyed: Pillsbury-Washburne Flour-Mills Co. v. Kistler, 53 Minn. 123, 54 N. W. 1063. In general, see Phillips v. South Park Com., 119 III. 626, 10 N. E. 230 (a declaration, made by the grantor eighteen years after he had parted with the title, is insufficient); Bragg v. Paulk, 42 Me. 502 (the trust declared in a subsequent bond, or contract to convey); see Albert v. Winn, 5 Md. 66; Aynesworth v. Haldeman, 2 Duval, 565; Blodgett v. Hildreth, 103 Mass. 484 (the statement "I intend to settle up our affairs and give up your deeds that you intrusted me with." does not sufficiently contain the terms of the trust to satisfy the statute); Yerkes v. Perrin's Estate, 71 Mich. 567, 39 N. W. 758 (series of

letters held insufficient); Tenny v. Simpson, 37 Kan. 579, 15 Pac. 512; Oliver v. Hunting, 44 Ch. Div. 205 (allowing parol evidence to connect the writings to prove the trust); see Tierney v. Wood, 19 Beav. 330, Ames Cas. on Trusts, for a declaration of trust by a cestui, of his interest; see Ransdel v. Moore, 153 Ind. 393, 53 L. R. A. 753, 53 N. E. 767 (citing the text, §§ 1006 and 1007). See, also, Becker v. Stroeber, 167 Mo. 306, 66 S. W. 1083; Davis v. Stambaugh, 163 Ill. 557, 45 N. E. 170; Cornelison v. Roberts, 107 Iowa, 220, 77 N. W. 1028; Pendleton v. Patrick, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 378, 57 S. W. 464. See, further, Ellison v. Ganiard, 167 Ind. 471, 79 N. E. 450 (trust declared in separate instrument).

§ 1007

by a writing executed simultaneously with or subsequent to the conveyance, and such writing may be of a most informal nature.² ^c The trustee's acceptance of the trust may be

v. Burnside, 58 Ill. 310, 11 Am. Rep. 67; Sime v. Howard, 4 Nev. 473, 482. The grantor may declare the trust by an instrument separate from the conveyance to the trustee: Wood v. Cox, 2 Mylne & C. 684 (a separate testamentary paper); Smith v. Attersoll, 1 Russ. 266 (a paper accompanying a will although not duly executed as a will; see, per contra, Lynch v. Clements, supra); Inchiquin v. French, 1 Cox, 1; but the separate instrument must be contemporaneous with the conveyance, or a part of the same single transaction; where the title has been vested in a grantee, his rights cannot be defeated by a subsequent and wholly independent act of the grantor; Adlington v. Cann, 3 Atk. 141, 145; Crabb v. Crabb, 1 Mylne & K. 511; Kilpin v. Kilpin, 1 Mylne & K. 520, 532; De Laurencel v. De Boom, 48 Cal. 581; Chapman v. Wilbur, 3 Or. 326; Bennett v. Fnlmer, 49 Pa. St. 155; Brown v. Brown, 12 Md. 87.

§ 1007, ² Letters, recitals, memoranda, etc., have been held sufficient evidence of a trust: Smith v. Matthews, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 139; Gardner

§1007, (c) The text is quoted in Golding v. Gaither, 112 Md. 187, 77 Atl. 333; Snader v. Slingluff, 95 Md. 356, 366, 52 Atl. 510, 512; Holmes v. Holmes, 65 Wash. 572, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1021, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 645, 118 Pac. 733. See, also, Loring v. Palmer, 118 U. S. 321, 24 L. Ed. 165, 6 Sup. Ct. 1073 (trust contained in a series of letters and agreements); Cain v. Cox, 23 W. Va. 594 (title bonds); Newkirk v. Place, 47 N. J. Eq. 477, 21 Atl. 124 (letters); McCandless v. Warner, 26 W. Va. 754; Gaylord v. City of Lafayete, 115 Ind. 423, 17 N. E. 899: Barrell v. Joy, 16 Mass. 221 (trust proved by a pamphlet issued by the grantee); Safford v. Rantoul, 12 Pick. 233 (that grantee subsequently acknowledged in writing that he received the property as security for a debt proved him a trustee); Montague v. Hays, 10 Gray, 609 (the grantee acknowledged the relation by a writing addressed to a third party); Nesbitt v. Stevens, 161 Ind.

519, 69 N. E. 256 (letters); Gates v. Paul, 117 Wis. 170, 94 N. W. 55 (letters); Wallace v. Pruitt, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 231, 20 S. W. 728 (quoting the text). See, further, Howison v. Baird, 145 Ala. 683, 40 South. 94 (any instrument signed by party at time or thereafter showing nature of trust with reasonable certainty); Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill. 384, 95 N. E. 498 (writing may be informal); Bailey v. Wood, 211 Mass. 37, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 950, 97 N. E. 902 (verbal agreement reduced to writing or declaration by trustee executed after death of donor is enough); Nolan v. Garrison, 151 Mich. 138, 115 N. W. 58 (writings may be informal); Bridgman v. McIntyre, 150 Mich. 78, 113 N. W. 776 (trustee joins in action, the petition alleging the trust); Ilinois Steel Co. v. Konkel, 146 Wis. 556, 131 N. W. 842 (if trust is to be inferred from several instruments, oral testimony cannot be used to aid).

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expressed by his executing the conveyance or other instru-

ment, or by assenting to the will; or it may be inferred from his dealing with the property; and *prima facie* he is pre-

v. Rowe, 2 Sim. & St. 346; 5 Russ. 258; Dale v. Hamilton, 2 Phill. Ch. 266; Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 696; Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 95 III. 267, 35 Am. Rep. 166 (notice in writing given by the grantee stating that the property in fact belonged to certain named beneficiaries, a sufficient declaration of trust); Rogers Locomotive etc. Works v. Kelly, 19 Hun, 399 (receipt by a bank that money deposited was in trust for specified purposes); Bates v. Hurd, 65 Me. 180 (a distinct written statement specifying the terms of the trust, and the parties to it, subscribed by the trustee, whether addressed to or delivered to the cestui que trust or not, or whether intended to be evidence of the trust or not when made, is a sufficient declaration); McClellan v. McClellan, 65 Me. 500 (it is sufficient that a trust is declared by a writing subscribed by the trustee subsequent to the conveyance); De Laurencel v. De Boom, 48 Cal. 581 (testator devised land to A on the face of the will absolutely; on the same day the will was executed, testator wrote a letter to A, stating that the devise was on trust for certain purposes which were sufficiently specified; afterwards, and during testator's lifetime, A, in writing, acknowledged the letter, accepted the trusts, and promised to carry them out. Held, that the express trust was declared, and A took the land as a trustee); Tanner v. Skinner, 11 Bush, 120 (explicit statement by a party declaring himself a trustee); Moore v. Pickett, 62 Ill. 158 (letter written by the trustee; and the lands mentioned in the letter as affected by the trust may be identified by evidence of the surrounding circumstances); Kingsbury v. Burnside, 58 Ill. 310, 11 Am. Rep. 67 (by letter of trustee); Johnson v. Deloney, 35 Tex. 42 (the same); Phelps v. Seely, 22 Gratt. 573 (the same); Baldwin v. Humphrey, 44 N. Y. 609 (grantees declaring themselves trustees by a written agreement); Packard v. Putnam, 57 N. H. 43; Ivory v. Burns, 56 Pa. St. 300. Even where there has been no other writing, the admissions by a party defendant in an answer in chancery may be a sufficient declaration of trust:^d Patton v. Chamberlain, 44 Mich.

§ 1007, (d) Admissions by Answer in Suit.—The author's note is cited to this effect in Schumacher v. Draeger, 137 Wis. 618, 119 N. W. 305. See, also, Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill. 384, 95 N. E. 498; McVay v. Mc-Vay, 43 N. J. Eq. 47, 10 Atl. 178; Garnsey v. Gothard, 90 Cal. 603, 27 Pac. 516; Whiting v. Gould, 2 Wis. 552 (it seems an admission of the parol trust, but an express reliance on the statute would protect the defendant); Dean v. Dean, 9 N. J. Eq. 425 (same); Kellogg v. Peddicord, 181 Ill. 22, 54 N. E. 623; but see Stubbings v. Stubbings, 248 Ill. 406, 94 N. E. 54 (answer in equity suit not a declaration of trust where trustee has absolutely conveyed to another: not competent to declare a trust when the property has been parted with). sumed to accept.³ • An acceptance by the trustee is necessary, in order to bind him, but not in order to validate the trust. A refusal to accept or disclaimer frees the trustee named from any duty to act under the trust, but the rights of the beneficiary do not depend upon his acceptance. A court of equity never suffers an express trust to fail from want of a trustee.^{4 f}

5; Broadrup v. Woodman, 27 Ohio St. 553; McLaurie v. Partlow, 53 Ill. 340; Cozine v. Graham, 2 Paige, 177; Maccubbin v. Cromwell, 7 Gill & J. 157, 164. As to the defendant's denial of the alleged parol agreement, or his express pleading of the statute, in his answer, see Ontario Bank v. Root, 3 Paige, 478; Dean v. Dean, 9 N. J. Eq. 425; Wolf v. Corby, 30 Md. 356, 360; Billingslea v. Ward, 33 Md. 48, 51; Allen v. Chambers, 4 Ired. Eq. 125.

§ 1007, ³ Montford v. Cadogan, 17 Ves. 485, 489; 19 Ves. 635, 638; Urch v. Walker, ³ Mylne & C. 702; Kirwan v. Daniel, ⁵ Hare, 493; Eyrick v. Hetrick, 13 Pa. St. 488, 493; Flint v. Clinton Co., 12 N. H. 430, 432; Lyle v. Burke, 40 Mich. 499; Hearst v. Pujol, 44 Cal. 230, 235.

§ 1007, 4 Whether the want arises from the fact that no trustee was named, or from the trustee's refusal to act, or from other cause, the court will appoint a trustee, or will treat the person in whom the legal title is vested as a trustee: King v. Donnelly, 5 Paige, 46; Cushney v. Henry, 4 Paige, 345; Shepherd v. McEvers, 4 Johns. Ch. 136, 8 Am. Dec. 561; Crocheron v. Jaques, 3 Edw. Ch. 207; De Barante v. Gott, 6 Barb. 492; Griffith's Adm'r v. Griffith, 5 B. Mon. 113; Furman v. Fisher, 4 Cold. 626, 94 Am. Dec. 210; Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. 532; 9 L. Ed. 422; Druid Park etc. Co. v. Oettinger, 53 Md. 46; Adams v. Adams, 21 Wall. 185 (the trustee's refusal to accept does not impair the beneficiary's rights).

§ 1007, (e) Harvey v. Gardner, 41
Ohio St. 462. See, also, § 1060, note. Acceptance by Cestui.—As to notice to, or acceptance by, the cestui, see Fearey v. O'Neill, 149 Mo. 467, 73 Am. St. Rep. 440, 50 S. W. 918; Norway Sav. Bk. v. Merriam, 88 Me. 146, 33 Atl. 840; Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. St. 321, 54 Atl. 994; Libby v. Frost, (Me.) 56 Atl. 906. Also, Security Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Farrady, 9 DeI. Ch. 306, 82 Atl. 24; In re Podhajsky's Estate, 137 Iowa, 742, 115 N. W. 590 (acceptance will be presumed); Marshall's Adm'r v. Marshall, 156 Ky. 20, 160 S. W. 775; Clark v. Callahan, 105 Md. 600, 12 Ann. Cas. 162, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 616, and note, 66 Atl. 618 (notice of the trust to the cestui que trust not necessary); City of Boston v. Turner, 201 Mass. 190, 87 N. E. 634 (same); Bailey v. Wood, 211 Mass. 37, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 950, 97 N. E. 902 (same); Fleenor v. Hensley, (Va.) 93 S. E. 582.

§ 1007, (f) Trust not Suffered to Fail from Want of a Trustee.—The text is cited to this effect in Texas

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§ 1008. Trusts of Personal Property may be Created Verbally.^a—The provisions of the statute of frauds apply to chattels real,¹ but not to money secured by mortgages and other charges upon land.² ^b Nor does the statute extend to trusts of pure personalty; and such trusts may therefore be created, declared, or admitted verbally, and proved by parol evidence, although the consensus of authorities demands clear and unequivocal evidence.³ ^c Trusts

§ 1008, ¹ Forster v. Hale, ³ Ves. 696; Riddle v. Emerson, ¹ Vern. 108.
§ 1008, ² Benbow v. Townsend, ¹ Mylne & K. 506; Bellasis v. Compton, ² Vern. 294.

§ 1008, ³ McFadden v. Jenkyns, 1 Phill. Ch. 153, 157; Hawkins v. Gardiner, 2 Smale & G. 441, 451; Clapp v. Emery, 98 Ill. 523 (a son collected and invested in his own name money of his mother. Held, his parol statement showed a trust, and not a mere loan); Hon v. Hon, 70 Ind. 135 (trust in personal property created verbally); Reiff v. Horst, 52 Md. 255 (a son-in-law receiving money from his father-in-law verbally agreed to hold it, and also another sum previously received, in trust for his own children. Held, a trust was impressed on *both* sums); Davis v. Coburn, 128 Mass. 377 (a trust in personal property may be shown by parol evidence); Chace v. Chapin, 130 Mass. 128 (the same); Gadsden v.

Rice Land Co. v. Langham, (Tex. Civ. App.) 193 S. W. 473. See, also, Minot v. Tilton, 64 N. H. 371, 10 Atl. 682 (the trustee's refusal to accept does not impair the beneficiary's rights); Sonley v. Clock Makers' Co., 1 Br. Ch. Cas. 81, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 225 (a devise to a corporation in trust being void, the heir at law took subject to the trust); Dodkin v. Brunt, L. R. 6 Eq. 580, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 226 (trustees were appointed); Nason v. First Church, 66 Me. 100 (same); see In re Lord and Fullerton's Contract, [1896] 1 Ch. 228, for disclaimer by trustee; but see Dye v. Beaver Creek Church, 48 S. C. 444, 59 Am. St. Rep. 724, 26 S. E. 717; Taft v. Stow, 167 Mass. 363, 45 N. E. 752; Loring v. Hildreth, 170 Mass. 328, 64 Am. St. Rep. 301, 40 L. R. A. 127, 49 N. E. 652 (the trust was not enforced as it could not be carried out in the manner intended by the settlor). See, further, Wells v. German Ins. Co., 128 Iowa, 649, 105 N. W. 123 (trust effective though trustee repudiated it); Herrick v. Low, 103 Me. 353, 69 Atl. 314; Rhines v. Wentworth, 209 Mass, 585, 95 N. E. 951; Hiles v. Garrison, 70 N. J. Eq. 605, 62 Atl. 865.

§ 1008, (a) Sections 1008–1010 are cited in McMonagle v. McGlinn, 85 Fed. 88, and Rousseau v. Call, 169 N. C. 173, 85 S. E. 414. This section cited, generally in McCoy v. McCoy, 30 Okl. 379, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 146, 121 Pac. 176.

§ 1008, (b) Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 11 Am. St. Rep. 288, 19 Pac. 641; but see Cameron v. Nelson, 57 Neb. 381, 77 N. W. 771.

§1008, (c) Quoted in Harris v. Bratton, 34 S. C. 259, 13 S. E. 447.

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which arise by operation of law-resulting and constructive

Whaley, 14 S. C. 210 (a person may create a trust in personal property by verbally declaring himself a trustee for the donee; no particular form of words is necessary, and the trust may be proved by circumstances as well as by direct evidence of the declarations); Ray v. Simmons, 11 R. I. 266, 23 Am. Rep. 447 (an owner of personalty may verbally declare that he holds it in trust for another; e. g., A, depositing money in a bank in his own name, may orally declare that he holds it as trustee for B); Silvey v. Hodgdon, 52 Cal. 363 (A took out a policy of insurance on his own life in name of his daughter, B, and on the face of it in her favor; a verbal agreement was made that she should hold it in trust for all A's children. Held, that a valid trust was created,—a very instructive case); Eaton v. Cook, 25 N. J. Eq. 55 (an oral direction by a creditor to his debtor to hold the money due in trust for A creates a valid trust in favor of the donee, A); Hooper v. Holmes, 11 N. J. Eq. 122; Kimball v. Morton, 5 N. J. Eq. 26, 31, 43 Am. Dec. 621; Barkley v. Lane's Ex'r, 6 Bush, 587; Higgenbottom v. Peyton, 3 Rich. Eq. 398; Maffitt's Adm'r v. Rynd, 69 Pa. St. 380 (although upon a conveyance of land a verbal declaration of trust in favor of the grantor or other person is void under the statute, yet such a verbal declaration by the grantee after a conversion of the land into money creates a valid trust with respect to the proceeds). See Lister v. Hodgson, L. R. 4 Eq. 30.

The text is cited to this effect in Austin v. Wilcoxson, 149 Cal. 24, 84 Pac. 417 (evidence of declarations of deceased must be received cautiously); Trubey v. Pease, 240 Ill. 513, 16 Ann. Cas. 370, 88 N. E. 1005 (proof of intention must be unequivocal); Richards v. Wilson, (Ind.) 112 N. E. 780 (same). That the statute does not apply to personalty, see Moore v. Campbell, 113 Ala. 587, 21 South. 353 (citing Alabama cases); Taber v. Bailey, 22 Cal. App. 617, 135 Pac. 975; Noble v. Learned, 153 Cal. 245, 94 Pac. 1047; Thomas v. Lamb, 11 Cal. App. 717, 106 Pac. 254; Maher v. Aldrich, 205 Ill. 242, 68 N. E. 810; Woods v. Matlock, 19 Ind. App. 364, 48 N. E. 384 (citing many Indiana cases); Taber v. Zehner, 47 Ind. App. 165, 93 N. E. 1035; Merritt Allen & Co. v. Torrance, 129 Iowa, 310, 105 N. W. 585; Jones v.

Nicholas, 151 Iowa, 362, 130 N. W. 125; Crews v. Crews' Adm'r, 113 Ky. 152, 67 S. W. 276; Marshall's Adm'r v. Marshall, 156 Ky. 20, 160 S. W. 775; Bohannon v. Bohannon's Adm'x, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 143, 92 S. W. 597; Clark v. Callahan, 105 Md. 600, 12 Ann. Cas. 162, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 616, 66 Atl. 618; Coyne v. Supreme Conclave, 105 Md. 54, 14 Ann. Cas. 870, 66 Atl. 704; Peck v. Scofield, 186 Mass. 108, 71 N. E. 109; Kendrick v. Ray, 173 Mass. 305, 73 Am. St. Rep. 289, 53 N. E. 823; Mee v. Fay, 190 Mass. 40, 76 N. E. 229; Eipper v. Benner, 113 Mich. 75, 71 N. W. 511 (citing Michigan cases); Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Mc-Kenna, 168 Mo. App. 254, 153 S. W. 521; Harris Banking Co. v. Miller, 190 Mo. 640, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 790, 89 S. W. 629; Ewing v. Parrish, 148 Mo. App. 492, 128 S. W. 538; Crowtrusts—are, in express terms, excepted from the statute.^d

ley v. Crowley, 131 Mo. App. 178, 110 S. W. 1100; Zeideman v. Molasky, 118 Mo. App. 106, 94 S. W. 754; Taylor v. Welch, 168 Mo. App. 223, 153 S. W. 490; Mantle v. White, 47 Mont. 234, 132 Pac. 22; Wolf v. Haslach, 65 Neb. 303, 91 N. W. 283; Devries Estate v. Hawkins, 70 Neb. 656, 97 N. W. 792; Neresheimer v. Smyth, 167 N. Y. 202, 60 N. E. 449; Rousseau v. Call, 169 N. C. 173, 85 S. E. 414; Berry v. Evendon, 14 N. D. 1. 103 N. W. 748; Martin v. Martin, 43 Or. 119, 72 Pac. 639; In re Washington's Estate, 220 Pa. 204, 69 Atl. 747; Pearlstine v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 74 S. C. 246, 54 S. E. 372; Brown v. Hall, 32 S. D. 225, 142 N. W. 854; Skein v. Marriott, 22 Utah, 73, 61 Pae. 296 (eiting the text); Friedrich v. Huth, 155 Wis. 196, 144 N. W. 202.

That the evidence must be clear and unequivocal, see Bliss v. Bliss, 20 Idaho, 467, 119 Pac. 451; In re Washington's Estate, 220 Pa. 204, 69 Atl. 747; Northrip v. Burge, 255 Mo. 641, 164 S. W. 584; Crowley v. Crowley, 131 Mo. App. 178, 110 S. W. 1100; Dewey v. Fleischer, 129 Wis. 591, 109 N. W. 525.

That there may be a valid parol trust as to the proceeds of realty, see Hoss's Appeal, 112 Pa. St. 168, 4 Atl. 340; Calder v. Moran, 49 Mich. 14, 12 N. W. 892; Edinger v. Heiser, 62 Mich. 598, 29 N. W. 367; Mohn v. Mohn, 112 Ind. 285, 13 N. E. 859; Thomas v. Merry, 113 Ind. 88, 15 N. E. 214; Bork v. Martin, 132 N. Y. 280, 28 Am. St. Rep. 570, 30 N. E. 584; but see Wolford v. Farnham, 44 Minn. 159, 46 N. W. 295 (a parol agreement by grantee to hold land for grantor until sold, and when sold, pay him the pro-

ceeds, void). See, also, Chace v. Gardner, (Mass.) 117 N. E. 841; Woodard v. Woodard, 216 Mass. 1, 102 N. E. 921; Watson v. Payne, 143 Mo. App. 721, 128 S. W. 238; Logan v. Brown, 20 Okl. 334, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 298, and note, 95 Pac. 441 (an instructive opinion); Kollock v. Bennett, 53 Or. 395, 133 Am. St. Rep. 840, 100 Pac. 940; Winder v. Nock, 104 Va. 759, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 415, and note, 52 S. E. 561. A declaration that a third person is to receive half the net profits of the sale of certain land does not create a trust in the land: Dexter v. McDonald, 196 Mo. 373, 95 S. W. 359.

See, also, on the general subject, Barry v. Lambert, 98 N. Y. 300, 50 Am. Rep. 677; Cobb v. Knight 74 Me. 253; Chace v. Chapin, 130 Mass. 128 (subsequent declarations of transferrer assented to and acted upon by the transferee, admissible to establish trust); Chase v. Perley, 148 Mass. 289, 19 N. E. 398; Danser v. Warwick, 33 N. J. Eq. 133; Roach v. Caraffa, 85 Cal. 437, 25 Pac. 22.

§ 1008, (d) See Wallace v. Bowen, 28 Vt. 638; Bickford v. Bickford's Estate, 68 Vt. 525, 35 Atl. 471; but where trusts resulting from the payment of consideration have been abolished a parol agreement showing a trust is prohibited by the statute: Jeremiah v. Pitcher, 20 Misc. 513, 45 N. Y. Supp. 758. Cases relating to the difference between an express, and a resulting trust: Smith v. Mason, 122 Cal. 426, 55 Pac. 145; Benson v. Dempster, 183 Ill. 297, 55 N. E. 651; Monson v. Hutchin, 194 Ill. 431, 62 N. E. 788; Smith v. Peacock, 114 Ga. 691, 88

§ 1009. Words or Dispositions Sufficient to Create a Trust.—What words or dispositions, either in the written or the verbal declaration, do or do not operate to create a trust? It is assumed in the present discussion that the property is directly conveyed to or is held by the person alleged to be a trustee. In the first place, as has already been shown, a mere voluntary promise to give property in trust does not create a trust, nor any right which a court of equity will enforce.¹ In the second place, no precise form of words is necessary to create a trust, but the intention must be clear.^a The fact that a trust of lands is created must not only be manifested and proved by a writing properly executed, but it must also be manifested and proved by such a writing what the trust is. The declaration of trust, whether written or oral, must be reasonably certain in its material terms; and this requisite of certainty includes the subject-matter or property embraced within the trust, the beneficiaries or persons in whose behalf it is created, the nature and quantity of interests which they are to have, and the manner in which the trust is to be per-

§ 1009, ¹ Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 422, 36 Am. Rep. 634; Estate of Webb, 49 Cal. 541; and see *ante*, §§ 997, 998, under head of voluntary trusts. On the same principle, a mere unfinished, inchoate purpose expressed does not create a trust; Bayley v. Boulcott, 4 Russ. 345; Donohoe v. Conrahy, 2 Jones & L. 688, 694; Dellinger's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 425; nor the mere expression that the property was "intended" for a certain person: Hays v. Quay, 68 Pa. St. 263.

Am. St. Rep. 53, 40 S. E. 757; Hillman v. Allen, 145 Mo. 638, 47 S. W. 509. See, generally, Galbraith v. Galbraith, 190 Pa. St. 225, 42 Atl. 683; Lamb v. Lamb, 18 App. Div. 250, 46 N. Y. Supp. 219; Rayl v. Rayl, 58 Kan. 585, 50 Pac. 501; Halsell v. Wise Co. Coal Co., 19 Tex. Civ. App. 564, 47 S. W. 1017; Tillman v. Murrell, 120 Ala. 239, 24 South. 712; Gorrell v. Alspaugh, 120 N. C. 362, 27 S. E. 85; Houser v. Jordan, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 398, 63

S. W. 1049; Butler v. Carpenter, 163
Mo. 597, 63 S. W. 823; Grayson v.
Bowlin, 70 Ark. 145, 66 S. W. 658;
Whitney v. Hay, 181 U. S. 77, 45
L. Ed. 758, 21 Sup. Ct. 537; but see
Bullenkamp v. Bullenkamp, 54 N. Y.
Supp. 482.

§ 1009, (a) The text is quoted in Coyne v. Supreme Conclave of I. O. H., 106 Md. 54, 14 Ann. Cas. 870, 66 Atl. 704; and cited to this effect in Trubey v. Pease, 240 Ill. 513, 16 Ann. Cas. 370, 88 N. E. 1005.

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formed. If the language is so vague, general, or equivocal that any of these necessary elements of the trust is left in real uncertainty, then the trust must fail.² ^b No particular

§ 1009, ² It does not follow that the grantee, devisee, or legatee takes the property absolutely free from the trust in such case; if the trust attempted to he created fails for reason of uncertainty, and the instrument shows an intention that the immediate donee was not to take and hold the heneficial interest, then a trust results to the donor: See *post*, § 1032; Knight v. Boughton, 11 Clark & F. 513; Smith v. Matthews, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 139; Briggs v. Penny, 3 Macn. & G. 546; Williams v. Williams, 1 Sim., N. S., 358; Reeves v. Baker, 18 Beav. 372; Stubbs v. Sargon, 2 Keen, 255; Cruwys v. Colman, 9 Ves. 319, 323, per Sir William Grant; Steere v. Steere, 5 Johns. Ch. 1, 9 Am. Dec. 256; Porter v. Bank of Rutland, 19 Vt. 410; Carpenter v. Cushman, 105 Mass. 417, 419; Inhabs. of Freeport v. Bartol, 3 Greenl. 340; Brown v. Combs, 29 N. J. L. 36;

§ 1009, (b) Quoted in Burling v. Newlands, 112 Cal. 476, 44 Pac. 810 (on rehearing); McMonagle v. Mc-Glinn, (Cal.) 85 Fed. 88; Greenwood v. Greenwood, 97 Kan. 380, 155 Pac. 807; Coyne v. Supreme Conclave, 106 Md. 54, 14 Ann. Cas. 870, 66 Atl. 705; United States v. Oregon & C. R. Co., (Or.) 186 Fed. 861; Otjen v. Frohbach, 148 Wis. 301, 134 N. W. 832. Cited to this effect in Greenwood v. Greenwood, 96 Kan. 591, 152 Pac. 657; Atwater v. Russell, 49 Minn. 57, 51 N. W. 629, 52 N. W. 26; Mead v. Robertson, 131 Mo. App. 185, 110 S. W. 1095; Smullin v. Wharton, 73 Neb. 667, 103 N. W. 288, 106 N. W. 577, 112 N. W. 622, 113 N. W. 267; and cited, generally, in Grant Trust & Savings Co. v. Tucker, 49 Ind. App. 345, 96 N. E. 487; Berry v. Berry's Ex'rs, 119 Va. 9, 89 S. E. 242. See, also, in general, Obermiller v. Wylie, 36 Fed. 641; Young v. Mercantile Trust Co., 140 Fed. 61 (allegations of bill too vague); Cresswell's Adm'r v. Jones, 68 Ala. 420 (conveyance to son-in-law "as an advancement" to the daughter "in part of her distri-

butive share" creates a trust for her); Holt v. Wilson, 75 Ala. 58 (antenuptial agreement that wife's property shall "inure and belong to" the husband is a declaration of trust); Ringrose v. Gleadell, 17 Cal. App. 664, 121 Pac. 407 (ambiguous language to be construed if possible in favor of the beneficiary); Bliss v. Bliss, 20 Idaho, 467, 119 Pac. 451 (no trust if there is uncertainty as to property or beneficiary or manner in which property is to be applied); Flanner v. Fellows, 206 Ill. 136, 68 N. E. 1057 (not too indefinite); Orr v. Yates, 209 Ill. 222, 70 N. E. 731 (trust will not fail merely because of uncertainty in whom the fee will vest in case the first beneficiary dies without leaving issue); Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill. 384, 95 N. E. 498 (not necessary that every element required to constitute trust be so clearly expressed in detail that nothing can be left to inference or implication); Burke v. Burke, 259 Ill. 262, 102 N. E. 293 (certain as to the property); French v. Calkins, 252 Ill. 243, 96 N. E. 877 (to pay necessary medical expenses of an annuitant, technical words need be used; even the words "trust" or "trustee" are not essential; any other words which unequivocally show an intention that the legal estate was

Harris's Ex'rs v. Barnett, 3 Gratt. 339; Rutledge v. Smith, 1 McCord Eq. 119; Norman v. Burnett, 25 Miss. 183; Mercer v. Stark, 1 Smedes & M. Ch. 479; Barkley v. Lane's Ex'r, 6 Bush, 587; Slocum v. Marshall, 2 Wash. C. C. 397; Russell v. Switzer, 63 Ga. 711 (certainty necessary); Hill v. Den, 54 Cal. 6 (a conveyance by A to himself and his brother jointly as trustees for A's children); Smith v. Ford, 48 Wis. 115 (trust created by express words on hehalf of grantor's wife and children); Chili First Presb. Soc. v. Bowen, 21 Hun, 389 (no valid trust without a certain beneficiary); Wallace v. Wainwright, 87 Pa. St. 263 (a trust exists where the legal estate is in one person and the equitable in another); Cockrell

certain); Snyder v. Snyder, 280 Ill. 467, 113 N. E. 465 (insufficient description of land); General Convention of the New Church v. Smith, 52 Ind. App. 136, 100 N. E. 384 (indefiniteness as to length of term of the trust); Anderson v. Crist, 113 Ind. 65, 15 N. E. 9; Quinn v. Shields, 62 Iowa, 129, 49 Am. Rep. 141, 17 N. W. 437; Maxwell v. Wood, 133 Iowa, 721, 111 N. W. 203 (conveyance to son on consideration that he care for parents, surplus to be paid his heirs, creates no trust); Tenney v. Simpson, 37 Kan. 579, 15 Pac. 512; Brown v. Brown's Adm'rs, 129 Ky. 138, 110 S. W. 831; Ryan v. Logan County Bank, 132 Ky. 625, 116 S. W. 1179, 119 S. W. 768 (conveyance of property upon oral agreement to hold it for another creates an enforceable trust in favor of latter); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Collamore, 100 Me. 578, 62 Atl. 652; Blouin v. Phaneuf, 81 Me. 176, 16 Atl. 540; Viele v. Curtis, (Me.) 101 Atl. 966 (insufficient declaration); Abrey v. Duffield, 149 Mich. 248, 112 N. W. 936 (purpose undefined); Taylor v. Wilds, 168 Mo. App. 223, 153 S. W. 490 (deed held sufficient); Northrip v. Burge, 255 Mo. 641, 164 S. W. 584 (requisites of valid trust of personalty stated); Mantle v. White, 47 Mont. 234, 132 Pac. 22 (paper executed at termination of partnership held to be intended not to be a trust); Glover v. Baker, 76 N. H. 393, 83 Atl. 916 (requisites stated; trust will not fail because trustee has discretion in distribution of income); Trunkey v. Van Sant, 176 N. Y. 535, 68 N. E. 946 (trust void for indefiniteness); Faust v. Faust, 144 N. C. 383, 57 S. E. 22; Witherington v. Herring, 140 N. C. 495, 6 Ann. Cas. 188, 53 S. E. 303 (as to disposition of fund); Hemphill v. Hemphill, 99 N. C. 436, 442, 6 S. E. 201; Sibenaler v. Weiderholt, (Okl.) 153 Pac. 683 (indefinite as to purpose); Francis v. Gisborn, 30 Utah, 67, 83 Pac. 571 (complaint states cause of action in conversion, merely); Coray v. Holbrook, 40 Utah, 325, 121 Pac. 572; Richardson v. Seever's Adm'r, 84 Va. 259, 270, 4 S. E. 712 (gift to donor's son-in-law for benefit of latter's wife and children, no trust created: words merely show motive for gift); McCamant v. Nuckolls, 85 Va. 331, 12 S. E. 160 (discretionary power merely).

vested in one person, but to be held in some manner or for some purpose on behalf of another, if certain as to all other

v. Armstrong, 31 Ark. 580 (express words not necessary; the intention to be gathered from the whole instrument); Smith v. Bowen, 35 N. Y. 83 (the words "all my estate, both real and personal, I give to my wife, to be used and disposed of at her discretion for the benefit of herself and my daughters, M., L. and A.," held to create a trust in favor of the daughters with respect to three fourths of the property); Zuver v. Lyons, 40 Iowa, 510 (a trust to A for life, and after his death the title in fee to vest in his heirs, creates a trust estate in A during his life, and remainder in fee to his heirs, contrary to the rule in Shelley's case); McElroy v. McElroy, 113 Mass. 509 (where a deed to A expressly creates a trust in favor of B, the habendum clause and the covenants do not necessarily limit the interest of the cestui que trust, nor give any beneficial interest to the grantee, A). Under the peculiar law of Pennsylvania, an express trust cannot be effectively created in behalf of a woman unless she is married, or unless it is created in contemplation of her marriage: Snyder's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 504; Pickering v. Coates, 10 Phila. 65; Ash v. Bowen, 10 Phila. 96. No trust will be created where the property to be the subject-matter is left uncertain: Bardswell v. Bardswell, 9 Sim. 319; Winch v. Brutton, 14 Sim. 379; Fox v. Fox, 27 Beav. 301; Lechmere v. Lavie, 2 Mylne & K. 197; Cowman v. Harrison, 10 Hare, 234; Palmer v. Simmonds, 2 Drew. 221; nor where the objects are left uncertain: Green v. Marsden, 1 Drew. 646; White v. Briggs, 2 Phill. Ch. 583. "Trust" and "trustee" not essential, but their omission might be a strong evidence of the intention: King v. Denison, 1 Ves. & B. 260, 273; Crockett v.

§ 1009 (c) "Trust" or "Trustee" not Essential.-Cahlan v. Bank of Lassen County, 11 Cal. App. 533, 105 Pac. 765; Carr v. Carr, 15 Cal. App. 480, 115 Pac. 261; Taber v. Bailey, 22 Cal. App. 617, 135 Pac. 975; Ryder v. Lyon, 85 Conn. 245, 82 Atl. 573; Hughes v. Fitzgerald, 78 Conn. 4, 60 Atl. 694; Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, 233 Ill. 327, 122 Am. St. Rep. 169, 84 N. E. 256; Bailey v. Wood, 211 Mass. 37, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 950, 97 N. E. 902; Robinson v. Cogswell, 192 Mass. 79, 78 N. E. 389; Packard v. Old Colony R. Co., 168 Mass. 92, 46 N. E. 433; Zeideman v. Molasky, 118 Mo. App. 106, 94 S. W. 754; In re Soulard's Estate, 141 Mo. 642, 43 S. W. 617; Mantle v. White, 47 Mont. 234, 132 Pac.
22; Woodward v. James, 115 N. Y.
346, 356, 22 N. E. 150; First Nat. Bank of Gradfield v. Hinkle, (Okl.)
162 Pac. 1092; Baker v. Baker, 123 Md. 32, 90 Atl. 776; Otjen v. Frobbach, 148 Wis. 301, 134 N. W. 832.

No particular form of words necessary: See Taber v. Bailcy, 22 Cal. App. 617, 135 Pac. 975; Plaut v. Plaut, 80 Conn. 673, 70 Atl. 52; Taber v. Zehner, 47 Ind. App. 165, 93 N. E. 1035; Grant Trust & Sav. Co. v. Tucker, 49 Ind. App. 345, 96 N. E. 487, citing text; In re Podhajsky's Will, 137 Iowa, 742, 115 N. W. 590; Kerr v. Crane, 212 Mass.

requisites, are sufficient.^g On the other hand, if the words "trust" or "trustee" are employed, they do not necessarily

Crockett, 1 Hare, 451; Raikes v. Ward, 1 Hare, 445; Jubber v. Jubber, 9 Sim. 503; Inderwick v. Inderwick, 13 Sim. 652; Bibby v. Thompson, 32 Beav. 646; Porter v. Bank of Rutland, 19 Vt. 410; Aynesworth v. Haldeman, 2 Duvall, 565, 571; Tohias v. Ketchum, 32 N. Y. 319, 327, 328; Smith v. Bowen, 35 N. Y. 83; Sheets's Estate, 52 Pa. St. 257, 566; and "trust" or "trustee" do not always show a trust:d Brown v. Combs, 29 N. J. L. 36; Attorney-General v. Merrimack M. Co., 14 Gray, 586, 612; Selden's Appeal, 31 Conn. 548; Freedley's Appeal, 60 Pa. St. 344; Richardson v. Ingleshy, 13 Rich. Eq. 59; Eldridge v. See Yup. Co., 17 Cal. 44. Sir William Grant said in Cruwys v. Colman, 9 Ves. 319, 323, that three things are indispensable to constitute a valid trust: 1. Sufficient words to raise it; 2. A definite subject; and 3. A certain or ascertained object. It is the well-settled rule that although the purpose to create atrust is evident, still, where the terms of its creation are so vague and indefinite that a court of equity cannot clearly ascertain either the objects or the persons who are to take, the trust will be held to fail, and the property will fall into the general fund of the author:^e Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 602, 609, 35 Am. Rep. 550, per Miller, J.; Fowler v. Garlike, 1 Russ. & M. 232; Stubbs v. Sargon, 2 Keen, 255; 3 Mylne & C. 507; Wood v. Cox, 2 Mylne & C. 684; Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 55, 79. This requisite applies with special force to private trusts; public or charitable trusts are governed by a much less stringent rule.^f

224, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 692, and note, 98 N. E. 783 (trust in proceeds of insurance certificate); Frost v. Frost, 165 Mich. 591, 131 N. W. 60; Putnam v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co., 191 N. Y. 166, 83 N. E. 789; Otjen v. Frohbach, 148 Wis. 301, 134 N. W. 832 (citing the text).

§ 1009, (d) "Trust" and "Trustee" do not Always Show a Trust.—Cleveland v. Springfield Inst. for Savings, 182 Mass. 110, 65 N. E. 27; Mc-Allister v. Hayes, 76 N. H. 108, 79 Atl. 726 (gift by will in trust for one person for life, thereafter equal shares of said sum in trust for two others. Held, remainder is not a trust); Matter of Hawley, 104 N. Y. 250, 10 N. E. 352; Decker v. Union Dime Sav. Inst., 15 App. Div. 553, 44 N. Y. Supp. 521; Rua v. Watson, 13 S. D. 453, 83 N. W. 572; Otjen v. Frohbach, 148 Wis. 301, 134 N. W. 832 (citing the text).

§1009, (e) Dyer's Appeal, 107 Pa. St. 446.

§ 1009, (f) The beneficiaries need not be named; it is sufficient if they can be ascertained, and parol evidence is, of course, admissible in case of a latent ambiguity: Gilmer v. Stone, 120 U. S. 586, 7 Sup. Ct. 689; First Nat. Bank v. Schween, 127 Ill. 573, 11 Am. St. Rep. 174, 20 N. E. 681; Sleeper v. Iselin, 62 Iowa, 583, 17 N. W. 922; Boardman v. Willard, 73 Iowa, 22, 34 N. W. 487;

^{§ 1009, (}g) Quoted, Ruhe v. Ruhe, 113 Md. 595, 77 Atl. 797.

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show an intention to create or declare a trust. It sometimes happens that an express trust arises, not from any

Kendrick v. Ray, 173 Mass. 305, 73 Am. St. Rep. 389, 53 N. E. 823. See, also, Lear v. Manser, 114 Me. 342, 96 Atl. 240 (gift in trust to "such person or persons or institution as shall care for me in my last illness").

See the following cases in which it was held the declaration or disposition was sufficient to create a trust: Gildersleeve v. Stratton, 59 N. J. Eq. 1, 36 Atl. 477; Tarbox v. Grant, 56 N. J. Eq. 199, 39 Atl. 378; In re McAuley's Estate, 184 Pa. St. 124, 39 Atl. 31; Cathcart v. Nelson's Adm'rs, 70 Vt. 317, 40 Atl. 826; In re Eshbach's Estate, 197 Pa. St. 153, 46 Atl. 905; Collins v. Steuart, 58 N. J. Eq. 392, 44 Atl. 467; Hodnett's Estate, 154 Pa. St. 485, 35 Am. St. Rep. 851, 26 Atl. 623; In re Fall's Estate, 31 Misc. Rep. 658, 66 N. Y. Supp. 47; Central Trust Co. v. Weeks, 15 App. Div. 598. 44 N. Y. Supp. 828; Moloney v. Tilton, 22 Misc. Rep. 682, 51 N. Y. Supp. 19; Starbuck v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 28 App. Div. 272, 51 N. Y. Supp. 58; Mosher v. Funk, 194 Ill. 351, 62 N. E. 782; A. P. Cook Co. v. Bell, 114 Mich. 283, 72 N. W. 174; Stranahan v. Richardson, 75 Minn. 402, 78 N. W. 110; Roger v. Johnson, 113 Ala. 589, 21 South. 477; Tennant v. Tennant, 43 W. Va. 547, 27 S. E. 334; First Nat. Bk. v. Fries, 121 N. C. 241, 61 Am. St. Rep. 663, 28 S. E. 350; Ramsey v. Ramsey, 123 N. C. 685, 31 S. E. 835; Commercial & Farmers' Bk. v. Vass, 130 N. C. 183, 41 S. E. 791; Hawkins v. Willard, (Tex. Civ. App.) 38 S. W. 365; McCreary v. Gewinner, 103 Ga. 528, 29 S. E. 960. See, also, Ranney v. Byers, 219 Pa. 332, 123 Am. St. Rep. 660, 68 Atl. 971 (sufficient identification of subject-matter).

In the following cases it was held that the declaration or disposition was not sufficient to establish the trust: In re Barker, [1892] 2 Ch. 491; In re Severn, etc., Bridge Co., [1896] 1 Ch. 559; Levis v. Kengla, 169 U. S. 234, 42 L. Ed. 728, 18 Sup. Ct. 309; Walston v. Smith, 70 Vt. 19, 39 Atl. 252; Fellows v. Fellows, 69 N. H. 339, 46 Atl. 474; In re Small's Will, 27 App. Div. 438, 50 N. Y. Supp. 341; Birdsall v. Grant, 37 App. Div. 348, 57 N. Y. Supp. 705; Hoffman House v. Stokes, 50 App. Div. 163, 63 N. Y. Supp. 784; Kyle v. Wills, 166 Ill. 501, 46 N. E. 1121; Loring v. Hildreth, 170 Mass. 328, 64 Am. St. Pep. 301, 40 L. R. A. 127, 49 N. E. 652; Welch v. Henshaw, 170 Mass. 409, 64 Am. St. Rep. 309, 49 N. E. 659; Com. Nat. Bk. v. Kirkwood, 172 Ill. 563, 50 N. E. 219; Moore v. Ransdel, 156 Ind. 658, 59 N. E. 936, 60 N. E. 1068; Hamilton v. Hall, 111 Mich. 291, 67 N. W. 484; Price v. Dawson, 111 Mich. 279, 69 N. W. 650; Stokes v. Sprague, 110 Iowa, 89, 81 N. W. 195; Rotter v. Scott, 111 Iowa, 31, 82 N. W. 437; Dillon v. Farley, 114 Iowa, 629, 87 N. W. 677; Citizens' Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Bradt, (Tenn. Ch. App.) 50 S. W. 778; Mulock v. Mulock, 156 Mo. 431, 57 S. W. 122; Gillen v. City of Frost, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 371, 61 S. W. 345; Kuehne v. Union Trust Co., (Mich.) 95 N. W. 715; In re Barefield, 177 N. Y. 387, 101 Am. St. Rep. -, 69 N. E. 732; see, also, Angus v. Noble, 73 Conn. 56, 46 Atl. 278.

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definite words, but from the entire dispositions contained in the will, deed, or other instrument, or from a construction of all its terms. Some examples of such trusts, both in real and in personal property, are given in the foot-note as illustrations.³

§ 1009, 3 Examples of trusts of real property Janes v. Throckmorton, 57 Cal. 368 (an encumbered estate being conveyed to A, in consideration thereof he gave a written agreement whereby he covenanted that he would pay off the indebtedness out of the estate, and if any money or land remained after payment of all the indebtedness, he would convey one fifth part thereof to B. Held, that a trust was created in favor of B; and A having freed the estate from the encumbrances, and obtained a clear title in himself, that he held the land subject to a trust in B's favor with respect to one fifth thereof; Wormouth v. Johnson, 58 Cal. 621; Taft v. Taft, 130 Mass. 461 (testator devised land to his daughter, with full power to dispose of the whole or any part or any of the proceeds, to devote the income, etc., to the maintenance and support of herself and her children, and if any portion of the estate was undisposed of during her life or by her last will, the same was to be held for her children until they became of age and then paid to them. Held, that no trust was created in favor of the children, but they took contingent remainders); Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552; Ferry v. Liable, 31 N. J. Eq. 566 (a testator's direction to his executors to continue his business creates a trust estate); Donovan v. Van de Mark, 78 N. Y. 244; Verdin v. Slocum, 71 N. Y. 345; Low v. Harmony, 72 N. Y. 408; Vernon v. Vernon, 53 N. Y. 351 (trusts under New York statute); Smith v. Bowen, 35 N. Y. 83; Whitcomb v. Cardell, 45 Vt. 24. Examples of trusts of personal property: Trust created, or not, of money deposited in a bank: Stone v. Bishop, 4 Cliff. 593; Weber v. Weber, 58 How. Pr. 255; Rogers etc. Works v. Kelly, 19 Hun, 399; Ray v. Simmons, 11 R. I. 266, 23 Am. Rep. 447; Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134, 31 Am. Rep. 448; Boykin v. Pace's Ex'r, 64 Ala. 68 (a receipt, "Received of S. P. eight hundred dollars, in trust for S. P., minor, to be kept and used for his benefit, to the best of my ability," etc., creates a valid trust which cannot be varied by parol evidence); Clapp v. Emery, 98 Ill. 523 (trust created by receiving and investing money of another with verbal declarations); Reiff v. Horst, 52 Md. 255 (trust by receiving money with verbal directions); Lyle v. Burke, 40 Mich. 499 (a written declaration of trust); Kershaw v. Snowden, 36 Ohio St. 181 (money placed in the bands of a person to be repaid on his death, held to create simply the relation of debtor and creditor, and not a trust); Gadsden v. Whaley, 14 S. C. 210 (a person verbally declares himself a trustee); Ferry v. Liable, 31 N. J. Eq. 566; Morrison v. Kinstra, 55 Miss. 71; Jones v. Kent, 80 N. Y. 585 (A sold to B certain stocks for III-141

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§ 1010. Express Trusts Inferred by Construction.—There is another important class of express trusts, which are not

a sum paid down, "and one half of whatever price the same should be sold for, when sold, over and above that sum." Held, no trust created of the stocks in B's hands); Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 422, 36 Am. Rep. 634; People v. Merchants and Mechanics' Bank, 78 N. Y. 269, 34 Am. Rep. 532; Silvey v. Hodgdon, 52 Cal. 363 (verbal trust in a policy of life insurance); Craige v. Craige, 9 Phila. 545; Eaton v. Cook, 25 N. J. Eq. 55 (a direction by a creditor to his debtor to hold the money in trust for a third person); Kitchen v. Bedford, 13 Wall. 413 (a receipt of a "sum" in railroad bonds, with a promise to expend "said sum" in the purchase of certain lands, held to constitute a trust of the securities).^h

§1009, (h) Miller v. Clark, 40 Fed. 15; Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, 550, 21 Am. St. Rep. 693, 12 L. R. A. 463, 27 N. E. 256, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 33 (the settlor said: "You can consider this money on interest"; if this was intended as an indication that the settlor would pay interest it would throw some doubt on the case); Willis v. Smyth, 91 N. Y. 297; Mabie v. Bailey, 95 N. Y. 206; People v. City Bk. of Rochester, 96 N. Y. 35; Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421, 15 Am. St. Rep. 531, 6 L. R. A. 403, 22 N. E. 940 (trust not inferred from a mere deposit of money in a savings bank by one person in the name of another); Marcy v. Amazeen, 61 N. H. 131, 60 Am. St. Rep. 320 (same); Robinson v. Ring, 72 Me. 140, 39 Am. St. Rep. 308, 7 L. R. A. 272; Boyd v. Munro, 32 S. C. 249, 10 S. E. 963 (no trust); Continental Bank v. Weems, 69 Tex. 489, 5 Am. St. Rep. 85, 6 S. W. 802; Edson v. Angell, 58 Mich. 336, 25 N. W. 307 (no trust); Chadwick v. Chadwick, 59 Mich. 87, 26 N. W. 288; Bowers v. Evans, 71 Wis. 133, 36 N. W. 629; Ellicott v. Barnes, 31 Kan. 170, 1 Pac. 767 (money delivered to cashier of bank to pay a note is a trust fund); compare Na-

tional Bank v. Ellicott, 31 Kan. 173, 1 Pac. 593; Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 90 Me. 468, 60 Am. St. Rep. 278, 38 Atl. 374 (check of donor); Metropolitan Bk. v. Loyd, 90 N. Y. 530 (deposit of a check); see Brooks v. Bigelow, 142 Mass. 6, 6 N. E. 766; Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wall. 252 (discussing a debtor and creditor relation, as distinguished from a bailment to a bank); Aetna Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bk. of N. Y., 46 N. Y. 82, 7 Am. Rep. 314. See, also, in support of the text, Teal v. Pleasant Grove Local Union No. 204, etc., (Ala.) 75 South. 335; Ryder v. Lyon, 85 Conn. 245, 82 Atl. 573; Martin v. Preston, 49 Wash. 288, 94 Pac. 1087.

Bank Deposits.—The general principle that no trust arises from a mere deposit in a bank is so well recognized by the authorities that it is not deemed necessary to cite additional, specific cases, but the reader is referred, generally, to the cases cited in this note, and to § 997, note (a), in regard to voluntary trusts of bank deposits; see, also, a collection of cases in Ames Cas. on Trusts 43, note 1.

Notwithstanding this well-established rule, a bank deposit may be

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directly and expressly declared by the terms of the instrument, but which are inferred by a construction of all the

made as a special deposit in such manner as to create a trust. A common instance is that of the deposit of a check, or draft, for collection: Giles v. Perkins, 9 East, 12, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 9; Commercial Nat. Bk. v. Armstrong, 39 Fed. 684 (holding the fiduciary relation exists until collection); Fifth Nat. Bk. v. Armstrong, 40 Fed. 46; First Nat. Bk. v. Armstrong, 42 Fed. 193; Goshorn v. Murray, 197 Fed. 407; Page County v. Rose, 130 Iowa, 296, 8 Ann. Cas. 114, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 886, 106 N. W. 744; People v. Bk. of Dansville, 39 Hun, 187; McLeod v. Evans, 66 Wis. 410, 57 Am. Rep. 287, 28 N. W. 173, 214; see First Nat. Bk. v. Armstrong, 39 Fed. 231 (the crediting by a bank on the receipt of the draft, giving the depositor a right to draw immediately, created the relation of debtor and creditor). Where paper is thus indorsed for collection it carries notice of the trust on its face, and when transmitted to a second or third bank for collection, such bank is bound by it; many of the cases holding that the depositor may proceed directly against the collecting bank. In Makesey v. Ramseys, 9 Clark & Finelly 818, Ames Cas. on Trusts 13, M. employed R. to collect a bill payable in Calcutta; R. employed C. & Co.; C. & Co. employed A. & Co.; A. & Co., collected the amount, credited C. & Co. with it and failed; the court held the crediting C. & Co. at A. & Co.'s was equivalent to crediting M. at R's, and R. was entitled to the full amount. The reasoning proceeded on the ground that title did not pass to C. & Co., nor to A. & Co.,

but that they were sub-agents for collection. It would seem that title did pass but was subject to the trust; yet the sub-agent theory is generally resorted to by the courts in such cases. See Commercial Nat. Bk. v. Hamilton Nat. Bk., 42 Fed. 880 (the collecting bank held liable where they remitted in a roundabout way after notice of insolvency of an intermediate bank); Midland Nat. Bk. of K. C. v. Brightwell, 148 Mo. 358, 71 Am. St. Rep. 608, 49 S. W. 994; Commercial Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 39 Fed. 684; Fifth Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 40 Fed. 46; First Nat. Bank of Wellston v. Armstrong, 42 Fed. 193; First Nat. Bank v. Reno Co. Bank, 3 Fed. 257, Balbach v. Frelinghuysen, 15 Fed. 675; White v. Bank, 102 U. S. 661; First Nat. Bank of C. P. v. First Nat. Bank of R., 76 Ind. 561, 40 Am. Rep. 261; Blaine v. Bourne, 11 R. I. 119; Manufacturers' Nat. Bank v. Continental Bank, 148 Mass. 553, 12 Am. St. Rep. 598, 2 L. B. A. 699, 20 N. E. 193; Freeman's Nat. Bank v. National Tube-Works, 151 Mass. 413, 21 Am. St. Rep. 461, 8 L. R. A. 42, 24 N. E. 779. As the note or check in such case is in trust, the insolvency of the one holding it for collection, if occurring before collection, should not affect the depositor's right to the paper or its proceeds: Nixon State Bank v. First State Bank, 180 Ala. 291, 60 South. 868 (holds under Alabama statute that if sending bank were a depositor, it would be entitled to priority, but that it was not); Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185, 90 Atl. 369 (after bank becomes insolvent, it

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terms and dispositions. They are all cases where the court infers that it was the intention of the party to create an

has no right to make collections); - Brockmeyer v. Washington Nat. Bk., 40 Kan. 376, 19 Pac. 855; Brown v. Sheldon State Bank, 139 Iowa, 83, 117 N. W. 289; American Nat. Bk. v. Owenshoro Savings Bk. & Trust Co's. Receiver, 146 Ky. 194, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 146, 142 S. W. 239 (note on trust in proceeds of collection made by bank while insolvent); Fifth Nat. Bk. v. Armstrong, 40 Fed. 46; see First Nat. Bk. of Wellston v. Armstrong, 42 Fed. 193, for a discussion of the effect of payment before and after the bankruptcy; see the dissenting opinion in Ditch v. Western Nat. Bk., 79 Md. 192, 47 Am. St. Rep. 375, 29 Atl. 72, 138; City of Somerville v. Beal, 49 Fed. 790 (a bank having knowledge of its insolvency when collecting); People v. Bank of Dansville, 39 Hun, 187; Continental Bank of N. Y. v. Weems, 69 Tex. 489, 5 Am. St. Rep. 85, 6 S. W. 802. In Jockusch v. Towsey, 51 Tex. 129, the court states: "We are of opinion, both on principle and authority, that after a bank 'has suspended, it thereby ceases to have the general power and authority which it previously had to collect paper which, before its suspension, had been deposited with it for this purpose, so as to make it a general creditor of the depositor, but that this subsequent collection must he held by it as agent in trust for the owner." The general rule would seem to be that hy the collection, and mingling of the funds with those of the bank, the res would be destroyed, and the trust extinguished, and a subsequent insolvency would give the depositor the right of a creditor only: Freeman's Nat. Bank v. Nat. Tube-Works Co., 151 Mass. 413, 21 Am. St. Rep. 461, 8 L. R. A. 42, 24 N. E. 779. For a case where the collecting bank knew of its insolvency, sce Sayles v. Cox, 95 Teun. 579, 49 Am. St. Rep. 940, 32 L. R. A. 715, 32 S. W. 626; Howard v. Wacker, 92 Tenn. 452, 21 S. W. 897 (holding that though not actually paid in money it is binding on the depositor); Akin v. Jones, 93 Tenn. 353, 42 Am. St. Rep. 921, 25 L. R. A. 523, 27 S. W. 669; approved in Arbuckle v. Kirkpatrick, 98 Tenn. 221, 60 Am. St. Rep. 854, 36 L. R. A. 285, 39 S. W. 3; Midland Nat. Bk. v. Brightwell, 148 Mo. 358, 71 Am. St. Rep. 608, 49 S. W. 994 (the sending bank not preferred to the general creditors because the assets were not unduly swelled); Tiukham v. Heyworth, 31 Ill. 519 (when collected, and credited, the relation of debtor and creditor arose); but see Capital Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank, 49 Neb. 786, 59 Am. St. Rep. 572, 69 N. W. 115; Monotuck Silk Co. v. Flanders, 87 Wis. 237, 58 N. W. 383, overruling McLeod v. Evans, 66 Wis. 401, 57 Am. Rep. 287, 28 N. W. 173, 214; Francis v. Evans, 69 Wis. 115, 33 N. W. 93; Bowers v. Evans, 71 Wis. 133, 36 N. W. 629; Bowman v. First Nat. Bank, 9 Wash, 614, 43 Am. St. Rep. 870, 38 Pac. 211; Guignon v. First Nat. Bk., 22 Mont. 140, 55 Pac. 1051, 1097 (for a discussion of what payment or crediting will change the relation). Further discussion of the rights of the cestui, in case the bank has collected the amount, may be found in § 1048, note (f), in regard to the right to follow the trust property or its proceeds.

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express trust for some purpose, although he has not expressed that intention in unequivocal and direct terms, and

Special Deposits .--- In cases of special deposit, where there is no collection intended, the trust may arise if such was the intention of the parties. In a leading English case, Farley v. Turner, 26 L. J. Ch. 710, the depositor gave a direction to have £500 of the deposit applied to paying R. & Co., with which they were to pay a certain bill; the receiving bank had £500 paid to R. & Co., and one of the firm died before it was applied to the payment of the depositor's account. It was held the depositor had a right to the £500. It would seem that the right which the forwarding bank had to compel R. & Co. to apply the money as directed, or to return it, was held in trust for the depositor. The case has been accepted as law, although the point as to what constituted the res is not always noticed. See Montague v. Pacific Bank, 81 Fed. 602 (money was deposited in N.Y. to the account of P. of San Francisco and P. ordered to pay to B. in Seattle; P. failed before transmitting to B. and it was held the depositor could recover in full as against the general creditors; it was further held that if P. should have kept the money separately the commingling with the bank's fund did not prevent recovery). The reasoning of the court, in regard to the commingling of the res, is criticised in 11 Har. Law. Rev. 202. See Moreland v. Brown, 86 Fed. 257 (a creditor refused payment in any way but by a draft to be payment if honored; the drawing bank failed before payment and the amount deposited for the payment of the draft was considered a special deposit; the case is

criticised in 12 Har. Law. Rev. 221, as not noticing the non-existence of a specific res unmixed with other funds); Massey v. Fisher, 62 Fed. 958 (money was paid on a note, and a receipt taken, to be given up when the note was returned; the bank failed and it was held a special deposit, though the particular money. could not be identified); see, also, Covey v. Cannon, 104 Ark. 550, 149 S. W. 514; Anderson v. Pacific Bk., 112 Cal. 598, 53 Am. St. Rep. 228, 32 L. R. A. 479, 44 Pac. 1063; Shopert v. Indiana Nat. Bank, 41 Ind. App. 474, 83 N. E. 515; Mitchell v. Bank of Indianola, 98 Miss. 658, 54 South. 8; Kimmel v. Dickson, 5 S. D. 221, 49 Am. St. Rep. 869, 25 L. R. A. 309, 58 N. W. 561: Cutler v. Am. Ex. Nat. Bk., 113 N.Y. 593, 4 L. R. A. 328, 21 N. E. 710; Drovers' Nat. Bk. v. O'Hare, 119 Ill. 646, 10 N. E. 360; City of St. Louis v. Johnston, 5 Dill. 241, Fed Cas. No. 12,235; McHose v. Dutton, 55 Iowa, 728, 8 N. W. 667 (the deposit was to pay X. and X. was allowed to recover it); Re Le Blanc, 14 Hun, 8 (deposit to pay certain dividends held a trust): In re Barned Banking Co., 39 L. J. Ch. 635 (M. drew a note payable at P. & Co., and deposited an amount to meet it with B., to be transmitted to P. & Co.; B. failed without having transmitted the amount, and M. sued to recover the full amount on the authority of Turner v. Farley, supra; but it was held the amount having been mixed with the funds of B. and no right existing against a third party, there was no res). Many of the cases, nominally following Farley v. Turner, are more like In re Barned in their facts,

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the court is forced to gather it from his general expressions, or from the objects and purposes of his gift. When such a trust is found by the court to have been intended by the party, it is in every respect an express active trust, has no resemblance whatever to a resulting or a constructive trust. It is, in fact, an express trust which the donor did not unmistakably declare, but which the court has helped out by interpretation and inference. To call this class "implied" trust, as is often done, is not only erroneous, but is productive of confusion and mistake.¹ These trusts

§ 1010, ¹ See Lane v. Lane, 8 Allen, 350. These trusts are in no sense *implied* if that word is used, as it only can be properly, in opposition

but the point as to the identical res is evaded by considering that if a bank should have kept a deposit unmixed it will be presumed to have done so; also that the general creditors have no equitable right to have their amounts increased by the special depositor's money, and if the deposit can be traced to "the vault of the bank" it will be sufficient, especially if it was such a short time before the bank failure that it is obvious that the bank assets are "unduly swelled." The Federal cases cited supra seem to follow such reasoning. For the proper consideration of this question see the notes to § 1048, where the right to follow the trust res is discussed; see, also, Simonton v. First Nat. Bank of Minn., 24 Minn. 216 (the deposit for the payment of the depositor's obligation held not a trust); First Nat. Bank of Scranton v. Higbee, 109 Pa. St. 130; see, ante, § 997, and notes, for cases of bank deposit as creating voluntary trust.

Ordinary Deposit.—The deposit in bank of a sum of money does not, in the ordinary case, create a trust, but gives rise to the relation of debtor and creditor ouly; the leading case of Foley v. Hill, 2 H. L. C.

28, settled the question in England if any doubt had existed. See In re Tidd, [1893] 3 Ch. 154, distinguishing a case where the money was paid to a private party; Carstair v. Bates, 3 Camp. 301, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 12 (a bill discounted by a bank and the amount credited to the drawer was held to pass the entire property to the bank, and on its bankruptcy the drawer got nothing). A conclusive test in such cases (if one is required) is the payment of interest; when such is paid there can be no trust: Ex parte Broad, 13 Q. B. D. 740; the fact that there is no res set aside in such cases would also tend to prove that no trust was created: Shoemaker v. Hinze, 53 Wis. 116, 10 N. W. 86 ("the parties did not contemplate or understand that the same identical money was to be kept for and returned to the plaintiff on demand, but only that a like sum of money should be repaid by the defendant"). As to whether public funds deposited in a bank which becomes insolvent are trust funds, see 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 886, note; Watts v. Board of Com'rs. of Cleveland County, 21 Okl. 231, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 918, and note, 95 Pac. 771.

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ordinarily arise from a construction of the language of wills; but there is no reason, on principle, why they may not also arise from conveyances and agreements *inter* $vivos.^{2a}$

§ 1011. 1. From Powers Given to the Trustees.—Although no trust is declared in express terms, nor even mentioned, still the intention of the donor to create the trust, and the existence of the trust itself, may be necessarily inferred from the powers and authority given to the grantee, and in case of wills, even where no estate is directly devised to the executors, but the whole estate is *apparently* given to the beneficiaries, the trust may be necessarily inferred from the powers and authority conferred upon the executors, and thus from a construction of the entire will the intention may be shown that the executors are to take the legal title as trustees of an express active trust.^{1 a} The

to express. They are a species of express trusts, and not a class distinct from express trust. They differ from all other express trusts only in degree, and not in kind. In every instance of express trust, the court must see an intention to convey or to hold the property in trust for some purpose, and this intention must be shown by the language used; in one instance the language is direct and technical, in another it is not so technical, but the meaning is equally plain; in the present instance there is no such direct language used to show that intention, and the intention is gathered from the whole instrument or from the nature of the dispositions. The term "implied" should be confined exclusively to those trusts which arise by operation of law, and are opposed to "express" trusts.

§ 1010, 2 See Liddard v. Liddard, 28 Beav. 266.

§ 1011, ¹ The case of Tobias v. Ketchum, 32 N. Y. 319, 327-331, contains so full a discussion of this important doctrine that I shall quote from it at some length. The testator gave to his widow all the furniture and one third of the income of the land during her life, and to his children

§ 1010, (a) This paragraph is quoted in full in Richards v. Wilson, (Ind.) 112 N. E. 780.

§ 1011, (a) This paragraph is quoted in Meek v. Briggs, 87 Iowa, 610, 43 Am. St. Rep. 410, 54 N. W. 456, also citing Tobias v. Ketchum, supra; cited in Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, 233 Ill. 327, 122 Am. St. Rep. 169, 84 N. E. 256 (if person cannot carry out provisions of the will without the legal title as trustee, he will be held to have the legal title); Lewis v. Curnutt, 130 peculiarity of this case is, that the trust arises, and the legal estate is vested in the trustees, although the will contains no disposition by which the legal estate is in terms devised to them. The doctrine is settled that, in disposi-

all the rest and residue of his property, real and personal, to be equally divided among them within six months after the widow's death. He then appointed executors, and gave them power to sell real estate, if necessary to make a fair division, and finally said that he clothed them "with full power and anthority to carry out all the provisions of this will," "to divide the proceeds," etc., and "full power and authority to rent, lease, repair, and insure any portion of the said estate, during any period of time the same may remain unsold and undivided." Here appears to be a direct gift of income to the widow during life, and a direct gift of the whole principal to the children, to be divided after the widow's death. There is no direct gift to the executors at all; and the words "trust," or "trustee," or other similar terms, are not used. The court said (p. 327): "The first question, then, is, Are the executors under this will made trustees of an express trust? The word 'trust' or 'trustee' is not used in the will, but that is only a circumstance to be noted in considering the question. It is by no means necessary that the donee should be expressly directed to hold the property to certain uses, or in trust, or as a trustee. ... It is one of the fixed rules of equitable construction that there is no magic in particular words; and any expressions that show unequivocally the intention of the parties to create a trust will have that effect. It was said by Lord Eldon that the word "trust" not being made use of is a circumstance to be alluded to, but nothing more; and if the whole frame of the will creates a trust, the law is the same, though the word "trust" is uot used': Hill on Trustees, orig. ed., 65, and cases cited. We are, in this case, to determine the question by the authority conferred and the duties imposed." The court then went into a full examination of the powers and duties given to the executors. If they had only authority to sell the land, and to make an equal division among the children, they

Iowa, 423, 106 N. W. 914 (trustee has whatever title is necessary to enable him to carry out the provisions of the trust); Arlington State Bank v. Paulsen, 57 Neb. 717, 78 N. W. 303; Hagen v. Sacrison, 19 N. D. 160, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 724, 123 N. W. 518. See, also, Welch v. Caldwell, 226 Ill. 488, 80 N. E. 1014; Clark v. Fleischmann, 81 Neb. 445, 116 N. W. 290; Johnson v. Lawrence, 95 N. Y. 154; Ward v. Ward, 105
N. Y. 68, 73, 11 N. E. 373; Toronto General Trust Co. v. Chicago etc. R.
R. Co., 123 N. Y. 37, 25 N. E. 198; Matter of Denton, 102 N. Y. 200, 6
N. E. 299; Mee v. Gordon, 187 N. Y.
400, 116 Am. St. Rep. 613, 10 Ann.
Cas. 172, 80 N. E. 353; Thorsen v.
Hooper, 57 Or. 75, 109 Pac. 388; Wolbert v. Beard, 128 Wis. 391, 107
N. W. 663. tions of such a nature, although there is no devise in terms to them, the authority conferred by the will upon the executors to lease, rent, repair, insure, pay taxes, assessments, and interest, and otherwise manage the trust property, and to pay over the *net* income to the devisees or legatees, necessarily carries the legal title to the executors, and creates an express active trust in them. It is a familiar doctrine that where land is conveyed or devised to trustees, and they have active duties to perform, they take the legal estate; the converse is also generally true, that where active duties are prescribed for executors, which could not be performed unless the legal estate is vested in

might be satisfied by regarding it merely as a power in trust, while the legal estate remained vested in the devisees. But the authority to sell and to divide among the children, together with the authority to lease, rent, insure, pay taxes, interest, and the like, showed conclusively that the legal estate was intended to vest in the executors. These powers lasted during the life of the widow; they could not be exercised unless the executors were clothed with the legal estate; they necessarily required that the executors should have full possession of the corpus of the property, with full power to manage it and to receive all the gross income, to pay all charges, and to pay only the net income to the widow and children. In other words, the executors were trustees; the legal estate vested in them made them trustees. In support of these conclusions the court cited and commented upon Lewin on Trusts, 248; Barker v. Greenwood, 4 Mees. & W. 421; White v. Parker, 1 Bing. N. C. 573; Birmingham v. Kirwan, 2 Schoales & L. 444; Leggett v. Perkins, 2 N. Y. 297; Brewster v. Striker, 2 N. Y. 19. In conclusion, the court said: "These authorities are conceived to be abundant to establish the proposition that the authority to lease, rent, repair, insure, pay taxes, assessments, and interest, and pay net income to devisees, carried the legal title to the executors in this case, and created a trust in them, valid under the statute." In Brewster v. Striker, 2 N. Y. 19, the testator devised his real estate to his grandchildren, and then provided that the lands should not be sold, but the executors should lease or rent them, and pay the rents and profits to the grandchildren; the executors were held to be trustees and to take the legal estate. See, also, Garvey v. McDevitt, 72 N. Y. 556, 562; Smith v. Scholtz, 68 N. Y. 41; Knox v. Jones, 47 N. Y. 389, 396; Vernon v. Vernon, 53 N. Y. 351, 359; Van Nostrand v. Moore, 52 N. Y. 12, 18; Wagstaff v. Lowerre, 23 Barb. 209, 221; Ferry v. Liable, 31 N. J. Eq. 566 (a direction to the executors to carry on the testator's business creates a trust estate in them).

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them, they are in fact made trustees, and necessarily take the legal estate for the purposes of the trust.^{2 b}

§ 1012. 2. Provisions for Maintenance.—A second species of trust by inference sometimes arises when property is given to a parent, or person *in loco parentis*, with no trust declared in terms, but with such directions for the maintenance of his family or children as enable the court to infer an intention on the part of the donor that the property should be held in trust for the purposes of the maintenance. No definite rule can be laid down; each case must stand upon its own circumstances. If the language is sufficient for the intention to be clearly inferred, the trust will be enforced; otherwise the donee will take an absolute estate, and the provisions concerning maintenance will be regarded as mere motives for the gift and recommendations addressed to his discretion.¹^a

§ 1011, ² In general: Wright v. Pearson, 1 Eden, 119, 125; Mott v. Buxton, 7 Ves. 201. To receive and pay over rents: Reynell v. Reynell, 10 Beav. 21; Collier v. McBean, 34 Beav. 426; Silvester v. Wilson, 2 Term Rep. 444.

§ 1012, ¹ Woods v. Woods, ¹ Mylne & C. 401; Raikes v. Ward, ¹ Hare, 445; Carr v. Living, 28 Beav. 644; Bird v. Maybury, 33 Beav. 351; Byne

§ 1011, (b) Quoted in Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 20 L. R. A. 247, 33 N. E. 858.

§1012, (a) The text is quoted in Greenwood v. Greenwood, 97 Kan. 380, 155 Pac. 807. This paragraph of the text is cited in Coffin v. Watson, 78 N. J. Eq. 307, 79 Atl. 275. See, also, In re G. ---- (Infants), [1899] 1 Ch. 719; Bell v. Watkins, 82 Ala. 512, 60 Am. Rep. 756, 1 South. 92; Zimmer v. Sennott, 134 Ill. 505, 25 N. E. 774 (a devise to testator's widow "upon condition that" she should raise, support and educate his children creates no trust); Blouin v. Phaneuf, 81 Me. 176, 16 Atl. 540; Seabrook v. Grimes, 107 Md. 410, 126 Am. St. Rep. 400, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 483, 68 Atl. 883 (no trust

after minority); Pitts v. Milton, 192 Mass. 88, 116 Am. St. Rep. 223, 77 N. E. 1028 (to widow, "for purpose of maintaining herself and our children, to her and her heirs forever," no trust); Johnson v. Johnson, 215 Mass. 276, 102 N. E. 465 (trust); Speirs v. Roberts, 73 Mich. 666, 41 N. W. 841 (absence of an obligation to account decisive against trust character of the provision); Courtenay v. Courtenay, 90 Miss. 181, 43 South. 68 (no trust after minority); Pilcher v. McHenry, 14 Lea (82 Tenn.), 77; Seibel v. Rapp, 85 Va. 28, 6 S. E. 478 (no trust for children); Trout v. Pratt, 106 Va. 431, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 398, 56 S. E. 165 (not a trust).

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§ 1013. 3. To Carry Out the Purposes of the Will.— Trusts, or at least powers in trust, are sometimes inferred from the terms of a will, when an intention to create the same is necessary, in order to carry out the directions and

v. Blackburn, 26 Beav. 41; Longmore v. Elcum, 2 Younge & C. Ch. 363, 369; Berry v. Briant, 2 Drew. & S. 1; Whiting v. Whiting, 4 Gray, 236, 240; Andrews v. Bank of Cape Ann, 3 Allen, 313; Smith v. Wildman, 39 Conn. 387; Paisley's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 153, 158; Whelan v. Reilly, 3 W. Va. 597; Bryan v. Howland, 98 Ill. 625 (land conveyed to a trustee, in trust for A, and to permit A to "use, occupy, possess, enjoy, rent, etc., in any manner for the support, maintenance, and benefit of himself and his children," held not to create a trust in favor of the children); Taft v. Taft. 130 Mass. 461 (devise to a daughter, with power to sell, and to devote the proceeds and income to the support and maintenance of herself and her children, no trust for the children); Smith v. Bowen, 35 N. Y. 83 • ("all my estate I give to my wife, to be used and disposed of at her discretion for the benefit of herself and my daughters, A, B, and C," created a trust for the daughters as to three fourths); Lyon v. Lyon, 65 N. Y. 339 (a testator devised all his real estate to his sons, provided that the house should be his daughter's "home, free of expense, as to paying any rent or privilege in said house." Held, the daughter was entitled to full support from the sons); Biddle's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 258 (devise to a trustee, in trust for testator's widow, to pay the income to her, and that income to be applied by her to the maintenance of his children, without her being called upon to give any account of her manner of applying it; held to create no trust for the children); Estate of Goodrich, 38 Wis, 492 (testator devised his "home farm," etc., to his son, and added, "my wife to have a home and good support as long as she lives on the home premises, board and clothing," etc. Held, the maintenance of the widow was charged upon the "home farm"); Young v. Young, 68 N. C. 309 (testator gave all his property to his widow, "to be managed by her, and that she may be enabled the better to control and manage our children, to be disposed of by her to them in that manner she may think best." Held, a trust created for the children); and see Parsons v. Best, 1 Thomp. & C. 211. It would be difficult to reconcile some of these American decisions with the current of English authorities. The following is a résumé of recent English cases :---

Where a bequest is made so that the legatee may use or dispose of the income for the benefit of *himself* and the maintenance or education of his children, a trust is, in general, created for the children in common with the interest of the parent: Woods v. Woods, 1 Mylne & C. 401; Berry v. Briant, 2 Drew. & S. 1; Castle v. Castle, 1 De Gex & J. 352; Byne v. Blackburn, 26 Beav. 41; Carr v. Living, 28 Beav. 644; Bird v. Maybury,

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purposes of the testator. For example, when a trustee is ordered to pay certain moneys, but no property is given him with which to make the payments, or when executors are ordered to sell the real estate, or the real estate is charged with the payment of the testator's debts,—in these and similar cases a trust, or a power in trust, may be inferred, in order that the trustee or executor may carry the directions into effect.^{1 a}

33 Beav. 351; Hora v. Hora, 33 Beav. 88; Wilson v. Maddison, 2 Younge & C. Ch. 372; Longmore v. Elcum, 2 Younge & C. Ch. 363, 370; Staniland v. Staniland, 34 Beav. 536. Sometimes the language shows that it was not the testator's intention for the parent to take any interest for himself; e.g., a gift to A to dispose of among his children: Blakeney v. Blakeney, 6 Sim. 52; or a gift to A to enable him to maintain his children until they become of age: Wetherell v. Wilson, 1 Keen, 80. A gift to A, to be disposed of for the benefit of kimself and his children, has been construed so that the parent took a life estate with a *power* of disposition in favor of his children, which would be a power in trust: Armstrong v. Armstrong, L. R. 7 Eq. 518; Crockett v. Crockett, 2 Phill. Ch. 553; Costabadie v. Costabadie, 6 Hare, 410; Gully v. Cregoe, 24 Beav. 185; Jeffery v. De Vitre, 24 Beav. 276; Shovelton v. Shovelton, 32 Beav. 142; but see Lambe v. Eames, L. R. 6 Ch. 597. As to a bequest to A, with a direction that B should reside with and be maintained by A, see Wilson v. Bell, L. R. 4 Ch. 581. On the other hand, the language may show no intention to create a trust, and may simply state the motive for the gift. Thus the bequest was held to be absolute in the following cases: A bequest to A, to enable him the better to provide for his children: Brown v. Cassamajor, 4 Ves. 498; a bequest to A, to enable him to assist his children: Benson v. Whittam, 5 Sim. 22; a legacy to A, to maintain and bring up B; Biddles v. Biddles, 16 Sim. 1; Jones v. Greatwood, 16 Beav. 527; but see Wheeler v. Smith, 1 Giff. 300. It must be conceded that the cases upon the subject of maintenance are very confused, and even contradictory.b

§ 1013, 1 Pitt v. Pelham, 2 Freem. 134; 1 Ch. Rep. 283; Tenant v. Brown, 1 Cas. Ch. 180; Blatch v. Wilder, 1 Atk. 420; Cook v. Fountain, 3 Swanst. 585; Hoxie v. Hoxie, 7 Paige, 187; Walker v. Whiting, 23 Pick: 313; Fay v. Taft, 12 Cnsh. 448; Watson v. Mayrant, 1 Rich. Eq. 449; Withers v. Leadon, 1 Rich. Eq. 324; Baker v. Red, 4 Dana, 158.

§ 1012, (b) See, also, Henry v. Strong, 39 Ch. Div. 443 (beneficiaries under a discretionary trust for maintenance have no assignable interest except such as the trustees, in their discretion, may allow them).

§ 1013, (a) These instances should be distinguished from the case of a § 1014. 4. Precatory Words.^a—The most common and important species of trusts by inference are those which arise where a testator has given property to a devisee or legatee, and has accompanied his gift with *precatory* words or phrases, implying his desire or wish that the property should be used for the benefit of some designated person or persons, or should be applied to some designated purpose.¹ Words expressing direction, recommendation, en-

§ 1014, 1 In Knight v. Knight, 3 Beav. 148, 172–174, 11 Clark & F. 513, Lord Langdale explained this doctrine in the following manner: "As a general rule, it has been laid down that when property is given absolutely to any person, and the same person is, by the giver who has power to command, recommended, or entreated, or wished to dispose of that property in favor of another, the recommendation, or entreaty, or wish shall be held to create a trust: 1. If the words are so used that, upon the whole, they ought to be construed as imperative; 2. If the subject of the recommendation or wish he certain; and 3. If the objects or persons intended to have the benefit of the recommendation or wish he also certain. In simple cases there is no difficulty in the application of the rule thus stated. If a testator gives one thousand pounds to A B, desiring, wishing, recommending, or hoping that A B will, at his death, give the same sum, or any certain part of it, to C D, it is considered that C D is an object of the testator's bounty, and A B is a trustee for him. No question arises upon the intention of the testator, upon the sum or subject intended to be given, or upon the person or object of the wish. So if a testator gives the residue of his estate, after certain purposes are answered, to A B, recommending A B, after his death, to give it to his own relations, or such of his own relations as he shall think most deserving, or as he shall choose, it has been considered that the residue of the property -though a subject to be ascertained-and that the relations to be selected -though persons or objects to be ascertained-are nevertheless so clearly and certainly ascertainable-so capable of being made certain-that the rule is applicable to such cases. On the other hand, if the giver accompanies his expression of wish or request by other words, from which it is

power of sale not discretionary, implying no special confidence in the executor; such power belongs to the office of executor, and may be exercised by an administrator with the will annexed: See Mott v. Ackerman, 92 N. Y. 539. See, also, Haywood v. Wachovia Loan & Trust Co., 149 N. C. 208, 62 S. E. 915.

§ 1014, (a) Sections 1014-1017 are cited in McDuffie v. Montgomery, 128 Fed. 105, and in Floyd v. Smith, 59 Fla. 485, 138 Am. St. Rep. 133, 21 Ann. Cas. 318, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 651, 51 South. 537. treaty, confidence, hope, expectation, desire, wish, request, and the like, are included under the denomination "precatory." As a most general statement of the rule, if such

to be collected that he did not intend the wish to be imperative; or if it appears from the context that the first taker was intended to have a discretionary power to withdraw any part of the subject from the object of the wish or request; or if the objects are not such as may be ascertained with sufficient certainty,-then it has been held that no trust has been Thus the words 'free and unfettered,' accompanying the strongest created. expressions of request, were held to prevent the words of request from being imperative. Any words by which it is expressed, or from which it may be implied, that the first taker may apply any part of the subject to his own use, are held to prevent the subject of the gift from being considered certain; and a vague description of the object-that is, a description by which the giver neither clearly defines the object himself, nor names a distinct class out of which the first taker is to select, or which leaves it doubtful what interest the object or class of objects is to takewill prevent the objects from being certain within the meaning of the rule; and in such cases we are told that the question 'never turns upon the grammatical import of the words,-they may be imperative, but not necessarily so; the subject-matter, the situation of the parties, and the probable intent must be considered': Meggison v. Moore, 2 Ves. 632, 633. And 'wherever the subject to be administered as trust property, and the objects for whose benefit it is to be administered, are to be found in a will not expressly creating a trust, the indefinite nature and quantum of the subject, and the indefinite nature of the objects, are always used by the court as evidence that the mind of the testator was not to create a trust; and the difficulty that would be imposed upon the court to say what should be so applied, or to what objects, has been the foundation of the argument that no trust was intended': Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. 535, 536; or, as Lord Eldon expresses it in another case, 'where a trust is to be raised characterized by certainty, the very difficulty of doing it is an argument which goes, to a certain extent, towards inducing the court to say it is not sufficiently clear what the testator intended': Wright v. Atkyns, Turn. & R. 157, 159." In this case a testator devised his estates to his heir at law,-a brother,-and added: "I trust to the liberality of my successors to reward any others of my old servants, and to their justice in continuing the estates in the male succession, according to the will of the founder of the family, my above-named grandfather." Held, that no trust was created; the devisee took the estate absolutely unfettered by any trust in favor of the male line. One of the most recent decisions in which the subject was carefully considered is Foose v. Whitmore, 82 N. Y. 405, 37 Am. Rep. 572. Testator said: "I do give and bequeath all my property

words are strong enough to indicate the intention, and this intention is not defeated by other provisions of the will,

to my beloved wife, only requesting her at the close of her life to make such disposition of the same among my children and grandchildren as shall seem to her good." Danforth, J., said (p. 406): "The tendency of modern decisions is not to extend the rule or practice which from words of doubtful meaning deduces or implies a trust: Lambe v. Eames, L. R. 10 Eq. 267; In re Hutchinson and Tenant, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 540. When this doctrine was applied, the object sought for was the intention of the testator, and for this the context of the will was looked at, first, to ascertain his wishes, if any were expressed, and next, to see whether he intended to impose an obligation on his legatee to carry them into effect, or having expressed his wishes, he intended to leave it to the legatee to act on them or not, in his discretion. Cases illustrating both divisions of this inquiry are collected by various text-writers. They are, however, subject to the rule stated by Lord Cranworth in Williams v. Williams, 1 Sim., N. S., 358, 36S, that 'the real question always is, whether the wish or desire or recommendation that is expressed by the testator is meant to govern the conduct of the party to whom it is addressed, or whether it is merely an indication of that which he thinks would be a reasonable exercise of the discretion of the party, leaving it, however, to the party to exercise his own discretion." Mr. Justice Danforth then cites Bernard v. Minshull, Johns. 276, Howarth v. Dewell, 6 Jur., N. S., 1360, and In re Hutchinson and Tenant, supra, and reaches the conclusion that the words used were not sufficient to show an intention on the part of the testator to create any trust.b

§ 1014, (b) The case of Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 32 L. Ed. 138, 8 Sup. Ct. 1164, illustrates the rule that a trust sought to be inferred from precatory words is not necessarily defeated by reason of uncertainty as to the form and extent of the provision intended, and because it involves the exercise of discretionary power on the part of the trustee. Mr. Justice Matthews says (pp. 319, 320): "We have seen that whatever discretion is given by the will to the testator's widow does not affect the existence of the trust. That discretion does not involve the right to choose whether a provision shall be made or not; nor is there anything personal or arbitrary implied in it. It is to be the exercise of judgment directed to the care and protection of the beneficiaries by making such a provision as will best secure that end. There is nothing in this left so vague and indefinite that it cannot, by the usual processes of the law, be reduced to certainty. Courts of common law constantly determine the reasonable value of property sold, where there is no agreement as to price, and the judge and jury are frequently called upon to adjudge what are necessaries for an infant, or reasonable maintenance for a deserted wife. The principles of equity and the machinery of its courts are still better adapted to its inquiries."

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the court infers that the property was given on trust for the person or object indicated, and will enforce such trust, according to its nature, as a similar trust declared in express terms would be enforced.²

§ 1014, 2 The following are some of the English cases showing what precatory words have or have not been held to create a trust: Words which have been held sufficient: "In full confidence": Le Marchant v. Le Marchant, L. R. 18 Eq. 414; Curnick v. Tucker, L. R. 17 Eq. 320; "well knowing": Briggs v. Penny, 3 Macn. & G. 546; "directs": White v. Briggs, 2 Phill. Ch. 583; "confides," "trusts and confides": Palmer v. Simmonds, 2 Drew. 221, 225; Griffiths v. Evan, 5 Beav. 241; Macnab v. Whitbread, 17 Beav. 299; "hopes," "doubts not," "recommends": Paul v. Compton, 8 Ves. 375, 380; Tibbits v. Tibbits, 19 Ves. 656; Malim v. Keighley, 2 Ves. 333, 335; Hart v. Tribe, 18 Beav. 215; but see Meggison v. Moore, 2 Ves. 630; "entreats": Prevost v. Clarke, 2 Madd. 458; "desires," "wills and desires": Stead v. Mellor, L. R. 5 Cb. Div. 225; Birch v. Wade, 3 Ves. & B. 198; Bonser v. Kinnear, 2 Giff. 195; "requests," "wishes and requests": Foley v. Parry, 2 Mylne & K. 138; Bernard v. Minshull, Johns. 276; "requires and entreats": Taylor v. George, 2 Ves. & B. 378; "I direct" that A "shall reside with and be maintained by" B: Wilson v. Bell, L. R. 4 Ch. 581. Settlement made after marriage in pursuance of a declaration of wish sustained: Teasdale v. Braithwaite, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 630; and see Irvine v. Sullivan, L. R. 8 Eq. 673. Words held not sufficient: "My wish": Parnall v. Parnall, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 96; "to do justice" to testator's "relations": In re Bond, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 238; "hoping," "fullest confidence": Eaton v. Watts, L. R. 4 Eq. 151; proceeds to be applied in maintaining children: Mackett v. Mackett, L. R. 14 Eq. 49; "may dispose of . . . for the good of their families": Alexander v. Alexander, 6 De Gex, M. & G. 593; and generally, where the intention appears from express terms or from the whole disposition that the devisee or legatee is to take absolutely, the addition of precatory words, even though standing alone they might create a trust, will not cut down the absolute gift; their fnlfillment is left to the donee's own discretion: Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. 542; Wood v. Cox, 2 Mylne & C. 684; a gift "absolutely," to dispose of, etc., testator having "full confidence," etc.: In re Hutchinson and Tenant, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 540; "to be at her disposal," "for the benefit of herself and family": Lambe v. Eames, L. R. 10 Eq. 267; 6 Ch. 597; a gift to A, "for his own use, benefit, and disposal absolutely," nevertheless "conjuring," or "desiring," or "recommending" bim to make some particular disposition: Winch v. Brutton, 14 Sim. 379; Johnston v. Rowlands, 2 De

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§ 1015. Modern Tendency to Restrict the Doctrine.—I shall not attempt any analysis and classification of the cases for the purpose of formulating more specific rules. This has been done, as far as practicable, in the various treatises upon trusts. The decisions are numerous and conflicting. Judges have for some time past shown a decided leaning against the doctrine of precatory trusts, and a strong tendency to restrict its operation within reasonable and somewhat narrow bounds; many of the earlier decisions would certainly not be followed at the present day. The courts of this country have generally adopted the doctrine substantially as settled in England, although perhaps with some caution and reserve, and they all exhibit the modern

Gex & S. 356; Webb v. Wools, 2 Sim., N. S., 267; Abraham v. Alman, 1 Russ. 509; Reeves v. Baker, 18 Beav. 372.^e

The following are among the most important English cases not mentioned in the foregoing abstract: Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469; Pierson v. Garnet, 2 Brown Ch. 38, 226; Harland v. Trigg, 1 Brown Ch. 142; Cunliffe v. Cunliffe, Amb. 686; Bland v. Bland, 2 Cox, 349; Horwood v. West, 1 Sim. & St. 387; Cary v. Cary, 2 Schoales & L. 173, 189; Shaw v. Lawless, 1 Lloyd & G. 558; 5 Clark & F. 129; Wright v. Atkyns, Turn. & R. 143, 157; 17 Ves. 255; 19 Ves. 299; Cruwys v. Colman, 9 Ves. 319, 322; Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. 521, 535; Paul v. Compton, 8 Ves. 375, 380; Knott v. Cottee, 2 Phill. Ch. 192; Hinxman v. Poynder, 5 Sim. 546; Sale v. Moore, 1 Sim. 534; Eade v. Eade, 5 Madd. 118; Curtis v. Rippon, 5 Madd. 434; Wood v. Cox, 1 Keen, 317.

§ 1014, (c) The recent English decisions reject Malim v. Keighley, supra, and accept Lambe v. Eames, L. R. 10 Eq. 267, supra, and In re Hutchinson and Tenant, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 540, supra, as illustrating the proper view: See In re Hamilton, [1895] 2 Ch. 373; In re Williams, [1897] 2 Ch. 12; see, also, as examples: "Feeling confident that she will act justly by our children in dividing" the property, "when no longer required by her": Mussoorie Bank v. Raynor, 7 App. Cas. (Priv. III-142

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Conn.) 321; devise to wife absolutely, "in full confidence that she will do what is right as to the disposal thereof between my children": In re Adams Vestry, 24 Ch. Div. 199; 27 Ch. Div. 394; "it is my desire that she allow": Gregory v. Edmondson, 39 Ch. Div. 253; In re Hanbury, [1904] 1 Ch. 415 ("in full confidence that"); In re Oldfield, [1904] 1 Ch. 549. Compare In re Concolly (Concolly v. Concolly), [1910] 1 Ch. 219, with In re Burley (Alexander v. Burley), [1910] 1 Ch. 215. tendency to limit rather than enlarge its scope; while in a few of the states the doctrine has been accepted with great reluctance, and only to a partial extent and in a modified form.^{1 a}

§ 1015, 1 Dresser v. Dresser, 46 Me. 48; Cole v. Littlefield, 35 Me. 439; Erickson v. Willard, 1 N. H. 217; Van Amee v. Jackson, 35 Vt. 173; Warner v. Bates, 98 Mass. 274, 277; Spooner v. Lovejoy, 108 Mass. 529, 533; Chase v. Chase, 2 Allen, 101; Homer v. Shelton, 2 Met. 194, 206; Whipple v. Adams, 1 Met. 444; Foose v. Whitmore, 82 N. Y. 405, 37 Am. Rep. 572; Smith v. Bowen, 35 N. Y. 83; Dominick v. Sayre, 3 Sand. 555; Parsons v. Best, 1 Thomp. & C. 211; Arcularius v. Geisenhainer, 3 Bradf. 64, 75; Van Duyne v. Van Duyne, 14 N. J. Eq. 397; Ward v. Peloubet, 10 N. J. Eq. 304; Williams v. Worthington, 49 Md. 572, 33 Am. Rep. 286; Tolson v. Tolson, 10 Gill & J. 159; Harrison v. Harrison's Adm'x. 2 Gratt. 1, 44 Am. Dec. 365; Crump v. Redd's Adm'r, 6 Gratt. 372; Reid's Adm'r v. Blackstone, 14 Gratt. 363; Rhett v. Mason's Ex'r, 18 Gratt. 541; Cook v. Ellington, 6 Jones Eq. 371; Carson v. Carson, 1 Ired. Eq. 329; Young v. Young, 68 N. C. 309; Lesesne v. Witte, 5 S. C. 450; Hunter v. Stembridge, 12 Ga. 192; Ingram v. Fraley, 29 Ga. 553; Lines v. Darden, 5 Fla. 51; McRee's Adm'rs v. Means, 34 Ala. 349; Ellis v. Ellis's Adm'rs.

§1015, (a) The text is quoted in Jennings v. Talbert, 77 S. C. 454, 58 S. E. 420. This paragraph is cited in Burnes v. Burnes, 137 Fed. 781, 70 C. C. A. 357, affirming 132 Fed. 485; Hayes v. Franklin, 141 N. C. 599, 54 S. E. 432; Carter v. Strickland, 165 N. C. 69, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 416, 80 S. E. 961. See, also, Rowland v. Rowland, 29 S. C. 54, 6 S. E. 902; Howze v. Barber, 29 S. C. 466, 7 S. E. 817; Hoxsey v. Hoxsey, 37 N. J. Eq. 46; Corby v. Corby, 85 Mo. 371; Randall v. Randall, 135 Ill. 398, 25 Am. St. Rep. 373, 25 N. E. 780; Orth v. Orth, 145 Ind. 184, 57 Am. St. Rep. 185, 32 L. R. A. 298, 42 N. E. 277, 44 N. E. 17; Seamonds v. Hodge, 36 W. Va. 304, 32 Am. St. Rep. 854, 15 S. E. 156; Foster v. Willson, 68 N. H. 241, 73 Am. St. Rep. 581, 38 Atl. 1003 (recognizing the trust); see Murphy v. Carlin, 113 Mo. 112, 35 Am. St. Rep. 699,

20 S. W. 786, which does not seem to be in full accord with the recent cases criticising the doctrine; see, also, citing the text, Curd v. Field, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 2016, 45 S. W. 92. On the general doctrine, see the following recent cases: In re Purcell's Estate, 167 Cal. 176, 138 Pac. 704 (no trust unless it appear that tes-_ tator intended to impose an imperative obligation and exclude any discretion); Floyd v. Smith, 59 Fla. 485, 138 Am. St. Rep. 133, 21 Ann. Cas. 318, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 651, 51 South. 537, citing the text (no trust); Eikman (Geisel's Estate) v. Landwehr, 43 Ind. App. 724, 88 N. E. 105; Wood v. Wood, 127 Ky. 514, 106 S. W. 226; Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155 Mich. 126, 130 Am. St. Rep. 568, 118 N. W. 938; Smullin v. Wharton, 73 Neb. 667, 103 N. W. 288, 106 N. W. 577, 112 N. W. 622, 113 N. W. 267.

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§ 1016. What Intention Necessary-The General Criterion.^a—Whether or not a trust has been created in any particular case is entirely a question of interpretation and construction. The intention must be sought for not only in the precatory words themselves, but also in the terms and qualifications of the gift, the powers of disposition or enjoyment conferred upon the first taker, the nature of the property, the description of the supposed beneficiaries, and all the other context. Precatory words may be used which, standing alone, would, under the decisions, create a trust; but they may be qualified and controlled by other expressions showing that the gift is absolute, and that everything is left to the discretion of the devisee or legatee. Each case must therefore turn upon its own circumstances, and not a little upon the sentiments and prepossessions of individual judges. With respect to the essential elements which must exist in every precatory trust, it is impossible

15 Ala. 296, 50 Am. Dec. 132; Lucas v. Lockhart, 10 Smedes & M. 466, 48 Am. Dec. 766; Cockrill v. Armstrong, 31 Ark. 580; Collins v. Carlisle, 7 B. Mon. 13; Hunt v. Hunt, 11 Nev. 442. In Connecticut and Pennsylvania the doctrine has been accepted with great reserve and caution, and under considerable limitations:^b See Harper v. Phelps, 21 Conn. 257; Gilbert v. Chapin, 19 Conn. 342; Bull v. Bull, 8 Conn. 47, 20 Am. Dec. 86; Coates's Appeal, 2 Pa. St. 129; Pennock's Estate, 20 Pa. St. 268, 59 Am. Dec. 718; Walker v. Hall, 34 Pa. St. 483; Kinter v. Jenks, 43 Pa. St. 445; Jauretche v. Proctor, 48 Pa. St. 466; Second Church v. Disbrow, 52 Pa. St. 219; Burt v. Herron, 66 Pa. St. 400; Paisley's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 153; Biddle's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 258.

§ 1015, (b) See Bowlby v. Thunder, 105 Pa. St. 173; Hopkins v. Glunt, 111 Pa. St. 290, 2 Atl. 183; Dexter v. Evans, 63 Conn. 58, 38 Am. St. Rep. 336, 27 Atl. 308; but see the later Pennsylvania cases of Good v. Fichthorn, 144 Pa. St. 287, 27 Am. St. Rep. 630, 22 Atl. 1032; Boyle v. Boyle, 152 Pa. St. 108, 34 Am. St. Rep. 629, 25 Atl. 494. See, further, In re Stinson's Estate, 232 Pa. 218, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 504, 81 Atl. 207; Miller v. Stubbs, 244 Pa. 482, 90 Atl. 1132 (no. trust); Hughes v. Fitzgerald, 78 Conn. 4, 60 Atl. 694 (no trust); Plaut v. Plaut, 80 Conn. 673, 70 Atl. 52 (trust).

§ 1016, (a) This section is cited generally in McMonagle v. McGlinn, 85 Fed. 88; Patrick v. Patrick, 135 Ky. 307, 122 S. W. 159 (words held imperative); Hayes v. Franklin, 141 N. C. 599, 54 S. E. 432; Carter v. Strickland, 165 N. C. 69, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 416, 80 S. E. 961. to add anything to the clear and accurate statement of Lord Langdale, in the case of Knight v. Knight, already quoted. Those essentials are the imperative nature and meaning of the precatory words, the certainty of the subject-matter or property embraced in the trust, and the certainty of the objects or intended beneficiaries. Upon the authority of the more modern decisions, the whole doctrine may be summed up in a single proposition: In order that a trust may arise from the use of precatory words, the court must be satisfied from the words themselves, taken in connection with all the other terms of the disposition, that the testator's intention to create an express trust was as full, complete, settled, and sure as though he had given the property to hold upon a trust declared in express terms in the ordinary manner. Unless a gift to A, with precatory words in favor of B, is in fact equivalent in its meaning, intention, and effect to a gift to A, "in trust for B," then certainly no trust should be inferred. The early decisions proceeded perhaps upon a more artificial rule, and saw an intention in the use of words of wish, desire, and the like, where no such intention really existed. The modern decisions have adopted a more just and reasonable rule, and require the intention to exist as a fact, and to be expressed in unequivocal language. No other conclusion can be reconciled with the general principles of construction which are based upon reason and universal experience.^{1 b} It has

§ 1016, 1 The following cases are given more as examples of the essential requisites, and as illustrations of the conclusion reached in the text: *Imperative nature of the words*:^c Stead v. Mellor, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 225.

§ 1016, (b) The text is quoted in Burnes v. Burnes, 137 Fed. 781, 70 C. C. A. 357, affirming 132 Fed. 485; in Wood v. Wood, 127 Ky. 514, 106 S. W. 226; in Jennings v. Talbert, 77 S. C. 454, 58 S. E. 420.

§ 1016, (c) This note is cited in Tilden v. Green, 130 N. Y. 29, 27 Am. St. Rep. 487, 14 L. R. A. 33, 28 N. E. 880. Words held not sufficient: "Rely upon my daughter" to make provision: In re Mitchell's Estate, 160 Cal. 618, 117 Pac. 774; "desire and direct": Plaut v. Plaut, 80 Conn. 673, 70 Atl. 52; "without reserve, for her to do as she thinks best": Wood v. Owen, 133 Ga. 751, 66 S. E. 951; "to divide as he thinks best," void: Fitzsimmons v. Harmon, 108 Me. 456, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 400, and

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HOW EXPRESS TRUSTS ARE CREATED.

sometimes been stated as a general rule that a *prima facie* presumption of an intention to create a trust arises from the use of precatory words. Whatever may have been true

The opinion of Jessel, M. R., in this case shows very clearly the positions occupied by modern authorities, and fully sustains the correctness of the criterion laid down above in the text. The will gave the residue to A and B, "my desire being that they shall distribute such residue as they think will he most agreeable to my wishes." Held, that A and B took the residue absolutely. Sir George Jessel said, among other things (p. 228): "Unless I find in the will something equivalent to a declaration that the? residuary legatees take as trustees, I must hold that they take a beneficial interest": Briggs v. Penny, 3 Macn. & G. 546, 554, 556, per Lord Truro: Williams v. Williams, 1 Sim., N. S., 358, 368; Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. 542, 550, 553; Bardswell v. Bardswell, 9 Sim. 319; Knott v. Cottee, 2 Phill. Ch. 192; Lechmere v. Lavie, 2 Mylne & K. 197; Hood v. Oglander, 34 Beav. 513; Scott v. Key, 35 Beav. 201; Shovelton v. Shovelton, 32

note, 81 Atl. 667; "wish and desire": Holmes v. Dalley, 192 Mass. 451, 78 N. E. 513; "wish and expectation": Russell v. United States Trust Co., 136 Fed. 758, 69 C. C. A. 410, affirming 127 Fed. 445; "enjoin": Lawrence v. Cooke, 104 N. Y. 632, 41 N. E. 144. See, also, Bacon v. Ransom, 139 Mass. 117, 29 N. E. 473; Rose v. Porter, 141 Mass. 309, 5 N. E. 641; Sturgis v. Paine, 146 Mass. 354, 16 N. E. 21; Bowlby v. Thunder, 105 Pa. St. 173; Hopkins v. Glunt, 111 Pa. St. 290, 2 Atl. 183; Giles v. Anslow, 128 Ill. 187, 21 N. E. 225; In re Whitcomb, 86 Cal. 265, 24 Pac. 1028; McDuffie v. Montgomery, 128 Fed. 105; Kaufman v. Gries, 141 Cal. 295, 74 Pac. 846; Clark v. Clark, (Md.) 58 Atl. 24. Words held sufficient: "Recommend," "request": Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 28 L. Ed. 420, 8 Sup. Ct. 1164; "If she find it convenient, . . . I wish it to be done": Phillips v. Phillips, 112 N. Y. 197, 8 Am. St. Rep. 737, 19 N. E. 411; "desire": Riker v. Leo, 115 N. Y. 93, 21 N. E. 719; "request": Eddy v. Hartshorne,. 34 N. J. Eq. 420; "I desire": In re Browne's Estate, 175 Cal. 361, 165 Pac. 960; "it is my desire": In re Buhrmeister's Estate, 1 Cal. App. 80, 81 Pac. 752, "desire and request": Deacon v. Cobson, 83 N. J. Eq. 122, 89 Atl. 1029; "would like": In re Stinson's Estate, 232 Pa. 218, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 504, 81 Atl. 207; "one simple request": Seefried v. Clarke, 113 Va. 365, 74 S. E. 204. See, also, Low v. Low, 77 Me. 171; Maught v. Getzendanner, 65 Md. 527, 57 Am. Rep. 352, 5 Atl. 471; Haight v. Royce, 274 Ill. 162, 113 N. E. 71; Pierce v. Pierce, 114 Me. 311, 96 Atl. 143; Long v. Willsey (In re Miller's Estate), 132 Minn. 316, 156 N. W. 349; Rector v. Olcorn, 88 Miss. 788, 41 South. 370; In re Mc-Veigh's Estate, 181 Mo. App. 566, 164 S. W. 673; Carter v. Strickland, 165 N. C. 69, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 416, 80 S. E. 961; Wolbert v. Beard, 128 Wis. 391, 107 N. W. 663; Russell v. U. S. Trust Co., 127 Fed. 445.

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of the earlier cases, the modern authorities do not, in my opinion, sustain any such rule; it is contrary to their whole scope and tenor.

Beav. 143; Liddard v. Liddard, 28 Beav. 266; Eaton v. Watts, L. R. 4 Eq. 151; Foose v. Whitmore, 82 N. Y. 405, 37 Am. Rep. 572; Cockrill v. Armstrong, 31 Ark. 580; Hunt v. Hunt, 11 Nev. 442; Biddle's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 258; Van Amee v. Jackson, 35 Vt. 173, 177. Certainty of subject-matter or property:^d Buggins v. Yates, 9 Mod. 122; Curtis v. Rippon, 5 Madd. 434; Pope v. Pope, 10 Sim. 1; Bardswell v. Bardswell, 9 Sim. 319; Winch v. Brutton, 14 Sim. 379; Cowman v. Harrison, 10 Hare, 234; Russell v. Jackson, 10 Hare, 204, 213; Lechmere v. Lavie. 2 Mylne & K. 197; Palmer v. Simmonds, 2 Drew. 221; Fox v. Fox, 27 Beav. 301; Constable v. Bull, 3 De Gex & S. 411; Williams v. Worthington, 49 Md. 572, 33 Am. Rep. 286; Tolson v. Tolson, 10 Gill & J. 159; Ingram v. Fraley, 29 Ga. 553. Certainty of object, the persons, and the way in which the property is to go:" Green v. Marsden, 1 Drew. 646; White v. Briggs, 2 Phill. Ch. 583; Sale v. Moore, 1 Sim. 534; Malim v. Keighley, 2 Ves. 333, 335; Briggs v. Penny, 3 Macn. & G. 546. With respect to the doctrine in all of its phases, see Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1833, 1834-1848, 1857-1866.

Notwithstanding the imposing line of authorities, there has always been a strong dissent from the doctrine from judges of the highest ability, who have described it as artificial, and its effect as violating the intention of parties. The following are a few examples: In Sale v. Moore, 1 Sim. 534, 540, Sir Anthony Hart, V. C., said: "The first case that construed words of recommendation into a command made a will for the testator; for every one knows the distinction between them." In Wright v. Atkyns, 1 Ves. & B. 313, 315, Lord Eldon said: "This sort of trust is generally a surprise on the intention, but it is too late to correct that." In the important case of Meredith v. Heneage, 1 Sim. 542, 551, before the house of lords, Chief Baron Richards said, speaking of prior decisions: "I entertain a strong doubt whether, in many or perhaps in most of the cases,

§ 1016, (d) Mussoorie Bank v. Raynor, 7 App. Cas. (Priv. Coun.) 321; Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 319, 320, 28 L. Ed. 420, 8 Sup. Ct. 1164; Knox v. Knox, 59 Wis. 172, 48 Am. Rep. 487, 18 N. W. 155; Noe v. Kern, 93 Mo. 367, 3 Am. St. Rep. 544, 6 S. W. 239.

§ 1016, (e) Handley v. Wrightson, 60 Md. 198; Knox v. Knox, 59 Wis. 172, 48 Am. Rep. 487, 18 N. W. 155; Noe v. Kern, 93 Mo. 367, 3 Am. St. Rep. 544, 6 S. W. 239. The case of Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 317, 28 L. Ed. 420, 8 Sup. Ct. 1164, well illustrates the manner in which the intention of the testator may be inferred from The situation of the testator at the time he framed the provisions of the will, from his relation to the beneficiaries, and the like.

§ 1017. Objections to the Doctrine,-The doctrine of precatory trusts has never met with unanimous approval. Able judges have dissented from it on principle, have pronounced it artificial, and have described it as violating instead of carrying out the intent of parties; and undoubtedly most of the earlier decisions were open to this criticism. It does seem strange that a testator, having a full and settled intention to create a trust, should adopt a mode which at best seems to be a mere suggestion or possible inference, and should not employ the familiar method of creating a trust by express declaration.¹ On the other hand, to abrogate the doctrine altogether would be introducing a rule wholly arbitrary and technical, since it would be saying, in fact, that trusts shall not be created except by means of a certain, fixed, and technical formula or manner of expression. Justice will be done, therefore, if the doctrine is placed upon reasonable grounds, its operation confined within narrow limits, and regulated by the criterion stated in the preceding paragraph.

the construction was not adverse to the real intention of the testator. It seems to me very singular that a person who really meant to impose the obligation established by the cases should use a course so circuitous, and a language so inappropriate and obscure, to express what might have been conveyed in the clearest and most usual terms,--terms the most familiar to the testator himself, and to the professional or other person who might prepare his will. In considering these cases, it has always occurred to me that if I had myself made such a will as has generally been considered imperative, I should never have intended it to be imperative; but on the contrary, a mere intimation of my wish that the person to whom I had given my property should, if he pleased, prefer those whom I proposed to him, and who, next to him, were at the time the principal objects of my regard." He also says that the question in such cases "is purely a matter of intention, to be collected from the words of the instrument. as in all other cases of wills." The foregoing language of this learned judge should, as it seems to me, he present to the minds of all courts, when passing upon cases of precatory trusts, as a proper and reasonable guide in rendering a decision.

§ 1017, 1 See quotations in the latter portion of the last preceding note.

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SECTION IV.

PUBLIC OR CHARITABLE TRUSTS.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1018. General description.
- § 1019. A public, not a private, benefaction requisite.
- § 1020. What are charitable uses and purposes: "Statute of charitable uses."
- §§ 1021-1024. Classes of charitable uses.
 - § 1021. 1. Religious purposes.
 - § 1022. 2. Benevolent purposes.
 - § 1023. 3. Educational purposes.
 - § 1024. 4. Other public purposes.
 - § 1025. Creation of the trust: certainty or uncertainty of the object and of the beneficiaries.
 - § 1026. Certainty or uncertainty of the trustees.
 - § 1027. The doctrine of cy-pres.
 - § 1028. Origin and extent of the equitable jurisdiction.
 - § 1029. Charitable trusts in the United States.

§ 1018. General Description.^a—In express private trusts there is not only a certain trustee who holds the legal estate, but there is a certain specified *cestui que trust* clearly identified or made capable of identification by the terms of the instrument creating the trust.^b It is an essential feature of public or charitable trusts that the beneficiaries are uncertain,—a class of persons described in some general language, often fluctuating, changing in their individual numbers, and partaking of a *quasi* public character.^c The

§ 1018, (a) The text, §§ 1018-1023, is cited in Field v. Drew Theological Seminary, 41 Fed. 371; §§ 1018-1029, cited in Lane v. Eaton, 69 Minn. 141, 65 Am. St. Rep. 559, 38 L. R. A. 669, 71 N. W. 1031; §§ 1018-1020 cited in In re Stewart's Estate, 26 Wash. 32, 66 Pac. 148, 67 Pac. 723. This section is cited in Hunt v. Fowler, 121 Ill. 269, 12 N. E. 331, 17 N. E. 491; Pennoyer v. Wadhams, 20 Or. 274, 11 L. R. A. 211, 25 Pac. 720. § 1018, (b) The text is quoted in Bauer v. Myers, (Kan.) 244 Fed. 902, 157 C. C. A. 252; Lear v. Mausen, 114 Me. 342, 96 Atl. 240 (trust for such person as should take care of testator in his last illness is not a public trust).

§ 1018, (c) The text is cited to this effect in In re Nilson's Estate, 81 Neb. 809, 116 N. W. 971; and quoted in Bauer v. Myers, 244 Fed. 902, 157 C. C. A. 252. most patent examples are "the poor" of a certain district, in a trust of a benevolent nature, or "the children" of a certain town, in a trust for educational purposes. In such a case it is evident that all the beneficiaries can never unite to enforce the trust; for even if all those in existence at any given time could unite, they could not include nor bind their successors. It is a settled doctrine in England and in many of the American states that personal property and real property, except when prohibited by statutes, may be conveyed or bequeathed in trust, upon charitable uses and purposes, for the benefit of such uncertain classes or portions of the public, and that if the purposes are charitable, within the meaning given to that term, a court of equity will enforce the trust. Furthermore, it is one of the most important and distinctive features of charitable trusts that however long the period may be during which they are to last, even though it be absolutely unlimited in its duration, they are not subject to nor controlled by the established doctrines, nor even the statutes which prohibit perpetuities. Indeed, it may be said that the full conception of a charitable trust includes the notion that it is or may be perpetual.^{1 d}

§ 1019. A Public, and not Private, Benefaction Requisite. In order that a trust may be charitable, the gift must be for the benefit of such an indefinite *class* of persons that the charity is really a public, and not a mere private, benefaction.^a On the other hand, in a public trust the designation of the charitable use and of the beneficiaries must be

§ 1018, ¹ The subject of charitable trusts in particular is so broad, and involves so many special rules and applications, that I shall attempt no more than to give an outline of its more general doctrines, and must refer the reader to treatises upon trusts for a detailed exposition; a proper treatment would require a volume by itself.

§ 1018, (d) The text is cited to
this effect in MacKenzie v. Trustees
of Presbytery of Jersey City, 67Bauer v. Myers,
C. C. A. 252.of Presbytery of Jersey City, 67§ 1019, (a) The
Matter of Shattu
227, 61 Atl. 1027; and quoted inMatter of Shattu
86 N. E. 455.

Bauer v. Myers, 244 Fed. 902, 157 C. C. A. 252.

§ 1019, (a) The text is quoted in Matter of Shattuck, 193 N. Y. 446, 86 N. E. 455. sufficiently certain and descriptive to indicate the intention of the donor; the language must not be so general and vague as to leave both the beneficiaries and the purposes and objects completely to the judgment and choice of the trustee or of the court.¹

§ 1019, 1 Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399, 405; 10 Ves. 522, 541; Mitford v. Reynolds, 1 Phill. Ch. 185; Att'y-Gen. v. Aspinall, 2 - Mylne & C. 613, 622, 623; British Musenm v. White, 2 Sim. & St. 594, 596; Nash v. Morley, 5 Beav. 177; Kendall v. Granger, 5 Beav. 300; Townsend v. Carus, 3 Hare, 257; Nightingale v. Goulburn, 5 Hare, 484; Whicker v. Hume, 14 Beav. 509; 1 De Gex, M. & G. 506; 7 H. L. Cas. 124; Miller v. Rowan, 5 Clarke & F. 99; Williams v. Kershaw, 5 Clarke & F. 111, note; Cocks v. Manners, L. R. 12 Eq. 574; Beaumont v. Oliveira, L. R. 6 Eq. 534; 4 Ch. 309, 314 (scientific purposes); President of the United States v. Drummond, cited 7 H. L. Cas. 155; Dolan v. Macdermot, L. R. 5 Eq. 60; 3 Ch. 676 (for "such charities and other public purposes as lawfully might be in the parish of T.,"-a good charitable trust); James v. Allen, 3 Mer. 17; Fowler v. Garlike, 1 Russ. & M. 232; Vezey v. Jamson, 1 Sim. & St. 69; Ellis v. Selby, 7 Sim. 352; 1 Mylne & C. 286; Loscombe v. Wintringham, 13 Beav. 87, 89, and cases in note; Baker v. Sutton, 1 Keen, 224; Wilkinson v. Lindgreen, L. R. 5 Ch. 570 ("to any other religious institution or purposes as A and B may think proper,"-a valid charity); Chamberlayne v. Brockett, L. R. 8 Ch. 806; Aston v. Wood, L. R. 6 Eq. 419 (conrt will not presume a public charitable use where none was declared, although the bequest was to the trustees of a religious society); Corporation of Gloucester v. Wood, 3 Hare, 131, 136-148; Lewis v. Allenby, L. R. 10 Eq. 668; Wilkinson v. Barber, L. R. 14 Eq. 96; Gillam v. Taylor, L. R. 16 Eq. 581; Att'y-Gen. v. Eastlake, 11 Hare, 205, 215; Pocock v. Att'y-Gen., L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 342; In re Jarman's Estate, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 584; In re Williams, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 735; In re Birkett, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 576; In re Hedgman, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 156; Mills v. Farmer, 1 Mer. 55; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36; Coggeshall v. Pelton, 7 Johns. Ch. 292, 11 Am. Dec. 471; Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen, 446; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539; American Academy v. Harvard College, 12 Gray, 582; Vidal v. Girard, 2 How. 127, 11 L. Ed. 205; Cresson's Appeal, 30 Pa. St. 437; Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. St. 23, 35; Franklin v. Armfield, 2 Sneed, 305; Russell v. Allen, 5 Dill. 235; Fed. Cas. No. 12.149; Boxford Sec. Relig. Soc. v. Harriman, 125 Mass. 321; Ould v. Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 303, 24 L. Ed. 450; Goodell v. Union Ass'n of Burlington Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 32; De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq. 36; Trustees of Cory Univ. Soc. v. Beatty, 28 N. J. Eq. 570; Stevens v. Shippen, 28 N. J. Eq. 487; Clement v. Hyde, 50 Vt. 716, 28 Am. Rep. 522; Craig v. Sccrist, 54 Ind. 419; Mason v. Meth. Epis. Ch., 27 N. J. Eq. 47; Cruse

§ 1020. What are Charitable Uses and Purposes—"Statute of Charitable Uses."—It is the question of primary importance, upon which all others depend, to determine what uses and purposes are charitable, within the meaning

v. Axtell, 50 Ind. 49; Old South Soc. v. Crocker, 119 Mass. 1, 20 Am. Rep. 299; Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. St. 465, 3 Am. Rep. 558 (a devise to "the Infidel Society in Philadelphia, for the purpose of building a hall for the free discussion of religion, politics, etc.," is not a valid charitable use); Meeting St. Bap. Soc. v. Hail, 8 R. I. 234; Needles v. Martin, 33 Md. 609; Thompson's Ex'rs v. Norris, 20 N. J. Eq. 489; Norris v. Thompson's Ex'rs, 19 N. J. Eq. 307; Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 602, 35 Am. Rep. 550.

In Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539, 556, Gray, J., said: "A charity is a gift to be applied, consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion; by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint; by assisting them to establish themselves in life; or by erecting or maintaining public works; or otherwise lessening the burdens of government." This may not be an exhaustive description of charitable purposes, but it accurately states the essential element that the gift must be for an *indefinite class*, so that the benefit conferred upon them is in its nature public.

Trusts for private objects do not fall within the denomination of charitable trusts, nor under the jurisdiction over them, and are void if they ereate perpetuities; as those for the erection or repair of private tombs or monuments:^b In re Rickard, 31 Beav. 244; Fowler v. Fowler, 33 Beav.

§ 1019, (b) Trusts for Private Objects .--- In the following cases trusts for the care of private burial plots, tombs, monuments, etc., were held invalid: Vaughan v. Thomas, 33 Ch. Div. 187; Prior v. Moore, [1901] 1 Ch. 936 (trust void for uncertainty as to its duration); Johnson v. Holifield, 79 Ala. 423, 58 Am. Rep. 596, and note; Estate of Willey, 128 Cal. 1, 60 Pac. 471 (dictum); Estate of Gay, 138 Cal. 552, 94 Am. St. Rep. 70, 71 Pac. 707; Mason v. Bloomington Library Ass'n, 237 Ill. 442, 15 Ann. Cas. 603, and note, 86 N. E. 1044; Burke v. Burke, 259 Ill. 262, 102 N. E. 293; Piper v. Moulton, 72 Me. 155; Detwiller v. Hartman,

37 N. J. Eq. 348; Hilliard v. Parker, 76 N. J. Eq. 447, 74 Atl. 447; Van Syckel v. Johnson, 80 N. J. Eq. 117, 70 Atl. 657 (to keep graveyard in repair); Kelly v. Nichols, 17 R. I. 306, 21 Atl. 906; Sherman v. Baker, 20 R. I. 446, 40 L. R. A. 717, 40 Atl. 11; Fite v. Beasley, 12 Lea, 328; Mc-Ilvain v. Hockaday, (Tex. Civ. App.) 81 S. W. 54. In some states, such trusts, while invalid as charities, are, though perpetual, protected by express terms of statutes: Webster v. Sughrow, 69 N. H. 380, 48 L. R. A. 100, 45 Atl. 139; Green v. Hogan, 153 Mass. 462, 27 N. E. 413; In re Bartlett, 163 Mass. 509, 40 N. E. 899; Morse v. Inhabitants of

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of the doctrine, so that gifts for such purposes may be sustained as valid charitable trusts, although they may tend to create perpetuities. It has already been shown that the purpose, whatever be its particular object, must benefit

616; Hoare v. Oshorne, L. R. 1 Eq. 585; or to found a private museum: Thompson v. Shakespear, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 399; or for the benefit of a private company; Attorney-General v. Haberdashers' Co., 1 Mylne & K. 420; or for a private charity: Ommaney v. Butcher, Turn. & R. 260; a "friendly society": In re Clark's Trust, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 497; Dawson v. Small, L. R. 18 Eq. 114 (to repair tomb); Thomas v. Howell, L. R. 18 Eq. 198 (a bequest to each of ten poor clergymen); In re Williams, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 735 (to repair tombs); Carne v. Long, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 75 (to support a library society which was established for the benefit of its own subscribers only); per contra, Cruse v. Axtell, 50 Ind. 49 (a devise to a lodge of Freemasons, held to be for a good charitable use; a decision which seems opposed to the authorities); Attorney-General v. Soule, 28 Mich. 153 (a bequest to establish an ordinary private school is not for a public charitable use); Swift v. Beneficial Soc., 73 Pa. St. 362 (bequest to a "friendly society," the benefits of which are confined to its own members, is not for a charitable use); In re Clark's Trust, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 497 (same as last).

Natick, 176 Mass. 510, 57 N. E. 996; Driscoll v. Hewlett, 198 N. Y. 297, 91 N. E. 784; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Town Council, 29 R. I. 393, 71 Atl. 644; Chapman v. Newell, 146 Iowa, 415, 125 N. W. 324; Lounsbury v. Trustees of Square Lake Burial Ass'n, (Mich.) 129 N. W. 36 (even if association is unincorporated); Stewart v. Coshow, 238 Mo. 662, 142 S. W. 283 (benefit of large circle of relatives and friends); Bliss v. Linden Cemetery Ass'n, 81 N. J. Eq. 394, 87 Atl. 224; Ritter v. Couch, 71 W. Va. 221, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1216, 76 S. E. 428 (to town as trustee for cemetery). In Ford v. Ford, 91 Ky. 572, 16 S. W. 451, under a statute validating any gift for any "charitable or humane purpose," it was held that a provision for a monument for the testator and his wife was valid. The court said,

however, that if the provision had been for a monument over the testator's grave alone it would have been invalid.

In general see In re Good (Harrington v. Watts), [1905] 2 Ch. 60 (gift of house for use of old officers of regiment at a small rent during their life held void); Spence v. Widney, (Cal.) 46 Pac. 463; Johnson v. De Pauw University, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 950, 76 S. W. 851 (for the purposes of education of the descendants of G. H. & J. M.); Bangor v. Masonic Lodge, 73 Me. 428, 40 Am. Rep. 369 (Masonic lodge not a public charity); Mason v. Perry, 22 R. I. 475, 48 Atl. 671 (same); Bates v. Bates, 134 Mass. 110, 45 Am. Rep. 305; Kelly v. Nichols, 17 R. I. 306, 21 Atl. 906, 18 R. I. 62, 25 Atl. 840 (for hospitality to traveling ministers and others of testator's relisome indefinite class or portion of the *public;* for mere private charities are governed by the rules which apply to ordinary private express trusts. The general objects which come within the description of "charitable uses," and

gious belief). In Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church, 104 Ala. 327, 53 Am. St. Rep. 48, 25 L. R. A. 360, 18 South. 394, a trust for masses for the repose of the testator's own soul was held to be a private trust. See, also, Moran v. Moran, 104 Iowa, 216, 65 Am. St. Rep. 443, 39 L. R. A. 204, 73 N. W. 617; but see contra, Hoeffer v. Clogan, 171 Ill. 462, 63 Am. St. Rep. 241, 40 L. R. A. 730, 49 N. E. 527; Gilmore v. Lee, 237 Ill. 402, 127 Am. St. Rep. 330, 56 N. E. 568; Burke v. Burke, 259 Ill. 262, 102 N. E. 293; Coleman v. O'Leary's Ex'r, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1248, 70 S. W. 1068; Sherman v. Baker, 20 R. I. 446, 40 Atl. 11. A bequest for the relief of the most destitute of the testator's relatives held valid: Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N. H. 354, 10 Atl. 706; but a provision for such of the testator's children and their descendants as may be destitute, not a public charity: Kent v. Dunham, 142 Mass. 216, 56 Am. Rep. 667, 7 N. E. 730.

The fact that a gift, otherwise public, is to constitute a memorial to the donor or his family, does not render the trust private; the personal motive does not deprive it of its character as a charity. French v. Calkins, 252 Ill. 243, 96 N. E. 877; Gagnon v. Wellman, (N. H.) 99 Atl. 786; Gibson v. Frye Institute, 137 Tenn. 452, **L. R. A.** 1917D, 1062, 193 S. W. 1059.

In Troutman v. De Boissiere Odd Fellows' Orphans H. & I. S. Ass'n, 66 Kan. 1, 71 Pac. 287, reversing

(Kan.) 64 Pac. 33, it was held that a trust to provide a home for the children of deceased members of a secret society is not a valid charitable trust. The court said: "Public charities may be restricted to a class of the people of the state or of a municipal division. At the same time, they must be general for all of the class within the particular municipality." While a Masonic lodge is not ordinarily held to be a public charity (see cases cited above), it may still act as trustee for a charitable use. Thus, it has heen held that a devise to a Masonic lodge "for the use of the widows' and orphans' fund of said lodge" is valid: Estate of Willey, 128 Cal. 1, 60 Pac. 471. See, also, Kauffman v. Foster, 3 Cal. App. 741, 86 Pac. 1108; Masonic Education & Charity Trust v. City of Boston, 201 Mass. 320, 87 N. E. 602 (home for indigent and needy Masons). Gift to Young Men's Christian Association, although membership is restricted and dues charged, is valid; Little v. City of Newburyport, 210 Mass. 414, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 425, 96 N. E. 1032. And gifts to the trustees of the permanent funds of three mutual benefit associations, the membership of which is open to all printers, all teachers, and all bank officers, respectively, of the city of Boston, the funds being devoted to the use of sick, needy, or disabled members, is charitable; Minns v. Billings, 183 Mass. 126, 94 Am. St. Rep. 420, 66 N. E. 593; and a proprietary liwhich may therefore constitute a valid charitable trust, were enumerated in the statute of charitable uses, passed in the reign of Queen Elizabeth,¹ as follows: "The relief of aged, impotent, and poor people; the maintenance of maimed and sick soldiers and mariners; the support of schools of learning, free schools, and scholars of universities; repairs of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks, and highways; education and preferment of orphans; the relief, stock, and maintenance of houses of correction; marriage of poor maids; aid and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed; relief or redemption of prisoners and captives; aid of poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteenths, setting out of soldiers, and other taxes." It will be seen that this list omits some most important and familiar charitable objects,

§ 1020, 1 43 Eliz., c. 4. The "charitable trusts" now under consideration should be carefully distinguished from gifts to corporations which are authorized by their charters, or other statutes, to receive and hold property, and apply it to objects which fall within the general designation of charitable. Such gifts are permitted in the states where the peculiar doctrine of "charitable trusts" has been abrogated, and they are regulated by the general rules of law applicable to all corporations, or by the provisions of the individual charter: See Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97, 112–118, per Wright, J.; Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584, 587–621, per Porter, J.; Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 450; Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70; 1 N. W. 92; 50 N. W. 1103; Gould v. Taylor Orphan Asylum, 46 Wis. 106; 50 N. W. 422.

brary, the use of which is free to various classes of students, though the stockholders have larger privileges, is a charity: Id. It has been held that a fire-engine company is not a charity: Neptune Fire Engine & Hose Co. v. Board of Education, 166 Ky. 1, 178 S. W. 1138. See, also, Moseley v. Smiley, 171 Ala. 593, 55 South. 143 (association which might use the trust for private purposes).

It is settled in England that a "friendly" or mutual benefit society may be a charity when, under its rules, distressed - circumstances or poverty is necessary to entitle a member to the benefits: Spiller v. Mande, 32 Ch. Div. 158, note; In re Bush, [1896] 2 Ch. 727; Pease v. Pattinson, 32 Ch. Div. 154; In re Lacy, [1899] 2 Ch. 149; but where a wealthy member would be entitled to share in the benefits equally with a poor member, it is not a charity: Cunnack v. Edwards, [1896] 2 Ch. 679; Braithwaite v. Attorney-General, [1909] 1 Ch. 510.

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—as, for example, the support and propagation of religion. The English and American courts have never regarded this enumeration as exhaustive, but as designed to be merely illustrative. Numerous objects analogous to those mentioned in the statute are held to be charitable. The doctrine is settled that all particular objects embraced within the general spirit, intent, and scope of the statute are to be considered as charitable, unless they violate some rule of public policy or the provisions of some positive statute.² a

§ 1021. Classes of Charitable Uses.—1. Religious Purposes.—In addition to the objects specifically enumerated in the statute, other purposes of a like general nature are held by the courts to be charitable, and these may all be arranged in the following classes: *Religious purposes*: The support and propagation of religion is clearly a "charitable use."¹^a. This includes gifts for the erection, maintenance,

§ 1020, ² Many gifts for purposes confessedly charitable are defeated by the statutes of mortmain in England, and in the states where these or analogous statutes have been adopted.

§ 1021, ¹ In England an exception is made of "superstitious" uses, contrary to the public policy, such as masses for the soul: Attorney-General v. Fishmongers' Co., 5 Mylne & C. 11; West v. Shuttleworth, 2 Mylne & K. 684; In re Blundell, 30 Beav. 360; Heath v. Chapman, 2 Drew. 417; Cary v. Abbot, 7 Ves. 490, 495. In the United States no such purposes

§1020, (a) In re Foveaux, [1895] 2 Ch. 501, per Chitty, J.: "The method employed by the Court is to consider the enumeration of Charities in the Statute of Elizabeth, bearing in mind that the enumeration is not exhaustive. Institutions whose objects are analogous to those mentioned in the statute are admitted to be charities; and again, institutions which are analogous to those already admitted by reported decisions are held to be charities." In the important case of Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A. C. 531, the meaning of the words "charitable purposes," as used in the Income Tax Act was exhaustively discussed. Lord Macnaghten (p. 583) makes a fourfold classification of charitable uses (often referred to in later cases), substantially identical with the author's classes, except that the words "relief of poverty" are employed as descriptive of the second class, instead of "benevolent."

§ 1021, (a) This section is cited in In re Stewart's Estate, 26 Wash. 32, 66 Pac. 148, 67 Pac. 723. and repair of church edifices, the maintenance of worship, the support of clergymen, the promotion and propagation

would probably be regarded as superstitious which were recognized by any religious belief and ritual: Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana, 170, 26 Am. Dec. 440; Methodist Church v. Remington, 1 Watts, 218, 26 Am. Dec. 61.^b In England, no charity for a *religious* purpose could be upheld as a valid

§ 1021, (b) Trusts for Masses, etc.-See dictum of Rapallo, J., in Holland v. Alcock, 108 N. Y. 312, 2 Am. St. Rep. 420, 16 N. E. 305; also, Hoeffer v. Clogan, 171 Ill. 462, 63 Am. St. Rep. 241, 49 N. E. 527; Gilmore v. Lee, 237 Ill. 402, 127 Am. St. Rep. 330, 86 N. E. 568; Burke v. Burke, 259 Ill. 262, 102 N. E. 293, Ackerman v. Fichter, 179 Ind. 392, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1117, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 221, 101 N. E. 493; Seda v. Huble, 75 Iowa, 429, 9 Am. St. Rep. 495, 39 N. W. 685; Coleman v. O'Leary's Ex'r, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1248, 70 S. W. 1068; In re Schouler, 134 Mass. 426; Webster v. Sughrow. 69 N. H. 380, 48 L. R. A. 100, 45 Atl. 139; Kerrigan v. Tabb, (N. J. Ch.) 39 Atl. 701; Kerrigan v. Conelly, (N. J. Ch.) 46 Atl. 227; Sherman v. Baker, 20 R. I. 446, 40 Atl. 11; Re Estate of Kavanaugh, 143 Wis. 90, 126 N. W. 672 (with dissenting opinion and reference note); but it has been held that a trust to be used in solemn masses for the repose of the testator's soul is not valid because not for a public purpose: Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church, 104 Ala. 327, 53 Am. St. Rep. 48, 25 L. R. A. 360, 18 South. 394. In discussing this case, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Hoeffer v. Clogan, 171 Ill. 462, 63 Am. St. Rep. 241, 40 L. R. A. 730, 49 N. E. 527, say: "We are not able to agree with the conclusion that there is no benefit to the church or

public in such case, and, as we have seen, the ceremonial of the mass is a public action, which can be seen and taken cognizance of, so that there is no more difficulty in procuring a mass to be said than there is in securing the public delivery of a sermon or a lecture." See, also, In re Lennon's Estate, 152 Cal. 327, 125 Am. St. Rep. 58, 14 Ann. Cas. 1024, 92 Pac. 870 (holding trust not a charity); Coleman v. O'Lcary's Ex'r, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1248, 70 S. W. 1068. In Moran v. Moran, 104 Iowa, 216, 65 Am. St. Rep. 443, 39 L. R. A. 204, 73 N. W. 617, the court approved the ruling in Festorazzi v. Church, but the trust was sustained as an ordinary trust. A good classification of the cases on this subject is found in Sherman v. Baker, 20 R. I. 446, 40 L. R. A. 717, 40 Atl. 11, where the court says: "In this country, where all forms of religious belief stand upon equal legal rights, the doctrine of superstitious uses has never been recognized, and bequests for masses are now generally admitted to be legal, but there is a diversity of opinion as to their execution. One class of cases holds that they are good as charitable trusts, being for religious services. Another class holds that they are private trusts, which are void because there is no living beneficiary to enforce the trust. A third class holds that they are good as outright gifts for a specified legal object."

of religious doctrines and beliefs in any manner by the church or by associations, the aid of missionary, Bible, and

public charity, unless the form of religion was one at least professing to acknowledge the divine revelation contained in the Bible, and to be founded thereon; indeed, the whole doctrine was regarded by the early judges as carrying out the precepts of Christianity. While the American courts do not discriminate between different phases of religious belief and doctrine, still the essential element of a charity for a religious purpose must be in reality religious. The supreme court of Pennsylvania therefore decided, in complete agreement with principle and authority, that a devise to "the Infidel Society in Philadelphia, for the purpose of building a hall for the free discussion of religion, politics, etc.," was not a valid charitable gift: Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. St. 465, 3 Am. Rep. 558.° In England it is not necessary that the objects should conform to the doctrines and modes of the established church. Charitable gifts are valid for dissenters: Attorney-General v. Cock, 2 Ves. Sr. 273; Shrewsbury v. Hornby, 5 Hare, 406; Attorney-General v. Lawes, 8 Hare, 32; Attornev-General v. Bunce, L. R. 6 Eq. 563. Roman Catholics: Cary v. Abbot, 7 Ves. 490; Attorney-General v. Todd, 1 Keen, 803; Walsh v. Gladstone, 1 Phill. Ch. 290; Cocks v. Manners, L. R. 12 Eq. 574. Jews: Michel's Trust, 28 Beav, 39. To promulgate doctrines of Joanna Southcott: Thornton v. Howe, 8 Jur., N. S., 663. But not to promote infidelity: Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. St. 465, 3 Am. Rep. 558.d

Among the particular objects which constitute valid religious purposes are the following: • Building, repairing, ornamenting, etc., churches:

§ 1021, (c) Sce, also, Manners v. Phila. Library Co., 93 Pa. St. 165, 39 Am. Rep. 741.

§ 1021, (d) Manners v. Philadelphia Library Co., 93 Pa. St. 165, 39 Am. Rep. 741.

§ 1021, (e) Religious Purposes; Additional English Decisions.—To repair a churchyard, valid: Vaughan v. Thomas, 33 Ch. Div. 187 (compare supra, note). For a Friends' cometery, valid: Re Manser (Att'y-Gen. v. Lucas), [1905] 1 Ch. 68. For erection of headstones for parishioners buried in church-yard: In re Pardoe (McLaughlin v. Attorney-General) [1906] 2 Ch. 184. "To the service of God," valid; though in a broad sense these words include

a great variety of purposes, not necessarily "charitable," in the ordinary meaning, as used by testators. they mean "religious purposes": In re Darling, [1896] 1 Ch. 50: Powerscourt v. Powerscourt, 1 Molloy, 616. "To the following religious societies, viz. ----, to be divided in equal shares among them," valid; a "religious society" is not necessarily a charity (Cocks v. Manners, L. R. 12 Eq. 574, association solely for the spiritual edification of its own members, not a charity), so that independently of authority the gift would fail; "but the authorities show that a bequest to a religious institution, or for a religious purpose, is prima facie a bequest for

other religious societies, and all other objects and purposes

Hoare v. Osborne, L. R. 1 Eq. 585; Booth v. Carter, L. R. 3 Ex. 757; Cresswell v. Cresswell, L. R. 6 Eq. 69 (to build a parsonage); providing things

a charitable purpose": In re White, [1893] 2 Ch. 41, citing Baker v. Sutton, 1 Keen, 224, 233; Townsend v. Carus, 3 Hare, 257, 261; Wilkinson v. Lingren, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 570. A gift to sisters of charity, valid: In re Delany, [1902] 2 Ch. 642, following Cocks v. Manners, L. R. 12 Eq. 574. To vicar of church to pay bell-ringers at Christmas, valid: In re Pardoe (McLaughlin v. Attorney-General), [1906] 2 Ch. 184. The purchase of advowsons and presentations is not a religious purpose: Hunter v. Attorney-General, [1899] App. Cas. 309, reversing In re Hunter, [1897] 2 Ch. 105, and restoring In re Hunter, [1897] 1 Ch. 518; In re Church Patronage Trusts, [1904] 2 Ch. 643, affirming [1904] 1 Ch. 41.

Religious Purposes; Additional American Cases .- See Field v. Drew Theological Seminary, 41 Fed. 371 (for education of two young men for Christian ministry); Conklin v. Davis, 63 Conn. 377, 28 Atl. 537 (Sunday school); Parish of Christ Church v. Trustees of Donations, etc., 67 Conn. 554, 35 Atl. 552; Appeal of Mack, 71 Conn. 122, 41 Atl. 242 (for the erection and maintenance of a church); Appeal of Eliot, 74 Conn. 586, 51 Atl. 558 (for erection of chapel and maintenance of mission); Trafton v. Black, 187 Ill. 36, 58 N. E. 292 (erection of churches); Andrews v. Andrews, 110 Ill. 223; People ex rel. Smith v. Braucher, 258 Ill. 604, 101 N. E. 944 (support of a church); Christian Church of Sand Creek v. Church of Christ, 219 Ill. 503, 76 N. E. 703 (gift to trustees of unincorporated

religious congregation); French v. Calkins, 252 Ill. 243, 96 N. E. 877 (to church, for improvements); Zion Church v. Parker, 114 Iowa, 1, 86 N. W. 60 (for the use and benefit of the ministry and membership of the Evangelical Association of North America); In re Johnston's Estate, 141 Iowa, 109, 119 N. W. 275 (gift to Presbyterian church and to home and foreign missions construed to carry property to Presbyterian societies, two judges dissenting); Crawford's Heirs v. Thomas, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1100, 54 S. W. 197 (evangelist); Chambers v. Higgins' Ex'r, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1425, 49 S. W. 436; Kinney v. Kinney, 86 Ky. 610, 6 S. W. 593 (foreign missions); Greer v. Synod Southern Presbyterian Church, 150 Ky. 155, 150 S. W. 16 (gift for employment of evangelists and any other purpose synod chooses in mountain districts of Kentucky); Grundy v. Neal, 147 Ky. 729, 145 S. W. 401 (deed of land to be used as union church); Simpson v. Welcome, 72 Me. 496, 39 Am. Rep. 349 (purchase and distribution of religious books); Morville v. Fowle, 144 Mass. 109, 10 N. E. 766; In re Bartlett, 163 Mass. 509, 40 N. E. 899 (to erect a chapel); Teele v. Bishop of Derry, 168 Mass. 341, 60 Am. St. Rep. 401, 38 L. R. A. 629, 47 N. E. 422 (same); McAllister v. Burgess, 161 Mass. 269, 24 L. R. A. 158, 37 N. E. 173 (for benefit of poor churches of a city and vicinity); Sears v. Attorney-General, 193 Mass. 551, 9 Ann. Cas. 1200, and note, 79 N. E. 772 (for the widows and orphans of deceased clergymen of a particular

which are really religious.^f The English courts made an

connected with church services: Turner v. Ogden, 1 Cox, 316; Adnam v. Cole, 6 Beav. 353; maintenance of divine worship: Att'y-Gen. v. Pearson,

parish, a valid charity, though the class is small); Massachusetts Baptist Missionary Society v. Bowdoin, 212 Mass. 198, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 472, 98 N. E. 1045 (gift to church); Chase v. Dickey, 212 Mass. 555, 99 N. E. 410 (gift to church for repairs of building and promoting of Christian Science); White v. Rice, 112 Mich, 403, 70 N. W. 1024; Farmers & Merchants' Bank v. Robinson, 96 Mo. App. 385, 70 S. W. 372 (support of pastor); Mott v. Morris, 249 Mo. 137, 155 S. W. 434 (church); Sandusky v. Sandusky, 261 Mo. 351, N. W. 1150 · (parsonage); 168 Strother v. Barrow, 246 Mo. 241, 151 S. W. 960 (church); Buckley v. Monck, (Mo.) 187 S. W. 31 ("wornout" preachers); In re Douglass' Estate, 94 Neb. 280, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 447, 143 N. W. 299 (church); Glover v. Baker, 76 N. H. 393, 83 Atl. 916 (same will as Chase v. Dickey, 212 Mass. 555, 99 N. E. 410); French v. Lawrence, 76 N. H. 234, 81 Atl. 705 (feeble Congregational churches of the state); Gagnon v. Wellman, (N. H.) 99 Atl. 786 (building church); Mills v. Davidson, 54 N. J. Eq. 659, 55 Am. St. Rep. 594, 35 L. R. A. 113, 35 Atl. 1072 (church); Jones v. Watford, 64 N. J. Eq. 785, 53 Atl. 397, affirming 50 Atl. 180, 62 N. J. Eq. 339 (for the purchase of books on the philosophy of spiritualism); Bruere v. Cook, 63 N. J. Eq. 624, 52 Atl. 1001 (missions): MacKenzie v. Trustees of Presbytery of New Jersey, 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227, 61 Atl. 1027 (public worship as Presbyterian church); Grace Church v. Ange, 161 N. C. 314, 77 S. E. 239

(parsonage not to be used or sold for any other purpose-trustees may sell and buy other land for parsonage); Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497, 32 S. E. 809 (to build a church; to build home for minister); In re Sellers Chapel Methodist Church 139 Pa. St. 61, 11 L. R. A. 282, 21 Atl. 145, 27 Wkly. Notes Cas. 383 (to build a church); Board of Foreign Missions v. Culp, 151 Pa. St. 467, 25 Atl. 117, 31 Wkly. Notes Cas. 135 (foreign missionary work); Young v. St. Mark's Lutheran Church, 200 Pa. St. 332, 49 Atl. 887 (to assist young men in obtaining an education for the ministry); St. Peter's Church v. Brown, 21 R. I. 367, 43 Atl. 642 (for church purposes); Wood v. Trustees of Fourth Baptist Church, 26 R. I. 594, 61 Atl. 279 (church); Brice v. Trustees of All Saints Memorial Chapel, 31 R. I. 183, 76 Atl. 774 (same); Jordan v. Universalist Gen. Convention Trustees, 107 Va. 79, 57 S. E. 652 (mission work in United States); Hood v. Dorer, 107 Wis. 149, 82 N. W. 546 (for support and maintenance of superannuated preachers of the church denominated the United Brethren in Christ); In re Evenson's Will, 161 Wis. 627, 155 N. W. 145 (churches, orphanages, missions). But mere hospitality to traveling ministers and others of the testator's religious denomination is not charity: Kelly v. Nichols, 17 R. I. 306, 21 Atl. 906.

§ 1021, (f) This portion of the text is quoted in Pennoyer v. Wadhams, 20 Or. 274, 11 L. R. A. 211, 25 Pac. 720 (for the use of a church to be organized). exception with reference to superstitious uses, but in the United States no such distinction is made. Our courts would recognize no difference among religious beliefs and opinions; but in this country, as well as in England, a gift could not be sustained as a charity for religious purposes when it was wholly irreligious, and its only object was to destroy all religion.

§ 1022. 2. Benevolent Purposes.—Numerous trusts for purposes of benevolence are upheld as charitable, although not mentioned in the statute, since they are within its spirit

3 Mer. 353, 409; Att'y-Gen. v. Bunce, L. R. 6 Eq. 563; Att'y-Gen. v. Webster, L. R. 20 Eq. 483; providing or supporting elergymen in the performance of their religious functions: Att'y-Gen. v. Lawes, 8 Hare, 32; Thornber v. Wilson, 3 Drew. 245; 4 Drew. 350; In re Maguire, L. R. 9 Eq. 632; In re Clergy Soc., 2 Kay & J. 615; In re Kilvert's Trusts, L. R. 12 Eq. 183; 7 Ch. 170; but a bequest to each of ten poor elergymen is not a "charitable gift": Thomas v. Howell, L. R. 18 Eq. 198; and see Russell v. Kellett, 3 Smale & G. 264; promoting religious doctrines and beliefs by the distribution of Bibles or tracts, and by means of religious societies, etc.: Att'y-Gen. v. Stepney, 10 Ves. 22; Wilkinson v. Lindgren, L. R. 5 Ch. 570; a gift to "sisters of charity," but not to a convent: Cocks v. Manners, L. R. 12 Eq. 574.

American decisions are to the same effect: Building and supporting churches, maintaining divine worship: Jones v. Habersham, 3 Woods, 443; 107 U. S. 174, 182; Laird v. Bass, 50 Tex. 412; De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq. 36; Old South Soc. v. Crocker, 119 Mass. 1, 20 Am. Rep. 299; Meeting St. Bap. Soc. v. Hail, 8 R. I. 234; promulgation of religious doctrines and beliefs and practices, missionary and other similar societies: Goodell v. Union Ass'n etc., 29 N. J. Eq. 32 (Young Men's Christian Association); De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq. 36 (missionary); Trustees of Cory Univ. Soc. v. Beatty, 28 N. J. Eq. 570 ("promotion of the Universalist denomination"); but Starkweather v. Am. Bible Soc., 72 Ill. 50, 22 Am. Rep. 133, holds that the American Bible Society is not a charity, within the statute of Elizabeth; Fairbanks v. Lamson, 99 Mass. 533; Maine Baptist Miss. Con. v. Portland, 65 Me. 92 (domestic missions, diffusion of Christian knowledge); for the benefit of the Sunday-school library of a specified church: Fairbanks v. Lamson, supra; but a bequest to a certain Sunday school, the income to be applied in procuring Christmas presents for the scholars, was held invalid: Goodell v. Union Ass'n, etc., 29 N. J. Eq. 32.

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and intent.^{1 a} Among the particular instances embraced within this class are trusts for the "poor,"^b the "deserving poor," widows and orphans of a specified town, district, or

§ 1022, 1 As examples, to support or aid widows or orphans, or the poor of a certain place or district: Powell v. Att'y-Gen., 3 Mer. 48; Att'y-Gen. v. Comber, 2 Sim. & St. 93; Att'y-Gen. v. Clarke, Amb. 422; Bishop of Hereford v. Adams, 7 Ves. 324; Russell v. Kellett, 3 Smale & G. 264; Thompson v. Corby, 27 Beav. 649; Fisk v. Att'y-Gen., L. R. 4 Eq. 521; Dawson v. Small, L. R. 18 Eq. 114; In re Williams, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 735; In re Birkett, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 576. It also seems to be settled that a gift or bequest in trust for the donor's or testator's "poor relations." or "poor descendants," or "poor kinsmen and their offspring and issue," as an indefinite class, is a good charitable trust for benevolent purposes: Gillam v. Taylor, L. R. 16 Eq. 581, 584; Att'y-Gen. v. Price, 17 Ves. 371; Isaac v. Defriez, Amb. 595; 17 Ves. 373, note; White v. White, 7 Ves. 423; Bernal v. Bernal, 3 Mylne & C. 559; Att'y-Gen. v. Duke of Northumberland, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 745; but a gift to particular individual poor relations would be an ordinary trust or legacy: Liley v. Hey, 1 Hare, 580; for erecting, endowing, or supporting hospitals: Pelham v.

§ 1022, (a) It should be observed that, while the word "benevolent" describes the purposes of this class more accurately than "relief of poverty" the words "benevolent purposes," as used in a bequest, have been frequently condemned by the English courts as too broad to support a valid charitable use. The English cases to this point, however, have not been generally followed in this country: See post, notes to § 1025.

Relief of the Poor.—Webster v. Southey, 36 Ch. Div. 9; Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 557, 37 L. Ed. 279, 13 Sup. Ct. 503 ("home for disabled or aged and infirm and deserving American mechanics"); Wood v. Paine, 66 Fed. 807 (for the support of the poor of a town); Duggan v. Slocum, 83 Fed. 244; affirmed in 92 Fed. 806, 34 C. C A. 676 (for a protectory for boys); Estate of Willey, 128 Cal. 1, 60 Pac. 471 (to certain Masonic lodges "for the use of the

widows' and orphans' fund" of said lodges); Fay v. Howe, 136 Cal. 599. 69 Pac. 423 ("in aid of deserving aged native born of S., needing such aid"); In re Merchant's Estate, (Cal.) 77 Pac. 475 (for the O. Red Cross Society); In re Upham's Estate, 127 Cal. 90, 59 Pac. 315 (for an orphans' home); Dailey v. City of New Haven, 60 Conn. 314, 14 L. R. A. 69, 22 Atl. 945 (deserving poor): Beardsley v. Selectmen of Bridgeport, 53 Conn. 489, 55 Am. Rep. 152, 3 Atl. 557 ("for the special benefit of the worthy, deserving, poor, white, American, Protestant, Democratic widows and orphans residing in the Town of B."); Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 38 Am. St. Rep. 346. 26 Atl. 846 (home for destitute and friendless children); Conklin v. Da-

^{§ 1022, (}b) The text is eited to this effect in Klumpert v. Vrieland, 142 Iowa, 434, 121 N. W. 34.

country; for hospitals, asylums, and similar public institutions; for any class of persons requiring aid, as "the colored persons" of a certain state; and benevolent objects

Anderson, 2 Eden, 296; Magistrates of Dundee v. Morris, 3 Macq. 134, 157; Perring v. Trail, L. R. 18 Eq. 88; University of London v. Yarrow, 1 De Gex & J. 72 (to found a hospital "for studying and curing maladies of any quadruped or bird useful to man"); for deserving unsuccessful literary men: Thompson v. Thompson, 1 Coll. C. C. 381, 395; for the encouragement of good servants; Loscombe v. Wintringham, 13 Beav. 87; for releasing debtors: Att'y-Gen. v. Painters' Co., 2 Cox, 51; for the redemption of captives or prisoners: Att'y-Gen. v. Ironmongers' Co., 2 Mylne & K. 576; in re Prison Charities, L. R. 16 Eq. 129; but see Thrupp v. Collett, 26 Beav. 125; for general benevolent purposes in a specified district or country at large, without mentioning any particular form or object: Dolan v. Macdermot, L. R. 5 Eq. 60; 3 Ch. 676; Cresswell v. Cresswell, L. R. 6 Eq. 69; Lewis v. Allenby, L. R. 10 Eq. 668; Wilkinson v. Barber, L. R. 14 Eq. 96; Att'y-Gen. v. Webster, L. R. 20 Eq. 483; Pocock v. Att'y-Gen., 3 Ch. Div. 342; Mills v. Farmer, 1 Mer. 55; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36; but in In re Jarman's Estate, L. R. 8

vis, 63 Conn. 377, 28 Atl. 537 (poor of a certain church); Hayden v. Connecticut Hospital for Insane, 64 Conn. 320, 30 Atl. 50 (to establish free bed for female patients in Hospital for Insane); In re Strong's Appeal, 68 Conn. 527, 37 Atl. 395 (worthy poor people of the Town of P.); Appeal of Eliot, 74 Conn. 586, 51 Atl. 558 (aid of destitute seamen, and home for old and infirm ladies); Guilfoil v. Arthur, 158 Ill. 600, 41 N. E. 1009 (widows and orphans of deceased members of organization); Hunt v. Fowler, 121 Ill. 269, 12 N. E. 331, 17 N. E. 491 ("worthy poor" of a certain city); Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Iowa, 92, 61 N. W. 434 (foundling hospital); Grant v. Saunders, 121 Iowa, 80, 100 Am. St. Rep. 310, 95 N. W. 411 (poor); Tichenor v. Brewer, 98 Ky. 349, 33 S. W. 86 (Roman Catholic charitable institutions); Coleman v. O'Leary's Ex'r. 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1248, 70 S. W. 1068

(home for poor Catholic men); Thompson's Ex'r v. Brown, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 371, 75 S. W. 210 (poor): Dascomb v. Marston, 80 Me. 223, 13 Atl. 888 (for the "worthy and unfortunate poor"); Bills v. Pease, (Me.) 100 Atl. 146 (trust to sell food or other necessities of life at low prices to worthy and industrious persons not supported at public expense but who need aid, a charity); Bullard v. Chandler, 149 Mass. 532, 5 L. R. A. 104, 21 N. E. 951 ("to poor and unfortunate"); Suter v. Hilliard, 132 Mass. 412, 42 Am. Rep. 444 (word "benevolent" sufficiently defined by accompanying words); Holmes v. Coates, 159 Mass. 226, 34 N. E. 190 ("disabled soldiers and seamen, their widows and orphans"); Sherman v. Congregational Home Miss. Co., 176 Mass. 349, 57 N. E. 702 ("old ladies' home" and "rest home for worthy working girls"); Attorney-General v. Goodell, generally, without specifying the form. Even trusts established for the donor's own "poor relations," or "poor descendants," as a class, are held to be true charities. The

Ch. Div. 584, a bequest to general benevolent purposes was held invalid from the uncertainty and indefiniteness of its object.

American decisions: Aid or support of the poor, widows, orphans, etc.: Sohier v. Burr, 127 Mass. 221; Goodell v. Union Ass'n etc., 29 N. J. Eq.

180 Mass. 538, 62 N. E. 962 (to be divided among the poor colored people of a certain city); Minns v. Billings, 183 Mass. 126, 97 Am. St. Rep. 420, 66 N. E. 593 (for the sick, needy, or disabled members of certain mutual benefit associations); Barkley v. Donnelly, 112 Mo, 561, 19 S. W. 305 (orphans' home); St. James' Orphan Asylum v. Shelby, 60 Neb. 796, 83 Am. St. Rep. 553, 84 N. W. 273; Haynes v. Carr, 70 N. H. 463, 49 Atl. 638 (the poor and destitute); Towle v. Nesmith, 69 N. H. 212, 42 Atl. 900 (for poor widows and children); Goodale v. Mooney, 60 N. H. 528, 49 Am. Rep. 334 ("benevolent" defined by whole purpose of will); Hesketh v. Murphy, 35 N. J. Eq. 23, and extensive collection of cases in reporter's note; af-•firmed, 36 N. J. Eq. 304 ("to the relief of the most deserving poor of P."); Union Meth. Epis. Ch. v. Wilkinson, 36 N. J. Eq. 141 (poor members of certain named churches); Hilliard v. Parker, 76 N. J. Eq. 447, 74 Atl. 447 (purchase of fuel for most needy women of town); Trenton Society for Organizing Charity v. Howell, (N. J. Ch.) 63 Atl. 1110 (gift to Dorcas Society when incorporated, held to be for relieving deserving poor of Trenton); Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122, 55 N. E. 568 (for founding a home for aged people); In re Sturgis, 164 N. Y. 485, 58 N. E. 646 (to selectmen of a town

in trust, to distribute so as to do the most possible good for the relief and benefit of respectable persons in reduced circumstances in a certain parish); In re Lewis's Estate, 152 Pa. St. 477, 25 Atl. 878, 31 Wkly. Notes Cas. 460 (to protect colored citizens in the enjoyment of their civil rights); Trim v. Brightman, 168 Pa. St. 395, 31 Atl. 1071 ("for the benefit of the poor of E. Township"); In re Daly's Estate, 208 Pa. St. 58, 57 Atl. 180 (home for industrious girls and women, either in or out of employment); Webster v. Wiggin, 19 R. I. 73, 28 L. R. A. 510, 31 Atl. 824 (to build residences for laborers): Pell v. Mercer, 14 R. I. 412; Dye v. Beaver Creek Church, 48 S. C. 444, 59 Am. St. Rep. 724, 26 S. E. 717 ("for poor children, for their tui-.tion"); Cheatham v. Nashville Trust Co., (Tenn. Ch. App.) 57 S. W. 202 (for the Old Women's Home of Nashville); Gidley v. Lovenberg, (Tex. Civ. App.) 79 S. W. 831 (home for widows and orphans; support of indigent Israelites); Sheldon ٧. Town of Stockridge, 67 Vt. 299, 31 Atl. 414 (for the poor of a certain kind); Sawtelle v. Withrow, 94 Wis. 412, 69 N. W. 72 (support and education of orphan children); Hood v. Dorer, 107 Wis. 149, 82 N. W. 546 (support and maintenance of superannuated preachers); Kronshage v. Varrell, (Wis.) 97 N. W. 928 (relief of distress caused by storms, floods,

beneficiaries to be relieved, and the mode proposed for aiding them, must be *public*; a trust on behalf of a strictly

32 ("in aid of the deserving poor of M."); Mason v. Meth. Epis. Ch., 27 N. J. Eq. 47; Fellows v. Miner, 119 Mass. 541 (aged and infirm poor); Gooch v. Ass'n for Relief etc., 109 Mass. 558 (a society "for the support of poor old women"); for building or sustaining a hospital; Ould v.

etc.); Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 57 Am. Rep. 278, 28 N. W. 353 ("relief of the resident poor"). A trust for the relief of the most destitute of testator's poor relations was held valid in Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N. H. 354, 10 Atl. 706; see, however, Kent v. Dunham, 142 Mass. 216, 56 Am. Rep. 667, 7 N. E. 730.

Gifts for Hospitals .-- Robbins v. Boulder County Com'rs (Hoover), 50 Colo. 610, 115 Pac. 526 (though in this case gift failed, because conditions of gift could not be met); Dykeman v. Jenkines, 179 Ind. 549, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1011, 101 N. E. 1013; Webber Hospital Ass'n v. Mc-Kenzie, 104 Me. 320, 71 Atl. 1032; Dunn v. Morse, 109 Me. 254, 83 Atl. 795 (to needy relatives, balance to hospitals to be selected by trustee); Ege v. Hering, 108 Md. 391, 70 Atl. 221 (to endow a bed); Baltzell v. Church Home & Infirmary, 110 Md. 244, 73 Atl. 151; Bowden v. Brown, 200 Mass. 269, 128 Am. St. Rep. 419, 86 N. E. 351 (gift to town for erection of building for sick and poor, those without homes); New England Sanitarium v. Inhabitants of Stoneham, 205 Mass. 335, 91 N. E. 385 (gift good though hospital took pay patients); Ware v. City of Fitchburg, 200 Mass. 61, 85 N. E. 951; Buchanan v. Kennard, 234 Mo. 117, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 50, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 993, and note, 136 S. W. 415; Johnson v. Bowen, 85 N. J. Eq. 76, 95 Atl. 370; Hays v. Harris, 73 W.

Va. 17, 80 S. E. 827 (pay patients); Harris v. Neal, 61 W. Va. 1, 55 S. E. 740.

Gifts for Asylums, etc.-Eccles v. Rhode Island Trust Co., 90 Conn. 592, 98 Atl. 129 (home for children); Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, 233 Ill. 327, 122 Am. St. Rep. 169, 84 N. E. 256 ("orphans' home for the friendless poor of all denominations"); Re Cleven's Estate, 161 Iowa, 289, 142 N. W. 986 (home for old people); Green's Adm'rs v. Fidelity Trust Co., 134 Ky. 311, 20 Ann. Cas. 861, 120 S. W. 283 (for orphans of Masons); Petition of Pierce, 109 Me. 509, 84 Atl. 1070 (for indigent seamen); Norris v. Loomis, 215 Mass. 344, 102 N. E. 419 (for old people); In re Creighton's Estate, 91 Neb. 654, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 128, 136 N. W. 1001 (for poor working girls); In re Robinson's Will, 203 N. Y. 380, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1023, 96 N. E. 925 (home for such persons as trustees shall select); In re MacDowell's Will, 217 N. Y. 454, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 853, 112 N. E. 177 (home for Protestant gentlewomen a charity although they were to pay seven dollars a week for board); Hamilton v. John C. Mercer Home, 228 Pa. 410, 77 Atl. 630 (for aged Presbyterian clergymen who did not use tobacco).

Gift for promotion of Christian Science may be sustained on theory of its being a faith cure: Glover v. Baker, 76 N. H. 393, 83 Atl. 916. PUBLIC OR CHARITABLE TRUSTS.

§ 1023

private association, the benefits of which are confined to its own members, is not a "charitable trust."

§ 1023. 3. Educational Purposes.—Gifts, devises, and bequests in trust for educational purposes are valid, since they are all clearly within the spirit of the statute.^{1 a} This class

Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 303; McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432; 21 Am. Rep. 529; devise to a lodge of Freemasons: Cruse v. Axtell, 50 Ind. 49;^e but a "beneficial society," the benefits of which are confined to its own members, is not a public charity: Swift v. Beneficial Soc., 73 Pa. St. 362; for general benevolent purposes not specified: De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq. 36; Mayer v. Soc. for Visitation of the Sick, 2 Brewst. 385; Thomson's Ex'rs v. Norris, 20 N. J. Eq. 489 (a bequest to "benevolent, religious, or charitable institutions," held not a good charitable use; "benevolent" includes objects not charitable).

§ 1023, ¹ Examples: To found, endow, or maintain schools and other institutions of learning, which are not strictly private: Magistrates of Dundee v. Morris, 3 Macq. 134; In re Latymer's Charity, L. R. 7 Eq. 353; In re Hedgmau, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 156 ("for supporting or founding free or ragged schools"); and see New v. Bonaker, L. R. 4 Eq. 655; for the foundation or endowment of professorships, scholarships, lectureships, etc., and maintenance of teachers: Rex v. Newman, 1 Lev. 284; Attorney-General v. Margaret Prof., 1 Vern. 55; Attorney-General v. Tancred, 1 Eden, 10; for the advancement of education, learning, and knowledge generally: Whicker v. Hume, 7 H. L. Cas. 124; 1 De Gex, M. & G. 506; also for the promotion of science and any strictly scientific purposes: President of the United States v. Drummond, cited 7 H. L. Cas. 155; as a gift to the Royal Society and to the Geographical Society: Beaumont v. Oliveira, L. R. 6 Eq. 534; 4 Ch. 309; and for a botanical garden: Trustees of the

§ 1022, (c) See contra, Bangor v. Masonic Lodge, 73 Me. 428, 40 Am. Rep. 369; and ante, § 1019, note b.

§ 1023, (a) This section is cited in Spence v. Widney, (Cal.) 46 Pac. 463; Lackland v. Walker, 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. 414; cited, also, in Richards v. Wilson, (Ind.) 112 N. E. 780. The paragraph is quoted in Peth v. Spear, 63 Wash. 291, 115 Pac. 164 (communal industrial institution, and education in the principles of Socialism). In In re Scowcroft, [1898] 2 Ch. 638, the court declined to decide whether a gift for the "furtherance of Conservative principles" is charitable, but supported a gift of a building for a village club and reading-room "to be maintained for the furtherance of Conservative principles and religious and mental improvement," on the ground that the "furtherance of Conservative principles" was not an alternative purpose, but that the words merely served to define the more general purposes of the gift. In Smith v. Kerr, [1902] 1 Ch. 774, affirming [1900] 2 Ch. 511, it was held that a certain Inn of Chancery

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embraces all trusts for the founding, endowing, and supporting schools and other similar institutions which are

British Museum v. White, 2 Sim. & St. 594; Townley v. Bedwell, 6 Ves. 194. American cases: Founding or supporting schools, etc. (in several of those cases the gift is to a town or other municipal body, as the trustee): Russell v. Allen, 5 Dill. 235; Boxford etc. Soc. v. Harriman, 125 Mass. 321; Stevens v. Shippen, 28 N. J. Eq. 487; Meeting St. Bap. Soc. v. Hail, 8 R. I. 234; but the school must be public, or for the benefit of some portion of the public; a gift of ten thousand dollars to trustees "for the establishment of a school at M., for the education of children," was held not a valid charity, since the school might be merely private: Attorney-General v. Soule, 28 Mich. 153; the same is true of a gift for a merely private library association: Carne v. Long, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 75; gifts for the promotion of education generally, or for the education of any designated class of persons in a town, or district, or state: Attorney-General v. Parker, 126 Mass. 216; Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70 ("for the education and tuition of worthy indigent females"); De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq. 36 ("educational enterprises"); Clement v. Hyde, 50 Vt. 716, 28 Am. Rep. 522 (bequest "to the treasurer of the county of O. and his successors in office, the income to be expended in the education of scholars of the poor in the county of O."); Craig v. Secrist, 54 Ind. 419 (devise to a county for the education of a certain class of children); Mason v. Meth. Epis. Ch., 27 N. J. Eq. 47 (bequest to two towns, the income for educating poor children); Birchard v. Scott, 39 Conn. 63 (to defray expenses of educating poor children in a certain district).

was a "school of learning" and its property held for "charitable" purposes. Gifts for the promotion of athletics in a school were held charitable. \mathbf{In} in re Mariette (Mariette v. Governing Body of Aldenham School), [1915] 2 Ch. 284. See, also, Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174, 27 L. Ed. 401, 2 Sup. Ct. 336 (support of school); Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 172, 27 L. Ed. 397, 2 Sup. Ct. 327 (to found a school); Duggan v. Slocum, 83 Fed. 244; affirmed in 92 Fed. 806, 34 C. C. A. 676 (for a public library); John v. Smith, 102 Fed. 218, 42 C. C. A. 275, affirming 91 Fed. 827 (for support of public schools); Handley v. Palmer, 103 Fed. 39, 43 C. C. A. 100, affirm-

ing 91 Fed. 948 (erection of schoolhouses); Tincher v. Arnold, (Ill.) 147 Fed. 665, 8 Ann. Cas. 917, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 471, 77 C. C. A. 649, (trust for school upheld although there was a public school system); Taylor v. Columbian University, 226 U. S. 126, 57 L. Ed. 152, 33 Sup. Ct. 73 (to college for education of young men to fit them for Naval Academy); Speer v. Colbert, 200 U. S. 130, 50 L. Ed. 403, 26 Sup. Ct. 201 (\$3,000 to establish medical scholarship at some college in District of Columbia); Korsstrom v. Barnes, 167 Fed. 216 (trust for publication of hieratic writings held bad. No case cited; probably contrary to true rule); McDonald v.

not strictly private; for the establishment of professorships, and maintenance of teachers; for the education of desig-

Shaw, 81 Ark. 235, 98 S. W. 952 (to educate young men for priesthood and poor Catholic children); People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 35 L. R. A. 269, 45 Pac. 270 (to establish a polytechnic school); In re Royer's Estate, 123 Cal. 614, 44 L. R. A. 364, 56 Pac. 461 (to establish a University professorship); Clayton v. Hallett, 30 Colo. 231, 97 Am. St. Rep. 117, 59 L. R. A. 407, 70 Pac. 429 (maintenance of college for orphan boys); Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 38 Am. St. Rep. 346, 26 Atl. 846 (school); Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 21 L. R. A. 454, 34 N. E. 467 (public library); Grand Prairie Seminary v. Morgan, 171 Ill. 444, 49 N. E. 516; Franklin v. Hastings, 253 Ill. 46, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 135, 97 N. E. 265 (to corporation to be organized to establish public library); Hitchcock v. Board of Missions, 259 III. 288, 102 N. E. 741 (education of poor children); Barker v. Town of Petersburg, 41 Ind. App. 447, 82 N. E. 996 (to town for erection of public school); Richards v. Wilson, (Ind.) 112 N. E. 780, citing this paragraph of the text (school for advancement of all useful branches of learning); Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Iowa, 92, 61 N. W. 434 (public library); Wilson v. First National Bank, 164 Iowa, 402, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 481, 145 N. W. 948 (industrial training school); Trustees of Washburn College v. O'Hara, 75 Kan. 700, 90 Pac. 234 (higher education of young men for ministry); Kasey v. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 Ky. 609, 115 S. W. 739 (free distribution of Bibles, not to pay debts of society); Bedford v. Bedford, 99 Ky. 273, 35 S. W. 926 (permanent state

school fund); Dascomb v. Marston, 80 Me. 223, 13 Atl. 888 (to found a public library); Piper v. Moulton, 72 Me. 155 (to town for support of schools); Allen v. Trustees of Nassan Institute, 107 Me. 120, 77 Atl. 638 (institute for education of young women); Novak v. Trustees of Orphans' Home, 123 Md. 161, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1067, 90 Atl. 997 (to establish school for boys and girls, held to mean to place on firm basis school already maintained by beneficiary); Sears v. Chapman, 158 Mass. 400, 35 Am. St. Rep. 502, 33 N. E. 604 (gift for "educational purposes"); In re Bartlett, 163 Mass. 509, 40 N. E. 899 (for public lyceum and free 4ibrary); Attorney-General v. Briggs, 164 Mass. 561, 42 N. E. 118 (for support of a public school); Dexter v. President, etc., of Harvard College, 176 Mass. 192, 57 N. E. 371 (scholarship in a college is a valid charity. although a preference is given to donor's kindred); Minns v. Billings, 183 Mass. 126, 97 Am. St. Rep. 420, 66 N. E. 593 (proprietary library. the use of which is free to many of students, though classes the stockholders have larger privileges. is a charity); Richardson v. Essex Institute, 208 Mass. 311, 21 Ann. Cas. 1158, 94 N. E. 262 (educational purposes, limited to inhabitants of Salem); Ely v. Attorney-General (Malone), 202 Mass. 545, 89 N. E. 166 (kindergarten); City of Owatonna v. Rosebrock, 88 Minn. 318, 92 N. W. 1122 (for a public kindergarten); Lackland v. Walker, 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. 414 (for a botanical garden with a museum and library connected); Missouri Hist. Soc. v. Acad. of Science, 94 Mo. 459, nated classes of persons, as the poor children of a town; for the promotion of science and scientific studies; and generally for the advancement of knowledge, learning, and education.

8 S. W. 346 (promotion of science, etc.); Crow v. Clay County, 196 Mo. 234, 95 S. W. 369 (education of poor children of district); Glover v. Baker, 76 N. H. 393, 83 Atl. 916 (Christian Science); Taylor v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 34 N. J. Eq. 101 (to establish and maintain a college); Brown v. Pancoast, 34 N. J. Eq. 521 (library); Green v. Blackwell, (N. J. Ch.) 35 Atl. 375 (for the education of the poor children of a certain district); Jones v. Watford, 64 N. J. Eq. 785, 53 Atl. 397, affirming 62 N. J. Eq. 339, 50 Atl. 180 (purchase of books on the philosophy of spiritualism); Hilliard v. Parker, 76 N. J. Eq. 447, 74 Atl. 447 (library, though it issued stock); Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Hoboken, 70 N. J. Eq. 630, 62 Atl. 1 (to city for library and industrial school); Vineland Trust Co. v. Westendorf, 86 N. J. Eq. 343, 98 Atl. 314 ("for the furtherance of the broadest interpretation of metaphysical thought," valid); Spring Green Church v. Thornton, 158 N. C. 119, 73 S. E. 810 (school); In re Murray's Will, 141 N. C. 588, 54 S. E. 435 (school); Butterworth v. Keller, 219 N. Y. 446, 114 N. E. 803 (school; no objection that tuition fees are charged, if object is not private profit); In re John's Will, 30 Or. 494, 36 L. R. A. 242, 47 Pac. 341, 50 Pac. 226 (for maintenance of a public school-an excellent case): In re Kimberley's Estate, 249 Pa. 483, 95 Atl. 86 (library); Almy v. Jones, 17 R. I. 265, 12 L. R. A. 414, 21 Atl. 616 (for an art institute);

Palmer v. Union Bank, 17 R. I. 627, 24 Atl. 109 (for giving premiums for treatises on subjects conducive to the advancement of medical science, and for printing and distributing such treatises); Webster v. Wiggin, 19 R. I. 73, 28 L. R. A. 510, 31 Atl. 824 (to pay salaries of additional public school teachers); Godfrey v. Hutchins, 28 B. I. 517, 68 Atl. 317 (advancement of science, learning and useful arts; no reference to poor. Held good); Dye v. Beaver Creek Church, 48 S. C. 444, 59 Am. St. Rep. 724, 26 S. E. 717 ("for poor children, for their tuition"); Gibson v. Frye Institute, 137 Tenn. 452, L. B. A. 1917D, 1062, 193 S. W. 1059 (building for library and lectures, with provision for dancing and other recreations; education includes training of body as well as of mind); In re Stewart's Estate, 26 Wash. 32, 66 Pac. 148, 67 Pac. 723 (for a sectarian college); Beurhaus v. City of Watertown, 94 Wis. 617, 69 N. W. 986 (public library); Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 57 Am. Rep. 278, 28 N. W. 353 (school "for the education of young persons in the domestic and useful arts"); Maxcy v. City of Oshkosh, 144 Wis. 238, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 787, 128 N. W. 899, 1138 (manual training school); In re Evenson's Will, 161 Wis. 627, 155 N. W. 145 (support of college students). In George v. Braddock, 45 N. J. Eq. 757, 14 Am. St. Rep. 754, 6 L. R. A. 511, 18 Atl. 881, a trust for the dissemination of the writings of Henry George was upheld. The test as laid down by

§ 1024. 4. Other Public Purposes.—Other public purposes, not in the ordinary sense *benevolent*, may be valid charities, since they are either expressly mentioned by the statute, or are within its plain intent. All of these purposes tend to benefit the public, either of the entire country

this case is as follows: "The writings to be circulated must not be, when considered with respect to their purpose and general tendency, hostile to religion, to law, or to morals." A school, which is a private pecuniary enterprise, is not a charity, even if it indirectly serves charitable ends: Stratton v. Physio-Medical College, 149 Mass. 508, 14 Am. St. Rep. 442, 5 L. R. A. 33, 21 N. E. 874, per. Holmes, J.

Promotion of Ethical and Political Reforms .--- A group of cases which does not readily admit of classification is that where the purpose is the prevention of cruelty to animals. Such gifts are supported as charitable in England on the ground that they tend to "the advancement of morals and education among men": In re Foveaux, [1895] 2 Ch. 501, 507, per Chitty, J.; Marsh v. Means, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 790; In re Douglas, 35 Ch. Div. 472; In re Wedgwood (Allen v. Wedgwood), [1915] 1 Ch. 113 ("for the protection and benefit of animals"). See, also, Minns v. Billings, 183 Mass. 126, 92 Am. St. Rep. 420, 66 N. E. 593. Hence, a gift to an Anti-vivisection Society is a valid charity; the court, in passing upon educational or religious gifts, seldom concerns itself with the truth or falsity of the opinions sought to be propagated: In re Foveaux, [1895] 2 Ch. 501; Armstrong v. Reeves, 25 L. R. Ir. 325. Drinking-fountains for animals: In re Coleman's Estate, 167 Cal. 212, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 682, 138 Pac. 992; In re Estate of Graves, 242 Ill. 23, 134 Am. St. Rep. 302, 17 Ann. Cas, 137, and note on gifts for benefit of animals, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 283, 89 N. E. 672. The "promotion of temperance work" is a valid charitable purpose: Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 76 Am. St. Rep. 924, 50 L. R. A. 307, 82 N. W. 345; Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen, 446; Sherman v. Congregational Home Miss. Co., 176 Mass. 349, 57 N. E. 702. The opinions in these cases do not indicate to which of the recognized classes such purpose is most closely assimilated; but it may be surmised that the purpose is chiefly one of moral education. A bequest to trustees, "to be used by them, according to their best judgment, for the attainment of woman suffrage in the United States of America and its territorics," is valid, although an accomplishment of the purpose might involve constitutional amendment: Garrison v. Little, 75 Ill. App. 402, disagreeing with Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539, on this point, and relying on Haines v. Allen, 78 Iud. 100, 41 Am. Rep. 555; In re Foveaux, [1895] 2 Ch. 501, and George v. Braddock, supra, 45 N. J. Eq. 757, 14 Am. St. Rep. 754, 6 L. R. A. 511, 18 Atl. 881. For education of the people in the principles of Socialism, valid; Peth v. Spear, 63 Wash. 291, 115 Pac. 164, quoting this paragraph of the text.

or of some particular district, or to lighten the public burdens for defraying the necessary expenses of local administration which rest upon the inhabitants of a designated region.^{1 a}

§ 1024, ¹ Examples: For the improvement or good of a town: Jones v. Williams, Amb. 651; Howse v. Chapman, 4 Ves. 542; Att'y-Gen. v. Lonsdale, 1 Sim. 105; Mitford v. Reynolds, 1 Phill. Ch. 185; Att'y-Gen. v. Bushby, 24 Beav. 299; for the benefit of the country generally: Nightingale v. Goulbourn, 2 Phill. Ch. 594; to aid in payment of the public debt: Newland v. Att'y-Gen., 3 Mer. 684; for a parish or the parishioners: Att'y-Gen. v. Webster, L. R. 20 Eq. 483; public benefit of a town, improving streets, lighting, paving, protecting from the sea, etc.: Att'y-Gen. v. Eastlake, 11 Hare, 205, 215, 216; Att'y-Gen. v. Brown, 1 Swanst. 265, 301, 302; fire companies in Pennsylvania: Humane Fire Co.'s Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 389; Bethlehem v. Perseverance Fire Co., 81 Pa. St. 445.

§1024, (a) In re Lord Stratheden and Campbell, [1894] 3 Ch. 265 (for benefit of a volunteer corps of militia); Attorney-General v. Day, [1900] 1 Ch. 31 (for repair of roads); Re Allen (Hargreaves v. Taylor), [1905] 2 Ch. 400, 405 (such charitable educational or other institutions of town and also such other general purposes for town as trustees might think fit); Trustees of Newcastle Common v. Megginson, 1 Boyce (24 Del.), 361, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1207, 77 Atl. 565 (use and benefit of inhabitants of town); Chapman v. Newell, 146 Iowa, 415, 125 N. W. 324 (public cemetery); Burr v. City of Boston, 208 Mass. 537, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 143, 95 N. E. 208 (maintenance and improvement of public parks); Richardson v. Mullery, 200 Mass. 247, 86 N. E. 319 (life-saving station); Richardson v. Essex Institute, 208 Mass. 311, 21 Ann. Cas. 1158, 94 N. E. 262 (museum, public park and botanical garden); Bowden v. Brown, 200 Mass. 269, 128 Am. St. Rep. 419, 86 N. E. 351 (gift to

town for erection of homes for poor); Thorp v. Lund, 227 Mass. 474, 116 N. E. 946 (gift to foreign nation, for national purpose, valid); In re Bartlett, 163 Mass. 509, 40 N. E. 899 (for a public park); Miller v. Rosenberger, 144 Mo. 292, 46 S. W. 167 (for the use and benefit of the citizens of an unincorporated town); Re Harteau, 204 N. Y. 292, 97 N. E. 726 (for erection of statue in Brooklyn Park, mayor of Brooklyn to act with executor, sustained though Brooklyn no longer had mayor); In re John's Estate, 30 Or. 494, 36 L. R. A. 242, 47 Pac. 341, 50 Pac. 226 (for support of free public schools in a certain district); Girard Trust Co. v. Russell, (Pa.) 179 Fed. 446, 120 C. C. A. 592 (trust to pay debt of state should be upheld if possible); Webster v. Wiggin, 19 R. I. 73, 28 L. R. A. 510, 31 Atl. 824 (to pay the salaries of additional school teachers); Sheldon v. Town of Stockbridge, 67 Vt. 299, 31 Atl. 414 (to a town to keep burial grounds in repair; for support of schools; for poor of

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§ 1025. Creation of the Trust—Certainty or Uncertainty of the Object and of the Beneficiaries.—One of the distinguishing elements of a "charitable" as compared with an ordinary trust consists in the generality, indefiniteness, and even uncertainty which is permitted in describing the objects and purposes or the beneficiaries. From the very definition of a "charitable trust" the beneficiaries are always an uncertain body or class; but the doctrine goes further than this. If the donor sufficiently shows his intention to create a charity, and indicates its general nature and purpose, and describes in general terms the class of beneficiaries, the trust will be sustained and enforced, although there may be indefiniteness in the declaration and description, and although much may be left to the discretion of the trustees.¹a This uncertainty, however, must

§ 1025, 1 The decisions *appear* to be very conflicting, and it is certainly difficult to harmonize them all. The following are examples of trusts

town); Ritter v. Couch, 71 W. Va. 221, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1216, 76 S. E. 428 (cemctery); Stuart v. City of Easten, 74 Fed. 854, 21 C. C. A. 146, 39 U. S. App. 238 erection of courtheuse); (før Staines v. Burton, 17 Utah, 331, 70 Am. St. Rep. 788, 53 Pac. 1015 (gift to trustee for benefit of members of Mormon church, which included a majority of the inhabitants of the state, "whether it be for schools, parks, watering cities, planting forests, acclimatizing forcign plants, or anything else whereby the members may be benefited," unheld). But to constitute a valid charity, benefit to the public must be the direct, and not a remote, object of the gift. Hence, a gift for the encouragement of a mere spert, such as yacht racing, cannot be supported as "charitable," although the sport might be beneficial to the public, as in the particular case by tending to train sailors and

encourage shipbuilding: In re Nottage, [1895] 2 Ch. 649. But see In re Good (Harington v. Watts), [1905] 2 Ch. 60 (to officers' mess of regiment to maintain library, any surplus to be used in purchase of plate for mess; held good as for general public purpose and tending to reduce taxation and increase efficiency of army). It is plain that the rule of In re Nottage mus. be confined within narrow limits. Gifts for the encouragement of athletics may be valid educational charities, since education includes the development of body as well as of mind: See In re Mariette (Mariette v. Governing Body of Aldenham School), [1915] 2 Ch. 284; Gibson v. Frye Institute, 137 Tenn. 452, L. R. A. 1917D, 1062, 193 S. W. 1059; cited in notes to § 1023.

§ 1025, (a) This section is cited in Woodreof v. Hundley, 147 Ala. 287, 39 South. 907; Hunt v. Fowler, not be carried too far. The intention of the donor to create some kind of charity, religious, benevolent, educational, or otherwise, must never be left uncertain. It must sufficiently appear that he designed to establish a charity, and the

which were held *invalid* on account of too great uncertainty: A gift for "charitable or public purposes": Vezey v. Jamson, 1 Sim. & St. 69; see Fowler v. Fowler, 33 Beav. 616; for such "objects of liberality and benevolence" as a trustee shall approve of: Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399; Williams v. Kershaw, 5 Clark & F. 111; Ellis v. Selby, 1 Mylne & C. 286; per contra, Waldo v. Caley, 16 Ves. 206; Horde v. Earl of Suffolk, 2 Mylne & K. 59; Johnston v. Swann, eited Amb. 585, note; but see comments on these cases in Ellis v. Selby, 1 Mylne & C. 286, 292, 293; also a bequest to a public body for a purpose, none being stated, is void: Corporation of Gloucester v. Osborn, 1 H. L. Cas. 272; sub nom. Corporation of Gloucester v. Wood, 3 Hare, 131, 136–148; a bequest "to the trustees of Mt. Zion chapel," etc., no purpose being stated; held that the court could not assume a charitable purpose to be intended, and the bequest was void: Aston v. Wood, L. R. 6 Eq. 419; a bequest which the

121 Ill. 269, 12 N. E. 331, 17 N. E. 491; Trafton v. Black, 187 Ill. 36, 58 N. E. 292; Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Iowa, 92, 61 N. W. 434; Bedford v. Bedford, 99 Ky. 273, 35 S. W. 926. The text in quoted in Peth v. Spear, 63 Wash. 291, 115 Pac. 164.

Indefiniteness of beneficiaries is a characteristic of such trusts: Moseley v. Smiley, 171 Ala. 593, 55 South. 143; Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, 233 Ill. 327, 122 Am. St. Rep. 169, 84 N. E. 256; Ackerman v. Fichter, 179 Ind. 392, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1117, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 221, 101 N. E. 493; Dykeman v. Jenkines, 179 Ind. 549, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1011, 101 N. E. 1013; Barker v. Town of Petersburg, 41 Ind. App. 447, 82 N. E. 996; Wilson v. First Nat. Bank, 164 Iowa, 402, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 481, 145 N. W. 948; Green's Adm'r v. Fidelity Trust Co., 134 Ky. 311, 20 Ann. Cas. 861, 120 S. W. 283; Kasey v. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 Ky. 609, 115

S. W. 739; Ripley v. Brown, 218 Mass. 33, 105 N. E. 637; Buckley v. Monck, (Mo.) 187 S. W. 31; Re Cunningham's Will, 206 N. Y. 601, 100 N. E. 437 (rule since amendment of 1893 same as English); Godfrey v. Hutchins, 28 R. I. 517, 68 Atl. 317.

Form of language used is not material if intent to create charitable trust appears: Chapman v. Newell, 146 Iowa, 415, 125 N. W. 324; Minot v. Attorney-General (Parker), 189 Mass. 176, 75 N. E. 149; Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Hoboken, 70 N. J. Eq. 630, 62 Atl. 1,

Most liheral rules applied to uphold trust: In re Peabody's Estate, 154 Cal. 173, 97 Pac. 184; Wilson v. First Nat. Bank, 164 Iowa, 402, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 481, 145 N. W. 948; Trenton Society for Organizing Charity v. Howell, (N. J. Ch.) 63 Atl. 1110; Godfrey v. Hutchins, 28 R. I. 517, 68 Atl. 317. purpose must be indicated with sufficient clearness, to enable the court, by means of its settled doctrines, to carry the design into effect. Such is the well-established English doctrine, and the court strives to carry out a charity if

executors "should apply to any charitable or benevolent purpose they might agree upon at any time," held too indefinite, and inoperative: In re Jarman's Estate, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 584.^b

Examples of trusts held valid, although uncertain in their objects or purposes: Where the intention to create a charitable trust is evident, the

§ 1025, (b) Gift to Charitable or Other (Indefinite) Purposes .--- It is a well-established rule of the English courts that where there is a gift of a fund, part or all of which may, at the discretion of the trustees, be applied to an indefinite purpose which is not strictly "charitable," the whole gift fails: Hunter v. Attorney-General, [1899] App. Cas. 309, reversing In re Hunter, [1897] 2 Ch. 105, and restoring [1897] 1 Ch. 518; Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399, 10 Ves. 321, supra; Vezey v. Jamson, 1 S. & S. 69; Dunne v. Byrne, [1912] App. Cas. 407 (gift to bishop to be used and expended wholly or in part as he may judge most conducive to the good of religion in his diocese); In re Da Costa (Clarke v. Church of England Collegiate School), [1912] 1 Ch. 337 (for such public purposes and to such person or persons as A may direct); In re The Friends' Free School (Clibborn v. O'Brien), [1909] 2 Ch. 675 (to such persons or for such purposes, "civil or religious," as certain persons might appoint); In re Davidson (Mintz v. Bourne), [1909] 1 Ch. 567 (fund to be divided between such charitable or other societies as trustee should think fit); In re Sidney (Hingeston v. Sidney), [1908] 1 Ch. **III**---144

126, [1908] 1 Ch. 488 (for such charitable uses or such emigration uses as trustee may appoint). This highly technical rule has frequently been deplored by judges who felt themselves bound by its authority; and is the more unfortunate in its results on acount of the strictness with which the English courts condemn, as incapable of creating a charity, many expressions which, in popular usage, are nearly synonymous with the word "charitable," because, when the meaning of such expressions is closely analyzed, they are found to be capable of embracing objects which cannot be the objects of a valid charitable use. The word "charity," in one at least of its popular meanings, is equivalent to "relief of poverty" (Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] App. Cas. 531), but the natural desire of testators to escape from this narrow meaning by the use of words more nearly synonymous with the broad significance of "charity" in its legal acceptation, has usually resulted in the defeat of their probable intention. Thus, a bequest to "objects of liberality and benevolence" was invalid: Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399, 10 Ves. 321, supra; "for benevolent purposes," invalid:

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at all practicable. In this country, the doctrine has been adopted only to a partial extent. In a few of the states where the system of charitable trusts prevails, the English theory seems to have been accepted with little or no modi-

court will, as a rule, sustain and enforce it, although its terms are very indefinite and uncertain: Magistrates of Dundee v. Morris, 3 Macq. 134, 157; a hequest for "such charities and other public purposes as lawfully may be in the parish of T.": Dolan v. Macdermot, L. R. 5 Eq. 60; 3 Ch. 676; for charitable purposes generally, no particular kind being mentioned: Att'y-Gen. v. Herrick, Amb. 712; Chamberlayne v. Brockett,

James v. Allen, 3 Mer. 17, 19; to "any charitable or benevolent purpose," invalid. In re Jarman's Estate, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 584, supra; to "such charitable or public purposes as my trustee thinks proper," invalidated by the word "public": Blair v. Duncan, [1902] App. Cas. 37; for "encouraging undertakings of general utility," invalid: Kendall v. Granger, 5 Beav. 300, 303. This line of decisions reached its reductio ad absurdum in the recent case of

In re McDuff, [1896] 2 Ch. 451, where a bequest for "charitable or philanthropic purposes" was held bad, on the ground that the word "philanthropic" had never been defined by the courts, and might possibly include objects not strictly "charitable." It must be said that the attempts of the Lords Justices of Appeal to suggest such possible objects are decidedly strained; the argument of Sir Richard Webster. Attorney-General, to the general effect that "philanthropic" expresses the technical legal import of the word "charitable" more perfectly than any word in the language and should therefore be regarded as identical in meaning, will probably carry more of conviction to an American court. [See the very recent case, Thorp v. Lund, 227

Mass. 474, 116 N. E. 946, holding that "philanthropic" is not essentially different from "charitable" and disapproving In re McDuff.] Moreover, the recent English cases are by no means free from inconsistency; thus, gifts "to the service of God" (In re Darling, [1896] 1 Ch. 50), and to "religious socicties" (In re White, [1893] 2 Ch. 41), were upheld on the authority of previous cases, although each expression was admittedly broad enough to cover objects not "charitable." A rule which finds "the service of God" definite. and "philanthropy" indefinite, certainly savors of extreme refinement.

The rule as stated at the beginning of this note is subject to two limitations (Hunter v. Attorney-General, [1899] App. Cas. 309, 324). The gift is valid where the trustees have a discretion to apportion between charitable objects and definite and ascertainable objects not charitable: Attorney-General v. Doyley, 4 Vin. Abr. 485, 7 Ves. 58, n.; Salushury v. Denton, 3 K. & J. 529; and where there is a general overriding trust for charitable purposes, but some of the particular purposes to which the fund may be applied are not strictly charitable, or one of two alternative modes of applicafication. In most of the states more certainty in defining the purposes of the charity and terms of the trust, or in designating the classes of persons who are intended to be the beneficiaries, is required, in order to sustain the gift, than is necessary under the methods of the English courts.²

L. R. 8 Ch. 206; for such charitable purposes as the trustee or some other designated person may determine, or where the selection and application are left to the discretion of the trustees: Lewis v. Allenby, L. R. 10 Eq. 668; Wilkinson v. Barber, L. R. 14 Eq. 96; Wilkinson v. Lindgren, L. R. 5 Ch. 570; Pocock v. Att'y-Gen., L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 342.° For further examples of uncertain objects and purposes, see *post*, § 1027, and cases cited as illustrations of the rule of *cy-pres*.

§ 1025, ² It is impossible to formulate any more specific American rule, since there is a radical difference in the theories and fundamental views prevailing in various states. I shall make no attempt to analyze and classify the decisions upon this most important question, but shall simply give some examples, referring the reader to treatises upon trusts for a detailed discussion. Examples of trusts held invalid:^d Bequest to execu-

Douglas, 35 Ch. Div. 472.

In a recent case, a gift to "charitable and henevolent institutions" was sustained, as meaning "charitable" institutions which were also benevolent: In re Best, [1904] 2 Ch. 354.

§ 1025, (c) Where there was a gift of a fund to the P. A. society "or some one or more kindred institutions" having certain specified objects, it was construed as \varkappa good charitable gift to one or more institutions of which the charity named was a type; the selection was not left to the discretion of the trustecs, but a scheme was directed to be settled: In re Delmar Charitable Trusts, [1897] 2 Ch. 163.

§ 1025, (d) Trusts Invalid for Uncertainty; Additional Examples: Crim v. Williamson, 180 Ala. 179, 60 South. 293 ("charitable purposes"); Fairfield v. Lawson, 50 Conn. 501,

47 Am. Rep. 669 (trust for "freedmen," void when no power given to trustee to select beneficiaries); Bristol v. Bristol, 53 Conn. 242, 5 Atl. 687 ("for such charitable purposes as A may deem proper"); Mills v. Newberry, 112 Ill. 123, 54 Am. Rep. 213; Moran v. Moran, 104 Iowa, 216, 65 Am. St. Rep. 443, 39 L. R. A. 204, 73 N. W. 617 (trust "to be divided among the Sisters of Charity"); Spalding v. St. Joseph's Industrial School, 107 Ky. 382, 54 S. W. 200 ("for charitable objects, to be expended for said objects in this diocese of Louisville, according to his discretion"); Coleman v. O'Leary's Ex'r, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1248, 70 S. W. 1068 (to one "to be applied to any charitable uses, and so as to do most good, in his judgment," invalid; to Jesuit order, "for the purposes of education or religion," invalid); Gerick's Ex'r v. Gerick, 158 Ky. 478, 165 S. W. 695 ("to dispose of all my

§ 1026. Certainty or Uncertainty of the Trustee.—Char-

tors and their successors, "to be by them distributed to such persons, societies, or institutions as they may consider most deserving," held too indefinite, and invalid as a charitable trust: Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211, 39 Am. Rep. 445; compare Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 602, 35 Am. Rep. 550; bequest to A, "to distribute the same in such manner as, in his discretion, shall appear best calculated to carry out wishes which I have expressed to him," held invalid, and the trust cannot be established by proof of testator's oral directions: Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221; bequest to a Sunday school, the income to be "applied to making Christmas presents to the scholars," void; no competent trustee and no certain beneficiaries: Goodell v. Union Ass'n etc., 29 N. J. Eq. 32; devise and

other property according to his judgment for good and charitable purposes"); Novak v. Trustees of Orphans' Home, 123 Md. 161, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1067, 90 Atl. 997 (gift to corporation for purpose outside its powers is void); Minot v. Attorney-General (Parker), 189 Mass. 176, 75 N. E. 149 (where trust is void for indefiniteness of beneficiaries, resulting trust should be declared for next of kin); Wheelock v. American Tract Soc., 109 Mich. 141, 63 Am. St. Rep. 578, 66 N. W. 955 (for certain charities in such proportions as trustees may think proper, and, in their discretion, to worthy poor girls); Moore ν. O'Leary, 180 Mich. 261, 146 N. W. 661 (gift to C., "to be disposed of as I have heretofore instructed him for charitable purposes"); Hadley v. Forsee, 203 Mo. 418, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49, and long note on charitable trusts, 101 S. W. 59 (for charitable purposes "as my wife may think will be most conducive to carrying out of my wishes." Wife died); Board of Trustees of M. E. Church v. May, 201 Mo. 360, 99 S. W. 1093 (to Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and missionary cause); Jones v. Patterson, 271 Mo.

1, L. R. A. 1917F, 660, 195 S. W. 1004 (missionary purposes); Livesey v. Jones, 55 N. J. Eq. 204, 35 Atl. 1064, affirmed sub nom. Chadwick v. Livesey, 56 N. J. Eq. 453, Atl. 1115 ("to humanity's 41 friend . . . B, to use and expend the same for the promotion of the religious, moral, and social welfare of the people in any locality, whenever and wherever he may think most needful and necessary"); Hyde's Ex'rs v. Hyde, 64 N. J. Eq. 6, 53 Atl. 593 ("for such reilgious, charitable, or educational or other purposes as they may deem advisable"); Van Syckel v. Johnson, (N. J. Ch.) 70 Atl. 657 (if unascertained part is not for charity, whole is void); Hegeman's Ex'rs v. Roome, 70 N. J. Eq. 562, 62 Atl. 392 (gift to be distributed among such religious, benevolent or chari table objects as trustee may select); Rose v. Hatch, 125 N. Y. 427, 26 N. E. 467 ("the property shall be devoted to the support and education of orphan children, in such way and manner as in his judgment may best conserve this object"); Read v. Williams, 125 N. Y. 560, 21 Am. St. Rep. 748, 26 N. E. 730 ("to such charitable institutions, and in such

itable trusts also differ from private trusts in another very

bequest "to the Roman Catholic orphans" of a certain diocese, the bishop, as executor, authorized to use the property for the benefit of said orphans, held invalid; uncertainty as to trustee and beneficiaries: Heiss v. Murphy, 40 Wis. 276; bequest to trustees, to be expended, at their discretion, "for the establishment of a school at M."; indefinite and invalid: Att'y-Gen. v. Soule, 28 Mich. 153; bequest to "benevolent, religious, or charitable purposes," invalid: Thomson's Ex'rs v. Norris, 20 N. J. Eq. 489; a bequest to A., bishop of W., and his successors, in trust for the sisters of St. Joseph, an unincorporated society: Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U. S. 362; 3 Hughes, 397; a devise or bequest to trustees for the benefit of "the colored persons" of a city or state: Needles v. Martin, 33 Md. 609.

proportions, as my executors, by and with the advice of my friend, H, shall determine"); Tilden v. Green, 130 N. Y. 29, 27 Am. St. Rep. 487, 14 L. R. A. 33, 28 N. E. 880 (to "such charitable, educational, and scientific purpose as in the judgment of my executors will render said residue of my property most widely and substantially beneficial to mankind"; also, to establish and maintain a free library); Fairchild v. Edson, 154 N. Y. 199, 61 Am. St. Rep. 609, 48 N. E. 541 (trust to be divided among such "incorporated religious, benevolent, and charitable societies of the city of New York" as shall be appointed by the trustees); In re Shattuck's Will, 193 N. Y. 446, 86 N. E. 455 (gift to religious, educational or eleemosynary institutions as trustees may select); Kelly v. Nichols, 17 R. I. 306, 21 Atl. 906 (where unascertainable portion is void, trust fails: Mason v. Perry, 22 R. I. 475, 48 Atl. 671 (same); Brennan v. Winkler, 37 S. C. 457, 16 S. E. 190 ("for the education of young men for the priesthood, or to educate individual orphan boys or orphan girls"); Johnson v. Johnson, 92 Tenn. (8 Pickle) 559, 36 Am. St.

Rep. 104, 22 L. R. A. 179, 23 S. W. 114 (income "shall be used for some charitable purpose, preference always to be given to something of an educational nature, although permissible to appropriate the income in any way it may seem to the trustees to be necessary and most desirable as they may elect"); Jones v. Green, (Tenn. Ch. App.) 36 S. W. 729 (for support of the ministry. repairs of the church, or other benevolent objects as may be designated from time to time by the said Union Church); Nolte v. Meyer, 79 Tex. 351, 15 S. W. 276 ("German citizens comprising the neighborhood six miles west of Brenham"); Fifield v. Van Wyck's Ex'r, 94 Va. 557, 64 Am. St. Rep. 745, 27 S. E. 446 ("for the benefit of the New Jerusalem Church (Swedenborgian), as they shall deem best"); Arnett v. Fairmont Trust Co., 70 W. Va. 296, 73 S. E. 930 ("to be placed and used to the very best of said parties' knowledge in helping the poor, those who are deserving, in lifting young men up and helping the work along in putting down intoxicating drinks and saving souls. Let this money be used in the way God may direct

important feature. It is settled, as a part of the complete

Examples of trusts held sufficiently certain and valid:^e Bequest to executors, "to be divided by them among such Roman Catholic charities, institutions, schools, or churches in the city of New York," as a majority of the executors should decide, there being many such institutions in New York authorized by law to take gifts by will: Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 602, 35 Am. Rep. 550; devise or bequest to a town, or towns, or a county, for purpose of building or maintaining a school, or educating poor children, or aiding the poor, etc.: Boxford etc. Soc. v. Harriman, 125 Mass. 321 (a school); Clement v. Hyde, 50 Vt. 716, 28 Am. Rep. 522 (educating poor children); Craig v. Secrist, 54 Ind. 419 (same); Mason v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 27 N. J. Eq. 47 (same, and aiding poor

for His cause," and "to be placed in the Baptist church to be used for the Lord's work in the way He may direct"). It should be observed that this note and the author's note above enumerate, among others, cases from several states of the author's "First class" (post, § 1029), where the doctrine as to charitable trusts has been abolished by statute, or adopted only with great restrictions.

A trust for the benefit of the testator's next of kin "who may be needy" was held to be void as to the clause "who may be needy" in Fontaine's Adm'r v. Thompson's Adm'r, 80 Va. 229, 56 Am. Rep. 588. See, also, Kent v. Dunham, 142 Mass. 516, 56 Am. Rep. 667, 7 N. E. 730. A similar bequest was upheld in Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 57 Am. Rep. 278, 28 N. W. 353. And see Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N. H. 354, 10 Atl. 706. For analogous English cases, see ante, § 1022, and note 1.

§ 1025, (e) Trusts Sufficiently Certain; Additional Examples: In re Pardoe (McLaughlin v. Attorney-General), [1906] 2 Ch. 184; Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 167, 27 L. Ed. 397, 2 Sup. Ct. 327; John v. Smith, 102 Fed. 218, 42 C. C. A. 275, affirm-

ing 91 Fed. 827; Handley v. Palmer, 103 Fed. 39, 43 C. C. A. 100, affirming 91 Fed. 948; Field v. Drew Theol. Sem., 41 Fed. 371; Wood v. Paine, 66 Fed. 807 (to town council, in trust for the support of the poor of said town); Duggan v. Slocum, 83 Fed. 244, affirmed in 92 Fed. 806, 34 C. C. A. 676; People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 35 L. R. A. 269, 45 Pac. 270 ("the boys and girls of California"); In re Upham's Estate. 127 Cal. 90, 59 Pac. 315; Fay v. Howe, 136 Cal. 599, 69 Pac. 423 (to trustee to be used "in aid of deserving aged native-born in the town of S. needing such aid, to be used as in his judgment he may think best"); Clayton v. Hallett, 30 Colo. 231, 97 Am. St. Rep. 117, 59 L. R. A. 407, 70 Pac. 429 (trust for college for poor, white, male orphans, born of reputable parents); Beardsley v. Selectmen of Bridgeport, 53 Conn. 489, 55 Am. Rep. 152 3 Atl. 557 ("to be used at discretion, . . . for the special benefit of the worthy, deserving, poor, white, American, Protestant, democratic widows and orphans residing in B."; each adjective capable of sustaining a charitable bequest); Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 38 Am. St.

system prevailing in England, that not only may the bene-

widows); Fellows v. Miner, 119 Mass. 541 (aged and infirm poor); devise and bequest in trust "for the purpose of founding an institution for the education of youths in St. Louis Co.": Russell v. Allen, 5 Dill. 235; a gift to trustees to pay income to an almoner to be appointed by the probate court, and he to distribute the same among the poor widows of a certain district, held valid, and not defeated by a delay of several years: Sohier v. Burr, 127 Mass. 221; a conveyance to trustees for an unincorporated church; Laird v. Bass, 50 Tex. 412; a devise of lands to trustees "for the erection of a hospital for foundlings, and for any corporation which Congress may create": Ould v. Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 303; a bequest, the income "to help form a Young Men's Christian Association";

Rep. 346, 26 Atl. 846 ("the number of beneficiaries under a charitable bequest is immaterial where a power of selection is given"); Conklin v. Davis, 63 Conn. 377, 28 Atl. 537; Hayden v. Connecticut Hospital for Insane, 64 Conn. 320, 30 Atl. 50; Parish of Christ Church v. Trustees of Donations, etc., 67 Conn. 554, 35 Atl. 552; In re Strong's Appeal, 68 Conn. 527, 37 Atl. 395 (for "the worthy poor people of said town of P., as may be in needy and necessitous circumstances, and in any misfortune; always, however, excluding from assistance or aid the criminal class, or the habitually intemperate, indolent, and lazy"); Appeal of Mack, 71 Conn. 122, 41 Atl. 242 '(to erect and maintain a church for use of the L. Church in S.); Beckwith v. St. Philip's Parish, 69 Ga. 564; Guilfoil v. Arthur, 158 Ill. 600. 41 N. E. 1009 (in trust for "widows and home and school for orphans of deceased members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers," "provided that the brotherhood may use the property or dispose of it for any charitable purpose, for the use of said widows and orphans"); Hunt v. Fowler, 121 Ill. 269, 12 N. E. 331, 17 N. E.

491 (worthy poor of a certain city); Grand Prairie Seminary v. Morgan, 171 Ill. 444, 49 N. E. 516; Trafton v. Black, 187 Ill. 36, 58 N. E. 292 (erection of churches of certain denominations within certain specified limits, executor being vested with discretion as to location and cost); Hitchcock v. Board of Home Missions, 259 Ill. 288, 102 N. E. 741 (education of poor children); Welch v. Caldwell, 226 Ill. 488, 80 N. E. 1014 ("charitable and religious purposes," to be chosen by trustee); French v. Calkins, 252 Ill. 243, 96 N. E. 877; Dykeman v. Jenkines, 179 Ind. 549, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1011, 101 N. E. 1013; Ackerman ν. Fichter, 179 Ind. 392, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1117, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 221, 101 N. E. 493; Grant v. Saunders, 121 Iowa, 80, 100 Am. St. Rep. 310, 95 N. W. 411 (to the poor, discretion being given to trustee); Chapman v. Newell, 146 Iowa, 415, 125 N. W. 324; In re Cleven's Estate, 161 Iowa, 289, 142 N. W. 986 (no objection that there was no limitation as to territory from which beneficiaries were to be selected); Tichenor v. Brewer, 98 Ky. 349, 33 S. W. 86 (to a bishop "to be by him used for the Roman Catholic charitable in-

ficiaries be uncertain, but that, even where the gift is made

also a bequest to A, "that the interest may be applied, at his discretion, in aid of the deserving poor of M.": Goodell v. Union Ass'n etc., 29 N. J. Eq. 32; a bequest to a certain church, "in trust, to use the same to promote the religious interests of said church, and to aid the missionary, educational, and benevolent enterprises to which said church is in the habit of contributing": De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq. 36; bequest to a church, to be paid as soon as it is incorporated, "to employ in the promotion of the Universalist denomination": Trustees etc. v. Beatty, 28 N. J. Eq. 570; a devise for the establishing a school for the benefit of youth residing in New Jersey, or furnishing education to such children of the city of H. as the authorities shall permit to attend: Stevens v. Shippen, 28 N. J. Eq. 487; a conveyance of land, in trust, for the purpose of erecting thereon a school-house and a meeting-house for divine worship: Meeting St. Bap. Soc. v. Hail, 8 R. I. 234; a bequest, the income to be applied for "the benefit of the sabbath-school library of the First Baptist Church in S., or the Baptist Home Missionary Society, whichever may be deemed most suitable": Fairbanks v. Lamson, 99 Mass. 533; see, also, Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 4 Wheat. 1; Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99; Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 127; Brown v. Concord, 33 N. H. 285; Burr's Ex'rs v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241, 29 Am. Dec. 154; Baker v. Smith; 13 Met. 34, 41; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539, 557; White v. Fisk, 22 Conn. 31; Shotwell's Ex'rs v. Mott, 2 Sand. Ch. 46; Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 525; Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298, 80 Am. Dec. 269; Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584; Witman v. Lex, 17 Serg. & R. 88, 17 Am. Dec. 644; Brendle v. German Ref. Cong., 33 Pa. St. 415, 418; Philadelphia v. Girard's Heirs, 45 Pa. St. 9, 84 Am. Dec. 470; Miller v. Porter, 53 Pa. St. 292; Gallego's Ex'rs v. Att'y-Gen., 3 Leigh, 450, 24 Am. Dec. 650; Venable v. Coffman, 2 W. Va. 310; McAuley v. Wilson, 1 Dev. Eq. 276, 18 Am. Dec. 587; Att'y-Gen. v. Jolly, 2 Strob. Eq. 379; Carter v. Balfour, 18 Ala. 814; Dickson v. Montgomery, 1 Swan, 348; Att'y-Gen. v. Wallace, 7 B. Mon. 611; Urmey's Ex'r v. Wooden, 1 Ohio St. 160, 59 Am. Dec. 615; Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 Ill. 225.

stitutions in his diocese"); Bedford v. Bedford, 99 Ky. 273, 35 S. W. 926 (to a state for a permanent school fund); Crawford's Heirs v. Thomas, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1100, 54 S. W. 197; Coleman v. O'Lcary's Ex'r, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1248, 70 S. W. 1068 (home for poor Catholic men); Thompson's Ex'r v. Brown, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 371, 75 S. W. 210, reversing a prior construction of the same will in 24 Ky. Law Rep. 674, 70 S. W. 674 ("to the poor in his discretion"); Fox v. Gibbs, 86 Me. 87, 29 Atl. 940 ("benevolent and charitable"); Eutaw Place Church v. Shively, 67 Md. 493, 1 Am. St. Rep. 412, 10 Atl. 244 (to a church "to be applied to the Sunday-school belonging to or attached to said church"); 2297

to no certain trustee, so that the trust, if private, would

Snowden v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 114 Md. 650, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 679, 85 Atl. 510 (discussion of rights of unincorporated asociations as beneficiaries); Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 9 Am. St. Rep. 713, 17 N. E. 839 (to trustee, "to be disposed of by him for such charitable purposes as he shall think proper"); White v. Ditson, 140 Mass. 351, 54 Am. Rep. 273, 4 N. E. 606 (same); Suter v. Hilliard, 132 Mass. 412, 42 Am. Rep. 444; Bullard v. Chandler, 149 Mass. 532, 5 L. R. A. 104, 21 N. E. 951 ("to poor and unfortunate"); Sears v. Chapman, 158 Mass. 400, 35 Am. St. Rep. 502, 33 N. E. 604; McAlister v. Burgess, 161 Mass. 269, 24 L. R. A. 158, 37 N. E. 173; Weber v. Bryant, 161 Mass. 400, 37 N. E. 203 ("objects and purposes of benevolence and charity, public and private, including educational or charitable in. stitutions and the relief of individual need"); St. Paul's Church v. Attorney-General, 164 Mass. 188, 41 N. E. 231; Gill v. Attorney-General, 197 Mass. 232, 83 N. E. 676 (gift to charitable institutions, persons and objects, as trustees may think fit; held "charitable" applied to all three); Chase v. Dickey, 212 Mass. 555, 99 N. E. 410 (Christian Science); Ripley v. Brown, 218 Mass. 33, 105 N. E. 637 (gift to endow or build a church or in alterna. tive an industrial school, or for relief of deserving poor of Boston, sustained); Sandusky v. Sandusky, 261 Mo. 351, 168 S. W. 1150 ("for the general advancement of Christianity"); Barkley v. Donnelly, 112 Mo. 561, 19 S. W. 305; Miller v. Rosenberger, 144 Mo. 292, 46 S. W. 167 (for the use and benefit of the citizens of an unincorporated town);

St. James' Orphan Asylum v. Shelby, 60 Neb. 796, 83 Am. St. Rep. 553, 84 N. W. 273 (to apply "to some charity according to his judgment; but I prefer that the same be applied to the establishment or maintenance of an orphanage"); Towle v. Nesmith, 69 N. H. 212, 42 Atl. 900 (for poor widows and children under ten years of age); Haynes v. Carr, 70 N. H. 463, 49 Atl. 638 ("for the benefit of the poor and destitute in N. H., and for charitable and educational purposes therein"); Goodale v. Mooney, 60 N. H. 528, 49 Am. Rep. 334 (to be distributed by executors "for benevolent objects"); Glover v. Baker, 76 N. H. 393, 83 Atl. 916 (details left to trustee; Christian Science and repair of church building); Hesketh v. Murphy, 36 N. J. Eq. 304 (the power to dispense the fund carries with it, by implication, the power to select the beneficiaries) Union Meth. Epis. Ch. v Wilkinson, 36 N. J. Eq. 141 (poor members of certain named churches); Bruere v. Cook, 63 N. J. Eq. 624, 52 Atl. 1001 (home and foreign missions); Vineland Trust Co. v. Westendorf, 86 N. J. Eq. 343, 98 Atl. 314 ("for the furtherance of the broadest interpretation of metaphysical thought," valid); People v. Powers, 147 N. Y. 104, 35 L. R. A. 502, 41 N. E. 432 ("charitable and benevolent institutions"); Be Cunningham's Will, 206 N. Y. 601, 100 N. E. 437 (gift "to such charitable and benevolent associations and institutions of learning as my said executor shall select," sustained); Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497, 32 S. E. 809 (to build a church and a home for a minister for a certain denomination in a certain place); Hagen v. Sacriwholly fail, a court of equity will carry the trust into effect,

son, 19 N. D. 160, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 724, 123 N. W. 518 ("destitute children" or "poor children" of a certain municipality; trustees may select beneficiaries); Pennoyer v. Wadhams, 20 Or. 274, 11 L. R. A. 211, 25 Pae. 720; In re John's Will, 30 Or. 494, 36 L. R. A. 242, 47 Pac. 341, 50 Pac. 226; Board of Foreign Missions v. Culp, 151 Pa. St. 467, 25 Atl. 117, 31 Wkly. Notes Cas. 135; In re Murphy's Estate, 184 Pa. St. 310, 63 Am. St. Rep. 802, 39 Atl. 70 ("to be divided among such benevolent, charitable, and religious institutions and associations as shall be selected by my executors"); Young v. St. Mark's Lutheran Church, 200 Pa. St. 332, 49 Atl. 887 (to aid young men in obtaining an education for the ministry, they to be selected according to the opinion of the pastor and church council); In re Sleicher's Estate, 201 Pa. St. 612, 51 Atl. 329 (to pay "to such German charitable institutions and German societies" as the trustees may select); In re Daly's Estate, 208 Pa. St. 58, 57 Atl. 180; In re Kimberley's Estate, 249 Pa. 483, 95 Atl. 86 ("to use and apply the same to such charitable uses as they may from time to time select"); In re Dulle's Estate, 218 Pa. 162, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1177, 67 Atl. 49 (for distribution among such religious, charitable and benevolent purposes and objects or institutions as in discretion of trustees shall be best); In re De Silver's Estate, 211 Pa. 459, 60 Atl. 1048 (such charitable institutions, except missionary societies, as they may select); Godfrey v. Hutchins, 28 R. I. 517, 68 Atl. 317 (uncertain beneficiaries, power of selection in trustees);

Selleck v. Thompson, 28 R. I. 350, 67 Atl. 425 ("charitable purposes"; power to administer implies power to select beneficiaries); Dye v. Beaver Creek Church, 48 S. C. 444; 59 Am. St. Rep. 724, 26 S. E. 717 (for poor children, for their tuition); Chatham v. Nashville Trust Co., (Tenn. Ch. App.) 57 S. W. 202 (in trust for the Old Women's Home of Nashville); Gidley v. Lovenberg, (Tex. Civ. App.) 79 S. W. 831; Inglish v. Johnson, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 118, 95 S. W. 558 (beneficiaries named as class, trustee designated and purpose of trust clear); and to same effect, Banner v. Rolf, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 88, 94 S. W. 1125 ("for the benefit and support of the poor, helpless and dependent members and orphan children" of a certain church); Staines v. Burton, 17 Utah, 331, 70 Am. St. Rep. 788, 53 Pac. 1015; Sheldon v. Town of Stockbridge, 67 Vt. 299, 31 Atl. 414 (for the poor of a certain town); In re Stewart's Estate, 26 Wash. 32, 66 Pac. 148, 67 Pac. 723 (for such other charitable purposes as they may see fit, in their discretion); Sawtelle v. Withrow, 94 Wis. 412, 69 N. W. 72 (to the "support, maintenance, and education of such indigent orphan children, under the age of fourteen years, in the county of R., as, in the judgment of my executors, may he most needy and deserving"); Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 76 Am. St. Rep. 924, 50 L. R. A. 307, 82 N. W. 345 (bequest in trust for temperance work in the city of M.); Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 57 Am. Rep. 278, 28 N. W. 353 (a bequest "to be given to any of my heirs who are in need, or not in very comfortable circumstances, as

either by appointing a trustee or by acting itself in the

to my executors seems fit and proper"); Hood v. Dorer, 107 Wis. 149, 82 N. W. 546 ("to be invested in a fund provided for the purpose for the support and maintenance of superannuated preachers of the denominated church the United Brethren in Christ"); Kronshage v. Varrel, (Wis.) 97 N. W. 928 (relief of distress arising from storms, floods, etc.).

It is noticeable that the American courts which profess to follow the English cases in supporting gifts of extreme uncertainty, such as gifts to "charitable objects" generally, have either repudiated the distinction between "charitable" and "benevolent" or kindred words, or at least have shown a strong inclination to infer from the context of the will that such words are used as synonymous with "charitable"; see, among other cases, Fox v. Gibbs, 86 Me. 87, 29 Atl. 940; Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen 446 (cf. Chamberlain v. Stearns, 111 Mass. 267); Pell v. Mercer, 14 R. I. 425; Goodale v. Mooney, 60 N. H. 528, 49 Am. Rep. 334; In re Murphy's Estate, 184 Pa. St. 310, 63 Am. St. Rep. 802, 39 Atl. 70 ("benevolent, charitable, and reassocialigious institutions and tions"); In re Dulle's Estate, 218 Pa. 162, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1177, 67 Atl. 49 (same); People v. Powers. 147 N. Y. 104, 35 L. R. A. 502, 41 N. E. 432; Rotch v. Emerson, 105 Mass. 431 ("philosophical and philanthropic purposes"); In re Cunningham's Will, 206 N. Y. 601, 100 N. E. 437 ("to such charitable and benevolent associations, and institutions of learning" as executor shall select): Staines v. Burton, 17 Utah,

331, 70 Am. St. Rep. 788, 53 Pac. 1015. Where the gift was for "objects and purposes of benevolence and charity, public and private, including educational or charitable institutions and the relief of individual need," it was held that the last words did not indicate private. non-charitable objects, but were "merely specifications within the limits of the dominant phrase": Weber v. Bryant, 161 Mass. 400, 37 N. E. 203. "Where one word expresses a charitable use and the others, if standing alone, might not indicate a charity, the dominant word is taken to be the one pointing to a charity and the more indefinite word linked with it held to be narrowed and colored by its context or used as a synonym with it in order to make more effective the main charitable intent": Thorp v. Lund, 227 Mass. 474, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1204, 116 N. E. 946. Where the trustees are given discretion to apply the fund to legal or illegal objects, the trnst is valid for the legal object: St. Paul's Church v. Attorney-General, 164 Mass. 188, 41 N. E. 231, citing many cases. Sce, however, as tending to follow the English rules explained ante, in note (e): Van Syckel v. Johnson, (N. J. Eq.) 70 Atl. 657; In re Shattuck's Will, 193 N. Y. 446, 86 N. E. 455 ("educational" too broad, as it may refer to private objects; purposes being named in disjunctive, whole gift fails); In re Sutro's Estate, 155 Cal. 727, 102 Pac. 920 (a very extreme case; "institutions of learning and science" may include institutions conducted for private profit).

place of a trustee,^a—that is, by establishing a scheme for accomplishing the design of the donor, as though the legal title had vested in a certain trustee. This result may happen in various modes. In one class of instances the same rule is merely applied which would be invoked under like circumstances to regulate the administration of a private trust. Where a testator has expressly purported to give the property to a trustee, but for any cause the appointment fails, the charitable trust will still be enforced.^{1 b} The doctrine, however, goes much farther than this simple rule, which does not permit a trust otherwise valid to fail for want of a designated trustee. It also applies where the property is given to a person or body incapable of *taking*

§ 1026, ¹ As where a testator gives property, to be applied in charity to such person as he shall hereafter in his will appoint his executor, and he neglects to appoint any one, or, having appointed one, the person dies in the testator's lifetime, and none other is named; or the testator gives his property to such person as his executor shall name, and no executor at all is appointed, or, if appointed, he dies in the testator's lifetime; or if the property is given to certain trustees, and they all die in the testator's lifetime, or the trustee named refuses to act,—in all such cases the court carries out the intended charity as stated in the text: Mills v. Farmer, 1 Mer. 55, 96; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 3 Brown Ch. 517; 1 Ves. 464; 7 Ves. 36, 69; Att'y-Gen. v. Jackson, 11 Ves. 365, 367; White v. White, 1 Brown Ch. 12; Att'y-Gen. v. Hickman, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 193; Brown v. Kelsey, 2 Cush. 243; Winslow v. Cummings, 3 Cush. 358, 365; McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15, 22; Sohier v. Burr, 127 Mass. 221.

§ 1026, (a) This portion of the text is quoted in Hunt v. Fowler, 121 Ill. 269, 12 N. E. 33, 17 N. E. 491. This section is cited in John v. Smith, 102 Fed. 218, 42 C. C. A. 275; Woodroof v. Herndley, 147 Ala. 287, 39 South. 907; MacKenzie v. frustees of Presbytery, 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227, 61 Atl. 1027.

§ 1026, (b) Where Appointment of Trustee Fails.—The text is cited to this effect in Jones v. Watford, 62 N. J. Eq. 339, 50 Atl. 180. See Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 167, 27 L. Ed. 397, 2 Sup. Ct. 327 (dictum); Robbins v. Boulder County Com'rs (Hoover), 50 Colo. 610, 115 Pac. 526 (where no trustee is appointed and no provision is made for carrying out trust or appointing trustee, court cannot administer trust); Eccles v. Rhode Island Trust Co., 90 Conn. 592, 98 Atl. 129; Dailey v. City of New Haven, 60 Conn. 314, 14 L. R. A. 69, 22 Atl. 945 (trustee refused to act); Appeal of Mack, 71 Conn. 122, 41 Atl. 242 (trustee rePUBLIC OR CHARITABLE TRUSTS.

and holding in perpetuity; or to a body uncertain, indefinite, and fluctuating in its members, such as an unincorporated society; or to a body not in legal being, as to a corporation not in existence; and even where there is no person or body

fused to act); Appeal of Eliot, 74 Conn. 586, 51 Atl. 558 (trustee incapable of taking); Harris v. Brown, 124 Ga. 310, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 828, 52 S. E. 610 (in absence of other provision in trust deed, court will appoint trustce); Grand Prairie Seminary v. Morgan, 171 Ill. 444, 49 N. E. 516 (equity can appoint new trustee when dutics of other cease); Garrison v. Little, 75 Ill. App. 402; Mason v. Bloomington Library Ass'n, 237 Ill. 442, 15 Ann. Cas. 603, 86 N. E. 1044 (discussion of power of court to substitute trustee); Dykeman v. Jenkincs, 179 Ind. 549, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1011, 101 N. E. 1013 (refusal of trustee to take); Richards v. Wilson, (Ind.) 112 N. E. 780; Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Iowa, 92, 61 N. W. 434 (refusal of trustee to act); In re Schouler, 134 Mass. 426 (trustee died without qualifying); Sears v. Chapman, 158 Mass. 400, 35 Am. St. Rep. 502, 33 N. E. 604 (gift for specified purpose does not fail for want of a trustee); Attorney-General v. Goodell, 180 Mass. 538, 62 N. E. 962 (same); Chase v. Dickey, 212 Mass. 555, 99 N. E. 410 (lack of capacity of trustee); Read v. Willard Hospital, 215 Mass. 132, 102 N. E. 95 (refusal of trustee to take); Richardson v. Essex Institute, 208 Mass. 311, 21 Ann. Cas. 1158, 94 N. E. 262 (same, unless it appears that continuance of trust is dependent on acceptance); Towle v. Nesmith, 69 N. H. 212, 42 Atl. 900 (refusal of trustee to act); Campbell v. Clough, 71 N. H. 181, 51 Atl. 668 (refusal

of trustee to act); Glover v. Baker, 76 N. H. 393, 83 Atl. 916 (lack of capacity of trustee); Winslow v. Stark (N. H.), 97 Atl. 979 (trustee refuses to accept); Brown v. Pancoast, 34 N. J. Eq. 521; Bruere v. Cook, 63 N. J. Eq. 624, 52 Atl. 1001 trustee non-existent); In re De Silver's Estate, 211 Pa. 459, 60 Atl. 1048 (death of trustee before designating beneficiaries, court will act); Brigham v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, (R. I.) 134 Fed. 513, 67 C. C. A. 393 (lack of capacity of trustee to act and death pending execution of trust); Godfrey v. Hutchins, 28 R. I. 517, 68 Atl. 317 (refusal of trustee to act); In re John's Estate, 30 Or. 494, 36 L. R. A. 242, 47 Pac. 341, 50 Pac. 226, reviewing many cases concerning certainty of the trustee (trust does not fail because of fact that persons who are authorized to appoint a board of trustees to succeed the executors in the management of the property fail to make such appointment).

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In general, that the gift will not fail for want of a trustee, see Hitchcock v. Board of Home Missions, 259 Ill. 288, 102 N. E. 741 (when gift is too indefinite to be carried out as legacy, court may appoint trustee to carry out purpose; discussion of Illinois cases); Klumpert v. Vrieland, 142 Iowa, 434, 121 N. W. 34 (to "poor" of a town); Chapman v. Newell, 146 Iowa, 415, 125 N. W. 324 (to permanent school fund of L. County); Green's Adm'rs v. Fidelity Trust Co., 134 Ky. 311, indicated as the recipients of the legal title, but the property is merely directed to be applied to some designated charitable purpose, the performance of which direction might and often would necessarily create a perpetuity.²

§ 1026, ² The following are some of the many cases in which this doctrine is either applied or discussed: To a body not in existence; Att'y-Gen. v. Bunce, L. R. 6 Eq. 563; In re Maguire, L. R. 9 Eq. 632; to unincorporated fluctuating associations: Cocks v. Manners, L. R. 12 Eq. 574; and see Gower v. Mainwaring, 2 Ves. Sr. 87, 89, per Lord Hardwicke; Att'y-Gen. v. Oglander, 3 Brown Ch. 166; Att'y-Gen. v. Green, 2 Brown Ch. 490; White v. White, 1 Brown Ch. 12; Att'y-Gen. v. Boultbee, 2 Ves. 380; Att'y-Gen. v. Bowyer, 3 Ves. 714; Att'y-Gen. v. Comber, 2 Sim. & St. 93; Att'y-Gen. v. Downing, Amb. 550, 571.^c

There is a fundamental divergence between two classes of American decisions upon this question. In some states the English doctrine as stated in the text is adopted, except so far as it is enlarged by the further and distinct doctrine of *cy-pres*; in others, charitable trusts are sustained and enforced only when the legal title to the property is given by the

20 Ann. Cas. 861, 120 S. W. 283; Webber Hospital Ass'n v. Mc-Kenzie, 104 Me. 320, 71 Atl. 1032 (will names no trustee); Book Depositary v. Trustees of Church Rooms Fund, 117 Md. 86, 83 Atl. 50 (no need to use word "trustee"); Glover v. Baker, 76 N. H. 393, 83 Atl. 916 (if court appoints, should not choose person hostile to testator's purpose); Nichols v. Newark Hospital, 71 N. J. Eq. 130, 63 Atl. 621; Trenton Soc. for Organizing Charity v. Howell, (N. J. Ch.) 63 Atl. 1110; Bowman v. Domestic & Foreign Missionary Soc., 182 N. Y. 494, 75 N. E. 535 (power under statute to appoint trustee to carry out purpose of legacy); Hagen v. Sacrison, 19 N. D. 160, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 724, 123 N. W. 518 (trustees need not be specifically designated); Wood v. Trustees of Fourth Baptist Church, 61 R. I. 594, 61 Atl. 279 (court will appoint trustee in this case a church corporation).

§ 1026, (c) As to "friendly societies" and the like, see ante, notes to § 1019. Where property is bequeathed to executors or trustees for charitable purposes, unexpressed, the proper mode of carrying out the intention is by a "scheme" under the direction of the court; but where there is a general charitable intention without a trust, the disposition of the gift is in the King by Sign Manual: In re Pyne, [1903] 1 Ch. 83 (citing Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36b, 6 R. R. 76; Paice v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 14 Ves. 364); Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 9 Am. St. Rep. 713, 17 N. E. 839, and cases cited by Holmes, J. In the case last mentioned it was held that the court would direct a scheme where the gift was to a trusteee "to be disposed of by him for such charitable purposes as he shall think proper," and the trustee died without making any disposition of the fund.

This is one of the most important points of distinction between charitable and private trusts; for it is certain that at law, and independently of the peculiar doctrine of equity on this subject, gifts to charitable uses, without a certain

donor to a certain trustee competent to take and hold in perpetuity, if the trust creates one. The following cases are given simply as examples: Gifts to unincorporated societies held valid:^a Laird v. Bass, 50 Tex. 412; Cruse v. Axtell, 50 Ind. 49. Gift to an unincorporated society, or uncertain or fluctuating body held invalid:^a Goodell v. Union Ass'n etc., 29 N. J. Eq. 32 (to a Sunday school); Heiss v. Murphey, 40 Wis. 276 ("to the

§ 1026, (d) Gifts to Unincorporated Societies held valid: In re Upham's Estate, 127 Cal. 90, 59 Pac. 315; In re Winchester's Estate, 133 Cal. 271, 54 L. R. A. 271, 65 Pac. 475 (direct gift to unincorporated association); Huger v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 137 Ga. 207, 73 S. E. 385 (to a named church, which has ceased to be active or organized; gift not necessarily void; trust is continuing executory trust); Burke v. Burke, 259 Ill. 262, 102 N. E. 293 (court will appoint trustee, if necessary); Glover v. Baker, 76 N. H. 393, 83 Atl. 916 ("church" gift given to association and not to any particular person compared to gift to a "town"); Chambers v. Higgins' Ex'r, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1425, 49 S. W. 436; Byers v. McCartney, 62 Iowa, 339, 17 N. W. 571 (where there is a devise to a church or society that is unable to take the legal title because of not being incorporated, the devise is not void, but the heirs will hold in trust, or the court will appoint a trustee until the society is incorporated and acquires the capacity to take); Missouri Hist. Soc. v. Acad. of Science; 94 Mo. 459, 8 S. W. 346; Hadden v. Dandy, 51 N. J. Eq. 154, 32 L. R. A. 625, 26 Atl. 464 (direct bequest of personalty to unincorporated charitable as-

sociation valid: citing Wellbeloved v. Jones, 1 Sim. & St. 40: Evangelical Association's Appeal, 35 Pa. St. 316; Banks v. Phelan, 4 Barb. 80); American Bible Soc. v. American Tract Soc., 62 N. J. Eq. 219, 50 Atl. 67; St. Peter's Church v. Brown, 21 R. I. 367, 43 Atl. 642; Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. (7 Pickle) 303, 15 L. R. A. 801, 18 S. W. 874. In Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497, 32 S. E. 809, there was a gift to an unincorporated church as trustee for a charitable purpose. It was held that the court would hold the fund until incorporation was effected. Under similar circumstances it was held in Dye v. Beaver Creek Church, 48 S. C. 444, 59 Am. St. Rep. 724, 26 S. E. 717, that the members took as individuals. In Conklin v. Davis, 63 Conn. 377, 28 Atl. 537, there was a gift to trustees of an incorporated church for a charitable purpose. The corporation could not take because not authorized by its charter. The court held that the trustees would take as individuals.

§ 1026, (e) Novak v. Trustees of Orphans' Home, 123 Md. 161, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1067, 90 Atl. 997; Kerrigan v. Conelly, (N. J. Ch.) 46 Atl. 227 (direct gift to unincorporated association invalid); Mount v. Tuttle, 183 N. Y. 358, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.)

and competent trustee to take and hold the legal title,---as to an unincorporated and fluctuating society,---would be

Roman Catholic orphans" of a diocese). Gift to a corporation not yet created, but its incorporation expected, valid:^f Ould v. Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 303; Trustees etc. v. Beatty, 28 N. J. Eq. 570. Gift to the treasurer of a county and his successors in office, the income for aiding poor, held valid:^g Clement v. Hyde, 50 Vt. 716, 28 Am. Rep. 522.

428, 76 N. E. 873 (unincorporated church, devise not in trust); Rhodes v. Rhodes, 88 Tenn. (4 Pickle) 637, 13 S. W. 590 (direct gift).

§ 1026, (f) Gift to Corporation not yet Created, valid: Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S. 174, 27 L. Ed. 401, 2 Sup. Ct. 336; Field v. Drew Theological Seminary, 41 Fed. 371; Brigham v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 134 Fed. 513, 67 C. C. A. 393; Coit v. Comstock, 51 Conn. 352, 50 Am. Rep. 29; Franklin v. Hastings, 253 Ill. 46, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 135, 97 N. E. 265 (gift would be upheld though corporation never organ. ized); French v. Calkins, 252 Ill. 243, 96 N. E. 877; Dascomb v. Marston, 80 Me. 223, 13 Atl. 888; Brigham v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, (Mass.) 126 Fed. 796; Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497, 32 S. E. 809; Wehster v. Wiggin, 19 R. I. 73, 28 L. R. A. 510, 31 Atl. 824; Kable v. Evangelical Lutheran Joint Synod, etc., 81 Minn. 7, 83 N. W. 460.

Gift to corporation not created, invalid: Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 215, 28 N. E. 233. But see Lougheed v. Dykeman's Baptist Church, 129 N. Y. 211, 14 L. R. A. 410, 29 N. E. 249, where it is held that if the corporation is incorporated before the time for the vesting of the gift it may take, although non-existent at the time of the death of the testator.

A gift increasing the property of a corporation beyond the amount it is allowed by statute or by its charter to hold can, according to the majority of decisions, be attacked only at the suit of the state: See the cases reviewed in the very instructive opinion of Peters, C. J., in Farrington v. Putnam, 90 Me. 405, 38 L. R. A. 339, 37 Atl. 652; Brigham v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, (C. C. A.) 126 Fed. 796, 134 Fed. 513 (excessive gift to corporation not yet created; trust may wait until special legislation is obtained).

§ 1026, (g) Gift to the selectmen of a town, valid: Beardsley v. Selectmen of Bridgeport, 53 Conn. 489, 55 Am. Rep. 152, 3 Atl. 557. In the case of In re Sturgis, 164 N. Y. 485, 58 N. E. 646, it was held that the selectmen took as individuals and not as officers; and that upon this construction the gift was valid. So, in City of Boston v. Doyle, 184 Mass. 373, 68 N. E. 851 (cf. Higginson v. Turner, 171 Mass. 586, 51 N. E. 172), construing the will of Benjamin Franklin, it was held that where the office of selectman ceased to exist, the aldermen of the city did not become ex officio trustees, but the court should appoint trustees. Gift to a municipal corporation, valid: Peynado v. Peynado, 82 Ky. 5; Clayton v. Hallett, 30 Colo. 231, 97 Am. St. Rep. 117, 59 L. R. A. 407, 70 Pac. 429; Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Iowa, 92, 61 N. W. 434; Higginson v. Turner, 171 Mass. 586, 51 N. E. 172; Barkley v. Donnelly, 112 Mo.

wholly void.³ The doctrine, however, is rejected by the courts of several American states, which admit the existence and validity of charitable trusts only in cases where the property is given to a certain and competent trustee.

§ 1027. The Doctrine of Cy-Pres.—In administering charitable gifts, the English courts have leaned so strongly

Where a bequest was made to two towns, in trust, to apply the income to the education of poor children and the relief of poor widows it was held that the town was not a proper trustee, but the charity would not fail on that account, for the court would appoint a trustee: Mason v. Meth. Epis. Ch., 27 N. J. Eq. 47. Gift to a bishop and his successors, in trust, for an object which would be or might be a perpetuity, held void: Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U. S. 362; 3 Hughes, 397; Heiss v. Murphey, 40 Wis. 276. See, also, Preachers' Aid Soc. v. Rich, 45 Me. 552; Tappan v. Dehlois, 45 Me. 122; Swasey v. Am. Bible Soc., 57 Me. 523; Tucker v. Seamen's Aid Soc., 7 Met. 188, 195; Bliss v. Am. Bihle Soc., 2 Allen, 334; Meeting St. Bap. Soc. v. Hail, 8 R. I. 234; Birchard v. Scott, 39 Conn. 63; Goodell v. Union Ass'n etc., 29 N. J. Eq. 32; Stevens v. Shippen, 28 N. J. Eq. 487; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169; Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Pa. St. 465, 3 Am. Rep. 558; State v. Warren, 28 Md. 338; Needles v. Martin, 33 Md. 609; Miller v. Atkinson, 63 N. C. 537; McIntyre v. Zanesville, 17 Ohio St. 352; Board of Ed. v. Edson, 18 Ohio St. 221, 98 Am. Dec. 114; Ex parte Lindley, 32 Ind. 367; Att'y-Gen. v. Soule, 28 Mich. 153; Methodist Ch. v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730; Heuser v. Harris, 42 Ill. 425; Academy of Visitation v. Clemens, 50 Mo. 167; Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal. 457.h

§ 1026, ³ Att'y-Gen. v. Tancred, Amb. 351; 1 W. Black. 90; Widmore v. Woodroffe, Amb. 636, 640; Anonymous, 2 Ch. Cas. 207; Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 4 Wheat. 1; McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15, 22; Grimes's Ex'rs v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, 9 Am. Rep. 690; Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97, 102, cases cited by Wright, J.

561, 19 S. W. 305; Towle v. Nesmith, 69 N. H. 212, 42 Atl. 900; Sheldon v. Town of Stockbridge, 67 Vt. 299, 31 Atl. 414. Gift to board of county commissioners, valid: Rush Co. Com'rs v. Dinwiddie, 139 Ind. 128, 37 N. E. 795. In Dailey v. City of New Haven, 60 Conn. 314, 14 L. R. A. 69, 22 Atl. 945, it is held that in the absence of charter authority a municipal corporation cannot act as trustee of a charitable trust; and that where there is such authority, it cannot be compelled to accept such a trust. Gift to a state, valid: Bedford v. Bedford, 99 Ky. 273, 35 S. W. 926.

§ 1026, (h) See, also, Hunt v. Fowler, 121 Ill. 269, 12 N. E. 331, 17 N. E. 491. In Tennessee, the trust is void if no trustees are appointed: Ewell v. Sneed, 136 Tenn. 602, 191 S. W. 131, reviewing Tennessee cases.

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in favor of sustaining the trusts, even when the donor's specified purpose becomes impracticable, that they invented at an early day, and have fully established, the so-called doctrine of *cy-pres*. The doctrine may be stated in general terms as follows: Where there is an intention exhibited to devote the gift to charity, and no object is mentioned, or the particular object fails, the court will execute the trust cy-pres, and will apply the fund to some charitable purposes, similar to those (if any) mentioned by the donor. "If the donor declare his intention in favor of charity indefinitely, without any specification of objects, or in favor of defined objects which happen to fail from whatever cause, -even though in such cases the particular mode of operation contemplated by the donor is uncertain or impracticable,-yet the general purpose being charity, such purpose will, notwithstanding the indefiniteness, illegality, or failure of its immediate objects, be carried into effect."^{1 a}

§ 1027, ¹ In the following cases this doctrine is defined, discussed, applied, and illustrated: Sinnett v. Herbert, L. R. 7 Ch. 232; Chamberlayne v. Brockett, L. R. 8 Ch. 206; Att'y-Gen. v. Baxter, 1 Vern. 248; Att'y-Gen. v. Andrew, 3 Ves. 633; Corbyn v. French, 4 Ves. 418; Att'y-Gen. v. Bishop of Oxford, cited 4 Ves. 431; Cary v. Abbot, 7 Ves. 490; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36; Mills v. Farmer, 1 Mer. 55; 19 Ves. 483, 485; Pieschel v. Paris, 2 Sim. & St. 384; De Costa v. De Pas, Amb. 228; 2 Swanst. 487; Hayter v. Trego, 5 Russ. 113; Simon v. Barber, 5 Russ. 112; Att'y-Gen. v. Ironmongers' Co., Craig & P. 208; 10 Clark & F. 908; Att'y-Gen. v. Glyn, 12 Sim. 84; Att'y-Gen. v. Bishop of Llandaff, cited 2 Mylne & K. 586; Incorporated Soc. v. Price, 1 Jones & L. 498; Loscombe v. Wintringham, 13 Beav. 87; Bennett v. Hayter, 2 Beav. 81; Marsh v. Att'y-Gen., 2 Johns. & H. 61; Att'y-Gen. v. Marchant, L. R. 3 Eg. 424; Att'y-Gen. v. Bunce, L. R. 6 Eq. 563; In re Latymer's Charity, L. R. 7 Eq. 353; In re Maguire, L. R. 9 Eq. 632; Merchant Tailors' Co. v. Att'y-Gen., L. R. 11 Eq. 35; 6 Ch. 512; In re Prison Charities, L. R. 16 Eq. 129; Att'y-Gen. v. St. John's Hospital, L. R. 1 Cb. 92; 2 Ch. Div. 554; Manchester School Case, L. R. 2 Ch. 497; Att'y-Gen. v. Wax Chandlers' Co., L. R. 5 Ch. 503; Att'y-Gen. v. Duke of Northumberland, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 745; and see, also, Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 9 Am. St. Rep. 713.

§ 1027, (a) Where the specified purpose appears to be impracticable, but there is a general charitable intention: Biscoe v. Jackson, 35 Ch. Div. 460; Attorney-General v. Boultbee, 2 Ves. 380, 387; Amory v. AtIn the first kind of cases, where the donor has specified no object, the court will determine upon some scheme which

torney-General, 179 Mass. 89, 60 N. E. 391 (beneficiary refuses to accept the gift in the particular form); Attorney-General v. Briggs, 164 Mass. 561, 42 N. E. 118 (gift to a public school, but the school district abolished); Wallis v. Solicitor-General for New Zealand, [1903] App. Cas. 173. Where there is a gift to a charitable institution which never existed at all, the court "is more ready to infer a general charitable intention than to infer the contrary": In re Davis, [1902] 1 Ch. 876 (eiting Loseombe v. Wintringham, 13 Beav. 87; Hoare v. Hoare, 56 L. T. 147, where there was no general charitable intent; In re Clergy Society, 2 K. & J. 615, 622; In re Maguire, L. R. 9 Eq. 632, 634). Where the institution comes to an end after the death of the testator, but before the legacy is paid, the property generally goes to the crown to be applied to charitable purposes: In re Slevin, [1891] 2 Ch. 236, 1 Ch. 373 (following Hayter v. Targo, 5 Russ. 113, and citing Attorney-General v. Ironmongers Co., 2 My. & K. 576, 2 Beav. 313, Cr. & P. 208, 10 Cl. & F. 908; Wilson v. Barnes, 38 Ch. Div. 507). See, also, In re Buck, [1896] 2 Ch. 727 (charitable fund not being needed for purposes of friendly society, a scheme directed); Pease v. Pattinson, 32 Ch. Div. 154; Cunnack v. Edwards, [1896] 2 Ch. 679 (extinct friendly society not having been a charity, its remaining funds are not applied *vy-pres*, but go to the crown as bona vacantia); Braithwaite v. Attorney-General, [1909] 1 Ch. 510 (same); Stratton v. Physio-Medical College, 149 Mass. 508, 14 Am. St. Rep. 442, 5 L. R. A.

33, 21 N. E. 874 (donee, a certain medical college, not having been a public charity, cy-pres rule not applicable); Attorney-General v. Price, [1912] 1 Ch. 667, [1914] App. Cas. 20, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1159 (where sixty years after death of testator, church school was closed, school directed to be carried on, as undenominational); In re The Friends' Free School (Clibborn v. O'Brien), [1909] 2 Ch. 675 (similar case); In re Faraker (Faraker v. Durell). [1912] 2 Ch. 488; (where the specified charity named had been consolidated with others prior to testator's death, it will be applied to the consolidated society); In re Avenon's Charity (Attorney-General v. Pelly), [1913] 2 Ch. 261 (endowment for seamen which originally yielded £16, in course of time yielded £315; £10 applied for the seamen, balance to salaries of eurator). Where property is bequeathed to executors or trustees for charitable purposes, unexpressed, the proper mode of carrying out the intention is by a "scheme" under the direction of the court; but where there is a general charitable intention without a trust, the disposition of the gift is in the King by Sign Manual: In re Pyne, [1903] 1 Ch. 83 (citing Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36b, 6 R. R. 76; Paice v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 14 Ves. 364). In Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 9 Am. St. Rep. 713, 17 N. E. 839, the court, by Holmes, J., commenting on this distinction, directed a scheme in a case where the trustee died without having made any disposition of the fund.

shall carry out the general intention; in the second kind, where the donor's specified object fails, the court will determine upon another object similar to that mentioned by the donor. A limitation upon the generality of the doctrine seems to be settled by the recent decisions, that where the donor has not expressed his charitable intention generally. but only by providing for one specific particular object, and this object cannot be carried out, or the charity provided for ceases to exist before the gift takes effect, then the court will not execute the trust; it wholly fails.² b The true doctrine of *cy-pres* should not be confounded, as is sometimes done, with the more general principle which leads courts of equity to sustain and enforce charitable gifts, where the trustee, object, and beneficiaries are simply uncertain. There is a radical distinction between the two. although the doctrine of *cy-pres* may be to some extent an

§ 1027, ² Fisk v. Att'y-Gen., L. R. 4 Eq. 521; New v. Bonaker, L. R. 4 Eq. 655; In re Clerk's Trust, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 497; Clephane v. Provost of Edinburgh, L. R. 1 H. L. S. 417; Cherry v. Mott, 1 Mylne & C. 123; Clark v. Taylor, 1 Drew. 642; Russell v. Kellett, 3 Smale & G. 264; Langford v. Gowland, 3 Giff. 617.

§ 1027, (b) Limitation on the Doctrine .--- The text is cited to this effect in Richard v. Wilson, (Ind.) 112 N. E. 780, dissenting opinion; * Gladding v. St. Matthew's Church, (R. I.) 57 Atl. 860. Where the institution ceased to exist in the testator's lifetime: In re Ovey, 29 Ch. Div. 560; In re Rymer, [1895] 1 Ch. 19, 34, and cases reviewed by Herschell, Lord Ch.; In re Davis, [1902] 1 Ch. 876; Stratton v. Physio-Medical College, 149 Mass. 508, 14 Am. St. Rep. 442, 5 L. R. A. 33, 21 N. E. 874, and cases cited by Holmes, J. Where there is no general charitable intent, and the object of the gift proves to be impracticable: In re White's Trusts, 33 Ch. Div. 449; In re University of London Medical Sciences Institute Fund (Fowler v.

Attorney-General), [1909] 2 Ch. 1 (where there was one specified object, which failed); In re Wilson, (Twentyman v. Simpson), [1913] 1 Ch. 314 (same); People ex rel. Smith v. Braucher, 258 Ill. 604, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1015, 101 N. E. 944 (church, not affiliated with any general body, becomes extinct); Allen v. Trustees of Nasson Institute, 107 Me. 120, 77 Atl. 638 (gift for particular purpose, which failed); Teele v. Bishop of Derry, 168 Mass. 341, 60 Am. St. Rep. 401, 38 L. R. A. 629, 47 N. E. 422; Bowden v. Brown, 200 Mass. 269, 128 Am. St. Rep. 419, 86 N. E. 351 (gift for building homes for poor: fund inadequate; no general charitable purpose shown); Brown v. Condit, 70 N. J. Eq. 440, 61 Atl. 1055.

expansion or enlargement of the other principle.³ In the great majority of the American states the courts have utterly rejected the peculiar doctrine of cy-pres as inconsistent with our institutions and modes of public administration. A few of the states have accepted it in a modified and partial form.⁴

§ 1027, 3 Some of the cases in which the court has professedly relied on the doctrine of cy-pres, and which are cited as illustrations of it, in a preceding note, seem to be nothing more than instances in which trusts with uncertain trustees or objects have been sustained. The suggestion of the text is not merely verbal; it has a practical importance in this country. It shows that the courts in the American states which have utterly rejected the doctrine of cy-pres may sustain and enforce charitable trusts which are simply uncertain in their objects or their trustees, and still be consistent with the general position which they have assumed.

§ 1027, ⁴ It has generally been said that the doctrine of *cy-pres* and the power to enforce it belong to and result from the *executive* authority held by the English chancellor as a representative of the crown in its character as *parens patriæ*, and are not a part of the judicial functions possessed by the *court* of chancery; while in the United States the courts are clothed with judicial functions only, the prerogative belonging to the *parens patriæ* being held by the legislatures. It may well be doubted, I think, whether this view is entirely correct: See Starkweather v. Am. Bible Soc., 72 III. 50, 22 Am. Rep. 133; Heiss v. Murphey, 40 Wis. 276; Heuser v. Harris, 42 III. 425; Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 III. 225.^e

§ 1027, (e) Cy-Pres Dectrine in the United States .- In Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 34 L. Ed. 478, 10 Sup. Ct. 792, the question . was discussed, and it was held that the legislature may, at any rate, delegate such power to the court. This paragraph of the text is cited in Grant v. Saunders, 121 Iowa, 80, 100 Am. St. Rep. 310, 95 N. W. 411; MacKenzie v. Trustees of Presbytery of Jersey City, 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227, 61 Atl. 1037. In Connecticut, by statute (Gen. Stats., sec. 778, in the year 1880), the courts have been authorized to apply the cy-pres doctrine, to a limited extent, to trusts created

by deed: Woodruff v. March, 63 Conn. 125, 38 Am. St. Rep. 346, 355, 26 Atl. 846; Parish of Christ Church v. Trustees of Donations. etc., 67 Conn. 554, 35 Atl. 552, 554. In Barnard v. Adams (C. C., Iowa), 58 Fed. 313, a fund was given to trustees to provide scholarships to educate young men for the ministry at a certain college; after the gift vested, that college suspended its functions, but no proceedings were taken to forfeit its charter; held. that the fund should be applied to provide scholarships at another college. The Iowa cases were entirely ignored by the court, and it seems doubtful whether, under the terms

§ 1028. Origin and Extent of the Equitable Jurisdiction. Such being the general nature of charitable trusts, the origin and extent of the jurisdiction over them remains to be examined. The question is one of little practical importance in England, since the jurisdiction is there exercised as though it were entirely derived from the statute of charitable uses of Elizabeth.¹ The question, however,

§ 1028, 1 43 Eliz., c. 4. This statute, in a particular and definite manner, declares the powers of chancery, regulates the proceedings for the enforcement of charitable trusts, and enumerates the purposes which are charitable as quoted *ante*, in § 1020.

of the will, the case would have been held a proper one for the application of the cy-pres doctrine even in England. The doctrine has heen recognized in Missouri in language somewhat broader than appears to be called for by the questions actually decided: Missouri Historical Society v. Academy of Science, 94 Mo. 459, 8 S. W. 346; Academy v. Clements, 50 Mo. 167; see post, last note to § 1029. In Massachusetts, where the cy-pres doctrine is more fully recognized than in other states, it has been intimated that the court would in some cases exercise the functions which were traditionally ascribed to the chancellor in his executive capacity: Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 9 Am. St. Rep. 713, 17 N. E. 839. Other recent cases are Bullard v. Town of Shirley, 153 Mass. 559, 12 L. R. A. 110, 27 N. E. 766 (doctrine not applied); Attorney-General v. Briggs, 164 Mass. 561, 42 N. E. 118; Teele v. Bishop of Derry, 168 Mass. 341, 60 Am. St. Rep. 401, 38 L. R. A. 649, 47 N. E. 422 (doctrine not applied); Amory v. Attorney-General, 179 Mass. 89, 60 N. E. 391. The last decade has witnessed a very general adoption of the doc-

trine in states which had hitherto not recognized it: In re Peabody's Estate, 154 Cal. 173, 97 Pac. 184; Lewis v. Gaillard, 61 Fla. 819. 56 South. 281; Tincher v. Arnold, (Ill.) 147 Fed. 665, 77 C. C. A. 649 (trust to pay teachers' salary applied to maintaining school); Mason v. Bloomington Library Ass'n, 237 Ill. 442, 15 Ann. Cas. 603, 86 N. E. 1044; People ex rel. Smith v. Braucher, 258 Ill. 604. 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1015, 101 N. E. 944 (where church has abandoned its property, is practically extinct, and there is no similar church of same beliefs, cy-pres cannot be applied); French v. Calkins, 252 Ill. 243, 96 N. E. 877; Filkins v. Severin, 127 Iowa. 738, 104 N. W. 346 (cy-pres doctrine . not recognized); Lynch v. South Congregational Parish, 109 Me. 32, 82 Atl. 432 (where one of three beneficiaries had discontinued school, gift given to other two, as they were carrying on same work); Petition of Pierce, 109 Me. 509, 84 Atl. 1070 (fund too small to carry out expressed purpose); Ely v. Attoruey-General (Malone), 202 Mass. 545, 89 N. E. 166 (where gift was inadequate to found institution, fund should be given to institution in

becomes of vital importance in this country,—is absolutely fundamental,—since the statute of Elizabeth has been held to be in force in but a very few of the states. The opinion at one time prevailed that the peculiar equitable jurisdiction

neighborhood doing similar work); followed in Grimke v. Malone, 206 Mass. 49, 91 N. E. 899, and so, also, Norris v. Loomis, 215 Mass. 344, 102 N. E. 419; Hubbard v. Worcester Art Museum, 194 Mass. 280, 10 Ann. Cas. 1025, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 689, 80 N. E. 490; Massachusetts Baptist Missionary Society v. Bowdoin Square Baptist Society, 212 Mass. 198, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 472, 98 N. E. 1045 (where church was moribund, its officers should turn over trust funds to some similar institution to hold under same trusts); Richardson v. Mullery, 200 Mass. 247, 86 N. E. 319 (gift to life-saving station; United States refused to accept; scheme should be devised by court for purpose of life saving at shipwrecks in that locality); Read v. Willard Hospital, 215 Mass. 132, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 574, 102 N. E. 95 (gift to hospital, which refused to take; given to another hospital of same class); City of Keene v. Eastman, 75 N. H. 191, 72 Atl. 213 (absence of provision for forfeiture is evidence of intention that gift do not revert if general purpose is practicable. Good statement of rule); Gagnon v. Wellman, (N. H.) 99 Atl. 786; Nichols v. Newark Hospital, 71 N. J. Eq. 130, 63 Atl. 621 (legacy given to a similar hospital, where hospital named uever did more than organize as a corporation); MacKenzie v. Trustees, 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227. 61 Atl. 1027 (trustees cannot make cy-pres application without approval of court); Rector of St.

James Church v. Wilson, 82 N. J. Eq. 546, 89 Atl, 519 (gift for building a church on a named plot. Before death of donor, character of place had so changed that court directed fund to be given to some other church in the neighborhood): In re Kramph's Estate, 228 Pa. 455, 77 Atl. 814 (gift for establishment of university in Philadelphia, carried out by establishing one in the immediate vicinity); In re Centennial and Memorial Ass'n of Valley Forge, 235 Pa. 206, 83 Atl. 683 (on dissolution of charitable association the property does not revert to the donors but should be applied by the court to similar purposes); Almy v. White, (R. I.) 79 Atl. 837 (where money was insufficient to establish and maintain a hospital, court directed it be turned over to establish ward in existing hospital); Brice v. Trustees of All Saints Memorial Chapel, 31 R. I. 183, 76 Atl. 774 (court will see that trust is carried out in accordance with general intent and if necessary will sacrifice specific object for that purpose); Mars v. Gibert, 93 S. C. 455, 77 S. E. 131 (gift to establish school for manual training cannot be diverted to scholarships in high school. Trustees may in their discretion employ public school teachers of manual training as teachers in their school so as to carry out trust); Inglish v. Johnson, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 118, 95 S. W. 558 (trust for maintaining a girls' school. Trustee was unable to carry it on. School was turned over to public

over charities, except in cases where a trust valid by the ordinary rules of law and equity was created, was derived solely from the statute.² Other English judges have maintained the opinion that the jurisdiction in its full extent was possessed by the court of chancery by virtue of its general powers, and that the statute had only the effect to regulate that jurisdiction, and to define more distinctly the classes of objects which are charitable. This conclusion has been sustained, and even demonstrated as correct, by the researches of the English record commissioners.³ The

§ 1028, ² This view was sustained by dicta of some able English judges, and by some decisions of American courts: See a dictum of Lord Loughborough in Att'y-Gen. v. Bowyer, 3 Ves. 714, 726; and the decisions in Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 4 Wheat. 1; Gallego's Ex'rs v. Att'y-Gen., 3 Leigh, 450, 24 Am. Dec. 650; McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15, 22; Common Council of Richmond v. State, 5 Ind. 334. These two cases held that the jurisdiction was derived solely from the statute, and that the statute was in force in Indiana, but they were completely overruled as to both points by Grimes's Ex'rs v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, 9 Am. Rep. 690. The early Massachusetts cases, Going v. Emery, 16 Pick. 107, 26 Am. Dec. 645, and Burbank v. Whitney, 24 Pick. 146, 35 Am. Dec. 312, seem to intimate that the statute was in force in Massachusetts, and that the jurisdiction was based upon it; but this view was finally discarded in Bartlett v. Nye, 4 Met. 378. In Illinois, the statute seems to be regarded as the source of jurisdiction:^a Starkweather v. Am. Bible Soc., 72 Ill. 50; Heuser v. Harris, 42 Ill. 425; Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 Ill. 225.

§ 1028, ³ Burford v. Lenthall, 2 Atk. 551, and Att'y-Gen. v. Middleton, 2 Ves. Sr. 327, per Lord Hardwicke; Att'y-Gen. v. Tancred, Amb. 351; 1 W. Black. 90; 1 Eden, 10, per Lord Northington; Att'y-Gen. v. Skinners' Co., 2 Russ. 407, 420, per Lord Eldon; a very decided opinion of Lord Redesdale in Att'y-Gen. v. Mayor etc. of Dublin, 1 Bligh, N. S., 312, 347, 348; and equally clear opinion of Lord Chancellor Sugden in Incor-

school system and used as co-educational school). The doctrine cannot be used to overturn the original intention of the donor: as, where land is given for a public park, it cannot be used for public buildings: Rawzee v. Pierce, 75 Miss. 846, 40 L. R. A. 402, 23 South. 307, citing the text.

§ 1028, (a) Andrews v. Andrews,

110 Ill. 223; Crerar v. Williams,
145 Ill. 625, 21 L. R. A. 454, 34 N.
E. 467. See Hitchcock v. Board of
Home Missions, 259 Ill. 288, 102 N.
E. 741; Burke v. Burke, 259 Ill. 262,
102 N. E. 293; Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, 233 Ill. 327, 122 Am. St. Rep.
169, 84 N. E. 256; in Iowa: Klumpert v. Vrieland, 142 Iowa, 434, 121
N. W. 34.

question has been repeatedly passed upon by the American courts. Wherever the system of charitable trusts has been accepted at all, it has generally been held that the jurisdiction belongs to equity as a part of its ordinary authority over express trusts, and is not referable for its origin to the statute of Elizabeth. This conclusion was necessary to support the jurisdiction in a great majority of the states, since that statute had not been adopted as a part of their local legislation.⁴ b

porated Soc. v. Richards, 1 Dru. & War. 258; 1 Con. & L. 58. The examination of the ancient records of the court of chancery by the commissioners has disclosed a large number of cases brought in that court and decided prior to the statute, in which charities of the most indefinite and general character were sustained, thus proving that the court then exercised the same kind of jurisdiction which it has exercised since the statute: See Coop. Pub. Rec. 355.

§ 1028, 4 The position above stated is affirmed in the same positive manner by repeated and most able decisions of the United States supreme court: Ould v. Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 303; Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 127, 155, 194, 196; Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 55, 77; Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. 369; Griffith v. State, 2 Del. Ch. 421; State v. Griffith, 2 Del. Ch. 392; Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal. 457; Howard v. Am. Peace Soc., 49 Me. 288; Clement v. Hyde, 50 Vt. 716, 28 Am. Rep. 522; Ex'rs of Burr v. Smith. 7 Vt. 241, 29 Am. Dec. 154; Bartlett v. Nye, 4 Met. 378; Going v. Emery, 16 Pick. 107, 26 Am. Dec. 645; Burbank v. Whitney, 24 Pick. 146, 35 Am. Dec. 312 (these two latter cases left the question in some doubt); McCartee v. Orphan Asylum Soc., 9 Cow. 437, 474-482, per Jones, C.; Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 525; Andrew v. New York Bible Soc., 4 Sand. 156; Ayres v. Methodist Ch., 3 Sand. 351; Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584, 604; Norris v. Thomson's Ex'rs, 19 N. J. Eq. 307; Com'rs of Lagrange Co. v. Rogers, 55 Ind. 297; Grimes's Ex'rs v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, 9 Am. Rep. 690; overruling McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15; Miller v. Chittenden, 2 Iowa, 315; Dickson v. Montgomery, 1 Swan. 348; Carter v. Balfour's Adm'r, 19 Ala. 814; Beal v. Fox's Ex'rs, 4 Ga. 404.

§ 1028, (b) This section is cited in Morris v. Boyd, 110 Ark. 468, 162 S. W. 69 (court may supervise trusts but may not create them nor alter trust decds); MacKenzie v. Trustees of Presbytery of N. J., 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227, 61 Atl. 1027 (cy-pres doctrine not to be rejected because statute of charitable uses not in force); Pennoyer v. Wadhams, 20 Or. 274, 11 L. R. A. 211, 25 Pac. 720. Sections 1028 et seq. are cited in Richards v. Wilson, (1nd.) 112 N. E. § 1029. Charitable Trusts in the United States.^a—With regard to the extent to which charitable trusts have been adopted and the jurisdiction over them exercised in the various states, there is the utmost conflict of judicial decision. It seems possible, however, without attempting any strict comparison of the cases or any minute classifications of the rules, to arrange the different states according to three general types, which shall represent with reasonable accuracy and certainty the existing condition of the law on the subject in this country. *First class*. This class includes those states in which charitable trusts have been abrogated or not adopted.¹ Either from a statutory abolition of all

§ 1029, 1 The excepted instances authorized by statute are generally cases where corporations may receive and hold property, in trust, for some object which is charitable. The states constituting this class are the following:—

New York: Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584; Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97; Holmes v. Mead, 52 N. Y. 332; Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298, 80 Am. Dec. 269; Dodge v. Pond, 23 N. Y. 69; Burrill v. Boardman, 43 N. Y. 254, 263, 3 Am. Rep. 694; Adams v. Perry, 43 N. Y. 487; Rose v. Rose, 4 Abb. App. 108; but see Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 602, 35 Am. Rep. 550, where a will gave property to his executors, "to be divided by them among such Roman Catholic charities, institutions, schools, or churches in the city of New York" as a majority of his executors should decide, and in such proportions as they should think proper. There were in New York City many such Roman Catholic institutions incorporated

780. See, also, Missouri Hist. Soc. v. Academy of Science, 94 Mo. 459, 8 S. W. 346; Howe v. Wilson, 91 Mo. 45, 60 Am. Rep. 226, 3 S. W. 390; Strother v. Barrow, 246 Mo. 241, 151 S. W. 960; St. James' Orphan Asylum v. Shelby, 60 Neb. 796, 83 Am. St. Rep. 553, 84 N. W. 273; Hutchins v. George, 44 N. J. Eq. 126, 14 Atl. 108 (the main result reached in this case on another point was overruled in George v. Braddock, 45 N. J. Eq. 757, 14 Am. St. Rep. 754, 6 L. R. A. 511, 18 Atl. 881); Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Hoboken, 70 N. J. Eq. 630, 62

Atl. 1 (inherent power of equity in full vigor in New Jersey); Haynes v. Carr, 70 N. H. 463, 49 Atl. 638; Garrison v. Sittle, 75 Ill. App. 402.

§ 1029, (a) This section is cited in Hunt v. Fowler, 121 III. 269, 12 N. E. 331, 13 N. E. 491; Lane v. Eaton, 69 Minn. 141, 65 Am. St. Rep. 559, 38 L. R. A. 669, 71 N. W. 1031; Lackland v. Walker, 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. 414; MacKenzie v. Trustees, 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227, 61 Atl. 1027; Almy v. Jones, 17 R. I. 265, 12 L. R. A. 414, 21 Atl. 616. uses and trusts, with a few specified exceptions, or from the

and authorized by statute to take by devise or bequest; a majority of the executors designated certain of these institutions as the beneficiaries. Held, the testamentary disposition was not void from uncertainty, but was operative, and the acts of the executors were effectual. This result, of course, depended upon the fact that all the beneficiaries were corporations authorized to hold property, in trust, for charitable purposes. In Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 525, a majority of the court of appeals admitted the doctrine under great restrictions; but this decision, and all the earlier ones which sustained the doctrine to a much fuller extent, have been overruled by the cases above cited.^b

Wisconsin:^c Ruth v. Oberbrunner, 40 Wis. 238; Heiss v. Murphey, 40 Wis. 276. See Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70, and Gould v. Taylor Orphan Asylum, 46 Wis. 106, for examples of gifts to corporations.

§1029, (b) New York .--- The New York rule was changed by statute in 1893, and that state now belongs to the second class. (See notes to second class.) The cases here cited follow the former rule. The opinion of Rapallo, J., in Holland v. Alcock, 108 N. Y. 312, 2 Am. St. Rep. 420, 16 N. E. 305, contains an exhaustive review of the earlier New York decisions. It was held that the doctrine of Power v. Cassidy could not be extended to a case where the number of beneficiaries among whom a selection was to be made was indefinitely large. So in Fosdick v. Town of Hempstead, 125 N. Y. 581, 11 L. R. A. 715, 26 N. E. 801, it was held that a bequest to a town, in trust, for "the poor" of the town was invalid for uncertainty, not being restricted to those for whose support the town is under a statutory liability. See, also, Prichard v. Thompson, 95 N. Y. 76, 47 Am. Rep. 9. See further, in interpretation of statutes limiting testamentary gifts to charitable corporations, Stephenson v. Short, 92 N. Y. 433, per Rapallo, J.; Hollis v. Drew Theological Seminary, 95 N. Y. 166. And see, in general, Rose v. Hatch, 125 N. Y. 427, 26 N. E. 467; Read v. Williams, 125 N. Y. 560, 21 Am. St. Rep. 748, 26 N. E. 730; Tilden v. Green, 130 N. Y. 29, 27 Am. St. Rep. 487, 14 L. R. A. 33, 28 N. E. 880; Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 215, 28 N. E. 238; Lougheed v. Dykeman's Baptist Church, 129 N. Y. 211, 14 L. B. A. 410, 29 N. E. 249; People v. Powers, 147 N. Y. 104, 35 L. R. A. 502, 41 N. E. 432; Fairchild v. Edson, 154 N. Y. 199, 61 Am. St. Rep. 609, 48 N. E. 541. A convenient summary of the general course of the New York cases may be found in the opinion of Marshall, J., in Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 76 Am. St. Rep. 924, 50 L. R. A. 307, 82 N. W. 345. In Bird v. Merklee, 144 N. Y. 544, 27 L. R. A. 423, 39 N. E. 645, a gift "to be divided and paid to the Methodist Episcopal churches of the Ninth ward of the City of New York, according to the number of members, to buy coal for the poor of said churches" was held not to create a trust and to be valid.

§1029, (c) Wisconsin.—Wisconsin now clearly belongs in the second class, as respects trusts of personal

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general provisions of the law against perpetuities, or from

Michigan:^d Methodist Church v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730 (there is no distinction between trusts for charitable purposes and any others, and the

property only. The following rules seem to be established: A devise of realty in trust for a charitable purpose will not be enforced if it violates the statutory rule against perpetuities: Danforth v. City of Oshkosh, 119 Wis. 262, 97 N. W. 258 (decision of a bare majority of the court: See vigorous dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.); De Wolf v. Lawson, 61 Wis. 469, 50 Am. Rep. 148: 21 N. W. 615, Beurhaus v. Cole, 94 Wis. 617, 69 N. W. 986. The statutory rule referred to prohibits the suspension of the power of alienation for a longer period than during two lives in being. It provides further that "such power of alienation is suspended, when there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed." Consequently, where the beneficiaries are not so definite that they can join in a conveyance, the trust fails. This statute has been held not to apply to personal property. Hence it is held that a bequest in trust for charitable uses is valid. And if, upon the doctrine of equitable conversion, a devise san be interpreted to be in effect a bequest, it may be sustained, although the use be charitable: Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 76 Am. St. Rep. 924, 50 L. R. A. 307, 82 N. W. 345; Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 57 Am. Rep. 278, 28 N. W. 353; Sawtelle v. Witham, 94 Wis. 412, 69 N. W. 72; Hood v. Dorer, 107 Wis. 149, 82 N. W. 546; Kronshage v. Varrell, (Wis.) 97 N. W. 928; In re Fuller's Will, 75 Wis. 431, 44 N. W. 304, is overruled, as are the dicta in McHugh v. McCole, 97 Wis.

166, 65 Am. St. Rep. 106, 49 L. R. A. 724, 72 N. W. 631. In general, see Estate of Hoffen, 70 Wis. 522, 36 N. W. 407 (direct gift to uncertain class invalid); Fadness v. Braunborg, 73 Wis. 257, 41 N. W. 84 (gift to corporation). In the instructive opinion of Marshall, J., in Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 76 Am. St. Rep. 924, 50 L. R. A. 307, 82 N. W. 345, after a careful review of the Wisconsin cases, the law of charitable trusts of personalty in that state is thus summarized: "It follows that indefiniteness of beneficiaries who can invoke judicial authority to enforce the trust, want of a trustee if there be a trust in fact, or indefiniteness in details of the particular purpose declared, the general limits being reasonably ascertainable, or indefiniteness of mode of carrying out the particular purpose, does not militate against the validity of a trust for charitable uses." See, also, Maxcy v. City of Oshkosh, 144 W1s. 238, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 787, 128 N. W. 899, 1138 (see observations on Wisconsin decisions in concurring opinion of Marshall, J.); In re Evenson's Will, 161 Wis. 627, 155 N. W. 145.

§ 1029, (d) Michigan.—Hathaway v. Village of New Baltimore, 48 Mich. 251, 12 N. W. 186; Wheelock v. American Tract Soc., 109 Mich. 141, 63 Am. St. Rep. 578, 66 N. W. 955; White v. Rice, 112 Mich. 403, 70 N. W. 1024; Hopkins v. Crossley, (Mich.) 96 N. W. 499. A recent statute, adouted from New York has placed Michigan in the second class. 2317

the general policy of the state legislation, "charitable

same requisites are necessary to their validity); see Attorney-General v. Soule, 28 Mich. 153.

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In all the foregoing states the same type of statute has been adopted, in terms abolishing all uses and trusts, except a few well-defined species of active express trusts which do not include any ordinary form of charitable use. The courts of these states have felt themselves compelled to hold that all charitable trusts were abolished, except such as would be valid forms, under the exceptions of the statute. No other conclusion seems to me possible, except by a judicial repeal of the legislation.

Maryland:⁴ Dashiell v. Attorney-General, 5 Har. & J. 392, 400; 6 Har. & J. 1, 9 Am. Dec. 572; Wilderman v. Baltimore, 8 Md. 551; Methodist

§ 1029, (e) Minnesota.—Little v. Willford, 31 Minn. 173, 17 N. W. 282; Atwater v. Russell, 49 Minn. 57, 51 N. W. 629, 52 N. W. 26; Lane v. Eaton, 69 Minn. 141, 65 Am. St. Rep. 559, 38 L. R. A. 669, 71 N. W. 1031; Shanahan v. Kelly, 88 Minn. 202, 92 N. W. 948; Kahle v. Evangelical Lutheran Joint Synod, 81 Minn. 7, 83 N. W. 460; City of Owatonna v. Rosebrock, 88 Minn. 318, 92 N. W. 1122; Young Men's Christiau Ass'n v. Horn, 120 Minn. 404, 139 N. W. 805.

§ 1029, (f) Maryland.-Rizer v. Perry, 58 Md. 112; Henry Watson, etc., Soc. v. Johnston, 58 Md. 139; Barnum v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 62 Md. 275, 50 Am. Rcp. 219; Isaac v. Emory, 64 Md. 333, 1 Atl. 713; Maught v. Getzendanner, 65 Md. 527, 57 Am. Rep. 331, 5 Atl. 471; Crisp v. Crisp, 65 Md. 422, 5 Atl. 421: Eutaw Place Baptist Church v. Shively, 67 Md. 493, 1 Am. St. Rep. 412, and note, 10 Atl. 244; Halsey v. Convention of Protestant Episcopal Church, 75 Md. 275, 23 Atl. 781 (limited jurisdiction in Maryland explained); Gamble v. Trippe, 75 Md. 252, 32 Am. St. Rep. 388, 15 L. R. A. 235, 23

Atl. 461; Yingling v. Miller, 77 Md. 104, 26 Atl. 491; Hanson v. Little Sisters of the Poor of Baltimore, 79 Md. 434, 32 L. R. A. 293, 32 Atl. 1052 (gift to church for its parish school, valid); Methodist Episcopal Church v. Jackson Square Evaugelical Church, 84 Md. 173, 35 Atl. 8; Missionary Society v. Humphreys, 91 Md. 131, 80 Am. St. Rep. 432, 46 Atl. 320; Prettyman v. Baker, 91 Md. 539, 46 Atl. 1020; Erhardt v. Baltimore Monthly Meeting of Friends, 93 Md. 669, 49 Atl. 561 ("a devise in trust for the benefit of an uncertain and indefined beneficiary is as invalid as if the devise had been directly to the beneficiary"). See, also, Ege v. Hering, 108 Md. 391, 70 Atl. 221; Baltzell v. Church Home & Infirmary, 110 Md. 244, 73 Atl. 151; Starr v. Minister etc. of Starr Methodist Protestant Church, 112 Md. 171, 76 Atl. 595; Snowden v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 114 Md. 650, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 679, 80 Atl. 510; Gardner v. McNeal, 117 Md. 27, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 119, 40 L. R. A. (N. S) 553, 82 Atl. 988; Book Depositary v. Trustees of Church Rooms Fund, 117 Md. 86, 83 Atl. 50; Novak v. trusts" do not exist at all, except where they are merely the express private trusts permitted by the law, or except in those particular instances authorized by statute. The

Church v. Warren, 28 Md. 388, 353; Needles v. Martin, 33 Md. 609; Murphy v. Dallam, 1 Bland, 529.

North Carolina:⁵ McAuley v. Wilson, 1 Dev. Eq. 276, 18 Am. Dec. 587; Trustees v. Chambers's Ex'rs, 3 Jones Eq. 253; Holland v. Peck, 2 Ired. Eq. 255; White v. Attorney-General, 4 Ired. Eq. 19, 44 Am. Dec. 92; Miller v. Atkinson, 63 N. C. 537.

Virginia:^h Virginia v. Levy, 23 Gratt. 21; Carter v. Wolfe, 13 Gratt. 301; Seaburn's Ex'r v. Seaburn, 15 Gratt. 423; Gallego's Ex'rs v. Attorney-General, 3 Leigh, 450, 24 Am. Dec. 650; Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U. S. 362; 3 Hughes C. C. 397.

West Virginia:ⁱ Venable v. Coffman, 2 W. Va. 310; Carpenter v. Miller's Ex'r, 3 W. Va. 174, 100 Am. Dec. 744.

In all these states a trust for charitable purposes would be upheld, provided it possessed all the elements of a valid ordinary private trust; that is, the trustee was a certain person competent to take and hold the property, the heneficiaries were certain or capable of being made so, and no perpetuity was created. In other words, an express trust, otherwise valid, would not become invalid because the ultimate purpose was charitable.

Trustees of Orphans' Home, 123 Md. 161, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1067, 90 Atl. 997.

§ 1029, (g) North Carolina.—Under the decision in Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497, 32 S. E. 809, it would seem that North Carolina now belongs to the second class.

§ 1029, (h) Virginia.—The earlier Virginia decisions were disapproved by Richardson, J., in Protestant, etc., Society v. Churchman's Rep's, 80 Va. 718. His conclusions, which were many of them mere dicta, would bring Virginia within the second class. In Fifield v. Van Wyck's Ex'r, 94 Va. 557, 64 Am. St. Rep. 745, 27 S. E. 446, the court refused to adopt those conclusions, saying: "We are unwilling to hold that this line of decisions, running back over a period of 50 years, was overturned by expressions of opinion in the Churchman and Guthrie Cases not necessary to their decision. If further changes are necessary or desirable on the subject, the legislature, the law-making power, and not the courts, should make them." See, also, Jordan's Adm'r v. Richmond Home for Ladies, 106 Va. 710, 56 S. E. 730; Jordan v. Universalist Gen. Convention Trustees, 107 Va. 79, 57 S. E. 652.

§1029, (1) West Virginia.—Mong v. Roush, 29 W. Va. 119, 11 S. E. 906; Wilson v. Perry, 29 W. Va. 169, 1 S. E. 302—following the earlier Virginia cases; Pack v. Shanklin, 43 W. Va. 304, 27 S. E. 389; Morris' Ex'r v. Morris' Devisees, 48 W. Va. 430, 37 S. E. 570 (valid); Weaver v. Spurr, (W. Va.) 48 S. E. 852 (invalid). West Virginia now appears to be in the second class.

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equitable system of distinctively charitable trusts is abandoned. Second class. This class includes the larger portion of the states in which "charitable trusts" exist under a somewhat modified and restricted form.² There is not a

§ 1029, ² The following states are placed in this class; but there is a great diversity in the particular rules prevailing in the different states, and only a *general* resemblance in their decisions:---

Alabama:^j Johnson's Adm'r v. Longmire, 39 Ala. 143; Williams v. Pearson, 38 Ala. 299; Carter v. Balfour's Adm'r, 19 Ala. 814; Antones v. Eslava, 9 Port. 527.

Arkansas:^k Grissom v. Hill, 17 Ark. 483. California:¹ Hinckley's Estate, 58 Cal. 457. m

Connecticut:ⁿ Bull v. Bull, 8 Conn. 47, 20 Am. Dec. 86; Chatham v. Brainerd, 11 Conn. 60; Brewster v. McCall, 15 Conn. 274; American Bible

§ 1029, (J) Alabama.—Johnson v. Holifield, 79 Ala. 423, 58 Am. Rep. 596; Burke v. Roper, 79 Ala. 138; Festorazzi v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church, 104 Ala. 327, 53 Am. St. Rep. 48, 25 L. R. A. 360, 18 South. 394. See, also, Moseley v. Smiley, 171 Ala. 593, 55 South. 143; Crim v. Williamson, 180 Ala. 179, 60 South. 293 (cy-pres doctrine not recognized in Alabama); Universalist Convention v. May, 147 Ala. 455, 41 South. 515 (same).

§ 1029, (14) Arkansas.-McDonald v. Shaw, 81 Ark. 235, 98 S. W. 952; Booe v. Vinson, 104 Ark. 439, 149 S. W. 524 ("to be used for charitable purposes," too vague); Morris v. Boyd, 110 Ark. 468, 162 S. W. 69. § 1029, (1) California.-People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 35 L. R. A. 269, 45 Pac. 270; In re Royer's Estate, 123 Cal. 614, 44 L. R. A. 364, 56 Pac. 461; In re Upham's Estate, 127 Cal. 90, 59 Pac. 315; In re Willey's Estate, 128 Cal. 1, 60 Pac. 471; In re Winchester's Estate, 133 Cal. 271, 54 L. R. A. 281, 65 Pac. 475; Fay v. Howe, 136 Cal. 599, 69 Pac. 423; Estate of Gay, 138 Cal. 552, 94 Am. St. Rep. 70, 71 Pac. 707; Spencer v. Widney, (Cal.) 46 Pac. 463; Kauffman v. Foster, 3 Cal. App. 741, 86 Pac. 1108; In re Lennon's Estate, 152 Cal. 327, 125 Am. St. Rep. 58, 14 Ann. Cas. 1024, 92 Pac. 870; In re Peabody's Estate, 154 Cal. 173, 97 Pac. 184 (cy-pres doctrine said to be recognized); In re Sutro's Estate, 155 Cal. 727, 102 Pac. 920; In re Coleman's Estate, 167 Cal. 212, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 682, 138 Pac. 992.

§ 1029, (m) Colorado.—Clayton v. Hallett, 30 Colo. 231, 97 Am. St. Rep. 117, 59 L. R. A. 407, 70 Pac. 429. See Robbins v. Boulder County Com'rs (Hoover), 50 Colo. 610, 115 Pac. 526 (parens patriae doctrine not in force. If will does not appoint trustee and makes no provision therefor, court cannot administer trust).

§ 1029, (n) Connecticut.—Fairfield. v. Lawson, 50 Conn. 501, 47 Am. Rep. 669; Coit v. Comstock, 51 Conn. 352, 50 Am. Rep. 29; Tappan's Appeal, 52 Conn. 412; Beardsley v. Selectmen of Bridgeport, 53 Conn.

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little divergence in the views maintained by the courts of the various states composing this class. In a few of them

Soc. v. Wetmore, 17 Conn. 181; Hampden v. Rice, 24 Conn. 350; White v. Fisk, 22 Conn. 31; Treat's Appeal, 30 Conn. 113; Birchard v. Scott, 39 Conn. 63. A statute similar to that of Elizabeth is enacted.

Delaware: • Griffith v. State, 2 Del. Ch. 421; State v. Griffith, 2 Del. Ch. 392.

489, 55 Am. Rep. 152, 3 At¹, 557; Bristol v. Bristol, 53 Conn. 242, 5 Atl. 687; Camp v. Crocker's Adm'r, 54 Conn. 21, 5 Atl. 604; Duggan v. Slocum, 83 Fed. 244, affirmed in 92 Fed. 806, 34 C. C. A. 676; Dailey v. City of New Haven, 60 Conn. 314, 14 L. R. A. 69, 22 Atl. 945; Couklin v. Davis, 63 Conn. 377, 28 Atl. 537; Hayden v. Connecticut Hospital for Insane, 64 Conn. 320, 30 Atl. 50; In re President and Fellows of Yale College, 67 Conn. 257, 34 Atl. 1036; In re Strong's Appeal, 68 Conn. 527, 37 Atl. 395; Appeal of Mack, 71 Conn. 122, 41 Atl. 242; Appeal of Eliot, 74 Conn. 586, 51 Atl. 558. A modified form of the cy-pres doctrine has been adopted by statute. In Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 38 Am. St. Rep. 346, 26 Atl. 846, the court says: "In 1876 the general assembly confided to the superior court power to order the sale of any lands devised in trust where, in its opinion, this would promote the interest of the beneficiaries: Gen. Stats., sec. 779. In 1880 it was given authority, in cases where the execution of a trust deed in accordance with its terms has become, by reason of a change of circumstances, impossible, or would frustrate the manifest intention of the grantor. to sell the land, and direct the application of the proceeds in such manner as it may deem most proper to secure the object for which the trust was originally created, as near as

may be according to the intent of the conveyance: Gen. Stats., sec. 778. In 1886 the superior court was invested with exclusive jurisdiction of all matters where the general assembly had theretofore exercised jurisdiction over the sale of lands, when, by reason of the condition of the parties in interest, or the limitations of any will or deed, no person could convey a legal title: Gen. Stats., sec. 776. Whether, in view of the gradual and, of late, rapid withdrawal of the general assembly from the consideration of matters proper for equitable relief, the equitable jurisdiction of the superior court, which has been thus expressly authorized to apply the cy-pres doctrine to trusts created by deed, ought not to be now deemed to include authority to deal in the same manner with charitable trusts created by will, it is unnecessary to determine in the present case." See, also, Parish of Christ Church v. Trustees of Donations, etc., 67 Conn. 554, 35 Atl. 552; Bridgeport Public Library v. Burrough's Home, 85 Conn. 309, 82 Atl. 582; Eccles v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 90 Conn. 592, 98 Atl. 129.

§ 1029 (•) Delaware. — Field v. Drew Theol. Sem., 41 Fed. 371; Doughten v. Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51; Trustees of New Castle Common v. Megginson, 1 Boyce (24 Del.), 361, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1207, 77 Atl. 565. the statute of Elizabeth is held to be in force, or one similar to it has been enacted. In the majority of them the doc-

Georgia:^D Walker v. Walker, 25 Ga. 420; Beall v. Fox, 4 Ga. 404; Jones v. Habersham, 3 Woods, 443.

Illinois:^Q Starkweather v. Am. Bible Soc., 72 Ill. 50, 22 Am. Rep. 133; Heuser v. Harris, 42 Ill. 425; Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 Ill. 225.

Indiana:^{**r**} Com'rs of Lagrange Co. v. Rogers, 55 Ind. 297; Craig v. Secrist, 54 Ind. 419; Cruse v. Axtell, 50 Ind. 49; Grimes's Ex'rs v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, 9 Am. Rep. 690; Ex parte Lindley, 32 Ind. 367; Sweeney v. Sampson, 5 Ind. 465; Common Council of Richmond v. State, 5 Ind. 334; McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15.

Iowa:⁴ Miller v. Chittenden, 2 Iowa, 315, 352; Johnson v. Mayne, 4 Iowa, 180; Lepage v. McNamara, 5 Iowa, 124, 146.

§ 1029, (D) Georgia: — Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174, 27 L. Ed. 401, 2 Sup. Ct. 336; Beckwith v. St. Philip's Parish, 69 Ga. 564; Harris v. Brown, 124 Ga. 310, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 828, 52 S. E. 610; Huger v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 137 Ga. 205, 73 S. E. 385.

§1029, (q) Illinois.—Andrews v. Andrews, 110 Ill. 223; Mills v. Newberry, 112 Ill. 123, 54 Am. Rep. 213; Hunt v. Fowler, 121 Ill. 269, 12 N. E. 331, 17 N. E. 491; Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 21 L. R. A. 454, 34 N. E. 467; Guilfoil v. Arthur. 158 Ill. 600, 41 N. E. 1009; Hoeffer v. Clogan, 171 Ill. 462, 63 Am. St. Rep. 241, 40 L. R. A. 730, 49 N. E. 527; Grand Prairie Seminary v. Morgan, 171 Ill. 444, 49 N. E. 516; Trafton v. Black, 187 Ill. 36, 58 N. E. 292. As the cy-pres doctrine is recognized in several recent cases, Illinois may now be placed in the third class.

§ 1029, (r) Indiana. — Rush Co. Com'rs v. Dinwiddie, 139 Ind. 128, 37 N. E. 795; Barker v. Town of Petersburg, 41 Ind. App. 447, 82 N. E. 996; Ackerman v. Fichter, 179 Ind. 392, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1117, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 221, 101 N. E. 493; III—146 Dykeman v. Jenkines, 179 Ind. 549, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1011, 101 N. E. 1013 (if part of trust is illegal, court will work it out, if possible, legally); Richards v. Wilson, (Ind.) 112 N. E. 780, (recognizing the cypres doctrine.)

§1029, (s) Iowa.-Seda v. Huble, 75 Iowa, 429, 9 Am. St. Rep. 495, 39 N. W. 685; Byers v. McCartney, 62 Iowa, 339, 17 N. W. 571; Phillips v. Harrow, 93 Iowa, 92, 61 N. W. 434; Moran v. Moran, 104 Iowa, 216, 65 Am. St. Rep. 443, 39 L. R. A. 204, 73 N. W. 617; Zion Church v. Parker, 114 Iowa, 1, 86 N. W. 60; Grant v. Saunders, 121 Iowa, 80, 100 Am. St. Rep. 310, 95 N. W. 411. See, also, Filkins v. Severn, 127 Iowa, 738, 104 N. W. 346 (cy-pres not recognized); In re Johnston's Estate, 141 Iowa, 109, 119 N. W. 275; Klumpert v. Vrieland, 142 Iowa, 434, 121 N. W. 34 (statute of Elizabeth in force); Chapman v. Newell, 146 Iowa, 415, 125 N. W. 324; In re Cleven's Estate, 161 Iowa, 289, 142 N. W. 986; Wilson v. First Nat. Bank, 164 Iowa, 402, 145 N. W. 948 (if gift is inadequate, trust will be carried out as far as possible).

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trine of charitable trusts, as a part of the ordinary juris-

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Louisiana: Society of Orphan Boys v. New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 62; New Orleans v. McDonogh, 12 La. Ann. 240; Fink v. Ex'r of Fink, 12 La. Ann. 301.

Maine : Maine Bapt. Miss. Con. v. Portland, 65 Me. 92; Swasey v. Am. Bible Soc., 57 Me. 523; Howard v. Am. Peace Soc., 49 Me. 288; Preachers' Aid Soc. v. Rich, 45 Me. 552; Tappan v. Deblois, 45 Me. 122; Shapleigh v. Pilsbury, 1 Me. 271.

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Mississippi:^x Wade v. Am. Colon. Soc., 7 Smedes & M. 663, 45 Am. Dec. 324.

§ 1029. (t) Kansas.—Troutman v. De Boissiere Odd Fellows' Orphans H. & I. S. Ass'n, 66 Kan. 1, 71 Pac. 287 (reversing (Kan.) 64 Pac. 33); Trustees of Washburn College v. O'Hara, 75 Kan. 700, 90 Pac. 234; Bauer v. Myers, 244 Fed. 902, 157 C. C. A. 252.

§ 1029, (u) Kentucky .- The decision in Spaulding v. St. Joseph's Industrial School, 107 Ky. 382, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1107, 54 S. W. 200, places Kentucky in the second class, as the trust in that case would clearly be valid under the English decisions; moreover, it is there asserted that all previous recognitions of the cy-pres rule in Kentucky were dicta. For the other Kentucky cases, see post, under class third. Recent cases are: Kasey v. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 Ky. 609, 115 S. W. 739; Green's Adm'rs v. Fidelity Trust Co., 134 Ky. 311, 20 Ann. Cas. 861, 120 S. W. 283; Grundy v. Neal, 147 Ky. 729, 145 S. W. 401; Greer v. Synod Southern Presbyterian Church, 150 Ky. 155, 150 S. W. 16; Gerick's Ex'r v. Gerick, 158 Ky. 478, 165 S. W. 695; Neptune Fire Engine & Hose Co. v. Board of

Education, 166 Ky. 1, 178 S. W. 1138; Adams v. Bohon, 176 Ky. 66, 195 S. W. 156 (*cy-pres* doctrine not in force).

§ 1029, (v) Maine.—Piper v. Moulton, 72 Me. 155; Simpson v. Welcome, 72 Me. 496, 39 Am. Rep. 349; Dascomb v. Marston, 80 Me. 223, 13 Atl. 888; Fox v. Gibbs, 86 Me. 87, 29 Atl. 940; Farrington v. Putuam, 90 Me. 405, 38 L. R. A. 339, 37 Atl. 652. Maine is now clearly in the third class: See post.

§ 1029, (w) Michigan. — Legislation, adopted from New York. has placed Michigan in this class: See Moore v. O'Leary, 180 Mich. 261, 146 N. W. 661; Lounsbury v. Trustees of Square Lake Burial Ass'n, (Mich.) 129 N. W. 36. For earlier cases, see under class one.

§ 1029, (**x**) Mississippi. — Under Const., §§ 269, 270, it is now held that a trust of realty for charitable purposes is void; but a trust of personalty for the same purposes is valid: Blackburn v. Tucker, 72 Miss. 735, 17 South. 737. See, in general, Rowzee v. Pierce, 75 Miss. 846, 65 Am. St. Rep. 625, 40 L. R. A. 402, 23 South. 307.

diction and functions of equity, has been accepted in a

Missouri: State v. Prewett, 20 Mo. 165; Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Russell v. Allen, 5 Dill. 235; Academy of Visitation v. Clemens, 50 Mo. 167.

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New Hampshire: ^{an} Dublin Case, 38 N. H. 459; Chapin v. School Dist., 35 N. H. 445; Brown v. Concord, 33 N. H. 285; Second Cong. Soc. v. First Cong. Soc., 14 N. H. 315; Duke v. Fuller, 9 N. H. 536, 32 Am. Dec. 392.

New Jersey:^{bb} Goodell v. Union Ass'n, 29 N. J. Eq. 32; De Camp v. Dobbins, 29 N. J. Eq. 36; Trustees etc. v. Beatty, 28 N. J. Eq. 570;

§ 1029, (y) Missouri. - Howe v. Wilson, 91 Mo. 45, 60 Am. Rep. 226, 3 S. W. 390; Missouri Hist. Soc. v. Acad. of Science, 94 Mo. 459, 8 S. W. 346; Barkley v. Donnelly, 112 Mo. 561, 19 S. W. 305; Miller v. Rosenberger, 144 Mo. 292, 46 S. W. 167; Lackland v. Walker, 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. 414; Farmers & Merchants' Bank v. Robinson, 96 Mo. App. 385, 70 S. W. 372. Under the decision in Missouri Historical Soc. v. Academy of Science, 94 Mo. 459, 8 S. W. 346, recognizing the cy-pres rule to a limited extent, Missouri may properly belong in the third class. See these recent cases: Crow v. Clay County, 196 Mo. 234, 95 S. W. 369; Board of Trustees of M. E. Church v. May, 201 Mo. 360, 99 S. W. 1093 (too indefinite); Hadley v. Forsee, 203 Mo. 418, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49, 101 S. W. 59; Buchanon v. Kennard, 234 Mo. 117, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 50, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 993, 136 S. W. 415; State ex rel. Heddens v. Rusk, 234 Mo. 201, 139 S. W. 199; Stewart v. Coshow, 238 Mo. 662, 142 S. W. 283; Strother v. Barrow, 246 Mo. 241, 151 S. W. 960 (statute of Elizabeth part of common law); Mott v. Morris, 249 Mo. 137, 155 S. W. 434 (cy-pres doctrine not applied); Sandusky v. Sandusky, 261 Mo. 351, 168 S. W. 1150; Buckley v. Monck, (Mo.) 187 S. W. 31; Jones v. Patterson, 271 Mo. 1, L. R. A. 1917F, 660, 195 S. W. 1004.

§ 1029, (z) Nebraska.—St. James' Orphan Asylum v. Shelby, 60 Neb. 796, 83 Am. St. Rep. 553, 84 N. W. 273; In re Nelson's Estate, 81 Neb. 809, 116 N. W. 971 (no *cy-pres* powers); Clarke v. Sisters of Society of Holy Child Jesus, 82 Neb. 85, 117 N. W. 107; In re Creighton's Estate, 91 Neb. 654, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 128, 136 N. W. 1001; In re Douglass' Estate, 94 Neb. 280, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 447, 143 N. W. 299.

§ 1029, (an) New Hampshire. — Goodale v. Mooney, 60 N. H. 528, 49 Am. Rep. 334, Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N. H. 354, 10 Atl. 706; Adams Female Academy v. Adams, 65 N. H. 225, 6 L. R. A. 785, 18 Atl. 777, 23 Atl. 430; Towle v. Nesmith, 69 N. H. 212, 42 Atl. 900; Webster v. Sughrow, 69 N. H. 380, 48 L. R. A. 100, 45 Atl. 139; Haynes v. Carr, 70 N. H. 463, 49 Atl. 638; Campbell v. Clough, 71 N. H. 181, 51 Atl. 668. New Hampshire is now apparently in class third.

§1029, (bb) New Jersey. — De Camp v. Dobbins, 31 N. J. Eq. 671;

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modified and limited form; such trusts are upheld when

Stevens v. Shippen, 28 N. J. Eq. 487; Mason's Ex'rs v. Meth. Epis. Ch., 27 N. J. Eq. 47; Thomson's Ex'rs v. Norris, 20 N. J. Eq. 489; Norris v. Thomson's Ex'rs, 19 N. J. Eq. 307; Att'y-Gen. v. Moore's Ex'rs, 19 N. J. Eq. 503. ce

Taylor v. Trustees, 34 N. J. Eq. 101; Brown v. Pancoast, 34 N. J. Eq. 324; Hesketh v. Murphy, 35 N. J. Eq. 23, 36 N. J. Eq. 304; Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N. J. Eq. 348; Union Meth. Epis. Ch. v. Wilkinson, 36 N. J. Eq. 141; Hutchins v. George, 44 N. J. Eq. 126, 14 Atl. 108; George v. Braddock, 45 N. J. Eq. 757, 14 Am. St. Rep. 754, 6 L. R. A. 511, 18 Atl. 881; Green v. Blackwell, (N. J. Ch.) 35 Atl. 375; Mills v. Davison, 54 N. J. Eq. 659, 55 Am. St. Rep. 594, 35 L. R. A. 113, 35 Atl. 1072; Livesey v. Jones, 35 Atl. 1064, 55 N. J. Eq. 204 (affirmed, Chadwick v. Livesey, 56 N. J. Eq. 453, 41 Atl. 1115); Kerrigan v. Tabb, (N. J. Ch.) 39 Atl. 701; Kerrigan v. Conelly, (N. J. Ch.) 46 Atl. 227; American Bible Soc. v. American Tract Soc., 62 N. J. Eq. 219, 50 Atl. 67; Lanning v. Com. of Public Instruction, 63 N. J. Eq. 1, 51 Atl. 787; Bruere v. Cook, 63 N. J. Eq. 624, 52 Atl. 1001; Jones v. Watford, 64 N. J. Eq. 785, 53 Atl. 397 (affirming 62 N. J. Eq. 339, 50 Atl. 180); Hyde's Ex'r v. Hyde, 64 N. J. Eq. 6, 53 Atl. 593. New Jersey now recognizes the cy-pres doctrine; for recent cases, see post under class third.

§ 1029, (cc) New York.—New York now belongs to the second class. A statute passed in 1893 (Laws 1893, c. 701) provides: "Section 1. No gift, grant, bequest or devise to religious, educational, charitable, or benevo-

lent uses, which shall, in other respects, be valid under the laws of this state, shall be deemed invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the persons designated as the beneficiaries thereunder in the instrument creating the same. If in the instrument creating such a gift, grant, bequest or devise there is a trustee named to execute the same, the legal title to the lands or property given, granted, devised or bequeathed for such purposes shall vest in such trustee. If no person be named as trustee then the title to such lands or property shall vest in the supreme court. Section 2. The supreme court shall have control over gifts, grants, bequests and devises in all cases provided for by section one of this act. The attorney-general shall represent the beneficiaries in all such cases and it shall be his duty to enforce such trusts by proper proceedings in the court." Under this statute, a gift in trust for the purpose of founding a home for aged people was upheld in Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122, 55 N. E. 568. The court also held that upon the death of the trustees the supreme court would execute the trust. See, also, In re Sturgis, 164 N. Y. 485, 58 N. E. 646. The opinion of Parker, C. J., in Allen v. Stevens, supra, is of much general interest because of the breadth of construction given to the statute, which was held to negative the effect not only of the cases invalidating charitable

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the property is given to a person sufficiently certain, and

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Ohio:^{ff} Am. Bible Soc. v. Marshall, 15 Ohio St. 537; Urmey's Ex'rs v. Wooden, 1 Ohio St. 160, 59 Am. Dec. 615; Hullman v. Honcomp, 5 Ohio St. 237; McIntire's School v. Zanesville, 9 Ohio, 203.

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Pennsylvania.^{hh} Humane Fire Co.'s Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 389; Swift's Ex'rs v. Eaton Beneficial Soc., 73 Pa. St. 362; Zeisweiss v. James, 63

trusts because of uncertainty, but also of the long line of decisions applying to charitable trusts the rule against perpetuitics. For a vigorous criticism of his reasoning, see Danforth v. City of Oshkosh, 119 Wis. 262, 97 N. W. 258, dissenting opinion of Marshall, J. Recent New York cases are: Bowman v. Domestic & Foreign Missionary Society, 182 N. Y. 494, 75 N. E. 535; Mount v. Tuttle, 183 N. Y. 358, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 428, 76 N. E. 873 (out-and-out devise to voluntary unincorporated association does not create a trust); Rothschild v. Schiff, 188 N. Y. 327, 80 N. E. 1030; In re Shattuck's Will, 193 N. Y. 446, 86 N. E. 455 (effect of statute of 1893 considered, but trust held too indefinite and uncertain to be sustained. Gifts for private institutions or individuals not protected by act); Driscoll v. Hewlett, 198 N. Y. 297, 91 N. E. 784 (discussion of New York statutes); In re Will of Robinson, 203 N.Y. 380, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1023, 96 N. E. 925; In re Harteau, 204 N. Y. 292, 97 N. E. 726; In re Cunningham's Will, 206 N. Y. 601, 100 N. E. 437; Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Carmody, 211 N. Y. 286, 105 N. E. 543 (effect of legislation reviewed); In re MacDowell's Will, 217 N. Y. 454, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 853, 112 N. E. 177 (law is restored to that in England prior to the Revolution); Butterworth v. Keeler, 219 N. Y. 446, 114 N. E. 803.

§ 1029, (dd) North Carolina.---Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497, 32 S. E. 809. See, also, In re Murray's Will, 141 N. C. 588, 54 S. E. 435; Spring Green Church v. Thornton, 158 N. C. 119, 73 S. E. 810; Grace Church v. Ange, 161 N. C. 314, 77 S. E. 239.

§ 1029, (ee) North Dakota.—See Hagen v. Sacrison, 19 N. D. 160, 26 L. B. A. (N. S.) 724, 123 N. W. 518 (charities highly favored; trust supported, though no trustee named).

§ 1029, (11) Ohio.—Mannix v. Purcell, 46 Ohio St. 102, 15 Am. St. Rep. 562, 2 L. R. A. 753, 19 N. E. 572.

§ 1029, (55) Oregon.—Pennoyer v. Wadhams, 20 Or. 274, 11 L. R. A. 211, 25 Pac. 720; In re John's Will, 30 Or. 494, 36 L. R. A. 242, 47 Pac. 341, 50 Pac. 226; John v. Smith, 102 Fed. 218, 42 C. C. A. 275 (affirming 91 Fed. 827).

§ 1029, (hh) Pennsylvania.—Handley v. Palmer, 103 Fed. 39, 43 C. C. A. 100 (affirming 91 Fed. 948); Manners v. Phila. Library Co., 93 Pa. St. 165, 39 Am. Rep. 741; Jones v. Renshaw, 130 Pa. St. 327, 18 Atl. 651; Commonwealth v. Pauline Temporary Home, 141 Pa. St. 537, 21 Atl. 661; In re Sellers Chapel Meth. Ch., 139 Pa. St. 61, 11 L. R. A. 282, 21 Atl. 145, 27 Wkly. Notes Cas. 383; Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions for an object sufficiently definite. With regard to this ele-

Pa. St. 465, 3 Am. Rep. 558; Mayer v. Soc. for Visitation of the Sick, 2 Brewst. 385; Philadelphia v. Girard, 45 Pa. St. 9, 84 Am. Dec. 470; McLean v. Wade, 41 Pa. St. 266; Miller v. Porter, 53 Pa. St. 292; Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. St. 335; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. St. 169; Soohan v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. St. 9; Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. St. 23; Griffitts v. Cope, 17 Pa. St. 96; McLain v. School Directors, 51 Pa. St. 196; Evangelical Association's Appeal, 35 Pa. St. 316; Mission Society's Appeal, 30 Pa. St. 425; Cresson's Appeal, 30 Pa. St. 437; Barr v. Weld, 24 Pa. St. 84; Brendle v. German Ref. Cong., 33 Pa. St. 415; Witman v. Lex, 17 Serg. & R. 88, 17 Am. Dec. 644; Gregg v. Irish, 6 Pa. St. 211; Wright v. Linn, 9 Pa. St. 433; Pickering v. Shotwell, 10 Pa. St. 23; Hillyard v. Miller, 10 Pa. St. 326; Methodist Ch. v. Remington, 1 Watts, 218, 26 Am. Dec. 61; Martin v. McCord, 5 Watts, 493, 30 Am. Dec. 342; Ex parte Cassel, 3 Watts, 408, 440; Morrison v. Beirer, 2 Watts & S. 81; Zimmerman v. Anders, 6 Watts & S. 218, 40 Am. Dec. 552; Philadelphia v. Elliott, 3 Rawle, 170; Girard v. Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1; Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 127.

Rhode Island:¹¹ Meeting St. Bap. Soc. v. Hail, 8 R. I. 234; Potter v. Thornton, 7 R. I. 252; Derby v. Derby, 4 R. I. 414.

South Carolina:^{jj} Attorney-General v. Jolly, 1 Rich. Eq. 99; 2 Strob. Eq. 379; Attorney-General v. Clergy Soc., 8 Rich. Eq. 190; Gibson v. McCall, 1 Rich. 174; Combe v. Brazier, 2 Desaus. Eq. 431.

v. Culp, 151 Pa. St. 467, 25 Atl. 117, 31 Wkly. Notes Cas. 135; In re Lewis, 152 Pa. St. 477, 25 Atl. 878, 31 Wkly. Notes Cas. 460; Trim v. Brightman, 168 Pa. St. 395, 31 Atl. 1071; In re Murphy's Estate, 184 Pa. St. 310, 63 Am. St. Rep. 802, 39 Atl. 70; Young v. St. Mark's Lutheran Church, 200 Pa. St. 332, 49 Atl. 887; In re Sleicher's Estate, 201 Pa. St. 612, 51 Atl. 329; In re Daly's Estate, 208 Pa. St. 58, 57 Atl. 180. Recent cases are: In re De Silver's Estate, 211 Pa. 459, 60 Atl. 1048; In re Dulle's Estate, 218 Pa. 162, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1177, 67 Atl. 49; Hamilton v. John C. Mercer Home, 228 Pa. 410, 77 Atl. 630; In re Kramph's Estate, 228 Pa. 455, 77 Atl. 814 (cy-pres rule applied as to location of institution); In re Centennial & Memorial Ass'n of Valley Forge, 235 Pa. 206, 83 Atl. 683 (on dissolution of charitable corporation, assets applied *cy-pres*); In re Kimberley's Estate, 249 Pa. 483, 95 Atl. 86 (statute of Elizabeth part of common law); Girard Trust Co. v. Russell, 179 Fed. 446, 102 C. C. A. 592. Some of these cases, perhaps, place Pennsylvania in the third class. The subject of charities is now regulated to a large extent by statute in Pennsylvania.

§ 1029, (11) *Rhode Island.*—Pell v. Mercer, 14 R. I. 412, declares that the *cy-pres* doctrine exists in Rhode Island. See notes to third class.

§ 1029, (ij) South Carolina.—Brennan v. Winkler, 37 S. C. 457, 16 S. E. 190; Dye v. Beaver Creek Church, 48 S. C. 444, 59 Am. St. Rep. 724, 26 S. E. 717. See, also, Mars v. Gibert, 93 S. C. 455, 77 S. E. 131 (cy-pres doctrine not recognized). ment of certainty in the trustee, and the objects, there is

Tennessee: kk Dickson v. Montgomery, 1 Swan, 348; White v. Hale, 2 Cold. 77; Gass v. Ross, 3 Sneed, 211; Franklin v. Armfield, 2 Sneed, 305; Green v. Allen, 5 Humph. 170.

Texas:¹¹ Laird v. Bass, 50 Tex. 412; Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 173; Bell Co. v. Alexander, 22 Tex. 350, 73 Am. Dec. 268; Hopkins v. Upshur, 20 Tex. 89, 70 Am. Dec. 375.

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Vermont:ⁿⁿ Clement v. Hyde, 50 Vt. 716, 28 Am. Rep. 522; Burr v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241, 29 Am. Dec. 154; Penfield v. Skinner, 11 Vt. 296; Stone v. Griffin, 3 Vt. 400.

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United States Supreme Court: Pr Ould v. Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 303; Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U. S. 362; 3 Hughes C. C. 397; Girard v.

§ 1029, (kk) Tennessee.-Fite v. Beasley, 12 Lea, 328; Rhodes v. Rhodes, 88 Tenn. (4 Pickle) 637, 13 S. W. 590; Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. (7 Pickle) 303, 15 L. R. A. 801, 18 S. W. \$74; Johnson v. Johnson, 92 Tenn. (8 Pickle) 559, 36 Am. St. Rep. 104, 22 L. R. A. 179, 23 S. W. 114; Jones v. Green, (Tenn. Ch. App.), 36 S. W. 729; Cheatham v. Nashville Trust Co., (Tenn. Ch. App.), 57 S. W. 202. See, also, Ewell v. Sneed, 136 Tenn. 602, 191 S. W. 131; Gibson v. Frye Institute, 137 Tenn. 452, L. R. A. 1917D, 1062, 193 S. W. 1059.

§ 1029, (11) Texas.—Ryan v. Porter, 61 Tex. 106; Pierce v. Weaver, 65 Tex. 44; Nolte v. Meyer, 79 Tex. 351, 15 S. W. 276; Peace v. First Christian Church, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 85, 48 S. W. 534. As the recent case of Inglish v. Johnson, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 118, 95 S. W. 558, applies the *cy-pres* doctrine, Texas may now be placed in class third.

§ 1029, (mm) Utah.—In Staines v. Burton, 17 Utah, 331, 70 Am. St. Rep. 788, 53 Pac. 1015, a trust was upheld the terms of which were very broad, and which would have been rejected by the English courts on the ground that it gave the trustees discretion to apply the fund for indefinite purposes not charitable. The *cy-pres* rule was not passed upon.

§ 1029, (nn) Vermont.—Sheldon v. Town of Stockbridge, 67 Vt. 299, 31 Atl. 414.

§ 1029, (oo) Washington.—In re Stewart's Estate, 26 Wash. 32, 66 Pac. 148, 67 Pac. 723; Peth v. Spear, 63 Wash. 291, 115 Pac. 164; Korsstrom v. Barnes, 167 Fed. 216.

§ 1029, (**DP**) West Virginia.--See Harris v. Neal, 61 W. Va. 1, 55 S. E. 740; Arnett v. Fairmont Trust Co., 70 W. Va. 296, 73 S. E. 930; Ritter v. Couch, 71 W. Va. 221, 42 **L. R. A.** (**N. S.**) 1216, 76 S. E. 428; Hays v. Harris, 73 W. Va. 17, 80 S. E. 827, For earlier cases, see under class first.

§ 1029, (99) Wisconsin now belongs in the second class, as respects trust of personal property: See cases cited *ante*, under first class.

§1029, (FF) Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174, 27 L. Ed. 401, 2 Sup.

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much diversity of decision. The doctrine of *cy-pres* is generally rejected.^{ss} *Third class*. This class includes a very few states which have accepted the doctrine in its full extent.³ The states composing this group have not even

Philadelphia, 7 Wall. 1; Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 127; Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 55; Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. 369; Bap. Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 4 Wheat. 1; Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1.

A few of the states in this list—e. g., New Jersey—might perhaps be properly placed in the third class, since their courts uphold trusts very uncertain, both as to trustee and object; but none of them, I believe, profess to accept the English doctrine in all its fullness.

§ 1029, ³ Massachusetts.^{tt}—The doctrine is freely and fully accepted, and the rule of *cy-pres* is enforced: Att'y-Gen. v. Parker, 126 Mass. 216; Sohier v. Burr, 127 Mass. 221; Boxford etc. Soc. v. Harriman, 125 Mass. 321; McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529;

Ct. 336; Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 172, 27 L. Ed. 397, 2 Sup. Ct. 327; Speer v. Colbert, 200 U. S. 130, 50 L. Ed. 403, 26 Sup. Ct. 201; Taylor v. Columbian University, 226 U. S. 126, 57 L. Ed. 152, 33 Sup. Ct. 73.

§1029, (ss) This portion of the text is quoted in Brennan v. Winkler, 37 S. C. 457, 16 S. E. 190.

§ 1029, (tt) Massachusetts .--- Suter v. Hilliard, 132 Mass. 412, 42 Am. Rep. 444; Bates v. Bates, 134 Mass. 110, 45 Am. Rep. 305; In re Schouler, 134 Mass. 426; White v. Ditson, 140 Mass. 351, 54 Am. Rep. 473, 4 N. E. 606; Kent v. Dunham. 142 Mass. 216, 56 Am. Rep. 667, 7 N. E. 730; Morville v. Fowle, 144 Mass. 109, 10 N. E. 766; Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 9 Am. St. Rep. 713, 17 N. E. 839; Bullard v. Chandler, 149 Mass. 532, 5 L. R. A. 104, 21 N. E. 951; Stratton v. Physio-Medical College, 149 Mass. 508, 14 Am. St. Rep. 442, 5 L. R. A. 33, 21 N. E. 874; Weeks v. Hobson, 150 Mass. 377, 6 L. R. A. 147, 23 N. E. 215: Burbank v. Burbank, 152 Mass. 254, 9 L. R. A. 748; 25 N. E. 427, Darcy

v. Kelley, 153 Mass. 433, 26 N. E. 1110; Bullard v. Town of Shirley, 153 Mass. 559, 12 L. R. A. 110, 27 N. E. 766; Green v. Hogan, 153 Mass. 462, 27 N. E. 413; Sears v. Chapman, 158 Mass. 400, 35 Am. St. Rep. 502, 33 N. E. 604; Holmes v. Coates, 159 Mass. 226, 34 N. E. 190; McAlister v. Burgess, 161 Mass. 269, 24 L. R. A. 158, 37 N. E. 173; Weber v. Bryant, 161 Mass. 400, 37 N. E. 203; In re Bartlett, 163 Mass. 509, 40 N. E. 899; St. Paul's Church v. Attorney-General, 164 Mass. 188, 41 N. E. 231; Teele v. Bishop of Derry, 168 Mass. 341, 60 Am. St. Rep. 401, 38 L. R. A. 629; 47 N. E. 422; AttorneyGeneral v. Briggs, 164 Mass. 561, 567, 42 N. E. 118; Higginson v. Turner, 171 Mass. 586, 51 N. E. 172; Dexter v. President, etc., of Harvard College, 176 Mass. 192, 57 N. E. 371; Sherman v. Congregational Home Miss. Society, 176 Mass. 349, 57 N. E. 702; Morse v. Inhabitants of Natick, 176 Mass. 510, 57 N. E. 996; Amory v. Attorney-General, 179 Mass. 89, 60 N. E. 391; Attorney-General v.

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totally rejected the doctrine of cy-pres, although they do not apply it so freely and under such extreme circumstances as would be done in England. The general system seems, at least, to be so far adopted that when an intention to give

Old South Soc. v. Crocker, 119 Mass. 1, 20 Am. Rep. 299; Fellows v. Miner, 119 Mass. 541; Gooch v. Ass'n for Relief etc., 109 Mass. 558; Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211, 39 Am. Rep. 445; Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221; Att'y-Gen. v. Garrison, 101 Mass. 223; Fairbanks v. Lamson, 99 Mass. 533; Hosea v. Jacobs, 98 Mass. 65; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539; Att'y-Gen. v. Old South Soc., 13 Allen, 474; Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen, 446; Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen, 1; Drury v. Natick, 10 Allen, 169; Att'y-Gen. v. Trinity Church, 9 Allen, 422; Dexter v. Gardner, 7 Allen, 243; Tainter v. Clark, 5 Allen, 66; Bliss v. Am. Bible Soc., 2 Allen, 334; Easterbrooks v. Tillinghast, 5 Gray, 171; Am. Acad. v. Harvard College, 12 Gray, 582; Wells v. Heath, 10 Gray, 17; North Adams etc. Soc. v. Fitch, 8 Gray, 421; Harvard College v. Soc. Prom. Theol. Educ., 3 Gray, 280; Wells v. Doane, 3 Gray, 201; Earle v. Wood, 8 Cush. 430; Nourse v. Merriam, 8 Cush. 11; Parker v. May, 5 Cush. 336; Winslow v. Cummings, 3 Cush. 358; Brown v. Kelsey, 2 Cush. 243; Baker v. Smith, 13 Met. 34; Sohier v. St. Paul's Church, 12 Met. 250; Washhurn v. Sewall, 9 Met. 280; Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Soc., 7 Met. 188; Bartlett v. Nye, 4 Met. 378; Burbank v. Whitney, 24 Pick. 146, 35 Am. Dec. 312; Sanderson v. White, 18 Pick. 328, 29 Am. Dec. 591; Going v. Emery, 16 Pick.

Goodell, 180 Mass. 538, 62 N. E. 962; Minns v. Billings, 183 Mass. 126, 97 Am. St. Rep. 420, 66 N. E. 593; City of Boston v. Doyle, 184 Mass. 373, 68 N. E. 851; Codman v. Brigham, (Mass.) 72 N. E. 1008; Brigham v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 126 Fed. 796; affirmed, Brigham v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 134 Fed. 513, 67 C. C. A. 393. See, also, these recent cases: Minot v. Attorney-General (Parker), 189 Mass. 176, 75 N. E. 149 (indefinite); Sears v. Attorney-General, 193 Mass. 551, 9 Ann. Cas. 1200, 79 N. E. 772; Hubbard v. Worcester Art Museum, 194 Mass. 280, 10 Ann. Cas. 1025, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 689, 80 N. E. 490 (cy-pres); Gill v. Attorney-General, 197 Mass. 232, 83 N. E. 676; Ware v. City of Fitchburg, 200

Mass. 61, 85 N. E. 951; Bowden v. Brown, 200 Mass. 269, 128 Am. St. Rep. 419, 86 N. E. 351 (cy-pres doctrine not applicable); Richardson v. [•] Mullery, 200 Mass. 247, 86 N. E. 319 (cy-pres); Masonic Education etc. Trust v. City of Boston, 201 Mass. 320, 87 N. E. 602; Ely v. Attorney-General (Malone), 202 Mass. 545, 89 N. E. 166 (cy-pres applied where fund was inadequate); New England Sanitarium v. Inhabitants of Stoneham, 205 Mass. 335, 91 N. E. 385; Grimke v. Attorney-General (Malone), 206 Mass. 49, 91 N. E. 899 (inadequate fund); Richardson v. Essex Institute, 208 Mass. 311, 21 Ann. Cas. 1158, 94 N. E. 262; Burr v. City of Boston, 208 Mass. 537, 84 L. R. A. (N. S.) 143, 95 N. E. 208; Little v. City of Newbury§ 1029

107, 26 Am. Dec. 645; Hadley v. Hopkins Acad., 14 Pick. 240; Bartlett v. King, 12 Mass. 537, 7 Am. Dec. 99; Barker v. Wood, 9 Mass. 419. uu

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Kentucky: ww The statute is adopted, and the court carries out the doctrine fully, in cases of uncertain trustees and objects, applying the rule of *cy-pres*: Cromies v. Louisville etc. Soc., 3 Bush, 365; Bap. Church v. Presb. Church, 18 B. Mon. 635; Hadden v. Chorn, 8 B. Mon. 70; Att'y-

port, 210 Mass. 414, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 425, 96 N. E. 1032; Bragg v. Litchfield, 212 Mass. 148, 98 N. E. 673 (cy-pres doctrine not applica. ble); Massachusetts Baptist Missionary Soc. v. Bowdoin, 212 Mass. 198, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 472, 98 N. E. 1045, (trustee moribund); Chase v. Dikey, 212 Mass. 555, 99 N. E. 410 (Mrs. Eddy's will; Christian Science); Read v. Willard Hospital, 215 Mass. 132, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 574, 102 N. E. 95 (cy-pres); Norris v. Loomis, 215 Mass. 344, 102 N. E. 419 (fund inadequate; cy-pres); Ripley v. Brown, 218 Mass. 33, 105 N. E. 637; Thorp v. Lund, 227 Mass. 474, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1204, 116 N. E. 946.

§ 1029, (un) Florida.—See Lewis v. Gaillard, 61 Fla. 819, 56 South. 281 (cy-pres may be used at least as a doctrine for liberal construction of a bequest, especially where it has once vested).

§ 1029, (vv) Illinois. — Christian Church of Sand Creek v. Church of Christ, 219 Ill. 503, 76 N. E. 703; Welch v. Caldwell, 226 Ill. 488, 80 N. E. 1014; Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, 233 Ill. 327, 122 Am. St. Rep. 169, 84 N. E. 256; Gilmore v. Lee, 237 Ill. 402, 127 Am. St. Rep. 330, 86 N. E. 568; Estate of Graves, 242 Ill. 23, 134 Am. St. Rep. 302, 17 Ann. Cas. 137, 89 N. E. 672; French v. Calkins, 252

Ill. 243, 96 N. E. 877 (cy-pres); Franklin v. Hastings, 253 Ill. 46, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 135, 97 N. E. 265 (gift to corporation to be formed sustained); Mason v. Bloomington Library Ass'n, 237 Ill. 442, 15 Ann. Cas. 603; 86 N. E. 1044; People ex rel. Smith v. Braucher, 258 Ill. 604, 101 N. E. 944; (cy-pres doctrine recognized); Burke v. Burke, 259 Ill. 262, 102 N. E. 293 (inherent jurisdiction apart from statute 43 Eliz.); Hitchcock v. Board of Home Missions, 259 Ill. 288, 102 N. E. 741 (statute of Elizabeth adopted in Illinois); Tincher v. Arnold, 147 Fed. 665, 77 C. C. A. 649 (cy-pres doctrine recognized). For earlier cases, see ante, note (q).

§ 1029, (ww) Kentucky.-Curling v. Curling, 8 Dana, 38, 33 Am. Dec. 475; Chambers v. Society, 1 B. Mon. 215; Leeds v. Shaw, 82 Ky. 80; Kinney v. Kinney, 86 Ky. 610, 6 S. W. 593; Givens v. Shouse, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 419; Peynado v. Peynado, 82 Ky. 5; Penick v. Thorn, 90 Ky. 668, 14 S. W. 830; Ford v. Ford, 91 Ky. 572, 16 S. W. 451; Ticheror v. Brewer, 98 Ky. 349, 33 S. W. 86; Bedford v. Bedford, 99 Ky. 273, 35 S. W. 926; Chambers v. Higgins' Ex'r, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1425, 49 S. W. 436; Spalding v. St. Joseph's Industrial School, 107 Ky. 382, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1107, 54 S. W. 200; Craw-

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disposition is uncertain and indefinite, either as to the

Gen. v. Wallace, 7 B. Mon. 611; Moore v. Moore, 4 Dana, 354, 29 Am. Dec. 417; Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana, 170, 26 Am. Dec. 446.

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ford's Heirs v. Thomas, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1100, 54 S. W. 197; Coleman v. O'Leary's Ex'r, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1248, 70 S. W. 1068; Thompson's Ex'r v. Brown, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 371, 75 S. W. 210; Johnson v. De Pauw University, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 950, 76 S. W. 851. In Spalding v. St. Joseph's Industrial School, 107 Ky. 382, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1107, 54 S. W. 200, it was held that the apparent adoption of the cy-pres rule in the earlier Kentucky cases, which are reviewed at length, was only by way of dicta, and a devise of the testator's entire estate to his executor "for charitable objects," to be expended in a certain diocese, was void for uncertainty. The case is difficult to reconcile with other Kentucky cases where the language of the testator was equally indefinite. This decision clearly places Kentucky in the second class.

§ 1029, (xx) Maine.—The cy-pres doctrine has been adopted in recent cases: Webber Hospital Ass'n v. McKenzie, 104 Me. 320, 71 Atl. 1032; Hamlin v. Property in Webster, (Me.) 76 Atl. 163; Allen v. Trustees of Nasson Institute, 107 Me. 120, 77 Atl. 638 (cy-pres); Congregational Lynch ν. \mathbf{South} Parish, 109 Me. 32, 82 Atl. •432 (cy-pres); Dunn v. Morse, 109 Me. 254, 83 Atl. 795; Petition of Pierce, 109 Me. 509, 84 Atl. 1070 (cy-pres will be applied when fund was too small to carry out original purpose); Lear v. Manser, 114 Me. 342, 96 Atl. 240; Bills v. Pease, (Me.) 100 Atl. 146. For earlier cases, see ante, under class second.

§ 1029, (YY) Missouri.—The cy-pres doctrine is recognized in Missouri, in broad terms, the actual decisions, however, going merely to the extent of holding that when land is given in trust to a charitable institution to use for a particular purpose, and its further use for that purpose becomes impracticable, the court may order it to be sold and the proceeds applied to the purposes of the trust: Missouri Historical Society v. Academy of Science, 94 Mo. 459, 8 S.-W. 346; Academy of Visitation Ψ. Clemens, 50 Mo. 167; or that the courts may permit the land to be alienated in a different manner from that prescribed by the donor; Lackland v. Walker, 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. 414.

§ 1029, (zz) New Hampshire.—Recent cases are: City of Keene v. Eastman, 75 N. H. 191, 72 Atl. 213 (cy-pres rule applied; discussion of cases); French v. Lawrence, 76 N. H. 234, 81 Atl. 705; Glover v. Baker, 76 N. H. 393, 83 Atl. 916; Smart v. Town of Durham, 77 N. H. 56, 86 Atl. 821; Winslow v. Stark, (N. H.) 97 Atl. 979; Gagnon v. Wellman, (N. H.), 99 Atl. 786 (cy-pres). For earlier cases, see ante.

§1029, (ann) New Jersey.—The cy-pres doctrine has been recognized in several recent cases: See Brown v. Condit, 70 N. J. Eq. 440, 61 Atl. 1055 (cy-pres not applied); MacKen§ 1029

trustee or as to the objects and beneficiaries, the trust is upheld or defeated, upon the same principles as those which would be followed by the English courts.

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zie v. Trustees of Presbytery of Jersey City, 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227, and note, 61 Atl. 1027 (cy-pres; many cases discussed); Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Hoboken, 70 N. J. Eq. 630, 62 Atl. 1; Hegeman's Ex'rs v. Roome, 70 N. J. Eq. 562, 62 Atl. 392; Nichols v. Newark Hospital, 71 N. J. Eq. 130, 63 Atl. 621; Trenton Society for Organizing Charity v. Howell, (N. J. Ch.) 63 Atl., 1110; Van Syckel v. Johnson, (N. J. Eq.) 70 Atl. 657; Larkin v. Wikoff, 75 N. J. Eq. 462, 72 Atl. 98 (cy-pres not applied); Hilliard v. Parker, 76 N. J. Eq. 447, 74 Atl. 447; Bliss v. Linden Cemetery Ass'n, 81 N. J. Eq. 394, 87 Atl. 224; Rector etc. of St. James Church v. Wilson, 82 N. J. Eq. 546, 89 Atl. 519 (cy-pres applied); Johnson v. Bowen, 85 N. J. Eq. 76, 95 Atl. 370; Vineland Trust Co. v. Westendorf, 86 N. J. Eq. 343, 98 Atl. 314.

§ 1029, (**bbb**) Rhode Island.—Under the decision in Pell v. Mercer, 14 R. I. 412, the doctrine of *cy-pres* seems to be fully adopted. Almy v. Jones, 17 R. I. 265, 12 L. R. A. 414, 21 Atl. 616; Palmer v. Union Bank, 17 R. I. 627, 24 Atl. 109; Kelly v. Nichols, 17 R. I. 306, 21 Atl. 906, 18 R. I. 62, 19 L. B. A. 413, 25 Atl. 840; In re Van Horne, 18 R. I. 389, 28 Atl. 341; Webster v. Wiggin, 19 R. I. 73, 28 L. B. A. 510, 31 Atl. 824; Sherman v. Baker, 20 R. I. 446, 40 Atl. 11; St. Peter's Church v. Brown, 21 R. I. 367, 43 Atl. 642; Mason v. Perry, 22 R. I. 475, 48 Atl. 671; Wood v. Paine, 66 Fed. 807. See, also, Wood v. Trustees of Fourth Baptist Church, 26 R. I. 594, 61 Atl. 279; Selleck v. Thompson, 28 R. I. 350, 67 Atl. 425; Godfrey v. Hutchins, 28 R. I. 517, 68 Atl. 317; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Town Council, 29 R. I. 393, 71 Atl. 644; Brice v. Trustees of All Saints Memorial Chapel, 31 R. I. 183, 76 Atl. 774; Almy v. White, (R. I.) 79 Atl. 837 (cy-pres applied where purpose failed before administration began).

§ 1029, (ecc) Texas.—As the oypres doctrine was distinctly recognized in Inglish v. Johnson, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 118, 95 S. W. 558, Texas may now be added to this class. See, also, Banner v. Rolf, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 88, 94 S. W. 1125. For earlier Texas cases, see under class second.

SECTION V.

TRUSTS ARISING BY OPERATION OF LAW-RESULTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.

ANALYSIS.

§ 1030.	General nature and kinds.
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§ 1030. General Nature and Kinds.^a—The second main division of trusts, and the one which, in this country

§ 1030, (a) This section is cited in Ala. 534, 70 South. 662; Flesner v. Smith v. Dallas Compress Co., 195 Cooper, 39 Okl. 133, 134 Pac. 379; especially, affords the widest field for the jurisdiction of equity in granting its special remedies so superior to the mere legal recoveries of damages, embraces those which arise by operation of law, from the deeds, wills, contracts, acts, or conduct of parties, either with or without their intention, but without any express words of creation.¹ A broad distinction separates all express trusts from those which arise by operation of law. In the former class the trust relation is rightful and permanent. In the latter, there is no such element of right and permanency. Even if the trust relation is not wholly wrongful, resulting from fraud or other unconscientious act, still a certain antagonism between the cestui que trust and the trustee is involved in the very existence of the trust; and instead of the idea of permanence, the substantial right of the beneficiary is that the trust should be ended by a conveyance of the legal title to himself.^{2 b} All trusts by operation of law

§ 1030, 1 The proposed Civil Code of New York (sec. 1169) and the Civil Code of California (sec. 2217) have invented the wholly unnecessary name of "involuntary trusts" to designate this class. Express trusts they call "voluntary," and define in such general and inaccurate terms that a voluntary trust is made to include every instance of fiduciary position,an attorney, agent, and even a confidential employee. There is, of course, the common element of *confidence* in all these fiduciary relations and in trusts; hut the essential conception of a "trust" is, that it always involves and relates to property; "trust," in its legal meaning, not only describes a confidential relation between two persons, but also includes the property which is the subject-matter of that relation, and which is stamped with the trust character. A legal "trust" is necessarily a species of ownership. The most natural and simple name by which to designate the entire class of trusts arising by operation of law would he "implied trusts" as distinguished from "express trusts" created by words intentionally used. Unfortunately, however, the term "implied trusts" is constantly used by text-writers and judges in so many and varying senses, that it would only produce confusion and uncertainty if one should employ it in this single and restricted meaning.

§ 1030, ² See vol. 1, § 148.

McCoy v. McCoy, 30 Okl. 379, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 146, 121 Pac. 176. Sections 1030-1044 are cited in Turner v. Turner, 34 Okl. 284, 125 Pac. 730. § 1030, (b) The text is quoted in Butts v. Cooper, 152 Ala. 375, 44 South. 616. See, also, Cone v. Dunham, 59 Conn. 145, 8 L. R. A. 647, consist, therefore, in a separation of the legal and the equitable estates, one person holding the legal title for the benefit of the equitable owner, who is regarded by equity as the *real* owner, and who is entitled to be clothed with the legal title by a conveyance.³ Certain instances of this class are trusts only *sub modo*; they are termed trusts, because the beneficial owner is entitled to the same remedies against the holder of the legal title which are given to the beneficiary under a true trust.⁴ All trusts which arise by operation of law are, as the name indicates, excepted from the requirements of the statute of frauds.⁵ ^c This entire grand division consists of two general classes: resulting trusts and constructive trusts. The line of distinction between these two classes is clear and definite; the failure to observe it has produced much unnecessary confusion.⁶ I

§ 1030, ³ The correctness of this conclusion is shown by the fact that no resulting or constructive trust growing out of the relations of parties or the use of funds will be enforced against the holder of the legal title who is clothed with an equal equity, even in favor of an infant: Haggard v. Benson, 3 Tenn. Ch. 268.

§ 1030, 4 This is especially true of those trusts ex maleficio which arise from actual fraud, and certain others which arise from a breach of fiduciary duty: See *post*, § 1053, concerning constructive trusts.

§ 1030, 5 See ante, § 1008; Ward v. Armstrong, 84 Ill. 151. It follows that such trusts need not be "declared" nor "evidenced" by any writing; the fact of their existence may be proved by parol.

§ 1030, 6 Hardly any two writers *entirely* agree in their classification of resulting and constructive trusts; the same instances are treated by some as resulting, by others as constructive. Even courts have sometimes failed to recognize the line of distinction which separates the two; thus in a recent case (Bickel's Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 204), the court are represented as holding that a resulting trust in land only arises from fraud in obtaining the land, or from the payment of the purchase-money. In any accurate sense of the term, a resulting trust *never* arises from fraud.^d

20 Atl. 311; Arnold v. Hall, 72 Wash. 50, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 349, 129 Pac. 914. All resulting trusts are dry trusts; Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S. W. 634.

§ 1030, (c) The text is cited to this effect in Griffin v. Schlenk, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 422, 102 S. W. 837. See, also, Ferguson v. Robinson, 258 Mo. 113, 167 S. W. 447.

§ 1030, (d) For a short but clear statement of the difference suggested, see Scadden Flat Gold Min. Co. v. Scadden, 121 Cal. 33, 53 Pac. 440.

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shall describe, *first*, resulting trusts, and *second*, constructive trusts, following a classification which seems to me the necessary consequence of fundamental principles.

Resulting Trusts.^a—In all species of re-§ 1031. First. sulting trusts, intention is an essential element, although that intention is never expressed by any words of direct creation. There must be a transfer, and equity infers the intention that the transferee was not to receive and hold the legal title as the beneficial owner, but that a trust was to arise in favor of the party whom equity would regard as the beneficial owner under the circumstances. The equitable theory of consideration, heretofore explained, is the source and underlying principle of the entire class.¹ Resulting trusts, therefore, are those which arise where the legal estate in property is disposed of, conveyed, or transferred, but the intent appears or is inferred from the terms of the disposition, or from the accompanying facts and circumstances, that the beneficial interest is not to go or be enjoyed with the legal title.^b In such case a trust is implied or results in favor of the person for whom the equitable interest is assumed to have been intended, and whom equity deems to be the real owner.^c This person is the one from whom the consideration actually comes, or who represents or is identified in right with the consideration; the resulting trust follows or goes with the real considera-

§ 1031, 1 See ante, § 981.

§ 1031, (a) Cited in Dixon v. Dixon 123 Md 44, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 616, 90 Atl. 846.

§ 1031, (b) Quoted in O'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Volfer, 106 Ala. 205, 54 Am. St. Rep. 31, 28 L. R. A. 707, 17 South 525, and in Flesner v. Cooper, 39 Okl. 133, 134 Pac. 379. The text is cited in Trumbo v. Fulk, (Va.) 48 S. E. 525. § 1031, (c) See Sanders v. Steele, 124 Ala. 415, 26 South. 882, quoting the text and citing Alabama cases. The text is quoted, also, in Flesner v. Cooper, 39 Okl. 133, 134 Pac. 379. See, also, citing the text, Shupe v. Bartlett, 106 Iowa, 654, 77 N. W. 455; Bible v. Marshall, 103 Tenn. 324, 52 S. W. 1077.

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tion.^{2 d} All true resulting trusts may be reduced to two general types: 1. Where there is a gift to A, but the intention appears, from the terms of the instrument, that the legal and beneficial estates are to be separated, and that he is either to enjoy no beneficial interest or only a part of In order that a case of this kind may arise, there must it. be a true gift so far as the immediate transferee, A, is concerned; the instrument must not even state any consideration, and no valid complete trust must be declared in favor of A or of any other person.^e Such trusts, therefore, generally arise from wills, although they may arise from deeds. If the conveyance be by a deed, the trust will result to the grantor; if it be by a will, the trust will result to the testator's residuary devisees or legatees, or to his heirs or personal representatives, according to the nature of the property and of the dispositions. 2. The second type includes the cases where a purchase has been made, and the legal estate is conveyed or transferred to A, but the purchase price is paid by B.^f I shall briefly examine these two forms.

§ 1032. First Form—Trust Resulting to the Donor.— This type includes the three following subdivisions: 1. Where property is conveyed by will or deed upon some

§ 1031, ² The *theory* of equity is, that a transfer takes place by will, deed, or otherwise, but that it is the intention of all the parties to the transaction, presumed, if not expressed, that the transferee of the legal title is not to enjoy the beneficial ownership, but that he is to hold as trustee, as to the whole or a part of the estate, for the party whom the circumstances show to be the real beneficial owner. This description completely excludes the notion of fraud as a source of resulting trusts.

§ 1031, (d) The text is quoted in Tenney v. Simpson, 37 Kan. 579, 15 Pac. 512, and in Flesner v. Cooper, 39 Okl. 133, 134 Pac. 379.

§1031, (e) The text is quoted in Down v. Down, 80 N. J. Eq. 68, 82 Atl. 322.

§1031,(f) The text is quoted in III-147 Down v. Down, 80 N. J. Eq. 68, 82 Atl. 322; and cited in Birmingham & A. R. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 152 Ala. 422, 44 South. 679; Heinrich v. Heinrich, 2 Cal. App. 479, 84 Pac. 326; McCoy v. McCoy, 30 Okl. 379, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 146, 121 Pac. 176. particular trust or particular objects, and these purposes fail in whole or in part, or the particular trusts are so uncertain and indefinite that they cannot be carried into effect, or they lapse, or they are illegal,—in all of these cases a trust, either with reference to the whole property or to the residuum, results in favor of the grantor, or the heirs, residuary devisees or legatees, or personal representatives of the testator.^{1 a} The following are illustrations: Where property is given by will or deed, stated to be *on trust*, but no trust is declared; or upon trusts thereafter to be declared, but no such declaration is made; or is given upon some trust which has wholly failed and become inoperative;² or when property is given upon a trust which is

§ 1032, ¹ Aston v. Wood, L. R. 6 Eq. 419; Symes v. Hughes, L. R. 9 Eq. 475; Cardigan v. Cruzon-Howe, L. R. 9 Eq. 358; Richards v. Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. 11; Wild v. Banning, L. R. 2 Eq. 577; Fisk v. Att'y-Gen., L. R. 4 Eq. 521; Longley v. Longley, L. R. 13 Eq. 133; Haigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch. 469; Biddulph v. Williams, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 203; Pawson v. Brown, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 202; Cruse v. Barley, 3 P. Wms. 20; Hill v. Bishop of London, 1 Atk. 618–620; Robinson v. Taylor, 2 Brown Ch. 589; Ripley v. Waterworth, 7 Ves. 425, 435; Stansfield v. Habergham, 10 Ves. 273; Stubbs v. Sargon, 3 Mylne & C. 507; 2 Keen, 255; Gihbs v. Rumsey, 2 Ves. & B. 294; Ommaney v. Butcher, 1 Turn. & R. 260, 270; Wood v. Cox, 2 Mylne & C. 684; 1 Keen, 317; Fowler v. Garlike, 1 Russ. & M. 232; Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211, 39 Am. Rep. 445; Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221; Easterbrooks v. Tillinghast, 5 Gray, 17; Straat v. Uhrig, 56 Mo. 482; Bennett v. Hutson, 33 Ark. 762; McCollister v. Willey, 52 Ind. 382; and see the following notes.

§ 1032, ² Aston v. Wood, L. R. 6 Eq. 419; Symes v. Hughes, L. R. 9 Eq. 475; Cardigan v. Cruzon-Howe, L. R. 9 Eq. 358; Haigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7

§ 1032, (a) This paragraph is cited in Belcher v. Young, 90 Wash. 303, 155 Pac. 1060. See, also, Schlessinger v. Mallard, 70 Cal. 326, 11 Pac. 728; McDermith v. Voorhees, 16 Colo. 402, 25 Am. St. Rep. 286, 27 Pac. 250; Haskins v. Kendall, 158 Mass. 224, 35 Am. St. Rep. 490, 33 N. E. 495; St Paul's Church v. Attorney-General, 164 Mass. 188, 41 N. E. 231. In Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve, etc., Ass'n, [1892] 1 Q. B. 147, it was held that a trust results to the executors of an insured, when the death of the insured was caused by the crime of the beneficiary. Further illustrations.—Illegal: John M. C. Marble Co. v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 15 Cal. App. 347, 115 Pac. 59. Conveyance to trustee to be transferred to corporation which was never formed: Walker v. Bruce, 44 Colo. 109, 97 Pac. 250.

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too uncertain, indefinite, and vague in its declaration to be carried into effect;^{3 b} or if property is given upon a trust which is illegal, and therefore void,⁴ or upon a trust which fails by lapse, and the property is not otherwise disposed of.^{5 c}

Ch. 469; Biddulph v. Williams, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 203; Pawson v. Brown, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 202; Brown v. Jones, 1 Atk. 188; Dawson v. Clark, 18 Ves. 247, 254; Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. 537; Pratt v. Sladden, 14 Ves. 193, 198; Sidney v. Shelley, 19 Ves. 352, 359; Collins v. Wakeman, 2 Ves. 683; Dunnage v. White, 1 Jacob & W. 583; Southouse v. Bate, 2 Ves. & B. 396; Brookman v. Hales, 2 Ves. & B. 45; Woollett v. Harris, 5 Madd. 452; Att'y-Gen. v. Windsor, 8 H. L. Cas. 369; 24 Beav. 679; Gloucester v. Osborn, 1 H. L. Cas. 272; 3 Hare, 131; Goodere v. Lloyd, 3 Sim. 538; Taylor v. Haygarth, 14 Sim. 8; Flint v. Warren, 16 Sim. 124; Coard v. Holderness, 20 Beav. 147; Fitch v. Weber, 6 Hare, 145; Onslow v. Wallis, 1 Macn. & G. 506; Barrs v. Fewkes, 2 Hem. & M. 60; Bennett v. Hutson, 33 Ark. 762; Russ v. Mebius, 16 Cal. 350; Sturtevant v. Jaques, 14 Allen, 523, 526; Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382, 388, 97 Am. Dec. 107.

§ 1032, ³ James v. Allen, 3 Mer. 17; Leslie v. Duke of Devonshire, 2-Brown Ch. 187; Stubbs v. Sargon, 3 Mylne & C. 507; 2 Keen, 255; Vezey v. Jamson, 1 Sim. & St. 69; Fowler v. Garlike, 1 Russ. & M. 232; Ellis v. Selby, 1 Mylne & C. 286; 7 Sim. 352; Kendall v. Granger, 5 Beav. 300; Williams v. Kershaw, 5 Clark & F. 111; Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211, 39 Am. Rep. 445; Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221; see Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 602, 35 Am. Rep. 550.

§ 1032, 4 Richards v. Delbridge, L. R. 18 Eq. 11; Pawson v. Brown, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 202; Gibbs v. Rumsey, 2 Ves. & B. 294; Carrick v. Errington, 2 P. Wms. 361; Arnold v. Chapman, 1 Ves. Sr. 108; Page v. Leapingwell, 18 Ves. 463; Jones v. Mitchell, 1 Sim. & St. 290; Cook v. Stationers' Co., 3 Mylne & K. 262; Pilkington v. Boughey, 12 Sim. 114; Russell v. Jackson, 10 Hare, 204; Dashiell v. Att'y-Gen., 6 Har. & J. 1; Stevens v. Ely, 1 Dev. Eq. 497; Lemmond v. Peoples, 6 Ired. Eq. 137.

§ 1032, ⁵ Ackroyd v. Smithson, 1 Brown Ch. 503; Spink v. Lewis, 3 Brown Ch. 355; Hutcheson v. Hammond, 3 Brown Ch. 128; Williams v. Coade, 10 Ves. 500; Muckleston v. Brown, 6 Ves. 52, 63; Davenport v.

§ 1032, (b) See, also, Heiskell v. Trout, 31 W. Va. 810, 3 S. E. 557; In re Davis, 112 Fed. 129; Filkins v. Severn, 127 Iowa, 738, 104 N. W. 346; Fitzsimmons v. Harmon, 108 Me. 456, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 400, 81 Atl. 667; Haskell v. Staples, (Me.) 100 Atl. 148; Minot v. Parker, 189 Mass. 176, 75 N. E. 149.

§ 1032, (c) See, also, Sperling v. Rochfort, 16 Ch. Div. 18; Golding v. Gaither, 113 Md. 187, 77 Atl. 333; or if the trust has terminated: Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. 342; 23 L. Ed. 392, 17 Sup. Ct. 401; In re

§ 1033. The Same. Essential Elements.-In this and all other forms belonging to the class under present consideration, there must be no pecuniary consideration coming from the grantee, for such a consideration would raise a trust in his own favor, and clothe him with the beneficial interest. Even if the conveyance merely recites a pecuniary consideration, the same effect would be produced.^a Furthermore, the deed or will must contain no declaration of use covering the whole estate in favor of the grantee or devisee; such a declaration of use would raise a trust in his favor, vest in him the beneficial estate to its extent, and so far defeat any resulting trust.^b Resulting trusts of this type are matters of intention. There is a substantial distinction between giving property expressly for a particular purpose, and giving it only subject to a particular purpose.^{1 c} If the intention appears from the whole

Coltman, 12 Sim. 588, 610; Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 318. If the property, where the prior trust fails by lapse or otherwise, is given to some other person, then no trust results.

§ 1033, ¹ The reason of this distinction lies wholly in the *intention or* assumed intention of the donor. When property is given to A expressly for a specific purpose, the instrument showing a clear intention that the gift is for that purpose alone,—e.g., land is given on trust to pay the grantor's debts,—then as to so much of the property given as is not re-

Trusts of the Abbott Fund, [1900] 2 Ch. 326 (resulting trust to subscribers of balance of fund raised by subscription, on death of the beneficiaries); In re Printers, etc., Trades Protection Society, [1899] 2 Ch. 184 (resulting trust on dissolution of voluntary association); compare Cunnack v. Edwards, [1896] 2 Ch. 679, [1895] 1 Ch. 489. See, however, for a case where the donee was held to take beneficial interest, on construction of the deed; Giersch v. Grady, 85 Conn. 685, 84 Atl. 103 (trust for education of children of clergyman; unexpended balance goes to children); In re Andrew's Trust (Carter v. Andrew), [1905] 2 Ch. 48 (the fund in this case was raised by subscription).

§ 1033, (a) This section is cited to the effect that where there is a consideration for the conveyance, the grantee takes the beneficial interest, in Methodist Episcopal Church v. Jackson Square Evangelical Church, 84 Md. 173, 35 Atl. 8.

§1033, (b) The text is quoted in Down v. Down, 80 N. J. Eq. 68, 82 Atl. 322.

§ 1033, (c) The distinction mentioned in the text is further supported by In re West, [1900] 1 Ch. 84, and the cases there cited.

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instrument that the donee is to take the beneficial interest, even though *subject* to the particular object or purpose designated, then no trust will result to the donor, if that object or purpose should fail.

§ 1034. 2. A Trust Declared in a Part Only of the Estate Conveyed.—A second subdivision includes those cases where the owner of both the legal and the equitable estates conveys the legal estate, but does not convey the equitable estate, or conveys only a portion of it, and a trust in the entire equitable estate in the one instance, or in the part of it undisposed of in the other, will, in general, result to

quired for the expressed purpose, a trust results to the donor. On the other hand, when property is given to A, subject only to or charged with, a particular purpose, the gift is held to be absolute; a heneficial interest as well as the legal estate vests in the donee; and no trust results to the donor, even though the special purpose wholly fails,---much less when there is a residuum of the property left after it is accomplished.^d The case is completely analogous to a conveyance or hequest to A of all the legal and beneficial interest in property, subject to or encumbered by a mortgage or any other kiud of lien. It follows that where property is devised or bequeathed to A, subject to or charged with the payment of the testator's debts or legacies, A takes the entire interest, subject only to the lien or charge, and there is no resulting trust: King v. Denison, 1 Ves. & B. 260, 272; Wood v. Cox, 2 Mylne & C. 684; Tregonwell v. Sydenham, 3 Dow, 194, 210. King v. Denison, supra, is the leading case illustrating this distinction. The court said: "If I give to A and to his heirs all my real estate, charged with my debts, that is a devise to him for a particular purpose, but not for that purpose alone. If the devise to him is on trust, to pay my debts, that is a devise for a particular purpose, and nothing more. And the effect of these two modes admits just the difference; the former is a devise of an estate for the purpose of giving the devisee the beneficial interest, subject, however, to a particular, purpose by way of charge; the latter is a devise for a particular purpose, with no intention to give him any beneficial interest."

§ 1033, (d) Thus, where there was a gift to A and B, "subject to the following conditions and bequests," viz., a trust to pay a part of the income to A and B during their lives, remainder to a charitable purpose which was void for indefiniteness, it was held that A and B take free from the trust: Booe v. Vinson, 104 Ark. 439, 149 S. W. 524.

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the grantor, or to the heirs or representatives of the testator.^{1 a}

§ 1035. 3. In Conveyances Without Consideration.—It was a doctrine of the English equity, in pursuance of the ancient principle that the use followed or was raised by the consideration, that when land was conveyed by deed without any consideration, and without any use or trust being declared, a trust resulted to the feoffor, the feoffee taking only the naked legal title. This doctrine, however, had no application to conveyances which operated under

§ 1034, ¹ As examples: Property is conveyed, devised, or bequeathed upon some particular trust which does not embrace the entire estate,-as to A in fee, in trust for B during his life,-or the purposes of which. do not exhaust the whole beneficial interest,-e.g., in trust to pay the testator's debts, or some particular debts, or to pay some specified annuity. -a trust in the residue will result; or a devise of all the testator's estate of every kind, upon trusts applicable only to personal property, a trust as to the real estate devised will result to the heirs: Longley v. Longley, L. R. 13 Eq. 133; Cottington v. Fletcher, 2 Atk. 155: Ellcock v. Mapp, 3 H. L. Cas. 492; 2 Phill. Ch. 793; Northen v. Carnegie, 4 Drew. 587; King v. Denison, 1 Ves. & B. 260, 272; Watson v. Hayes, 5 Mylne & C. 125; Dunnage v. White, 1 Jacob & W. 583; Lloyd v. Lloyd, L. R. 7 Eq. 458; Marshal v. Crutwel, L. R. 20° Eq. 328; Parnell v. Hingston, 3 Smale & G. 337, 344; Lloyd v. Spillet, 2 Atk. 149, 150; Hobart v. Countess of Suffolk, 2 Vern. 644; Davidson v. Foley, 2 Brown Ch. 203; Benbow v. Townsend, 1 Mylne & K. 506; Halford v. Stains, 16 Sim. 488; Cooke v. Dealey, 22 Beav. 196; Sewell v. Denny, 10 Beav. 315; Read v. Stedman, 26 Beav. 495; McCollister v. Willey, 52 Ind. 382; Ponce v. McElvy, 47 Cal. 154, 159; Kennedy v. Nunan, 52 Cal. 326; Loring v. Eliot, 16 Gray, 568; Hogan v. Jaques, 19 N. J. Eq. 123, 97 Am. Dec. 644; Hogan v. Stayhorn, 65 N. C. 279.

§ 1034, (a) This paragraph of the text is cited in Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 15 Ariz. 424, 139 Pac. 879, dissenting opinion. See, also, Packard v. Marshall, 138 Mass. 301; Skellinger's Ex'rs v. Skellinger's Ex'r, 32 N. J. Eq. 659; Schlessinger v. Mallard, 70 Cal. 326, 11 Pac. 728; Weaver v. Leiman, 52 Md. 708; Blount v. Walker, 31 S. C. 13, 9 S. E. 804. Compare Smith v. Cooke, [1891] App. Cas. 297, reversing Cooke v. Smith, 45 Ch. Div. 38 (trust deed for payment of creditors construed; no resulting trust in surplus). Assignment for benefit of creditors; resulting trust in surplus, if any: Butt v. McAlpine, 167 Ala. 521, 52 South. 420. the statute of uses, since a use was raised in favor of the immediate grantee by a "bargain and sale" between strangers, and by a "covenant to stand seised" between relatives. If the doctrine has any existence under the conveyancing system of this country, so that a trust should result to the grantor from the absence of a consideration, it can only be where the deed simply contains words of grant or transfer, and does not recite nor imply any consideration, and does not, in the *habendum* clause or elsewhere, declare any use in favor of the grantee, and the conveyance is not in fact intended as a gift.^{1 a}

§ 1035, ¹ Gould v. Lynde, 114 Mass. 366, holds that no trust results to the grantor upon a warranty deed in the usual form, which recites a consideration, and contains an *habendum* to the grantee's use: Osborn v. Osborn, 29 N. J. Eq. 385 (no trust results upon a voluntary conveyance from a husband to bis wife); Bragg v. Geddes, 93 Ill. 39; Stucky v. Stucky, 30 N. J. Eq. 546; Davis v. Baugh, 59 Cal. 568; Gerry v. Stimson, 60 Me. 186; Philbrook v. Delano, 29 Me. 410; Farrington v. Barr, 36 N. H. 86; Graves v. Graves, 29 N. H. 129; Titcomb v. Morrill, 10 Allen, 15; Bartlett v. Bartlett, 14 Gray, 277; Cairns v. Colburn, 104 Mass. 274; Rathbun v. Rathbun, 6 Barb. 98, 105; Bank of United States v. Housman, 6 Paige, 526; Squire v. Harder, 1 Paige, 494, 19 Am. Dec. 446; Miller v. Wilson, 15 Ohio, 108.

The doctrine would doubtless apply under the special condition of facts described in the text. The case of Russ v. Mebius, 16 Cal. 350, contains an instructive discussion of the subject. The plaintiff, C. R., was owner in fee of a certain lot of land; he conveyed the lot to his father, the only consideration being a verbal promise by the father to make a will and thereby devise to the plaintiff certain other property of a stipulated value.

§ 1035, (a) Quoted in Luckhart v. Luckhart, 120 Iowa, 248, 94 N. W. 461; Moore v. Jordan, 65 Miss. 229, 7 Am. St. Rep. 641, 3 South. 737. See, also, Ohmer v. Boyer, 89 Ala. 273, 7 South. 663; McCormack Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Griffin, 116 Iowa, 397, 90 N. W. 84; Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 Ill. 248, 54 N. E. 918; Hays v. Marsh, 123 Iowa, 81, 98 N. W. 604 (no trust when husband's deed to wife recites a valuable consideration); Jacobson v. Nealand, 122 Iowa, 372, 98 N. W. 158 (same); McClenahan v. Stevenson, 118 Iowa, 106, 91 N. W. 925 (trust cannot be established by mere showing of want of consideration); Fretz v. Roth, (N. J. Eq.) 59 Atl. 676, and cases cited. Resulting trust where no consideration, and a gift not intended: J. J. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Walton Trust Co., 39 Okl. 748, 136 Pac. 769; Gray v. Beard, 66 Or. 59, 133 Pac. 791; Toney v. Toney, 84 Or. 310, 165 Pac. 221. § 1036. Parol Evidence.—In all the instances belonging to this first form of resulting trust, the intention that the donee is not to enjoy the beneficial interest, but that a trust is to result, or the contrary intention, must appear ex-.

The father died still holding the lot, but without in any manner performing his agreement with the plaintiff,-without bequeathing to him any property. The plaintiff brought this suit to establish a trust and to compel a reconveyance of the land. The court held that as the father's verbal agreement was void and unperformed, there was no consideration, express or implied, for the conveyance; and as it was clear that no gift was intended, a trust resulted in favor of the plaintiff, and he was entitled to have a conveyance to himself of the legal title. Mr. Justice Cope said (p. 355): "We are unable to see why the case does not fall within the doctrine of resulting trusts. The agreement was void, and the conveyance was executed without any consideration, express or implied. It is shown that the transaction was not intended as a gift, and as there was no consideration, a trust resulted in favor of the plaintiff by implication of law"; quoting Story's Eq. Jur., secs. 1197, 1198. In discussing another aspect of the case the judge said: "It was stated on the argument that the convevance from the plaintiff to his father did not express the real consideration for which it was given, but acknowledged the payment by the father of a nominal consideration in money. This is an important matter. . . . If the statement was correct, parol evidence was inadmissible to establish the trust, and the plaintiff . . . must eventually fail to obtain the relief which he asks: . . . Story's Eq. Jur., sec. 1199. The doctrine of resulting uses and trusts is founded upon a mere implication of law, and, in general, this implication cannot be indulged in favor of the grantor, where it is inconsistent with the presumptions arising from the deed. Unless there is some evidence of fraud or mistake, the recitals in the deed are conclusive upon the grantor, and no resulting trust can be raised in his favor in opposition to the express terms of a conveyance." The judge quoted the strong case of Leman v. Whitley, 4 Russ. 423, where a son had conveyed land to a father, upon no actual consideration, but upon a mere temporary and verbal arrangement; but the deed recited and acknowledged a pecuniary consideration as paid by the father. After the father's death. the son filed a bill to have a trust declared. The master of rolls held that the recital of a pecuniary consideration raised a conclusive presumption that a beneficial interest was intended to be given to the grantee, and cut off the resulting trust in favor of the grantor; and parol evidence was not admissible, in the absence of any fraud or mistake (which was not pretended), to show the falsity of the recital; see, also, to the same effect, Squire v. Harder, 1 Paige, 494, 19 Am. Dec. 446.

pressly or by implication from the terms of the instrument itself by which the property is conveyed. If the instrument is a will, then no extrinsic evidence is ever admissible to show the testator's meaning, nor even to show a mistake.¹ If the instrument is a deed, no extrinsic evidence of the donor's intention is admissible, unless fraud or mistake is alleged and shown. If, therefore, there is in fact no consideration, but the deed recites a pecuniary consideration, even merely nominal, as paid by the grantee, this statement raises a conclusive presumption of an intention that the grantee is to take the beneficial estate, and destroys the possibility of a trust resulting to the grantor, and no extrinsic evidence would be admitted to contradict the recital, and to show that there is in fact no consideration, except in a case of fraud or mistake.² a

§ 1037. Second Form. Conveyance to A—Price Paid by B.—In pursuance of the ancient equitable principle that the beneficial estate follows consideration and attaches to the party from whom the consideration comes,^{1 a} the doctrine is settled in England and in a great majority of the American states, that where property is purchased and the conveyance of the legal title is taken in the name of

§ 1036, 1 See ante, § 871, cases in note.

§ 1036, ² Leman v. Whitley, 4 Russ. 423; Russ v. Mebius, 16 Cal. 350; Squire v. Harder, 1 Paige, 494, 19 Am. Dec. 446.

§ 1037, 1 See ante, § 981.

§ 1036, (a) The text is quoted in Rogers v. Ramsey, 137 Mo. 598, 39 S. W. 66; Luckhart v. Luckhart, 120 Iowa, 248, 94 N. W. 461; Davis v. Jernigan, 71 Ark. 494, 76 S. W. 554; quoted, also, in Birmingham & A. R. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 152 Ala. 422, 44 South. 679; Down v. Down, 80 N. J. Eq. 68, 82 Atl. 322; paraphrased in Holton v. Holton, 72 N. J. Eq. 312, 65 Atl. 481; cited in J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Walton Trust Co., 39 Okl. 748, 136 Pac. 769. See, also, Salisbury v. Clarke, 61 Vt. 453, 17 Atl. 135; Ohmer v. Boyer, 89 Ala. 273, 7 South. 663; Moore v. Jordan, 65 Miss. 229, 7 Am. St. Rep. 641, 3 South. 737; Feeney v. Howard, 79 Cal. 525, 530, 12 Am. St. Rep. 162, 4 L. R. A. 826, 21 Pac. 984; Hays v. Marsh, 123 Iowa, 81, 98 N. W. 604; Jacobsen v. Nealand, 122 Iowa, 372, 98 N. W. 158; Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222, 63 S. E. 1028.

§ 1037, (a) This section is cited to this effect in Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk, 148 Ill. 9, 35 N. E. 383. one person, A, while the purchase price is paid by another person, B, a trust at once results in favor of the party who pays the price, and the holder of the legal title becomes a trustee for him.^b In order that this effect may be produced, however, it is absolutely indispensable that the payment should be actually made by the beneficiary, B, or that an absolute obligation to pay should be incurred by him, as a part of the original transaction of purchase, at or before the time of the conveyance; no subsequent and entirely independent conduct, intervention, or payment on his part would raise any resulting trust.² g

§ 1037, ² This description assumes that the conveyance to A is made with the knowledge and consent, express or implied, of B, who pays the price,—that the whole transaction is in pursuance of a common understanding or arrangement.^e If the conveyance is taken by A secretly, contrary to B's wishes, in violation of a duty owed to him, or in fraud

§1037, (b) The text is quoted in Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. First Nat. Bk., 58 Neb. 548, 78 N. W. 1064, and in Levy v. Ryland, 32 Nev. 460, 109 Pac. 905; Hinshaw v. Russell, 280 Ill. 235, 117 N. E. 406. This paragraph is quoted at large in Jesser v. Armentrout's Ex'r, 100 Va. 666, 42 S. E. 681; and cited in Bible v. Marshall, 103 Tenn. 324, 52 S. W. 1077; Trumbo v. Fulk, (Va.) 48 S. E. 525; cited, also, in Birmingham & A. R. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 152 Ala. 422, 44 South. 679; Heinrich v. Heinrich, 2 Cal. App. 479, 84 Pac. 326; Wilder v. Wilder, 138 Ga. 573, 75 S. E. 654; Hays v. Dean, (Iowa) 164 N. W. 770; Barnes v. Spencer, 79 Or. 205, 153 Pac. 47; Smalley v. Paine, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 52, 130 S. W. 739; Pearce v. Dyess, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 406, 101 S. W. 549; Weber v. Whidden, 63 Wash. 472, 115 Pac. 1046.

§ 1037, (c) The fact, therefore, that the parties agreed orally to that which the law implies does not defcat the trust, since the trust arises from the fact of payment: Long v. Mechem, 142 Ala. 405, 38 South. 262; Gerety v. O'Sheehan, 9 Cal. App. 447, 99 Pac. 545; Breitenbucher v. Oppenheim, 160 Cal. 98, 116 Pac. 55; Murrell v. Peterson, 59 Fla. 566, 52 South. 726; Lynch v. Herrig, 32 Mont. 267, 80 Pac. 240. Compare Bell v. Edwards, 78 S. C.

§1037, (g) The text is quoted in Coons v. Coons, 106 Va. 572, 56 S. E. 576; Levy v. Ryland, 32 Nev. 460, 109 Pac. 905; Brooke v. Quigley, 33 Cal. App. 484, 165 Pac. 731; Butts v. Cooper, 152 Ala. 375, 44 South. 616; Hughes v. Letcher, 168 Ala. 314, 52 South. 914; and cited in Scribner v. Meade, (Ariz.) 85 Pac. 477; Watkins v. Carter, 164 Ala. 456, 51 South. 318; Norton v. Brink, 75 Neb. 566, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 945, 106 N. W. 668, 110 N. W. 669; Ostheimer v. Single, 73 N. J. Eq. 539, 68 Atl. 231; De Reboam v. Schmidtlin, 50 Or. 388, 92 Pac. 1082; Pearce v. Dyess, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 406, 101 S. W. 549.

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§ 1038. Special Rules.—To the general doctrine are

of his rights, the trust which arises in B's favor is not "resulting," but is "constructive." The two kinds are often confounded, but the distinction is important, and especially so in those states where the "resulting" trusts of this form have been in terms abolished by statute. The leading case is Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox, 92; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 314, 319, 333; see notes of the English and American editors for a full collection of authorities. Lord Chief Baron Eyre laid down the general doctrine as follows: "The clear result of all the cases, without a single exception, is, that the trust of a legal estate, whether taken in the names of the purchaser and others jointly, or in the names of others without that of the purchaser, whether in one name or several, whether jointly or successively, results to the man who advances the purchase-money." See, also, Withers v. Withers, Amb. 151; Wray v. Steele, 2 Ves. & B. 388; Loyd v. Read, 1 P. Wms. 607; Rider v. Kidder, 10 Ves. 360; Case v. Codding, 38 Cal. 191; Dikeman v. Norrie, 36 Cal. 94; Roberts v. Ware, 40 Cal. 634; Currey v. Allen, 34 Ccl. 254; Millard v. Hathaway, 27 Cal. 119; Bayles v. Baxter, 22 Cal. 575; Hidden v. Jordan, 21 Cal. 92; Wasley v. Foreman, 38 Cal. 90; Bludworth v. Lake, 33 Cal. 255; Davis v. Baugh, 59 Cal. 568; Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 8 Pac. Law J. 636; Lehman v. Lewis, 62 Ala. 129; Burks v. Burks, 7 Baxt. 353; Mathis v. Stufflebeam, 94 Ill. 481; Smith v. Patton, 12 W. Va. 541; Hampson v. Fall, 64 Ind. 382; Keller v. Kunkel, 46 Md. 565; Brooks v. Shelton, 54 Miss. 353; Boskowitz v. Davis, 12 Nev. 446; Du Val v. Marshall, 30 Ark. 230; Lee v. Browder, 51 Ala. 288; Billings v. Clinton, 6 S. C. 90; Sale v. McLean, 29 Ark. 612; Midmer v. Midmer's Ex'rs, 26 N. J. Eq. 299; Murphy v. Peabody, 63 Ga. 522. Such a resulting trust may arise where a husband has paid for property with money belonging to his wife, and has taken the title in his own name, and where a parent has in like manner paid for property with money of his child, and taken the conveyance to himself; but if the transaction is secretly done, in violation of a fiduciary duty, the trust would be constructive, rather than resulting. See, as examples,^d Johnson v. Anderson, 7 Baxt.

490, 59 S. E. 535 (if the proposed testimony shows an agreement beyond what the law would imply as, that title was to be held until a certain indebtedness was paid,—it involves an express parol trust inconsistent with the asserted resulting trust, which therefore fails).

§ 1037, (d) Husband or Parent Purchases With Wife's or Child's Money.—See, also, Nettles v. Nettles, 67 Ala. 599 (barred by laches); Kline v. Ragland, 47 Ark. 111, 14 S. W. 474; Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111; Blum v. Rogers, 71 Tex. 668, 9 S. W. 595; Kinlow v. Kinlow, 72 Tex. 639, 10 S. W. 729; Camp v. Smith, 98 Ind. 409; Broughton v. Brand, 94 Mo. 169, 7' S. W. 119; Mosteller v. Mosteller, 40 Kan. 658, 20 Pac. 464; Mercier v. Mercier, [1903] 2 Ch. 98; Riley v. Martinelli, 97 Cal. 575, 33 Am. St. Rep. 209, 21 L. R. A. 33, 32 Pac. 579; Arnold v.

added the following more specific rules: The trust results

251; Thomas v. Standiford, 49 Md. 181; Catherwood v. Watson, 65 Ind. 576 (but cut off by a sale to a *bona fide* purchaser); Loften v. Witboard, 92 Ill. 461; Tilford v. Torrey, 53 Ala. 120; Moss v. Moss, 95 Ill. 449 (but is cut off by a general release of all claims given to her husband); Cunningham v. Bell, 83 N. C. 328. In the following cases no trust resulted to the wife under the circumstances:^e Kenneday v. Price, 57 Miss. 771; Hause v. Hause, 57 Ala. 262; Bibb v. Smith, 12 Heisk. 728; McCullough

Harris, (Tenn. Ch. App.) 52 S. W. 715; Boynton v. Miller, 144 Mo. 681, 46 S. W. 754; Condit v. Maxwell, 142 Mo. 266, 44 S. W. 467; Johnston v. Johnston, 173 Mo. 91, 95 Am. St. Rep. 486, 61 L. R. A. 166, 73 S. W. 202; Grantham v. Grantham, 34 S. C. 504, 27 Am. St. Rep. 839, 13 S. E. 675; Hicks v. Pogue, (Tex. Civ. App.) 76 S. W. 786; Miller v. Baker, 166 Pa. St. 414, 45 Am. St. Rep. 680, 31 Atl. 121; Booth v. Lenox, (Fla.) 34 South. 566; Berry v. Wiedman, 40 W. Va. 36, 52 Am. St. Rep. 866, '20 S. E. 817; Cresap v. Cresap, (W. Va.) 46 S. E. 582; Fawcett v. Fawcett, 85 Wis. 332, 39 Am. St. Rep. 844, 55 N. W. 405; Madison v. Madison, 206 Ill. 534, 69 N. E. 625; Smith v. Willard, 174 Ill. 538, 66 Am. St. Rep. 313, 51 N. E. 835. See, also, the following recent cases: Spradling v. Spradling, 101 Ark. 451, 142 S. W. 848; Title Ins. Co. v. Ingersoll, 158 Cal. 474, 111 Pac. 360; Shaw v. Bernal, 163 Cal. 262, 124 Pac. 1012; Fagan v. Troutman, 25 Colo. App. 251, 138 Pac. 442; Wright v. Wright, 242 III. 71, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 161, 89 N. E. 789; Hinshaw v. Russell, 280 III. 235, 117 N. E. 406; Smith v. Smith, 132 Iowa, 700, 119 Am. St. Rep. 581, 109 N. W. 194; Copper v. Iowa Trust & Savings Bank, 149 Iowa, 336, 128 N. W. 373; Johnson v. Foust, 158 Iowa, 195, 139 N. W. 451; In re Mahin's Estate, 161 Iowa, 459, 143 N. W. 420; Gittings v. Win-

ter, 101 Md. 194, 60 Atl. 630; Dixon v. Dixon, 123 Md. 44, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 616, 90 Atl. 846; Siling v. Hendrickson, 193 Mo. 365, 92 S. W. 105; Hudson v. Wright, 204 Mo. 412, 103 S. W. 8; Freeland v. Williamson, 220 Mo. 217, 119 S. W. 560; Holman v. Holman, (Mo.) 183 S. W. 623; Johnson County v. Taylor, 87 Neb. 487, 127 N. W. 862; Ricks v. Wilson, 154 N. C. 282, 70 S. E. 476; Lane v. Myers, 70 Or. 376, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 649, 141 Pac. 1022; O'Neill v. O'Neill, 227 Pa. 334, 76 Atl. 26; Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 411, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 381, and note, 90 S. W. 485; Pearce v. Dyess, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 406, 101 S. W. 549; Silling v. Todd, 112 Va. 802, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 643, 72 S. E. 682. But see Plath v. Mullins, 87 Wash. 403, 151 Pac. 811.

§1037, (e) See, also, Meredith v. Meredith, 150 Ind. 299, 50 N. E. 29; Lewis v. Stanley, 148 Ind. 351, 45 N. E. 693, 47 N. E. 677; Dick v. Dick, 172 III. 578, 50 N. E. 142; Shupe v. Bartlett, 106 Iowa, 654, 77 N. W. 455; Henderson v. Baniel, (Tenn. Ch. App.) 42 S. W. 470; Chapman v. Chapman, 114 Mich. 144, 65 N. W. 215, 72 N. W. 131 (statute); Snider v. Udell Woodenwork Co., 74 Miss. 353, 20 South. 836 (fraud on part of wife). See, further, Jones v. Jones, 80 Ark. 379, 97 S. W. 451 (no trust in absence of clear proof of his intention to waive his common-law rights to his wife's personal

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whether the title is taken in the name of one grantee only,

v. Ford, 96 Ill. 439; Hon v. Hon, 70 Ind. 135. See, also, as illustrations of the general doctrine,^f Kelley v. Jenness, 50 Me. 455, 79 Am. Dec. 623; Baker v. Vining, 30 Me. 121, 126, 50 Am. Dec. 617; Hopkinson v. Dumas, 42 N. H. 296; Hall v. Young, 37 N. H. 134; Clark v. Clark, 43 Vt. 685; Kendall v. Mann, 11 Allen, 15; Dean v. Dean, 6 Conn. 285; Boyd v. Mc-Lean, 1 Johns. Ch. 582; Cutler v. Tuttle, 19 N. J. Eq. 549, 558; Nixon's Appeal, 63 Pa. St. 279; Stewart v. Brown, 2 Serg. & R. 461; Cecil Bank v. Snively, 23 Md. 253; McGovern v. Knox, 21 Ohio St. 547, 551, 8 Am. Rep. 80; Milliken v. Ham, 36 Ind. 166; Latham v. Henderson, 47 Ill. 185; Johnson v. Quarles, 46 Mo. 423; McLenan v. Sullivan, 13 Iowa, 521; Rogan v. Walker, 1 Wis. 527; Frederick v. Haas, 5 Nev. 389.

estate); Spradling v. Spradling, 101 Ark. 451, 142 S. W. 848 (evidence to show gift by wife to husband); Reed v. Sperry, 193 Mo. 167, 91 S. W. 62; Byers v. Ferner, 216 Pa. 233, 65 Atl. 620.

§ 1037, (f) The General Doctrine. See, also, as recent examples of resulting trust: Brainard v. Buck, 184 U. S. 99, 46 L. Ed. 449, 22 Sup. Ct. 458 (citing the text); Lewis v. Wells, 85 Fed. 896; Hallett v. Parker, 69 N. H. 134, 39 Atl. 583; Smith v. Balcom, 24 App. Div. 437, 48 N. Y. Supp. 487; Carey v. Griffin, 36 Misc. Rep. 469, 73 N. Y. Supp. 766; Tillman v. Murrell, 120 Ala. 239, 24 South. 712; Gorrell v. Alspaugh, 120 N. C. 362, 27 S. E. 85; Norton v. McDevit, 122 N. C. 755, 30 S. E. 24; Jones v. Thorn, 45 W. Va. 186, 32 S. E. 173; Elrod v. Cochran, 59 S. C. 467, 38 S. E. 122; Neel v. Moore, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 918, 39 S. W. 1042; McClure v. Bryant, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 141, 44 S. W. 3; Rarick v. Vandevier, 11 Colo. App. 116, 52 Pac. 743; Branstetter v. Mann, 6 Idaho, 580, 57 Pac. 433; Whiting v. Gould, 2 Wis. 552; Thum v. Wolstenholme, 21 Utah, 446, 61 Pac. 537 (citing the text); Flanary v. Kane, 102 Va. 547, 46 S. E. 312, 681; Crowley v. Crowley, 72 N. H. 241, 56 Atl. 190; Dwyer v. O'Connor, 200 Ill. 52, 65 N. E. 668; Ackley v. Croucher, 203 Ill. 530, 68 N. E. 86. For cases where no trust resulted, see Allen v. Caylor, 120 Ala. 251, 74 Am. St. Rep. 31, 24 South. 512; Evans v. Curtis, 190 Ill. 197, 60 N. E. 56; Brown v. Brown, 62 Kan. 666, 64 Pac. 599; Hutzler v. Groff, (Tex.) 48 S. W. 206; Rotter v. Scott, 111 Iowa, 31, 82 N. W. 437, and post, § 1040, note. See, also, as illustrations of the general doctrine, Connor v. Follansbee, 59 N. H. 124; Moore v. Stinson, 144 Mass. 596, 12 N. E. 410; Beck v. Beck. 43 N. J. Eq. 39; Rice v. Pennypacker, 5 Del. Ch. 33; Gregory v. Peoples, 80 Va. 355; Heiskell v. Powell, 23 W. Va. 717; Thurber v. La Roque, 105 N. C. 301, 11 S. E. 460; Simmons v. Ingram, 60 Miss. 886; Richardson v. Taylor, 45 Ark. 472; Burns v. Ross, 71 Tex. 516, 9 S. W. 468; Boyer v. Libbey, 88 Ind. 235; Harris v. McIntyre, 118 Ill. 275, 8 N. E. 182; Reynolds v. Sumner, 126 Ill. 58, 9 Am. St. Rep. 523, and note, 1 L. R. A. 327, 18 N. E. 334; La Fitte v. Rups, 13 Colo. 207, 22 Pac. 309; Parker v. Newitt, 18 Or. 274, 23 Pac. 246; Woodard v.

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or of two or more grantees jointly; in the latter case there

Wright, 82 Cal. 202, 22 Pac. 1118; Wolf v. Citizens' Bk. of Rogersville, (Tenn. Ch. App.) 42 S. W. 39; Cox v. Cox, 95 Va. 173, 27 S. E. 834; and cases cited in following notes. Further, see the following cases: Higginbotham recent ٧. Boggs, 234 Fed. 253, 148 C. C. A. 155; Wilson v. Edwards, 79 Ark. 69, 94 S. W. 927; Beloate v. Hennessee, 81 Ark. 478, 99 S. W. 681; Rothenbusch v. Hebel, 11 Cal. App. 692, 106 Pac. 119; Waterman v. Buckingham, 79 Conn. 286, 64 Atl. 212; Amidon v. Snouffer, 139 Iowa, 159, 117 N. W. 44; Anderson v. Gile, 107 Me. 325, 78 Atl. 370; Johns v. Carroll, 107 Md. 436, 69 Atl. 36; Turpin v. Miles, 108 Md. 678, 71 Atl. 440; Lufkin v. Takeman, 188 Mass. 528, 74 N. E. 933; Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598, 127 Am. St. Rep. 516, 85 N. E. 945; Davis v. Downer, 210 Mass. 573, 97 N. E. 90; Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S. W. 634; Adams v. Gossom, 228 Mo. 566, 129 S. W. 16; Cowles v. Cowles, 89 Neb. 327, 131 N. W. 738; Doll v. Doll, 99 Neb. 82, 155 N. W. 226; Baker v. Baker, 75 N. J. Eq. 305, 72 Atl. 1000; Asam v. Asam, 239 Pa. 295, 86 Atl. 871. It has been held that where property is bought with partnership funds and the title is taken in the name of one partner, a trust results to the partnership: Kringle v. Rhomberg, 120 Iowa, 472, 94 N. W. 1115; Hardin v. Hardin, 26 S. D. 601, 129 N. W. 108 (mining partnership). See, however, Gunnison v. Erie Dime S. & L. Co., 157 Pa. St. 303, 27 Atl. 747. It has been held that when a life tenant pays a mortgage under the mistaken belief that he owns the fee, no resulting trust arises: Wild-

er's Ex'x v. Wilder, 75 Vt. 173, 53 Atl. 1072. It has been held that the consideration moving from the party who becomes the *cestui* may consist of services rendered in effecting the sale: Aborn v. Searles, 18 R. I. 357, 27 Atl. 796.

Payment, or Obligation to Pay must be Part of Original Transaction .- As illustrating the rule that the payment must be made, or an absolute obligation incurred, by the beneficiary, as a part of the original transaction of purchase, see Ducie v. Ford, 138 U. S. 587, 34 L. Ed. 1091, 11 Sup. Ct. 417; In re Stanger, 35 Fed. 241; Niver v. Crane, 98 N. Y. 40; Krauth v. Thiele, 45 N. J. Eq. 408, 18 Atl. 351; McDevitt v. Frantz, 85 Va. 740, 8 S. E. 642; Murry v. Sell, 23 W. Va. 476; Richardson v. Day, 20 S. C. 418; Brown v. Cave, 23 S. C. 251; Boozer v. Teague, 27 S. C. 348, 3 S. E. 551; Whaley v. Whaley, 71 Ala. 159; Bibb v. Hunter, 79 Ala. 351; Milner v. Freeman, 40 Ark. 62; Williams v. San Saba County, 59 Tex. 442; Oury v. Saunders, 77 Tex. 278, 13 S. W. 1030; Boyer v. Libbey, 88 Ind. 235; Hunt v. Friedman, 63 Cal. 510; Arnold v. Harris, (Tenn. Ch. App.) 52 S. W. 715 (same); Long v. King, 117 Ala. 423, 23 South. 534 (citing Alabama cases); Dick v. Dick, 172 Ill. 578, 50 N. E. 142 (citing Illinois cases); Keith v. Miller, 174 Ill. 64, 51 N. E. 151; Pickler v. Pickler, 180 Ill. 168, 54 N. E. 311; Arnold v. Ellis, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 262, 48 S. W. 883; Williamson v. Gore, (Tex. Civ. App.) 73 S. W. 563; Clark v. Timmons, (Tenn. Ch. App.) 39 S. W. 534. To the same point, see these recent cases: Higginbotham v. Boggs, are joint trustees.¹ A trust also results in favor of one who pays only a part of the price. In other words, where

§1038, ¹ Ex parte Houghton, 17 Ves. 251, 253; Rider v. Kidder, 10 Ves. 360, 367.

(Va.) 234 Fed. 253, 148 C. C. A. 155; Carlson v. Erickson, 164 Ala. South. 175 (agreement 380, 51 to pay at subsequent time not enough); Guin v. Guin, 196 Ala. 221, 72 South. 74; Butterfield v. Butterfield, 79 Ark. 164, 9 Ann. Cas. 248, 95 S. W. 146; Plummer v. Flesher, 246 Ill. 313, 92 N. E. 863; Anderson v. Gile, 107 Me. 325, 78 Atl. 370 (if payment is made by a third person, must appear that beneficiary is liable to repay); Riggin v. Robinson, 117 Md. 81, 83 Atl. 143 (agreement to pay at subsequent time not enough); Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S. W. 634; Lynch v. Herrig, 32 Mont. 267, 80 Pac. 240 (if sale is under executory contract, payment may be made at any time prior to conveyance); Eisenberg v. Goldsmith, 42 Mont. 563, 113 Pac. 1127; Woodward v. Woodward, 89 Neb. 142, 131 N. W. 188 (part of payment evidenced by beneficiary's note and mortgage); Phillips v. Phillips, 81 N. J. Eq. 459, 86 Atl. 949; Yetman v. Hedgeman, 82 N. J. Eq. 221, 88 Atl. 206 (mortgage); Casciola v. Donatella, 218 Pa. 624. 67 Atl. 901 (mortgage); Musselman v. Myers, 240 Pa. 5, 87 Atl. 425; Miller v. Saxton, 75 S. C. 237, 55 S. E. 310; Larisey v. Larisey, 93 S. C. 450, 77 S. E. 129; Allen v. Allen, 101 Tex. 362, 107 S. W. 528 (agreement to pay not enough); Hayworth v. Williams, 102 Tex. 308, 132 Am. St. Rep. 879, 116 S. W. 43; Erp v. Meachem, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 71, 130 S. W. 230 (mortgage); Lee v. R. H. Elliott & Co.,

113 Va. 618, 75 S. E. 146; Herriford v. Herriford, 78 Wash. 429, 139 Pac. 212; Belcher v. Young, 90 Wash. 303, 155 Pac. 1060; Hall v. Edwards, 140 Ga. 765, 79 S. E. 852; Watts Bros. & Co. v. Frith, (W. Va.) 91 S. E. 402.

Payment With Borrowed Money. If it be shown that the money was advanced as a loan, merely, to the grantee, the implication of a resulting trust is, of course, defeated: Whaley v. Whaley, 71 Ala. 159. Recent cases where the money was loaned to grantee, and no trust resulted: Martin v. New York & St. Louis Mining & Mfg. Co., 165 Fed. 398, 91 C. C. A. 348; Stokes v. Clark, 131 Ga. 583, 62 S. E. 1028; German v. Heath, 139 Iowa, 52, 116 N. W. 1051; McGinnis v. McGinnis, 159 Iowa, 394, 139 N. W. 466; Kennerson v. Nash, 208 Mass. 393, 94 N. E. 475; Fike v. Ott, 76 Neb. 439, 107 N. W. 774; Surasky v. Weintraub, 90 S. C. 522, 73 S. E. 1029; Cottonwood County Bank v. Case, 25 S. D. 77, 125 N. W. 298; Erp v. Meachem, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 71, 130 S. W. 230; Jordan v. Jordan, (Tex. Civ. App.) 154 S. W. 359; De Baun's Ex'r v. De Baun, 119 Va. 85, 89 S. E. 239. But the fact that the payment was made with money borrowed for the purpose from the person in whose name the title was taken does not prevent the trust from resulting to the person making such payment: Robinson v. Leflore, 59 Miss. 148; Gardner v. Randell, 70 Tex. 453, 7 S. W. 781; Thomas v. Jameson, 77 Cal. 91, 19 Pac. 177; also, these recent cases: Dooly v.

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two or more persons together advance the price, and the title is taken in the name of one of them, a trust will result in favor of the other with respect to an undivided share of the property proportioned to his share of the price.² a

§ 1038, ² Wray v. Steele, ² Ves. & B. 388; Case v. Codding, 38 Cal. 191; Dikeman v. Norrie, 36 Cal. 94; McCreary v. Casey, 50 Cal. 349; Miller v. Birdsong, 7 Baxt. 531; Cramer v. Hoose, 93 Ill. 503; Smith v. Patton, 12 W. Va. 541; Rhea v. Tucker, 56 Ala. 450; Smith v. Smith, 85 Ill. 189.

Pinson, 145 Ala. 659, 39 South. 664; Brown v. Spencer, 163 Cal. 589, 126 Pac. 493; Pittock v. Pittock, 15 Idaho, 426, 98 Pac. 719; Herlihy v. Coney, 99 Me. 469, 59 Atl. 952; Miller v. Miller, 101 Md. 600, 61 Atl. 210; Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598, 127 Am. St. Rep. 516, 85 N. E. 945; Scott v. Ferguson, 235 Mo. 576, 139 S. W. 102; Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S. W. 634; Levy v. Ryland, 32 Nev. 460, 109 Pac. 905; Schrager v. Cool, 221 Pa. 622, 70 Atl. 889 (agent to buy land uses his own money to complete the purchase, transaction regarded as loan to principal); but see Hughes v. Letcher, 168 Ala. 314, 52 South. 914; Scribner v. Meade, 10 Ariz. 143, 85 Pac. 477; Cushing v. Heuston, 53 Wash. 379, 102 Pac. 29; or the advancement may consist in the extinguishment of a preexisting debt owing from the grantee to the beneficiary: Thomas v. Thomas, 62 Miss. 531; or the purchase price may consist, in part, of money furnished by the grantee as an advancement out of his estate to the beneficiary, his daughter: Erdman v. Kenney, 159 Ky. 509, 167 S. W. 685.

§ 1038, (a) **Trust Resulting from Part Payment.**—The text is quoted in Tenney v. Simpson, 37 Kan. 579, 15 Pac. 512; quoted, also, in Hinshaw v. Russell, 280 Ill. 235, 117 N. E. 406; cited generally in Farmers & Traders' Bank v. Kimball Milling Co., 1 S. D. 388, 36 Am. St. Rep. 739, 47 N. W. 402, and cited to this effect in Bible v. Marshall, 103 Tenn. 324, 52 S. W. 1077; Thurber v. La Roque, 105 N. C. 301, 11 S. E. 460. The text is cited, also, in Breitenbucher v. Oppenheim, 160 Cal. 98, 116 Pac. 55; Wilder v. Wilder, 138 Ga. 573, 75 S. E. 654. See, also, Webb v. Foley, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1207, 49 S. W. 40; Sweet v. Stevens, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 407, 63 S. W. 41; Crawford v. James, 163 Mo. 577, 63 S. W. 838; McGee v. Wells, 52 S. C. 472, 30 S. E. 602; Sanders v. Steele, 122 Ala. 415, 26 South. 882 (citing Alabama cases); Thurber v. La Roque, 105 N. C. 301, 11 S. E. 460; Brown v. Cave, 23 S. C. 251; Bibb v. Hunter, 79 Ala. 351; Thomas v. Thomas, 62 Miss. 531; Blum v. Rogers, 71 Tex. 668, 9 S. W. 595; Harris v. McIntyre, 118 Ill. 275, 8 N. E. 182; Tenney v. Simpson, 37 Kan. 353, 15 Pac. 187; Simpson v. Tenney, 41 Kan. 561, 21 Pac. 634; Bear v. Koenigstein, 16 Neb. 65, 20 N. W. 104; Thomas v. Jameson, 77 Cal. 91, 19 Pac. 177; Johnston v. Johnston, 96 Md. 144, 53 Atl. 792; Skehill v. Abbott, 184 Mass. 147, 68 N. E. 37; Aborn v. Searles, 18 R. I. 357, 27 Atl. 796; Bailey v. Hemenway, 147 Mass. 326; Plass v. Plass, 122 Cal. 3, 54 Pac.

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The doctrine in all of its phases applies alike to personal and to real property.^{3 b}

§ 1038, 3 Where a hond, or shares of stock, or annuity, or any other thing in action, or kind of personal property, is assigned to one person,

372. And see the following recent cases: Hendrichs v. Morgan, 167 Fed. 106, 92 C. C. A. 558 (mining claim); Carlson v. Erickson, 164 Ala. 380, 51 South. 175; Stewart v. Douglass, 148 Cal. 511, 83 Pac. 699 (mining claim); Moultrie v. Wright, 154 Cal. 518, 98 Pac. 257; Gerety v. O'Sheehan, 9 Cal. App. 447, 99 Pac. 545; Brown v. Spencer, 163 Cal. 589, 126 Pac. 493; Hinshaw v. Russell, 280 Ill. 235, 117 N. E. 406 (29/124 is an "aliquot part"); Parker v. Boyle, 178 Ind. 560, 99 N. E. 986; Bisbee v. Mackey, 215 Mass. 21, 102 N. E. 327; Wrightman v. Rogers, 239 Mo. 417, 144 S. W. 479: Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S. W. 634; Levy v. Ryland, 32 Nev. 460, 109 Pac. 905; Botsford v. Van Riper, 33 Nev. 156, 110 Pac. 705 (joint adventure); Baker v. Baker, 75 N. J. Eq. 305, 72 Atl. 1000; Russell v. Wade, 146 N. C. 116, 59 S. E. 345; Bettencourt v. Bettencourt, 70 Or. 384, 142 Pac. 326; Miller v. Saxton, 75 S. C. 237, 55 S. E. 310; Hayworth v. Williams, 102 Tex. 308, 132 Am. St. Rep. 879, 116 S. W. 43; Neathery v. Neathery, 114 Va. 650, 77 S. E. 465 (if amount contributed is certain); Weber v. Whidden, 63 Wash. 472, 115 Pac. 1046; Croup v. De Moss, 78 Wash. 128, 138 Pac. 671; Scranton v. Campbell, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 388, 101 S. W. 285; but see, contra, Storm v. McGrover, 70 App. Div. 33, 74 N. Y. Supp. 1032; Pickler v. Pickler, 180 III. 168, 54 N. E. 311 (must pay a definite part); Onasch v. Zinkel, (Ill.) 72 N. E. 716 (same; citing Illinois cases); Dudley v. III—148

Dudley, 176 Mass. 34, 56 N. E. 1011; Andrews v. Andrews, 114 Iowa, 524, 87 N. W. 494. And see the following cases where the amount contributed was uncertain: Watkins v. Carter, 164 Ala. 456, 51 South. 318; Harton v. Amason, 195 Ala. 594, 71 South. 180 (must be definite aliquot part); Breitenbucher v. Oppenheim, 160 Cal. 98, 116 Pac. 55; Wells v. Messenger, 249 Ill. 72, 94 N. E. 87; Lynch v. Herrig, 32 Mont. 267, 80 Pac. 240. See, further, Smalley v. Paine, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 52, 130 S. W. 739. Where part of the consideration was paid by the wife, it was held, in the following cases, that a trust resulted: Bible v. Marshall, 103 Tenn. 324, 52 S. W. 1077; Beringer v. Lutz, 188 Pa. St. 364, 41 Atl. 643; McLeod v. Venable, 163 Mo. 536, 63 S. W. 847; Haney v. Legg, 129 Ala. 619, 87 Am. St. Rep. 81, 30 South. 34 (citing Alabama cases). And see these recent cases: Lindley v. Blumberg, 7 Cal. App. 140, 93 Pac. 894; Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ingersoll, 158 Cal. 474, 111 Pac. 360; Mayer v. Kane, 69 N. J. Eq. 733, 61 Atl. 374; Beck v. Beck, 78 N. J. Eq. 544, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 712, and note, 80 Atl. 550. Contra, Butler v. McLean, 122 N. C. 357, 29 S. E. 416; Barger v. Barger, 30 Or. 268, 47 Pac. 702 (the funds were mixed so that identification of any specific part was impossible). The same rule exists in case the part is paid by a son: Caldwell v. Bryan's Ex'rs, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 168, 49 S. W. 240.

§1038, (b) Resulting Trust in Personal Property.—See, also, Rob-

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§ 1039. Purchase in the Name of a Wife or Child.— Wherever the real purchaser—the one who pays the price —is under a legal, or even in some cases a moral, obligation to maintain the person in whose name the purchase is made, equity raises the presumption that the purchase is intended as an advancement or gift to such recipient, and no trust results. If, therefore, a purchase of either real or personal property is made by a husband in the name of his lawful wife, or in the joint names of himself and his wife, or such a purchase is made by a father in the name of his legitimate child, or in the joint names of himself and child, no trust results in favor of the husband or father, but the transaction is presumed to be a gift or advancement to or for the benefit of the wife or child.^{1 a} It ap-

a trust therein will result in favor of another who advances the consideration of the transfer in whole or part: Loyd v. Read, 1 P. Wms. 607; Ex parte Houghton, 17 Ves. 251, 253; Rider v. Kidder, 10 Ves. 360; Soar v. Foster, 4 Kay & J. 152; Beecher v. Major, 2 Drew. & S. 431; Garrick v. Taylor, 29 Beav. 79; 7 Jur., N. S., 1174; Sidmouth v. Sidmouth, 2 Beav. 447, 454; and cases under last paragraph.

§ 1039, ¹ Kingdon v. Bridges, 2 Vern. 67; Rider v. Kidder, 10 Ves. 360; Drew v. Martin, 2 Hem. & M. 130; Devoy v. Devoy, 3 Smale & G. 403; Soar v. Foster, 4 Kay & J. 152 (must be a lawful wife); Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox, 92; Finch v. Finch, 15 Ves. 43, 50; Murless v. Franklin, 1 Swanst. 13, 17, 18; Grey v. Grey, 2 Swanst. 594, 597; Tucker v. Burrow, 2 Hem. & M. 515, 524; Williams v. Williams, 32 Beav. 370; Christy v. Courtenay, 13 Beav. 96; Sidmouth v. Sidmouth, 2 Beav. 447; Low v. Carter, 1 Beav. 426; Vance v. Vance, 1 Beav. 605; Sayre v. Hughes, L. R.

bins v. Robbins, 89 N. Y. 251, 258; McClung v. Colwell, 107 Tenn. 592, 89 Am. St. Rep. 961, 64 S. W. 890 (quoting note 3, supra); Monahan v. Monahan, (Vt.) 59 Atl. 169 (deposit in bank); In re Policy No. 6402 of the Scottish Eq. Life Assur. Soc., [1902] 1 Ch. 282. And see, further, Thompson v. Bank of California, 4 Cal. App. 660, 88 Pac. 987; Bacon v. Grosse, 165 Cal. 481, 132 Pac. 1027; Barker v. Montana Gold etc. Min. Co., 35 Mont. 351, 89 Pac. 66 (stock). § 1039, (a) Quoted in Catoe v. Catoe, 32 S. C. 595, 10 S. E. 1078; also, in Hays v. Dean, (Iowa) 164 N. W 770. The text is cited to this effect in Viers v. Viers, 175 Mo. 444, 75 S. W. 395; Thurber v. La Roque, 105 N. C. 301, 11 S. E. 460; Hudson v. White, 17 R. I. 519, 23 Atl. 57. Cited, also, in Herbert v. Alvord, 75 N. J. Eq. 428, 72 Atl. 946; Mendenhall v. Walters, 'Okl.) 157 Pac. 732; Fishblate v. Fishblate, 238 Pa. 450, 86 Atl. 469. See, also, Heath v. Carter, 20 Ind. App. 83, pears to be now settled that the same rule applies to a mother who purchases property in the name of her child,

5 Eq. 376; In re Curteis's Trusts, L. R. 14 Eq. 217; Marshal v. Crutwell, L. R. 20 Eq. 328 (where a trust did result upon a bank account being transferred into names of husband and wife merely for convenience); Stevens v. Stevens, 70 Me. 92; Lorentz v. Lorentz, 14 W. Va. 809; Lochenour v. Lochenour, 61 Ind. 595; Baker v. Baker, 22 Minn. 262; Norton v. Mallory, 3 Thomp. & C. 640; Gilbert v. Gilbert, 2 Abb. App. 256; Farrell v. Lloyd, 69 Pa. St. 239.

50 N. E. 318; Devine v. Devine, 180 Ill. 447, 54 N. E. 336; Spencer v. Terrell, 17 Wash. 514, 50 Pac. 468; Klamp v. Klamp, 51 Neb. 17, 70 N. W. 525; Curd v. Brown, 148 Mo. 82, 49 S. W. 990; Veal v. Veal, 89 Ky. 314, 25 Am. St. Rep. 534, 12 S. W. 384; Evans v. Curtis, 190 Ill. 197, 60 N. E. 56; Lane v. Lane, 80 Me. 570, 16 Atl. 323; Bennett v. Camp, 54 Vt. 36; Whitley v. Ogle, 47 N. J. Eq. 67, 20 Atl. 284; Wheeler v. Kidder, 105 Pa. St. 270; McClintock v. Loisseau, 31 W. Va. 865, 8 S. E. 612; Thurber v. La Roque, 105 N. C. 301, 11 S. E. 460; Cerney v. Pawlot, 66 Wis. 262, 28 N. W. 183; Schuster v. Schuster, 93 Mo. 438, 6 S. W. 259; Gilliland v. Gilliland, 96 Mo. 522, 10 S. W. 139; Chambers v. Michael, 71 Ark. 373, 74 S. W. 516; Johnston v. Johnston, 96 Md. 144, 53 Atl. 792; Solomon v. Solomon, (Neb.) 92 N. W. 124; Kern v. Howell, 180 Pa. St. 315, 51 Am. St. Rep. 641, 36 Atl. 872. See, further, the following recent cases: Dunbar v. Dunbar, [1909] 2 Ch. 639; Cole v. Thompson, (W. Va.) 169 Fed. 729; Higginbotham v. Boggs, (Va.) 234 Fed. 253, 148 C. C. A. 155; Hamby v. Brooks, 86 Ark. 448, 111 S. W. 277; Poole v. Oliver, 89 Ark. 578, 117 S. W. 747; Cotton v. Citizens' Bank, 97 Ark. 568, 135 S. W. 340; Wood v. Wood, 100 Ark. 370, 140 S. W. 275; Spradling v. Spradling, 101 Ark. 451, 142 S. W. 848; Hall v. Cox, 104 Ark. 303, 149 S. W 80; Keith v. Wheeler, 105 Ark. 318, 151 S. W. 284 (stepdaughter); Rowe v. Johnson, 33 Colo. 469, 81 Pac. 268; Foster v. Berrier, 39 Colo. 398, 89 Pac. 787; Fagan v. Troutman, 25 Colo. App. 251, 138 Pac. 442; Stonecipher v. Kear, 131 Ga. 688, 127 Am. St. Rep. 248, and note, 63 S. E. 215; De France v. Reeves, 148 Iowa, 348, 125 N. W. 655; Mullong v. Schneider, 155 Iowa, 12, 134 N. W. 957; Hays v. Dean, (Iowa) 164 N. W. 770; Clester v. Clester, 90 Kan. 638, 135 Pac. 996; Staples v. Bowden, 105 Me. 177, 73 Atl. 999; Pollock v. Pollock, 223 Mass. 382, 111 N. E. 963; Waddle v. Frazier, 245 Mo. 391, 151 S. W. 87; Lipp v. Fielder, 72 N. J. Eq. 439, 66 Atl. 189; Ricks v. Wilson, 154 N. C. 282, 70 S. E. 476; Hayes v. Horton, 46 Or. 597, 81 Pac. 386; De Reboam v. Schmidtlin, 50 Or. 388, 92 Pac. 1082; Casciola v. Donatelli, 218 Pa. 624, 67 Atl. 901; Bucknell v. Johnson, (S. D.) 163 N. W. 683; Ferguson v. Booth, 128 Tenn. 259, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1079, 160 S. W. 67; Taylor v. Delaney, 118 Va. 203, 86 N. E. 831; Adley v. Fletcher, 55 Wash. 82, 104 Pac. 167; Simpson v. Belcher, 61 W. Va. 157. 56 S. E. 211. But in such cases it may be shown that no advancement was intended; the presumption is rebuttable: Culp v. Price, 107 Iowa,

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or in the joint names of herself and child, and pays the price with her own separate funds; no trust results.^{2 b}

§ 1039, ² In re De Visne, 2 De Gex, J. & S. 17 (holds that a trust did result); Sayre v. Hughes, L. R. 5 Eq. 376, 381; Batstone v. Salter, L. R. 19 Eq. 250; 10 Ch. 431; Fowkes v. Pascoe, L. R. 10 Ch. 343; but see, *per contra*, Flynt v. Hubbard, 57 Miss. 471.

133, 77 N. W. 848; Walker v. Walker, 199 Pa. St. 435, 49 Atl. 133; Smithsonian Institute v. Meech, 169 U. S. 398, 42 L. Ed. 793, 18 Sup. Ct. 396; Corey v. Morrill, 71 Vt. 51, 42 Atl. 976; Faylor v. Faylor, 136 Cal. 92, 68 Pac. 482; Flanner v. Butler, 131 N. C. 151, 92 Am. St. Rep. 773, 42 S. E. 557; Lahey v. Broderick, 72 N. H. 180, 55 Atl. 354; Skahen v. Irving, 206 Ill. 597, 69 N. E. 510; Deck v. Tabler, 41 W. Va. 332, 56 Am. St. Rep. 837, 23 S. E. 721; Bailey v. Dobbins, (Neb.) 93 N. W. 687; Dorman v. Dorman, 187 Ill. 154, 79 Am. St. Rep. 210, 58 N. E. 235; Trumbo v. Fulk, (Va.) 48 S. E. 525; Monahan v. Monahan, (Vt.) 59 Atl. 169 (deposit in bank by husband in wife's name; presumption of gift overcome). See, further, that the presumption of a gift or advancement to wife or child is rebuttable, Poole v. Oliver, 89 Ark. 578, 117 S. W. 747; Wood v. Wood, 100 Ark. 370, 140 S. W. 275; Fulkerson v. Stiles, 156 Cal. 703, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 181, 105 Pac. 966; Johnston v. Sherehouse, 61 Fla. 647, 54 South, 892: Wilder v. Wilder, 138 Ga. 573, 75 S. E. 654; Bachseits v. Leichtweis, 256 Ill. 357, 100 N. E. 197 (intention against gift may be established by subsequent admissions of wife); Elliott v. Prater. 260 Ill. 64, 102 N. E. 1015; McKey v. Cochran, 262 Ill. 376, 104 N. E. 693; Hartley v. Hartley, 279 Ill. 593, 117 N. E. 69; Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass, 598, 127 Am. St. Rep. 516, 85

N. E. 945; Davis v. Downer, 210 Mass. 573, 97 N. E. 90; Couch v. Harp, 201 Mo. 457, 100 S. W. 9; Derry v. Fielder, 216 Mo. 176, 115 S. W. 412; Long v. Long, (Mo.) 192, S. W. 948; Woodward v. Woodward, 89 Neb. 142, 131 N. W. 188; Hageman v. Brown, (N. J. Eq.) 72 Atl. 438; Thomas v. Thomas, 79 N. J. Eq. 461, 81 Atl. 748; Yetman v. Hedgeman, 82 N. J. Eq. 221, 88 Atl. 206; Currie v. Look, 14 N. D. 482, 106 N. W. 131; Wheelwright v. Roman, (Utah) 165 Pac. 513; Johnson v. Ludwick, 58 W. Va. 464, 52 S. E. 489; Ludwick v. Johnson, 67 W. Va. 499, 68 S. E. 117. But see Kinley v. Kinley, 37 Colo. 35, 119 Am. St. Rep. 261, 86 Pac. 105. Where the son purchased land in the name of his mother it was held that a trust resulted. Champlin v. Champlin, 136 Ill. 309, 29 Am. St. Rep. 323, 26 N. E. 526. But see Elliott v. Merchants' Bank & Trust Co., 21 Cal. App. 536, 132 Pac. 280.

§ 1039, (b) The text is quoted in Trumbo v. Fulk, (Va.) 48 S. E. 525. See, also, Hallenbeck v. Rogers, 57 N. J. Eq. 199, 40 Atl. 576, 58 N. J. Eq. 580, 43 Atl. 1098; Brown v. Brown, 62 Kan. 666, 64 Pae. 599; Wilder v. Wilder, 138 Ga. 573, 75 S. E. 654; McGinnis v. McGinnis, 159 Iowa, 394, 139 N. W. 466; Clark v. Creswell, 112 Md. 339, 76 Atl. 579. See, also, Cooley v. Cooley, 172 Mass. 476, 52 N. E. 631; In re Peabody, 118 Fed. 266, 55 C. C. A. 360 (presumption is rebuttable). The rule also applies where the person advancing the price has placed himself in loco parentis towards the other.^{3 c}

§ 1040. Admissibility of Parol Evidence.-Since these resulting trusts are not embraced within the statute of frauds, their existence need not be evidenced by any writing, and may, therefore, be established by parol. In cases belonging to the first form,-purchases between strangers, -- if the deed does not show on its face that the price was actually paid by another, and even, according to many decisions, if the deed recites that the payment was made by the grantee therein, the real fact may always be established by parol evidence; it may be proved by parol that the purchase price was wholly or partly paid by another person, and thus a trust may be shown to result in his favor. Where the trust does not appear on the face of the deed or other instrument of transfer, a resort to parol evidence is indispensable. It is settled by a complete unanimity of decision that such evidence must be clear, strong, unequivocal, unmistakable, and must establish the fact of the payment by the alleged beneficiary beyond a doubt.^a

§ 1039, ³ Beckford v. Beckford, Lofft, 490 (father and illegitimate son); Ebrand v. Dancer, 2 Cas. Ch. 26 (grandfather and grandchild); Currant v. Jago, 1 Coll. C. C. 261 (husband and wife's nephew); Higdon v. Higdon, 57 Miss. 264 (brother and his sisters); Loyd v. Read, 1 P. Wms. 607; Forrest v. Forrest, 11 Jur., N. S., 317; Sayre v. Hughes, L. R. 5 Eq. 376, 380; Smith v. Patton, 12 W. Va. 541; but in Tucker v. Burrow, 2 Hem. & M. 515, Page Wood, V. C., held that the mere fact that a person had placed himself *in loco parentis* towards the illegitimate son of his daughter did not alone bring a purchase made in the name of such illegitimate grandson within this rule which prevents a resulting trust. He said: "The court has never held that any presumption of advancement arose merely from the fact of so distant a relationship (if it be a relationship) as this, nor yet *merely* from the fact that one of the parties was *in loco parentis* to the other."

§ 1039, (c) The text is cited to this effect in Capek v. Kropik, 129 Ill. 509, 21 N. E. 836; and in Wolters v. Shraft, 69 N. J. Eq. 215, 66 Atl. 398. See, also, Hamilton v. Steele, 22 W. Va. 348. § 1040, (a) The text is quoted in Catoe v. Catoe, 32 S. C. 595, 10 S. E. 1078; Walston v. Smith, 70 Vt. 19, 39 Atl. 252 (a valuable decision discussing the early cases). Quoted, also, in Wells v. Messenger, 249 III. 72, 94 Where the payment of a part only is claimed, the evidence must show, in the same clear manner, the exact portion of the whole price which was paid.¹ Parol evidence is also

§ 1040, ¹ A few of the earliest decisions did not permit such evidence, on the ground that it would violate the statute of frauds, but they have long been overruled. Several of the cases cited below are examples of what kind and amount of parol evidence is or is not sufficient to raise a trust, and also when such a trust may be shown by circumstantial evidence alone:^b Gascoigne v. Thwing, 1 Vern. 366; Bartlett v. Pickersgill, 1 Eden,

N. E. 87; Anderson v. Gile, 107 Me. 325, 78 Atl. 370; Lee v. R. H. Elliott & Co., 113 Va. 618, 75 S. E. 146; Teter v. Viquesney, 179 Fed. 655, 103 C. C. A. 213; Dooley v. Pinson, 145 Ala. 659, 39 South. 664; Keuper v. Mette's Unknown Heirs, 239 Ill. 586, 88 N. E. 218; Freeman v. Peterson, 45 Colo. 102, 100 Pac. 600. This section is cited generally in Oberlender v. Butcher, (Neb.) 93 N. W. 764; to the effect that the trust may be proved by parol in Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk, 148 III. 9, 35 N. E. 383; also in J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Walton Trust Co., 39 Okl. 748, 136 Pac. 769; McCoy v. McCoy, 30 Okl. 379, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 146, 121 Pac. 176; Flesner v. Cooper, 39 Okl. 133, 134 Pac. 379; and to the effect that the evidence must be clear and satisfactory, in Sing You v. Wong Free Lee, (S. D.) 92 N. W. 1073; Dooly v. Pinson, 145 Ala. 659, 39 South. 664; Heinrich v. Heinrich, 2 Cal. App. 479, 84 Pac. 326; Irvine v. Minshull, 60 Colo. 112, 152 Pac. 1150; Lord v. Reed, 254 Ill. 350, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 139, 98 N. E. 553; Denny v. Holden, 55 Wash. 22, 103 Pac. 1109; Harras v. Harras, 60 Wash. 258, 110 Pac. 1085; Pilcher v. Lotzgesell, 57 Wash. 471, 107 Pac. 340. See Sheehan v. Sullivan, 126 Cal. 189, 58 Pac. 543, for a case discussing the proof required by the courts, for the establishment of trusts generally. In the case of Stone v. Manning, 103 Tenn. 232, 52 S. W. 990, it was stated: "In Sanford v. Weeden, 2 Heisk. 76, Chief Justice Nicholson said: 'Different judges have employed different language in declaring the character and the weight of the proof which is necessary and sufficient to set up a resulting trust. The result of all the attempts to define the rule as to the amount of parol proof necessary in such cases is that the conscience of the court should be fully satisfied that the facts relied on to raise the trust are true and sufficient to create the trust.' "

§1040, (b) The following cases held the evidence sufficient to establish the trust: Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk, 148 Ill. 9, 35 N. E. 383 (quoting the text); Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. First Nat. Bk., 58 Neb. 548, 78 N. W. 1064 (citing the text); Oregon Lumber Co. v. Jones, 36 Or. 80, 58 Pac. 769 (citing numerous Oregon decisions); Crawford v. Jones, 163 Mo. 577, 63 S. W. 838. See, further, the recent cases: Dieckmann v. Merkh, 20 Cal. App. 655, 130 Pac. 27 (admissions by alleged trustee three or four days prior to the creation of the trust held admissible); Davis v. Downer, 210 Mass. 573, 97 N. E. 90. See, as to the doctrine in general, Ducie v.

admissible on the part of the grantee to defeat a trust. Since the whole doctrine of a resulting trust depends upon

515; Ryall v. Ryall, 1 Atk. 59; Willis v. Willis, 2 Atk. 71; Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 511, 517; Groves v. Groves, 3 Younge & J. 163; Heard v. Pilley, L. R. 4 Ch. 548, 552; Whitmore v. Learned, 70 Me. 276; Parker v. Snyder, 31 N. J. Eq. 164; Agricultural etc. Ass'n v. Brewster, 51 Tex. 257; Miller v. Blose's Ex'r, 30 Gratt. 744; Smith v. Patton, 12 W. Va. 541; Rhea v. Tucker, 56 Ala. 450; Hyden v. Hyden, 6 Baxt. 406; Lee v. Browder, 51 Ala. 288; Billings v. Clinton, 6 S. C. 90; Hennessey v. Walsh, 55 N. H. 515 (evidence insufficient); McCreary v. Casey, 50 Cal. 349; Murphy v. Peabody, 63 Ga. 522; Byers v. Wackman, 16 Ohio St. 440; Frederick v. Haas, 5 Nev. 389; Boyd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch. 582, 586; Page v. Page, 8 N. H. 187, 195; Baker v. Vining, 30 Me. 121, 126, 50 Am. Dec. 617; Thomas v. Standiford, 49 Md. 181.

Ford, 138 U. S. 587, 34 L. Ed. 1091, 11 Sup. Ct. 417; In re Stanger, 35 Fed. 241; Hoover v. Hoover, 129 Pa. St. 201, 19 Atl. 854; Witts v. Horney, 59 Md. 584; Donaghe v. Tams, 81 Va. 132; Lofton v. Sterrett, 23 Fla. 565, 2 South. 837; Bibb v. Hunter, 79 Ala. 351; Simmons v. Ingram, 60 Miss. 886 (trust presumed for creditors of person advancing the consideration); Thomas v. Thomas, 62 Miss. 531; Murphy v. Hanscome, 76 Iowa, 192, 40 N. W. 717; Adams v. Burns, 96 Mo. 361, 10 S. W. 26; Burdett v. May, 100 Mo. 13, 12 S. W. 1056; Parker v. Newitt, 18 Or. 274. 23 Pac. 246. To the effect that the evidence must be full, clear, strong, certain, definite, convincing, satisfactory, trustworthy, positive, reliable, unquestionable, unmistakable, unequivocal, see, further, Higginbotham v. Boggs, 234 Fed. 253, 148 C. C. A. 155; Carlson v. Erickson, 164 Ala. 380, 51 South. 175; Mason v. Harkins, 82 Ark. 569, 102 S. W. 228; Colegrove v. Colegrove, 89 Ark. 182, 131 Am. St. Rep. 82, 116 S. W. 190; Doyle v. Davis, 127 Ark. 302, 192 S. W. 229; Leroy v. Norton, 49 Colo. 490, 113 Pac. 529 (trust cannot be established on admission of party alone); Fagan v. Troutman, 25 Colo. 251, 138 Pac. 442; Appeal of Wilson, 84 Conn. 560, 80 Atl. 718 (especially after death of alleged trustee); Geter v. Simmons, 57 Fla. 423, 49 South. 131; Johnston v. Sherehouse, 61 Fla. 647, 54 South. 892; Briscoe v. Price, 275 Ill. 63, 113 N. E. 881; De France v. Reeves, 148 Iowa, 348, 125 N. W. 655; Lillie v. Owen, 147 Iowa, 290, 126 N. W. 188; Re Mahin's Estate, 161 Iowa, 459, 143 N. W. 420; Piper v. Piper, 78 Kan. 82, 95 Pac. 1051 ("any writing prepared at the time, as well as the negotiations of the parties, their acts and conduct, and all circumstances in connection with the transaction tending to prove a trust, may be shown in evidence"); Stevens v. Hicks, 84 Kan. 351, 113 Pac. 1049 (where beneficiary incompetent to testify, agreement to hold in trust may be shown by circumstantial evidence); Tuttle v. Merrow, 109 Me. 347, 84 Atl. 463 (requirement of convincing proof does not mean that a larger body of evidence or more witnesses must be produced); Johns v. Carroll, 107 Md. 436, 69 Atl. 36; Turpin v. Miles, 108 Md. 678, 71 Atl. 440; Dixon v. an equitable presumption of an intention, so this presumption may be overcome by parol evidence of an actual intention on the part of the one paying the price, that the transaction was to be a gift.^{2 c}

§ 1040, ² Of course a gift may be made between strangers, and may be made in the form of a purchase of property conveyed to A, the donee,

Dixon, 123 Md. 44, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 616, 90 Atl. 846 (parol evidence should be received with the greatest caution); Reed v. Sperry, 193 Mo. 167, 91 S. W. 62; Smith v. Smith, 201 Mo. 533, 100 S. W. 579 (proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt); Derry v. Fielder, 216 Mo. 176, 115 S. W. 412 (same); Lowry v. Troy, 73 N. J. Eq. 387, 69 Atl. 172; Berla v. Strauss, 74 N. J. Eq. 678, 75 Atl. 763; Yetman v. Hedgeman, 82 N. J. Eq. 221, 88 Atl. 206; McGee v. Mc-Gee, 81 N. J. Eq. 190, 86 Atl. 406 (proof must leave no doubt); Phillips v. Phillips, 81 N. J. Eq. 459, 86 Atl. 949; McWhirter v. McWhirter, 155 N. C. 145, 71 S. E. 59; Carter v. Carter, 14 N. D. 66, 103 N. W. 425 (evidence must leave no hesitation or substantial doubt in mind of chancellor); De Roboam v. Schmidtlin, 50 Or. 388, 92 Pac. 1082; Lane v. Myers, 70 Or. 376, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 649, 141 Pac. 1022; Bell v. Edwards, 78 S. C. 490, 59 S. E. 535; Feaster v. Kendall, 80 S. C. 30, 61 S. E. 200; Sutton v. Whetstone, 21 S. D. 341, 112 N. W. 850; First Nat. Bank v. Mather, 29 S. D. 555, 137 N. W. 51; Kjolseth v. Kjolseth, 27 S. D. 80, 129 N. W. 752; Lee v. R. H. Elliott & Co., 113 Va. 618, 75 S. E. 146; Burrows v. Williams, 52 Wash. 278, 100 Pac. 340 (must be free from doubt); Croup v. De Moss, 78 Wash. 128, 138 Pac. 671; Watts Bros. & Co. v. Frith, (W. Va.) 91 S. E. 402. The following cases held the evidence insufficient to establish the trust; the

text being frequently quoted: Hutton v. Cunningham, 28 Ind. App. 295, 62 N. E. 644; Pickler v. Pickler, 180 Ill. 168, 54 N. E. 311; Strang v. Messinger, 148 Ill. 431, 36 N. E. 617; Doan v. Dunham, 64 Neb. 137, 89 N. W. 640; Rice v. Rigley, 7 Idaho, 115, 61 Pac. 290; Wacker v. Wacker, 147 Mo. 246, 48 S. W. 835; Klamp v. Klamp, 51 Neb. 17, 70 N. W. 525; Evans v. Curtis, 190 Ill. 197, 60 N. E. 56; Keith v. Miller, 174 Ill. 64, 51 N. E. 151; Reynolds v. Blaisdell, 23 R. I. 16, 49 Atl. 42; In re Cornman's Estate, 197 Pa. St. 125, 46 Atl. 940; Fox v. People, 201 Pa. St. 9, 50 Atl. 226; Brinkman v. Sunken, 174 Mo. 709, 74 S. W. 963; Cline v. Cline, 204 Ill. 130, 68 N. E. 545; Malley v. Malley, 121 Iowa, 237, 96 N. W. 751. See, also, the following recent cases: Mason v. Harkins, 82 Ark. 569, 102 S. W. 228; Colegrove v. Colegrove, 89 Ark. 182, 116 S. W. 190; Stambaugh v. Lung, 232 Ill. 373, 83 N. E. 922; Briscoe v. Price, 275 Ill. 63, 113 N. E. 881 (payments by minor son, some of which went into purchase of land, probably on basis of earnings of unemancipated child); Anderson v. Gile, 107 Me. 325, 78 Atl. 370; Dixon v. Dixon, 123 Md. 44, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 616, 90 Atl. 846; Curry v. Dorr, 210 Mass. 430, 97 N. E. 87; Lee v. R. H. Elliott & Co., 113 Va. 618, 75 S. E. 146; Price v. Price, 68 W. Va. 389, 69 S. E. 892.

§1040, (c) Presumption of Trust Rebuttable.—The text is cited to

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§ 1041. The Same. Between Family Relatives. - In trusts of the second form, between family relatives, no evidence is necessary, in the first instance, to show the operation of the rule, since a presumption arises on the face of the transaction that a gift was intended, and that no trust This result, however, is merely a presumption, results. and may be overcome. Extrinsic evidence, either written or parol, is admissible on behalf of the husband or parent paying the price to rebut the presumption of an advancement or gift, and to show that a trust results; and conversely, such evidence may be used to fortify and support the presumption. In general, this extrinsic evidence, to defeat an advancement and establish a trust as against the party to whom the property is conveyed or transferred and those holding under him, must consist of matters substantially contemporaneous with the purchase, conveyance, or transfer, so as to be fairly connected with the transaction.1 a

while the donor, B, pays the price. Whenever this condition of fact is shown by the evidence, no trust can result: Lane v. Dighton, Amb. 409; Bellasis v. Compton, 2 Vern. 294; Benbow v. Townsend, 1 Mylne & K. 506; Deacon v. Colquboun, 2 Drew. 21; Beecher v. Major, 2 Drew. & S. 431; Garrick v. Taylor, 29 Beav. 79, 7 Jur., N. S., 1174; Wheeler v. Smith, 1 Giff. 300; Carter v. Montgomery, 2 Tenn. Ch. 216; and the presumption may thus be rebutted as to a part of the trust, and not as to the remainder: Rider v. Kidder, 10 Ves. 360, 368; Benbow v. Townsend, 1 Mylne & K. 506.

§ 1041, ¹ Kilpin v. Kilpin, ¹ Mylne & K. 520; Lamplugh v. Lamplugh, ¹ P. Wms. 111, 113; Hall v. Hill, ¹ Dru. & War. 94, 114; Murless v. Franklin, ¹ Swanst. 13; Tucker v. Burrow, ² Hem. & M. 515, 524; Sid-

this effect in Lord v. Reed, 254 III. 350, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 139, 98 N. E. 553 (intention to give may be proved by circumstances as well as by declarations). See, also, Ward v. Ward, 59 Conn. 188, 22 Atl. 149; Tryon v. Huntoon, 67 Cal. 325, 7 Pac. 741; Walsh v. McBride, 72 Md. 45, 19 Atl. 4; Funk v. Hensler, 31 Wash. 528, 72 Pac. 102; Larisey v. Larisey, 93 S. C. 450, 77 S. E. 129; Long v. Mechem, 142 Ala. 405, 38 South. 262 (gift to mistress). See, also, *supra*, § 1039, note a.

§ 1041, (a) This section is cited to the effect that the evidence must consist of matters substantially contemporaneous with the purchase or conveyance, in McClintock v. Loisseau, 31 W. Va. 865, 8 S. E. 612; Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U. S. 398, 42 L. Ed. 793, 18 Sup. Ct. 396;

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§ 1042. Legislation of Several States.—The second form of resulting trusts in real property, above described, where

mouth v. Sidmouth, 2 Beav. 447, 455; Williams v. Williams, 32 Beav. 370; Dumper v. Dumper, 3 Giff. 583; Devoy v. Devoy, 3 Smale & G. 403; Stevens v. Stevens, 70 Me. 92.

What facts are sufficient or not to rebut the presumption of an advancement or gift, and to establish a resulting trust, is a question frequently considered by the English cases.^b The following have been held *not*

and generally, in Van Houten v. Van Houten, (N. J. Eq.) 59 Atl. 555. Cited, also, in Wright v. Wright, 242 Ill. 71, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 161, 89 N. E. 789; McCoy v. McCoy, 30 Okl. 379, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 146, 121 Pac. 176; Flesner v. Cooper, 39 Okl. 133, 134 Pac. 379; J. I. Case Thresh. ing Mach. Co. v. Walton Trust Co., 39 Okl. 748, 136 Pac. 769; Harras v. Harras, 60 Wash. 258, 110 Pac. 1085; Denny v. Schwabacher, 54 Wash. 689, 132 Am. St. Rep. 1140, 104 Pac. 137 (presumption of gift overcome by proof); Plath v. Mullins, 87 Wash. 403, 151 Pac. 811. That the presumption cannot be rebutted by circumstances, other than admissions of parties, subsequent to the transaction, see Thomas v. Thomas, 79 N. J. Eq. 461, 81 Atl. 748. See, also, in general, Lister v. Lister, 35 N. J. Eq. 49; Read v. Huff, 40 N. J. Eq. 229; Earnest's Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 310; Hayes's Appeal, 123 Pa. St. 138, 16 Atl. 600; Hamilton v. Steele, 22 W. Va. 348; McClintock v. Loisseau, 31 W. Va. 865, 8 S. E. 612; Harden v. Darwin, 66 Ala. 55; Viers v. Viers, 175 Mo. 444, 75 S. W. 395; Monahan v. Monahan, (Vt.) 59 Atl. 169.

§ 1041, (b) The cases all agree that the proof of payment by the husband or father, in order to lay the foundation for proof of a resulting trust, must, as in the ordinary case, be clear and convincing. Whether

this same stringent requirement as to the quantum of evidence is to be exacted in the further step of overcoming the presumption of a gift is a question on which there is some confusion in the cases. No such requirement is known to the English law; and the presumption of a gift is described by the text-books as a "bare" presumption, which may readily be overcome by proof of an intention to create a trust. The question was carefully examined in the recent case of Hartley v. Hartley, 279 Ill. 593, 177 N. E. 69, where numerous dicta were overruled, and the rule established that "it is the intention of the parties in such cases that must control, and what that intention was may be proved by the same quantum or degree of evidence required to establish any other fact upon which a judicial tribunal is authorized to act." See, also, cases cited ante in note (a), §1039. In the following cases, however, it is asserted, in general terms, and without discriminating between the two steps in the proof, that as against wife or child the trust must beproved by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence: Keith v. Wheeler, 105 Ark. 318, 151 S. W. 284; Hall v. Cox, 104 Ark. 303, 149 S. W. 80; McGinnis v. McGinnis, 159 Iowa, 394, 139 N. W. 466; Derry v. Fielder, 216 Mo. 176, 115 S. W. 412; Waddle v. Frazier, 245 Mo. 391, 151 S. W.

the title to land is taken in the name of one person and the price is paid by another, has been abolished by the legislation of several states.¹ In pursuance of these statutes,

sufficient: Possession of the estate and receipt of its rents by the father during his life, after conveyance to his child: Lamplugh v. Lamplugh, 1 P. Wms. 111; Taylor v. Taylor, 1 Atk. 386; Christy v. Courtenay, 13 Beav. 96;^e nor receipt by the father of the dividends of investments made in the name of his son: Sidmouth v. Sidmouth, 2 Beav. 447; but see Smith v. Warde, 15 Sim. 56; nor a devise, bequest, or lease of the property by the husband or parent after the purchase: Crahb v. Crabb, 1 Mylne & K. 511; Dummer v. Pitcher, 2 Mylne & K. 262; Jeans v. Cooke, 24 Beav. 513; Murless v. Franklin, 1 Swanst. 13.^d

§ 1042, 1 New York.—Rev. Stats. 1875, pt. 2, c. 1, art. 6, secs. 51, 52, 53, p. 1105, sec. 51: "Where a grant for a valuable consideration shall be made to one person, and the consideration therefor shall he paid by another, no use or trust shall result in favor of the person by whom such payment shall be made; but the title shall vest in the person named as the alience in such conveyance, subject only to the provisions of the next

87 (must be no room for reasonable doubt); Lipp v. Fielder, 72 N. J. Eq. 439, 66 Atl. 189; Herbert v. Alvord, 75 N. J. Eq. 428, 72 Atl. 946 (proof must be of facts antecedent or contemporaneous, and must be beyond reasonable doubt); Down v. Down, 80 N. J. Eq. 68, 82 Atl. 322; Yetman v. Hedgeman, 82 N. J. Eq. 221, 88 Atl. 206 (testimony of wife that land was settled on her in trust for husband, admissible; in general, any antecedent or contemporaneous acts or facts are admissible either to rebut or support the presumption of a gift); McGee v. McGee, 81 N. J. Eq. 190, 86 Atl. 406 (proof must leave no doubt of intention of parties); De Reboam v. Schmidtlin, 50 Or. 388, 92 Pac. 1082; First Nat. Bank v. Mather, 29 S. D. 555, 137 N. W. 51; Taylor v. Delaney, 118 Va. 203, 86 S. E. 831 (where great laches).

§ 1041, (c) Bogy v. Roberts, 48 Ark. 17, 3 Am. St. Rep. 211, 2 S. W. 186; White v. White, 52 Ark. 188, 12 S. W. 201; Maxwell v. Maxwell, 109 III. 588; and see the cases cited in the notes to § 1039. Occupation and cultivation of land bought in wife's name, insufficient, being referable to husband's natural desire to manage and care for wife's property: Poole v. Oliver, 89 Ark. 578, 117 S. W. 747; Doyle v. Davis, 127 Ark. 302, 192 S. W. 229; Mullong v. Schneider, 155 Iowa, 12, 134 N. W. 957; Hays v. Dean, (Iowa) 164 N. W. 770. But where the husband has put his entire property. in the name of the wife, the presumption of a gift may be rebutted by slight evidence: Bachseits v. Leichtweis, 256 Ill. 357, 100 N. E. 197. Presumption overcome by counter presumption where son was agent of parent: Long v. Long, (Mo.) 192 S. W. 948.

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§ 1041, (d) Such presumption is repelled by proof that the deed was executed to defraud the husband's creditors: Thurber v. La Roque, 105 N. C. 301, 11 S. E. 460. which follow substantially a common type in all these states, no trust ever results in favor of the one who pays the purchase price, wholly or partly, where the title is with his knowledge taken in the name of another person; but in place thereof, a trust arises in favor of the creditors of the one thus paying or advancing the price. This pro-

section." Sec. 52: "Every such conveyance shall be presumed fraudulent as against the creditors at that time of the person paying the consideration; and where a fraudulent intent is not disproved, a trust shall result in favor of such creditors, to the extent that may be necessary to satisfy their just demands." Sec. 53: "The provisions of the preceding section 51 shall not extend to cases where the alience named in the conveyance shall have taken the same as an absolute conveyance in his own name, without the consent or knowledge of the person paying the consideration, or where such alience, in violation of some trust, shall have purchased the lands so conveyed with moneys belonging to another person."

Michigan.-2 Comp. Laws 1871, p. 1331, sec. 7: Same as New York, sec. 51. Sec. 8: Same as New York, sec. 52, except the words "at that time" are omitted. Sec. 9: Same as New York, sec. 53.^a

Minnesota.—Young's Stats. 1880, p. 553, secs. 7, 8, 9.^b Same as New York, secs. 51, 52, 53.

Wisconsin.—2 Taylor's Rev. Stats. 1872, p. 1129, sec. 7: Same as New York, sec. 51. Sec. 8: Same as New York, secs. 2071, 2077, 2078, sec. 52, except the words "at that time" are omitted. Sec. 9: Same as New York, sec. 53.^e

Kansas.—Dassler's Comp. Laws 1881, p. 989,^d sec. 6: Same as New York, sec. 51. Sec. 7: Substantially the same as New York, sec. 52, except that it extends to subsequent as well as prior creditors, if the fraudulent intent is shown. Section 8 provides that the preceding section 6 shall not apply to the same cases described in New York, sec. 53, and then adds the following case: "Or where it shall be made to appear that, by agreement, and without any fraudulent intent, the party to whom the conveyance was made, or in whom the title shall vest, was to hold the land or some interest therein, in trust, for the party paying the purchase-money, or some 1 art thereof."

Indiana.--1 Stats. 1876, p. 915, secs. 6, 7, 8: Same as the Kansas secs. 6, 7, 8.^e

§ 1042, (a) *Michigan.*— Howell's Stats. 1882, secs. 5569-5571; Mich. Comp. Laws, § 8835.

§ 1042, (b) Minnesota. -- Kelly's Stats. 1882, secs. 4009, 4011. § 1042, (c) Wisconsin. — Sanborn and Berryman's Stats. 1889, secs. 2077-2079.

§ 1042, (d) Kansas.-C. 114.

§ 1042, (e) Indiana.-2 Rev. Stats. 1888, secs. 2974-2976.

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vision does not, however, include the cases where the grantee takes the deed in his own name without the knowledge and consent of the person paying the money, nor where the purchase is made in his own name with another's money, in violation of some duty or confidence; in these instances the trust, which is then really constructive rather than resulting, still arises. All of these statutes seem to be confined in their terms to conveyances of real property, so that the settled rules concerning resulting trusts in personal property appear to be left untouched. They also relate solely to the second form of resulting trusts, as heretofore described, so that the instances of the first form, where a trust results to the grantor, remain unaltered, and the rules concerning them in full force. In construing the first and main clause of the statute which abolishes the resulting trust in favor of the person paying the price, it is thoroughly settled by the New York courts that the provision implies his consent and co-operation in the mode of transfer, so that he in fact induces the conveyance of the title to the grantee, and that it does not apply unless he were aware that the conveyance was so made, and the title was so taken. This seems to be the correct construction of the provision, which is the same in all the statutes.²

Kentucky.—Gen. Stats. 1873, p. 587,^f sec. 19: Substantially same as New York, sec. 51. The *Georgia* Code 1873, p. 400, sec. 2316, defines "implied" trusts,—resulting and constructive,—but without altering the doctrines of equity as generally settled, simply declaratory of existing rules.

§ 1042, ² Reitz v. Reitz, 80 N. Y. 538; reversing 14 Hun, 536; Lounsbury v. Purdy, 18 N. Y. 515; Day v. Roth, 18 N. Y. 448; Siemon v. Schurck, 29 N. Y. 598, 610; Traphagen v. Burt, 67 N. Y. 30; Underwood v. Sutcliffe, 77 N. Y. 58. Thus it is held that where a father paid the price and had a conveyance made to a third person, the purchase being intended for the benefit of a child and as an advancement, the whole transaction being completed without the child's knowledge, a trust resulted in favor of such child: Siemon v. Schurck, *supra*; 33 Barb. 9; Gilbert v. Gilbert, 2 Abb. App. 256.⁵⁵

§ 1042, (1) Kentucky.—C. 63, art. **§ 1042, (15)** See, also, Woerz v. 1; Stats. 1903, § 235. Rademacher, 120 N. Y. 67, 23 N. E.

With regard to the true interpretation of the clause creating a trust in favor of the creditors of the person paying the price, there has been some conflict among the decisions and *dicta* of the New York courts.³ Cases arising under the similar statutory provisions of the other states are collected in the foot-note.⁴

§ 1042, ³ The earlier cases regarded the clause as creating a pure trust in favor of the creditors, which they could enforce simply as *cestuis que trustent*, without taking any legal proceedings against their debtor: Garfield v. Hatmaker, 15 N. Y. 475; Wood v. Robinson, 22 N. Y. 564; McCartney v. Bostwick, 32 N. Y. 53; 31 Barb. 390. The later decisions hold that only judgment creditors can reach the land by ordinary creditors' suit after having exhausted their legal remedies against the debtor: Ocean Nat. Bank v. Olcott, 46 N. Y. 12; Dunlap v. Hawkins, 59 N. Y. 342; 2 Thomp. & C. 292.

§ 1042, 4 Michigan: Munch v. Shabel, 37 Mich. 166; Weare v. Linnell, 29 Mich. 224; Linsley v. Sinclair, 24 Mich. 380; Fisher v. Fobes, 22 Mich. 454; Jackson v. Cleveland, 15 Mich. 94, 90 Am. Dec. 266; Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329; Maynard v. Hoskins, 9 Mich. 485; Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 358.^h

Minnesota: Baker v. Baker, 22 Minn. 262; Rogers v. McCauley, 22 Minn. 384; Matthews v. Torinus, 22 Minn. 132; Johnson v. Johnson, 16 Minn. 512; Durfee v. Pavitt, 14 Minn. 424; Gorton v. Massey, 12 Minn. 145; Foster v. Berkey, 8 Minn. 351; Baker v. Terrell, 8 Minn. 195; Summer v. Sawtelle, 8 Minn. 309; Irvine v. Marshall, 7 Minn. 286; Wentworth v. Wentworth, 2 Minn. 277, 72 Am. Dec. 97.¹

Kentucky: Ewing v. Bibb, 7 Bush, 654; Martin v. Martin, 5 Bush, 47; Graves v. Graves, 3 Met. 167; Lindsay v. Williams's Ex'rs, 2 Duvall, 475; Aynesworth v. Haldeman, 2 Duvall, 565.^J

1113; Niver v. Crane, 98 N. Y. 40; Lee v. Timken, 10 App. Div. 213, 41 N. Y. Supp. 979. That the provision cannot be invoked to cover a fraud, see Robbins v. Robbins, 89 N. Y. 256. For cases considering the statute when the trusts were held to be express, see Miller v. Monroe, 59 App. Div. 623, 69 N. Y. Supp. 861; Morgan v. Turner, 35 Misc. Rep. 399, 71 N. Y. Supp. 996.

§ 1042, (h) Michigan.—Hamilton v. Wickson, 131 Mich. 71, 90 N. W. 1032; Fairbairn v. Middlemiss, 47 Mich. 372, 11 N. W. 203; Pulford v. Morton, 62 Mich. 25, 28 N. W. 716. See, also, Ruggles v. Merritt, 166 Mich. 457, 132 N. W. 112 (but oral agreement will be enforced); Waldron v. Merrill, 154 Mich. 203, 117 N. W. 631; Wipfler v. Wipfler, 153 Mich. 18, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 941, 116 N. W. 544; Crane v. Read, 172 Mich. 642, 138 N. W. 223.

§ 1042, (1) *Minnesota.*—Connelly v. Sheridan, 41 Minn. 18, 16 Am. St. Rep. 667, 42 N. W. 601.

§ 1042, (1) Kentucky.— Curd v. Curd's Adm'rs, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 919, 53 S. W. 522; Watt v. Watt,

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§ 1043. Interest and Rights of the Beneficiary.—The interest of the *cestui que trust* in a resulting trust is not a mere "equity"; it is an equitable estate in the land or other

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Kansas: There is one marked difference between the statutes of Kansas and Indiana and those of the other states. While the *presumption* of a resulting trust in favor of the one paying the money is abrogated, it seems that such trust may be created by *express agreement* between the person taking the conveyance to himself and the person paying the price, even though this agreement is parol: Kennedy v. Taylor, 20 Kan. 558; Mitchell v. Skinner, 17 Kan. 563; Franklin v. Colley, 10 Kan. 260; Lyons v. Bodenhamer, 7 Kan. 455; Morrall v. Waterson, 7 Kan. 199; Winkfield v. Brinkman, 21 Kan. 682.¹

Indiana: Derry v. Derry, 74 Ind. 560; Hon v. Hon, 70 Ind. 135; Mc-Collister v. Willey, 52 Ind. 382; Tracy v. Kelley, 52 Ind. 535; Hampson v. Fall, 64 Ind. 382; Lochenour v. Lochenour, 61 Ind. 595; Milliken v. Ham, 36 Ind. 166; Hubble v. Osborn, 31 Ind. 249; Gaylord v. Dodge, 31 Ind. 41; Glidewell v Spaugh, 26 Ind. 319; McDonald v. McDonald, 24 Ind. 68; Catherwood v. Watson, 65 Ind. 576.^m

19 Ky. Law Rep. 25, 39 S. W. 48; Neel v. Moore, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 918, 39 S. W. 1042; Webb v. Foley, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1207, 49 S. W. 40. See, also, Nelson v. Nelson, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 885, 96 S. W. 794; Erdman v. Kenny, 159 Ky. 509, 167 S. W. 685 (statute has no reference to a case where the grantee agrees to hold the property in trust; it merely operates where no agreement is made). Trust if grantee took title without consent of other party: Nelson v. Nelson, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 885, 96 S. W. 794; Neel's Ex'r v. Noland's Heirs, 166 Ky. 455, 179 S. W. 430.

§ 1042, (*) Wisconsin.-Skinner v. James, 69 Wis. 605, 35 N. W. 37; Campbell v. Campbell, 70 Wis. 311, 35 N. W. 743; Cerney v. Pawlot, 66 Wis. 262, 28 N. W. 183; Richtman v. Watson, 150 Wis. 385, 136 N. W. 797; Friedrich v. Huth, 155 Wis. 196, 144 N. W. 202; State Bank v. Bienfang, 133 Wis. 431, 113 N. W. 726 (remedy of creditors). Does not apply if person paying price was ignorant: Perkinson v. Clarke, 135 Wis. 584, 116 N. W. 229. Mortgage not included under definition of grant; statute does not apply to personalty: Tobin v. Tobin, 139 Wis. 494, 121 N. W. 144.

§ 1042, (1) Kansas.--Tenney v. Simpson, 37 Kan. 353, 15 Pac. 187; Simpson v. Tenney, 41 Kan. 561, 21 Pac. 634; Fink v. Umscheid, 40 Kan. 271, 2 L. R. A. 146, 19 Pac. 623; Mosteller v. Mosteller, 40 Kan. 658, 20 Pac. 464; Acker v. Priest, 92 Iowa, 610, 61 N. W. 235. Does not apply to personalty; mortgage not a conveyance: Hanrion v. Hanrion, 73 Kan. 25, 117 Am. St. Rep. 453, 84 Pac. 381.

§ 1042, (m) Indiana. — Camp v. Smith, 98 Ind. 409; Boyer v. Libey, 88 Ind. 235; Lord v. Bishop, 101 Ind. 334; Repp v. Lesher, 27 Ind. App. 360, 61 N. E. 609; Brown v. White,

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thing of which the legal title is vested in the trustee; and as such, it may be conveyed, transferred, devised, or otherwise dealt with as property.^{1 a} It is valid, and may be enforced not only against the trustee, but against his heirs, devisees, personal representatives, and all others who derive title from him as volunteers or purchasers with notice; but, being a purely equitable interest, it is cut off and destroyed as against all *bona fide* purchasers or mortgagees from the trustee for a valuable consideration and without

Georgia: I add some illustrations of the Georgia Code concerning implied trusts, although it does not at all follow the New York type described in the text. Resulting trusts: Houser v. Houser, 43 Ga. 415; Street v. Lynch, 38 Ga. 631; McKinney v. Burns, 31 Ga. 295; Chastain v. Smith, 30 Ga. 96; Gordon v. Green, 10 Ga. 534; Williams v. Turner, 7 Ga. 348; Pitts v. Bullard, 3 Ga. 5, 46 Am. Dec. 405. Constructive trusts: Brown v. Crane, 47 Ga. 483; Alexander v. Alexander, 46 Ga. 283; Adams v. Jones, 39 Ga. 479, 508; Cameron v. Ward, 8 Ga. 245.ⁿ

§ 1043, ¹ Stump v. Gaby, 2 De Gex, M. & G. 623, 630; Gresley v. Mousley, 4 De Gex & J. 78, 90, 92; Uppington v. Bullen, 2 Dru. & War. 184; Dickinson v. Burrell, L. R. 1 Eq. 337; Morgan v. Holford, 1 Smale & G. 101; Malin v. Malin, 1 Wend. 625; Clapper v. House, 6 Paige, 149; Cogswell v. Cogswell, 2 Edw. Ch. 231; McKissick v. Pickle, 16 Pa. St. 140; Kent v. Mahaffey, 10 Ohio St. 204; Kane Co. v. Herrington, 50 Ill. 232.

(Ind. App.) 67 N. E. 273. As between husband and wife, there can be no resulting or implied trust: Shipley v. Shipley, 38 Ind. App. 48, 77 N. E. 965. Indiana statute construed: Scott v. Dilley, 53 Ind. App. 100, 101 N. E. 313; Holliday v. Perry, 38 Ind. App. 585, 78 N. E. 877. See Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37, 100 N. E. 376; Essex v. Hopkins, 50 Ind. App. 316, 98 N. E. 307; Dressel v. Lobstein, 45 Ind. App. 595, 91 N. E. 258; Reece v. Leitch, 46 Ind. App. 342, 92 N. E. 553.

§ 1042, (n) Georgia.—Cottle v. Harrold, 72 Ga. 830.

§1043, (a) The text is quoted in Flesner v. Cooper, 39 Okl. 133, 134 Pac. 379; Mendenhall v. Walters, (Okl.) 157 Pac. 732; Birmingham & A. R. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 152 Ala. 422, 44 South. 679. The text is cited to the point in Bible v. Marshall, 103 Tenn. 324, 52 S. W. 1077; Cottle v. Harrold, 72 Ga. 830; and cited, generally, in Heinrich v. Heinrich, 2 Cal. App. 479, 84 Pac. 326. See, also, in general, ante, § 375; Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37, 100 N. E. 376 (land may be levied upon and sold for debt of beneficiary, and sale for debt of trustee may be enjoined).

notice.^{2 b} The *cestui que trust* is entitled to the remedy of compelling a conveyance or assignment of the legal estate to himself by the trustee, or perhaps, in some instances, of compelling the trustee to hold the property for the benefit of the beneficiary, and subject to his power of enjoyment, control, and disposition.^{3 c}

§ 1043, ² Lehman v. Lewis, 62 Ala. 129; Flynt v. Hubbard, 57 Miss. 471; Catherwood v. Watson, 65 Ind. 576; McClure v. Doak, 6 Baxt. 364 (postponed to the lien of a judgment recovered against the trustee); Haggard v. Benson, 3 Tenn. Ch. 268; Hampson v. Fall, 64 Ind. 382; King v. Pardee, 96 U. S. 90 (in Pennsylvania a resulting trust in land is barred by a delay of twenty-one years in enforcing it); Baker v. Hardin, 10 Heisk. 300 (not affected by judgments against the trustee); Moss v. Moss, 95 Ill. 449 (resulting trust in favor of a wife barred by a general release of all claims and demands given by her to her husband); Roy v. McPherson, 11 Neb. 197 (resulting trust in favor of a wife postponed to the liens of judgments against her husband).

§ 1043, 3 Millard v. Hathaway, 27 Cal. 119; Maloy v. Sloan, 44 Vt. 311.

§1043, (b) The text is quoted in Flesner v. Cooper, 39 Okl. 133, 134 Pac. 379; Mendenhall v. Walters, (Okl.) 157 Pac. 732. See Lord v. Bishop, 101 Ind. 334. The trust will be enforced against volunteers and purchasers with notice: Thompson v. Bank of California, 4 Cal. App. 660, 88 Pac. 987; Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598, 127 Am. St. Rep. 516, 85 N. E. 945; Davis v. Downer, 210 Mass. 573, 97 N. E. 90; Cowles v. Cowles, 89 Neb. 327, 131 N. W. 738; Baker v. Baker, 75 N. J. Eq. 305, 72 Atl. 1000; Miller v. Saxton, 75 S. C. 237, 55 S. E. 310; Cottonwood County Bank v. Case, 25 S. D. 77, 125 N. W. 298. The trust does not avail against bona fide purchasers for value and without notice: Cole v. Thompson, 169 Fed. 729; Croup v. De Moss, 78 Wash. 128, 138 Pac. 671.

§ 1043, (c) The text is quoted in Flesner v. Cooper, 39 Okl. 133, 134 Pac. 379; Mendenhall v. Walters, (Okl.) 157 Pac. 732. See, also, Burns v. Ross, 71 Tex. 516, 9 S. W. III-149

468. That the cestui que trust or his heirs cannot enforce the trust when the transaction was intended as a fraud on his creditors, see Scll v. West, 125 Mo. 621, 46 Am. St. Rep. 508, 28 S. W. 969 (although the claims of such creditors are barred by the statute of limitations). And see to the same effect, Higginbotham v. Boggs, 234 Fed. 253, 148 C. C. A. 155; De France v. Reeves, 148 Iowa, 348, 125 N. W. 655; Bush v. Roberts, 57 Or. 169, 110 Pac. 790; but see Cowles v. Cowles, 89 Neb. 327, 131 N. W. 738; Lufkin v. Jakeman, 188 Mass. 528 (attempted fraud on wife); Asam v. Asam, 239 Pa. 295, 86 Atl. 871 (same). For an important discussion of the application of the "clean hands" maxim, see Monahan v. Monahan, (Vt.) 59 Atl. 169, especially the dissenting opinion, citing or quoting the text, §§ 398, 399, 401, 404 (where the securities were taken in the name of another for the purpose of evading taxation).

§ 1044. Second. Constructive Trusts. — Constructive trusts include all those instances in which a trust is raised by the doctrines of equity for the purpose of working out justice in the most efficient manner, where there is no intention of the parties to create such a relation, and in most cases contrary to the intention of the one holding the legal title, and where there is no express or implied, written or verbal, declaration of the trust.^a They arise when the legal title to property is obtained by a person in violation, express or implied, of some duty owed to the one who is equitably entitled, and when the property thus obtained is held in hostility to his beneficial rights of ownership. As the trusts of this class are imposed by equity, contrary to the trustee's intention and will, upon property in his hands, they are often termed trusts in invitum; and this phrase furnishes a criterion generally accurate and sufficient for determining what trusts are truly "constructive." An exhaustive analysis would show, I think, that all instances of constructive trusts properly so called may be referred to what equity denominates fraud, either actual or constructive, as an essential element, and as their final

§1044, (a) The text is quoted in Orth v. Orth, 145 Ind. 184, 57 Am. St. Rep. 185, 32 L. R. A. 298, 42 N. E. 277, 44 N. E. 17; also, in Stubbin's Adm'r v. Briggs, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 230, 68 S. W. 392; Wilson v. Louisville Trust Co., 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1590, 44 S. W. 121; Mizamore v. Berglin, 197 Ala. 111, 72 South. 347; Eisenberg v. Goldsmith, 42 Mont. 563, 113 Pac. 1127; Butts v. Cooper, 152 Ala. 375, 44 South. 616; Scribner v. Meade, 10 Ariz. 143, 85 Pac. 477; McConnell v. Gentry, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 548, 99 S. W. 278. This- section is cited in Johnston v. Little, 141 Ala. 382, 37 South. 592; Heinrich v. Heinrich, 2 Cal. App. 479, 84 Pac. 326; Sanguinetti v. Rossen, 12 Cal. App. 623, 107

Pac. 560; Carr v. Craig, 138 Iowa, 526, 116 N. W. 720; Holtzclaw v. Wells, 166 Ky. 353, 179 S. W. 193; Tarbox v. Tarbox, 111 Me. 374, 89 Atl. 194; Batty v. Greene, 206 Mass. 561, 138 Am. St. Rep. 407, 92 N. E. 715; Foote v. Cotting, 195 Mass. 55, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 693, 80 N. E. 600; Shearer v. Barnes, 118 Minn. 179, 136 N. W. 861; Eckert v. Searcy, 114 Miss. 150, 74 South. 818; Lind v. Webber, 36 Nev. 623, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1046, 134 Pac. 461, 135 Pac. 139, 141 Pac. 458; Farmers & Traders' Bank v. Kimball Milling Co., 1 S. D. 388, 36 Am. St. Rep. 739, 47 N. W. 402; McMonagle v. McGlinn, 85 Fed. 88. Sections 1044-1055 are cited in Turner v. Turner, 34 Okl. 284, 125 Pac. 730.

source.^b Even in that single class where equity proceeds upon the maxim that an intention to fulfill an obligation should be imputed, and assumes that the purchaser *intended* to act in pursuance of his fiduciary duty, the notion of fraud is not invoked, simply because it is not absolutely necessary under the circumstances; the existence of the trust in all cases of this class might be referred to constructive fraud.¹ This notion of fraud enters into the conception in all its possible degrees. Certain species of the constructive trusts arise from actual fraud; many others spring from the violation of some positive fiduciary obligation; in all the remaining instances there is, latent perhaps, but none the less real, the necessary element of that unconscientious conduct which equity calls constructive fraud.² c Courts of equity, by thus extending the funda-

§ 1044, ¹ I refer to the class of cases where a trustee uses trust funds to pay for property purchased in his own name; equity assumes that he intended to act in accordance with his fiduciary duty, although in the majority of such instances the actual intention is undoubtedly to violate the duty. It will be seen that, in my opinion, certain kinds of so-called trusts which are often spoken of as "constructive" do not at all belong to that class.

§ 1044, ² The effect of actual or constructive fraud in producing these trusts is well described in Mr. Perry's treatise (sec. 166): "If one party procures the legal title to property from another by fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment, or if a party makes use of some influential or confidential relation which he holds towards the owner of the legal title to

§ 1044, (b) Quoted in Schloss & Kahn v. Brightman, 195 Ala. 540, 70 South. 670; Mizamore v. Berglin, 197 Ala. 111, 72 South. 347; Scribner v. Meade, 10 Ariz. 143, 85 Pac. 477; Down v. Down, 80 N. J. Eq. 68, 82 Atl. 322.

§ 1044, (c) Quoted in O'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Volfer, 106 Ala. 205, 54 Am. St. Rep. 31, 28 L. R. A. 707, 17 South. 525. Cited to this effect in Harton v. Amason, 195 Ala. 594, 71 South. 180 (consent negatives fraud); Carson v. Wiley, 98 Wash. 476, 167 Pac. 1111. Fraud a necessary element; Clester v. Clester, 90 Kan. 638, L. R. A. 1915E, 648, 135 Pac. 996. See, also, citing the text, Meredith v. Meredith, 149 Ind. 299, 50 N. E. 29. For a case discussing the difference between express and constructive trusts, see Soar v. Ashwell, [1893] 2 Q. B. 390. See, also, Mara v. Browne, [1896] 1 Ch. 199; Luscombe v. Grigsby, 11 S. D. 408, 78 N. W. 357; Reynolds v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 28 App. Div. 591, 51 N. Y. Supp. 446. mental principle of trusts-that is, the principle of a division between the legal estate in one and the equitable estate in another---to all cases of actual or constructive fraud and breaches of good faith, are enabled to wield a remedial power of tremendous efficacy in protecting the rights of property; they can follow the real owner's specific property, and preserve his real ownership, although he has lost or even never had the legal title, and can thus give remedies far more complete than the compensatory damages obtainable in courts of law.^e The principle is one of universal application; it extends alike to real and to personal property, to things in action, and funds of money. Salutary and efficient as the principle is, however, many of the constructive trusts which it creates are only trusts sub modo: they have little resemblance, in their essential nature, to express trusts.³ In applying this principle, care should

obtain such legal title from him upon more advantageous terms than he could otherwise have obtained it, equity will convert such party thus obtaining property into a trustee. If a person obtains the legal title to property by such arts or acts or circumstances of circumvention, imposition, or fraud, or if he obtains it by virtue of a confidential relation and influence under such circumstances that he ought not, according to the rules of equity and good conscience, to hold and enjoy the heneficial interest of the property, courts of equity, in order to administer complete justice between the parties, will raise a trust by construction out of such circumstances or relations; and this trust they will fasten upon the property in the hands of the offending party, and will convert him into a trustee of the legal title, and will order him to hold it or to execute the trust in such manner as to protect the rights of the defrauded party who is the beneficial owner."^d See Jenckes v. Cook, 9 R. I. 520; McLane v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 48; Collins v. Collins, 6 Lans. 368; Thompson v. Thompson, 16 Wis. 91; Pillow v. Brown, 26 Ark. 240.

§ 1044, ³ The language of Lord Westbury on this point, in Rolfe v. Gregory, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 576, 579, is very instructive. The case was one where a person had fraudulently obtained trust property; but the remarks will apply to all such constructive trusts based upon actual fraud:

§ 1044, (d) This note is quoted in Day v. Amburgey, 147 Ky. 123, 143 S. W. 1033; Willis v. Lam, 158 Ky. 777, 166 S. W. 251; Erdman v. Kenney, 159 Ky. 509, 167 S. W. 685. § 1044, (e) Quoted in Landrum v. Landrum, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 130 S. W. 907.

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be taken to distinguish between actual trusts and those relations which are only trusts by way of metaphor; between persons who are true trustees holding the legal title for a beneficial *owner*, and those who simply occupy a position which is analogous in some respects to that of a trustee. The use of these terms to designate relations and parties which have no essential element in common with actual trusts and trustees can only produce confusion and inaccuracy.^{4 f}

§ 1045. Kinds and Classes.—The specific instances in which equity impresses a constructive trust are number-

"When it is said that the person who fraudulently receives or possesses himself of trust property is converted by this court into a trustee, the expression is used for the purpose of describing the nature and extent of the remedy against him, and it denotes that the parties entitled beneficially have the same rights and remedies against him as they would be entitled to against an express trustee who had fraudulently committed a breach of trust."

§ 1044, 4 The distinction is clearly stated by Lord Westbury in Knox v. Gye, L. R. 5 H. L. 656, 675. It was argued, according to the common mode of expression, that a surviving partner is a trustee of the share of his deceased partner; but the lord chancellor referred to the case of the vendor and vendee of land, and said that although the vendor might by a metaphor be called a trustee for the vendee, he was trustee only to the extent of his obligation to perform the agreement between himself and the vendee, and proceeded as follows: "In like manner here the surviving partner may be called trustee for the dead man, but the trust is limited to the discharge of the obligation, which is liable to be barred by the lapse of time. As between the express trustee and cestui que trust, time will not run, but the surviving partner is not a trustee in that full and proper sense. It is most important to mark this again and again, for there is not a more fruitful source of error in law than the inaccuracy of language. The application to a man who is improperly and by metaphor only called a trustee of all the consequences which would follow if he were a trustee by express declaration,-in other words, a complete trustee,-holding the property exclusively for the benefit of the cestui que trust, well illustrates the remark made by Lord Macclesfield, that nothing in law is so apt to mislead as a metaphor."

§ 1044, (f) The text is quoted in Wilson v. Louisville Trust Co., 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1590, 44 S. W. 121. less,—as numberless as the modes by which property may be obtained, through bad faith and unconscientious acts. It is possible, however, to distinguish and describe the general groups or types under which all these instances may be arranged, and thus to present a comprehensive view of the whole subject.

§ 1046. 1. Arising from Contract, Express or Implied.— There are certain relations which are often spoken of as trusts, and as constituting a species of constructive trusts, but which are not, in any true and complete sense, trusts, and can only be called so by way of analogy or metaphor.^a Since they lack the element of fraud, they do not, in any view, properly belong to the division of constructive trusts.¹ It is commonly said that a trust is created by a contract for the sale of land; that the vendor holds the legal title as a trustee for the purchaser. Whatever of truth there is in this mode of statement, whatever of a real trust relation exists, it certainly has nothing in common with constructive trusts; it rather resembles an express trust.² In like manner, the survivors of a partnership are

§ 1046, ¹ There is a tendency among writers to enlarge the meaning of the word "trust" beyond its legitimate signification. By some, the various equitable liens and similar rights arising from contract are made to be the most important, and with a very few exceptions the only instances of constructive trusts. As Lord Westbury shows, such a mode of treatment can produce nothing but confusion. The cases included in the first subdivision of the text are not constructive trusts, and are mentioned simply for purposes of completeness, and to distinguish between correct and mistaken conceptions.^b

§ 1046, ² See ante, vol. 1, §§ 368, 372;^c Coman v. Lakey, 80 N. Y. 345, 350; Pelton v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 605, 607; Hensler v. Sefrin, 19 Hun, 564; Felch v. Hooper, 119 Mass. 52; Musham v. Musham, 87 Ill. 80. In the face of the great number of decisions and opinions by

§ 1046, (a) Quoted in Hollins v. Brierfield, etc., Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 37 L. Ed. 1113, 14 Sup. Ct. 127. Cited to this effect in Gallagher v. Asphalt Co. of America, (N. J. Eq.) 55 Atl. 259. § 1046, (b) Quoted in O'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Volfer, 106 Ala. 205, 54 Am. St. Rep. 31, 28 L. R. A. 707, 17 South. 525.

§1046, (c) See, also, §1261.

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called trustees for the estate of the deceased partner, with respect to his share of the firm property. This expression is mostly metaphorical; there is certainly nothing in the relation resembling a constructive trust.³ Extending the analogy still further, courts regard partnership property, after an insolvency or dissolution of the firm, and in the proceeding for winding up its affairs, as a trust fund for the benefit of the firm creditors;⁴ and the capital stock and other property of private corporations, especially after their dissolution, is treated as a trust fund in favor of creditors.⁵ These statements may be sufficiently accurate as strong modes of expressing the doctrine that such property is a fund sacredly set apart for the payment of partnership and corporation creditors, before it can be appropriated to the use of the individual partners or corporators, and that the creditors have a lien upon it for their own security; but it is plain that no constructive trust can arise in favor of the creditors unless the partners or directors, through fraud or a breach of fiduciary duty, wrongfully appropriate the property, and acquire the legal title to it in their own names, and thus place it beyond the reach of

the ablest courts, it would be impossible to assert that the vendor is not truly a trustee; but he is a trustee only to a partial extent, measured by his obligation. It is plain that this trust arises from the express contract, is included within its terms by the interpretation of equity; it therefore resembles those express trusts which are inferred from the entire provisions of an instrument.

§ 1046, ³ See Knox, v. Gye, L. R. 5 H. L. 656, 675, per Lord Westbury. § 1046, ⁴ Campbell v. Mullett, 2 Swanst. 551, 574; West v. Skip, 1 Ves. Sr. 239, 456; Ex parte Ruffin, 6 Ves. Sr. 119, 126; Murray v. Murray, 5 Johns. Ch. 60; Young v. Frier, 9 N. J. Eq. 465.

§ 1046, ⁵ Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308; Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281, 286; Vose v. Grant, 15 Mass. 505, 517, 522; Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. 9, 15; Lyman v. Bonney, 101 Mass. 562; Brewer v. Boston Theatre, 104 Mass. 378; Goodin v. Cincinnati, etc., Co., 18 Ohio St. 169, 98 Am. Dec. 95; Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 587; 60 Barb. 648; Hastings v. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9; Tinkham v. Borst, 31 Barb. 407. creditors through ordinary legal means.^{6 d} I have thus collected the instances which are sometimes, though improperly, classed with constructive trusts, in order the more clearly to indicate the nature of the trusts which are truly constructive, and which are described in the following paragraphs.

§ 1046, 6 Hastings v. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9, 16; Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 587; 60 Barb. 648.

§ 1046, (d) Quoted in O'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Volfer, 106 Ala. 205, 54 Am. St. Rep. 31, 28 L. R. A. 707, 17 South. 525; Altoona v. Richardson, G. & O. Co., 81 Kan. 717, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 651, 106 Pac. 1025; Conover v. Hull, 10 Wash. 673, 45 Am. St. Rep. 810, 39 Pac. 166. The text is cited in Rouse v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 46 Ohio St. 493, 15 Am. St. Rep. 644, 5 L. R. A. 378, 22 N. E. 293; Jennings, Neff & Co. v. Crystal Ice Co., 128 Tenn. 231, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1058, 159 S. W. 1088.

"Trust Fund Doctrine."-The real extent of the so-called trust fund doctrine as applied to the assets of corporations is stated in a series of decisions by the United States Supreme Court. Speaking by Justice Field, that court said in Fogg v. Blair, 133 U. S. 534, 33 L. Ed. 721, 10 Sup. Ct. 338: "We do not question the general doctrine invoked by the appellant, that the property of a railroad company is a trust fund for the payment of its debts, but do not perceive any place for its application here. The doctrine only means that the property must first be apportioned to the payment of the debts of the company before any portion can be distributed to the stockholders; it does not mean that the property is so affected by the indebtedness of the company

that it cannot be sold, transferred, or mortgaged to bona fide purchasers, for a valuable consideration, except subject to the liability of being appropriated to pay that indebtedness. Such a doctrine has no existence." Again, in Hollins v. Brierfield, etc., Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 37 L. Ed. 1113, 14 Sup. Ct. 127, it was said: "The officers of a corporation act in a fiduciary capacity in respect to its property in their hands, and may be called to an account for fraud, or sometimes even mere mismanagement, in respect thereto; but, as between itself and its creditors, the corporation is simply a debtor, and does not hold its property in trust, or subject to a lien in their favor, in any other sense than does an individual debtor. That is certainly the gen-.eral rule, and, if there be any exceptions thereto, they are not presented by any of the facts in this case. Neither the insolvency of the corporation nor the execution of an illegal trust deed, nor the failure to collect in full all stock subscriptions, nor all together, gave to these simple contract creditors any lien upon the property of the corporation, nor charged any direct trust thereon." The doctrine applies when corporate property has been divided among the stockholders, leaving dehts unpaid: Missouri, L.

§ 1047. 2. Money Received Which Equitably Belongs to Another.—By the well-settled doctrines of equity, a constructive trust arises whenever one party has obtained money which does not equitably belong to him, and which

M. & S. Co. v. Reinhard, 114 Mo. 218, 35 Am. St. Rep. 746, 21 S. W. 488.

In accordance, however, with the limitations laid down above, it is held, by the great weight of authority, that a corporation, either solvent or insolvent, may pay or secure certain creditors to the exclusion of others: O'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Volfer, 106 Ala. 205, 54 Am. St. Rep. 31, 28 L. R. A. 707, 17 South. 525; Pollak v., Muscogee Mfg. Co., 108 Ala. 467, 54 Am. St. Rep. 165, 18 South. 611; Worthen v. Griffith, 59 Ark. 562, 43 Am. St. Rep. 50, 28 S. W. 286; Curtis, Jones & Co. v. Smelter Nat. Bank, 43 Colo. 391, 96 Pac. 172; Albany, etc., Co. v. Southern Agric. Works, 76 Ga. 135, 2 Am. St. Rep. 26; Illinois Steel Co. v. O'Donnell, 156 Ill. 624, 47 Am. St. Rep. 245, 31 L. R. A. 265, 41 N. E. 185; Rockford Grocery Co. v. Standard G. & M. Co., 175 Ill. 89, 67 Am. St. Rep. 205, 51 N. E. 642; First Nat. Bank v. Dovetail, etc., Co., 143 Ind. 550, 52 Am. St. Rep. 435, 40 N. E. 810; Rollins v. Shaver Wagon, etc., Co., 80 Iowa, 380, 20 Am. St. Rep. 427, 45 N. W. 1037; Butler v. Harrison L. & M. Co., 139 Mo. 467, 61 Am. St. Rep. 464, 41 S. W. 234; Coleman v. Hagey, 252 Mo. 102, 158 S. W. 829; Barrie v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 125 Mo. App. 96, 102 S. W. 1078; Ames v. Heslet, 19 Mont. 188, 61 Am. St. Rep. 496, 47 Pac. 805; Sabin v. Columbia Fuel Co., 25 Or. 15, 42 Am. St. Rep. 756, 34 Pac. 692 (so long as corporation is a going concern); Garetson-Hilton

Lumber Co. v. Hinson, 69 Or. 605, 140 Pac. 633; Slack v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 103 Wis. 57, 74 Am. St. Rep. 841, 79 N. W. 51 (preference may be made so long as corporation is a going concern); Ford v. Hill, 92 Wis. 188, 53 Am. St. Rep. 902, 66 N. W. 115, and see cases cited in monographic note, 45 Am. St. Rep. 826. Of course, in such jurisdictions the creditor may obtain a preference by attachment or by judgment: La Grange B. T. Co. v. Nat. Bank, 122 Mo. 154, 43 Am. St. Rep. 558, 26 S. W. 710; Sweeney v. Grape Sugar Co., 30 W. Va. 443, 8 Am. St. Rep. 88, 40 S. E. 431; Ballin v. Merchants' Exchange Bank, 89 Wis. 278, 46 Am. St. Rep. 834, 27 L. R. A. 357, 61 N. W. 1118. An exception is made where directors and other officers of an insolvent corporation are also creditors. After the corporation becomes insolvent. the officers are not allowed to obtain a preference: Rockford Grocery Co. v. Standard G. & M. Co., 175 Ill. 89, 67 Am. St. Rep. 205, 51 N. E. 642; La Grange B. T. Co. v. Nat. Bank, 122 Mo. 154, 43 Am. St. Rep. 558, 26 S. W. 710; Campbell, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Marder, Luse & Co., 50 Neb. 283, 61 Am. St. Rep. 573, 69 N. W. 774; Hill v. Pioneer Lumber Co., 113 N. C. 173, 37 Am. St. Rep. 621, 21 L. R. A. 560, 18 S. E. 107; Edwards v. Snow Hill Supply Co., 150 N. C. 171, 63 S. E. 742; Olney v. Conanicut Land Co., 16 R. I. 597, 27 Am. St. Rep. 767, 18 Atl. 181; Slack v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 103 Wis. 57, 74 Am. St. Rep.

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he cannot in good conscience retain or withhold from another who is beneficially entitled to it; as, for example, when money has been paid by accident, mistake of fact, or fraud, or has been acquired through a breach of trust, or viola-

841, 79 N. W. 51. Occasionally, however, it is held that even a director is entitled to obtain a preference. As stated in a Missouri case, "The trust fund doctrine . . . can extend no further than to restrain the disposition thereof to good faith creditors of the corporation, whether director or non-director creditors": Butler v. Harrison L. & M. Co., 139 Mo. 467, 61 Am. St. Rep. 464, 41 S. W. 234. A director acting in good faith may deal with a solvent corporation and take security from it The subsequent insolvency will not preclude him from enforcing his security: Mullanphy Sav. Bank v. Schott, 135 III. 655, 25 Am. St. Rep. 401, 26 N. E. 640. See, also, Harle-Haas Drug Co. v. Rogers Drug Co., 19 Wyo. 35, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 181, 113 Pac. 791.

On the other hand, a few courts have argued that the assets of a corporation are in reality a trust fund, and accordingly have held that an insolvent corporation cannot pay or secure certain creditors to the exclusion of others: Collins v. Kaw City Mill & Elevator Co., 26 Okl. 641, 110 Pac. 734; Rouse v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 46 Ohio St. 493, 15 Am. St. Rep. 644, 5 L. B. A. 378, 22 N. E. 293 (citing the text); Furber v. Williams-Flower Co., 21 S. D. 228, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1259, 111 N. W. 548; Boyes v. Turk Mining Co., 56 Wash. 515, 106 Pac. 475; Fowler v Bell, 90 Tex. 150, 59 Am. St. Rep. 788, 32 L. R. A. 825, 37 S. W. 1058 (no preference allowed after corporation has become insolvent and has ceased to do business); Conover v. Hull, 10 Wash. 673, 45 Am. St. Rep. 810, 39 Pac. 166; Cook v. Moody, 18 Wash. 114, 63 Am. St. Rep. 872, 50 Pac. 1020. In Tennessee, the assets become a trust fund for equal pro rata distribution, from the date of insolvency. There must, however, be some positive act of insolvency, such as the filing of a bill to administer its assets, or the making of a general assignment, or a permanent cessation to do business: Memphis Barrel, etc., Co. v. Head, 99 Tenn. 172, 63 Am. St. Rep. 825, 42 S. W. 13; Jennings, Neff & Co. v. Crystal Ice Co., 128 Tenn. 231, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1058, 159 S. W. 1088, citing this section (creditors can follow assets into the hands of anyone not a holder for value in ordinary course of busi-If the company continues to ness) be a going concern, it may make preferences, although the liabilities greatly exceed the assets: Tradesman Pub. Co. v. Knoxville C. W. Co., 95 Tenn. 634, 49 Am. St. Rep. 943, 31 L. B. A. 593, 32 S. W. 1097.

The property of a corporation may perhaps be regarded as a trust fund for creditors and stockholders in the sense that it cannot be given away or disposed of without consideration, or in fraud of creditors and stockholders: Buck v. Ross, 68 Conn. 29, 57 Am. St. Rep. 60, 35 Atl. 763; Atlas Nat. Bank v. More, 152 Ill. 528, 43 Am. St. Rep. 274, 38 N. E. 684; In re Brockway Mfg. Co., 89 Me. 121, 56 Am. St. Rep. 401, 35 Atl. 1012; Hospes v. Northwestern tion of fiduciary duty, and the like.^a It is true that the beneficial owner can often recover the money due to him by a legal action upon an implied *assumpsit*;¹ but in many instances a resort to the equitable jurisdiction is proper and even necessary.² ^b

§ 1048. 3. Acquisition of Trust Property by a Volunteer, or Purchaser With Notice.—Wherever property, real or personal, which is already impressed with or subject to a trust of any kind, express or by operation of law, is conveyed or transferred by the trustee, not in the course of executing and carrying into effect the terms of an express trust, or devolves from a trustee to a third person, who is

§ 1047, ¹ See Frue v. Loring, 120 Mass. 507,—a decision based upon the narrow and statutory jurisdiction of the Massachusetts courts, and not in harmony with the general doctrines of equity.

§ 1047, ² Com. Dig., tit. Chancery, 2, A, 1; 2 Fonbl. Eq., b. 2, c. 1, sec. 1, note b.

Mfg. Co., 48 Minn. 174, 31 Am. St. Rep. 637, 15 L. R. A. 470, 50 N. W. 1117; Cole v. Millerton Iron Co., 133 N. Y.-164, 28 Am. St. Rep. 615, 30 N. E. 847; Durlacher v. Frazer, 8 Wyo. 58, 80 Am. St. Rep. 918, 55 Pac. 306.

§1047, (a) Quoted in York v. Farmers' Bank, (Mo. App.) 79 S. W. 968, and in In re Northrup, 152 Fed. 763; Bank of Williston v. Alderman, 106 S. C. 386, 91 S. E. 296. This section is cited in Robinson v. Pierce, 118 Ala. 273, 72 Am. St. Rep. 160, 45 L. R. A. 66, 24 South. 984; Batty v. Greene, 206 Mass. 561, 138 Am. St. Rep. 407, 92 N. E. 715; Clifford Banking Co. v. Donovan Com. Co., 195 Mo. 262, 94 S. W. 527; H. Stern, Jr., & Bros. Co. v. Wing, 135 Mich. 331, 97 N. W. 791; Watts v. Newberry, 107 Va. 233, 57 S. E. 657. See, also, First Nat. Bank v. Wakefield, 148 Cal. 558, 83 Pac. 1076 (where bank took deposit sup-

posing it to belong to partnership, owner may recover on theory of trust, though bank held a mortgage against the partnership); Taber v. Zehner, 47 Ind. App. 165, 93 N. E. 1035 (money collected for another, but never accounted for); Page County v. Rose, 130 Iowa, 296, 8 Ann. Cas. 114, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 886, 106 N. W. 744 (money wrongfully deposited in bank by public official); Tarbox v. Tarbox, 111 Me. 374, 89 Atl. 194 (where a constructive trustee who supposed property was his own was held liable for losses due to investments); Mills v. Hendershot, 70 N. J. Eq. 258, 62 Atl. 542 (dividend paid out of principal); In re Berry, 147 Fed. 208, 77 C. C. A. 434 (money paid by mistake to bankrupt day before failure).

§ 1047, (b) The text is quoted in In re Northrup, 152 Fed. 763; Bank of Williston v. Alderman, 106 S. C. 386, 91 S. E. 296.

a mere volunteer, or who is a purchaser with actual or constructive notice of the trust, then the rule is universal that such heir, devisee, successor, or other voluntary transferee, or such purchaser with notice, acquires and holds the property subject to the same trust which before existed, and becomes himself a trustee for the original beneficiary.² Equity impresses the trust upon the property in the hands of the transferee or purchaser, compels him to perform the trust if it be active, and to hold the property subject to the trust, and renders him liable to all the remedies which may be proper for enforcing the rights of the beneficiary. It is not necessary that such transferee or purchaser should be guilty of positive fraud, or should actually intend a violation of the trust obligation; it is sufficient that he acquires property upon which a trust is in fact impressed. and that he is not a *bona fide* purchaser for a valuable consideration and without notice.^b This universal rule forms the protection and safeguard of the rights of beneficiaries in all kinds of trust; it enables them to follow trust property,-lands, chattels, funds of securities, and even of money,---as long as it can be identified, into the hands of all subsequent holders who are not in the position of bona

§1048, (a) The text is quoted in Walston v. Smith, 70 Vt. 19, 39 Atl. 252; also, in In re Northrup, 152 Fed. 763; Paysse v. Paysse, 86 Wash. 349, 150 Pac. 622. The text is cited in Sanguinetti v. Rossen, 12 Cal. App. 623, 107 Pac. 560; Keeney v. Bank of Italy, 33 Cal. App. 515, 165 Pac. 735; Elliott v. Landis Mfg. Co., 236 Mo, 546, 139 S. W. 356; Shuman v. Citizens' State Bank, 27 N. D. 599, L. R. A. 1915A, 728, 147 N. W. 388; United States Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Citizens' State Bank, 36 N. D. 16, 161 N. W. 562; Miller v. Himebaugh, (Tex. Civ. App.) 153 S. W. 338; Boyd v. Northern Pacific R. Co., (Wash.) 170 Fed. 779; Perkinson v. Clarke, 135 Wis. 584, 116 N. W. 229.

Sections 1048 et seq. are cited in Bevans v. Murray, 251 Ill. 603, 96 N. E. 546.

§ 1048, (b) The text is quoted in Farmers & Traders' Bk. v. Fidelity, etc., Co. of Md., 22 Ky. Law Rep. 22, 56 S. W. 671; also, in In re Northrup, 152 Fed. 763; Paysse v. Paysse, 86 Wash. 349, 150 Pac. 622. The text is cited to the effect that a purchaser from a trustee, in contravention of the trust, becomes thereby a constructive, not an express, trustee, in Robinson v. Pierce, 118 Ala. 273, 72 Am. St. Rep. 160, 45 L. R. A. 66, 24 South. 984, 991; Smith v. Dallas Compress Co., 195 Ala. 534, 70 South. 662.

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fide purchasers for value and without notice; it furnishes all those distinctively equitable remedies which are so much more efficient in securing the beneficiary's rights than the mere pecuniary recoveries of the law.¹ • Even when the

§ 1048, 1 Adair v. Shaw, 1 Schoales & L. 243, 262; Rolfe v. Gregory, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 576; Leigh v. Macauley, 1 Younge & C. 260, 265, 266; Smith v. Barnes, L. R. 1 Eq. 65; Boursot v. Savage, L. R. 2 Eq. 134; Newton v. Newton, L. R. 6 Eq. 135; Heath v. Crealock, L. R. 18 Eq. 215; In re European Bank, L. R. 5 Ch. 358, 362; Ex parte Cooke, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 123; In re Hallett's Estate, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696; Lane v. Dighton, Amb. 409; Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 678; Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 511; Lewis v. Madocks, 17 Ves. 48, 56; Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 372, 388; Mayor etc. v. Murray, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 497; Ernest v. Croysdill, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 175; Griffin v. Blanchar, 17 Cal. 70; Sharp v. Goodwin, 51 Cal. 219; Scott v. Umbarger, 41 Cal. 410; Price v. Reeves, 38 Cal. 457; Siemon v. Schurck, 29 N. Y. 598; Swinburne v. Swinburne, 28 N. Y. 568; Stephens v. Board of Education, 79 N. Y. 183, 35 Am. Rep. 511 (trust moneys paid by trustee to his creditor in discharge of an antecedent debt, but without notice of the trust, cannot be followed by the beneficiary); Holden v. New York and Erie Bank, 72 N. Y. 286; Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y. 133, 137, 139, 25 Am. Rep. 152; Dotterer v. Pike, 60 Ga. 29; Musham v. Musham, 87 Ill. 80; Phelps v. Jackson, 31 Ark. 272; Veile v. Blodgett, 49 Vt. 270; Dey v. Dey, 26 N. J. Eq. 182; Mercier v. Hemme, 50 Cal. 606; Boyd v. Brinckin, 55 Cal. 427; Planters' Bank v. Prater, 64 Ga. 609; McVey v. McQuality, 97 Ill. 93; Burnett v. Gustafson, 54 Iowa, 86, 37 Am. Rep. 190 (moneys paid to a creditor in discharge of an antecedent debt, but without notice of any trust, cannot be followed); Michigan etc. R. R. v. Mellen, 44 Mich. 321; Winona etc. R. R. v. St. Paul etc. R. R., 26 Minn. 179; Mechanics' Bank v. Seton, 1 Pet. 399; Russell v. Clark's Ex'rs, 7 Cranch, 69, 97; Wilson v. Mason, 1 Cranch, 24: Powell v. Monson etc. Mfg. Co., 3 Mason, 347; Murray v. Balleu, 1 Johns. Ch. 566; Tradesman's Bank v. Merritt, 1 Paige, 302; Mechanics' Bank v. Levy, 3 Paige, 606.

§ 1048, (c) Text quoted in Faysse v. Paysse, 86 Wash. 349, 150 Pac. 622. See, also, Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S. 320, 25 L. Ed. 955; National Bank v. Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. Ed. 693; Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. McAlpine, 129 U. S. 305, 314, 32 L. Ed. 673, 9 Sup. Ct. 286; Wetmore v. Porter, 92 N. Y. 77; Dodge v. Stevens, 94 N. Y. 209; Baker v. New York Nat. Ex. Bank, 100 N. Y. 31, 50 Am. Rep. 150, 2 N. E. 452; Zimmerman v. Kinkle, 108 N. Y. 287, 15 N. E. 407; Cobb v. Knight, 74 Me. 253; Leake v. Watson, 58 Conn. 332, 18 Am. St. Rep. 270, 8 L. R. A. 666, 20 Atl. 343; Swift v. Williams, 68 Md. 236, 11 Atl. 835; Bath Paper Co. v. Langley, 23 S. C. 129; Rabb v. Flenniken, 32 S. C. 189, original property is placed beyond the reach of the beneficiary by a sale to a *bona fide* purchaser for value and without notice, the trust, as will more fully appear hereafter, attaches to the proceeds in the hands of the trustee who

10 S. E. 943; Bigham v. Coleman, 71 Ga. 576; Lee v. Lee, 67 Ala. 406, 423; Drake v. Thyng, 37 Ark. 228; Mills v. Swearingen, 67 Tex. 269, 3 S. W. 268 (where the trust moneys are loaned in pursuance of the requirements of the trust, the borrower does not become a trustee); Everett v. Railway Co., 67 Tex. 430, 3 S. W. 678; Gilbert v. Sleeper, 71 Cal. 290, 12 Pac. 172. See, also, ante, §§ 688, 770.

The following cases are mere examples, wherein the cestui was allowed to follow the res: Missouri Broom Mfg. Co. v. Guymon, 115 Fed. 112, 53 C. C. A. 16; Duckett v. National Bk. of Baltimore, 88 Md. 8, 41 Atl. 161, 1062; Pancoast v. Geishaker, 58 N. J. Eq. 537, 43 Atl. 883; Flaherty v. Kayser, 62 N. J. Eq. 758, 48 Atl. 565; Butler v. Butler, 164 Ill. 171, 45 N. E. 426; Otis v. Otis, 167 Mass. 245, 45 N. E. 737; Hanrick v. Gresley, (Tex. Civ. App.) 48 S. W. 994; Elting v. First Nat. Bk., 173 Ill. 368, 50 N. E. 1095; Lehnard v. Specht, 180 III. 208, 54 N. E. 315; Hale v. Dressen, 73 Minn. 277, 76 N. W. 31; Luse v. Rankin, 57 Neb. 632, 78 N. W. 258; Foote v. Utah Com. & Sav. Bk., 17 Utah, 283, 54 Pac. 104; Haslam v. Haslam, 19 Utah, 1, 56 Pac. 243; Schenck v. Wicks, 23 Utah, 576, 65 Pac. 732; Chapman v. Hughes, 134 Cal. 641, 66 Pac. 982; Mordecai v. Seignious, 53 S. C. 95, 30 S. E. 717; Harris v. Smith, 98 Tenn. 286, 39 S. W. 343; Webb v. Foley, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1207, 49 S. W. 40; Bircher v. Walther, 163 Mo. 461, 63 S. W. 691 (the

action not based on the wrong of the trustee); James v. Allen, (N. J. Eq.) 57 Atl. 1091; Winter v. Truax, 87 Mich. 324, 24 Am. St. Rep. 160, 49 N. W. 604. See, further, the following recent cases: Joslyn v. Downing, Hopkins & Co., 150 Fed. 317, 80 C. C. A. 205 (trustee used trust funds in defendant's "bucket-shop"; held, defendant, a mere gambler, was not a holder for value); Whitney v. Dewey, 158 Fed. 385, 86 C. C. A. 21 (purchaser of partnership) land from one partner); Hoyt v. Weyerhaeuser, 161 Fed. 324, 98 C. C. A. 404; Teal v. Pleasant Grove Local Union, (Ala.) 75 South. 335; Green v. Maddox, 97 Ark. 397, 134 S. W. 931; Catterson v. Hall, 37 Ind. App. 341, 76 N. E. 889; Lewis v. Hershey, 45 Ind. App. 104, 90 N. E. 332 (trust money); Cooley v. Gilliam, 80 Kan. 278, 102 Pac. 1091 (trust money); First Nat. Bank v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 108 Me. 79, 79 Atl. 4 (money); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Cahn, 102 Md. 530, 62 Atl. 819; Allen v. Stewart, 214 Mass. 109, 100 N. E. 1092 (trust land, charged with arrears of income, turned over by trustee to remaindermen, who were held to be constructive trustees as to the arrears); Bisbee v. Mackay, 215 Mass. 21, 102 N. E. 327; Wocdard v. Woodard, 216 Mass. 1, 102 N. E. 921; Gibney v. Allen, 156 Mich. 301, 120 N. W: 811 (mortgagee); Bank of Hickory v. McPherson, 102 Miss. 852, 59 South. 934; Nestell v. Hart, -202 N. Y. 280, 85 N. E. 703; Pittsburgh-Westmoreland Co. v. Kerr,

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makes the transfer. The statement and grounds of the rule show that it does not extend to the case where the property is duly transferred or purchased in pursuance of an express trust to convey or sell, and for the purpose of

220 N. Y. 137, 115 N. E. 465; Brooks v. Garner, 20 Okl. 236, 94 Pac. 694, 97 Pac. 995; Mansfield v. Wardlov, (Tex. Civ. App.) 91 S. W. 859; Newman v. Newman, 60 W. Va. 371, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 370, 55 S. E. 377. To the effect that one who purchases without notice is not bound by the trust, see Whittle v. Vanderbilt Mfg. & Milling Co., 83 Fed. 48; Spencer v. Weber, 26 App. Div. 285, 49 N. Y. Supp. 687; Tapley v. Tapley, 115 Ga. 109, 41 S. E. 235; Bevan v. Citizens' Nat. Bk., 19 Ky. Law Rep. 242, 43 S. W. 242; Baily v. Dyer, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1585, 65 S. W. 595. For a few recent cases considering what constitutes notice, see London & Canadian L. & A. Co., Limited, v. Duggan, [1893] App. Cas. 506; Simpson v. Molson's Bk., [1895] App. Cas. 270; Union Bk. of Austria, Limited, v. Murray-Aynsley, [1898] App. Cas. 693; Royalty v. Shirley, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1015, 53 S. W. 1044; see, also, McWaid v. Blair State Bk., 58 Neb. 618, 79 N. W. 620; Interstate Nat. Bank v. Claxton, (Tex. Civ. App.) 77 S. W. 44.

Trustee may Sue, as Well as Beneficiary.—In such cases, where there exists a right on the part of the *cestui* to obtain possession of his property, there has arisen the question as to whether the trustee, who has been guilty of a breach of trust in conveying the property, cannot sue and recover the property for the benefit of the *cestui*: In Wetmore v. Porter, 92 N. Y. 76, Ames Cas. on. Trusts, 262, a trustee of bonds allowed them to be used as security by a partnership, of which he was a member, the remaining partner having knowledge that they were trust property when they were so used; upon suit, by the trustee, for the return of the bonds, the defendant objected on the ground that the trustee should have been joined as defendant; that his collusion in his individual capacity in the use of the bonds prevented his bringing the suit for their return. The lower court concluded that the proper remedy was for "the cestui que trust to have another trustee appointed who shall bring the proper action." The judgment was reversed in the court of appeals, the court saying, "Whoever receives property knowing that it is the subject of a trust, and has been transferred in violation of the duty or power of the trustee, takes it subject to the right, not only of its cestui que trust, but also of the trustee, to reclaim possession of the specific property, or to recover damages for its conversion in case it has been converted"; (citing Briggs v. Davis, 20 N. Y. 15, 75 Am. Dec. 363) and again, "We see no reason why a trustee who has been guilty even of an intentional fault is not entitled to his locus penitentiæ and an opportunity to repair the wrong which he may have committed." The result of the case seems most just and equitable, when it is considered that the trustee's suit is for the benefit, not of himself, but of the cestui, and that the defendant is not deprived

carrying such trust into effect. And where the rule does apply, there is some distinction between money and other kinds of trust property. If a trustee or other fiduciary person, in violation of his own duty, uses trust money to pay an antecedent debt of his own to a creditor who has no notice of the breach of trust, or that the money is subject to the trust, in such a manner that the money is received as a general payment, and not as a distinct and separate fund, then the money becomes free from the trust, and cannot be followed by the beneficiary into the hands of the creditor, although, in general, an antecedent debt does not constitute a valuable consideration.² d

§ 1048, ² The reason given for this conclusion is, that money is not "ear-marked"; ^e when received by the creditor and mingled with his other

of property to which he has established any equitable claim. See, as supporting the principle of the case, Franco v. Franco, 3 Ves. Jr. 75; Price v. Blakemore, 6 Beav. 569; Baynard v. Woolley, 20 Beav. 583; Crichton v. Crichton, [1896] 1 Ch. 870; Sharp v. Jackson, [1899] App. Cas. 419 (conveyance, to make good a breach, not void as in preference of creditors); Meeks v. Olpherts, 100 U. S. 564, 25 L. Ed. 735; Willson v. Louisville Trust Co., 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1590, 44 S. W. 121 (holding the cestui barred by the statute of limi. tations running against the trustee in such a case); Lee v. Horton, 104 N. Y. 538, 11 N. E. 51 (approving Wetmore v. Porter, supra); Costner v. Piedmont Cotton Mills Co., 155 N. C. 128, 71 S. E. 85; Zimmerman v. Kinkle, 108 N. Y. 282, 15 N. E. 407 (same); Place v. Hayward, 117 N. Y. 487, 23 N. E. 25; Abbott v. Reeves, 49 Pa. St. 494, 88 Am. Dec. 510; Atwood v. Lester, 20 R. I. 660, 40 Atl. 866 (approving Wetmore v. Porter, supra). In such cases it must, obviously, be a suit by the trustee in his fiduciary, or representative capacity, and not as an in-

dividual: McColl v. Fraser, 40 Hun, 111 ("we think the complaint was properly dismissed for the reason that the action is prosecuted in the individual name of the plaintiff, and not in the character of a trustee of the funds which he collected as agent"); Moss v. Cohen, 32 N. Y. Supp. 1078, 11 Misc. Rep. 184 (same). The court was evidently not convinced of the inequitable position of the defendant in Munnerlyn v. Augusta Sav. Bank, 94 Ga. 356, 21 S. E. 575, where they admitted the right of the beneficiary in such case but refused to allow any relief where the beneficiary and the trustee were joined as plaintiffs; the ground on which the case is to be supported is not apparent; see, also, Harris v. Smith, 98 Tenn. 286, 39 S. W. 393.

§ 1048, (d) The text is cited to this effect in Shuman v. Citizens' State Bank, 27 N. D. 599, L. R. A. 1915A, 728, 147 N. W. 388. The text is quoted in Smith v. Des Moines Nat. Bk., 107 Iowa, 620, 78 N. W. 238.

§ 1048, (e) Following Trust Funds that have been Mingled With the Trustee's Own Funds.—To explain

§ 1049. 4. Fiduciary Persons Purchasing Property With Trust Funds.—Another important form of the trust arises

pecuniary assets, it cannot be distinguished and identified. Under these circumstances other kinds of property would remain subject to the trust, since the creditor would not be a *bona fide* purchaser *for value*: Stephens v. Board of Education, 79 N. Y. 183, 35 Am. Rep. 511; Burnett v. Gustafson, 54 Iowa, 86, 37 Am. Rep. 190; Justh v. Bank of Commonwealth, 56 N. Y. 478, 484.

modern doctrine upon this the vexed subject it is desirable, at the outset, to refer to a few general principles. If the trustee, in violation of his trust, uses the trust money or property in the purchase of lands or chattels, the cestui que trust may follow the proceeds of the trust in their converted form; and if trust property has been converted into money, he may follow the fund so created as long as it can be identified or reached: Post, § 1051. If a part only of the purchase price is paid by the use of trust funds, a trust in a proportional part of the property bought arises in the beneficiaries' favor: See §§ 1038, 1049; or the beneficiary may, if he sees fit, assert a lien against the property for the full amount of the trust money that has gone into the purchase. This latter remedy will be to his advantage where the property purchased by the trustee is worth less than the price paid for it; in that case it would, obviously, be inequitable to confine him to the former remedy, the enforcement of a constructive trust in a proportional part of the property, and thus compel him to share the loss with the defaulting trustee: See post, § 1076. So, where a trustee mingles trust moneys with his own, the lien of the beneficiary attaches to the entire combined fund as security for

all that actually belongs to the trust estate: Post, § 1076; In re Hallett's Estate (Knatchbull v. Hallett), L. R. 13 Ch. D. 696, 709 et seq. In addition to these remedies in rem, the beneficiary may enforce the personal liability of the trustee by way of compensation or indemnification for the breach of trust; this liability is a "simple contract equitable debt,"—that is, a liability of the same rank or degree as that arising from breach of contract: Post, § 1080, and note 2.

The lien of the beneficiary is a lien on the specific fund or property into which the trust fund has gone, not on the general assets of the trustee's estate. Among a vast number of decisions to this effect, see the following, chiefly recent, cases: Spokane County v. First Nat. Bank, 68 Fed. 979, 16 C. C. A. 81, 29 U. S. App. 707; Macy v. Roedenbeck, 227 Fed. 346, L. R. A. 1916C, 12, 142 C. C. A. 42; Nixon State Bank v. First State Bank of Bridgeport, 180 Ala. 291, 60 South. 868; Hill v. Miles, 83 Ark. 486, 104 S. W. 198; Cotting v. Berry, 50 Colo. 217, 114 Pac. 641; Drovers & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Roller, 85 Md. 495, 60 Am. St. Rep. 344, 36 L. R. A. 767, 37 Atl. 30; Little v. Chadwick, 151 Mass. 109, 7 L. R. A. 570, 23 N. E. 1005; Lowe v. Jones, 192 Mass. 94, 116 Am. St. Rep. 225, 7 Ann. Cas. 551, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 310, 78 N.

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from the acts of persons already possessing some fiduciary character or standing in some fiduciary relation. When-

E. 402 (an instructive case); Hewitt v. Hayes, 205 Mass. 356, 137 Am. St. Rep. 448, 91 N. E. 332; Cavin v. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 256, 11 N. E. 504; Kent v. Kent, (Utah) 165 Pac. 271; Watts v. Newberry, 107 Va. 233, 57 S. E. 657 (citing this note); Heidelbach v. Campbell, 95 Wash. 661, 164 Pac. 247; also the later cases in the next group, infra. The contrary holding confuses the lien with the trustee's personal liability. Such confusion is harmless in its results when the trustee is solvent; but where his assets are insufficient to pay his debts, the question becomes important as between the beneficiary and the general creditors. To extend the lien in such case to the general mass of the trustee's assets is to pervert the character of the personal liability of the trustee,-a "simple" equitable debt,-and to render the cestui que trust a preferred creditor, irrespective of his inability to establish any right of property in a specific portion of the trustee's estate. Such, however, was the result attained, for a time, by the decisions in a group of western states, nearly all of which have since been repudiated by the courts which rendered them: McLeod v. Evans, 66 Wis. 401, 57 Am. Rep. 287, 28 N. W. 173, 214 (but see Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Flanders, 87 Wis. 237, 58 N. W. 383; Burnham v. Barth, 89 Wis. 362, 366, 62 N. W. 96); Davenport Plow Co. v. Lamp, 80 Iowa, 722, 20 Am. St. Rep. 442, 45 N. W. 1049 (but see Bradley v. Chesebrough, 111 Iowa, 126, 82 N. W. 472; compare Whitcomb v. Carpenter, 134 Iowa, 227, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 928, 111 N. W. 825; McCutchen v. Roush, 139 Iowa, 351, 115 N. W. 903);

Myers v. Board of Education, 51 Kan. 87, 37 Am. St. Rep. 263, 32 Pac. 658 (but see Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Caldwell, 59 Kan. 156, 52 Pac. 440; Kansas State Bank v. First State Bank, 62 Kan. 788, 64 Pac. 634); Carley v. Graves, 85 Mich. 487, 24 Am. St. Rep. 99, 48 N. W. 710 (but see Board of Fire & Water Com'rs v. Wilkinson, 119 Mich. 655, 658, 670, 44 L. R. A. 493, 78 N. W. 893); State v. Bruce, 17 Idaho, 1, 134 Am. St. Rep. 245, L. R. A. 1916C, 1, 102 Pac. 831 (see Bellevue State Bank v. Coffin, 22 Idaho, 210, 125 Pac. 816); Capital Nat. Bank v. Coldwater Nat. Bank, 49 Neb. 786, 59 Am. St. Rep. 572, 69 N. W. 115 (but see State v. Bank of Commerce, 54 Neb. 725, 75 N. W. 28; Lincoln v. Morrison, 64 Neb. 822, 57 L. R. A. 885, 90 N. W. 905).

The general rule, then, is well established that the cestui que trust can assert a preferential claim against the estate of the insolvent trustee only so far as he can trace the trust property or moneys into a specific fund or property embraced within such estate at the time when it is impounded by the trustee's representative: In re Brunsing, 169 Fed. 668; Lucas County v. Jamison, 170 Fed. 338; In re J. M. Acheson Co., 170 Fed. 427, 95 C. C. A. 597; In re Brown, 193 Fed. 24, 113 C. C. A. 348; Empire State Surety Co. v. Carroll County, 194 Fed. 593, 114 C. C. A. 435; State Bank of Winfield v. Alva Security Bank, 232 Fed. 847, 147 C. C. A. 41; Daughtry v. International Bank of Commerce, 18 N. M. 119, 134 Pac. 220; Cherry v. Territory, 17 Okl. 221, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1254, 89 Pac. 192. To this rule there is, in theory at least, one

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ever a trustee or other person in a fiduciary capacity, acting apparently within the scope of his powers,—that is,

qualification that has the support of a considerable body of dicta. If the beneficiary can show that the trustee's estate, as it came into the hands of his assignee, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, executor, or administrator, was actually increased by the whole or a definite portion of the misappropriated trust fund, justice demands that he and not the other creditors should have the benefit of this increase. The creditors have no right to make a profit by their debtor's breach of trust: Lucas County v. Jamison, 170 Fed. 338; In re J. M. Acheson Co., 170 Fed. 427, 95 C. C. A. 597; Bettendorf Metal Wheel Co. v. P. P. Mast & Co., 187 Fed. 590, 109 C. C. A. 420; compare Empire State Surety Co. v. Carroll County, 194 Fed. 593, 114 C. C. A. 435. This qualification of the general rule, however, is of little practical benefit to the beneficiary, since, as has been pointed out, to establish a definite increase of the assets by means of the trust fund would almost always involve an identification of the trust fund or its proceeds, which is permissible in any event: 19 Harv. L. R. 521. Such increase of the assets is not shown by proof that the trust fund has gone in the payment of the trustee's creditors or the expenses of his business: American Can Co. v. Williams, 176 Fed. 816, 178 Fed. 420, 101 C. C. A. 634; In 're Larkin & Metcalf, 202 Fed. 572; In re See, 209 Fed. 172, 126 C. C. A. 120; Bellevue State Bank v. Coffin, 22 Idaho, 210, 125 Pac. 816; Arnold Inv. Co. v. Citizens' State Bank, 98 Kan. 412, 158 Pac. 68 (an instructive opinion); Drovers' & M. Nat. Bank v. Roller, 85 Md. 495, 60 Am. St. Rep. 344, 36

L. R. A. 767, 37 Atl. 30; Cavin v. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 256, 11 N. E. 504; Slater v. Oriental Mills, 18 R. I. 352, 27 Atl. 443. Such payments by an insolvent may diminish his liabilities, but do not augment his assets.

The practical question, then, in nearly all cases, is that of identifying the trust fund in its converted form. Returning to the case where the trustee has mingled the trust fund with a definite fund of his own-as, for example, his individual bank account, or where a bank receives a deposit under circumstances that render it a trustee, and mingles the deposit with its general fundswe first encounter the old theory referred to by the author, that the trust has disappeared, because money has no "earmark": that is, the bills or coin deposited cannot be identified and recovered. This theory, however, has long since been abandoned. The fund itself is the entity considered, not the bills or coin that originally composed it: Woodhouse v. Crandall, 197 Ill. 104, 58 L. R. A. 385, 64 N. E. 292. If the mixed account or fund has been undisturbed since the trust moneys were blended with it, there is no difficulty in impressing a lien upon it for the full protection of the trust estate. \mathbf{The} difficulties arise where, as is usually the case, there have been subsequent withdrawals by the trustee for his individual use from the blended account, and subsequent additions to it from his individual funds. The law on this subject was established, both for England and for nearly all the jurisdictions in this country, in the famous case of In re Hallett's Estate (Knatchbull v. Hallett), [1879] 13 Ch. D. 696. The judgment of Jessel.

. having authority to do what he does,—purchases property with trust funds, and takes the title thereto in his own

M. R., in that case emphasizes the conception of \mathbf{the} beneficiary's charge or lien where trust funds are mingled with individual funds. (Page 711.) "Supposing, instead of being invested in the purchase of land or goods, the moneys were simply mixed with other moneys of the trustee, using the term again in its full sense as including every person in a fiduciary relation, does it make any difference according to the modern doctrine of equity? I say none. It would be very remarkable if it were to do so. Supposing the trust money was 1,000 sovereigns, and the trustee put them into a bag, and by mistake, or accident, or otherwise, dropped a sovereign of his own into the bagcould anybody suppose that a Judge in Equity would find any difficulty in saying that the cestui que trust has a right to take 1,000 sovereigns out of that bag? I do not like to call it a charge of 1,000 sovereigns on the 1,001 sovereigns, but that is the effect of it. I have no doubt of it. It would make no difference if, instead of one sovereign, it was another 1,000 sovereigns," etc. In a later opinion in the same case, the rule in Clayton's Case, 1 Mer. 572, -the presumption that the sum first paid into a bank account is the sum first paid out,-is disposed of by the Master of the Rolls in this often quoted passage (page 727): The trustee "cannot be heard to say that he took away the trust money when he had a right to take away his own money. The simplest case put is the mingling of trust moneys in a bag with money of the trustee's own. Suppose he has a hundred sovereigns in a bag, and he adds to

them another hundred sovereigns of his own, so that they are commingled in such a way that they cannot be distinguished, and the next day he draws out for his own purposes £100, is it tolerable for anybody to allege that what he drew out was the first £100, the trust money, and that he misappropriated it, and left his own £100 in the bag? It is obvious he must have taken away that which he had a right to take away, his own £100. What difference does it make if, instead of being in a bag, he deposits it with his banker, and then pays in other money of his own, and draws out some money for his own purposes? Could he say that he had actually drawn out anything but his own money?"

Following this reasoning, it is now the well-settled rule, that where withdrawals from the mixed fund, with or without subsequent replenishing from the trustee's individual money, have not at any time reduced the balance to a sum less than the trust fund deposited, the cestui que trust, as against the trustee's creditor, is entitled to repayment in full; his money is sufficiently identified as having always been contained within the blended fund: Philadelphia Nat. Bank v. Dowd, 38 Fed. 172, 2 L. R. A. 480; Western German Bank v. Norvell, 134 Fed. 724; 69 C. C. A. 330; In re Royea's Estate, 143 Fed. 182; In re Berry, 147 Fed. 208, 77 C. C. A. 434; Smith v. Mottley, 150 Fed. 266, 80 C. C. A. 154; Weiss v. Haight & Freese Co., 152 Fed. 479; Clark Sparks & Sons Mule & Horse Co. v. American Nat. Bank, 230 Fed. 738; Hall v. Beymer, 22 Colo. App. 271,

name, without any declaration of trust, a trust arises with respect to such property in favor of the *cestui que trust* or

125 Pac. 561; Shopert v. Indiana Nat. Bank, 41 Ind. App. 474, 83 N. E. 515; Continental Nat. Bank of Indianapolis v. McClure, 60 Ind. App. 553, 111 N. E. 191; Patek v. Patek, 166 Mich. 446, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 461, 131 N. W. 1101; Yellowstone County v. First Trust & Sav. Bank, 46 Mont. 439, 128 Pac. 596; First Nat. Bank of Beaumont v. Union Trust Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 155 S. W. 989; Emigh v. Earling, 134 Wis. 565, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 243, 115 N. W. 128. Where the withdrawals have brought the balance to a sum less than the trust fund deposited, and there have been no subsequent additions to this minimum, the cestui que trust is entitled to the whole of the amount so remaining. The further rule has become well established that subsequent additions to the fund from the trustee's own moneys will not be treated as made for the cestui's benefit, but that he is entitled, as against creditors, to claim only the lowest balance found to have existed in the fund after the deposit of the trust moneys: James Roscoe, Ltd., v. Winder, [1915] 1 Ch. 62; Board of Com'rs of Crawford County v. Strawn, 157 Fed. 49, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1100, 84 C. C. A. 553, modifying 149 Fed. 229; In re A. O. Brown & Co., 189 Fed. 432; In re M. E. Dunn & Co., 193 Fed. 212; Powell v. Missouri & Arkansas Land & Mining Co., 99 Ark. 553, 139 S. W. 299; Covey v. Cannon, 104 Ark. 550, 149 S. W. 514. This, at first sight, seems a weak point in the rationale of the doctrine. The presumption of the trustee's honesty, or of his "intention to fulfill an obligation," ought, one would think, to extend to his acts in replenishing the fund

as well as to his acts in withdrawing from it. It would seem only consistent to hold (what is often, undoubtedly, the fact) that such replenishing was done with the intention, prima facie, of righting his misconduct and fulfilling his obligation to the beneficiary. Such, however, is not the law. For an explanation of this seeming inconsistency we must recur to the conception of the beneficiary's lien on the blended fund, which, as has been seen, was the foundation of the rule in Hallett's Estate. When the withdrawals have reduced the fund below the amount of the trust money deposited, the lien, of course, to that extent disappears; and there is no analogy to justify its expansion to cover sums subsequently deposited from the trustee's individual resources; unless, indeed, the trustee has, in effect, declared a trust in these additions.

The rule in Hallett's Estate is adopted, and illustrated in its various phases in the following cases, among others: Merchants' Nat. Bank v. School Dist., 94 Fed. 705, 36 C. C. A. 432; In re Northrup, 152 Fed. 763; Board of Com'rs of Crawford County v. Strawn, 157 Fed. 49, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1100, 84 C. C. A. 553, modifying Board of Com'rs of Crawford Co. v. Patterson, 149 Fed. 229; United States v. Carter, 172 Fed. 1, 96 C. C. A. 587; American Can Co. v. Williams, 176 Fed. 816; 178 Fed. 420, 101 C. C. A. 634; In re City Bank of Dowagiac, 186 Fed. 413; In re A. O. Brown & Co., 189 Fed. 432; Empire State Surety Co. v. Carroll County, 194 Fed. 593, 114 C. C. A. 435; Brennan v. Tillinghast, 201 Fed. 609, 120 C. other beneficiary. Equity regards such a purchase as made in trust for the person beneficially interested, independently

C. A. 37; Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne v. Lovell, 212 Fed. 337; Powell v. Missouri & Arkansas Land & Min. Co., 99 Ark. 553, 139 S. W. 299; Covey v. Cannon, 104 Ark. 550, 149 S. W. 514; People v. California Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 175 Cal. 756, 167 Pac. 388; Woodhouse v. Crandall, 197 Ill. 104, 58 L. R. A. 385, 64 N. E. 292; Drovers' & M. Nat. Bank v. Roller, 85 Md. 495, 60 Am. St. Rep. 344, 36 L. R. A. 767, 37 Atl. 30; Hewitt v. Hayes, 205 Mass. 356, 137 Am. St. Rep. 448, 91 N. E. 332; Board of Fire & W. Com'rs v. Wilkinson, 119 Mich. 655, 44 L. R. A. 493, 78 N. W. 893; Lincoln v. Morrison, 64 Neb. 822, 57 L. R. A. 885, 90 N. W. 905; Waddell v. Waddell, 36 Utah, 435, 104 Pac. 743; Chase & Baker Co. v. Olmsted, 93 Wash. 306, 160 Pac. 952; Heidelbach v. Campbell, 95 Wash. 661, 164 Pac. 247; State v. Foster, 5 Wyo. 199, 63 Am. St. Rep. 47, 29 L. R. A. 226, 38 Pac. 926.

The presumption that the first withdrawals are from the trustce's own funds must not be pushed too far. It has no application where the evidence shows that the first moneys drawn out of the mingled fund by the trustee were not in fact dissipated by him at all, but were merely transferred, in a substituted form, to another investment. The fact that, in such case, the remainder of the mingled fund is dissipated and lost does not prevent the beneficiary from asserting his lien against the new fund or investment: In re Oatway (Hertslet v. Oatway), [1903] 2 Ch. 356; Brennan v. Tillinghast, 201 Fed. 609, 614, 120 C. C. A. 37. And the presumption, of course, does not arise where it is stipulated

in the case that the trust moneys have been paid out: Heidelbach v. Campbell, 95 Wash. 661, 164 Pac. 247.

In a few recent decisions the presumption as to withdrawals from the mixed account is held not to apply to cases where the plaintiff's money was obtained by fraud, constituting a trust ex maleficio. The argument here is, that the presumption, being based on the general assumption of the trustee's honesty, is met and overcome by proof of his general dishonesty: People v. California Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 175 Cal. 756, 167 Pac. 388; Stilson v. First State Bank of Corwith, 149 Iowa, 662, 129 N. W. 70; In re First State Bank, 152 Iowa, 724, 133 N. W. 354. If the principle of these cases were carried to its logical conclusion, there seems to be no reason why it should not extend to all instances where the trustee was conscious of the wrongful nature of his act in mingling the trust fund with his own, and leave the rule in In re Hallett to apply only to the comparatively rare instances where he was ignorant of his duty to keep trust moneys separate. The plaintiff's right to his own, therefore, would depend on proof of his trustee's moral character. The vice of these decisions lies in the fact that they utterly ignore the true ground of the cestui's preference; viz., his lien upon the mingled fund. The court, no doubt, would have recognized that lien if the money of which plaintiff is defrauded had been used in the purchase of land or stock; equally should it be recognized where the money has merely been blended in a mass with other

of any imputation of fraud, and without requiring any proof of an intention to violate the existing fiduciary obligation, because it assumes that the purchaser intended to act in pursuance of his fiduciary duty, and not in violation of it. This doctrine is of wide application; it extends to trustees, executors and administrators, directors of corporations, guardians, committees of lunatics, agents using money of their principals, partners using partnership funds, husbands purchasing property with money belonging to the separate estate of their wives, parents, and children, and all persons who stand in fiduciary relations towards others.^a Equity jurisprudence contains few more efficient doctrines than this in maintaining the beneficial rights of The evidence that the purchase was made with property.^{1 b} trust funds must, however, be clear and unmistakable.

§ 1049, ¹ This form of trusts is treated by some writers as belonging to the denomination of "resulting" trusts, and it has one striking element in common with them,—the *intention* with which it is presumed the purchase was made. In every other respect it differs from resulting trusts,

money. The lien, in either case, is a substantial right of property, needing no tenuous presumption for its support. A large proportion of the cases cited in this note involve trusts *ex maleficio*, but make no such distinction as that laid down in the California and Iowa cases.

On the general subject of this note, see a highly instructive article by the late Professor Ames, in 19 Harvard Law Review, 511. The older cases, with a few of the recent ones, are set forth in great detail in **L. R. A.** 1916C, 21-89, note.

On the subject of the mingling of several trust funds belonging to different cestuis que trustent, see Empire State Surety Co. v. Carroll County, 194 Fed. 593, 114 C. C. A. 435; Hewitt v. Hayes, 205 Mass. 356, 137 Am. St. Rep. 448, 91 N. E. 332; Raban v. Cascade Bank of Great Falls, 33 Mont. 413, 84 Pac. 72; Commonwealth ex rel. Bell v. Tradesmen's Trust Co., 250 Pa. 378, L. R. A. 1916C, 10, 95 Atl. 577.

§ 1049, (a) Text quoted in Harmon v. Harmon, (S. C.) 71 S. E. 815; Mendenhall v. Walters, (Okl.) 157 Pac. 732.

§ 1049, (b) The text is cited in Moore v. McLure, 124 Ala. 120, 27 South. 499; Red Bud Realty Co. v. South, 96 Ark. 281, 131 S. W. 340; Shaw v. Bernal, 163 Cal. 262, 124 Pac. 1012 (purchase of land with wife's money); First Nat. Bank v. Leech, 207 Ill. 215, 69 N. E. 890; Cook v. Miller, 47 Ind. App. 453, 94 N. E. 783; Bevan v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1261, 43 S. W. 242; Seibel v. Bath, 5 Wyo. 409, 40 Pac. 756. See a valuable discussion in Robinson v. Pierce, 118 Ala. 273, 72 Am. St. Rep. 160, 45 § 1050. 5. Renewal of Leases by Partners and Other Fiduciary Persons.^a—Another special form of constructive trusts, depending upon a much more general principle to

and clearly belongs, on principle, to the class of "constructive" trusts. It is always established in invitum, and although an assumption of fraud is not necessary, some element of fraud, actual or constructive, is in fact generally present: Deg v. Deg, 2 P. Wms. 412, 414; Perry v. Phellips, 4 Ves. 108; 17 Ves. 173; Bennett v. Mahew, cited 1 Brown Ch. 232; 2 Brown Ch. 287; Keech v. Sandford, Sel. Cas. Ch. 61; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 48, 49, 62; Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 511; Trench v. Harrison, 17 Sim. 111; Mathias v. Mathias, 3 Smale & G. 552; Ousley v. Anstruther, 10 Beav. 453, 461; Flanders v. Thompson, 3 Woods, 9; Watson v. Thompson, 12 R. I. 466; Thomas v. Standiford, 49 Md. 181; Burks v. Burks, 7 Baxt. 353; Miller v. Birdsong, 7 Baxt. 531; Winkfield v. Brinkman, 21 Kan. 682; Moss v. Moss, 95 Ill. 449; Dodge v. Cole, 97 Ill. 338, 37 Am. Rep. 111; Derry v. Derry, 74 Ind. 560; Roy v. McPherson, 11 Neb. 197; 7 N. W. 873; Reickhoff v. Brecht, 51 Iowa, 633, 2 N. W. 522; Barrett v. Bamber, 81 Pa. St. 247; Jones v. Dexter, 130 Mass. 380, 39 Am. Rep. 459; Michigan etc. R. R. Co. v. Mellen, 44 Mich. 321; 6 N. W. 845;

L. R. A. 66, 24 South. 984, and in the dissenting opinion of McIver, J., in Green v. Green, 56 S. C. 193, 46 L. R. A. 525, 34 S. E. 249. See, generally, Butler v. Watrous, 185 Ala. 130, 64 South. 346; Small v. Hockinsmith, 158 Ala. 234, 48 South. 541 (calling trust "resulting"; life tenant invests personal assets in land); Lagarde v. Anniston L. & S. Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 South. 199; Moritz v. Lavelle, 77 Cal. 10, 11 Am. St. Rep. 229, 18 Pac. 803, and cases cited: Haney v. Legg, 129 Ala. 619, 87 Am. St. Rep. 81, 30 South. 34 (distinguishing these trusts from "resulting trusts"); Deaner ν. O'Hara, 36 Colo. 476, 85 Pac. 1123 (partner); Cree v. Lewis; 49 Colo. 186, 112 Pac. 326; Verble v. Dillon, 218 Ill. 537, 75 N. E. 1046 (gnardian); Moore v. Scruggs, 131 Iowa, 692, 117 Am. St. Rep. 437, 109 N. W. 205 (agent); Rose v. Hayden, 35 Kan. 106, 57 Am. Rep. 145, 10 Pac.

554; Hartsock v. Russell, 52 Md. 619; James v. Groff, 157 Mo. 402, 57 S. W. 1081; Rannels v. Isgrigg, 99 Mo. 19, 12 S. W. 343; Wood v. Rabe, 96 N. Y. 414, 48 Am. Rep. 640; Currie v. Look, 14 N. D. 482, 106 N. W. 131; Brazel v. Fair, 26 S. C. 370, 2 S. E. 293; Hardin v. Hardin, 26 S. D. 601, 129 N. W. 108 (mining partner); Morris v. Smith, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 357, 112 S. W. 130; Me-Cully v. McCully, 78 Va. 159; Taylor v. Taylor, 76 W. Va. 469, 85 S. E. 652 (agent); Myers v. Myers, 47 W. Va. 487, 35 S. E. 868; Hill v. True, 104 Wis. 294, 80 N. W. 462; and see ante, §§ 422, 587.

§ 1050, (a) This section is cited in Donleavey v. Johnston, 24 Cal. App. 319, 141 Pac. 229; Mallory v. Mallory-Wheeler Co., 61 Conn. 135, 23 Atl. 708; Lind v. Webber, 36 Nev. 623, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1046, 134 Pac. 461, 135 Pac. 139, 141 Pac. 458. be examined in subsequent paragraphs, has been established by a unanimity of decision. One member of a partnership cannot, during its existence, without the knowledge and consent of his co-partners, take a renewal lease, in his own name or otherwise, for his own benefit and to the exclusion of his fellows, of premises leased by the firm or occupied by them as tenants. A lease so taken by a partner inures to the benefit of the whole firm; it is regarded as a continuation of or as "grafted on" the old lease; a trust will be impressed upon the leasehold estate; equity will treat the partner as a trustee for the firm, and if neces-

Schlaefer v. Corson, 52 Barb. 510; McLarren v. Brewer, 51 Me. 402; White v. Drew, 42 Mo. 561; Stow v. Kimball, 28 Ill. 93; Barker v. Barker, 14 Wis. 131; Church v. Sterling, 16 Conn. 388; Johnson v. Dougherty, 18 N. J. Eq. 406; Bancroft v. Consen, 13 Allen, 50; Reid v. Fitch, 11 Barb. 399; Bridenbecker v. Lowell, 32 Barb. 9; Robb's Appeal, 41 Pa. St. 45; Smith v. Burnham, 3 Sum. 435; Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 333, 401; Homer v. Homer, 107 Mass. 82; Settembre v. Putnam, 30 Cal. 490; Jenkins v. Frink, 30 Cal. 586, 89 Am. Dec. 134.

The recent case of Ferris v. Van Vechten, 73 N. Y. 113, reversing 9 Hun, 12, is a very instructive decision illustrating the extent and limits of this doctrine. An attempt was made to reach land purchased by a trustee, on the ground that it was paid for with trust funds. There was no evidence as to what amount of trust moneys was thus used, and in fact there was no direct positive evidence that any such funds were appropriated by the trustee in paying for the land. Held, that the doctrine could not be invoked on behalf of the plaintiff. While the general rule was fully admitted, in order that it should be applicable, the trust fund must be clearly and distinctly traced, and positively shown to have been used in the purchase. The relief could not be granted upon any mere inference. If the evidence only showed that at one time the trustee had trust funds in his hands, and that afterwards he bought and took the title to a piece of land in his own name, but went no farther, the court could not draw the inference from these bare facts that the trust funds were employed in the purchase, and could not impress a trust upon the land.c

§ 1049, (c) See, also, Phillips v. Overfield, 100 Mo. 466, 13 S. W. 705; Sisemore v. Pelton, 17 Or. 546, 21 Pac. 667; Moore v. Taylor, 251 Ill. 468, 96 N. E. 229; Wisdom v. Wisdom, 157 Wis. 434, 145 N. W. 126. The text is cited to the point in Bevan v. Citizens' Nat. Bk., 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1261, 43 S. W. 242; see, also, ante, § 1048, note.

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sary and possible, will compel him to assign the renewal lease to it; if a condition inserted in such lease against assigning should prevent the relief of an actual assignment, it will not in the least prevent the court from enforcing the trust by compelling the partner to hold the legal title for the benefit of all. This rule applies under every variety of circumstances, provided the rights of the other partners are still subsisting at the time when the renewal lease is obtained. It operates with equal force whether the renewal lease was to begin during the continuance of the firm or after its termination; whether the partnership was for an undetermined period, or was to end at a specified time, and the renewal lease was not to take effect until the expiration of that prescribed time; whether there was or was not a right in the firm, by contract, custom, or courtesy, to a renewal of the original lease from the lessor; and even whether the landlord would or would not have granted a new lease to the other partners or to the firm. All these facts are wholly immaterial to the application of the doctrine, for its operation does not in the slightest degree depend upon the terms and provisions of the original lease, nor upon the attitude of the landlord. The doctrine is not confined to partners; it extends in all its breadth and with all its effects to trustees, guardians, and all other persons clothed with a fiduciary character, who are in possession of premises as tenants on behalf of their beneficiaries, or who are in possession as tenants of premises in which their beneficiaries are interested.^{1 b} As this rule results from

§ 1050, ¹ In Phyfe v. Wardell, 5 Paige, 268, 28 Am. Dec. 430, Walworth, C., thus states the doctrine in its general form: "If a person who has a particular or special interest in a lease obtains a renewal thereof from the circumstance of his being in possession as tenant, or from having

§ 1050, (b) The text is quoted in Smith v. Smith, 153 Ala. 504, 45 South. 168. See, also, Davis v. Hamlin, 108 Ill. 39, 48 Am. Rep. 541 (confidential agent); Donleavey v. Johnston, 24 Cal. App. 319, 141 Pac. 229; Jacksonville Cigar Co. v. Dozier, 53 Fla. 1059, 43 South. 523 (the trust not enforced unless court can see that it will not injure landlord); Forlaw v. Augusta Naval Stores Co., 124 Ga. 261, 52 S. E. 898; the relation of trust and confidence existing between the partners or other persons interested, it might be regarded as an outgrowth of the doctrine formulated in the preceding paragraph. It is more directly, however, a particular

such particular interest, the renewed lease is in equity considered as a mere continuance of the original lease, subject to the additional charges upon the renewal, for the purpose of protecting the equitable rights of all parties who had any interest, either legal or equitable, in the old lease." In Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N. Y. 123, 139, 19 Am. Rep. 252, the court, after a full examination of the authorities, summed up the discussion with the following propositions, which they held to be settled conclusions: "1. A trustee holding a lease, whether corporate or individual, holds the renewal as a trustee, and as he held the original lease. 2. This does not depend upon any right which the cestui que trust has to the renewal, but upon the theory that the new lease is, in technical terms, a 'graft' upon the old one; and that the trustee 'had a facility,' by means of his relation to the estate, for obtaining the renewal, from which he shall not personally profit. 3. This doctrine extends to commercial partnerships, and one of several partners cannot, while a partnership continues, take a renewal lease clandestinely, or 'behind the backs' of his associates, for his own benefit. It is not material that the landlord would not have granted the new lease to the other partners, or to the firm. 4. It is of no consequence whether the partnership is for a definite or an indefinite period. The disability to take the lease for individual profit grows out of the partnership

Essex Trust Co. v. Enwright, 214 Mass. 507, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 567, 102 N. E. 441 (employee); H. C. Girard & Co. v. Lamoureux, 227 Mass. 277, 116 N. E. 572 (director obtaining lease after his removal from office); Pike's Peak Co. v. Pfuntner, 158 Mich. 412, 123 N. W. 19 (director); Eisenberg v. Goldsmith, 42 Mont. 563, 113 Pac. 1127 (partner); Finnegan v. McGuffog, 203 N. Y. 342, 96 N. E. 1015 (widow of trustee, though she took without notice); McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 103, 7 Ann. Cas. 287, 76 C. C. A. 73 (director). The doctrine was carefully re-examined in the recent case of In re Biss, [1903] 2 Ch. 40, 55, 64. The following is from the syllabus in that case: ""A person renewing is only held to be a constructive trustee of the new lease if, in respect of the old lease, he occupied some special position by virtue of which he owed a duty towards the other persons interested; as, for example, in the case of a renewal by a tenant for life of settled leaseholds, or by a partner of a partnership lease, or by a mortgagee of a mortgaged lease." See, also, Bevan v. Webb, [1905] 1 Ch. 620. Tenants in common do not stand in such fiduciary relation to each other: Id., p. 57; Kennedy v. De Trafford, [1897] App. Cas. 180.

For the extension of the general doctrine of this paragraph to the cases where agents for purchase make use of information acquired in application of a broad principle of equity, extending to all actual and quasi trustees, that a trustee, or person clothed with a fiduciary character, shall not be permitted to use his position or functions so as to obtain for himself any

relation. While that lasts, the renewal cannot be taken for individual purposes, even though the lease does not commence until after the expiration of the partnership. 5. It cannot necessarily be assumed that the renewal can be taken by an individual member of the firm, even after dissolution. The former partners may still be tenants in common; or there may be other reasons of a fiduciary nature why the transaction cannot be entered into." This conclusion and the statements of the text are fully sustained by the following cases, in which the doctrine has been applied under every variety of circumstances: Keech v. Sandford, Sel. Cas. Ch. 61; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 48, 49, 62; Holt v. Holt, 1 Cas. Ch. 190; Manlove v. Bale, 2 Vern. 84; Rakestraw v. Brewer, 2 P. Wms. 511; Pickering v. Vowles, 1 Brown Ch. 197; Lee v. Vernon, 5 Brown Parl. C. 10, Hargrave, arg.; Alden v. Fouracie, 3 Swanst. 489; Cook v. Collingridge, Jacob, 607, 619; Brown v. De Tastet, Jacob, 284; Griffin v. Griffin, 1 Schoales & L. 352; Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, 17 Ves. 298, 311; Moody v. Matthews, 7 Ves. 174, 185, and note in Sumner's ed.; Clegg v. Fishwick, 1 Macn. & G. 294; Clegg v. Edmondson, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 787; Clements v. Hall, 2 De Gex & J. 173; Burton v. Wookey, 6 Madd. 367; Blissett v. Daniel, 10 Hare, 493, 522, 536; Gardner v. McCutcheon, 4 Beav. 534; Lees v. Laforest, 14 Beav. 250; York etc. R'y Co. v. Hudson, 16 Beav. 485; Perens v. Johnson, 3 Smale & G. 419; Burdon v. Barkus, 3 Giff. 412; 4 De Gex, F. & J. 42; Holridge v. Gillespie, 2 Johns. Ch. 30; Van Horne v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. 388, 407; Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252, 258; Phyfe v. Wardell, 5 Paige, 268, 28 Am. Dec. 430; Armour v. Alexander, 10 Paige, 571; Wood v. Perry, 1 Barb. 114, 134;

their fiduciary capacity to purchase for themselves after the termination of the agency, and adversely to the principal's interest, see ante, § 959, notes; Trice v. Comstock, 121 Fed. 620, 61 L. B. A. 176, 57 C. C. A. 646 (an instructive case); De Bardeleben v. Bessemer L. & I. Co., (Ala.) 37 South. 511 (president of corporation); Schrager v. Cool, 221 Pa. 622, 70 Atl. 889; Morris v. Reigel, (S. D.) 101 N. W. 1086; and see Rogers v. Genung, 75 N. J. Eq. 13, 71 Atl. 230; Dean v. Roberts, 182 Ala. 221, 62 South. 44; Koyer v. Willmon, 150 Cal. 785, 90 Pac. 135 (partner eannot buy in his own name property that was being considered by the firm); American Circular Loom Co. v. Wilson, 198 Mass. 182, 126 Am. St. Rep. 409, 84 N. E. 133 (director violates duty by secretly purchasing invention for himself which he knows will be useful to corporation); Edwards v. Johnson, 90 S. C. 90, 72 S. E. 638 (partner obtains option on property intended to be bought by the firm). advantage or profit inconsistent with his supreme duty to his beneficiary.² c

§ 1051. 6. Wrongful Appropriation or Conversion into a Different Form of Another's Property.—In the foregoing fourth form of constructive trust the fiduciary person appropriates trust funds in the purchase of property, but the court imputes no wrongful intent; it assumes that he was acting in pursuance of his trust. In the present case the wrongful intent necessarily exists; the intended violation of a fiduciary duty and of another's beneficial rights is the essential element. A constructive trust arises whenever another's property has been wrongfully appropriated and converted into a different form. If one person having money or any kind of property belonging to another in his hands wrongfully uses it for the purchase of lands,

Gibbes v. Jenkins, 3 Sand Ch. 130; Dickinson v. Codwise, 1 Sand. Ch. 214, 226; Dougherty v. Van Nostrand, 1 Hoff. Ch. 68, 70; Bennett v. Van Syckel, 4 Duer, 162; Dunlop v. Richards, 2 E. D. Smith, 181; Struthers v. Pearce, 51 N. Y. 357; Leach v. Leach, 18 Pick. 68, 76; Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sum. 475, 495; Kelley v. Greenleaf, 3 Story, 93, 101; Huson v. Wallace, 1 Rich. Eq. 1, 2, 4, 7; Lacy v. Hale, 37 Pa. St. 360; Barrett v. Bamber, S1 Pa. St. 247; Winkfield v. Brinkman, 21 Kan. 682; Jones v. Dexter, 130 Mass. 380, 39 Am. Rep. 459; Laffan v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 662, 70 Am. Dec. 678; Gower v. Andrew, 8 Pac. L. J. 617 (the rule correctly applied by the majority of the court to a confidential managing clerk of a firm).

In the cases where the rule was not applied it will be found that there were always some controlling facts which prevented its operation, even though the rule itself was fully recognized: See Acheson v. Fair, 3 Dru. & War. 512; Nesbitt v. Tredennick, 1 Ball & B. 29, 48; Maunsell v. O'Brien, 1 Jones' (Ir.) 176, 184; Phillips v. Reeder, 18 N. J. Eq. 95; Musselman's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 81, 1 Am. Rep. 382; Van Dyke v. Jackson, 1 E. D. Smith, 419; Anderson v. Lemon, 8 N. Y. 236; 4 Sand. 552.

§ 1050, ² Fox v. Mackreth, ² Brown Ch. 400; ² Cox, 320; ¹ Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. Ed., 188, 212, 237; Pooley v. Quilter, ² De Gex & J. 327; ⁴ Drew. 184; Fosbrooke v. Balguy, ¹ Mylne & K. 226; Docker v. Somes, ² Mylne & K. 655. This principle is discussed in the following section.

§ 1050, (c) The text is quoted in Smith v. Smith, 153 Ala. 504, 45 Lind v. Webber, 36 Nev. 623, 50 South. 168. L. R. A. (N. S.) 1046, 134 Pac. 461;

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taking the title in his own name;^a or if a trustee or other fiduciary person wrongfully converts the trust fund into a different species of property, taking to himself the title; or if an agent or bailee wrongfully disposes of his principal's securities, and with the proceeds purchases other securities in his own name,---in these and all similar cases equity impresses a constructive trust upon the new form or species of property, not only while it is in the hands of the original wrong-doer, but as long as it can be followed and identified in whosesoever hands it may come, except into those of a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice; and the court will enforce the constructive trust for the benefit of the beneficial owner or original cestui que trust who has thus been defrauded. As a necessary consequence of this doctrine, whenever property subject to a trust is wrongfully sold and transferred to a bona fide purchaser. so that it is freed from the trust, the trust immediately attaches to the price or proceeds in the hands of the vendor, whether such price be a debt yet unpaid due from the purchaser, or a different kind of property taken in exchange, or even a sum of money paid to the vendor, as long as the money can be identified and reached in his hands or under his control.^{1 b} It is not essential for the

§ 1051, ¹ The doctrine was most clearly and tersely stated by Turner, L. J., in Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 372, 388: "It is an undoubted principle of this court that as between the *cestui que trust* and trustee, and all parties claiming under the trustee, otherwise than by pur-

§ 1051, (a) Wrongful Purchase of Land With Trust Fund.—The text is quoted in Success Realty Co. v. Trowbridge, 50 Okl. 402, 150 Pac. 898; Harmon v. Harmon, (S. C.) 71 S. E. 815. See, also, Hanna v. Mc-Laughlin, 158 Ind. 292, 63 N. E. 475; Case v. Collins, 37 Ind. App. 491, 76 N. E. 781; Aldridge v. Aldridge, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 246, 109 S. W. 873 (decedent received money to hold or invest for another and on his death had only land); Preston v. Moore, 133 Tenn. 247, 180 S. W. 320.

§ 1051, (b) The above portion of the text is quoted in Success Realty Co. v. Trowbridge, 50 Okl. 402, 150 Pac. 898; Harmon v. Harmon, (S. C.) 71 S. E. 815; Schneider v. Sellers, (Tex.) 84 S. W. 417 (trustee conveys to purchaser with notice and he to bona fide purchaser; cestui que trust may recover value from first purchaser). This section is eited in Seibel v. Bath, 5 Wyo. 409, 40

application of this doctrine that an actual trust or fiduciary relation should exist between the original wrong-doer and

chase for valuable consideration without notice, all property belonging to a trust, however much it may be changed or altered in its nature or character, and all the fruit of such property, whether in its original or in its altered state, continues to be subject to or affected by the trust": Fox v. Mackreth, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 188, 212, 237; Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & S. 562, 574, 576; Ex parte Dumas, 1 Atk. 232, 233; Lane v. Dighton, Amb. 409, 411, 413; Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 511, 517; Lewis v. Madocks, 17 Ves. 48, 51, 58; Grigg v. Cocks, 4 Sim. 438; Ernest v. Croysdill, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 175; Barnes v. Addy, L. R. 9 Ch. 244; Ex parte Cooke, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 123; Nant-y-Glo etc. Co. v. Grave, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 738; In re Hallett's Estate, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696; Rolfe v. Gregory, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 576; Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 678; Wells v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 133, 140, 141; Lathrop v. Bampton, 31 Cal. 17, 89 Am. Dec. 141; Schlaeffer v. Corson, 52 Barb. 510; Swinburne v. Swinburne, 28 N. Y. 568 (a most instructive case); Hastings v. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9, 16; Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 587; Holden v. New York etc. Bank, 72 N. Y. 286; Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y. 133, 136-140, 25 Am. Rep. 152; Taylor v. Mosely, 57 Miss. 544; Burks v. Burks, 7 Baxt. 353; Broyles v. Nowlin, 59 Tenn. 191; Tilford v. Torrey, 53 Ala. 120; Pindall v. Trevor, 30 Ark. 249; Friedlander v. Johnson, 2 Woods, 675; McDonough v. O'Niel, 113

Pac. 756. See, also, Parks v. Parks, 66 Ala. 326; Peters v. Rhodes, 157 Ala. 25, 47 South. 183; Atkinson v. Ward, 47 Ark. 533, 2 S. W. 77; Humphreys v. Butler, 51 Ark. 351, 11 S. W. 479; Red Bud Realty Co. v. South. 96 Ark. 281, 131 S. W. 340 (beneficiary entitled to proceeds or lien on investment); Adams v. Lambard, 80 Cal. 426, 22 Pac. 180; Taber v. Bailey, 22 Cal. App. 617, 135 Pac. 975 (as between trustee and beneficiary, property may be followed into any form into which it is converted); Bellevue State Bank v. Coffin, 22 Idaho, 210, 125 Pae. 816; Frohlich v. Seacord, 180 Ill. 85, 54 N. E. 286; Moore v. Taylor, 251 Ill. 468, 96 N. E. 229; Riehl v. Evansville Foundry Ass'n, 104 Ind. 70, 3 N. E. 633; Case v. Collins, 37 Ind. App. 491, 76 N. E. 781 (right of next of kin to follow investment of estate funds by administrator in his own name); Jones v. Nicholas, 151 Iowa, 362, 130 N. W. 125; State Savings Bank v. Thompson, 88 Kan. 461, 128 Pae. 1120; Italian Fruit & Importing Co. v. Penniman, 100 Md. 698, 61 Atl. 694 (money transferred from one fund to another); Houghton v. Davenport, 74 Me. 590; Sargent v. Wood, 196 Mass. 1, 81 N. E. 901 (on sale by trustee, beneficiary entitled to proceeds or lien on investment); Allen v. Stewart, 214 Mass. 109, 100 N. E. 1092 (trust property taken for public use); Furber v. Dane, 204 Mass. 412, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 808 and note, 90 N. E. 859 (broker deposits proceeds of sale of land to his own account); Twohy Mercantile Co. v. Melbye, 78 Minn. 357, 81 N. W. 25, 83 Minn.

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the beneficial owner. Wherever one person has wrongfully taken the property of another, and converted it into a new

Mass. 92; Tracy v. Kelley, 52 Ind. 535; Cookson v. Richardson, 69 Ill. 137; Coles v. Allen, 64 Ala. 98 (when no trust arises); Dodge v. Cole, 97 Ill. 338, 37 Am. Rep. 111; Derry v. Derry, 74 Ind. 560; Newton v. Taylor, 32 Ohio St. 399; Barrett v. Bamber, 81 Pa. St. 247; Veile v. Blodgett, 49 Vt. 270; Hubbard v. Burrell, 41 Wis. 365 (proceeds charged with a trust on sale to a *bona fide* purchaser); Michigan etc. R. R. v. Mellen, 44 Mich. 321; Murray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns. Ch. 441, 443; Boyd v. McLean, 1 Johns. Ch. 582; Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 382, 1 Am. Rep. 115, 97 Am. Dec. 107; Shelton v. Lewis, 27 Ark. 190; Mathews v. Heyward, 2 S. C. 239; Thompson v. Perkins, 3 Mason, 232; Duncan v. Jandon, 15 Wall. 165.

In order that this species of trust may arise, it is not indispensable that the conventional relation of trustee and *cestui que trust*, or even *any* fiduciary relation, should exist between the original wrong-doer and the beneficial owner, although such relation generally exists in these cases. Where securities had been stolen, and transferred and sold by the thief, a trust was held impressed upon them and on their proceeds, in the hands of a transferee, with notice: Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y. 133, 140, 25 Am. Rep. 152; Bank of America v. Pollock, 4 Edw. Ch. 215.^c

394, 86 N. W. 411; Shearer v. Barnes, 118 Minn. 179, 136 N. W. 861 (corporation officer invests its funds for his own use); Munro v. Collins, 95 Mo. 33, 7 S. W. 461; Elliott v. Landis Mach. Co., 236 Mo. 546, 139 S. W. 356 (proceeds traced into stock, beneficiaries entitled to dividends and interest); Davis v. Cummins, (Mo.) 195 S. W. 752; Warren v. Union Bank of Rochester, 157 N. Y. 259, 68 Am. St. Rep. 777, 43 L. R. A. 256, 51 N. E. 1036; Berry v. Evendon, 14 N. D. 1, 103 N. W. 748 (personal property converted into real estate); Success Realty Co. v. Trowbridge, 50 Okl. 402, 150 Pac. 898 (quoting text); O'Neill v. O'Neill, 227 Pa. 334, 76 Atl. 26; Smally v. Paine, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 52, 130 S. W. 739 (where there are successive transfers, each link must be clearly shown); Rose v. Taylor, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 535, 43 S. W. 285, 44 S. W. 326; Merchants' Nat. Bk. v. Phillips & Wiggs Mach. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 159, 39 S. W. 217; Primeau v. Granfield, 184 Fed. 480; Brennan v. Tillinghast, 201 Fed. 609, 120 C. C. A. 37 (money transferred from one fund to another); United States v. Carter, 217 U. S. 286, 19 Ann. Cas. 594, 54 L. Ed. 769, 30 Sup. Ct. 515.

§ 1051, (c) The case of Bank of America v. Pollock, *supra*, is commented on favorably by several of the cases, *supra*, note (b); and is expressly approved in Tecumseh Nat. Bk. v. Russell, 50 Neb. 277, 69 N. W. 763. See, also, Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Malone, 89 Neb. 260, 131 N. W. 200; Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N. Y. 261, 139 Am. St. Rep. 817, 19 Ann. Cas. 747, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 119, 91 N. E. 582. form, or transferred it, the trust arises and follows the property or its proceeds.^d

§ 1052. 7. Wrongful Acquisition of the Trust Property by a Trustee or Other Fiduciary Person.-In several of the preceding subdivisions, the trustee, by means of trust funds, has acquired property from a third person, which thereby becomes subject to the original trust. The present species includes all the various instances in which the trustee or other fiduciary person wrongfully acquires the title and beneficial use of the very trust property itself,the property in specie which forms the subject-matter of the trust. The doctrine may be stated in its most general form, that whenever a trustee or person clothed with any fiduciary character takes advantage of the relation, and by means of it acquires the title or use of the trust property, or makes a profit or advantage to himself out of the trust and confidence, then a constructive trust is impressed upon such property, profits, or proceeds in his hands, in favor of the original beneficiary.^a The following are some of the most important applications of this doctrine: When a trustee, administrator, agent, attorney, or other fiduciary person, without the knowledge or consent of his beneficiary, purchases the trust property at a public or private sale: or when, by taking advantage of the trust and confidence reposed, and of the superiority conferred upon him by the

§ 1.5.1, (d) The text is quoted with approval in Red Bud Realty Co. v. South, 96 Ark. 281, 131 S. W. 340; Farmers & Traders' Bk. v. Fidelity, etc., Co. of Md., 108 Ky. 384, 56 S. W. 671; Success Realty Co. v Trowbridge, 50 Okl. 402, 150 Pac. 898; Harmon v. Harmon, (S. C.) 71 S. E. 815; Bank of Williston v. Alderman, 106 S. C. 386, 91 S. E. 296; Schneider v. Sellers, (Tex.) 84 S. W. 417; Thum v. Wolstenholme, 21 Utah, 446, 61 Pac. 537; and cited in American Soda Fountain Co. v. HII--151 Futrall, (Ark.) 84 S. W. 505 (property subject to a chattel mortgage exchanged for other property; mortgagee entitled to a lien on the property received in exchange); Williams v. Young, 78 N. J. Eq. 293, 81 Atl. 1118; Lewis v. Blount, (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 7; Miller v. Himebaugh, (Tex. Civ. App.) 153 S. W. 338.

§1052, (a) The text is quoted in Home Investment Co. v. Strange, (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 510. relation, he unconscientiously acquires title to the trust property by purchase or gift directly from the beneficiary; or when he uses the trust property for his own benefit, or in his own business, and by means of such use obtains additional gains and profits,—in these and all similar cases equity impresses a constructive trust upon the property purchased or obtained, and upon the profits and acquisitions so made, for the benefit of the party beneficially entitled.¹ ^c This form of constructive trusts embraces many

§ 1052, ¹ The dealings between persons in fiduciary relations have been fully examined in the previous section concerning "constructive fraud." The cases there eited are also authorities for and illustrations of the text, since the trust above mentioned arises from the wrongful dealings with trust property there described: See cases eited *ante*, under §§ 957, 963; **b**

§ 1052, (b) And post, §§ 1075-1078.

§ 1052, (c) The text is cited in Williford v. Williford, 102 Ark. 65, 143 S. W. 132; Lewis v. Blount, (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 7; Irons v. United States Life Ins. Co., 128 Ky. 640, 129 Am. St. Rep. 318, 108 S. W. 904. See, also, Bay State Gas Co. v. Rogers, 147 Fed. 557 (trustee making secret profits); Stewart v. Westlake, 148 Fed. 349, 78 C. C. A. 341 (agent of owner of mining claim allowed it to lapse, then relocated it for himself); Pepper v. Addicks, 153 Fed. 383 (controlling stockholder making profits); Cascaden v. Dunbar, 157 Fed. 62, 84 C. C. A. 566; Smith v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 162 Fed. 15, 88 C. C. A 669; Powell v. Powell, 80 Ala. 11; Wren v. Followell, . 52 Ark. 76, 12 S. W. 155; Beckwith v. Sheldon, 154 Cal. 393, 97 Pac. 867; Holmes v. Holmes, 106 Ga. 858, 33 S. E. 216; Weaver v. Fisher, 110 Ill. 146; Davis v. Hamlin, 108 Ill. 39, 48 Am. Rep. 541; Allen v. Jackson, 122 Ill. 567, 13 N. E. 840; Val-

lette v. Tedens, 122 Ill. 607, 3 Am. St. Rep. 502, 14 N. E. 52; Byington v. Moore, 62 Iowa, 470, 17 N. W. 644; Rose v. Hayden, 35 Kan. 106, 57 Am. Rep. 145, 10 Pac. 554; Bryan v. McNaughton, 38 Kan. 98, 16 Pac. 57; Tarbox v. Tarbox, 111 Me. 374, 89 Atl. 194; Lansburgh v. Donaldson, 108 Md. 689, 71 Atl. 88 (tenant, whose duty it was to keep down taxes, bought at tax sale); Rolikatis v. Lovett, 213 Mass. 545, 100 N. E. 748; Solis v. Williams, 205 Mass. 350, 91 N. E. 148 (life tenant buying at tax sale); Carrier v. Heather, 62 Mich. 441, 29 N. W. 38; McCall, v. McCall, 159 Mich. 144, 123 N. W. 550 (purchase by life tenant at judicial sale); Lewis v. Wright, 148 Mich. 290, 111 N. W. 751 (same); Arnold v. Smith, 121 Minn. 116, 140 N. W. 748 (administrator acquiring trust property); Peak v. Peak, 228 Mo. 536, 137 Am. St. Rep. 638, and note, 128 S. W. 981 (purchase by life tenant at judicial sale); O'Neill v. Otero, 15 N. M. 707, 113 Pac. 614 (tenant who fails to do assessment work and then acquires mining prop-

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particular instances, and the principle is extended to all abuses of confidence, whereby the one in whom the confidence is reposed obtains an advantage.

Fox v. Mackreth, 2 Brown Ch. 400; 2 Cox, 320; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 188, 212, 237; Morret v. Paske, 2 Atk. 52, 54; Powell v. Glover, 3 P. Wms. 252, note; Docker v Somes, 2 Mylne & K. 655; Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 4 Mylne & C. 41; Great Luxembourg Ry. Co. v. Magnay, 25 Beav. 586; Kimber v. Barber, L. R. 8 Ch. 56; Pooley v. Quilter, 2 De Gex & J. 427; 4 Drew. 184; Fosbrooke v. Balguy, 1 Mylne & K. 226; Willett v. Blanford, 1 Hare, 253; Townend v. Townend, 1 Giff. 201; Fawcett v. Whitehouse, 1 Russ. & M. 132, 149; Bulkley v. Wilford, 2 Clark-& F. 102, 177; Ernest v. Croysdill, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 175; Rolfe v. Gregory, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 576; Heath v. Crealock, L. R. 18 Eq. 215; Barnes v. Addy, L. R. 9 Ch. 244; Ex parte Cooke, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 123; Nant-y-Glo etc. Co. v. Grave, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 738; In re Hallett's Estate, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696; Webster v. King, 33 Cal. 348; Scott v. Umbarger, 41 Cal. 410; Guerrero v Ballerino, 48 Cal. 118; Tracy v. Colby, 55 Cal. 67; Tracy v. Craig, 55 Cal. 91; Davis v. Rock Creek etc. Co., 55 Cal. 359, 36 Am. Rep. 40; Swinburne v Swinburne, 28 N. Y. 568; Bennett v. Austin, 81 N. Y. 308; Hastings v. Drew, 76 N. Y. 9; Holden v. New York and Erie Bank, 72 N Y. 286; Smith v. Frost, 70 N. Y. 65; Hubbell v. Medbury, 53 N. Y. 98, Gardner v Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327, 78 Am. Dec. 192; Manning v. Hayden, 5 Saw. 360; Broyles v. Nowlin, 59 Tenn. 191; Pindall v Trevor, 30 Ark. 249; Cookson v Richardson, 69 Ill. 137; Reickhoff v. Brecht, 51 Iowa, 633; 2 N. W. 522; Treadwell v. McKeon, 7 Baxt. 201; Newton v. Taylor, 32 Ohio St. 399; Barrett v. Bamber, 81 Pa. St. 247; Jones v Dexter, 130 Mass. 380, 39 Am. Rep. 459; Rea v. Copelin, 47 Mo. 76: Whitwell v. Warner, 20 Vt. 425; Giddings v. Eastman, 5 Paige, 561; Brown v. Lynch, 1 Paige, 147, Blauvelt v. Ackerman, 20 N. J. Eq. 141; Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo. 444, 100 Am. Dec. 304.

erty); Nuckols v. Stanger, (Tex. Civ. App.) 153 S. W. 931; Matney v. Yates, (Va.) 93 S. E. 694; Ackerson v. Elliott, 97 Wash. 31, 165 Pac. 899; Ravenswood S. & G. Ry Co. v. Woodyard, 46 W. Va. 558, 33 S. E. 285 (president of corporation wrongfully took salary); Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1147, 61 S. E. 410 (agent whose duty it was to pay taxes, redeeming from tax sale); Boon v. Root, 137 Wis. 451, 119 N. W. 121 (life tenant acquiring tax title); and see cases cited at end of note, § 1056.

Tenant in Common Purchases Adverse or Outstanding Title.—It is the usual view that the relation of tenant in common or joint tenant is fiduciary, within the principle of this paragraph of the text, and that he therefore holds the title so purchased as constructive trustee for the common benefit, if the others elect within a reasonable time to § 1053. 8. Trusts Ex Maleficio.—In general, whenever the legal title to property, real or personal, has been obtained through actual fraud, misrepresentations, concealments, or through undue influence, duress, taking advantage of one's weakness or necessities, or through any other similar means or under any other similar circumstances which render it unconscientious for the holder of the legal title to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest, equity impresses a constructive trust on the property thus acquired in favor of the one who is truly and equitably entitled to the same, although he may never perhaps have had any legal estate therein;^a and a court of equity has jurisdiction to reach

contribute their share of the purchase money See, as illustrations, Beaman v Beaman, 90 Miss. 762, 44 South. 987 (wife of co-tenant purchases at foreclosure sale under a mortgage given by a former owner), Caldwell v. Caldwell, 173 Ala. 216, 55 South. 515; Randolph v. Vails, 180 Ala. 82, 60 South. 159; Harrison v. Cole, 50 Colo. 470, 116 Pac. 1123, Scanlon v. Parish, 85 Conn. 379, 82 Atl. 969 (purchase of mortgage); Wilson v. Linder, 21 Idaho, 576, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 148, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 242, and note, 123 Pac. 487 (others forfeit their rights by delay, purchase at tax sale); Peabody v. Burri, 255 Ill. 592, 99 N E. 690 (tax sale); Spurlock v Spurlock, 161 Ky 248, 170 S. W. 605; Coburn v Page, 105 Mc. 458, 134 Am. St. Rep. 575, 74 Atl. 1026; Hill v Coburn, 105 Me. 437, 75 Atl. 67; Darcey v. Bayne, 105 Md. 365, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 863, 66 Atl. 434 (bill to enforce the trust must tender share of expense); Hoyt v. Lightbody, 98 Minn. 189, 116 Am. St. Rep. 358, 8 Ann. Cas. 984, and note, 108 N. W. 843; Lytle v. Devlin. 34 Nev. 179, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 852, 117 Pac. 15 (acquiring homestead right from government); Roll v. Everett, 73 N. J. Eq. 697, 17 Ann. Cas. 1196, 71 Atl. 263 (tax title); Arthur v. Coyne, 32 Okl. 527, 122 Pac. 688 (acquiring lot under town. site act); Niday v. Cochran, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 292, 93 S. W. 1027; Mc-Cready v. Frederickson, 41 Utah, 388, 126 Pac. 316; Stone v. Marshall, 52 Wash. 375, 100 Pac. 858 (tax sale); Flat Top Grocery Co. v. Bailey, 62 W. Va. 84, 57 S. E. 302. Contra, Jackson v Baird, 148 N. C. 29, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 591, and note, 61 S. E. 632; McLawhorn v. Harris, 156 N. C. 107, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 831, and note, 72 S. E. 211; Starkweather v. Jenner, 216 U. S. 524, 17 Ann. Cas. 1167, 54 L. Ed. 602, 30 Sup. Ct. 382 (purchase at public sale an exception to rule).

§ 1053, (a) Quoted in Butler v. Watrous, 185 Ala. 130, 64 South. 346; McDonald v. Tyner, 84 Ark. 189, 105 S. W. 74; Bragg v. Hartney, 92 Ark. 55, 121 S. W. 1059; Ussery v. Ussery, 113 Ark. 36, 166 S. W. 946; Robertson v. Board of Com'rs of Rawlins Co., 84 Kan. 52, 113 Pac. 413; Becker v. Neurath, 149 Ky. 421, 149 S. W. 857; Morris v. Vyse, 154 Mich. 253, 129 Am. St. the property either in the hands of the original wrongdoer, or in the hands of any subsequent holder, until a purchaser of it in good faith and without notice acquires a higher right, and takes the property relieved from the trust.^b The forms and varieties of these trusts, which are termed *ex maleficio* or *ex delicto*, are practically without limit. The principle is applied wherever it is necessary for the obtaining of complete justice, although the law may also give the remedy of damages against the wrong-doer.¹ c

§ 1053, ¹ See ante, cases cited under §§ 946-951, which furnish many examples of these trusts; Dyer v. Dyer, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 314, 350-364, note of Am. ed.; conveyances obtained from persons of weak mind, by undue influence, etc.: Addison v. Dawson, 2 Vern. 678; Ex parte Roberts, 3 Atk. 308, 310 (lunacy); Att'y-Gen. v. Sothon, 2 Vern. 497;

Rep. 472, 117 N. W. 639, 641; Rollins v. Mitchell, 52 Minn. 41, 38 Am. St. Rep. 519, 53 N. W. 1020; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Summers, 143 N. C. 102, 55 S. E. 522; Ewing v. Ewing, 33 Okl. 414, 126 Pac. 811; Kroll v. Coach, (Or.) 78 Pac. 397; Schneider v. Sellers, (Tex.) 84 S. W. 417; Home Inv. Co. v. Strange, (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 510; Virginia Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Lambert, 107 Va. 368, 122 Am. St. Rep. 860, 13 Ann. Cas. 277, 58 S. E. 561; Bluett v. Wilce, 43 Wash. 492, 86 Pac. 853; Arnold v. Hall, 72 Wash. 50, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 349, 129 Pac. 914.

§ 1053, (b) Quoted by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Moore v. Crawford, 130 U. S. 122, 128, 32 L. Ed. 878, 9 Sup. Ct. 447; quoted, also, in Butler v. Watrous, 185 Ala. 130, 64 South. 346; McDonald v. Tyner, 84 Ark. 189, 105 S. W. 74; Bragg v. Hartney, 92 Ark. 55, 121 S. W. 1059; Ussery v. Ussery, 113 Ark. 36, 166 S. W. 946; Becker v. Neurath, 149 Ky. 421, 149 S. W. 857; Morris v. Vyse, 154 Mich. 253,

129 Am. St. Rep. 472, 117 N. W. 639; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Summers, 143 N. C. 102, 55 S. E. 522; Ewing v. Ewing, 33 Okl. 414, 126 Pac. 811; Home Inv. Co. v. Strange, (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 510; Bluett v. Wilce, 43 Wash. 492, 86 Pac. 853; Arnold v. Hall, 72 Wash. 50, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 349, 129 Pac. 914. For other decisions, quoting the text, see Parrish v. Parrish, 33 Or. 486, 54 Pac. 352; Savage v. Johnston, 125 Ala. 673, 28 South. 547; Kent v. Dean, 128 Ala. 600, 30 South. 543; Michigan Trust Co. v. Probasco, 29 Ind. App. 109, 63 N. E. 255; Schneider v. Sellers, (Tex.) 84 S. W. 417; see, also, Barnes v. Thuet, 116 Iowa, 359, 39 N. W. 1085.

§ 1053, (c) The text is quoted in. Kroll v. Coach, (Or.) 78 Pac. 397; McDonald v. Tyner, 84 Ark. 189, 105 S. W. 74; Bragg v. Hartney, 92 Ark. 55, 121 S. W. 1059; Ussery v. Ussery, 113 Ark. 36, 166 S. W. 946; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Cahn, 102 Md. 530, 62 Atl. 819; Morris v. Vyse, 154 Mich. 253, 129 Am. St. Rep. 472, 117 N. W. 639; Massey v. Alston, 173 While these instances are so many and various, there are certain special forms of frequent occurrence and great importance which require particular mention.

Gould v. Okeden, 4 Brown, Parl. C. 198; Price v. Berrington, 7 Hare, 394; 3 Macn. & G. 486; Harvey v. Mount, 8 Beav. 439; deeds or wills fraudulently destroyed, in order to deprive the owner of his title: Tucker v. Phipps, 3 Atk. 359, 360; Downes v. Jennings, 32 Beav. 290; Bailey v. Stiles, 2 N. J. Eq. 220; see ante, § 919; owners conveying away their property, through mistake or ignorance of their rights: Bingham v. Bingham, 1 Ves. Sr. 126; Naylor v. Winch, 1 Sim. & St. 555, 564; Hollinshead v. Simms, 51 Cal. 158; Mercier v. Hemme, 50 Cal. 606; Dewey v. Moyer, 72 N. Y. 70, 76; Hammond v. Pennock, 61 N. Y. 145; Fulton v. Whitney, 6 Hun, 16; Baier v. Berberich, 6 Mo. App. 537 (a combination to prevent bidding at a public sale of land renders the purchaser a trustee); Beach v. Dyer, 93 Ill. 295 (no trust against the grantee in a fraudulent conveyance of land, unless he was a party to the fraud); Huxley v. Rice, 40 Mich. 73 (trust from actual fraud); Troll v. Carter, 15 W. Va. 567; Phelps v. Jackson, 31 Ark. 272; Hendrix v. Nunn, 46 Tex. 141; Veile v. Blodgett, 49 Vt. 270; Newell v. Newell, 14 Kan. 202; Jenkins v. Doolittle, 69 Ill. 415; Greenwood's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 181 (extent of such trustee's liability); Barnes v. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 7 (ditto).

N. C. 215, 91 S. E. 964; Ewing v. Ewing, 33 Okl. 414, 126 Pac. 811; cited in American Soda Fountain Co. v. Futrall, (Ark.) 84 S. W. 505 (the trust enforced in equity though there may be an action at law for damages). Cited, also, in Brissell v. Knapp, 155 Fed. 809; Cook v. Flagg, 233 Fed. 426, 147 C C. A. 362; Sanguinetti v. Rossen, 12 Cal. App. 623, 107 Pac. 560; Lauricella v. Lauricella, 161 Cal. 61, 118 Pac. 430; Robertson v. Board of Com'rs, 84 Kan. 52, 113 Pac. 413; Wellner v. Eckstein, 105 Minn. 444, 117 N. W. 830; Phillips v. Jackson, 240 Mo. 310, 144 S. W. 112; O'Day v. Annex Realty Co., (Mo.) 191 S. W. 41; Ashby v. Yetter, 79 N. J. Eq. 196, 81 Atl. 730; Preston v. Moore, 133 Tenn. 247, 180 S. W. 320; Jones v. Lynch, (Tex. Civ. App.) 137 S. W. 395; Miller v. Himebaugh, (Tex. Civ. App.) 153 S. W. 338; Borchert v. Borchert, 132 Wis. 593, 113 N. W. 35. See, also, to the same effect, Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 176 Ala. 282, 58 South. 199 (person assuming without authority to act as guardian of lunatic); Green v. Clyde, 80 Ark. 391, 97 S. W. 437 (land patent issued by mistake is fraud to person not entitled to it); Ussery v. Ussery, 113 Ark. 36, 166 S. W. 946 (not such a trust where title was put in son-in-law for benefit of his wife and children and he abandoned wife); De Leonis v. Hammel, 1 Cal. App. 390, 82 Pac. 349; Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 87 Am. St. Rep. 98, 67 Pac. 282; Wingerter v. Wingerter, 71 Cal. 105, 11 Pac. 853; O'Dell v. Moss, 137 Cal. 542, 70 Pac. 547; Jones v. Jones, 140 Cal. 587, 74 Pac. 143; Whitcomb v. Carpenter, 134 Iowa, 227, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 928, 111 N. W. 825; Newis v. Topfer, 121 Iowa, 433, 96 N. W. 905; Kahm. v. Klaus, 64 Kan. 24,

8 1054. (1) A Devise or Bequest Procured by Fraud.— Whenever a person procures a devise or bequest to be made directly to himself,—and thereby preventing perhaps an intended testamentary gift to another,--through false and fraudulent representations, assurances, or promises that he will carry out the original and true purpose of the testator, and will apply the devise or bequest to the benefit of the third person who is the real object, and who would otherwise have been the actual recipient of the testator's bounty. and after the testator's death he refuses to comply with his former assurances or promises, but claims to hold the property in his own right and for his own exclusive benefit,in such case equity will enforce the obligation by impressing a trust upon the property in favor of the one who has been defrauded of the testator's intended gift, and by treating the actual devisee or legatee as a trustee holding the mere legal title, and by compelling him to carry the trust

67 Pac. 542; Cowin v. Hurst, 124 Mich. 545, 83 Am. St. Rep. 344, 83 N. W. 274; Hack v. Norris, 46 Mich. 587, 10 N. W. 104 (vendees of non compos mentis); Culbertson v. Young, 50 Mich. 190, 15 N. W. 77; Nester v. Gross, 66 Minn. 371, 69 N. W. 39; Owen v. Monroe County Alliance, 77 Miss. 500, 27 South. 383; Moore v. Crump, 84 Miss. 612, 37 South. 109; Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co. v. Randolph, 151 Mo. App. 385, 132 S. W. 255 (pledgee who sells collateral on default is not such a trustee); Davis v. Cummins, (Mo.) 195 S. W. 752 (bigamist a trustee of property of woman he pretended to marry, for her heirs); Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Malone, 89 Neb. 260, 131 N. W. 200 (police such trustees of stolen property for owners); Logan v. Aabel, 90 Neb. 754, 134 N. W. 523; Coggswell v. Griffith, 23 Neb. 334, 36 N. W. 538; Piper v. Hoard, 107 N. Y. 73, 1 Am. St. Rep. 789, 13 N. E. 626; Clough v. Dawson, 69 Or. 52, 133 Pac. 345, 138 Pac. 233 (receiving and retaining property through fraud of agent); Walker v. Walker, 199 Pa. St. 435, 49 Atl. 133; Christy v. Sill, 95 Pa. St. 380; Bailey's Appeal, 96 Pa. St. 253; Woodfin v. Marks, 104 Tenn. 512, 58 S. W. 227; Bridgens v. West, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 277, 80 S. W. 417; Chantler v. Hubbell, 34 Wash. 211, 75 Pac. 802; Borchert v. Borchert, 132 Wis. 593, 113 N. W. 35; Lockhart v. Leeds, 195 U. S. 427, 49 L. Ed. 263, 25 Sup. Ct. 76 (relocators of mine obtained title through fraudulent conspiracy with complainant's partner, whereby latter was to fail in his duty to perfect the original location; complainant, in ignorance of this conspiracy, failed to perfect the location within the statutory time); Jones v. Van Doren, 130 U. S. 684, 32 L. Ed. 1077, 9 Sup. Ct. 685; Missouri Broom Mfg. Co. v. Guymon, 115 Fed. 112, 53 C. C. A. 16.

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into effect through a conveyance to the one who is beneficially interested.^a It is not necessary that the representations, assurances, or promises of the actual devisee or legatee should be in writing; they may be entirely verbal. There are a few cases which seem to hold that a trust will arise under these circumstances from a *mere verbal promise* of the devisee or legatee to hold the property for the benefit of another person. This position, however, is clearly opposed to settled principle. The only ground upon which such a trust can be rested, and is rested by the overwhelming weight of authority, is actual intentional fraud.¹ b

§ 1054, ¹ McCormick v. Grogan, L. R. 4 H. L. 82, 97, per Lord Westbury (see *ante*, vol. 1, § 431); Podmore v. Gunning, 7 Sim. 644; 5 Sim. 485. In this case the vice-chancellor said, as the ground of his decision: "I have always understood that the court would interfere to prevent the obtaining of an estate by fraud, notwithstanding the statute of frauds." See, also, Sellack v. Harris, 5 Vin. Abr. 521; Chamberlaine v. Chamberlaine, Freem. Ch. 52; Devenish v. Baines, Prec. Ch. 3; Thynn v. Thynn, 1 Vern. 296; Oldham v. Litchfield, 2 Vern. 506; Drakeford v. Wilks, 3 Atk. 539; Walker v. Walker, 2 Atk. 98; Reech v. Kennigate, Amb. 67; 1 Ves. Sr. 123; Muckleston v. Brown, 6 Ves. 52; Stickland v. Aldridge, 9 Ves. 516; Chamberlain v. Agar, 2 Ves. & B. 259; Seagrave v. Kirwan, 1 Beat. 157; Dixon v. Olmius, 1 Cox, 414; Bulkley v. Wilford, 8 Bligh, N. S., 111; Chester v. Urwick, 23 Beav. 407; Middleton v. Middleton, 1 Jacob & W. 94, 96; Church v. Ruland, 64 Pa. St. 432; Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts. 163,

§ 1054, (a) The text is quoted in Stahl v. Stahl, 220 Ill. 188, 77 N. E. 67; Suman v. Harvey, 114 Md. 241, 79 Atl. 197 (no trust where testator merely misunderstood the effect of the will, supposing that it provided for plaintiff).

§ 1054, (b) The text is quoted in Winder v. Scholey, 83 Ohio St. 204, 21 Ann. Cas. 1379, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 995, 93 N. E. 1098 (an instructive case); Smith v. Smith, 153 Ala. 504, 45 South. 168. The text is eited in Lauricella v. Lauricella, 161 Cal. 61, 118 Pac. 430; People v. Schaefer, 266 Ill. 334, 107 N. E. 617; Tyler v. Stitt, 132 Wis. 656, 122 Am. St. Rep. 1012, 12 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 1087, 112 N. W. 1091 (right is based on fraud; defendant is heir, preventing devise). See, also, General Convention of the New Church in United States v. Smith, 52 Ind. App. 136, 100 N. E. 384 (only in case of actual or constructive fraud); Mc-Dowell v. McDowell, 141 Iowa, 286, 133 Am. St. Rep. 170, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 176, and note, 119 N. W. 702; Gemmel v. Fletcher, 76 Kan. 577, 92 Pac. 713, 93 Pac. 339: Chapman's Ex'r v. Chapman, 152 Ky. 344, 153 S. W. 434; Gilpatrick v. Glidden. 81 Me. 137, 10 Am. St. Rep. 245, 2 L. R. A. 662, 16 Atl. 464; Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 68 Miss. 92, 24 Am. St. Rep. 256, 11 L. R. A. 316,

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§ 1055. (2) Purchase upon a Fraudulent Verbal Promise.—A second well-settled and even common form of trusts *ex maleficio* occurs whenever a person acquires the legal title to land or other property by means of an intentionally false and fraudulent verbal promise to hold the same for a certain specified purpose,—as, for example, a promise to

213, 26 Am. Dec. 52; Dowd v. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197; Williams v. Vreeland, 29 N. J. Eq. 417. In this last case the point was directly decided that a trust arises from such a verhal promise made to the testator. The chancellor said (p. 419): "It is fraud for V. to have induced the testator to make a hequest to him, including money intended by the former for the complainants, at his suggestion and on his promise to pay them that money, after the testator's decease, out of the legacy to him, and then after receiving the entire legacy, to refuse to pay them the money which he had so promised to pay." But, *per contra*, in Bedilian v. Seaton, 3 Wall, Jr. 279, Fed. Cas. No. 1218, it seems to he held not only that no trust will arise from a mere verhal promise to the testator, however solemn, but none will arise from a fraudulent promise,—only a contract which equity will enforce. See, also, *ante*, cases cited under § 919; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 350.

8 South. 315; Williams v. Vreeland, 32 N. J. Eq. 734, and cases cited in the reporter's note; Williams v. Fitch, 18 N. Y. 546; Socher's Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 609; In re Washington's Estate, 220 Pa. 204, 69 Atl. 747; Shields v. McAuley, 37 Fed. 302. The majority of the recent decisions do not insist on an actual fraudulent intention on the part of the legatee or devisee as necessary to the creation of a trust of this nature: Winder v. Scholey, 83 Ohio St. 204, 21 Ann. Cas. 1379, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 995, 93 N. E. 1098, quoting this note. In the important case of O'Hara v. Dudley, 95 N. Y. 403, 47 Am. Rep. 53, the trial court found as a fact that the legatees had made no express promise to obtain the bequest, and had practiced no fraud; the court say (p. 412): "This finding is assailed, but unsuccessfully so far as it frees the legatees from a charge of actual fraud. In that respect we agree that there was no evil or selfish intention on their part"; and further, "Where, in such case, the legatee, even by silent acquiescence, encourages the testatrix to make a bequest to him to be by him applied for the benefit of others, it has all the force and effect of an express promise"; citing Wallgrave v. Tebbs, 2 Kay & J. 321; Schultz's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 405; and see In re Washington's Estate, 220 Pa. 204, 69 Atl. 747 (promise may be implied from silence). In Sprinkle v. Hayworth, 26 Gratt. 384, Staples, J., dissented from the majority holding, and correctly stated: "If, for example (in the familiar instance), the testator communicates his intention to the devisee of charging a legacy on his estate, and the devisee should tell him it is unnecessary, and he will

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convey the land to a designated individual, or to reconvey it to the grantor, and the like,—and having thus fraudulently obtained the title, he retains, uses, and claims the property as absolutely his own, so that the whole transaction by means of which the ownership is obtained is in fact a scheme of actual deceit. Equity regards such a person

pay it, the legacy being thus prevented, the devisee will be required to make it good. In such case it does not matter whether the devisee made the representation fraudulently or not. The fraud is in the refusal to pay the legacy; not in the promise, but in the breach." The whole subject underwent an exhaustive discussion in In re Fleetwood, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 594, and it was held that no actual or personal fraud on the part of the legatee was necessary to give the court jurisdiction to enforce the trust. The case of In re Stead, [1900] 1 Ch. 237, is a valuable one discussing the case when the devise is to tenants in common, or to joint tenants; and see Powell v. Yearance, 73 N. J. Eq. 117, 67 Atl. 892. In Moore v. Ransdel, 156 lnd. 658, 59 N. E. 936, 60 N. E. 1068, the court said: "An actual fraudulent intention on the part of the heir or devisee is not necessary to the creation of a trust of this nature." See, also, Curdy v. Berton, 79 Cal. 420, 12 Am. St. Rep. 157, 5 L. R. A. 189, 21 Pac. 858; Re Evert's Estate, 163 Cal. 449, 125 Pac. 1058; Rice-Stix Dry Goods Co. v. Albrecht, 273 Ill. 447, 113 N. E. 66; Benbrook v. Yancy, 96 Miss. 536, 51 South. 461; Smullin v. Wharton, 73 Neb. 667, 103 N. W. 288, 106 N. W. 577, 112 N. W. 622, 113 N. W. 267; Pollard v. McKenney, 69 Neb. 742, 96 N. W. 679, 101 N. W. 9; Crinkley v. Rogers, 100 Neb. 647, 160 N. W. 974; Powell v. Yearance, 73 N. J. Eq. 117, 67 Atl. 892; In re Keleman, 126 N. Y. 73, 26 N. E. 968; Trustees of Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N. Y. 282, 37 L. R. A. 305, 45 N. E. 876; Hollis v. Hollis, (Pa.) 98 Atl. 789; Tennant v. Tennant, 43 W. Va. 547, 27 S. E. 334; In re Maddock (Llewelyn v. Washington), [1902] 2 Ch. 220; In re Hetley (Hetley v. Hetley), [1902] 2 Ch. 866; In re Pitt Rivers (Scott v. Pitt Rivers), [1902] 1 Ch. 403.

The object of the trust must, however, be communicated to the legatee or devisee in the testator's lifetime; otherwise there cannot be that acquiescence or implied promise on the part of the former which is necessary to raise the trust; if there was no promise, express or implied, no trust can arise: See In re Boyes, L. R. 26 Ch. Div. 531; O'Donnell v. Murphy, 17 Cal. App. 625, 120 Pac. 1076; Mead v. Robertson, 131 Mo. App. 185, 110 S. W. 1095; In re Stirk's Estate, 232 Pa. 98, 81 Atl. 187. In Oliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221, the distinction was made that where the will shows on its face that the devise or bequest is in trust, but the purposes of the trust are not stated, then the equitable estate results to the beirs at law or next of kin of the testator, and cannot be divested by anything short of a testamentary disposition. This distinction seems to be entirely unsupported by authority; indeed, in many of the cases cited in this note the devise or bequest was expressed to be in trust, and not absolute: See Cagney v. O'Brien, 83 Ill. 72; Podas holding the property charged with a constructive trust, and will compel him to fulfill the trust by conveying according to his engagement.^{1 a}

§ 1055, ¹ The trust in such cases arises wholly from the fraud; the statute of frauds requiring a written declaration of trust does not apply, since trusts *ex maleficio* are excepted from its operation: Hunt v. Roberts, 40 Me. 187; Hodges v. Howard, 5 R. I. 149; Fraser v. Child, 4 E. D. Smith, 153; Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts, 163, 214, 26 Am. Dec. 52; Cousins

more v. Gunning, 7 Sim. 644; In re Fleetwood, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 594; Riordan v. Banon, 10 Ir. Eq. 469; Curdy v. Berton, 79 Cal. 420, 12 Am. St. Rep. 157, 21 Pac. 858. In Carver v. Todd, 48 N. J. Eq. 102, 27 Am. St. Rep. 466, 21 Atl. 943, a trust arising out of an oral promise by a devisee was enforced against the creditors of the devisee.

Proof of such an oral trust must be very clear: Mead v. Robertson, 131 Mo. App. 185, 110 S. W. 1095; Heinisch v. Pennington, 73 N. J. Eq. 456, 68 Atl. 233; Aumack v. Jackson, 79 N. J. Eq. 599, 82 Atl. 896; Hollis v. Hollis, (Pa.) 98 Atl. 789. The action is to enforce a trust, not for specific performance, or reformation: Belknap v. Tillotson, 82 N. J. Eq. 271, 88 Atl. 841; Heinisch v. Pennington, 73 N. J. Eq. 456, 68 Atl. 233; Blick v. Cockins, 234 Pa. 261, 83 Atl. 196. If the trust is for a prohibited purpose (O'Donnell v. Murphy, 17 Cal. App. 625, 120 Pac. 1076), or if the purpose is unascertainable as to proportions (Aumack v. Jackson, 78 N. J. Eq. 189, 78 Atl. 749), the legatee will hold for the next of kin. The promise may be to make a will devising the land to the beneficiary; on the promisor's dying without making the devise, a constructive trust was impressed upon the estate in Chapman's Ex'r v. Chapman, 152 Ky. 344, 153 S. W. 434: Aumack v. Jackson, 78 N. J. Eq. 189, 78 Atl. 749; Belknap v. Tillotson, 82 N. J. Eq. 271, 88 Atl. 841.

Devise or inheritance Procured by Murder.-It is astonishing that the numerous cases holding that no exception can be made to the statutes of wills or of descent for the case where the testator or ancestor is murdered by his devisee, legatee or heir, have overlooked the plain analogy to the principle of the above paragraph. Unfortunately, the opinions in most of these cases show no evidence that this analogy was considered by the court, or even brought to the court's attention. That the principle should be applied in this class of cases, and the criminal held a constructive trustee of the fruits of his crime, seems too plain for argument: See Wellner v. Eckstein, 105 Minn. 444, 117 N. W. 830 (opinion of Elliott, J.); Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 123 Am. St. Rep. 510, 14 Ann. Cas. 92, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 244, 108 S. W. 641. For a typical case ignoring the equitable view, see McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 115 Am. St. Rep. 233, 7 Ann. Cas. 973, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 726, and note, 84 Pac. 112.

§ 1055, (a) The text is quoted in Grigsby v. Miller, 240 Fed. 188 (no trust); Smith v. Smith, 153 Ala. 504, 45 South. 168; McDonald v. Tyner, 84 Ark. 189, 105 S. W. 74; La Cotts v. La Cotts, 109 Ark. 335,

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§ 1056. (3) No Trust from a Mere Verbal Promise.— The foregoing cases should be carefully distinguished from those in which there is a *mere* verbal promise to purchase and convey land. In order that the doctrine of trusts ex

v. Wall, 3 Jones Eq. 43; Cameron v. Ward, 8 Ga. 245; Jones v. McDougal, 32 Miss. 179; Martin v. Martin, 16 B. Mon. 8; Arnold v. Cord, 16 Ind. 177; Laing v. McKee, 13 Mich. 124, 87 Am. Dec. 738; Nelson v. Worrall, 20 Iowa, 469; Coyle v. Davis, 20 Wis. 564; Hidden v. Jordan, 21 Cal. 92,

159 S. W. 1111; Larmon v. Knight, 140 Ill. 232, 33 Am. St. Rep. 229, 29 N. E. 1116; Gregory v. Bowlshy, 115 Iowa, 327, 88 N. W. 822; Clester v. Clester, 90 Kan. 638, L. R. A. 1915E, 648, 135 Pac. 996; Turner v. Turner, 34 Okl. 284, 125 Pac. 730 (and note 1); Parrish v. Parrish, 33 Or. 486, 54 Pac. 352; Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 Utah, 48, 95 Pac. 527; and cited in Mosely v. Mosely, 86 Ala. 289, 5 South. 732; Kent v. Dean, 128 Ala. 600, 30 South. 543; Butler v. Watrous, 185 Ala. 130, 64 South. 346; * Teal v. Pleasant Grove Local Union, (Ala.) 75 South. 335; Scrihner v. Meade, 10 Ariz. 143, 85 Pac. 477 (no trust); Veasey v. Veasey, 110 Ark. 389, 162 S. W. 45; Lauricella v. Lauricella, 161 Cal. 61, 118 Pac. 430; Sanguinetti v. Rossen, 12 Cal. App. 623, 107 Pac. 560; In re Fisk, 81 Conn. 433, 71 Atl. 559; Board of Education v. Day, 128 Ga. 156, 57 S. E. 359; Ryder v. Ryder, 244 Ill. 297, 91 N. E. 451; Terry v. Davenport, (Ind.) 112 N. E. 998; Carr v. Craig, 138 Iowa, 526, 116 N. W. 720; Phillips v. Jackson, 240 Mo. 310, 144 S. W. 112; O'Day v. Annex Realty Co., (Mo.) 191 S. W. 41; Johnston v. Reilly, 66 N. J. Eq. 451, 57 Atl. 1049; Peterson v. Hicks, 43 Wash. 412, 86 Pac. 634. The question as to what constitutes fraud, in such cases, is not perfectly clear. Some cases maintain that it must he fraud existing at the time the

deed is made to the one sought to be held as constructive trustee: Grove v. Kase, 195 Pa. St. 325, 45 Atl. 1054, is an example. Phillips, J., in Pope v. Dafray, 176 Ill. 478, 52 N. E. 58, quotes from Lantry v. Lantry, 51 Ill. 458, 2 Am. Rep. 310, as follows: "If A voluntarily conveys land to B, the latter having taken no measure to procure the conveyance, but accepting it and verhally promising to hold the property in trust for C, the case falls within the statute, and chancery will not enforce the parol promise. But if A was intending to convey the land directly to C, and B interposed and advised A not to convey directly to C, but to convey to him, promising, if A would do so, he, B, would hold the land in trust for C, chancery will lend its aid to enforce the trust, upon the ground that B obtained the title by fraud and imposition upon A. The distinction may seem nice, but it is well established. In the one case B has had no agency in procuring the conveyance to himself; in the other, he has had an active and fraudulent agency." The question that may well be asked, is, does it make any difference whether B intended at the time he obtained the conveyance, to violate the confidence reposed in him, or is it sufficient if he actively procures the conveyance and then, at some later time, concludes to vio*maleficio* with respect to land may be enforced under any circumstances, there must be something more than a mere verbal promise, however unequivocal, otherwise the statute of frauds would be virtually abrogated; there must be

99-102; Sandfoss v. Jones, 35 Cal. 481, 489; Coyote etc. Co. v. Ruhle, 8 Or. 284; Troll v. Carter, 15 W. Va. 567.^b

The doctrine is often used with great efficacy to prevent the triumph of fraud, and to protect persons under necessities, in cases where, at execution sale, or mortgage foreclosure, or other compulsory public sale, a party buys in the land under a prior fraudulent promise made to the owner that the purchaser will take the title, hold the property for the benefit of such owner, and will reconvey to him on being repaid the amount advanced for the purchase price; and having thus by a fraudulent contrivance cut off competition, and prevented the owner from making other arrangements to protect his property, and having obtained the property perhaps for much less than its real value, he refuses to abide by his verbal promise, and retains the land or other property as absolutely his own. Equity will relieve the defrauded owner by impressing on the property a trust *ex maleficio*, and by treating the purchaser as a trustee *in invitum*. This application of the doctrine was explained and the authorities were examined in Ryan v. Dox, 34 N. Y. 307, 90 Am. Dec. 696; and

late it ?. It seems that his conduct in either case would be equally inequitable; and the fraud, after he has actively procured the conveyance, would consist in his holding the property contrary to the terms of the agreement. See the statement in Goodwin v. McMinn, 193 Pa. St. 646, 74 Am. St. Rep. 703, 44 Atl. 1094; see, also, Seichrist's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 237, and Whitney v. Hay, 181 U. S. 77, 45 L. Ed. 758, 21 Sup. Ct. 537; O'Day v. Annex Realty Co., (Mo.) 191 S. W. 41. Such reasoning, however, is criticised in Williams v. Williams, 180 Ill. 361, 54 N. E. 229, and a quotation is taken from Perry v. McHenry, 13 Ill. 227, wherein the court was considering the breach of the contract alone, and had rightly concluded that such breach was not sufficient to establish the trust. The criticism seems to have been formed without a real

conception of the elements that constitute the inequitable conduct.

§ 1055, (b) It is said, in such cases, that the court will not allow the statute of frauds to be used as an instrument of fraud: In re Duke of Marlborough, [1894] 2 Ch. 133; Whitney v. Hay, 181 U. S. 77, 45 L. Ed. 758, 21 Sup. Ct. 537; Potts v. Fitch, 47 W. Va. 63, 34 S. E. 959; Halsell v. Wise Co. Coal Co., 19 Tex. Civ. App. 564, 47 S. W. 1017; Smith v. Balcom, 24 App. Div. 437, 48 N. Y. Supp. 487. See, also, Manning v. Pippen, 86 Ala. 357, 11 Am. St. Rep. 46, 5 South. 572 (conveyance obtained by fraudulent promise to make a will in grantor's favor); Remshard v. Renshaw, 102 Ark. 309, 143 S. W. 1092 (husband obtains wife's property by misrepresentations that he has no children); Nordholt v. Nordholt, 87 Cal. 552, 22 Am. St. Rep. 268, 26 Pac. an element of positive fraud accompanying the promise, and by means of which the acquisition of the legal title is wrongfully consummated. Equity does not pretend to

Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66 N. Y. 227.^c See, also, Dodd v. Wakeman, 26 N. J. Eq. 484; Walker v. Hill's Ex'rs, 22 N. J. Eq. 519; Merritt v. Brown, 21 N. J. Eq. 401, 404; Farnham v. Clements, 51 Me. 426; McCulloch v. Cowher, 5 Watts & S. 427, 430; Kisler v. Kisler, 2 Watts, 323, 27 Am. Dec. 308; Schmidt v. Gatewood, 2 Rich. Eq. 162; Green v. Ball, 4 Bush, 586; Moore v. Tisdale, 5 B. Mon. 352; Rose v. Bates, 12 Mo. 30; Wolford v. Herrington, 86 Pa. St. 39; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 350–364.

As to enforcing such a verbal promise free from fraud, where the statute of frauds is not pleaded as a defense, see Combs v. Little, 4 N. J. Eq. 310, 40 Am. Dec. 207; Marlatt v. Warwick, 18 N. J. Eq. 108; 19 N. J. Eq. 439; Merritt v. Brown, 21 N. J. Eq. 401, 404.

599; Brison v. Brison, 75 Cal. 525, 7 Am. St. Rep. 189, 17 Pac. 689; Dieckman v. Merkle, (Cal. App.) 130 Pac. 27 (refusal of one standing in confidential relation to make conveyance as theretofore agreed); Bradley Co. v. Bradley, 165 Cal. 237, 131 Pac. 750 (same); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 21 Cal. App. 620, 132 Pac. 612 (same); Cooney v. Glynn, 157 Cal. 583, 108 Pac. 506 (same); Crabtree v Potter, 150 Cal. 710, 89 Pac. 971 (no intention of performing promise); Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 7 Cal. App. 634, 95 Pac. 659 (conveyance obtained by false representations, with oral agreement to reconvey on demand); Fishbeck v. Gross, 112 Ill. 208; Henschel v. Mamero, 120 Ill. 660, 12 N. E. 203; Hill v. Simpson, 230 Ill. 170, 82 N. E. 588 (to son, on promise to convey to others); Ward v. Conklin, 232 Ill. 553, 83 N. E. 1058 (to son; promise to pay certain bequests); Crossman v. Keister, 223 Ill. 69, 114 Am. St. Rep. 305, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 698, and note, 79 N. E. 58; Catalani v. Catalani, 124 Ind. 54, 19 Am. St. Rep. 73, 24 N. E. 375; Carr v. Craig, 138 Iowa, 526, 116 N. W. 720 (on promise which was

not intended to be kept); Stout v. Stout, 165 Iowa, 552, L. R. A. 1915A. 711, 146 N. W. 474 (to wife on fraudulent promise to pay certain sums to her stepchildren); Becker v. Nenrath, 149 Ky. 421, 149 S. W. 857 (same, though no actual fraud shown); Dickson v. Stewart, 71 Neb. 424, 115 Am. St. Rep. 596, 98 N. W. 1085; Fox v. Fox, 77 Neb. 601, 110 N. W. 304 (to son on promise to pay to sister); Schneringer v. Schneringer, 81 Neb. 661, 116 N. W. 491 (to husband, on promise to hold for child after grantor's death); Ahrens v. Jones, 169 N. Y. 555, 88 Am. St. Rep. 620, 62 N. E. 666; Avery v. Stewart, 136 N. C. 426, 68 L. R. A. 776, 48 S. E. 775; Gates v. Kelly, 15 N. D. 639, 110 N. W. 770 (deed of outstanding interest on statement it was to clear up title of owner); Hanson v. Svarvereud, 18 N. D. 550, 120 N. W. 550 (to son on promise to hold for another on grantor's death); Blick v. Cockins, 234 Pa. 261, 83 Atl. 196 (to husband on his agreement to devise).

§ 1055, (c) Purchase at Judicial Sale on Fraudulent Promise to Reconvey to Owner.—The author's note is quoted in Davis v. Cummins, enforce verbal promises in the face of the statute; it endeavors to prevent and punish fraud, by taking from the wrong-doer the fruits of his deceit, and it accomplishes this object by its beneficial and far-reaching doctrine of constructive trusts.^{1 a}

§ 1056, ¹ Leman v. Whitley, 4 Russ. 423; Levy v. Brush, 45 N. Y. 589; Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66 N. Y. 227; Payne v. Patterson, 77 Pa. St. 134; Bennett v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 87 Pa. St. 382; Hon v. Hon, 70 Ind. 135; Gibson v. Decius, 82 Ill. 304; Farnham v. Clements, 51 Me. 426; Pattison

(Mo.) 195 S. W. 752; Turner v. Turner, 34 Okl. 284, 125 Pac. 730; Chadwick v Arnold, 34 Utab, 48, 95 Pac. 527; and cited in Phillips v. Jackson, 240 Mo. 310, 144 S. W. 112; O'Day v Annex Realty Co., (Mo.) 191 S. W. 41. See, also, Rochefoncauld v. Boustead, [1897] 1 Ch. 196; Strasner v. Carroll, 125 Ark. 34, 187 S. W 1057; Patrick v. Kirkland, 53 Fla. 768, 125 Am. St. Rep. 1096, 12 Ann. Cas. 540, 43 South. 969; Board of Education v Day, 128 Ga. 156, 57 S. E. 359; Dorsey v. Wolcott, 173 Ill. 539, 50 N. E. 1015; Michigan Trust Co. v. Probasco, 29 Ind. App. 109, 63 N. E. 255; Barnes v. Thuet, 116 Iowa, 359, 89 N. W. 1085; Carr v. Craig, 138 Iowa, 526, 116 N. W. 720; Fishback v. Green, 87 Ky. 107, 7 S. W 881; Griffin v. Schlenk, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 422, 102 S. W. 837 (joint owners); Howe v. Courtney, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 711, 107 S. W. 206; Brook's Ex'r v. Strange, 147 Ky. 503, 144 S. W. 747; Doom v. Brown, 171 Ky. 469, 188 S. W. 475; Hebron v Kelly, 75 Miss. 74, 21 South. 799; Merrett v. Poulter, 96 Mo. 237, 9 S. W. 586; Phillips v. Hardenburg, 181 Mo. 463, 80 S. W. 891, Smith v. Balcom, 24 App. Div. 437, 48 N. Y. Supp. 487; Allen v. Arkenburgh, 158 N. Y. 697, 53 N. E. 1122; Ahrens' v. Jones, 169 N. Y. 555, 88 Am. St. Rep. 620, 62 N. E. 666; Tankard v. Tankard, 84 N C. 286; McNair v. Pope, 100 N. C. 404, 6 S. E. 234; Urquhart v. Belloni, 57 Or. 314, 111 Pac. 692; Cowperthwaite v. First Nat. Bk., 102 Pa. St. 397; Kraft v. Smith, 117 Pa. St. 183, 11 Atl. 370; Salsbury v. Black, 119 Pa. St. 200-207, 4 Am. St. Rep. 631, 13 Atl. 67; Lamar v. Wright, 31 S. C. 60, 9 S. E. 736; Jarrot v. Kuker, 78 S. C. 510, 59 S. E. 533; Luscombe v. Grigsby, 11 S. D. 408, 78 N. W. 357; Thompson v. Thompson, (Tenn. Ch. App.) 54 S. W. 145; Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 Utah, 48, 95 Pac. 527; Harras v. Harras, 60 Wash. 258, 110 Pac. 1085 (instructive case; evidence must be clear); Davis v. Settle, 43 W. Va. 17, 26 S. E. 557; Boyd v. Hankinson, 92 Fed. 49, 34 C. C. A. 197. But see Bryan v. Douds, 213 Pa. 221, 110 Am. St. Rep. 544, 5 Ann. Cas. 171, 62 Atl. 828.

The situation described in the author's note is often treated as creating a parol mortgage of the owner's interest to secure the purchaser's advances. To the creation of such a mortgage, it is immaterial whether the conveyance moves directly from mortgagor to mortgagee, or by the roundabout course of a judicial sale. See *post*, § 1196, notes.

§ 1056, (a) This section is quoted in Scribner v. Meade, 10 Ariz. 143, 85 Pac. 477; Turner v. Turner, 34 Okl. 284, 125 Pac. 730; Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 Utah, 48, 95 Pac. 527; § 1057

§ 1057. (4) Trusts in Favor of Creditors.—In carrying out the general principle of trusts for the purpose of working ultimate justice, and reaching property where the legal

v. Horn, 1 Grant Cas. 301; Hogg v. Wilkins, 1 Grant Cas. 67; Barnet v. Dougherty, 32 Pa. St. 371; Campbell v. Campbell, 2 Jones Eq. 364; Chambliss v. Smith, 30 Ala. 366; Whiting v. Gould, 2 Wis. 552; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 355-364.

Cushing v. Heuston, 53 Wash. 379, 102 Pac. 29; and cited in Moseley v. Moseley, 86 Ala. 289, 5 South. 732; Veasey v. Veasey, 110 Ark. 389, 162 S. W. 45; Spradling v. Spradling, 101 Ark. 451, 142 S. W. 848; Sanguinetti v. Rossen, 12 Cal. App. 623, 107 Pac. 560; Ryder v. Ryder, 244 Ill. 297, 91 N. E. 451; Terry v. Davenport, (Ind.) 112 N. E. 998; Seymour v. Cushway, 100 Wis. 580, 69 Am. St. Rep. 957, 76 N. W. 769 (parol partnership to deal in real estate.) See, also, Mitchell v. Wright, 155 Ala. 458, 46 South. 473; Butts v. Cooper, 152 Ala. 375, 44 South. 616; Bland v. Talley, 50 Ark. 71, 76, 6 S. W. 234; La Cotts v. La Cotts, 109 Ark. 335, 159 S. W. 1111; Barr v. O'Donnell, 76 Cal. 469, 9 Am. St. Rep. 242, 18 Pac. 429; Feency v. Howard, 79 Cal. 525, 12 Am. St. Rep. 162, 4 L. R. A. 826, 21 Pac. 984; Bohm v. Bohm, 9 Colo. 100, 10 Pac. 790; Parramore v. Hampton, 55 Fla. 672, 45 South. 992; Lyons v. Bass, 108 Ga. 573, 34 S. E. 721; Davis v. Stambaugh, 163 Ill. 557, 45 N. E. 170; Westphal v. Heckman, (Ind.) 113 N. E. 299; McClain v. McClain, 57 Iowa, 167, 10 N. W. 333; Heddleston v. Storer, 128 Iowa, 525, 105 N. W. 56; Krebs v. Lauser, 133 Iowa, 241, 110 N. W. 443; Flanders v. Booge, 146 Iowa, 675, 125 N. W. 661; Goff v. Goff, 98 Kan. 201, 158 Pac. 26; Doom v. Brown, 171 Ky. 469, 188 S. W. 475; Nester v. Sullivan, 147 Mich. 493, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1106,

111 N. W. 85, 1033 (parol partnership to buy land. Title taken in name of one who paid for it); Rapley v. McKinney's Estate, 143 Mich. 508, 107 N. W. 101; Henderson v. Murray, 108 Minn. 76, 133 Am. St. Rep. 412, 121 N. W. 214; Ferguson v. Robinson, 258 Mo. 113, 167 S. W. 447; Slocum v. Wooley, 43 N. J. Eq. 451, 453, 11 Atl. 264; Down v. Down, 80 N. J. Eq. 68, 82 Atl. 322; Pattison v. Meyerhofer, 204 N. Y. 96, 97 N. E. 472; Salter v. Bird, 103 Pa. St. 436; Salsbury v. Black, 119 Pa. St. 200, 4 Am. St. Rep. 631, 13 Atl. 67; Dilts v. Stewart, (Pa. St.) 1 Atl. 587 (and note at end of case); Whiting v. Dyer, 21 R. I. 278, 43 Atl. 181; Watson v. Young, 30 S. C. 144, 8 S. E. 706; Thorp v. Gordon, (Tex. Civ. App.) 43 S. W. 323; Salisbury v. Clarke, 61 Vt. 453, 17 Atl. 135; Arnold v. Hall, 72 Wash. 50, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 349, 129 Pac. 914 (conveyance to mother); Henderson v. Henrie, 68 W'. Va. 562, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 318, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 628, 71 S. E. 172; Sipes v. Decker, 102 Wis. 588, 78 N. W. 769; Bardon v. Hartley, 112 Wis. 74, 87 N. W. 809; Stevens v. McChrystal, 150 Fed. 85, 80 C. C. A. 39. See, also, the following cases in which it was held there was no trust: Chesser v. Motes, 180 Ala. 563, 61 South. 267; Loomis v. Loomis, 148 Cal. 149, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 312, 82 Pac. 679 (conveyance of homestead to wife on promise to give to brother-in-law on her

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title has been parted with, and is beyond the scope of legal process, a constructive trust is said to arise in favor of judgment creditors with respect to the property of their

death, for property was her own on husband's death); Perreau v. Perreau, 12 Cal. App. 122, 106 Pac. 728 (oral promise after title passed); Vickers v. Vickers, 133 Ga. 383, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1043, 65 S. E. 885, (gift with expectation that donee would permit donor to share in benefit); Stubbings v. Stubbings, 248 Ill. 406, 94 N. E. 54 (conveyance by wife to husband for purpose of enabling him to conduct business for her); McHenry v. McHenry, 248 Ill. 506, 94 N. E. 84 (conveyance on oral promise to reconvey); Martin v. Martin, (Iowa) 94 N. W. 493; Day v. Amburgey, 147 Ky. 123, 143 S. W. 1033 (purchase by agent with his own money); Nagengast v. Alz, 93 Md. 522, 49 Atl. 333 (not from promise to sell when other can "raise money"); Emerson v. Galloupe, 158 Mass. 146, 32 N. E. 118; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 168 Mass. 488, 47 N. E. 431; Perkins v. Perkins, 181 Mass. 401, 63 N. E. 926; Kennerson v. Nash, 208 Mass. 393, 94 N. E. 475 (agreement by agent to purchase for principal, subsequent purchase by agent with own money); Dougan v. Bemis, 95 Minn. 220, 5 Ann. Cas. 253, 103 N. W. 882 (same); Wolfskill v. Wells, 154 Mo. App. 302, 134 S. W. 51 (absolute deed to son; oral agreement for trust); Norton v. Brink, 75 Neb. 566, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 945, 106 N. W. 668, 110 N. W. 669 (agreement to purchase land as partners, subsequent purchase by one with own money); De Vita v. Loprete, 75 N. J. Eq. 418, 72 Atl. 1007 (agent purchasing land with own money after oral promise to buy for `principal); McCloskey v. McCloskey,

205 Pa. 491, 55 Atl. 180; Lancaster Trust Co. v. Long, 220 Pa. 499, 69 Atl. 993 (purchaser at sheriff's sale); Bryan v. Douds, 213 Pa. 221, 110 Am. St. Rep. 544, 5 Ann. Cas. 171, 62 Atl. 828 (agreement to buy land on execution sale, resell and divide proceeds with execution debtor); Nichols v. Capen, 79 Wash. 120, 139 Pac. 868; Spaulding v. Collins, 51 Wash. 488, 99 Pac. 306 (pending foreclosure, conveyance to third person subject to mortgage, to protect debtor's wife); Croup v. De Moss, 78 Wash. 128, 138 Pac. 671.

Conveyance to Fiduciary on His Oral Promise .- If, however, the parties stood in a relation of confidence with each other, the fact that, at the time of the conveyance and promise to reconvey, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of the grantee is immaterial; a constructive trust arises: See Wood v. Rabe, 96 N. Y. 414, 48 Am. Rep. 640 (mother and son); Brison v. Brison, 75 Cal. 525, 7 Am. St. Rep. 189, 17 Pac. 689, 90 Cal. 323, 27 Pac. 186 (wife and husband); Alaniz v. Casenave, 91 Cal. 41, 27 Pac. 521; Broder v. Conklin, 77 Cal. 331, 19 Pac. 513 (attorney and client); Bartlett v. Bartlett, 15 Neb. 593, 19 N. W'. 691 (wife and husband); Butler v. Hyland, 89 Cal. 575, 26 Pac. 1108 (conveyance to de facto guardian); Gruhn v. Richardson, 128 Ill. 178, 21 N. E. 18; Haight v. Pearson, 11 Utah, 51, 39 Pac. 479; Bowler v. Curler, 21 Nev. 158, 37 Am. St. Rep. 501, 26 Pac. 226; Koefoed v. Thompson, (Neb.) 102 N. W. 268 (conveyance to cotenant); compare Barr v. O'Donnell, 76 Cal. 469, 9 Am. St. Rep. 242, 18

debtors, which has been transferred with the intent to defraud the creditors of their rights, or of which the legal title is vested in third persons with a like fraudulent intent,

Pac. 429 (relation between tenants in common not confidential). See, further, the following recent cases: Sanguinetti v. Rossen, 12 Cal. App. 623, 107 Pac. 560, citing numerous sections of the text (conveyance to attorney on oral promise to execute a writing reciting the terms of the trust on which he was to hold it): Cooney v. Glynn, 157 Cal. 583, 108 Pac. 506 (conveyance by mother to son, on promise to pay rents and profits to sister); Lauricella v. Lauricella, 161 Cal. 61, 118 Pac. 430 (hushand conveyed to wife on her promise to convey half to his parents upon his death); Dieckmann v. Merkle, 20 Cal. App. 655, 130 Pac. 27 (father to daughter, on her promise to divide with other children); Bradley Co. v. Bradley, 165 Cal. 237, 131 Pac. 750; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 21 Cal. App. 620, 132 Pac. 612 (the trust must be shown by clear proof); In re Fisk, 81 Conn. 433, 71 Atl. 559, 561; Stahl v. Stahl, 214 Ill. 131, 105 Am. St. Rep. 101, 2 Ann. Cas. 774, 68 L. R. A. 617, 73 N. E. 319; Hilt v. Simpson, 230 Ill. 170, 82 N. E. 588 (by father to son, on promise to convey to others on father's death); Ward v. Conklin, 232 Ill. 553, 83 N. E. 1058 (same), Lehrling v. Lehrling, 84 Kan. 766, 115 Pac. 556 (father to children); Becker v. Neurath, 149 Ky 421, 149 S. W. 857 (hushand to wife, on her oral promise to leave it to the children on her death); Huffine v. Lincoln, 53 Mont. 474, 160 Pac. 888 (same, wife to husband); Fox v. Fox, 77 Neb. 601, 110 N. W. 304 (father to son, he agreeing to pay his sister a certain sum); Schneringer v. Schneringer,

81 Neb. 661, 116 N. W. 491 (wife to husband, on his promise to devise to child); Cardiff v. Marquis, 17 N. D. 110, 114 N. W. 1088, citing this note (daughter to father); Hanson v. Svarverud, 18 N. D. 550, 120 N. W. 550 (parents to sons in oral trust for grantors during life and afterward to be divided equally among children); Blick v. Cockins, 234 Pa. 261, 83 Atl. 196 (wife to husband, on his agreement to devise to her brother and sister). Some jurisdictions, however, appear to take the view that the general rule of the text controls in these cases, notwithstanding the confidential relation of the parties: See Chesser v. Motes, 180 Ala. 563, 61 South, 267 (husband to wife); Spradling v. Spradling, 101 Ark. 451, 142 S. W. 848 (wife to husband); Jackson v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 675, 92 S. E. 65; Westphal v. Heckman, (Ind.) 113 N. E. 299; Heddleston v. Stoner, 128 Iowa, 525, 105 N. W. 56; Mullong v. Schneider, 155 Iowa, 12, 134 N. W. 957 (husband to wife); Down v. Down, 80 N. J. Eq. 68, 82 Atl. 322 (husband to wife); Nichols v. Capen, 79 Wash. 120, 139 Pac. 868 (heir to administrator). See, also, Vickers v. Vickers, 133 Ga. 383, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1043, 65 S. E. 885 (hushand to wife); Stubbings v. Stubbings, 248 Ill. 406, 94 N. E. 54 (conveyance by wife to husband for purpose of enabling him to manage her business for her is on an express trust, if any); Goff v. Goff, 98 Kan. 201, 158 Pac. 26 (relation of father and son not necessarily confidential); Nester • v. Sullivan, 147 Mich. 493, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1106, 111 N. W. 85, 1033, or which is of such a nature that it cannot be taken by execution upon judgments in legal actions.¹

§ 1058. Rights and Remedies of the Beneficiary.—The essential nature of constructive trusts has been explained in a former paragraph.¹ Equity regards the *cestui que trust*, in all instances except that last mentioned in favor of creditors, although without any legal title, and perhaps without any written evidence of interest, as the real owner, and entitled to all the rights and consequences of such ownership. Numerous important questions concerning the conduct of trustees, their relations with the trust property and with the beneficiaries, which arise from express trusts, can have no existence in connection with constructive trusts. Every act of the trustee in holding, managing, investing, or otherwise dealing with the trust property as though he could retain it, is itself a violation of his para-

§ 1057, ¹ The trust is, in reality, one in name alone; the creditor's right to reach the debtor's property is in no true sense an interest in that property; it is, at most, only an equitable lien on the property. Since the creditor's right to pursue his debtor's property under the circumstances mentioned is constantly spoken of by judges and text-writers as based upon a trust affecting such property, I have simply enumerated the case among the different species of constructive trusts. The examination of the doctrine is postponed until the subject of "creditors' suits" and other similar remedies is reached: * See Dewey v. Moyer, 72 N. Y. 70, 76, Bliss v. Matteson, 45 N. Y. 22, 24; Savage v. Murphy, 34 N. Y. 508, 90 Am. Dec. 733; 8 Bosw. 75; King v. Wilcox, 11 Paige, 589; Loomis v. Tifft, 16 Barb. 541, 543; Mead v. Gregg, 12 Barb. 653; Day v. Cooley, 118 Mass. 524; Partridge v. Messer, 14 Gray, 180; Case v. Gerrish, 15 Pick. 49, 50, Mann v. Darlington, 15 Pa. St. 310; Jones v. Reeder, 22 Ind. 111; Kahn v. Gumberts, 9 Ind. 430; and see ante, §§ 972, 973. § 1058, 1 See ante, § 1044.ª

(oral partnership to deal in real estate and divide profits, where the one advancing money for any parcel takes title thereto, is within statute of frauds); Norton v. Brink, 75 Neb. 566, 7 L. B. A. (N. S.) 945, 106 N. W. 668, 110 N. W. 669 (a similar case). § 1057, (a) The author's note is quoted in Sims v. Gray, 93 Iowa, 38, 61 N. W. 171. See, also, Kitchell v. Jackson, 71 Ala. 556; Rieg v. Burnham, 55 Mich. 39, 20 N. W. 708, 21 N. W. 431; Mason v. Pierson, 69 Wis. 585, 34 N. W. 921.

§ 1058, (a) See, also, ante, § 375.

mount obligation to the beneficiary. If the trustee refuses or delays to convey the property to its beneficial owner, and retains it. derives benefit from its use. and appropriates its rents, profits, and income, he must account for all that he thus receives, and pay over the amount found to be due to the cestui que trust, as well as convey to him the corpus of the trust fund. The beneficiary, therefore, being the true owner, may always, by means of an equitable suit. compel the trustee to convey or assign the corpus of the trust property, and to account for and pay over the rents, profits, issues, and income which he has actually received. or, in general, which he might with the exercise of reasonable care and diligence have received.^{2 b} In such a suit the plaintiff is also entitled to any additional or auxiliary remedy, such as injunction,^d cancellation, accounting, which may be necessary to render his final relief fully efficient. No change in the form of the trust property, effected by the trustee, will impede the rights of the beneficial owner to reach it and to compel its transfer, provided it can be identified as a distinct fund, and is not so mingled up with other moneys or property that it can no longer be specifically separated.^e If the trust property has been trans-

§ 1058, ² There are instances, where the trustee has acted in good faith, in which a court of equity would only hold him accountable for what he had *actually* received, and would not charge him with proceeds or profits which he might have received, nor with compound interest, etc.:^c See Barnes v. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 7; Greenwood's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 181.

§ 1058, (b) Cited to this effect in Ravenswood, S. & G. Ry. Co. v. Woodyard, 46 W. Va. 558, 33 S. E. 285. The text is cited, also, in Shearer v. Barnes, 118 Minn. 179, 136 N. W. 861 (interest of beneficiary is an equitable estatc; evidence of intention to waive the trust must be clear and convincing and show full knowledge of the facts); Stahl v. Stahl, 220 Ill. 188, 77 N. E. 67 (decree in suit to establish construc-

tive trust should provide for vesting legal title in beneficiaries).

§1058, (c) This note is cited in Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk, 148 Ill. 9, 35 N. E. 383.

§ 1058, (d) Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Malone, 89 Neb. 260, 131 N. W. 200; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Summers, 143 N. C. 102, 55 S. E. 522.

§ 1058, (e) The text is quoted in McCormick v. McCormick's Adm'r, (Ky.) 121 S. W. 450.

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ferred to a *bona fide* purchaser for value without notice, or has lost its identity, the beneficial owner must, and under other circumstances he may, resort to the personal liability of the wrong-doing trustee.^{3 f} The existence of a constructive trust, as of a resulting one, must be proved by clear, unequivocal evidence.^{4 g}

§ 1058, ³ Lathrop v. Bampton, 31 Cal. 17, 89 Am. Dec. 141.

§ 1058, ⁴ As to delay in enforcing the beneficiary's right, see Rolfe v. Gregory, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 576; Manning v. Hayden, 5 Saw. 360; North Car. R. R. v. Drew, 3 Woods, 691 (acquiescence); German Am. Sem. v. Kiefer, 43 Mich. 105.

§ 1058, (f) The text is cited to this effect in Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N. Y. 261, 139 Am. St. Rep. 817, 19 Ann. Cas. 747, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 119, 91 N. E. 582.

§1058, (g) The text is quoted in the following cases: Ferchen v. Arndt, 26 Or. 121, 46 Am. St. Rep. 603, 29 L. R. A. 664, 37 Pac. 161; Wetherell v. O'Brien, 140 Ill. 146, 33 Am. St. Rep, 221, 29 N. E. 904; Guignon v. First Nat. Bank, 22 Mont. 140, 55 Pac. 1051, 1097. See, also, citing the text, Deaner v. O'Hara, 36 Colo. 476, 85 Pac. 1123; Bartz v. Paff, 95 Wis. 95, 37 L. R. A. 848, 69 N. W. 297, see, also, ante, § 989; De Galindo v. De Galindo, 147 Cal. 77, 81 Pac. 279 (clear and convincing evidence required); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 152 Iowa, 168, 130 N. W. 365 (same); Ferguson v. Robinson, 258 Mo. 113, 167 S. W. 447 (clear, strong and unequivocal,

leaving court in no doubt); Bunel v. Nester, 203 Mo. 429, 101 S. W. 69 (beyond reasonable doubt); Eisenberg v. Goldsmith, 42 Mont. 563, 113 Pac.' 1127; Davis v. Davis, 216 Pa. 228, 65 Atl. 622 (cannot be established by loose testimony); and, further; Rolikatis v. Lovett, 213 Mass. 545, 100 N. E. 748 (interest on advances denied to trustee ex maleficio); Arnold v. Smith, 121 Minn. 116, 140 N. W. 748 (such a trustee must account not only for what he conveyed away, but for what he should have collected); Johnston v. McKenna, 77 N. J. Eq. 555, 78 Atl. 19 (beneficiary may affirm a sale and recover the purchase money, and if the trustee sells for less than he bought for, he must return amount for which he bought); Snow v. Hazlewood, 179 Fed. 182, 102 C. C. A. 448 (compensation and disbursements refused).

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SECTION VI.

POWERS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF EXPRESS TRUSTEES.

ANALYSIS.

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§ 1087.	Appointment of new trustees.

§ 1059. Divisions.—The duties and liabilities of the trustees and corresponding rights of the beneficiaries in trusts arising by operation of law have been explained in the preceding section. The discussions of the present section refer primarily and mainly to the powers, duties, and liabilities of the trustees in express trusts of all kinds and for all purposes, and the statement of their duties and liabilities necessarily includes the correlative rights and remedies of the *cestuis que trustent*; some of the conclusions may, however, apply to the trustees in resulting and constructive trusts. The entire subject embraces the following subdivisions: 1. The trustee's powers and modes of acting; 2. His duties and liabilities; 3. His compensation and allowances; 4. Removal and appointment of trustees.

§ 1060. First. Powers and Modes of Acting.—Although an acceptance by the trustee is not required in order to assure the interest and rights of the beneficiary, it is essential to the existence of any power or liability of the trustee himself; both his powers and his liabilities originate upon his acceptance.¹ " The acceptance may be express by executing an instrument in writing, or implied from acts done by the trustee in carrying the trust into effect or in dealing with the trust property.² b When property is given upon

§ 1060, 1 See ante, § 1007; Ainsworth v. Backus, 5 Hun, 414; Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84; Smedes v. Bank of Utica, 20 Johns. 372.

§ 1060, ² Urch v. Walker, 3 Mylne & C. 702; Crewe v. Dicken, 4 Ves. 97; Armstrong v. Morrill, 14 Wall. 120, 139; see Life Ass'n of Scotland v. Siddal, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 58; Youde v. Cloud, L. R. 18 Eq. 634.

§1060, (a) Kock v. Streuter, 232 Ill. 594, 83 N. E. 1072; McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 Ill. 281, 86 N. E. 139.

§ 1060, (b) Acceptance and Disclaimer.—See, also, Girard v. Futterer, 84 Ala. 323, 4 South. 292; Kennedy v. Winn, 80 Ala. 165; St. Mary's Hospital v. Perry, 152 Cal. 338, 92 Pac. 864 (acceptance of property may show acceptance of trust); Tuckerman v. Currier, 54 Colo. 25, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 599, 129 Pac. 210 (where executors appointed trustees are presumed to act in that capacity); Goodsell v. McElroy Bros. Co., 86 Conn. 402, 85 Atl. 509 (acts constituting acceptance); Coudon v. Updegraff, 117 Md. 71, 83 Atl. 145 (by continuing to act executor may become trustee); Coates v. Lunt, 213 Mass. 401, 100 trust to two or more trustees, they become joint owners, and, in general, all who have accepted must unite in conveyances and similar solemn and important acts.³^c It

§ 1060, ³ This assumes, of course, that there is no express provision to the contrary in the instrument creating the trust: Learned v. Welton, 40 Cal. 349; Saunders v. Schmaelzle, 49 Cal. 59, 67; Boston v. Robbins, 126 Mass. 384; In re Bernstein, 3 Redf. 20; Crane v. Hearn, 26 N. J. Eq. 378; Lee v. Sankey, L. R. 15 Eq. 204; Charlton v. Earl of Durham, L. R. 4 Ch. 433 (but a receipt by one of two executors who are also trustees is operative and sufficient).

N. E. 829 (same); Earle v. Earle, 93 N. Y. 104 (executor by accepting office accepts the trusts vested in him as such.) As stated in § 1007, ante, a trustee's acceptance is presumed, therefore to avoid liability / he should disclaim before conduct indicating acceptance, or before the cestui has acted in reliance on the presumed acceptance. The disclaimer may he either by deed or parol; see Adams v. Adams, 21 Wall. 165, 22 L. Ed. 504, Ames Cas. on Trusts 227; Burritt v. Silliman, 13 N. Y. 93. 64 Am. Dec. 532; Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298, 575; Matter of Robinson, 37 N. Y. 261 (mere failure to act for twenty years is equivalent to a disclaimer); see In re Lord and Fullerton's Contract, [1896] 1 Ch. 228; Adams v. Adams, 64 N. H. 224, 9 Atl. 100 (the failure of the trustee to act for more than two years, and allowing the property to go to ruin, justified the inference that he had refused to act); Curtis v. Crossley, 59 N. J. Eq. 358, 45 Atl. 905; New South Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Gann, 101 Ga. 678, 29 S. E. 15; Dodge v. Dodge, 109 Md. 164, 130 Am. St. Rep. 503, 71 Atl. 519 (disclaimer may be by acts or conduct).

§1060, (c) Trustees are Joint Owners.-Wilder v. Ranney, 95 N.

Y. 7; Ham v. Ham, 58 N. H. 70; Crowley v. Hicks, 72 Wis. 539, 40 N. W. 151; see Bailey's Petition, 15 R. I. 60, 1 Atl. 131; Franklin Institute v. People's Sav. Bank, 14 R. I. 632; Gibb v. McMahon, 11 Ont. L. Rep. 522, 4 Ann. Cas. 952; Reichert v. Missouri & I. C. Co., 231 Ill. 238, 121 Am. St. Rep. 307, 83 N. E. 166 (are joint tenants); Hoosier Mining Co. v. Union Trust Co., 173 Ky. 505, 191 S. W. 305 (all must join in a lease); Webb v. Borden, 145 N. C. 188, 58 S. E. 1083 (are joint tenants; if one is barred, all are barred). Where only a part of several trustees disclaimed the remaining ones were bound by the trust: Bonifant v. Greenfield, Cro. El. 80; Adams v. Taunton, 5 Madd. 435; Re Stevenson, 3 Paige, 420, and cases in the note; King v. Donnelly, 5 Paige, 46 (if they all disclaim, the legal estate nominally vests in them for the benefit of the cestui, and the court may remove them and appoint others); Re Van Schoonhoven, 5 Paige, 559 (and the disclaiming trustee cannot later accept the trust unless reappointed); Jackson v. Ferris, 15 Johns. 346 (the remaining trustee has full power to deal with the property in such case); Leggett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445 (same); Clemens v. Clemens, 60 Barb. 366

results from the joint tenancy of trustees that when one dies or resigns, all the estate and powers remain in the survivors or survivor; and this right of survivorship will not be affected merely because there is a power of appointing new trustees in the place of those dying or ceasing to act; it will operate until the new trustees are appointed.⁴ d Upon the death of a single trustee or a last survivor, the trust may devolve upon his heir or administrator until a new trustee is appointed.⁵ \circ

§ 1060, ⁴ Lane v. Dehenham, 11 Hare, 188; Warburton v. Sandys, 14 Sim. 622; In re Waddell's Contract, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 172; In re Cookes's Contract, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 454; Saunders v. Schmaelzle, 49 Cal. 59, 67; In re Bernstein, 3 Redf. 20.

§ 1060, ⁵ Robson v. Flight, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 608 (the heir at law in such case cannot exercise *discretionary* powers given to the trustee, although he holds the estate subject to the trust); Sander v. Heathfield, L. R. 19 Eq. 21; Rackham v. Siddall, 1 Maen. & G. 607; Lord v. Wightwick, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 803; Russell v. Peyton, 4 Ill. App. 473; and see Clark v. Tainter, 7 Cush. 567; Treadwell v. Cordis, 5 Gray, 341, 359; Warden v. Richards, 11 Gray, 277; Dunning v. Ocean Nat. Bank, 6 Lans. 296; Evans v. Chew, 71 Pa. St. 47; Waters v. Margerum, 60 Pa. St. 39; Gray v. Henderson, 71 Pa. St. 368.

(same, and subsequent death of disclaiming trustee vests title absolutely in the one accepting); De Saussure v. Lyons, 9 S. C. 492 (three of six executors and trustees qualified, and they were held capable of transferring the property left them); Putnam Free School v. Fisher, 30 Me. 523 (those accepting the trust are competent to convey); Ratcliff v. Sangston, 18 Md. 383; Long v. Long, 62 Md. 33; Nicoll v. Miller, 37 Ill. 387 (one trustee disclaiming will not defeat a conveyance to the trustees); Stein v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 127 Md. 206, 96 Atl. 349 (remaining trustees take all powers and authority vested in the trustees as such and which are requisite for administration of trust).

§ 1060, (d) Golder v. Bressler, 105 III. 419; Cooley v. Kelley, 52 Ind. App. 687, 96 N. E. 638, 98 N. E. 653 (if one dies, survivors may act); Atzinger v. Berger, 151 Ky. 800, 152 S. W. 971 (where power is coupled with interest, it is not necessary that all the trustees qualify); Long v. Long, 62 Md. 33; Weeks v. Frankel, 197 N. Y. 304, 90 N. E. 969 (right of survivor to act); Mattison v. Mattison, 53 Or. 254, 133 Am. St. Rep. 829, 18 Ann. Cas. 218, 100 Pac. 4; Bailey's Petition, 15 R. I. 60, 1 Atl. 131.

§ 1060, (e) Death of Sole Trustee. See, also, In re Townsend's Contract, [1895] 1 Ch. 716; In re Crunden & Meux's Contract, [1909] 1 Ch. 690 (executor could not exercise power of sale); Le Croix v. Malone,

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§ 1061. Second. Duties and Liabilities.—In this subdivision I shall state the general duties of express trustees, the violations of them which constitute a breach of trust, and the nature and extent of the liabilities incurred thereby. The doctrines to be examined are those which courts of equity apply in controlling the conduct of all classes of persons who are clothed with fiduciary relations towards property in which others are beneficially interested, including trustees proper, executors and administrators, guardians of infants or of persons non compotes mentis, directors or managers of corporations, and other *quasi* trustees.^{1 a} All the various duties of actual and quasi trustees may be grouped under three general heads: 1. To carry out the trust; 2. To use care and diligence; 3. To act with good faith;^b and each of these contains several more specific obligations.

§ 1062. I. To Carry the Trust into Execution.—1. The Duty to Conform Strictly to the Directions of the Trust.^a— Under the general obligation of carrying the trust into execution, trustees and all fiduciary persons are bound, in

§ 1061, 1 These doctrines are embodied in the proposed Civil Code of New York, secs. 1177-1188, 1196-1201, 1202-1207, and in the Civil Code of California, secs. 2228¹2239, 2258-2263, 2267-2269, 2273-2275.

157 Ala. 434, 47 South. 725 (by statute on death of surviving trustee of an express trust, the trust estate does not descend to his heirs, but remains in abeyance until the court appoints new trustees); Boyer v. Sims, 61 Kan. 593, 60 Pac. 309; Laughlin v. Page, 108 Me. 307, 80 Atl. 753; Cameron v. Hicks, 141 N. C. 21, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 407, 53 S. E. 728; Dillard v Dillard, 97 Va. 434, 34 S. E. 60 (containing a good statement as to the effect of the death of one trustee when a discretion was vested in three of them). See Tonnele v. Wetmore, 195 N. Y. 436, 88 N. E. 1068 (on death of surviving. trustee, trust, by statute, vests in supreme court).

§ 1061, (a) The text is cited, as respects corporation directors, in Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 164, 85 Am. St. Rep. 667, 55 L. R. A. 751, 61 N. E. 163; Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 777, 54 L. R. A. (N. S.) 112, 99 N. E. 138.

§1061, (b) The text is cited to this effect in Klugh v. Seminole Securities Co., 103 S. C. 120, 87 S. E. 644.

§ 1062, (a) Sections 1062-1087 are cited in Jones v. Watford, 64 N. J. Eq. 785, 53 Atl. 397. Section 1062 the first place, to conform strictly to the directions of the trust. This is in fact the corner-stone upon which all other duties rest, the source from which all other duties take their origin. The trust itself, whatever it be, constitutes the charter of the trustee's powers and duties; from it he derives the rule of his conduct; it prescribes the extent and limits of his authority: it furnishes the measure of his obligations. If the trust is express, created by deed or will, then the provisions of the instrument must be followed and obeyed. If the fiduciary relation is established by law and regulated by settled legal rules, then these legal rules must constantly guide and restrain the conduct of the one who occupies the relation. In this manner the acts, powers, duties, and liabilities of executors, administrators, guardians, and corporation directors are governed by a fixed system of legal rules which constitute their instrument or declaration of trust.¹ A trustee can use the property only for the purposes contemplated in the trust, and must conform to the provisions of the trust in their true spirit, intent, and meaning, and not merely in their letter. If, therefore, through non-feasance, he omits to carry the trust into execution, or through misfeasance he disobeys the directions of the trust, he renders himself in some manner liable to the beneficiary whose rights have been thus violated.²

§ 1062, ¹ In the case of corporation directors and officers, the charters and by-laws are the primary source of the fiduciary power and duty. Even if the trust is a pure resulting or constructive one, the simple duty to convey the property and pay over all its profits to the beneficiary is marked out by the law.

§ 1062, ² As an illustration merely, in a trust to sell, the trustee must not sell except for a proper object, and must protect the interests of all the *cestuis que trustent* in selling, by obtaining, as far as may be reasonable, the full value, or the best possible price, etc.:^b Mortlock v. Buller,

is cited in In re Holscher's Heirs, (Iowa) 101 N. W. 759 (as to guardian's responsibility to the court); Ainsa v. Mercantile Trust Co. of San Francisco, 174 Cal. 504, 163 Pac. 898. § 1062, (b) Sale by Trustee.—See, also, Huse v. Den, 85 Cal. 390, 20 Am. St. Rep. 232, 24 Pac. 790; In re Heberle's Estate, 155 Cal. 723, 102 Pac. 935 (duty to take a reasonable time to sell, to avoid a sacrifice);

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Trustees, in carrying the trust into execution, are not confined to the very letter of the provisions. They have au-

10 Ves. 292, 308; Wilkins v. Fry, 1 Mer. 244, 268; Ord v. Noel, 5 Madd. 438; Adair v. Brimmer, 74 N. Y. 539, Penny v Cook, 19 Iowa, 538. The following cases are given only as illustrations of the doctrine, since its application must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each case: Stroughill v. Anstey, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 635; Boulton v. Beard, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 608; Lord v. Wightwick, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 803; In re Wood-

Beall v. Dingman, 227 Ill. 294, 81 N. E. 366 (sale for grossly inadequate price, when a contest of the will was impending); Shaw v. Smith, 107 Md. 523, 69 Atl. 116 (mere inadequacy of price not sufficient to set aside sale); Bertron, Storrs & Griscom v. Polk, 101 Md. 686, 61 Atl. 616 (sale set aside because it would reduce both corpus and income); Reeder v Lanahan, 111 Md. 372, 74 Atl. 575 (duty to obtain fair value); Neale v. Peverley, 114 Md. 198, 78 Atl. 1102 (court refused to confirm private sale for \$1,500, where \$1,700 had been refused at public sale, and there was a pending bid of \$1,600. It is primary concern of court to dispose of property for best price reasonably to be obtained); Givens v. McCray, 196 Mo. 306, 113 Am. St. Rep. 736, 93 S. W. 374 (duty of trustee under a trust deed to secure a debt. See ante, § 995); Browning v Stiles, (N. J. Eq.) 65 Atl. 457 (court will not interfere unless property sold for so much less than market value as to be an abuse of discretion).

§ 1062, (c) Duty to Conform to Terms of the Trust.—See, also, Livermore v. Maxwell, 87 Iowa, 705, 55 N. W. 37, citing the text; Reed v. Stouffer, 56 Md. 236; Boisseau v. Boisseau, 79 Va. 73, 52 Am. Rep. 616; Berrien v. Thomas, 65 Ga. 61; Jones v. McPhillips, 82 Ala. 102, 2 South. 468; Baker v. Ducker, 79 Cal.

365, 21 Pac. 764 (when property is held by a religious society in trust for its members, none of the members, though they constitute a majority, have any right or power to divert the property to the use of another and different church organization). And see these recent cases: Hendrix College v. Arkansas Townsite Co., 85 Ark. 446, 108 S. W. 514 (trust to provide school to be owned and controlled by church. No power to lease to another to conduct school); Williamson v. Grider, 97 Ark. 588, 135 S. W. 361 (power to mortgage, sell or lease to pay debts will not authorize mortgage to finance general merchandise business); In re Connecticut Trust & S. D. Co., 80 Conn. 540, 69 Atl. 360 (trustee of income for life tenants must not deduct from income to meet possible depreciation of principal); Curlett v. Emmons, 9 Del. Ch. 62, 85 Atl. 1079 (must pay beneficiary named); Stephens v. Collison, 274 Ill. 389, 113 N. E. 691 (no authority to compel beneficiaries to accept a compromise settlement of the trust estate in disregard of the terms of the trust, even if that is for the best interest of all concerned); Jones v. Jones, 111 Md. 700, 77 Atl. 270; Digney v. Blanchard, 226 Mass. 335, 115 N. E. 424 (investment in. buildings on land of third person not authorized); Gibney v. Allen, 156 Mich. 301, 120 N. W. 811; Byron

thority to adopt measures and to do acts which, though not specified in the instrument, are implied in its general

burn's Will, 1 De Gex & J. 333; Brunskill v. Caird, L. R. 16 Eq. 493; Carlyon v. Truscott, L. R. 20 Eq. 348; Thompson v. Hudson, L. R. 2 Ch. 255; Talhot v. Marshfield, L. R. 3 Ch. 622; Dance v. Goldingham, L. R. 8 Ch. 902; Tolson v. Sheard, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 19; Avery v. Griffin, L. R. 6 Eq. 606; Vyse v. Foster, L. R. 8 Ch. 309; O'Halloran v. Fitzgerald, 71 Ill. 53; Roberts v. Moseley, 64 Mo. 507; Vose v. Trustees, etc., 2 Woods,

Reed Co. v. Klabunde, 76 Neb. 801, 108 N. W. 133 (no power to mortgage); Paine v. Sackett, 27 R. I. 300, 61 Atl. 753 (duty to convey although cestuis are willing property shall remain); Branch v. De Wolf, 28 R. I. 542, 68 Atl. 543 (cannot change investment unless authorized); Clark v. Brown, (Tex. Civ. App.) 108 S. W. 421 (right of minority of religious association to prevent diversion of property from the original purpose); Kennedy v. Pearson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 109 S. W. 280; Haldeman v. Openheimer, 103 Tex. 275, 126 S. W. 566; Miller v. Mitchell, 58 W. Va. 431, 52 S. E. 478 (trustee under trust deed has no implied power to receive payment of the debt); Upham v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 376, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1004, 140 N. W. 5; Darlington v. Turner, 202 U. S. 195, 50 L. Ed. 992, 26 Sup. Ct. 630 (where will directed payment to nephews and nieces, trustee is liable for loss if he pays to their father).

Power of Sale, and Its Exercise.— That a power to sell does not generally imply a power to pledge or mortgage, see Loring v. Brodie, 134 Mass. 453; Wilson v. Md. Life Ins. Co., 60 Md. 150; Willis v. Smith, 66 Tex. 31, 17 S. W. 247; but see Waterman v. Baldwin, 68 Iowa, 255, 26 N. W. 435; Bent-Otero Imp. Co. v. Whitehead, 25 Colo. 354, 71 Am. St. Rep. 140, 54 Pac. 1023; Schanewerk

v. Hoberecht, 117 Mo. 22, 38 Am. St. Rep. 691, 22 S. W. 949 (deed directing a sale "at the courthouse door" is not properly followed by a sale at the courthouse door and at the church door also); Hinton v. Pritchard, 120 N. C. 1, 58 Am. St. Rep. 768, 26 S. E. 627 (where, in such case, the trustee is forced to use his discretion, it must be exercised in a reasonable and intelligent manner); Hickok v. Still, 168 Pa. St. 155, 47 Am. St. Rep. 880, 31 Atl. 1100 (a direction to sell during the settlor's life or at his death does not authorize the trustee to give an option to purchase within thirtythree and one-third years); see, also, Maxwell v. Barringer, 110 N. C. 76, 28 Am. St. Rep. 668, 14 S. E. 516; Mallory v. Kissler, 18 Utah, 11, 72 Am. St. Rep. 765, 54 Pac. 892; Stephens v. Clay, 17 Colo. 489, 31 Am. St. Rep. 328, 30 Pac. 43 (the cestui's interest is not affected by an improper sale); In re Cole's Estate, 102 Wis. 1, 72 Am. St. Rep. 854, 78 N. W. 402 ("as the testator's [settlor's] scheme was worked out and inscribed in the will, so must it be. The trustees must carry out that to the letter"); More v. Calkins, 95 Cal. 455, 29 Am. St. Rep. 128, 30 Pac. 583 (the death of the grantor does not revoke a power of sale in a trust deed); see for the effect of a statute authorizing a sale on petition of part of the beneficiaries, In directions, and are reasonable and proper means for making them effectual. This implied discretion in the choice

647; Hill v. Den, 54 Cal. 6; Iles v. Martin, 69 Ind. 114; Bowman v. Pinkham, 71 Me. 295; In re Lewis, 81 N. Y. 421; James v. Cowing, 82 N. Y. 449; Sharp v. Goodwin, 51 Cal. 219 (if trustees for creditors sell and transfer the property to a third person who has notice of the trust, but pays value, and he converts the property into money and pays off all the creditors, then they have no cause of action against the original trustees).

re Freeman's Estate, 181 Pa. St. 405, 59 Am. St. Rep. 659, 37 Atl. 591. See, also, the following recent cases: Stewart v. Cross, 184 Ala. 166, 63 South. 956; Harr v. Fordyce, 88 Ark. 192, 113 S. W. 1033 (trustee has discretion as to manner of sale); Blair v. Hazard, 158 Cal. 721, 112 Pac. 298 (he may execute deed without order of court); Murphy v. Union Trust Co., 5 Cal. App. 146, 89 Pac. 988 (where absolute discretion given, sale does not require confirmation); Aldersley v. McCloud, 35 Cal. App. 17, 168 Pac. 1153; Green v. Bissell, 79 Conn. 547, 118 Am. St. Rep. 156, 9 Ann. Cas. 287, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1011, 65 Atl. 1056 (trustee to distribute income, who receives a stock dividend, may convert it into cash); Mason v. Mason, 219 Ill. 609, 76 N. E. 692 (when trustee has power of sale, beneficiary cannot set sale aside without a showing of fraud or collusion, or that property did not sell for true value); Holsapple v. Schrontz, (Ind. App.) 117 N. E. 547 (power of sale does not authorize barter or exchange); Smith v. Nones, 121 Ky. 147, 89 S. W. 153; Hegan v. Netherland, 141 Ky. 686, 133 S. W. 546 (power of sale implied from other provisions making it imperative); Robinson v. Robinson, 105 Me. 68, 134 Am. St. Rep. 537, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 675, 72 Atl. 883 (same); Cutter v. Burroughs, 100 Me. 379, 61 Atl. 767 (where there is imperative power of sale, court will force sale and protect purchasers even as against subsequent legal owners); Washington County R. Co. v. Canadian Colored Cotton Mills Co., 104 Me. 527, 72 Atl. 491 (sale not made in accordance with terms of trust passes no title); Bailey v. Worster, 103 Me. 170, 68 Atl. 698 (where beneficiary asked that sale be not made); Schloendorn v. Schmidt, 115 Md. 74, 80 Atl. 309 (power of sale implied from other provisions); Harrison v. Denny, 113 Md. 509, 77 Atl. 837 (same); Trustees of Samuel Ready School v. Safe Deposit etc. Co., 121 Md. 515, 88 Atl. 261 (no objection to sale that appointment of trustee was irregular); Stump v. Warfield, 104 Md. 530, 118 Am. St. Rep. 434, 10 Ann. Cas. 249, 65 Atl. 346 (power to sell does not give power to mortgage); Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N. E. 381 (cannot borrow in order to pay legacies, but should sell part of estate, if necessary); Bremer v. Hadley, 196 Mass. 217, 81 N. E. 961 (no power of sale implied where language was "stand and be possessed and pay over income"); Polk v. Dale, 93 Miss. 664, 17 Ann. Cas. 754, and note, 47 South. 386 (trustee under trust to secure debts may resell after invalid first sale); Weeks v. Frankel, 197 N. Y. 304, 90 N. E. 969; In re Streater's Estate, 250 Pa. 328, 95 Atl. 459 (trustee may usually sell of measures and acts is subject to the control of a court of equity, and must be exercised in a reasonable manner.^{3 d}

§ 1062, ³ The following are examples, and individual cases can only be cited as examples upon such a proposition: Kekewich v. Marker, 3 Macn. & G. 310; Barnett v. Sheffield, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 371; Manser v. Dix, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 703; Tait v. Lathbury, L. R. 1 Eq. 174; In re Peyton's Trust, L. R. 7 Eq. 463; In re Chawner's Will, L. R. 8 Eq. 569; Messeena v. Carr, L. R. 9 Eq. 260; In re Lord Hotham's Trusts, L. R. 12 Eq. 76;

personalty); Kenworthy v. Equitable Trust Co., 218 Pa. 286, 67 Atl. 469 (power of sale does not include power to mortgage, where prohibition against encumbering); Leserne v. Cheves, 105 S. C. 432, 90 S. E. 37 (sale imperative because of investment in unproductive real estate); Weakley v. Barrow, 137 Tenn. 224, 192 S. W. 927 (where sales forbidden, not allowed even to provide support for wife and children); Wisdom v. Wilson, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 593, 127 S. W. 1128 (sale means sale for cash); Mansfield v. Wardlow, (Tex. Civ. App.) 91 S. W. 859 (power to sell does not give power to mortgage); Kennedy v. Pearson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 109 S. W. 280 (power to hold and manage for limited period does not carry with it power of sale); Brinton v. Lewis-Littlefield Co., 66 Wash. 40, 118 Pac. 917 (power of sale, prudent course to convey to mortgagee, with agreement for repurchase when there is danger of foreclosure); Sprague v. Betz, 44 Wash. 650, 87 Pac. 916 (same).

§ 1062, (d) Trustees' Implied Discretion.—See, also, Moulton v. Holmes, 57 Cal. 337. A direction in a will appointing a particular person solicitor or agent to the trustees imposes no duty on the trustees to continue such person their solicitor or agent: Foster v. Elsley, 19 Ch. Div. 518; citing Finden v. Stephens,

2 Phill. Ch. 142; Shaw v. Lawless, 5 Clark & F. 129. See Clay v. Rufford, 5 De G. & S. 768; In re Bedingfeld and Herring's Contract, [1893] 2 Ch. 332 (the consent of the cestui, required by the deed, must be given though he is bankrupt); In re Peake's Settled Estates, [1894] 3 Ch. 520 (see the effect of statute, and authorization by the court); In re Crowther, [1895] 2 Ch. 56 (a discretion to postpone the sale of property carries with it an implication to carry on the business): In re Smith, [1896] 1 Ch. 171 (same, but not indefinitely; court may limit the time); see In re Runney and Smith. [1897] 2 Ch. 351; In re Morrison, [1901] 1 Ch. 701; see, for cases where a power of sale was implied from the general terms of the trust deed, Boston Safe Deposit Co. v. Mixter, 146 Mass. 100, 15 N. E. 141; Harvard College v. Weld, 159 Mass. 114, 34 N. E. 175 ("to manage and invest to the best advantage" carries a power to sell); Purdie v. Whitney, 20 Pick. 25 (a direction to "invest and reinvest in stocks" carries an implication to sell that is "strictly necessary"); approved in Goodrich v. Proctor, 1 Gray, 567; see, also, Bohlen's Estate, 75 Pa. St. 304; Goad v. Montgomery, 119 Cal. 552, 63 Am. St. Rep. 145, 51 Pac. 681 (a trust to manage property, and deliver to the beneficiaries at their majority, does not carry an implied

It follows from their general duty that trustees cannot set

In re Shaw's Trusts, L. R. 12 Eq. 124; Armstrong v. Armstrong, L. R. 18 Eq. 541; Hayward v. Pile, L. R. 5 Ch. 214; Astley v. Earl of Essex, L. R. 6 Ch. 898; Austin v. Austin, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 233; Leeming v. Lady Murray, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 123; Hayes v. Oatley, L. R. 14 Eq. 1; Goddard v. Brown, 12 R. I. 31; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 12 R. I. 141; Luigi v. Luchesi, 12 Nev. 306; Phelps v. Harris, 51 Miss. 789; Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22; Vallette v. Bennett, 69 Ill. 632; Zabriskie's Ex'rs v. Wetmore,

power to sell); see for notice of sale under trust deed, Yellowly v. Beardsly, 76 Miss. 613, 71 Am. St. Rep. 536, 24 South. 973. See, also, Preston v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 116 Md. 211, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 975, 81 Atl. 523 (existence of an express power of sale does not negative an implied power); Lueft v. Lueft, 128 Wis. 534, 9 Ann. Cas. 639, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 263, note, 109 N. W. 652 (may borrow temporarily to make property productive).

As to implied power to lease, see Hutcheson v. Hodnett, 115 Ga. 990, 42 S. E. 422, and cases cited; In re North (Garton v. Cumberland), [1909] 1 Ch. 625 (implied power to let from year to year); South End Warehouse Co. v. Lavery, 12 Cal. App. 449, 107 Pac. 1008 (cannot lease property for period longer than duration of trust); Butler v. Topkis, (Del. Ch.) 63 Atl. 646; Ohio Oil Co. v. Daughetee, 240 Ill. 361, -36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1108, 88 N. E. 818 (cannot grant unusual leases); Hubbell v. Hubbell, 135 Iowa, 637, 14 Ann. Cas. 640, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 496, 113 N. W'. 512 (cannot lease for a period longer than the probable duration of the trust); Upham v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 376, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) • 1004, 140 N. W. 5 (trustee given "entire control, management and charge" of estate may, with concurrence of court, grant ninety-nine year leases).

"Where in the administration or management of a trust estate by the trustees, especially where the estate consists of a business or of shares in a mercantile company, there arises an emergency or a state of circumstances which it may reasonably be supposed was not foreseen or anticipated by the author of the trust and is unprovided for by the trust instrument, and which renders it desirable and perhaps even essential, in the interests of the beneficiaries, that certain acts should be done by the trustees which they themselves have no power to do, and to which the consent of all the beneficiaries cannot be obtained by reason of some not being sui juris or not yet in existence, the court will exercise its general administrative jurisdiction by sanctioning, on bchalf of all parties interested, those acts being done by the trustee": In re New, [1901] 2 Ch. 534. For an example of change of scheme by court's direction for purpose of effectuating testator's general intention, see Pennington v. Metropolitan Museum of Arts, (N. J. Eq.) 55 Atl. 468. See, also, Packard v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bk., 261 Ill. 450, 104 N. E. 275 (court may change terms of trust so as to authorize lease, where that is necessary for best interests of estate); Weakley v. Barrow, 137 Tenn. 224, 192 S. W. 927 (even if there is a restriction on power of sale, court will disregard it up the adverse title of a stranger against their *cestuis que* 26 N. J. Eq. 18; Macon etc. R. R. v. Georgia etc. R. R., 63 Ga. 103; Starr v. Moulton, 97 Ill. 525.

Whenever the instrument of trust expressly confers upon trustees a discretion as to acts and measures in carrying out the general object of the trust, a court of equity will not generally interfere to control such discretion, except to prevent its abuse or unreasonable exercise to the actual or probable prejudice of the beneficiaries:^e In re Beloved Wilkes's Charity, 3 Macn. & G. 440; Brophy v. Bellamy, L. R. 8 Ch. 798; In re

if necessary to preserve the property, as where taxes or special assessments threaten to wipe out the subject-matter of the trust; Bennett v. Nashville Trust Co., 127 Tenn. 126, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1045, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 43, 153 S. W. 840 (trust for accumulation may be modified to allow payment of income for maintenance and support); Upham v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 376, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1004, 140 N. W. 5; Price v. Long, (N. J. Eq.) 101 Atl. 195. But thus modifying the terms of the trust in order to save it from destruction is a different matter from a settlement of the trust estate in disregard of its terms, thus destroying the trust: Stephens v. Collison, 274 Ill. 389, 113 N. E. 691; and see Johnson v. Buck (Ill.), 77 N. E. 163 (trustee may be authorized to sell contrary to provisions of will only where there is a necessity for the purpose of preserving the estate).

§ 1062, (*) Discretion Expressly Conferred.—See, also, Russell v. Hartley, 83 Conn. 654, 78 Atl. 320 (discretion as to paying money for support); Brackett v. Middlesex Banking Co., 89 Conn. 645, 95 Atl. 12; Yates v. Yates, 255 Ill. 66, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 143, 99 N. E. 360; Keeler v Lauer, 73 Kan. 388, 85 Pac. 541; Bull v. Cromie, 81 Ky. 646; Woodward v. Dain, 109 Me. 581, 85 Atl. 660; Veazie v. Forsaith, 76 Me. III--153 172; Childs v. Waite, 102 Me. 451, 67 Atl. 311 (trust giving discretion to trustee will not be defeated because trustee refuses to exercise discretion); Pole v. Pietsch, 61 Md. 570; Zimmerman v. Fraley, 70 Md. 561, 17 Atl. 560 (a trustee substituted by the court for one who had discretion is not thereby clothed with discretion); Baer v. Kahn, (Md.) 101 Atl. 596; Gottschalk v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 102 Md. 521, 62 Atl. 810; Shaeffer v. Klee, 100 Md. 264, 59 Atl. 850 (same); Corkery v. Dorsey, 223 Mass. 97, 111 N. E. 795 (paying all principal to beneficiary an abuse of discretion); Garvey v. Garvey, 150 Mass. 185, 22 N. E. 889; Johnson v. Johnson, 215 Mass. 276, 102 N. E. 465 (as to support and education of children); State v. Muench, 217 Mo. 124, 129 Am. St. Rep. 536, 117 S. W. 25 (power of sale with approval of court does not give court authority to administer trust); Abbott v. Abbott, 76 N. H. 225, 81 Atl. 699; Watson v. Kennard, 77 N. H. 23, 86 Atl. 257 (discretion as to applying principal to support of life tenant will not justify refusal to pay out entire income); Read v. Patterson, 44 N. J. Eq. 211, 3 Am. St. Rep. 305, 14 Atl. 490; Larkin v. Wikoff, 75 N. J. Eq. 462, 72 Atl. 98, 79 Atl. 365; Coffin v. Watson, 78 N. J. Eq. 307, 79 Atl. 275; O'Gorman v. Crowly, 80 N. J. Eq. 101, 83 Atl. 379; Haight v. trustent, and much less buy up and hold such adverse title for their own benefit.^{4 f}

Hodges, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 754; Tabor v. Brooks, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 273; Thomas v. Dering, 1 Keen, 729; Sillibourne v. Newport, 1 Kay & J. 602; In re Coe's Trust, 4 Kay & J. 199; Walker v. Walker, 5 Madd. 424; Bankes v. Le Despencer, 11 Sim. 508, 527; Cowley v. Hartstonage, 1 Dow, 361, 378; Potter v. Chapman, Amb. 98; Wain v. Earl of Egmont, 3 Mylne & K. 445; Costabadie v. Costabadie, 6 Hare, 410, 414; Atty.-Gen. v. Mosely, 2 De Gex & S. 398; Prendergast v. Prendergast, 3 H. L. Cas. 195; Goddard v. Brown, 12 R. I. 31; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 12 R. I. 141; Haydel v. Hurek, 5 Mo. App. 267; Starr v. Moulton, 97 Ill. 525; Morton v. Southgate, 28 Me. 41; Littlefield v. Cole, 33 Me. 552; Hawes Place Cong. Soc. v. Trustees etc., 5 Cush. 454; Leavitt v. Beirne, 21 Conn. 1; Arnold v. Gilbert, 3 Sand. Ch. 531; Mason v. Mason's Ex'rs, 4 Sand. Ch. 623; Pulpress v. African Ch., 48 Pa. St. 204; Cochran v. Paris, 11 Gratt. 348, 356.

§ 1062, 4 Newsome v. Flowers, 30 Beav. 461; O'Halloran v. Fitzgerald,

Brisbin, 96 N. Y. 132, 135; Collister v. Fassitt, 163 N. Y. 281, 79 Am. St. Rep. 586, 57 N. E. 490 (discretion as to amount of annuity to be paid beneficiary; court named a fixed figure when the discretion had not been fairly and honestly exercised); Hayes v. Franklin, 141 N. C. 599, 54 S. E. 432; Dubois v. Barbour, 27 R. I. 281, 61 Atl. 752; Angell v. Angell, 28 R. I. 592, 68 Atl. 583 (discretion as to payment of income mustbe reasonably exercised); Faulk v. Dashiell, 62 Tex. 642, 50 Am. Rep. 542; Bacon v. Bacon, 55 Vt. 243; Wayland v. Crank's Ex'r, 79 Va. 602; Trout v. Pratt, 106 Va. 431, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 398, note, 56 S. E. 165; Givens v. Klem, 107 Va. 435, 59 S. E. 413; Pabst v. Geodrich, 133 Wis. 43, 14 Ann. Cas. 824, 113 N. W. 398; Upham v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 376, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1004, 140 N. W. 5.

Whether a Discretionary Power Passes to a Substituted Trustee.— In the following recent cases it was held that the power involved a personal confidence reposed by, the creator of the trust in the trustee selected by him, and the power, therefore, did not pass to a substituted trustee: Whitaker v. McDowell, 82 Conn. 195, 16 Ann. Cas. 324, 72 Atl. 938; Russell v. Hartley, 83 Conn. 654, 78 Atl. 320; Williams v. Gardner, 90 Conn. 461, 97 Atl. 854; Wilmington Trust Co. v. Jacobs, 9 Del. Ch. 77, 77 Atl. 78; Christopher v. Mungen, 61 Fla. 513, 534, 55 South. 273; United States Trust Co. v. Poutch, 130 Ky. 241, 113 S. W. 107; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 115 Md. 339, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1279, 80 Atl. 903. For instances where the power was not personal but was annexed to the office of trustee, see Jacobs v. Wilmington Trust Co., 9 Del. Ch. 400, 80 Atl. 346; Vernoy v. Robinson, 133 Ga. 653, 66 S. E. 928; Taylor v. Monmonier, 120 Md. 101, 87 Atl. 513; Stein v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 127 Md. 206, 96 Atl. 349.

§ 1062. (f) Trustee cannot Set Up Adverse Title.—See, also, Ney§ 1063. 2. The Duty to Account.^a—As a branch of the general obligation of carrying the trust into execution, a trustee is also bound to account for all the trust property. He must not only render a full account of his conduct at the time of final settlement, but it is one of his most imperative duties to keep regular and accurate accounts during the whole course of the trust of all property coming into, passing out of, or remaining in his hands. These accounts must clearly distinguish between the trust property and his own individual assets; for the two should never be mingled in the accounts nor in use; they should show all receipts and payments, and should at all times be open to the inspection, and produced at the demand of the beneficiary.^{1 b}

71 Ill. 53; Roberts v. Moseley, 64 Mo. 507; Morrow v. Saline Co. Com'rs, 21 Kan. 484; and see Neale v. Davis, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 258, 263.

§ 1063, 1 A failure to keep full or accurate accounts raises all presumptions against the trustee; it may subject him to pecuniary loss by rendering him liable to pay interest, or chargeable with moneys received and not duly accounted for: See Pearse v. Green, 1 Jacob & W. 135; Freeman v. Fairlee, 3 Mer. 40, 42; White v. Lady Lincoln, 8 Ves. 363; Lord Chedworth v. Edwards, 8 Ves. 46; Lupton v. White, 15 Ves. 432,

land v. Bendy, 69 Tex. 711, 7 S. W. 497; Baker v. Springfield, etc. Ry. Co., 86 Mo. 75; Turner v. Fryberger (In re Robbins' Estate), 94 Minn. 433, 110 Am. St. Rep. 375, 103 N. W. 217; Krauczunas v. Hoban, 221 Pa. 213, 70 Atl. 740; Sullivan v. Fant, (Tex. Civ. App.) 160 S. W. 612.

§ 1063, (a) This section is cited in Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 164, 85 Am. St. Rep. 667, 55 L. R. A. 751, 61 N. E. 163; In re Belt's Estate, 29 Wash. 535, 92 Am. St. Rep. 916, 70 Pac. 74; Page v. Marston, 94 Me. 342, 47 Atl. 529. Cited, also, in Bone v. Hayes, 154 Cal. 759, 99 Pac. 172 (if he negligently fails to keep true accounts, or fails to account, all presumptions are against him); Purdy v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 521, 163 Pac. 893 (same); Wylie v. Bushnell, 277 Ill. 484, 115 N. E. 618.

§ 1063, (b) See, generally, Hopkinson v. Burghley, L. R. 2 Ch. 447; McCarthy v. McCarthy, 74 Ala. 546; Alexander v. Steele, 84 Ala. 332, 4 South. 281; Burch v. Gaston, 182 Ala. 467, 62 South. 508 (accounting refused unless fraud alleged, where will provides there need be no account); Williamson v. Grider, 97 Ark. 588, 135 S. W. 361 (court should require vouchers); Red Bud Realty Co. v. South, 96 Ark. 281, 131 S. W. 340 (all presumptions and doubts will be resolved against the § 1064. 3. The Duty to Obey Directions of the Court.— Wherever there is any *bona fide* doubt as to the true meaning and intent of provisions of the instrument creating the trust, or as to the particular course which he ought to pursue, the trustee is always entitled to maintain a suit in equity, at the expense of the trust estate, and obtain a judicial construction of the instrument, and directions as to

440; Ottley v. Gilby, 8 Beav. 602; Horton v. Brocklehurst, 29 Beav. 504; McDonnell v. White, 11 H. L. Cas. 570; Cramer v. Bird, L. R. 6 Eq. 143; Talbot v. Marshfield, L. R. 3 Ch. 622; Clark v. Moody, 17 Mass. 145, 148; Cooley v. Betts, 24 Wend. 203; Lockwood v. Thorne, 11 N. Y. 170, 62 Am. Dec. 81; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 62, 108; Miller v. Simonton, 5 S. C. 20.

trustee); Green v. Brooks, 81 Cal. 328, 22 Pac. 849 (the right to compel an accounting does not rest on fraud; it is merely to determine what has been received and what expended, so as to determine whether the cestui is entitled to payment); Weaver v. Fisher, 110 Ill. 146; Waterman v. Alden, 144 Ill. 90, 32 N. E. 972; Chirurg v. Ames, 138 Iowa, 697, 116 N. W. 865 (trustee may be charged with all items not accounted for); Dillivan v. German Savings Bank (Iowa) 124 N. W. 350 (trustee must keep strict and accurate account; burden is on him to show amount of receipts and expenditures); Morrill v. Morrill, 1 Allen (83 Mass.), 132 (need not account for land not in the jurisdiction); Munroe v. Holmes, 13 Allen (95 Mass.), 109 (as to what account should show); Clark v. Blackington, 110 Mass. 369; Dodd v. Winship, 133 Mass. 359; Appeal of Glover, 167 Mass. 280, 45 N. E. 744, (as to the right to reopen the account); Ashley v. Winkley, 209 Mass. 509, 95 N. E. 932 (burden is

on trustee to show proper discharge of duties); Loud v. Winchester, 52 Mich. 174, 17 N. W. 784; Coram v. Davis, 39 Mont. 495, 104 Pac. 518 (usually a demand should precede suit); Blauvelt v. Ackerman, 23 N. J. Eq. 495 (where the account has been kept in a negligent manner. the presumption will be against trustee on settlement); Elmer v. Loper, 25 N. J. Eq. 475 (where the account shows improper dealings, the trustee will not be allowed compensation); . In re Gaston, 35 N. J. Eq. 60; Smith v. Robinson, 83 N. J. Eq. 384, 90 Atl. 1063 (trustee must produce proper vouchers); McCulloch v. Tomkins, 62 N. J. Eq. 262, 49 Atl. 474; Averill v. Barber, 24 App. Div. 53, 49 N. Y. Supp. 123; Frethey v. Durant, 24 App. Div. 58, 48 N. Y. Supp. 839; Topping v. Windley, 99 N. C. 4, 5 S. E. 14; Libbett v. Maultsby, 71 N. C. 345; Martin v. Wilbourne, 66 N. C. 321; Royal v. Royal, 30 Or. 448, 47 Pac. 828, 48 Pac. 695; Landis v. Scott, 32 Pa. St. 495 (failure to keep an account compels the trustee to show nonhis own conduct.^a Such directions he must, of course, faithfully obey, and if he does so, he will be relieved from all responsibility therefor. Wherever any suit or proceeding is instituted by the beneficiary or other person interested, and the court by its decree or order therein directs anything to be done or omitted by the trustee, such directions are imperative, and must be implicitly obeyed. A refusal or neglect to obey may render the trustee liable to sum-

receipt of money he should have received); Christy v. Christy, 176 Pa. St. 421, 35 Atl. 245; Mintz v. Brock, 193 Pa. St. 294, 44 Atl. 417; In re Scott's Estate, 202 Pa. St. 389, 51 Atl. 1023; In re Morton's Estate, 201 Pa. St. 269, 50 Atl. 933; Gray v. Ward, (Tenn. Ch. App.) 52 S. W. 1028; Buchner v. Waite, (Tex. Civ. App.) 137 S. W. 383 (only person entitled to account can sue); In re Belt's Estate, 29 Wash. 535, 92 Am. St. Rep. 916, 70 Pac. 74; Borchert v. Borchert, 132 Wis. 593, 113 N. W. 35; In re McClear's Will, 147 Wis. 60, 132 N. W. 539 (accounting refused; rights were waived, so it would be futile); Speckart v. Schmidt, 190 Fed. 499, 111 C. C. A. 331 (no defense that plaintiff was influenced by others to sue, when under terms of trust defendant should have accounted long since). As a general rule, where the omission of the trustee to account is due to mere negligence, without any actual intent to defraud, simple interest alone is allowed the cestui que trust on the trust funds; but if the omission is willful, compound interest is allowed: Adams v. Lambard, 80 Cal. 426, 22 Pac. 180; Lathrop v. Smalley, 23 N. J. Eq. 192; State v. Howarth, 48 Conn. 207; Darlington v. Turner, 202 U. S. 195, 50 L. Ed. 992, 26 Sup.

Ct. 630 (if trustee does not keep accurate account, he may be charged interest on all property received); Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Silver King Consolidated Mining Co., 204 Fed. 166, 122 C. C. A. 402. As to the duty to produce documents and accounts for the inspection of the cestui, see In re Tillott, [1892] L. R. 1 Ch. 86; Ames Cas. on Trusts, 468; Wynne v. Humbertson, 27 Beav. 421 ("the rule is, that where the relation of trustee and cestui que trust is established, all cases submitted and opinions taken by the trustee to guide himself in the administration of his trust, and not for the purpose of his own defense in any litigation against himself, must be produced to the cestui que trust"); see In re Dartnall, [1895] 1 Ch. 474. For the interest necessary to entitle one to an accounting, see Hartman's Appeal. 90 Pa. St. 203; In re Dority, 40 App. Div. 236, 57 N. Y. Supp. 1073; In re Wagoner's Estate, 190 Pa. St. 513, 42 Atl. 955. As to accounting by quasi trustees, see § 1421.

§ 1064, (a) Quoted in Lake View M. & M. Co. v. Hannon, 93 Ala. 87, 9 South. 539; Knox v. Knox, 87 Kan. 381, 124 Pac. 409. This section is cited in Page v. Marston, 94 Me. 342, 47 Atl. 529. § 1064, ¹ Several of these cases are examples of such applications, or of when applications are or are not necessary: In re Shaw's Trusts, L. R. 12 Eq. 124; In re Strutt's Trusts, L. R. 16 Eq. 629; In re Potts's Estate, L. R. 16 Eq. 631, and note; In re T—, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 78; Middleton v. Chichester, L. R. 6 Ch. 152; Evans v. Bear, L. R. 10 Ch. 76; Iles v. Martin, 69 Ind. 114; James v. Cowing, 82 N. Y. 449; Williams v. Dwinelle,

§ 1064, (b) Suit for Instructions. See, also, Floyd v. Forbes, 71 Cal. 588, 12 Pac. 726; Whitelock v. Dorsey, 121 Md. 497, 88 Atl. 241; (if court is administering trust, the trustee is merely its agent; court nust sanction all acts); Gottschalk v. Mercantile Trust Co., 102 Md. 521, 62 Atl. 810 (same); Baer v. Kahn, (Md.) 101 Atl. 596 (same); Fairbanks v. Belknap, 135 Mass. 179, 181; Bremer v. Hadley, 196 Mass. 217, 81 N. E. 961; Greeley v. Nashua, 62 N. H. 166; Fisher v. Fisher, 170 N. C. 378, 87 S. E. 113 (trustee's violation of instructions approved by court); Walrond v. Walrond, 29 Beav. 586 (failure to comply with order to pay money may result in liability for compound interest). See, as to right to apply for instructions: to the court Stapyleton v. Neeley, 44 Fla. 212, 32 South. 868; Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill. 384, 95 N. E. 498 (court may construe trust on question of its duration); Browning v. Stiles, (N. J.) 65 Atl. 457 (some special equity must appear to give court jurisdiction); Read v. Citizens' St. R. Co., 110 Tenn. 316, 75 S. W. 1056; see, also, Bryan v. McCann, (W. Va.) 47 S. E. 143. Examples of such suits: Williamson v. Grider, 97 Ark. 588, 135 S. W. 361; Union Trust Co. v. Sheldon, 84 Conn. 494, 80 Atl. 758 (suit unnecessary); Bridgeport

Trust Co. v. Bartholomew, 90 Conn. 517, 97 Atl. 758 (premature); Carroll v. Smith, 99 Md. 653, 59 Atl. 131; Diggs v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 112 Md. 50, 20 Ann. Cas. 1274, 75 Atl. 517; Burroughs v. Wellington, 211 Mass, 494, 98 N. E. 596 (proceedings being analogous to interpleader, trustee cannot have suit dismissed when all parties are before the court and case is about to be decided); Hill v. Moors, 224 Mass. 163, 112 N. E. 641 (only as to present duties); Thorp v. Lund, 227 Mass. 474, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1204, 116 N. E. 946; Ripley v. Brown, 218 Mass. 33, 105 N. E. 637; Tibbetts v. Tompkinson, 217 Mass. 244, 104 N. E. 562 (only as to present duties); Gray v. Hemenway, 212 Mass. 239, 98 N. E. 789 (costs to be paid out of corpus); Harvey v. Harvey, 73 N. H. 106, 59 Atl. 621; Hewitt v. Green, 77 N. J. Eq. 345, 77 Atl. 25 (only as to present duties); Goetz v. Sickel, 71 N. J. Eq. 371, 63 Atl. 1116 (where bill was really to determine whether plaintiff's appointment is legal): Trustees of Princeton University v. Wilson, 78 N. J. Eq. 1, 78 Atl. 393; Ogden v. McLane, 73 N. J. Eq. 159, 67 Atl. 695 (suit premature); Passaic Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. East Ridgelawn Cemetery, (N. J. Eq.) 101 Atl. 1026 (same); Stephenson v. Norris, 128 Wis. 242, 107 N. W. 343.

§ 1065. 4. The Duty to Restore the Trust Property at the End of the Trust.—Finally, when the trust is ended, and the authority of the trustee as such ceases, it is his duty to restore the property to the persons who are then entitled to it either by the terms of the instrument or by operation of legal rules. To accomplish this object, he is bound to make such conveyances as the parties may require, in order to vest the title in them.¹^a

51 Cal. 442, 446. Among the instances where a suit for a judicial construction is proper is that of a will creating trusts, or giving property in trust: See *ante*, vol. 1, § 352, note 1. This particular subject is more fully examined in a subsequent section.^e

§ 1065, ¹ The trustee may, under some circumstances, demand a release of the trust from those to whom he transfers the estate: King v. Mullins, 1 Drew. 308; Goodson v. Ellison, 3 Russ. 583; Hampshire v. Bradley, 2 Coll. C. C. 34; Whitmarsh v. Robertson, 1 Younge & C. 715; Holford v. Phipps, 3 Beav. 434; Yeates v. Roberts, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 227; 3 Drew. 170; Cramer v. Bird, L. R. 6 Eq. 143; Stokes's Appeals, 80 Pa. St. 337; Pennock v. Lyons, 118 Mass. 92 (a lease executed by trustees in ignorance of the fact that the *cestui que trust* had died, and the trust thereby ended, is voidable only).

§ 1064, (c) See §§ 1155-1157.

§ 1065, (a) This section is cited in Ringrose v. Gleadall, 17 Cal. App. 664, 121 Pac. 407. See, also, Saunders v. Nevil, 2 Vern. 428 (the estate must be conveyed according to the terms of the trust); Watts v. Turner, 1 R. & M. 634. It would seem that the trustee could be compelled to make such conveyance, or do such acts, as regards the property, as he could do for himself in case he had the entire estate: Dawkins v. Penrhyn, 4 App. Cas. 51 (it seems he could be compelled to bar an estate tail, and enlarge it to a fee-simple, for the benefit of the cestui); see Turner v. Buck, 22 Viner's Abridgment, 21, pl. 5, where the court seems to have been misled by the mere fact that the cestui was a volunteer. The right to com-

pel a conveyance upon the impossibility of a condition being performed, upon which depended a limitation over, seems well recognized: In re Widdow's Trusts, L. R. 11 Eq. 408 (woman presumed past childbearing at fifty-three years and nine months); Davidson v. Kempton, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 213 (same, fiftyfour years); In re White, [1901] 1 Ch. 570 (same, fifty-six years, three months). In Towle v. Delano, 144 Mass. 95, 10 N. E. 769, the court refused to follow the case of In re Widdow's Trusts, supra, though the age of the woman was the same. See, also, Bearden v. White, (Tenn. Ch. App.) 42 S. W. 476; In re Radcliffe, [1892] 1 Ch. 227; Inches v. Hill, 106 Mass. 575 (a cestui obtained a conveyance of his portion of the estate). As to the presump§ 1066. II. To Use Care and Diligence.—The second branch of the trustee's obligation is to use care and diligence in the discharge of his functions. This duty is very comprehensive; it extends through the entire range of his conduct; it is entirely independent of the question of good

tion, in a collateral matter, that the trustee, whose sole duty is to convey, has performed that duty, see Reilly v. Conrad, 9 Del. Ch. 154, 78 Atl. 1080.

As to the right of the cestui to call for a conveyance, generally, see Onslow v. Wallis, 1 Hall & Twells 513; In re Lashmar, [1891] 1 Ch. 258; Woolley v. Preston, 82 Ky. 415; Paine v. Forsaith, 86 Me. 357, 30 Atl. 11; Reid v. Gordon, 35 Md. 174; Lemen v. McComas, 63 Md. 153; Gunn v. Brown, 63 Md. 96; Whall v. Converse, 146 Mass. 345, 15 N. E. 660; Archer v. American Water Works, 50 N. J. Eq. 33, 24 Atl. 508; Mathews v. McPherson, 65 N. C. 189 (the principle recognized hut a conveyance refused, as the cestui's right was not complete); Aubert's Appeal. 109 Pa. St. 447, 1 Atl. 336; Fisher v. Wister, 154 Pa. St. 65, 25 Atl. 1009; Nightingale v. Nightingale, 13 R. I. 113; Whelan v. Reilly, 3 W. Va. 597; Chamberlain v. Maynes, 108 Pa. St. 39, 36 Atl. 410; In re Barber, 36 Misc. Rep. 433, 73 N. Y. Supp. 749; Armistead's Ex'rs v. Hart, 97 Va. 316, 33 S. E. 616; Ordway v. Gardner, 107 Wis. 74, 82 N. W. 696; Thom's Ex'rs v. Thom, 95 Va. 413, 28 S. E. 583; Cherry v. Richardson, 120 Ala. 242, 24 South. 570; Webster v. Bush, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 565, 39 S. W. 411, 42 S. W. 1124; Adams v. Adams, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1756, 56 S. W. 151. As to the termination of a trust, when its purposes are fulfilled, and all bene-

ficiaries so desire, see, also, Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill. 384, 95 N. E. 498; Wayman v. Follansbee, 253 Ill. 602, 98 N. E. 21 (when the purposes have been accomplished as to some of the beneficiaries, the court may order the trust as to them terminated and distribution made, the trust being continued as to the other beneficiaries); Miller's Ex'rs v. Miller's Heirs, 172 Ky. 519, 189 S. W. 417; Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co., 195 Mass. 575, 12 Ann. Cas. 837, 81 N. E. 300; Angell v. Angell, 28 R. I. 592, 68 Atl. 583. For the right of a cestui to obtain a conveyance of specific property, instead of allowing the trustee or executor to sell, or manage it, and pay over the proceeds, see In re Browne's Will, 27 Beav. 324, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 458; Huber v. Donoghue, 49 N. J. Eq. 125, 23 Atl. 495; Mellen v. Mellen, 139 N. Y. 210, 34 N. E 925; McDonald v. O'Hara, 144 N. Y. 566, 39 N. E. 642; also, Stier v. Nashville Trust Co., 158 Fed. 601, 85 C. C. A. 423; In re Dongan, 139 Ga. 351, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 868, 77 S. E. 158; Wicker v. Moore, 79 Neb. 755, 113 N. W. 148; McKiernan v. McKiernan, (N. J. Eq.) 74 Atl. 289 (where no limitation upon the duration of the trust relation, it may be determined at any time by decree of the court with the consent of all parties); Bussell v. Wright, 133 Wis. 445, 113 N. W. 644; and see ante, § 991, note.

faith, for he will be liable for its failure even when no wrongful intent nor violation of good faith is charged upon him. He may be liable for its neglect by being held answerable for property actually lost through want of care or prudence, and also for moneys which he might have received if he had exercised due care, prudence, and judgment in his investments and other dealings with the trust estate. This head embraces the protection of trust property, the delegation of authority to third persons and to co-trustees, the amount of care and diligence requisite, and the important subject of making investments, which will be considered in the order here indicated.

§ 1067. 1. The Duty of Protecting the Trust Property. The trustee is bound to protect the trust property in every reasonable manner during the continuance of the trust.^{1 a}

§ 1067, ¹ The following cases are cited simply as illustrations of this duty, and as examples of acts which have been held to be or not to be violations of it: Wiles v. Gresham, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 770; Lloyd v. Atwood, 3 De Gex & J. 614; Harper v. Hayes, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 542; Case v. James, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 256; Turquand v. Marshall, L. R. 6 Eq.

§1067, (a) This section is cited in Smith v. Bank of New England, 72 N. H. 4, 54 Atl. 386. See, also, Tarver v. Torrance, 81 Ga. 261, 12 Am. St. Rep. 311, 6 S. E. 177 (liable for loss of trust funds stolen from his person). The court will not authorize the trust fund to be carried beyond its jurisdiction without requiring security for its protection: Cochran v. Fillans, 20 S. C. 237; McCullough v. McCullough, 44 N. J. Eq. 313, 14 Atl. 123, and reporter's note on foreign investment of trust funds; Hughes v. Edwards, [1892] App. Cas. 583; In re Morley, [1895] 2 Ch. 738; Lehman v. Robertson, 84 Ala. 489, 4 South. 728 (not liable for loss by robbery); Cornwell v. Deck, 8 Hun, 122 (administrator liable for money stolen from a trunk, when negligently kept); Stitzer v. Whittaker, (Neb.) 91 N. W. 713; Miller v. Miller, 148 Mo. 113, 49 S. W. 852. In general, Bourquin v. Bourquin, 120 Ga. 115, 47 S. E. 639 (trustee is bound to exercise the diligence of a prudent man to prevent the trust property from being sold for taxes); Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N. E. 381 (to prevent sacrifice of securities, may borrow money temporarily to be repaid out of proceeds of securities when sold); Oellien v. Galt, 150 Mo. App. 537, 131 S. W. 158 (duty to pay taxes as they accrue), Moeller v. Poland, 80 Ohio St. 418, 89 N. E. 100 (court will protect cestui if trustee does not and will refuse specific performance of an improvident agreement); Bryan v. McCann, 55 W. Va. 372, 47 S. E. 143.

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He must therefore with due diligence obtain possession of the trust property, and must then retain it securely under his own control. He cannot divest himself of the trust by conveying or assigning the property away to third persons,^c unless the trust itself is for the very purpose of a sale or other disposition; and even then he can only dispose of the property in pursuance of the trust, and to carry out its objects.² As a mode of obtaining secure possession, the trustee must with all reasonable diligence collect debts and demands, and the amounts due on choses in action, when required to do so by the terms of the trust instrument, or by the nature and objects of the trust, and he is liable for losses resulting from his neglect or unreasonable delay in this matter.^{3 d} Trust moneys may be deposited for a rea-

112, Taylor v. Cartwright, L. R. 14 Eq. 167; Ex parte Dressler, L. R.
9 Ch. Div. 252; Butler v Carter, L. R. 5 Eq. 276; Talbot v. Marshfield,
L. R. 3 Ch. 622; Dance v. Goldingham, L. R. 8 Ch. 902; Tolson v. Sheard,
L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 19; In re T—, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 78; Ex parte Culley,
L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 307; Goddard v. Brown, 12 R. I. 31; Pool v. Dial, 10
S. C. 440; Vose v. Trustees etc., 2 Woods, 647; Carpenter v. Carpenter,
12 R. I. 544, 34 Am. Rep. 716; Gilmore v. Tuttle, 32 N. J. Eq. 611;^b
Russell v. Peyton, 4 Ill. App. 473; Morrow v. Saline Co. Com'rs, 21
Kan. 484; Adair v Brimmer, 74 N. Y. 539; Foscue v. Lyon, 55 Ala. 440;
Wasson v Garrett, 58 Tenn. 477; Mansfield v. Alwood, 84 Ill. 497;
Sharp v. Goodwin, 51 Cal. 219; Gettins v. Scudder, 71 Ill. 86.

§ 1067, ² The trustee is, of course, liable for any loss occasioned by his undue neglect to obtain possession of the property or to retain it securely: See Salway v. Salway, 2 Russ. & M. 215; Butler v. Carter, L. R. 5 Eq. 276; Youde v. Cloud, L. R. 18 Eq. 634; Ex parte Ogle, L. R. 8 Ch. 711.

§ 1067, 3 The trustee's duties and liabilities concerning investments, and his permitting funds to remain invested in certain kinds of securities, are stated in subsequent paragraphs: §§ 1071-1074. The nature of the trust will generally determine whether notes, stocks, and other things in

§ 1067, (b) Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617.

§ 1067, (c) Anderson v. Robinson, (Phegley), 57 Or. 172, 109 Pac. 1118, 110 Pac. 975.

§ 1067, (d) Duty to Collect Debts. See, also, Billings v. Brogden, 38 Ch. Div. 546; Leonard's Appeal, 95 Pa. St. 196; Mill's Adm'r v. Talley's Adm'r, 83 Va. 361, 5 S. E. 368; Lawson v. Copeland, 2 Br. Ch. Cas. 156, Ames Cas. on Trusts 492 (failure to collect a debt); Munden v. Bailey, 70 Ala. 63 (administrator not collecting a note); Purdy v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 521, 163 Pac. 893 (same): sonable time in a bank having good credit, if the deposit is made to the credit of the trust estate, and not in the trustee's individual name and account; and the trustee does not become liable for a loss occasioned by a failure of the bank under these circumstances.⁴ • He is liable, however,

action should be converted into money. If the trust instrument, in terms, gives to a beneficiary the income arising from certain specified choses in action, the form of the investment would thus he declared, and no duty would generally arise to convert such securities into money: See Wiles v. Gresham, 2 Drew. 258; 5 De Gex, M. & G. 770; Grove v. Price, 26 Beav. 103; Sculthorpe v. Tipper, L. R. 13 Eq. 232; Ex parte Ogle, L. R. 8 Ch. 711; Bacot v. Heyward, 5 S. C. 441 (compromising a debt); Mansfield v. Alwood, 84 Ill. 497 (collecting rents and profits); Dockery v. French, 73 N. C. 420 (receiving payments in Confederate.money); Moore v. Mitchell, 2 Woods, 483 (ditto).

§ 1067, 4 Rowth v. Howell, 3 Ves. 565; Swinfen v. Swinfen, 29 Beav. 211; Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 372; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 12 R. I. 544, 34 Am. Rep. 716 (bonds placed in a bank as a special deposit and stolen); Crane v. Moses, 13 S. C. 561.

State v. Gregory, 88 Ind. 110; Hunt v. Gontrum, 80 Md. 64, 30 Atl. 620 (accepting notes instead of money); Bennett v. Pierce, 188 Mass. 186, 74 N. E. 360 (where successors of trustee found estate impaired, they should collect from his personal estate, or may themselves be held liable for deficiency); Booker v. Armstrong, 93 Mo. 49, 4 S. W. 727 (failure to sell and realize on security); Backus v. Crane, (N. J. Eq.) 100 Atl. 900 (failure to collect dividend from estate of insolvent debtor); Harrington v. Keteltas, 92 N. Y. 40 (executor failing to collect debt); Re Anderson, 211 N. Y. 136, 105 N. E. 79 (acceptance of worthless lease as so much cash and failing to collect shortage from predecessor); Wilson v. Lineberger, 88 N. C. 416; Torrence v. Davidson, 92 N. C. 437, 53 Am. Rep. 419 (administrator not bound to sue on a debt if it would probably occasion loss to the estate); Rowe v. Bentley, 29 Gratt. 756; Lovett v. Thomas, 81 Va. 245 (not bound to sue for debt where it is probable the debtor could not pay it); Venable v. Cody, 68 Ga. 171 (receiving payment in Confederate money); approved in McCook v. Harp, 81 Ga. 229, 7 South. 174; Pool v. Dial, 10 S. C. 440 (compromise).

§ 1067, (e) Depositing Trust Moneys in Bank .---- This section is quoted in Smith v. Fuller, 86 Ohio St. 57, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 387, 99 N. E. 214. Sections 1067, 1076 are cited in Chancellor v. Chancellor, 177 Ala. 44, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1, 58 South. 423, discussing deposits of trust funds. See Munnerlyn v. Augusta Bank, 88 Ga. 333, 30 Am. St. Rep. 159, 14 S. E. 554; Norwood v. Harness, 98 Ind. 134, 49 Am. Rep. 739 (quoting the text and stating that "the question in all such cases is, was the trustee reasonably prudent in making or continuing the defor a loss resulting from a failure of the bank or of a broker, when funds which ought to have been invested are left remaining on deposit, or when the deposit is in the trustee's individual account mingled with his own funds.^{5 f} For wrongful payments made to third persons, or to a *cestui que trust*, the trustee is generally chargeable.^{6 g}

§ 1067, ⁵ Challen v. Shippam, 4 Hare, 555; Johnson v. Newton, 11 Hare, 160; Swinfen v. Swinfen, 29 Beav. 211; Rehden v. Wesley, 29 Beav. 213; Matthews v. Brise, 6 Beav. 239; Moyle v. Moyle, 2 Russ. & M. 710; Salway v. Salway, 2 Russ. & M. 215. As to mingling trust funds with his own, see *post*, § 1076.

§ 1067, 6 Each case must, to a great extent, stand upon its own circumstances. Where a payment made in good faith, and with the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, turns out to be wrong, the trustee may not be obliged to make the amount good for the benefit of the estate.

posit?"); Jacobus v. Jacobus, 37 N. J. Eq. 17; People v. Faulkner, 107 N. Y. 477, 14 N. E. 415; In re Law's Estate, 144 Pa. St. 499, 14 L. R. A. 103, 22 Atl. 831; Officer v. Officer, 120 Iowa, 389, 98 Am. St. Rep. 365, and note, 94 N. W. 947; Knight v. Plymouth, 1 Dick. 120 (trustee may remit to a distance through a broker).

§1067, (f) See Cann v. Cann, 33 Weekly Rep. 40, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 481 (a deposit of fourteen months not allowed); Ashbury v. Beasly, 17 Weekly Rep. 638 (the amount being large may affect the time it may be left on deposit); Thompson v. Clydesdale Bank, [1893] App. Cas. 282; Barney v. Saunders, 16 How. 535, 14 L. Ed. 1047 (if the deposit amounts to a loan the trustees are liable); In re Arguello, 97 Cal. 196, 31 Pac. 937, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 482 (deposit in name of trustee individually); In re Wood, 159 Cal. 466, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 252, 114 Pac. 992; Ricks v. Broyles, 78 Ga. 610, 6 Am. St. Rep. 280, 3 S. E. 772 (general deposit is a loan and not allowed); State v. Greensdale, 106 Ind. 364, 55 Am.

Rep. 753, 6 N. E. 926; Naltner v. Dolan, 108 Ind. 504, 58 Am. Rep. 61, 8 N. E. 289; State v. Gooch, 97 N. C. 186, 2 Am. St. Rep. 284; Summers v. Reynolds, 95 N. C. 404; Woodley v. Holley, 111 N. C. 380, 16 S. E. 419 (amount left on deposit for three years); Williams v. Williams, 55 Wis. 300, 42 Am. Rep. 708, 12 N. W. 465, 13 N. W. 274; Appeal of Baer, 127 Pa. St. 360, 4 L. R. A. 609, 18 Atl. 1 (deposit for u definite time not allowed); Frankenfield's Appeal. 127 Pa. St. 369 (same); Booth v. Wilkinson, 78 Wis. 652, 23 Am. St. Rep. 443, 47 N. W. 1128 (administrator).

§ 1067, (g) See, also, Kimball v. Norton, 59 N. H. 1, 47 Am. Rep. 171 (a stipulation between a savings bank and a depositor that his deposit may be paid to any one presenting his book does not relieve the bank from the duty of exercising reasonable care); Judy v. Farmers', etc., Bank, 81 Mo. 404 (bank deposit). Compare In re Horne (Wilson v. Cox Sinclair), [1905] 1 Ch. 76, as to overpayments by a trustee who is also himself a beneficiary. § 1068. 2. The Duty not to Delegate His Authority.— The office of a trustee is one of personal confidence, and cannot be delegated. A trustee, therefore, unless expressly authorized by the instrument of trust, cannot delegate, or transfer, or intrust, in whole or in part, his powers of discretion and management to any associate, subordinate, or assistant who takes his place and assumes his responsibility. If he does so, he remains liable to the beneficiary, and is chargeable for all acts and omissions of his delegate, and with all losses, whether occasioned by the latter's fraud, neglect, want of good faith, or other cause.¹^a This rule

The following cases are mere examples: Forshaw v. Higginson, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 827; Aveline v. Melhnish, 2 De Gex, J. & S. 288; Darke v. Williamson, 25 Beav. 622; Ward v. Ward, 2 H. L. Cas. 777, 784; Gunnell v. Whitear, L. R. 10 Eq. 664; Hayes v. Oatley, L. R. 14 Eq. 1; Taylor v. Cartwright, L. R. 14 Eq. 167; Ex parte Ogle, L. R. 8 Ch. 711; In re Englefield etc. Co., L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 388; In re Cull's Trusts, L. R. 20 Eq. 561; Talbot v. Marshfield, L. R. 3 Ch. 622; Haydel v. Hurck, 5 Mo. App. 267; Singleton v. Lowndes, 9 S. C. 465; Wasson v. Garrett, 58 Tenn. 477; Draper v. Stone, 71 Me. 175.

§ 1068, ¹ Ex parte Rigley, 19 Ves. 463; Adams v. Clifton, 1 Russ. 297; Salway v. Salway, 4 Russ. 60; 2 Russ. & M. 215; Eaves v. Hickson, 30 Beav. 136; Turner v. Corney, 5 Beav. 515, 517; Ghost v. Waller, 9 Beav. 497; Griffiths v. Porter, 25 Beav. 236; Rowland v. Witherden, 3 Macn. & G. 568; Bostock v. Floyer, L. R. 1 Eq. 26; Berger v. Duff, 4 Johns. Ch. 368; Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 318; Pearson v. Jamison, 1 McLean, 197; Vose v. Trustees, etc., 2 Woods, 647; Seely v. Hills, 49 Wis. 473.

§ 1068, (a) Anonymous, 3 Swanst. 79, n. (a), Ames Cas. on Trusts, 508 (even though the *cestui* consented); Mortimer v. Latimer, 11 Jur. 721, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 508; Cooke v. Crawford, 13 Sim. 91, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 509 (though the trust deed read, to A, B, & C and the survivors or survivor of them, or the heirs of such survivor, it does not give a right to assign the trust); Fry v. Tapson, 28 Ch. Div. 268; Robinson v. Harkin, [1896] 2 Ch. 415 (trustee liable for loss occasioned by employment of improper broker); Gosling

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v. Gaskell, [1897] App. Cas. 575; Wyman v. Paterson, [1900] App. Cas. 271 (liable for loss from bankruptcy of agent employed); In re Sheppard (De Brimont v. Harvey), [1911] 1 Ch. 50 (as to permitting solicitor to hold moneys for an unreasonable time); Saunders v. Webber, 39 Cal. 287; In re Wood, 159 Cal. 466, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 252, and note, 114 Pac. 992 (giving control of funds to surety); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Butler, 130 Ga. 225, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 994, 60 S. E. 851 (giving joint control of funds to surety); does not prohibit a trustee from employing agents. He may act through agents in his administrative operations whenever such a mode of dealing is in accordance with the ordinary course of business.²

§ 1068, ² For example, he may employ a steward or manager of the estate for all matters strictly ministerial; he can, of course, employ clerks, bookkeepers, and the like; he can deposit trust moneys in a responsible bank, and direct clerks who collect sums to deposit them therein; he can remit moneys by bills drawn on and by responsible parties, etc. If he act in such manner according to the customary modes of doing business, in good faith and with reasonable prudence, he will not be responsible for the loss of trust funds occurring through such dealings:^b Wren v. Kirton, 11 Ves. 377; Massey v. Banner, 1 Jacob & W. 241; Clough v. Bond, 3 Mylne & C. 490; Joy v. Campbell, 1 Schoales & L. 328, 341; Darke v. Martyn, 1 Beav. 525; Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 318, 487; Sinclair v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 543; Abbot v. Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578; Leggett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445; Blight v. Schenck, 10 Pa. St. 285, 51 Am. Dec. 478; Lewis v. Reed, 11 Ind. 239; Telford v. Barney, 1 Iowa, 575, 591.

Grover v. Hale, 107 Ill. 638 (sale in the absence of the trustee held void); Coleman v. Connelly, 242 Ill. 574, 134 Am. St. Rep. 347, 90 N. E. 278 (cannot delegate authority so far as discretionary acts are concerned); Spurlock v. Sproule, 72 Mo. 503 (same); Powell v. Tuttle, 3 N. Y. 396 (only one of several commissioners present); Fuller v. O'Neil, 69 Tex. 349, 5 Am. St. Rep. 59, 6 S. W. 181 (a sale of land under a trust deed in the nature of a mortgage, not conducted by the trustee in person, held void); Smith v. Lowther, 35 W. Va. 300, 13 South. 999; see contra, Johns v. Sergeant, 45 Miss. 332; Tyler v. Herring, 67 Miss. 169, 19 Am. St. Rep. 263, 6 South. 840: Dunton v. Sharpe, 70 Miss. 850, 12 South. 800; Taylor v. Dickinson, 15 Iowa, 483 (the trust deed may provide that any one of several trustees may act); Bradford v. Monks, 132 Mass. 405 (deed may impliedly provide that the trust may be assigned); Fish v. Carter, 48 Hun, 64. See ante, § 1062.

§ 1068, (b) Acting Through Agents. In re Belchier, Amb. 218, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 516 (an assignee in bankruptey had employed a broker to sell tohacco and he died insolvent without having paid over the proceeds of the sale; the court said: "This court has laid down a rule with regard to trustees, so as not to strike a terror into mankind acting for the benefit of others, and not for their own"); Speight v. Gaunt, 22 Ch. Div. 727, on appeal, 9 App. Cas. (H. L.) 1; compare Fry v. Tapson, 28 Ch. Div. 268; see, also, Stockwell v. Barnum, 7 Cal. App. 413, 94 Pac. 400 (may employ his attorney as auctioneer to conduct sale); Dillivan v. German Savings Bank (Iowa), 124 N. W. 350 (trustee ' employing agent to collect rents is liable for rents collected); An lerson v. Roberts, 147 Mo. 486, 48 S. W. 847 (a valuable case); Keim v. Lind-

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§ 1069. 3. The Duty not to Surrender Entire Control to a Co-trustee.—As a trustee cannot delegate his authority to a subordinate, so on the same principle he cannot idly yield or surrender the entire control of the trust property and exercise of the trust functions to his co-trustees, when he is associated in the trust with others. A trustee is not liable under all circumstances for every act or default of his co-trustees; but still, in general, where there are several trustees, the beneficiary is entitled to that security and protection which result from the care, oversight, and co-operation of all the trustees. If, therefore, a trustee virtually abandons his active functions, neglects to interpose in the management, and leaves the whole control to his co-trustees. he will be liable for losses occasioned by their wrongful acts or neglects.^{1 a}

§ 1070. 4. The Amount of Care and Diligence Required. The principle is well settled that trustees are bound to exercise care and prudence in the execution of their trust, in the same degree that men of common prudence ordinarily

§ 1069, 1 Clough v. Bond, 3 Mylne & C. 490, 497; Burrows v. Walls, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 233; Styles v. Guy, 1 Macn. & G. 422; Paddon v. Richardson, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 563; Thompson v. Finch, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 560, 563, 564; Bates v. Underhill, 3 Redf. 365; Gray v. Reamer, 11 Bush, 113; Spencer v. Spencer, 11 Paige, 299; Clark v. Clark, 8 Paige, 152, 35 Am. Dec. 676; Monell v. Monell, 5 Johns. Ch. 283, 9 Am. Dec. 298; Banks v. Wilkes, 3 Sand. Ch. 99; Pim v. Downing, 11 Serg. & R. 66; Jones's Appeal, 8 Watts & S. 143, 147, 42 Am. Dec. 282; Wayman v. Jones, 4 Md. Ch. 500; Ringgold v. Ringgold, 1 Har. & G. 11, 18 Am. Dec. 250; Maccubbin v. Cromwell's Ex'rs, 7 Gill & J. 157; Royall's Adm'r v. Me-Kenzie, 25 Ala. 363; State v. Guilford, 15 Ohio, 593. For the relations between co-trustees and their liabilities in general, see *post*, §§ 1081, 1082.

ley (Griffith), (N. J. Ch.) 30 Atl. 1063; Gates v. Dudgeon, 173 N. Y. 426, 93 Am. St. Rep. 608, 66 N. E. 116; Bohlen's Estate, 75 Pa. 304; Field v. Field, [1894] 1 Ch. 425 (where necessary, the trustee may allow title deeds to remain with his solicitor); Jobson v. Palmer, [1893] 1 Ch. 71; Shepherd v. Harris, [1905], 2 Ch. 310 (may employ broker, and if will permits, use a co-trustee in that capacity). See *ante*, § 1062.

§ 1069, (a) See, also, Earle v. Earle, 93 N. Y. 113; Hinson v. Williamson, 74 Ala. 180. exercise in their own affairs. A trustee, in other words, must use the same care, skill, diligence, and prudence in his management of the trust and his dealings with the trust property which a man of ordinary care, skill, and prudence would use in his own transactions and with his own property under like circumstances; and the trustee is answerable for all losses, deficiencies, and injuries which are occasioned by his affirmative or negative violation of this obligation.¹ The law does not cast upon the trustee an extraordinary

§ 1070, 1 This doctrine was so fully and ably examined in the very recent case of Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65, 37 Am. Rep. 546, that I shall quote from it at some length. The action was brought by a receiver representing the depositors against a portion of the directors of a savings bank. The bank was located in New York City, and did a very small business. Up to January, 1873, its average deposits were about seventy thousand dollars, and its income had been less than its expenses. In May, 1873, the bank, by order of the board of directors, bought a lot for twenty-nine thousand dollars, paying ten thousand dollars of this price in cash; it then erected a building on this lot, costing twenty-seven thousand dollars, and gave a mortgage thereon for thirty thousand five hundred dollars. All this was done with the avowed object of increasing the apparent credit of the bank and thereby its business. Two years after, the bank failed. This lot and building, and other property amounting only to one thousand dollars, constituted the entire assets of the bank. In other words, all the assets except one thousand dollars were swallowed up in the lot and building, and this was all swept away by a foreclosure of the mortgage. Before the purchase of the lot, the bank had occupied leased rooms; and its total assets were several thousand dollars less than its debts, which fact was known to the directors when they made the purchase. The charter gave the directors power to purchase a lot for a banking-house. Held, that the transaction was not a mere error of judgment, and that the directors were personally liable. In regard to the position of directors, the court held that the relation of the directors to the bank was that of agent to a principal, the relation of the directors to the depositors was that of trustee and cestui que trust. On the general doctrine concerning the duty of trustees, the court said, per Earl, J. (p. 70): "If the trustees act fraudulently or do a willful wrong, it is not doubted that they may be held for all the damage they cause to the bank or its depositors. But if they act in good faith, within the limits of powers conferred, using proper prudence and diligence, they are not responsible for mere mistakes or errors of judgment. What degree of care and diligence are they bound to exercise? Not the highest degree, not such as a very vigilant or

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duty, nor demand an extraordinary care, nor hold him liable for *mere* error of judgment, much less does it make him an insurer of the property.^a If he has exercised the care and judgment of ordinary prudent men in their own affairs, he will not be chargeable for his mere errors of judgment, nor for accidental injuries and losses.^b This rule concerning the extent and limits of the trustee's duty to use care, diligence, and prudence applies to all his transactions in connection with the trust, and all his dealings with the

extremely careful person would exercise. . . . When one deposits money in a savings bank, or takes stock in a corporation, he expects, and has the right to expect, that the trustees or directors will exercise ordinary care and prudence in the trusts committed to them,-the same degree of care and prudence that men prompted by self-interest generally exercise in their own affairs. It is impossible to give the measure of culpable negligence for all cases, as the degree of care required depends upon the subjects to which it is to be applied: First Nat. Bank v. Ocean Nat. Bank, 60 N. Y. 278, 19 Am. Rep. 181. There is a classification of negligence to be found in the books, not always of practical value, and yet sometimes serviceable, into slight negligence, gross negligence, and that degree of negligence, intermediate the two, attributed to the absence of ordinary care; and the claim on behalf of these trustees is, that they can only be held responsible in this action for the consequences of their gross negligence, according to this classification. If gross negligence he taken according to its ordinary meaning,-as something nearly approaching fraud or bad faith,-I cannot yield to this claim; and if there are any authorities upholding the claim, I emphatically dissent from them. It seems to me that it would be a monstrous proposition to hold that trustees, intrusted with the management of the property, interests, and business of other people, who divest themselves of the management and confide in them, are bound to give only slight care to the duties of their trust, and are liable only in case of gross inattention and negligence; and I have found no authority fully upholding such a proposition. It is true that authorities are found which hold that trustees are liable only for crassa negligentia, which literally means gross negligence; but that phrase has been defined to mean the absence of ordinary care and diligence adequate to the particular case." He then quotes from Scott v. Depeyster, 1 Edw. Ch. 513, 543, 53 Am. Dec. 624, Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R. I. 312, 53 Am. Dec. 624, 3 R. I. 9, Litchfield v. White, 3 Sandf. 545,

§ 1070, (a) The text is cited to this effect in Ripley v. McGavic, 120 Iowa, 52, 94 N. W. 452. §1070, (b) The text is quoted and followed in Wylie v. Bushnell, 277 Ill. 484, 115 N. E. 618.

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trust property, by which the interests of the beneficiary can be affected. If some of the particular rules concerning the making and retaining of investments seem to be more

and Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 405, all of which directly sustain his position, and continues: "In the Scotch case of Liquidators of the Western Bank v. Douglas, 11 Ses. Cas. S., 3d series, 112, it is said: 'Whatever the duties [of trustees and directors], are, they must be discharged with fidelity and conscience, and with ordinary and reasonable care. It is not necessary that I should attempt to define where excusable remissness ends and gross negligence begins. That must depend to a large extent on the circumstances. It is enough to say that gross negligence in the performance of such a duty, the want of reasonable and ordinary fidelity and care, will impose liability for loss thereby occasioned.' In Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11, 10 Am. Rep. 684, Judge Sharswood said: 'They [the directors] can only be regarded as mandataries,---persons who have gratuitously undertaken to perform certain duties, and who are therefore bound to apply ordinary skill and diligence,-but no more'; and added that the directors 'are not liable for mistakes of judgment, even though they may be so gross as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous. provided they were honest, and provided they are fairly within the scope of the powers and discretion confided to the managing body.' As I understand this language, I cannot assent to it as properly defining to any extent the nature of a director's responsibility. Like a mandatary, to whom he has been likened, he is bound not only to exercise proper care and diligence, but ordinary skill and judgment. As he is bound to exercise ordinary skill and judgment, he cannot set up that he did not possess them. When damage is caused by his want of judgment, he cannot excuse himself by alleging his gross ignorance."

The language of some able decisions may, when carelessly read, be misleading. They speak of "gross" negligence as a measure of a trustee's liability, but at the same time define "gross" negligence as merely being the want of ordinary care. Thus in the Scotch case quoted above, "gross negligence" is made to be synonymous with "the want of reasonable and ordinary care and fidelity." A few subsequent cases have taken a portion of this rule-the gross negligence-apparently without adverting to the definition thus given of the term: Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11, referred to by Mr. Justice Earl, may be regarded as an illustration. It may be difficult, perhaps, to reconcile the different passages of Judge Sharswood's opinion in this case. So far as it holds the trustee liable only for gross negligence, using that word in any other sense than the want of ordinary care, it is unsupported by authority. The English courts have abandoned the three grades of gross, ordinary, and slight negligence. The modern English decisions have entirely abrogated the

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stringent, they will be found, upon closer examination, to be applications of the same general doctrine, varied only by the nature and situation of the subject-matter. It re-

doctrine so often laid down in books, that an uncompensated mandatary or other bailee is only bound to use slight care, and is only liable for gross neglect; they hold that such mandatary or bailee may be bound to use great care, and is always obliged to use all the care and skill which he actually possesses: See Wilson v. Brett, 11 Mees. & W. 113, 115, per Rolfe, B.; Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Q. B. 646, 661, per Lord Denman; Wyld v. Pickford, 8 Mees. & W. 443, 461, 462, per Parke, B.; Grill v. Central Iron etc. Co., L. R. I. Com. P. 600, 612, 614, per Willes and Montague Smith, JJ. On every consideration of principle, as well as upon authority, the same doctrine must apply to trustees. The case of Turquand v. Marshall, L. R. 4 Ch. 376, gives no support whatever to the broad doctrine as laid down by Judge Sharswood. The decision of the court is simply that on the bill framed upon charges of misrepresentation against the directors, relief cannot be granted for their negligence. Lord Hatherley does not discuss the general duties of directors, much less those of trustees; his dictum concerning the liability of the defendants for their dealings (p. 386) is based wholly upon the terms of their "deed of settlement" and the powers which it gave them in this particular case. The decision is not an authority upon the liability in general of trustees or directors for care and diligence. In the often-quoted case of Clough v. Bond, 3 Mylne & C. 490, 496, Lord Cottenham states the rule in a very clear manner. He is speaking of the duty with reference to the safety and security of trust funds; but the same doctrine clearly applies to all dealings by a trustee with the affairs of the trust which may endanger the safety of the estate. "It will be found to be the result of all the best authorities upon the subject, that although a personal representative, acting strictly within the line of his duty, and exercising reasonable care and diligence, will not be responsible for the failure or depreciation of the fund in which any part of the estate may be invested, or for the insolvency or misconduct of any person who may have possessed it, yet if that line of duty be not strictly pursued, and any part of the property be invested by such personal representative in funds or upon securities not authorized, or be put within the control of persons who ought not to be intrusted with it, and a loss be thereby eventually sustained, such personal representative will be liable to make it good, however unexpected the result, however little likely to arise from the course adopted, and however free such conduct may have been from any improper motive."

While the general rule is thus settled, the courts constantly reiterate the truth that in its application each case must stand upon its own circumstances. The following citations are necessarily given as mere illustrasults from the duty that a trustee may be held accountable for more property than that which actually came into his possession. He may be charged with rents, profits, inter-

tions; in some, trustees have violated their duty; in others, they have erred (if at all) only in judgment: ^c Kekewich v. Marker, 3 Macn. & G. 311 (discretion expressly given to the trustees; and see *ante*, cases under § 1062); In re Beloved Wilkes's Charity, 3 Macn. & G. 440 (ditto); Barnett v. Sheffield, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 371, 379; Manser v. Dix, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 703, 712; Forshaw v. Higginson, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 827, 832; Baud v. Fardell, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 628; Harper v. Hayes, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 542; Dance v. Goldingham, L. R. 8 Ch. 902; Youde v. Cloud, L. R. 18 Eq. 634; Vyse v. Foster, L. R. 8 Ch. 309; In re Englefield etc. Co., L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 388; Massey v. Banner, 1 Jacob & W. 241, 247; Charitable Corp'n v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 405; Overend v. Gibb, L. R. 5 H. L. 480, 484, 494; Pool v. Dial, 10 S. C. 440; Luigi v. Luchesi, 12 Nev. 306; Bacot v. Heyward, 5 S. C. 441; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 12 R. I.

§ 1070, (c) This section is cited generally in Kessler & Co. v. Ensley Co., 129 Fed. 397; Re Wood, 159 Cal. 466, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 252, 114 Pac. 992; Lesesne v. Cheves, 105 S. C. 432, 90 S. E. 37. Cited in Waterman v. Alden, 144 Ill. 90, 32 N. E. 972, as authority for statement that trustees must discharge their duties to the best of their skill and ability, "with such care and diligence as men fit to be intrusted with such matters may fairly be expected to put forth in their own business of equal importance." See, also, Bacon v. Bacon, 5 Ves. 331; In re Grindey, [1898] 2 Ch. 593 (see for the effect of statute allowing exemption from liability where the acts are honest and reasonable); In re Lord Clifford's Estate, [1900] 2 Ch. 707; Lowson v. Copeland, 2 Brown Ch. Cas. 156, Ames Cas. on Trusts, 493 (liable for not recovering a debt); see Knight v. Plymouth, 1 Dick. 120 (where money was transmitted through an agent); Hitchcock v. Cosper, (Ind. App.) 69 N. E. 1029; Dillivan v. German Savings Bank, (Iowa) 124 N. W. 350 (held to ordinary care to make property produce income); Bogard v. Planters' Bank & Trust Co. (Ky.) 112 S. W. 872; Callaway v. Hubner, 99 Md. 529, 58 Atl. 362; Thayer v. Dewey, 185 Mass. 68, 69 N. E. 1074; Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N. E. 381 (case where court would have held trustee liable if will had not confined liability to cases of willful neglect or default); Michigan Home Missionary Soc. v. Corning, 164 Mich. 395, 129 N. W. 686; Beam v. Paterson Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 195, 86 Atl. 369 (shrinkage of funds to ten per cent of their original value raises prima facie case against trustee); Costello v. Costello, 209 N. Y. 252, 103 N. E. 148; Belding v. Archer, 131 N. C. 287, 42 S. E. 800; Stewart v. Madden, 153 Pa. St. 445, 34 Am. St. Rep. 713, 25 Atl. 803 (the discretion of a trustee will be controlled by the court, as it is only a "legal discretion"); In re Adams' Estate, 221 Pa. St. 77, 128 Am. St. Rep. 727, 15 Ann. Cas. 518, 70 Atl. 436 (measure of care not that actually beest, income, proceeds of sales, and the like, which he never in fact received, but which he might and should have received by the exercise of due and reasonable care, diligence,

544, 34 Am. Rep. 716; Gilmore v. Tuttle, 32 N. J. Eq. 611;^d Russell v. Peyton, 4 Ill. App. 473; Haydel v. Hurck, 5 Mo. App. 267; Morrow v. Saline Co. Com'rs, 21 Kan. 484; Adair v. Brimmer, 74 N. Y. 539; King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76, 50 Barb. 453; Foscue v. Lyon, 55 Ala. 440; Clark v. Anderson, 13 Bush, 111; Mansfield v. Alwood, 84 Ill. 497; Gettins v. Scudder, 71 Ill. 86; Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass. 262; Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R. I. 312, 53 Am. Dec. 624; 3 R. I. 9; Scott v. Depeyster, 1 Edw. Ch. 513, 543; Litchfield v. White, 3 Sand. 545; Ackerman v. Emott, 4 Barb. 626, 645, 646; Ringgold v. Ringgold, 1 Har. & G. 11, 25, 18 Am. Dec. 250.^e See, also, especially, on that branch of the

stowed by trustee in his own business); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 81 S. C. 506, 62 S. E. 845; Pearson v. Gillenwaters, 99 Tenn. 446, 63 Am. St. Rep. 844, 42 S. W. 9 (administrator not liable for depreciation for delaying sale at the request of the beneficiary, and under the advice of counsel); Winder v. Nock, 104 Va. 759, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 415, and note, 52 S. E. 561, on degree of care required of trustee who sells; Elliott v. Carter, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 541 (the court says: "Where they [trustees] have intended to discharge their duties fairly, I think they should be treated with tenderness, , and due caution taken not to hold him liable upon slight or uncertain grounds, lest by a different policy men of integrity, and who would be actuated by the proper views, may be deterred from taking upon themselves an office so necessary in the concerns of life, from fear of the anxiety, trouble and risk which it involves"); approved and quoted in Hoke v. Hoke, 12 W. Va. 427. For cases in which the trustee was held to act reasonably in not attempting to collect a debt, see Bowen v. Montgomery, 48 Ala. 353; Sanborn v. Goodhue, 28 N. H. 48, 59 Am.

Dec. 398; and if he acted unreasonably in suing, he is allowed no costs incurred; Anderson v. Piercy, 20 W. Va. 282. See, in general, In re Benson, [1899] 1 Ch. 39; Hogg v. Hoag, 107 Fed. 807; Hughes v. Williams, 99 Va. 312, 38 S. E. 138; Phillips v. Burton, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 720, 52 S. W. 1064 (valuable case as to the rate of interest payable).

§1070, (d) Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617.

§1070, (e) Also Speight v. Gaunt, 22 Ch. Div. 727; on appeal, 9 App. Cas. (H. L.) 1; Fry v. Tapson, 28 Ch. Div. 268; Learoyd v. Whiteley, 12 App. Cas. (H. L.) 727, affirming 33 Ch. Div. 347; Wilmerding v. Mc-Kesson, 103 N. Y. 329, 8 N. E. 665; Matter of Cornell, 110 N. Y. 358, 18 N. E. 142; Shurtleff v. Rile, 140 Mass. 213, 40 N. E. 407; McCartin v. Traphagen, 43 N. J. Eq. 340, 11 Atl. 156; Fesmire's Estate, 134 Pa. St. 67, 19 Am. St. Rep. 676, 19 Atl. 502; Parsley's Adm'r v. Martin, 77 Va. 376, 46 Am. Rep. 733; Pate v. Oliver, 104 N. C. 466, 10 S. E. 709; Pope v. Mathews, 18 S. C. 444; Crumpler v. Deens, 85 Ala. 149, 4 South. 826; Boaz v. Milliken, 83 Ky. 634; Loud v. Winchester, 64 Mich. 23, 30 N. W. 896; Dundas v. Chrisand prudence in his modes of dealing.² A trustee who pays the wrong party will generally be liable to pay over again to those who are really entitled.³

rule which frees trustees from liability for mere errors of judgment,⁴ Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11, 10 Am. Rep. 684; Miller v. Proctor, 20 Ohio St. 442; Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191, 46 Am. Dec. 211; Finlay v. Merriman, 39 Tex. 56, 62; Salter v. Salter, 6 Bush, 624, 638; Cross v. Petree, 10 B. Mon. 413; Ellig v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 683, 695; Thompson v. Brown, 4 Johns. Ch. 619, 627; Vanderheyden v. Young, 11 Johns. 150, 157; Griffith v. Follett, 20 Barb. 620, 634; Smith v. Rathbun, 22 Hun, 150.

§ 1070, 2 Mansfield v. Alwood, 84 Ill. 407; Ellig v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 684.

§ 1070, ³ Where a trustee, acting in good faith, and even deceived by forged documents, pays trust funds to the wrong party, it is held that he must pay over again the amount, with interest, to those who are entitled: Ashby v. Blackwell, 2 Eden, 299, 302; Eaves v. Hickson, 30 Beav. 136; Sporle v. Barnaby, 10 Jur., N. S., 1142; Haydel v. Hurck, 5 Mo. App. 267; and where, by mistake, he pays capital to life tenants, instead of investing it and paying the income, he must make it good, but is entitled to be recouped out of their life interest in fixing the amount of the deficiency: Barratt v. Wyatt, 30 Beav. 442; Davies v. Hodgson, 25 Beav. 177; Griffiths v. Porter, 25 Beav. 236.^E Where an infant cestui que trust

man, 25 Neb. 495, 41 N. W. 449. The fact that the trustee, by the terms of the instrument, is exempted from liability except for willful and intentional breaches of trust does not excuse negligence in the selection of investments for the trust funds: Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617; compare Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N. E. 381; see Hackey v. Western, [1898] 1 Ch. 351; In re Raybould, [1900] 1 Ch. 199 (the reasonable acts of a trustee in managing the estate may, by injuring the property of others, give rise to a right of action against the estate through the trustee, on the ground that the trustee has a right to be indemnified, or exonerated); Robinson v. Harkin, [1896] 2 Ch. 415; Stokes v. Prance, [1898] 1 Ch. 212.

§ 1070, (f) Head v. Gould, [1898] 2 Ch. 250; Lagunas Nitrate Co. v. Lagunas Syndicate, [1899] 2 Ch. 392; Pleasanton's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 362; Williams v. Nichol, 47 Ark. 254, 1 S. W. 243; Taft v. Smith, (Mass.) 70 N. E. 1031.

§ 1070, (g) Payment to Wrong Party.—Bate v. Hooper, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 338 (it was held that the life tenant could not be compelled to refund a voluntary overpayment after thirty years); Crocker v. Dillon, 133 Mass. 91; and one cestui may recover an improper payment made to another: Dixon v. Dixon, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 587; and see Bremer v. Williams, 210 Mass. 256, 96 N. E. 687; Draper v. Brown, 153 Mich. 120, 117 N. W. 213; In re Anderson, 211 N. Y. 136, 105 N. E. 79; therefore, a trustee, having paid certain cestuis, § 1071. 5. The Duty as to Investments.—The general obligation under consideration finds its most striking and important application in the matter of the investment of trust funds. It is the trustee's duty to use diligence in investing the trust property so that it may produce as much income as possible, and also to use care and prudence in investing it in such securities as will render its loss highly improbable, even if not virtually impossible. From these somewhat antagonistic duties arise two corresponding liabilities. If the trustee suffers moneys to lie idle in his hands, producing no income, when by a proper investment an income might have been obtained, and this continues for an unreasonably long time, he will be liable for the amount of income which he might and ought to have made

amount of income which he might and ought to have made by an investment, and will be charged with such amount by the court in the settlement of his accounts. On the other hand, if he has made an investment in improper securities, contrary to the settled rules of equity on the subject, and the principal has been wholly or partially lost through insolvency or depreciation of value, or has failed to produce income, he will be held personally responsible for the loss or deficiency. If, however, an investment is made with the exercise of reasonable care, diligence, and business prudence, in the form, manner, and securities approved of by the rules of equity, a trustee will not be liable for losses

falsely represents himself to be of age, and thereby procures payment by the trustee of the amount payable on his becoming of age, he cannot compel the trustee to pay over again when he attains twenty-one: Overton v. Banister, 3 Hare, 503; a *cestui que trust* who is overpaid must refund: Livesey v. Livesey, 3 Russ. 287; as to paying the wrong person, see also *ante*, cases under § 1067.

and having a claim against the trust estate for reimbursements, can recover from those having received payment in order to protect those not yet paid: Wells-Stone Mercantile Co. v. Aultman, Miller & Co., 9 N. D. 520, 84 N. W. 375. This result would seem proper on the principle of Wetmore v. Porter, ante, § 1048, note. See, however, as to reimbursement of a trustee who is also a beneficiary, and has made overpayments to other beneficiaries, In re Horne (Wilson v. Cox Sinclair), [1905] 1 Ch. 76. which may occur through the destruction or depreciation of values.¹^a The general duty involves two distinct ele-

§ 1071, 1 Robinson v. Robinson, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 247, 254-257 (where trustees simply neglect to invest moneys, they are chargeable only with the principal sum and lawful interest thereon); Att'y-Gen. v. Alford, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 843 (ditto); Ex parte Geaves, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 291; Lockhart v. Reilly, 1 De Gex & J. 464; Lloyd v. Attwood, 3 De Gex & J. 614; Shepherd v. Mouls, 4 Hare, 500, 503, 504; Phillipson v. Gatty, 7 Hare, 516; Clough v. Bond, 3 Mylne & C. 490, 496, 497; Mayor of Berwick v. Murray, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 497, 519; Burdick v. Garrick, L. R. 5 Ch. 233, 241; Blogg v. Johnson, L. R. 2 Ch. 225, 228; Brown v. Gellatly, L. R. 2 Ch. 751; Stewart v. Sanderson, L. R. 10 Eq. 26; Pickard v. Anderson, L. R. 13 Eq. 608 (consent of beneficiary); In re T----, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 78; Ex parte Norris, L. R. 4 Ch. 280; Stone v. Stone, L. R. 5 Ch. 74; Budge v. Gummow, L. R. 7 Ch. 719; In re British etc. Co., L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 335; Barney v. Saunders, 16 How. 535, 542, 543; Kimball v. Reding, 31 N. H. 352, 64 Am. Dec. 333; Frey v. Frey, 17 N. J. Eq. 71, 72, 74; Schieffelin v. Stewart, 1 Johns. Ch. 620, 7 Am. Dec. 507; Baker v. Disbrow, 18 Hun, 29; Brown v. French, 125 Mass. 410, 28 Am. Rep. 254; Adair v. Brimmer, 74 N. Y. 539; In re Foster's Will, 15 Hun, 387; Roosevelt v. Roosevelt, 6 Abb. N. C. 447; Bowman v. Pinkham, 71 Me. 295; Nancrede v. Voorhis, 32 N. J. Eq. 524; Gilmore v. Tuttle, 32 N. J. Eq. 611;^b Clark v. Anderson, 13 Bush, 111; Dockery v. French, 73 N. C. 420; Moore v. Mitchell, 2 Woods, 483; Kirby v. Goodykoontz, 26 Gratt. 298 (in the three preceding cases the investment was made in Confederate securities); Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass. 262; Sherman v. Parish, 53 N. Y. 483 (acquiescence of the beneficiary); Ormiston v. Olcott, 84 N. Y. 339; Wiggins v. Howard, 83 N. Y. 613; Chesterman v. Eyland, 81 N. Y. 398.

§ 1071, (a) This paragraph of the text is cited in Indiana Trust Co. v. Griffith, 176 Ind. 643, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1023, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 896, 95 N. E. 573 (not liable where investment authorized by court); Lesesne v. Cheves, 105 S. C. 432, 90 S. E. 37. See Hume v. Lopes, [1892] App. Cas. 112 (a statute allowing a trustee to invest "any trust funds in his hands" in certain securities, extends to trust funds already invested, as well as to cash in hand); see In re Campbell, [1893] 3 Ch. 468; In re Somerset, [1894] 1 Ch. 231 (as to the effect of statute on improper investment); In re Chapman, [1896] 2 Ch. 763 (if the will authorizes investment in realty, it is not improper to allow existing mortgage on realty to stand); In re Gouldby's Estate, 201 Pa. St. 491, 51 Atl. 315. See, also, In re Smith, [1896] 1 Ch. 71; Isler v. Brock, 134 N. C. 428, 46 S. E. 951 (liability for interest).

§1071, (b) Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617. ments, which will be separately examined,—the necessity of making investments, and the proper kinds of securities in which the investments may be made.

§ 1072. The Necessity of Making Investments.—It is the trustee's imperative duty to render the trust property as productive as possible consistent with its security and with the demands of ordinary business prudence and judgment. The rule is general, therefore, that if he permits the money to remain in his own hands, unproductive, for a period which, under the circumstances, is unreasonable, then he will be personally chargeable with the lawful interest which might and should have been obtained by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence; and if the principal fund should be wholly or partially lost in consequence of such unreasonable delay, he will be compelled to make up the deficiency. Even when the instrument creating the trust prescribes a particular mode of investment,-as, for example, it directs that all the personal property should be converted into cash, and the proceeds invested in the purchase of land,-the trustee cannot be justified in suffering the cash to lie idle and unproductive for an unreasonable length of time.^{1 a}

§ 1072, ¹ Robinson v. Robinson, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 247; Att'y-Gen. v. Alford, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 843; Baud v. Fardell, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 628; Paddon v. Richardson, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 563; Ex parte Geaves, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 291; Bate v. Hooper, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 338; Sculthorpe v. Tipper, L. R. 13 Eq. 232; In re British etc. Co., L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 335; Gilman v. Gilman, 2 Lans. 1; and see other cases in the last preceding note. If the trustee permits trust moneys to remain on deposit in a bank or in the hands of a third person for an unreasonable time, he is responsible for any loss: Lupton v. White, 15 Ves. 432; and see *ante*, § 1067, and cases cited.^b Or if he delays unnecessarily in collecting a demand

§ 1072, (a) Cavender v. Cavender, 114 U. S. 464, 29 L. Ed. 212, 5 Sup. Ct. 955; Lent v. Howard, 89 N. Y. 170; Nunn v. Nunn, 66 Ala. 35; Smith v. Hall, 20 R. I. 170, 37 Atl. 698; In re Muller, 31 App. Div. 80, 52 N. Y. Supp. 565; Calkins v. Bump, 120 Mich. 335, 79 N. W. 491; Hayes v. Applegate, 101 Ky. 22, 39 S. W. 436 (distinguishing Fritsch v. Klansing, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 788, 13 S. W. 241).

§1072, (b) Perpetual Ex. & F. Ass'n of Australia, Lim., v. Swan,

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Kinds of Investments-When Particular Secur-8 1073. ities are Expressly Authorized.-There are two cases to be considered: 1. When the instrument creating the trust expressly authorizes investment in particular securities, or directs particular modes of investment; 2. When the instrument is wholly silent with respect to the mode of investment, and the matter is left to the judgment of the trustee. In the first case, when the instrument itself directs the mode and nature of the investment, and designates the securities, the trustee is bound to follow these directions with scrupulous care, and if any loss of trust property is the result of his obedience, he is not at all responsible. A departure from the directions will entail liability for the losses which may be occasioned thereby. Even when a general discretion in the choice of securities is expressly given, it must be exercised with reasonable care and business prudence.^{1 a}

and it is thereby lost: Grove v. Price, 26 Beav. 103; Ellig v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 683.

§ 1073, ¹ Mortimore v. Mortimore, ⁴ De Gex & J. 472; Baud v. Fardell, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 628; Paddon v. Richardson, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 563; In re Langdale's Trust, L. R. 10 Eq. 39; Stewart v. Sanderson, L. R. 10 Eq. 26; Pickard v. Anderson, L. R. 13 Eq. 608 (investing on mere personal security with consent of the beneficiary); Bethell v. Abraham, L. R.

[1898] App. Cas. 763 (deposit in bank on interest is not allowed though statute provides that trustees may employ bankers).

§ 1073, (a) This paragraph is cited in Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 777, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 112, 99 N. E. 138; Indiana Trust Co. v. Griffith, 176 Ind. 643, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1023, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 896, 95 N. E. 573 (trustee not protected where he invests in corporate stock, though statute gives discretionary power to invest). See, also, Dodd v. Evans, [1901] 1 Ch. 916; In re De Pothonier, [1900] 2 Ch. 529; In re Laing's Settlement, [1899] 1 Ch. 593; In re Smith, [1896] 2 Ch. 590; In re Tucker, [1894] 1 Ch. 724; In re Sir S. M. Maryon-Wilson's Estate, [1912] 1 Ch. 55 (enlargement of power of investment beyond what the general law sanctions to be construed strictly); Merchants' Loan & T. Co. v. Northern T. Co., 250 Ill. 86, 95 N. E. 59 ("Invest and reinvest at pleasure" will permit purchase of real estate in other states); Zimmerman v. Fraley, 70 Md. 561, 17 Atl. 560 (direction to invest in landed securities does not authorize a purchase of land); Green v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 62 N. E. 956; Appeal of Davis, 183 Mass. 499, 67 N. E. 604; Michigan Home Missionary Soc. v. Corning (Mich.), 129 N. W. 686 (direction giving power to use best § 1074. The Same. When No Directions are Given.— Where the instrument of trust is silent as to the mode of investment, the rules governing the action of trustees may appear to be somewhat arbitrary, but are in reality based upon the clearest principles of justice and expediency. The law does not give to trustees the same freedom of choice in investments which may be exercised by prudent business men in their own affairs. A business man of even more than average caution may, and often does, assume intentional risks in the investment of his own property; for the sake of obtaining a greater than ordinary income, he will

17 Eq. 24 (even when trustees are clothed with discretion they cannot invest in foreign funds or railway stocks); Lewis v. Nobbs, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 591 (where trustees are expressly authorized to vary the trust funds and "to invest the same in any other funds or securities"); In re Chennell, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 492; In re Wedderburn's Trusts, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 112; In re Peyton, L. R. 7 Eq. 463; Clark v. St. Louis etc. R. R., 58 How. Pr. 21; Foscue v. Lyon, 55 Ala. 440; Bowman v. Pinkham, 71 Me. 295 (a trustee expressly authorized to invest as he shall think fit cannot buy land on credit, and bind the estate by his note given as trustee); Gilmore v. Tuttle, 32 N. J. Eq. 611 (a trustee clothed with discretion is liable for loss arising from his investment in second mortgages);^b Nancrede v.

skill and discretion in investments does not enlarge powers or discretion); Clark v. Clark, 23 Misc. Rep. 272, 50 N. Y. Supp. 1041; In re Hall, 48 App. Div. 488, 62 N. Y. Supp. 888; Costello v. Costello, 259 N. Y. 252, 103 N. E. 148 (where testator authorized trustees to have interest as partner in business, they could sell out or take stock in a successor corporation); Willis v. Braucher, 79 Ohio St. 290, 16 Ann. Cas. 66, and note, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 873, 87 N. E. 185 (invest and reinvest at discretion permits investment in corporate stocks; In re Hart's Estate, 203 Pa. St. 480, 53 Atl. 364; Metzger v. Lehigh Valley Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 220 Pa. St. 535, 69 Atl. 1037 (direction to invest proceeds of conversion of real estate implies power to reinvest only in same class of securities); Whitehead v. Whitehead, 85 Va. 870, 9 S. E. 10; International Trust Co. v. Preston, 24 Wyo. 163, 156 Pac. 1128 (court cannot, by approving annual reports of trustee, vary provisions of the trust as to investments); In re Allis's Estate, (Wis.) 101 N. W. 365 (where instrument gives full discretion as to investments). Courts have refused to sanction a change of investment not authorized by the instrument of trust on the ground that it will be to the advantage of the beneficiaries: In re Tollemache, [1903] 1 Ch. 457, 955.

§ 1073, (b) Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617.

often invest in such a manner that the risk of ultimate loss is considerable, and such speculative use of his property would not be regarded as illegitimate nor as deserving of any censure. For example, he may invest in the stocks of companies which promise, and with good fortune may pay, large dividends, but which also may utterly fail. No such risk is permitted to the trustee. In the management and investment of trust property for the benefit of the *cestui* que trust, the law, while requiring some income, regards the security of the fund invested and the certainty of a moderate regular income as of paramount-of absolutely essential-importance when compared with the amount of the income. It permits the trustee to assume no risks in his investment other than those which are inseparable from every species of property. Absolute freedom from risk is impossible. The most stable forms of property may lose their value; lands may depreciate; even nations may become bankrupt. From these risks which inhere in every kind

Voorhis, 32 N. J. Eq. 524 (ditto); Adair v. Brimmer, 74 N. Y. 539; Denike v. Harris, 84 N. Y. 89.

A trustee cannot loan on mere personal security, unless authorized: Walker v. Symonds, 3 Swanst. 1, 63, 80; Darke v. Martyn, 1 Beav. 525; Styles v. Guy, 1 Macn. & G. 422; ^e but may do so when authorized; Paddon v. Richardson, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 563; Denike v. Harris, 84 N. Y. 89; but even then he cannot lend to a co-trustee, unless *expressly* authorized: — v. Walker, 5 Russ. 7; and giving a trustee discretion as to investment does not authorize a loan on mere personal security: Pocock v. Reddington, 5 Ves. 794. Investment in corporation stock is not allowed unless expressly authorized: ^a Trafford v. Boehm, 3 Atk. 440, 444; Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth, 7 Ves. 137, 150; where trustees invest in mortgages they are responsible for the value of the land and the sufficiency of the security at the time of the investment: Phillipson v. Gatty, 7 Hare, 516; but not for a subsequent depreciation: Nancrede v. Voorhis, 32 N. J. Eq. 524.

§ 1073, (c) Judge of Probate v. Mathes, 60 N. H. 433; Baer's Appeal, 127 Pa. St. 360, 4 L. R. A. 609, 18 Atl. 1.

§1073, (d) Indiana Trust Co. v. Griffith, 176 Ind. 643, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1023, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 896, 95 N. E. 573, citing this paragraph of the text; but see Willis v. Braucher, 79 Ohio St. 290, 16 Ann. Cas. 66, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 873, 87 N. E. 185. of ownership the law does not pretend to save the beneficiary; but from risks growing out of the uncertainty of speculative investments the law does protect him by making the trustee personally responsible for all trust funds invested by him in such a manner.^a It is the settled rule of equity, in the absence of express directions in the instrument creating the trust, or of statutory permission, that trustees or executors cannot invest trust property upon any mere personal security, nor upon the stocks, bonds, or other securities of private business corporations.^{1 b} Where no directions are given by the instrument of trust, the wellsettled rule of the English courts of equity is, that the trustee should invest trust funds, and can only escape personal risk and liability by investing, in real estate securities, or in the public, governmental securities of the British government.² ^c In the United States, while the rules are

§ 1074, ¹ Clough v. Bond, 3 Mylne & C. 490, 496, 497; Powell v. Evans, 5 Ves. 839; Tehbs v. Carpenter, 1 Madd. 290; Ex parte Geaves, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 291; Paddon v. Richardson, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 563; and see cases cited in last preceding note; King v. King, 3 Johns. Ch. 552.

§ 1074, ² Investment in municipal bonds or in the governmental stocks, bonds, or funds of foreign countries, or in the stocks or bonds of corporations, is never *directed* by the court, nor permitted in the absence of authority given by the instrument of trust; Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth, 7 Ves. 137, 151; Hume v. Richardson, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 29; Baud v.

§ 1074, (a) The text is quoted in Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Trust Co., 250 Ill. 86, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 411, 95 N. E. 59; section cited in Indiana Trust Co. v. Griffith, 176 Ind. 643, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1023, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 896, 95 N. E. 573; Pabst v. Goodrich, 133 Wis. 43, 14 Ann. Cas. 824, 113 N. W. 398.

§ 1074, (b) Personal Securities, Stocks, etc. — Hutton v. Annan, [1898] App. Cas. 289; Bermingham v. Wilcox, 120 Cal. 467, 52 Pac. 822; White v. Sherman, 168 III. 589, 61 Am. St. Rep. 132, 48 N. E. 128; Robertson v. Robertson's Trustee, 130 Ky. 293, 132 Am. St. Rep. 368, 113 S. W. 138 (liable for loss on stock investments not authorized by statute); Cornet v. Cornet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S. W. 333; In re Reed v. Harmon's Estate, 45 App. Div. 196, 61 N. Y. Supp. 50 (investment outside state); Smith v. Fuller, 86 Ohio St. 57, 99 N. E. 214.

§ 1074, (c) Several special rules have been established concerning real estate securities, as to the amount which may be loaned on property of certain classes, the care required in ascertaining the value certainly not so stringent and invariable as in England, and while different regulations may prevail to some extent in different states, based partly upon statutory legislation, and partly upon the policy of encouraging local enterprises, the same fundamental principle of requiring permanent investments in real estate or governmental securities is generally recognized by the courts,—at least, all speculative risks are forbidden.^{3 d} Investments in first mortgages of

Fardell, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 628; Dimes v. Scott, 4 Russ. 195; Holland v. Hughes, 16 Ves. 111; Raby v. Ridehalgh, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 104; Robinson v. Robinson, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 247, 263; Mortimore v. Mortimore, 4 De Gex & J. 472; Mant v. Leith, 15 Beav. 524; Harris v. Harris, 29 Beav. 107; In re Colne Valley etc. Ry., 1 De Gex, F. & J. 53; Bethell v. Abraham, L. R. 17 Eq. 24; In re Rehoboth Chapel, L. R. 19 Eq. 180; In re Chennell, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 492; In re Wedderburn's Trusts, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 112; Sculthorpe v. Tipper, L. R. 13 Eq. 232; Budge v. Gummow, L. R. 7 Ch. 719.

§ 1074, 3 The action of the American courts can best be illustrated by the facts of a few very recent and instructive decisions. In Adair v. Brimmer, 74 N. Y. 539, the subject was examined in a most able and exhaustive manner, and trustees were sternly held up to their duty. A testator had given an enormous estate to three trustees, with power to sell lands, in their discretion, and to invest the proceeds. Among the lands was a large tract of undeveloped coal-land in Pennsylvania, of which the testator owned one we divided third, the other two-thirds being owned by M. & N., and the entire tract being worth from one million to one million four hundred thousand dollars. The trustees conveyed their onethird to M. and N. nominally for the price of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. The sale was really made to enable M. and N. to organize a mining company, and the land was immediately conveyed by them to the company. Stock of this company was issued, and the trustees took such stock at its par value to the amount of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars as the consideration for the sale of the land. The company went on to develop the coal mines, and was compelled to borrow money, and to that end it issued its bonds for several hundred thousand dollars, which

of the property, and the like: See Godfrey v. Faulkner, 23 Ch. Div. 483; Fry v. Tapson, 28 Ch. Div. 268; Learoyd v. Whiteley, 12 App. Cas. (H. L.) 727, affirming 33 Ch. Div. 347; Olive v. Westerman, 34 Ch. Div. 70; Webb v. Jonas, 39 Ch. Div. 660; Chapman v. Browne, [1902] 1 Ch. 785.

§ 1074, (d) The text is cited to this effect in Indiana Trust Co. v. Griffith, 176 Ind. 643, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1023, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 896, 95 N. E. 573.

improved land are universally favored, and the trustee is not liable for any subsequent depreciation of value if the original security was sufficient. Indeed, investments of this form are generally required to be made by public officials of trust moneys paid into court. Investments in second or other subsequent mortgages would be at the trustee's own peril. Trustees may always invest in the governmental securities of the state under whose jurisdiction

the stockholders were obliged to take pro rata, and the trustees thus took a large amount of said bonds as security for money advanced by them to the company. The stock and the bonds became worthless, so that the coal-land had in fact heen totally lost to the trust estate. In their final accounting the trustees claimed that they were entitled to be credited with the two hundred and fifty thousand dollars in the stock, and with the amount of the company's bonds which they had taken. The court held that the trustees had grossly violated their duty. They had no right to sell the land for such a speculative purpose; the power given them in the will to sell only authorized them to sell for the purpose of carrying out the general objects of the trust, and of making the property certainly productive for the beneficiaries. Furthermore, they had no authority to invest the proceeds in such securities as the company's stock and bonds. They were to be charged with the market value of the land at the time of the sale, and with interest thereon at six per cent computed with annual rests. The trustees having set up acquiescence by the beneficiaries in defense, it was further held that an acquiescence or assent of the beneficiaries, so as to relieve the trustees, could only avail when given after a full knowledge of all the facts, and a full understanding of all the beneficiaries' own rights in the matter; any assent given in the absence of such full knowledge and understanding was of no effect. King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76, 50 Barb, 453, is also a very instructive case. Trustees held funds given by a will, in trust, to apply the interest to the maintenance, etc., of the beneficiaries during their minority, and on their coming of age the principal and all accumulated interest were to be transferred to them absolutely. The trustees invested the principal moneys in certain securities, and on the beneficiaries coming of age, the trustees offered to deliver to them these same securities, which the beneficiaries refused to accept. There was no allegation that the trustees had acted in bad faith, and the only question was, whether the investments were proper and such as the beneficiaries were bound to accept in discharge of the trustees' obligation. The court of appeals held the following propositions: Where trustees hold funds for investment for the benefit of cestuis que trustent who are to be supported out of the income thereof, the law,

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they are, and in those of the United States; and perhaps an investment in the public securities of other states of the Union, of which the credit is firmly established, may be permitted; but to any greater extent than this, investments in foreign securities are a violation of the trustee's duty. In some of the states, statutes permit investments in the

by its general principles, imposes on the trustees the duty of placing the funds in a position of security, of seeing that they produce interest, and of so keeping them that they may always he subject to future recall for the benefit of the cestuis que trustent. In a trust of this kind, it is not in accordance with the nature of the trust, nor a compliance with the requirements of ordinary prudence, for the trustee to place the principal of the fund in a condition in which it is necessarily exposed to the hazards of loss or gain, and in which, by the very terms of the investment, the principal sum is not to be refurned at all. The investment by such a trustee in the stocks of canal, railroad, bank, insurance, and other such private corporations is a violation of his trust duty. Held, therefore, where, in such a trust, the trustee had invested the principal of the fund in stocks of the Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., the New York and Harlem R. R. Co., the New York and New Haven R. R. Co., the Saratoga and Washington R. R. Co., and the Bank of Commerce, the beneficiaries were not bound to accept such investments, but could compel the trustees to pay over the principal fund in cash, charged with interest at six per cent per annum, computed with annual rests. It may be remarked that all these companies were at the time in good, and some of them in very high, credit. Woodruff, J., said that in such a case, where there were different kinds of investments, the beneficiaries were not restricted to accepting all, or rejecting all, but might accept some, and reject others, at their pleasure. Four judges were of opinion that, in the absence of statute, trustees holding funds for investment, without special directions, were bound to invest either in governmental or in real estate securities, according to the wellsettled rule of equity in England; that any other investment would render the trustees personally liable in case of loss or depreciation. Three judges were of opinion that so stringent a general rule could not be regarded as a part of our law. The opinion of Mr. Justice Woodruff in this case upholds, in a most admirable manner, the high morality of equity in determining and enforcing the obligations of trustees towards their beneficiaries: Gilman v. Gilman, 2 Lans. 1. Large amounts of money were given by will to the executors as trustees, and they were directed by the will to invest it in United States stocks, or state, city, or town bonds, or in bonds and mortgages. They did not obey these instructions. They kept on hand, for years, large amounts on deposit in their individual municipal bonds of cities, counties, and towns of the state within whose jurisdiction the trustee acts. Wherever the principles of equity jurisprudence have been fully accepted by the courts, trustees are not allowed to invest in the stocks, bonds, and other securities of private corporations, --certainly not without a statutory permission. Such un-

names, and these deposits they frequently used in their own business; but all the sums thus used they returned to the estate, and charged themselves with interest thereon during the time they were using the same. They did not charge themselves with any interest on the large amounts remaining idle in bank. In excuse for not investing in the United States securities, they set up that the beneficiaries were opposed to any investments therein. Held, that this last allegation was no excuse; if they had invested in United States securities, even against the consent of the beneficiaries, they would have been fully justified; and, at all events, there were other good securities, state and municipal, in which they might have invested according to the directions of the will. They were charged with interest on all balances remaining in their hands after a reasonable time, viz., on all balances remaining on hand six months after allowing thirty days more for procuring investments. Held, further, that they would ordinarily he chargeable with compound interest on the trust funds which they had used in their own private business; but as none had been lost, and they had charged themselves with interest thereon, the court would not enforce this liability. (This was a mistaken leniency, since the beneficiaries were clearly entitled to the profits of the business made by the use of the trust funds.) Also, that while trustees and executors are entitled to be allowed for all sums reasonably expended in protecting the estate or in maintaining or defending litigations reasonably necessary for its protection, these defendants were not entitled to be reimbursed for their expenses in unsuccessfully resisting an application to compel them to account, and in resisting proceedings for contempt instituted against them for their neglect to obey an order to account: Chesterman v. Eyland, 81 N. Y. 398 (money paid into court and invested by officer of the court in a sufficient real estate mortgage; the officer not liable, although by a great depreciation of value, the land turned out insufficient and part of the fund was lost); Denike v. Harris, 84 N. Y. 89; reversing 23 Hun, 213 (trust money loaned on the borrower's own promise, without any further security, according to express directions of a will); Ormiston v. Olcott, 84 N. Y. 339 (as a general rule, investments of trust moneys in foreign securities, or in a manner which takes the fund beyond the reach of the court, as in mortgages on foreign lands, etc., is improper, and a trustee making such investment does so at his own peril. This rule is III-155

authorized investments do not *ipso facto* render the trustees personally liable, where no loss ensues; but if any loss results, they must make it good. Where, however, the trust provides for a transfer of the property to the beneficiaries, they are not bound to accept such unauthorized securities from the trustees, even though these securities are not at

not absolutely without exception; it may give way under very special and imperative circumstances. An investment in mortgage on lands in another state, sustained under the peculiar circumstances as being the only mode by which the property could be saved); e Sherman v. Parish, 55 N. Y. 483 (a married woman who is a cestui que trust may consent to an unauthorized investment so as to bar any action against her trustee); Wiggins v. Howard, 83 N. Y. 613; Foscue v. Lyon, 55 Ala. 440 (investment in mortgages on real estate is proper; a trustee directed to invest in stocks cannot compel the beneficiary to accept land or chattels); Nancrede v. Voorhis, 32 N. J. Eq. 524 (a trustee invests in second mortgages at his own peril, but is not liable for depreciation in value of land when investment is made in first mortgages); Gilmore v. Tuttle, 32 N. J. Eq. 611 (trustee is liable for loss resulting from his investment in second mortgages); f Clark v. Anderson, 13 Bush, 111 (a trustee is chargeable for all loss resulting from a change of investment made after the beneficiary had become of age and entitled to the control of the estate, also for funds invested in second-mortgage bonds of a railroad, but not for loss from an unexpected depreciation of real estate, where the investment was originally proper); Patteson v. Horsley, 29 Gratt. 263 (a trustee is liable for loss from investment in Confederate securities); Dockery v. French, 73 N. C. 420 (ditto); Moore v. Mitchell, 2 Woods, 483 (ditto); Kirby v. Goodykoontz, 26 Gratt. 298 (ditto); g Tucker v. State, 72 Ind. 242 (an investment in the stock of corporations is improper, and made at the trustee's own peril); Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass. 262 (a trustee who, in good faith and in the exercise of a sound discretion, retains an investment in railroad stock, when it is gradually falling in value, is not responsible for the depreciation, although the stock becomes worthless. This decision certainly does not represent the true doctrine of equity. It is directly opposed to the rule as settled, not only in England, but by the overwhelming weight of the highest American authority); see, also, Barney

§ 1074, (e) Followed in Denton v. Sanford, 103 N. Y. 607, 9 N. E. 490; see, also, McCullough v. McCullough, 44 N. J. Eq. 313, and note, 14 Atl. 123. §1074, (f) Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617.

§ 1074, (E) Contra, Douglass v.
Stephenson, 75 Va. 747; Waller's Adm'rs v. Catlett's Ex'rs, 83 Va. 200,
2 S. E. 280.

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all depreciated in value. It should be carefully observed, in this connection, that if the beneficiary is *sui juris* and competent to bind himself, his consent to the irregular in-

v. Saunders, 16 How. 535; Kimball v. Reding, 31 N. H. 352, 64 Am. Dec. 333 (a very instructive case); Lovell v. Minot, 20 Pick. 116, 32 Am. Dec. 206; Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446; Smith v. Smith, 4 Johnsi Ch. 281, 445; Thompson v. Brown, 4 Johns. Ch. 619, 628; Ackerman v. Emott, 4 Barb. 626; Worrell's Appeal, 9 Pa. St. 508; Swoyer's Appeal, 5 Pa. St. 377; Twaddell's Appeal, 5 Pa. St. 15; Murray v. Feinour, 2 Md. Ch. 418, 419; Evans v. Iglehart, 6 Gill & J. 171, 192; Ellig v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 683.^h

§ 1074, (h) See, generally, Gilbert v. Kolb, 85 Md. 627, 37 Atl. 423; In re Westerfield, 32 App. Div. 324, 53 N. Y. Supp. 25; Stone v. Clay, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 2029, 45 S. W. 80; Avdelott v. Breeding, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 1146, 64 S. W. 916; Calloway v. Calloway, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 870, 39 S. W. 241; Penn v. Fogler, 182 III. 76, 55 N. E. 192; Mathewson v. Davis, 191 Ill. 391, 61 N. E. 68. See, also, as to speculative risks, White v. Sherman, 168 Ill. 589, 61 Am. St. Rep. 132, 48 N. E. 128; English v. McIntyre, 29 App. Div. 439, 51 N. Y. Supp. 697; Randolph v. East Birmingham Land Co., 104 Ala. 355, 53 Am. St. Rep. 64, 16 South. 126 (investment in corporation stock not allowed). Many cases are cited in Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 452, 465, 5 Sup. Ct. 221, 26 L. Ed. 774, which also holds investment in Confederate bonds unlawful (p. 476). See, also, Opie v. Castleman, 32 Fed. 511 (Confederate money); Crabb v. Young, 92 N. Y. 56; Porter v. Woodruff, 36 N. J. Eq. 174, 185; McCoy v. Harwitz, 62 Md. 183; Cogbill v. Boyd, 77 Va. 450; Simmons v. Oliver, 74 Wis. 633, 43 N. W. 561; Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617 (investments in second mortgages, ao circumstances being shown to justify a resort to such hazardous securities, or investments made without instituting proper inquiries as to the value of the securities, are not excused by a clause in the instrument creating the trust exempting the trustee from liability except for "willful and intentional breaches of trust"); Dickinson's Appeal, 152 Mass. 184, 25 N. E. 99 (investment in railroad stocks allowed in Massachusetts, but not when the enterprise is hazardous); Peckham v. Newton, 15 R. I. 321, 4 Atl. 758 (no limitation in Rhode Island to any particular class of securities). Recent cases are: Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N. E. 381 (investment of most of the fund in a single building, not an exercise of sound discretion); Cornet v. Cornet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S. W. 333 (bonds of a Mexican state disapproved); Wieters v. Hart, 67 N. J. Eq. 507, 63 Atl. 241; Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 745, 66 Atl. 1076 (it is trustee's duty, within a reasonable time, to convert the securities into those which are authorized by law); In re Anderson, 211 N. Y. 136, 105 N. E. 79 (investment in a leasehold is improvident); Villard v. Villard, 219 N. Y. 482, 114 N. E. 789 (negligence of a

vestment would be a justification of the trustee's action, and a waiver of all claim against him for resulting loss.^{4 i}

§ 1075. III. To Act With Good Faith. 1. The Duty not to Deal With Trust Property for His Own Advantage.--Absolute and most scrupulous good faith is the very essence of the trustee's obligation. The first and principal duty arising from this fiduciary relation is to act in all matters of the trust wholly for the benefit of the beneficiary. The trustee is not permitted to manage the affairs of the trust, or to deal with the trust property, so as to gain any advantage, directly or indirectly, for himself, beyond his lawful compensation. The equitable rules which govern the personal dealings between trustees and all other fiduciaries and their beneficiaries-their contracts, purchases, gifts, and the like-have already been examined, and this branch of their general obligation to use good faith needs no further discussion.¹ It is equally imperative upon the trustee, in his dealings with trust property, not to use it in his own private business, not to make any incidental profits for himself in its management, and not to acquire any pecuniary gains from his fiduciary position. The beneficiary is entitled to claim all advantages actually gained, and to hold the trustee chargeable for all losses in any way happening, from a violation of this duty.² a

§ 1074, ⁴ A married woman is competent to bind herself in this manner when a beneficiary: Sherman v. Parish, 53 N. Y. 483.

§ 1075, 1 See ante, §§ 955-965.

§ 1075, ² Thus if a trustee or other fiduciary buys up a dcbt or encumbrance against the estate at less than its full amount, he cannot retain

new trustee in retaining securities); Fisher v. Fisher, 170 N. C. 378, 87 S. E. 113; Scoville v. Brock, 79 Vt. 449, 118 Am. St. Rep. 975, 65 Atl. 577, 81 Vt. 405, 70 Atl. 1014 (no rule in Vermont against investments in corporate stocks and bonds outside state. Trustee may rely upon general reputation as to soundness of securities. Personal investigation of affairs of corporation impracti-

§ 1074; (i) See, also, in general, Etting v. Marx, 4 Fed. 673, 4 Hughes, 312; Willis v. Holcomb, 83 Ohio St. 254, 94 N. E. 486.

§ 1075, (a) Trustee Making Profits, etc.—The text is cited in White v. Sherman, 168 III. 589, 611, 61 Am. St. Rep. 132, 144, 48 N. E. 128;

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§ 1076. 2. The Duty not to Mingle Trust Funds With His Own Funds.^a—This second important duty of good faith includes not only the intentional use of trust funds in the trustee's own business: it prohibits the mixing the two

the benefit of the discount, but can only credit himself with the sum actually paid: Pooley v. Quilter, 2 De Gex & J. 327; 4 Drew. 184; Fosbrooke v. Balguy, 1 Mylne & K. 226; see *ante*, § 959. Using trust money in the trustee's own business, in trade or mercantile adventures, in stock speculations, in buying and selling land, and the like, is a breach of trust: Docker v. Somes, 2 Mylne & K. 655; Willett v. Blanford, 1 Hare, 253; Heathcote v. Hulme, 1 Jacob & W. 122; Moons v. De Bernales, 1 Russ. 301; San Diego v. San Diego etc. R. R., 44 Cal. 106, 112–116; Page v. Naglee, 6 Cal. 241; Gunter v. Janes, 9 Cal. 643, 660–662; Commonwealth v. McAlister, 28 Pa. St. 480.

The penalty for a violation of this duty may be imposed in any form necessary to a complete indemnification of the beneficiary. Where the trustee has used trust funds in his own business, in trade, speculation,

and in Linsley v. Strang, 149 Iowa, 690, 126 N. W. 941, 128 N. W. 932; see, also, Powell v. Powell, 80 Ala. 11: Title Ins. & T. Co. v. Ingersoll, 158 Cal. 474, 111 Pac. 360 (cannot make profit from breach of trust); Purdy v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 521, 163 Pac. 893 (using trust property to secure advancements made by trustees personally); Whitelock v. Dorsey, 121 Md. 497, 88 Atl. 241 (where he was tenant for eighteen years, on appointment as trustee his continuance as tenant is merely voidable); Petrie v. Badenoch, 102 Mich. 45, 47 Am. St. Rep. 503, 60 N. W. 449; Cornet v. Cornet, 269 χ Mo. 298, 190 S. W. 333 (on the facts, \a loan of trust funds to trustee's corporation on real estate mortgage, at good rate of interest, from which he made no individual profit, did not necessitate charging him compound interest); Baugh's Ex'r v. Walker, 77 Va. 99; Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106, 59 L. Ed. 151, 35 Sup. Ct. 77 (cannot share in commissions which a firm of which he was a member earned through dealings with the estate); Kroegher v. Calivada Colonization Co., 119 Fed. 641, 56 C. C. A. 257. The decision in Heckscher v. Blanton, 111 Va. 648, 37 L. E. A. (N. S.) 923, 69 S. E. 1045, permitting a trustee to retain a bonus or gratuity received from a third person, appears to be indefensible on principle and on authority.

§ 1076, (a) This section is cited to the effect that a trustee mingling trust funds with his own is liable for compound interest, in Bemmerly v. Woodward, 124 Cal. 568, 57 Pac. 561; to the effect that he is liable for principal and interest in In re Hodge's Estate, 66 Vt. 70, 44 Am. St. Rep. 820, 28 Atl. 663; and, generally, in White v. Sherman, 168 Ill. 589, 604, 61 Am. St. Rep. 132, 138, 48 N. E. 128; Chancellor v. Chancellor, 177 Ala. 44, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 47, 44 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1, 58 South. 423. funds together in one amount, the depositing trust moneys in his own personal account with his own moneys in bank, borrowing trust funds or going through the form of borrowing for his own use, mingling receipts and payments of

has made profits, acquired property, and the like, the beneficiary may, if he elect, claim and secure the advantage, profits, property, etc., for bis own benefit. If the gains, profits, or acquisitions of such dealings cannot be ascertained with certainty, the trustee may he held liable to pay extra interest, and even compound interest. The beneficiary is not, however, permitted to claim both profits and interest; he is required to elect between the two. Finally, if the trustee uses trust funds for such improper purposes, and loses them in any manner, he will he obliged to make up the loss to an extent sufficient to give the beneficiary complete indemnity. not only for the principal, but also for the income or interest which ought to have been made by the exercise of good faith and ordinary business prudence. These conclusions are illustrated by the cases above cited, and also by those following: b Robinson v. Robinson, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 247, 256, 257; Ex parte Geaves, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 291; Lloyd v. Attwood, 3 De Gex & J. 614; General Exch. Bank v. Horner, L. R. 9 Eq. 480; Whitney v. Smith, L. R. 4 Ch. 513 (a trustee who also acted as solicitor in a transfer of certain trust property cannot be charged with profits which he made as acting solicitor); Ellis v. Parker, L. R. 7 Ch. 104; Parker v. McKenna, L. R. 10 Ch. 96; Albion etc. Co. v. Martin, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 580; In re Imperial Land Co., L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 566; Land Credit Co. v. Lord Fermoy, L. R. 8 Eq. 7; Williams v. Powell, 15 Beav. 461; Sweet v. Jeffries, 67 Mo. 420; Vason v. Beall, 58 Ga. 500; O'Halloran v. Fitzgerald, 71 Ill. 53; Roberts v. Moseley, 64 Mo. 507; Fulton v. Whitney, 66 N. Y. 548; 5 Hun, 16; Fast v. McPherson, 98 Ill. 496; Coltrane v. Worrell, 30 Gratt. 434; Morrow v. Saline Co. Com'rs, 21 Kan. 484; Heath v. Waters, 40 Mich. 457; Malone v. Kelley, 54 Ala. 532 (both profits and interest not permitted); Baker v. Disbrow, 18 Hun, 29; Romaine v. Hendrickson, 27 N. J. Eq. 162; Blauvelt v. Ackerman, 20 N. J. Eq. 141, 148, 149; Staats v. Bergen, 17 N. J. Eq. 554, 562, 563; Trull v. Trull, 13 Allen, 407; Marsh v. Renton, 99 Mass. 132, 135; Schieffelin v. Stewart,

§ 1075, (b) See, also, Bowen v. Richardson, 133 Mass. 296; Hazard v. Durant, 14 R. I. 25; Deegan v. Capner, 44 N. J. Eq. 339, 15 Atl. 819; Haberman's Appeal, 101 Pa. St. 329; Dorsey v. Banks, 70 Md. 508, 17 Atl. 272; Burwell v. Burwell's Guardian, 78 Va. 574; Carr v. Askew, 94 N. C. 194; Dowling v. Feeley, 72 Ga. 557; Powell v. Powell, 80 Ala. 11; State v. Roeper, 82 Mo. 57; Baker's Appeal, 120 Pa. St. 33, 13 Atl. 487; Marshall v. Carson, 38 N. J. Eq. 250, 48 Am. Rep. 319; and see the various questions in regard to profits and interest discussed at length in Cruce v. Cruce, 81 Mo. 676. See post, §§ 1079-1080.

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trust moneys and his own moneys in his books of account, and all similar modes of combining or failing to distinguish between the two funds. The trustee may not thus mingle trust moneys with his own, even though he eventually accounts for the whole, and nothing is lost. The rule is designed to protect the trustee from temptation, from the hazard of loss, and of being a possible defaulter. When a trustee does mingle trust moneys with his own, the right and lien of the beneficiary attach to this entire combined fund as security for all that actually belongs to the trust estate. A violation of this duty subjects the trustee to the following liabilities: 1. If the mingling is followed by actual loss, accidental or otherwise, the trustee must make good the principal sum lost, together with interest, and perhaps with compound interest; 2. Where there has been no positive loss, but the whole funds, principal, profits, and proceeds, are in the trustee's hands in their mingled condition, the burden of proof rests upon him of showing most conclusively what portion is his, and whatever of the mixed fund, including both profits and principal, he cannot thus show to be his own, even though it be the whole mass, will be awarded to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is always entitled to claim and receive the actual profits when they can be ascertained; 3. If it is difficult to distinguish the funds so as to tell the amount of profits or proceeds which is the beneficiary's share, the court may not only require the trustee to restore the principal which he has appropriated. but in place of the profits may compel him to pay interest compounded, with rests annual or semi-annual, or even more frequent, as the extent of his bad faith may seem to demand; 4. Even if the trustee voluntarily accounts for and restores all the principal that he has mingled with his

1 Johns. Ch. 620, 7 Am. Dec. 507; Gilman v. Gilman, 2 Lans. 1; Diffenderffer v. Winder, 3 Gill. & J. 311; Chapman v. Porter, 69 N. Y. 276; Barnes v. Brown, 80 N. Y. 527, 535; Duncomb v. N. Y. etc. R. R., 84 N. Y. 190; Davis v. Rock Creek etc. Co., 55 Cal. 359, 36 Am. Rep. 40; Chamberlain v. Pacific Wool etc. Co., 54 Cal. 103; and see cases in the two following notes.

own, the court will at all events charge him with interest thereon.^{1 b}

§ 1076, 1 It should be observed that the trustee is liable for trust monev lost while mingled with his own, or while being used in his own business, no matter how or by what cause the loss occurs. He may have used the utmost care and prudence in conducting the business, and the loss may have been the result of unforeseen, inevitable accident,-he is still liable, since he is engaged in a positive violation of duty: Lupton v. White, 15 Ves. 432; Heathcote v. Hulme, 1 Jacob & W. 122; Mason v. Morley, 34 Beav. 471, 475; Frith v. Cartland, 2 Hem. & M. 417; Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 372; Ernest v. Croysdill, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 175; Ex parte Geaves, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 291; Cook v. Addison, L. R. 7 Eq. 466, 470 ("It is a well-established doctrine in this court that if a trustee or agent mixes and confuses the property which he holds in a fiduciary character with his own property, so as that they cannot be separated with perfect accuracy, he is liable for the whole"); Woodruff v. Boyden, 3 Abb. N. C. 29; Malone v. Kelley, 54 Ala. 532; Davis v. Coburn, 128 Mass. 377; Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wall. 252; Case v. Abeel, 1 Paige, 392; Utica Ins. Co. v. Lynch, 11 Paige, 520; Mumford v. Murray, 6 Johns. Ch. 1; Kip v. Bank of New York, 10 Johns. 63; Comm. v. McAlister, 28 Pa. St. 480; Gunter v. James, 9 Cal. 643, 660-662 (a very instructive case); Livingston v. Wells, 8 S. C. 347.

§1076, (b) See, also, Atkinson v. Ward, 47 Ark. 533, 2 S. W. 77; Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ingersoll, 158 Cal. 474, 111 Pac. 360 (when trustee should not be charged with compound interest); Asay v. Allen, 124 Ill. 391, 16 N. E. 865; Vanatta v. Carr, 229 Ill. 47, 82 N. E. 267 (when funds are mixed, burden on trustee to show clearly amount used of his own funds in order to obtain credit therefor); Waltner v. Dolan, 108 Ind. 500, 504, 58 Am. Rep. 61, 8 N. E. 289; Baughman v. Lowe, 41 Ind. App. 1, 83 N. E. 255 (trustee who deposited trust funds in personal account held liable personally on failure of bank); Page's Ex'r v. Holman, 82 Ky. 573; Supreme Lodge v. Liberty Trust Co., 215 Mass. 27, 102 N. E. 96 (treasurer of lodge kept lodge funds in private account; overdrew account, but at once deposited enough to keep lodge fund intact; lodge can recover against executor); Treacy v. Power, 112 Minn. 226, 127 N. W. 936; Moore v. First Nat. Bank, 154 Mo. App. 516, 135 S. W. 1005 (when funds are mixed, burden on trustee to distinguish his own); French v. Armstrong, 79 N. J. Eq. 289, 82 Atl. 331 (same); Matter of Kernochan, 104 N. Y. 618, 11 N. E. 149; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Rankin, 33 Okl. 7, 124 Pac. 71 (burden on trustee to distinguish his own); Robert's Appeal, 92 Pa. 407; Reid v. Reid, 237 Pa. St. 176, 85 Atl. 85; Brazel v. Fair, 26 S. C. 370, 2 S. E. 293 (trustee used trust funds to erect improvements on his own land); Central National Bank v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 54, 26

§ 1077. 3. The Duty not to Accept Any Position or Enter into Any Relation, or Do Any Act Inconsistent With the Interests of the Beneficiary.2-This rule is of wide application, and extends to every variety of circumstances. It rests upon the principle that as long as the confidential relation lasts the trustee or other fiduciary owes an undivided duty to his beneficiary, and cannot place himself in any other position which would subject him to conflicting duties, or expose him to the temptation of acting contrary to the best interests of his original cestui que trust. The rule applies alike to agents, partners, guardians, executors and administrators, directors and managing officers of corporations, as well as to technical trustees. The most important phase of this rule is that which forbids trustees and all other fiduciaries from dealing in their own behalf with respect to matters involved in the trust, and this prohibition operates irrespectively of the good faith or bad faith of such dealing.^b It is therefore a gross violation of his duty for any trustee or director, acting in his fiduciary capacity, to enter into any contract with himself connected with the trust or its management; such a contract is voidable, and may be defeated or set aside at the suit of the beneficiary. If, however, the trustee's act, in violation of this rule, is not done in bad faith, and the beneficiary has received any benefit therefrom, it cannot be avoided without a restoration to the trustee of what has thus been re-

L. Ed. 693; Primeau v. Granfield, 184 Fed. 481. In like manner, it has been held that it is a breach of trust for a trustee to mingle several trust funds together: Vaughn v. Rhode Island M. & T. Co., 24 R. I. 350, 53 Atl. 125; but see In re Union Trust Co., 219 N. Y. 514, 114 N. E. 1057, holding that the advantages in making investments by a consolidation of funds may outweigh the disadvantages.

§1077, (a) This section is cited in Nabours v. McCord, (Tex. Civ. App.) 75 S. W. 827; Yale Gas Stove Co. v. Wilcox, 64 Conn. 101, 42 Am. St. Rep. 159, 25 L. R. A. 90, 29 Atl. 303 (transaction is voidable only); Mallory v. Mallory-Wheeler Co., 61 Conn. 135, 23 Atl. 708; H. B. Cartwright & Bro. v. United States Bank & Trust Co., (N. M.) 167 Pac. 436.

§ 1077, (b) The text is quoted in Smith v. Goethe, 147 Cal. 725, 82 Pac. 384; Acker, Merrall & Condit v. McGaw, 106 Md. 536, 68 Atl. 17.

ceived.^{1 d} As another application of the general doctrine,

§ 1077, 1 Since the applications of this duty to corporation directors and officers are very important and frequent, it will be proper to make a brief quotation from one or two very recent cases. In Duncomb v. New York etc. R. R., 84 N. Y. 190, 198, the court said: "It is not intended to deny or question the rule that, whether a director of a corporation is to be called a trustee or not in a strict sense, there can be no doubt that his character is fiduciary, and that he falls within the doctrine by which equity requires that confidence shall not be abused by the party in whom it is reposed, and which it enforces by imposing a disability, either partial or complete, upon such party to deal on his own behalf in respect to any matter involving such confidence. Nor is it at all questioned that, in such cases, the right of the beneficiary or those claiming through him to avoidance does not depend upon the question whether the trustee in fact has acted fraudulently, or in good faith and honestly: Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 260. But the rule was adopted to secure justice, not to work injustice; to prevent a wrong, not to substitute one wrong for another; and hence have arisen limitations upon its operation, calculated to guard it against evil results as inequitable as those it was designed to prevent. Thus the beneficiary may avoid the act of the trustee, but cannot do so without restoring what he has received: York Co. v. Mackenzie, 8 Brown Parl. C. 42. To cling to the fruits of the trustee's dealing while seeking to avoid his act, to take the benefit of his loan and yet avoid and reverse its security, would be grossly inequitable and unjust." The court held that the rule does not apply where a trustee or director simply takes collateral security for a debt justly due to him, or for a liability justly incurred by him. See, also, Barnes v. Brown, 80 N. Y. 527, 535, per Earl, J. The following cases illustrate the general duty in its various applications: C Aberdeen Ry. v. Blaikie, 1 Macq. 461; Lloyd v. Attwood, 3 De Gex & J. 614 (trustees bound to give full information); Imperial etc. Ass'n v. Coleman, L. R. 6 Ch. 558; Flanagan v. Great West. R'y,

§ 1077, (c) Contracts Between a Corporation and One of Its Directors.—Much of the apparent confusion in judicial dicta upon this important subject may be cleared up by a reference to the two classes of cases of transactions presumptively invalid between persons in fiduciary relations, described ante, § 957; viz., the first class, where "the two parties consciously and intentionally deal and negotiate with each other," and the second class, where the trustee or agent, "purporting to act in his fiduciary character, deals with himself in his private and personal character, without the knowledge of his beneficiary." In the second class of cases the transaction is voidable at the option of the beneficiary; in the first class, it may be upheld if the

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^{§ 1077, (}d) The text is quoted in Smith v. Goethe, 147 Cal. 725, 82 Pac. 384.

a trustee is bound to communicate to his beneficiary any

L. R. 7 Eq. 116, 123; Albion etc. Co. v. Martin, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 580; Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587; Risley v. Indianapolis etc. R. R., 62 N. Y. 240; Hoyle v. Plattsburgh etc. R. R., 54 N. Y. 314, 328, 13 Am. Rep. 595; Butts v. Wood, 37 N. Y. 317; Smith v. Lansing, 22 N. Y. 520, 531; Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327, 78 Am. Dec. 192; Fulton v. Whitney, 66 N. Y. 548; N. Y. Central Ins. Co. v. Nat. Protect. Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 85; St. James's Church v. Church of the Redeemer, 45 Barb. 356; Davis v. Rock Creek etc. Co., 55 Cal. 359, 36 Am. Rep. 40; Chamberlain v. Pacific Wool etc. Co., 54 Cal. 103; San Diego v. San Diego etc. R. R., 44 Cal. 106, 112-116; Stewart v. Lehigh Val. R. R., 38 N. J. L. 505; Gardner v. Butler, 30 N. J. Eq. 702; Sweet v. Jeffries, 67 Mo. 420; Roberts v. Moseley, 64 Mo. 507; O'Halloran v. Fitzgerald, 71 Ill. 53; Fast v. McPherson, 98 Ill. 496; Morrow v. Saline Co. Com'rs, 21 Kan. 484.

trustee or agent successfully discharges the burden of proof as to its fairness. In the case of corporations, which can only act through agents, there is often some difficulty in determining which of these two rules is applicable to a given transaction; viz., in solving the question of fact, whether the director or officer was acting in the transaction as agent or representative of the corporation, as well as on his own behalf, in which case the second rule should apply, and the transaction should be absolutely voidable; or whether the corporation was effectively represented in the transaction by other agents, so that it may be said to have taken part therein "knowingly," and thus the director or officer has merely the burden of proving the fairness and good faith of his contract. In general, see In re George Newman & Co., [1895] 1 Ch. 675; Alexander v. Automatic Telephone Co., [1900] 2 Ch. 56, reversing [1899] 2 Ch. 302 (directors obtaining secret benefits); Shaw v. Holland, [1900] 2 Ch. 305 (purchasing shares of the company at an under value); Wardell v.

Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 651, 26 L.Ed. 509; Thomas v. Brownsville, etc., R. R. Co., 109 U. S. 522, 27 L. Ed. 1018, 3 Sup. Ct. 315; Jackson v. Mc-Lean, 36 Fed. 213; Jesup v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 43 Fed. 483; Barr v. Pittsburgh Plate-Glass Co., 57 Fed. 86, 6 C. C. A. 260, 17 U. S. App. 124 (contract valid if fair); Burnes v. Burnes, 137 Fed. 781, 70 C. C. A. 357; Monmouth Inv. Co. v. Means, 151 Fed. 159, 80 C. C. A. 527 (vote of back salary, void); Teller v. Tonopah & G. R. Co., 155 Fed. 482 (agreement upheld); Pepper v. Addicks, 153 Fed. 383 (majority stockholder who dominated affairs of corporation in same position as a director); Union Trust Co. v. Carter, 139 Fed. 717 (contract closely scrutinized, but upheld); Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co., 144 Fed. 765, 75 C. C. A. 631 (fiduciary relation of majority stockholders to minority); Cowell v. McMillin, 177 Fed. 25, 100 C. C. A. 443; Wheeler v. Abilene Nat. Bank Bldg. Co., 159 Fed. 391, 14 Ann. Cas. 917, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 892, 89 C. C. A. 477 (sale, by single majority stockholder, of corporate

knowledge or information he may have obtained affecting

property to himself, voidable; an instructive opinion by Sanborn, J.); Ross v. Quinnesec Iron Mining Co., 227 Fed. 337, 142 C. C. A. 33; Heublein v. Wight, 227 Fed. 667 (excessive salaries); Mercy v. Guanajuato Development Co., 228 Fed. 150 (contracts between interlocking directorates); Fagan v. Stuttgart Normal Institute, 91 Ark. 141, 120 S. W. 404 (as to purchase by director at judicial sale); Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Altadena Min. & Inv. Co., 11 Cal. App. 165, 104 Pac. 470 (director who signs appeal bond for company may take security); Schnittger v. Old Home Consol. Min. Co., (Cal.) 78 Pac. 9 (loan by directors to corporation is voidable merely); Smith v. Los Angeles, etc., Ass'n, 78 Cal. 289, 12 Am. St. Rep. 53, 20 Pac. 677 (director who is personally interested in the passage of a resolution by the board of directors disgualified from voting thereon); Mallory ν. Mallory-Wheeler Co., 61 Conn. 135, 23 Atl. 708 (same; contract so made is voidable); St. Joe & M. F. Consol. Min. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 10 Colo. App. 339, 50 Pac. 1055 (director may loan on security to a solvent corporation); Burns v. National Mining, Tunnel & Land Co., 23 Colo. App. 545, 130 Pac. 1037 (action to set aside loan by director to corporation, voidable if vote of director necessary); Eberhardt v. Christiana Window Glass Co., 9 Del. 284, 81 Atl. 774 (liquidating trustee obtaining title to the property); Fricker v. Americus Mfg. & Imp. Co., 124 Ga. 165, 52 S. E. 65; Klein v. Independent Brewing Ass'n, 231 Ill, 594, 83 N. E. 434; Moore v. United States One Stave Barrel Co.,

238 Ill. 544, 128 Am. St. Rep. 153, 87 N. E. 536; City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 248 Ill. 242, 93 N. E. 757 (contract of board of education with one of their number voidable, regardless of whether vote of the trustee was necessary); Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa, 362, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 230, L. R. A. 1916E, 878, 157 N. W. 929; Trask v. Chase, 107 Me. 137, 77 Atl. 698; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Minis, 120 Md. 461, 496, 87 Atl. 1062; Malden, etc., Gaslight Co. v. Chandler, 209 Mass. 354, 95 N. E. 791; In re Allen-Foster-Willett Co., 227 Mass. 551, 116 N. E. 875 (buying up claims at a discount after receiver appointed); Thoman v. Mills, 159 Mich. 402, 124 N. W. 33 (nominal damages only allowed, as it did not appear that beneficiaries were injured); Savage v. Madelia Farmers' Warehouse Co., 98 Minn. 343, 108 N. W. 296 (question is one of fairness and good faith); Brooker v. William H. Thompson Trust Co., 254 Mo. 125, 162 S. W. 187 (promoter; there must be a full disclosure); Jackson v. Mc-Lean, 100 Mo. 130, 13 S. W. 393; Coombs v. Barker, (Mont.) 79 Pac. 1; Tatem v. Eglanol Min. Co., 42 Mont. 475, 113 Pac. 295 (directors may loan to corporation, in good faith); Forrest v. Nebraska Hardware Co., 91 Neb. 735, 137 N. W. 839; Barry v. Moeller, 68 N. J. Eq. 483, 59 Atl. 97; Booth v. Land Filling & Imp. Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 536, 59 Atl. 767; Marr v. Marr, 73 N. J. Eq. 643, 133 Am. St. Rep. 742, 70 Atl. 375, reversing 72 N. J. Eq. 797, 66 Atl. 182 (duty of director on taking legal proceedings for collection of his claim against the corporation); Stephany v. Marsden, 75 N. J. Eq.

the beneficiary's interests so far as they are embraced in or depend upon the trust or confidential relation.^e

90, 71 Atl. 578; Endicott v. Marvel, 81 N. J. Eq. 378, 87 Atl. 230; Mitchell v. United Box, Board & Paper Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 580, 66 Atl. 938; Purchase v. Atlantic Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 344, 87 Atl. 444 (contract between director and corporation is voidable without regard to fairness); Voorhees v. Nixon, 72 N. J. Eq. 791, 66 Atl. 192 (same); Hodge v. United States Steel Corp., (N. J. Eq.) 54 Atl. 1; H. B. Cartwright & Bro. v. U. S. Bank & Trust Co., (N. M.) 167 Pac. 436; Billings v. Shaw, 209 N. Y. 265, 103 N. E. 142; Pollitz v. Wabash R. Co., 207 N. Y. 113, 100 N. E. 721; Continental Ins. Co. v. New York & H. R. Co., 187 N. Y. 225, 79 N. E. 1026 (contracts between corporations having common directors, if in perfect good faith, may be ratified); Haines Mercantile Co. v. Highland Gold Mines Co., 49 Or. 71, 88 Pac. 865; Young v. Columbia Land & I. Co., 53 Or. 438, 133 Am. St. Rep. 844, 99 Pac. 936, 101 Pac. 212 (purchasing notes against corporation at a discount); Bird Iron & Coal Co. v. Humes, 157 Pa. St. 278, 37 Am. St. Rep. 727, 27 Atl. 750 (secret profits); Attala Iron Ore Co. v. Virginia Iron, C. & C. Co., (Tenn.) 77 S. W. 774 (directors organize and contract with contract corporation; such new voidable, whether favorable or not, on seasonable application of directors and stockholders of first corporation); Law v. Fuller, 217 Pa. St. 439, 66 Atl. 754; Nueces Valley Irr. Co. v. Davis, (Tex. Civ. App.) 116 S. W. 633 (sale by director to corporation; as a condition for setting it aside, debt must be ten-

dered; new board of directors cannot ratify the transaction); Davis v. Nueces Valley Irr. Co., 103 Tex. 243, 126 S. W. 4; Niles v. United States Ozocerite Co., 38 Utah, 367, 113 Pac. 1038; Singer v. Salt Lake City Copper Mfg. Co., 17 Utah, 143, 70 Am. St. Rep. 773, 53 Pac. 1024 (director may loan on security to a solvent corporation); Griffith v. Blackwater B. & L. Co., 46 W. Va. 56, 33 S. E. 125; Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 109 N. W. 581, 110 N. W. 798. Where vote of director is necessary to make quorum, vote fixing his salary or conveying property to him or allowing his claim, is void; Mobile Land Imp. Co. v. Gass, 142 Ala. 520, 39 South. 229; Paxton v. Heron, 41 Colo. 147, 124 Am. St. Rep. 123, 92 Pac. 15; Steele v. Gold Fissure Min. Co., 42 Colo. 529, 126 Am. St. Rep. 177, 95 Pac. 349; Camden Land Co. v. Lewis, 101 Me. 78, 63 Atl. 523; Jacobson v. Brooklyn Co., 184 N. Y. 152, 76 N. E. 1075; Davis v. Nueces Valley Irr. Co., 103 Tex. 243, 126 S. W. 4. See Francis v. Brigham-Hopkins Co., 108 Md. 233, 70 Atl. 95. Α director is not allowed to purchase property which he knows the corporation will need and then make a profit by selling to the corporation: Miller v. Consolidated, etc., Co., 110 Fed. 480; Lagarde v. Anniston, etc., Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 South. 199; Seacoast R. Co. v. Wood, (N. J. Eq.) 56 Atl. 337; De Barde-Ichen v. Bessemer Land & Imp. Co., (Ala.) 37 South. 511 (president taking lease in his own name holds as trustee); Acker, Merrall &

§1077, (e) Sec §§ 902-904; §1063.

§ 1078. 4. The Duty not to Sell Trust Property to Himself nor to Buy from Himself.—This particular duty has already been fully discussed. It has been shown that where a trustee deals directly with his beneficiary by way of purchase or sale, the transaction is presumptively invalid; and that where a trustee with authority to sell directly or indirectly purchases the property for himself behind his beneficiary's back, or where a trustee with authority to buy purchases the property in such a manner from himself, in each case the transaction may be avoided by the beneficiary, unless he has ratified it with full knowledge of all the facts.^{1 a}

§ 1078, ¹ See ante, §§ 958-965, 1049-1052. See, also, In re Bloye's Trust, 1 Macn. & G. 488; Knight v. Majoribanks, 2 Macn. & G. 10; Hickley v. Hickley, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 190; Ellis v. Barker, L. R. 7 Ch. 104; Boerum v. Schenck, 41 N. Y. 182 (when a trustee to sell has himself purchased the trust property, the mere receipt and acceptance of the proceeds by the beneficiary is not such a ratification as will prevent him from avoiding the sale); Munn v. Berges, 70 Ill. 604; Bush v. Sherman, 80 Ill. 160; Star Fire Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 41 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 267; Spencer's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 317; Tatum v. McLellan, 50 Miss. 1; Union Slate Co. v. Tilton, 69 Me. 244; James v. James, 55 Ala. 525; Higgins v. Curtiss, 82 Ill. 28; Ferguson v. Lowery, 54 Ala. 510, 25 Am. Rep. 718.

Condit v. McGaw, 106 Md. 536, 68 Atl. 17 (manager securing renewal of lease in his own name); Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, 11 Ariz. 245, 100 Pac. 784; Nebraska Power Co. v. Koenig, 93 Neb. 68, 139 N. W. 839; Hussong Dyeing Machine Co. v. Morris, (N. J. Eq.) 89 Atl. 249; Douglass-Whisler Brick Co. v. Simpson, 233 Pa. 515, 82 Atl. 759; Mc-Court v. Singers-Biggers, 145 Fed. 103, 7 Ann. Cas. 287, 76 C. C. A. 73; nor to keep sums secretly paid to influence his action by one dealing with the corporation: Scott v. Farmers & Merchants' Nat. Bank, (Tex.) 75 S. W. 7 (conveyance made to president in consideration of railroad extending its line); Rutland, etc., Co. v. Bates, 68 Vt. 579, 54 Am. St. Rep. 904, 35 Atl. 480; nor to be secretly interested in contracts with the corporation: D. M. Steward Mfg. Co. v. Steward, 109 Tenn. 288, 70 S. W. 809. See, also, Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Lockwood, 166 Cal. 185, 135 Pac. 496 (secret profits); Commonwealth Title Ins. & T. Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 136 Am. St. Rep. 896, 76 Atl. 77 (same).

§ 1078, (a) Williams v. Scott, [1900] App. Cas. 499 (though the beneficiary consented); Silkstone and Haigh Moore Coal Co. v. Edey, [1900] 1 Ch. 167; In re Sykes, [1909] 2 Ch. 241 (under special provision in will, trustees were § 1079. IV. Breach of Trust, and Liability Therefor.— It might be supposed that the term "breach of trust" was confined to willful and fraudulent acts which have a *quasi* criminal character, even if they have not been made actual crimes by statute. The term has, however, a broader and more technical meaning. It is well settled that every violation by a trustee of a duty which equity lays upon him, whether willful and fraudulent, or done through negligence, or arising through mere oversight or forgetfulness, is a breach of trust.^a The term therefore includes every omis-

permitted to deal with themselves as testator had done in his lifetime); Hoyt v. Latham, 143 U. S. 553, 36 L. Ed. 259, 12 Sup. Ct. 568; (the cestui may ratify the sale); Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 224, 36 L. Ed. 134, 12 Sup. Ct. 418 (such sale is voidable and may be ratified); Morse v. Hill, 136 Mass. 60 (purchase by trustee may be avoided by a part of the beneficiaries); Yeackel v. Litchfield, 13 Allen (95 Mass.), 417, 90 Am. Dec. 207 (sale to trustee cannot be attacked at law by a stranger); Creveling v. Fritts, 34 N. J. Eq. 134 (sale to a third party and subsequent purchase from him protects trustee); H. B. Cartwright & Bro. v. United States Bank & T. Co., (N. M.) 167 Pac. 436 (director of trustee corporation purchasing trust property); Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns Ch. 252 (a sale to one to hold in trust for the trustee's wife is within the rule); Lingke v. Wilkinson, 57 N. Y. 445 (court upheld a sale to the trustee's son on the ground that it was not intended for the benefit of the trustee); Marquam v. Ross, 47 Or. 374, 78 Pac. 698, 83 Pac. 852 (cannot buy at own sale, but this does not apply to a mortgagee in possession); Irwin v. Monongahela River Consol. C. & C. Co., 238 Pa. 558, 86 Atl. 491 (sale by executor to dummy and reconveyance; executor holds on same trusts as before); Board of Trustees v. Blair, 45 W. Va. 812, 32 S. E. 203 (sale to third person and subsequent sale to trustee protects him); Pittsburg Min. Co. v. Spooner, 74 Wis. 307, 17 Am. St. Rep. 149, 42 N. W. 259 (corporation trustees). See as to the effect of a sale to a third party, and a subsequent sale to the trustee, Williams v. Scott, supra; Frazier v. Jeakins, 64 Kan. 615, 57 L. R. A. 575, 68 Pac. 24; Broder v. Conklin, 121 Cal. 282, 53 Pac. 699 (voidable); Hamilton v. Dooley, 15 Utah, 280, 49 Pac. 769 (trustee not allowed to purchase at judicial sale); Shelby v. Creighton, 65 Neb. 485, 91 N. W. 369 (cestui has option to take benefit of purchase or to treat the sale as valid, but his decision must be made within a reasonable time); St. Paul Trust Co. v. Strong, 85 Minn. 1, 88 N. W. 256.

§ 1079, (a) The text is quoted in Duckett v. National Mechanics' Bank, 86 Md. 400, 403, 63 Am. St. Rep. 513, 516, 39 L. R. A. 84, 38 Atl. 983, and in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Rice, 186 Fed. 204; H. B. Cartwright & Bro. v. United States Bank & T. Co., (N. M.) 167 Pac. 436;

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sion or commission which violates in any manner either of the three great obligations already described: of carrying out the trust according to its terms, of care and diligence in protecting and investing the trust property, and of using perfect good faith. This broad conception of breach of trust, and the liabilities created thereby, are not confined to trustees regularly and legally appointed; they extend to all persons who are acting trustees, or who intermeddle with trust property.^{1 b} In order that a trustee may be personally liable for a breach of trust, he must be *sui juris*.²

§ 1079, ¹ Rackham v. Siddall, ¹ Macn. & G. 607; Lord v. Wightwick, ⁴ De Gex, M. & G. 803; Life Ass'n of Scotland v. Siddal, ³ De Gex, F. & J. ⁵⁸; Pearce v. Pearce, ²² Beav. ²⁴⁸; Hennessey v. Bray, ³³ Beav. ⁹⁶.

§ 1079, ² Where the common-law disabilities of coverture prevail, a married woman does not become personally liable for her breach of trust: Underwood v. Stevens, 1 Mer. 712, 717; Cresswell v. Dewell, 4 Giff. 460; Wainford v. Heyl, L. R. 20 Eq. 321; although her separate estate might be liable under some circumstances: See Brewer v. Swirles, 2 Smale & G. 219; Fletcher v. Green, 33 Beav. 426; as to wrongful investments made with her consent, see Cocker v. Quayle, 1 Russ. & M. 525; Kellaway v. Johnson, 5 Beav. 319. An infant is not, in general, liable for a breach of trust: Whitmore v. Weld, 1 Vern. 326, 328; Hindmarsh v. Southgate, 3 Russ. 324; unless it was intentional and fraudulent: Cory v. Gertcken, 2 Madd. 40; Wright v. Snowe, 2 De Gex & S. 321.^e

Comingor v. Louisville Trust Co., 128 Ky. 697, 129 Am. St. Rep. 322, 108 S. W. 950, 111 S. W. 681.

§1079, (b) The text is quoted in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Rice, 186 Fed. 204; H. B. Cartwright & Bro. v. United States Bank & T. Co., (N. M.) 167 Pac. 436. This section is cited in Duckett v. Bank, 86 Md. 400, 63 Am. St. Rep. 513, 39 L. R. A. 84, 38 Atl. 983; Russell v. McCall, 141 N. Y. 437, 38 Am. St. Rep. 807, 36 N. E. 498; Miami County Bank v. State, 61 Ind. App. 360, 112 N. E. 40. See, also, Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Sutherberry, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 236 (a breach of trust though beneficial to the estate was not condoned by the court). A breach of trust is not generally excused because committed at the request of the beneficiary; see Griffith v. Hughes, [1892] 3 Ch. 105; Bolton v. Curre, [1895] 1 Ch. 545; Williams v. Scott, [1900] App. Cas. 499. An investment, unintentionally improper, is a breach for which the trustee is liable: Stokes v. Prance, [1898] 1 Ch. 212. That the words "willful and intentional breaches of trust" may include mere acts of negligence, see Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617; see, also, Elliott v. Carter, 9 Gratt. 541, and ante, § 1070.

§ 1079, (c) See ante, § 987. It has been held that a trustee may limit and qualify the character in which he is to be held answerable, and

§ 1080. Nature and Extent of the Liability.-It has already been shown that a beneficiary may always claim and reach the trust property through all its changes of form while in the hand of the trustee, and that he may also follow it into the possession and apparent ownership of third persons, until it has been transferred to a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration and without notice; and that a court of equity will furnish him with all the incidental remedies necessary to enforce his claim and to render it effective.¹ In addition to this claim of the beneficiary upon the trust estate as long as it exists, the trustee incurs a personal liability for a breach of trust by way of compensation or indemnification, which the beneficiary may enforce at his election, and which becomes his only remedy whenever the trust property has been lost or put beyond his reach by the trustee's wrongful act. The trustee's personal liability to make compensation for the loss occasioned by a breach of trust is a simple contract equitable debt.^{2 a} It may be enforced by a suit in equity against the trustee himself, or against his estate after his death, and the statute of limitations will not be admitted as a defense unless the statutory language is express and mandatory upon the

§ 1080, 1 See ante, §§ 1048-1058.

§ 1080, ² Vernon v. Vawdry, 2 Atk. 119; Adey v. Arnold, 2 De Gex, M. & G. 432; Lockhart v. Reilly, 1 De Gex & J. 464; Obee v. Bishop, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 137; Ex parte Blencowe, L. R. 1 Ch. 393; Holland v. Holland, L. R. 4 Ch. 449; Wynch v. Grant, 2 Drew. 312; Benbury v. Benbury, 2 Dev. & B. Eq. 235, 238. The distinction between specialty debts and simple contract debts in the settlement of estates being generally abolished in this country, the liability of the trustee may properly be described as an equitable contract liability or debt,—that is, an equitable liability of the same nature as that arising from breach of contract.

where it plainly appears that he did not intend to bind himself personally the courts will treat the transaction according to the plainly expressed intention of the parties: Glenn v. Allison, 58 Md. 527; Noyes v. Blakeman, 6 N. Y. 567; New v. III--156 Nicoll, 73 N. Y. 127, 20 Am. Rep. 111; Perry v. Board of Missions of the P. E. Church, 102 N. Y. 99, 6 N. E. 116.

§ 1080, (a) Little v. Chadwick, 151 Mass. 109, 7 L. R. A. 570, 23 N. E. 1005.

court.^b The amount of the liability is always sufficient for the complete indemnification and compensation of the beneficiary.³

§ 1080, ³ The general doctrines concerning the trustee's liability for profits, for interest simple or compound, and for the funds lost or misapplied, have been stated in the foregoing paragraphs. For a more detailed discussion of these rules, especially as to interest, the reader must be referred to the various treatises upon trusts. As to the liability of the trustee's estate after his death, and the defense of the statute of limitations,^c see Devaynes v. Robinson, 24 Beav. 86; Brittlehank v. Goodwin, L. R. 5 Eq. 545; Wood v. Weightman, L. R. 13 Eq. 434; Taylor v. Cartwright, L. R. 14 Eq. 167; Burdick v. Garrick, L. R. 5 Ch. 233; Stone v. Stone, L. R. 5 Ch. 74; Dixon v. Dixon, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 587; Pinson v. Gilhert, 57 Ala. 35; Rowe v. Bentley, 29 Gratt. 756. As to the liability in general,^d see Robinson v. Robinson, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 247 (for interest); Att'y-Gen. v. Alford, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 843 (ditto); Cosser v. Radford, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 585; Bostock v. Floyer, L. R. 1 Eq. 26 (liable for fraud of his attorney); Sutton v. Wilders, L. R. 12 Eq. 373 (ditto); Hopgood v. Parkin, L. R. 11 Eq. 74 (liable for the negligence of his attorney); In re Grabowski's Settlement, L. R. 6 Eq. 12 (for compound interest); Cook v. Addison, L. R. 7 Eq. 466; Beaty v. Curson, L. R. 7 Eq. 194; Jacubs v. Rylance, L. R. 17 Eq. 341; Livingston v. Wells, 8 S. C. 347; Leedon v. Lombaert, 80 Pa. St. 381; Brown v. Lambert's Adm'r, 33 Gratt. 256; and see cases cited under the last preceding paragraphs.

§1080, (b) Quoted in Beecher v. Foster, 51 W. Va. 605, 42 S. E. 647. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Cahn, 102 Md. 530, 62 Atl. 819; Cunningham v. Pettigrew, 169 Fed. 335, 94 C. C. A. 457; Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S. W. 634; General Proprietors of Eastern Division of New Jersey v. Force's Ex'rs, 72 N. J. Eq. 56, 68 Atl. 914 (measure of damages for breach of trust). Cited to the effect that the statute of limitations is not a defense in Duckett v. Bank, 86 Md. 400, 63 Am. St. Rep. 513, 39 L. R. A. 84, 38 Atl. 983. See § 419, and on the general subject of statute of limitations and laches in suits to enforce trusts, Pom. Eq. Rem., § 28.

§ 1080, (c) See, also, Richardson v. Hutchins, 68 Tex. 81, 3 S. W. 276.

§1080, (d) In re Barclay, [1899] 1 Ch. 674; Nunn v. Nunn, 66 Ala. 35; Atkinson v. Ward, 47 Ark. 533, 2 S. W. 77; Adams v. Lambard, 80 Cal. 426, 22 Pac. 180; Clapp v. Vatcher, 9 Cal. App. 462, 99 Pac. 549; Fricker v. Americus Mfg. & Imp. Co., 124 Ga. 165, 52 S. E. 65; O'Neil v. Epting, 82 Kan. 245, 108 Pac. 107; In re Schofield's Estate, 99 Ill. 513; Zimmerman v. Fraley, 70 Md. 561, 17 Atl. 560; McKim v. Hibbard, 142 Mass. 422, 8 N. E. 152; Rowley v. Towsley, 53 Mich. 329, 19 N. W. 20; Demars v. Hudon, 33 Mont. 170, 82 Pac. 952; Bartlett v. Fitz, 59 N. H. 502 (not liable for interest for non-investment); Stothoff v. Reed, 32 N. J. Eq. 213; Jones v. Haines, 79 N. J. Eq. 110, 80 Atl. 943 (interest not allowed

§ 1081. Liability Among Co-trustees.—I do not now speak of the liability for the acts or defaults of a co-trustee, but assume that co-trustees have concurred in a breach of trust. The rule is firmly settled that where a breach

where a delay of twenty-eight years in seeking enforcement of trust); Wilmerding v. McKesson, 103 N. Y. 329, 8 N. E. 665; Gray v. Thompson, ,1 Johns. Ch. 82; Rundle v. Allison, 34 N. Y. 180; Ticonderoga R. Co. v. Delaware & H. Co., 204 N. Y. 588, 97 N. E. 475 (in absence of bad faith, should be charged only with such interest as he has been able to collect); Bettencourt v. Bettencourt, 70 Or. 384, 142 Pac. 326 (if beneficiary elects to proceed against trustee personally, decree should not direct sale of property purchased with the trust fund); Buist v. Williams, 88 S. C. 252, 70 S. E. 817; Home Inv. Co. v. Strange, (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 510; D. Sullivan & Co. v. Ramsey, (Tex. Civ. App.) 155 S. W. 580 (may recover value of property converted as of date of trial, and rents and profits earned); Snyder v. Parmalee, 80 Vt. 496, 68 Atl. 649; In re Mendel's Will, 164 Wis. 136, 159 N. W. 806.

Simple Interest charged was against the trustee in the following cases: In re Davis, [1902] 2 Ch. 314 (by English rule, five per cent interest, though that is much above the mercantile rate, charged on funds invested in trade or speculative transactions; or, at option of the beneficiary, the profits made on the investment); Primeau v. Granfield, 184 Fed. 481, 180 Fed. 847 (constructive trust, simple interest allowed, though the trustee had profit); Eppinger made по ٧. Canepa, 20 Fla. 262 (failure to pay into court); Offutt v. Divine's Ex'rs, (Ky.) 53 S. W. 816; Gott v. State, 44 Md. 319; Crosby v. Merriam, 31 Minn. 342, 17 N. W. 950 (guardian chargeable with legal rate for non-investment); Ames v. Scudder, 83 Mo. 189, 11 Mo. App. 168 (negligent non-investment); Cornet v. Cornet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S. W. 333; Aldridge v. McClelland, 36 N. J. Eq. 288 (funds used for trustee's benefit); Backus v. Crane, (N. J. Eq.) 100 Atl. 900 (simple interest at four per cent only, on account of plaintiff's delay); In re Myers, 131 N. Y. 409, 30 N. E. 135 (six per cent for using the trust funds); In re Barnes, 4 Misc. Rep. 136, 23 N. Y. Supp. 600 (six per cent for non-investment); Skipp v. Hettrick, 63 N. C. 329 (keeping funds mingled with his own); In re Whitecar's Estate, 147 Pa. St. 368, 23 Atl. 575 (one per cent in addition to what the fund had drawn from the negligent deposit); McCloskey v. Gleason, 56 Vt. 264, 38 Am. Rep. 770 (the highest legal rate charged, for mingling the fund with that of the trustee); Coghill v. Bird, 79 Va. 1 (an improvident investment at ten per cent was repudiated by the cestui: held, the trustee liable at the rate of six per cent only); In re Thurston, 57 Wis. 104, 15 N. W. 126 (non-fraudulent failure to invest).

Compound Interest: Price v. Peterson, 38 Ark. 494 ("It is usual, and quite necessary, sometimes, in equity, to inflict compound interest upon trustees, not so much for punishment, but that the bene-

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of trust has affected two or more or all of co-trustees with a common liability, they are liable jointly and severally; each is liable for the whole loss sustained or the whole amount due, and a decree obtained against them jointly may be enforced against any one of them.¹^a Wherever

§ 1081, ¹ Wilson v. Moore, 1 Mylne & K. 126; Lyse v. Kingdon, 1 Coll. C. C. 184, 188; Att'y-Gen. v. Wilson, Craig & P. 1, 28; Lawrence v. Bowle, 2 Phill. Ch. 140; Fletcher v. Green, 33 Beav. 426; Rehden v. Wesley, 29 Beav. 213, 215; Burrows v. Walls, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 233; Wiles v. Gresham, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 770; Ex parte Geaves, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 291; Lockhart v. Reilly, 1 De Gex & J. 464; Case v. James, 3 De Gex,

ficiaries may receive that which, in justice, they should, and which they most probably would have received if the trustee had been reasonably attentive and faithful"); In re Thompson's Estate, 101 Cal. 349, 35 Pac. 991, 36 Pac. 98, 508 (using the fund for his own profit); Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ingersoll, 158 Cal. 474, 111 Pac. 360 (only where extremely difficult or impracticable to ascertain with any degree of certainty what profit was realized); Hough v. Harvey, 71 Ill. 72 (six per cent for mere failure to invest); Rochester v. Levering, 104 Ind. 562, 4 N. E. 203 (six per cent); Page v. Holman, 82 Ky. 573 (trustee using for his own business); Elliott v. Sparrell, 114 Mass. 404; Perrin v. Lepper, 72 Mich. 454, 40 N. W. 859 (fraudulent appropriation to the use of trustee); Crowder v. Shakelford, 35 Miss. 321 (using the fund); McKnight v. Walsh, 24 N. J. Eq. 498; Salisbury v. Colt, 27 N. J. Eq. 492 (failure to invest funds); French v. Armstrong, 79 N. J. Eq. 289, 82 Atl. 331 (where trustee used fund for eight years); Windmuller v. Spirits Distributing Co., 83 N. J. Eq. 6, 90 Atl. 249 (choice between compound interest and all profits); Cook v.

Lowry, 95 N. Y. 103 (trustee using the funds); Roberts's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 407; Reed v. Timmins, 52 Tex. 84 (trustee using res); In re Hodges Estate, 66 Vt. 70, 44 Am. St. Rep. 820, 28 Atl. 663 (trustee mingling with his own funds); Jones v. Ward, 10 Yerg. 160 (statute providing for the payment of annual interest means compounding interest).

That the liability of a trustee may be limited by the instrument creating the trust, but that a strict rule of construction will be applied against such limitation, see Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617. See, also, Digney v. Blanchard, 226 Mass. 335, 115 N. E. 424 (trustee not protected from willful and intentional breach of trust).

§ 1081, (a) This paragraph is cited in Ashley v. Winkley, 209 Mass. 509, 95 N. E. 932; General Proprietors of Eastern Division of New Jersey v. Force's Ex'rs, 72 N. J. Eq. 56, 68 Atl. 914 (not necessary to make all participating trustees parties). See, also, Windmuller v. Spirits Distributing Co., 83 N. J. Eq. 6, 90 Atl. 249; Andrews v. Tuttle-Smith Co., 191 Mass. 461, 78 N. E. 99 (as to joinder of parties when different trustees have committed separate breaches). two or more co-trustees are thus jointly and severally liable in the same amount for a breach of trust which is not purely tortious in its nature,—as where it consists in a failure to carry out the directions of the trust, or a failure to make proper investments, or other like acts of omission or commission which are not fraudulent, or do not involve a willful breach of good faith,—a right of contribution exists among themselves; and if one of them has paid the amount of liability, he may enforce a contribution from the others, in a suit brought for that purpose. In such cases, upon the general principles of equity pleading, all the trustees who are liable should be joined as defendants in a suit brought by the beneficiary; the contribution, however, cannot be *enforced* in that suit.² Where, on the other hand, the

F. & J. 256; Turquand v. Marshall, L. R. 6 Eq. 112; Sculthorpe v. Tipper, L. R. 13 Eq. 232; Ashhurst v. Mason, L. R. 20 Eq. 225; Ex parte Norris, L. R. 4 Ch. 280; Budge v. Gummow, L. R. 7 Ch. 719; Ellis v. Barker, L. R. 7 Ch. 104; Evans v. Bear, L. R. 10 Ch. 76; Butler v. Butler, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 554; 7 Ch. Div. 116; In re Englefield etc. Co., L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 388; Land Credit Co. v. Lord Fermoy, L. R. 8 Eq. 7, 11, 13; 5 Ch. 763; Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65, 37 Am. Rep. 546; Weetjen v. Vibbard, 5 Hun, 265; Heath v. Waters, 40 Mich. 457 (where one trustee deals with another person, whom he knows to be also a trustee, in such a manner as amounts to a breach of the latter's trust, both are affected with an equitable liability); see, also, on the general subject of the trustees' liability; Townley v. Sherborne, Bridg. 35; Brice v. Stokes, 11 Ves. 319; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed. 1738, 1748, 1791, and notes of the English and American editors.

§ 1081, ² This rule is sometimes laid down in the broadest terms, as though the right of contribution was universal, existing in every instance of liability among co-trustees for any breach of trust. This is certainly erroneous, since the distinction mentioned in the text is clearly made by the decisions. The general language of judicial opinions in stating the rule should always be interpreted by the facts of the case before the court. It has also heen said that the defaulting trustees should all be joined as defendants in a suit by the beneficiary, in order that the contribution among them might be settled and enforced by the one decree. This view is not sustained by the decisions. Many of the authorities which recognize the right of contribution declare in the most positive manner that it cannot be enforced among the defendants in the suit brought against them by the beneficiary. The true reason for making them all parties is, that

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breach of trust concurred in by several co-trustees is tortious in its nature, as where it is actually fraudulent, or consists in an intentional misappropriation of trust funds to the trustee's own use, or in any other willful violation of

they may be bound by the decree which fixes the amount of the liability for which they must contribute: See Perry on Trusts, secs. 848, 876. The leading case on the subject of contribution is Lingard v. Bromley, 1 Ves. & B. 114, 117. Two trustees were sued, and a decree was obtained against them jointly for not conveying certain property. The master of rolls said: "Where damages are recovered against several defendants guilty of a tort, a court of justice will not enforce a contribution among them; but here is nothing but the non-performance of a civil obligation. The trustees were bound to convey; a loss was occasioned by their not conveying, and they were bound to make good that loss. The liability, therefore, was not at all ex delicto." He goes on to show that there was not the slightest fraud in the defendants' default, and they were entitled to a contribution. The whole reasoning indicates the ground upon which the right of contribution is placed to be the absence of any tortious character in the defendants' breach of trust. In Sherman v. Parish, 53 N. Y. 483, 489, defendant was sued for an alleged breach of trust in not making proper investments. The court held that the fault, if any, was entirely that of the defendants' co-trustce, who was not made a party defendant, and that the defendant was not at all liable. Folger, J., added: "It is quite clear that if defendant had been held to answer in the first instance to the plaintiff, he should have recompense from the estate of the active trustee, contribution from that of the co-trustee equally in fault, and be enabled to pursue and recover the fund in the securities in which it has been put." He goes on to say that the other co-trustee was a necessary party, and seems to intimate as the reason, that the court might by its decree in the same suit adjust the rights, and enforce the contribution between the defendants themselves. This whole statement is an obiter dictum; but the rule which it lays down concerning the right of contribution is undoubtedly correct when confined to such cases as the one then before the court. The conclusion which the learned judge reaches, that the contribution would be enforced by the decree in the suit brought by the beneficiary, is certainly not suported by the decisions which he cites. See, also, Coppard v. Allen, 2 De Gex, J. & S. 173, 177, per Turner, L. J.; Fletcher v. Green, 33 Beav. 513, 515 (while admitting the right of contribution, expressly holds that "the equities of the defendants as between themselves cannot be determined in this suit" brought by the cestui que trust); Att'y-Gen. v. Daugars, 33 Beav. 621, 624 (same rule); Perry v. Knott, 4 Beav. 179, 180 (holds that all the defaulting trustees should be made parties, not because contribution could be enforced in this suit, for it

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good faith, or perhaps in gross and culpable negligence occasioning a loss, there is no right of contribution among the trustees; the beneficiary may, at his election, sue one or more of the wrong-doers without joining all who are liable.³

could not; "but if they were all present, the amount due would be settled in the presence of all, and *in a subsequent suit for contribution*, the amount would already have been conclusively decided"); Pitt v. Bonner, 1 Younge & C. Ch. 670 (a contribution as to costs for the defendants was decreed by consent of the parties on motion in the same suit); Wilson v. Goodman, 4 Hare, 54; Munch v. Cockerell, 8 Sim. 219 (all the defaulting trustees are, in general, necessary parties defendant in a suit for a breach of trust); Priestman v. Tindall, 24 Beav. 244; Baynard v. Woolley, 20 Beav. 583; Birks v. Micklethwait, 33 Beav. 409.^b

§ 1081, 3 In Att'y-Gen. v. Wilson, Craig & P. 1, 28, a suit was brought against a portion of a body of trustees, who had been guilty of a willful misappropriation of trust funds, and of gross negligence in the management of the trust estate. The objection was urged with great earnestness that all the wrong-doing trustees should have been made defendants, and that the suit could not be sustained against a part of them only. Lord Cottenham laid down the rule in the following emphatic manner, and his conclusions are founded upon plain and settled principles: "It was then urged that all the governing body, at least all who took any part in these transactions, ought to be co-defendants. Upon this point, also, Lord Hardwicke's authority in the Charitable Corporation Case, 2 Atk. 400, 406, is of the highest value. It was urged that, as the injury had arisen from the misconduct of many, each ought to be answerable for so much only as his particular misconduct had occasioned; but Lord Hardwicke said: 'If this doctrine should prevail, it is indeed laying the ax to the root of the tree. But if upon inquiry there should appear to be supine negligence in all of them, by which a gross complicated loss happens. I will never determine that they are not all guilty; nor will I ever determine that a court of equity cannot lay hold of every breach of trust, let the person guilty of it be either in a private or a public capacity.' In cases of this kind, where the liability arises from the wrongful act of the parties, each is liable for all the consequences, and there is no contribution between them, and each case is distinct, depending upon the evidence against each party. It is therefore not necessary to make all

§ 1081, (b) See, also, Chillingworth v. Chambers, [1896] 1 Ch. 685; Robinson v. Harkin, [1896] 2 Ch. 415 (as between the trustees statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claim of the cestus que trust is established against one of them); Jackson v. Dickinson, [1903] 1 Ch. 947. § 1082. Liability for Co-trustees.—The general theory of equity is, that each one of several trustees has the same rights as the others with respect to the possession, control, and management of the trust property. It follows as a necessary consequence of this conception, and the general rule is well settled, that each trustee is generally liable only for his own conduct in dealing with the affairs of the trust; he is not responsible for the acts or defaults—the intentional or negligent breaches of trust—of a co-trustee, in which he has not joined or concurred, or to which he has not consented, or which he has not aided or made possible by his own negligence.^{1a} Where a trustee who is not really

parties who may more or less have joined in the act complained of; nor would any one derive any advantage from their being all made defendants, because, as the decree would be general against all found to be guilty of the charge, it might be executed against any of them. It is evident that Lord Hardwicke, in the case of the Charitable Corporation, cousidered that each defendant would be liable for each transaction in which he had been a party." He also cites Att'y-Gen. v. Brown, 1 Swanst. 265, decided by Lord Eldon as sustaining his conclusion. The same distinction was recognized and followed, and declared to be the well-settled rule, in Cunningham v. Pell, 5 Paige, 607, per Walworth, C.; and in Heath v. Erie R. R. Co., 8 Blatch. 347; Smith v. Rathbun, 22 Hun, 150.°

§ 1082, 1 Townley v. Sherborne, Bridg. 35; Brice v. Stokes, 11 Ves. 319; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1738, 1748-1790, 1791-1805; the English and American authorities are collected in the editor's notes; Derhishire v. Home, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 80 (not liable for moneys which come into the hands of a co-trustee); Paddon v. Richardson, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 563 (money having been loaned to a co-trustee in pursuance of express directions of the trust, the omission of the other trustee to compel

§ 1081, (e) This note is cited in Russell v. McCall, 141 N. Y. 437, 38 Am. St. Rep. 807, 36 N. E. 498. See, also, citing the text, Wilkinson v. Dodd, 40 N. J. Eq. 123, 3 Atl. 360.

§ 1082, (a) The text is cited in Keenan v. Scott, 78 W. Va. 729, 90 S. E. 331. See Shepherd v. Harris, [1905] 2 Ch. 310 (not liable for default of co-trustee employed as broker as authorized by will and at request of beneficiary); Estate of Fesmire, 134 Pa. St. 67, 19 Am. St. Rep. 676, 19 Atl. 502; In re Graham's Estate, 218 Pa. 344, 67 Atl. 458 (not liable if he is diligent and without fault himself). It has been held that one trustee cannot sue a co-trustee for possession. This is merely an application of the legal rule as to joint tenants and tenants in common: Goldschmidt v. Maier, 140 Cal. xvii, 73 Pac. 984. an acting one joins merely for the sake of conformity with his co-trustees who are acting, in receipts given for money, he is not liable with respect to such money to the beneficiary.² The foregoing statement of the general doctrine shows that a trustee is not absolutely and under all circumstances free from liability with respect to his co-trustees. A trustee is responsible for the willful or negligent wrongful acts or omissions—breaches of trust—of his co-trustee

its repayment did not render that other trustee liable for its loss, in the absence of any misconduct on his part); Barnard v. Bagshaw, 3 De Gex, J. & S. 355 (trustees are not liable for moneys which a co-trustee gets into his possession without their consent or knowledge and by a fraud upon them); Land Credit Co. v. Lord Fermoy, L. R. 5 Ch. 763; reversing 8 Eq. 7 (a director is not liable for a breach of trust by the other directors of which he had no knowledge); Cargill v. Bower, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 502, 514 (a director of a company is not liable for a fraud committed by his codirectors unless he has either authorized it or tacitly permitted it); Williams v. Nixon, 2 Beav. 472; Att'y-Gen. v. Holland, 2 Younge & C. 683; Kip v. Deniston, 4 Johns. 23; and see Mendes v. Guedalla, 2 Johns. & H. 259; Cottam v. East Cos. R'y, 1 Johns. & H. 243; Trutch v. Lamprell, 20 Beav. 116; Baynard v. Woolley, 20 Beav. 583; Griffiths v. Porter, 25 Beav. 236; Eager v. Barnes, 31 Beav. 579. It seems to be settled in New York that where persons are at once executors and trustees, the liability of one for the acts of the other is the same as in the case of executors; that each is liable only for his own acts, and cannot be made responsible for the default of another, unless he in some manner aided or concurred therein: b Ormiston v. Olcott, 84 N. Y. 339, 346; citing Sutherland v. Brush, 7 Johns. Ch. 17, 22, 11 Am. Dec. 383; Monell v. Monell, 5 Johns. Ch. 283, 9 Am. Dec. 298; Manahan v. Gibbons, 19 Johns. 427; Kip v. Deniston, 4 Johns. 23; Banks v. Wilkes, 3 Sand. Ch. 99; and disapproving of Bates v. Underhill, 3 Redf. 365.

§ 1082, ² Brice v. Stokes, 11 Ves. 319, 324; Walker v. Symonds, 3 Swanst. 1, 63; Gray v. Reamer, 11 Bush, 113; Sinelair v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 543; Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. 531, 562; 1 How. 134; Taylor v. Benham, 5 How. 233. But he must prove affirmatively that he acted only for the sake of conformity; and even then he will he liable if he negligently permit his co-trustee to retain the trust money for his own uses, or to deal with it in violation of the trust: Brice v. Stokes, *supra;* Ingle v. Partridge, 32 Beav. 661.

§ 1082, (b) As to executors, etc., 9 L. R. A. 223, 24 N. E. 306; Tompsee Nanz v. Oakley, 120 N. Y. 84, kins v. Tompkins, 18 S. C. 1.

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to which he consented, or which by his own negligence he made it possible for his co-trustee to commit. Every trustee is, of course, liable for the defaults of his co-trustee in which he has joined or concurred, but his liability then arises from his own actual breaches of trust, and not from those of his fellow-trustee. "With respect to the liability of a trustee for the acts of a co-trustee, there are three modes in which he may become liable according to the ordinary rules of the court: 1. Where one trustee receives trust money and hands it over to a co-trustee without securing its due application; 2. Where he permits a co-trustee to receive trust money without making due inquiry as to his dealing with it; 3. Where he becomes aware of a breach of trust, either committed or meditated, and abstains from taking the necessary steps to obtain restitution." It thus appears that the consent to a co-trustee's breach of trust need not be express. It may be implied from the trustee's conduct in refraining from taking reasonable and necessary steps to prevent or repair the loss.³ ^c In applying this

§ 1082, ³ See ante, § 1069, as to negligent surrender of entire control to a co-trustee: Wilkins v. Hogg, 8 Jur., N. S., 25; French v. Hobson, 9 Ves. 103; Brice v. Stokes, 11 Ves. 319, 324; Hovey v. Blakeman, 4 Ves. 596; Sadler v. Hobbs, 2 Brown Ch. 114; Boardman v. Mosman, 1 Brown Ch. 68; Joy v. Campbell, 1 Schoales & L. 328, 341; Broadhurst v. Balguy, 1 Younge & C. 16; Hanbury v. Kirkland, 3 Sim. 265; Mucklow v. Fuller, Jacob, 198; Booth v. Booth, 1 Beav. 125; Styles v. Guy, 1 Macn. & G. 422, 430; Burrows v. Walls, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 233; Thompson v. Finch, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 560, 563, 564; 22 Beav. 316; Ex parte Geaves, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 291; Case v. James, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 256; Mendes v.

§ 1082, (c) This paragraph of the text is cited in Ashley v. Winkley, 209 Mass. 509, 95 N. E. 932; Caldwell v. Graham, 115 Md. 122, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1029, 80 Atl. 839. See Bruen v. Gillet, 115 N. Y. 10, 12 Am. St. Rep. 764, 4 L. R. A. 529, 21 N. E. 676; In re Beatty's Estate, 214 Pa. 449, 63 Atl. 975; In re Adams's Estate, 221 Pa. 77, 128 Am. St. Rep. 727, 15 Ann. Cas. 518, 70 Atl. 436 (if trustee hears of any fact tending to call his attention to mismanagement by co-trustee, it is his duty to intervene. If the funds consist of negotiable securities and he has reason to believe that co-trustee may convert them, he must take necessary steps -to prevent it); Harvey v. Schwettman, (Mo. App.) 180 S. W. 413 (no endeavor to recover funds removed from state by co-trustee). general rule, some of the American decisions do not hold trustees to quite so rigid a responsibility for mere omissions to interfere with the wrongful acts of their fellows as is done by the English cases; but there does not appear to be any substantial difference in the modes of formulating the doctrine by the courts of the two countries.

§ 1083. The Beneficiary Acquiescing or Concurring.—A beneficiary who, subsequently to a breach of trust, acquiesces in it, cannot maintain a suit for relief against those who would otherwise have been liable. The acquiescence, in order to produce this effect, must take place with full information by the beneficiary of all the facts, and with full knowledge of his legal rights arising from those facts; in short, it must have all the requisites of an acquiescence heretofore described, to defeat the liability of a defaulting fiduciary.¹ Although, in general, lapse of time is not a

Guedalla, 2 Johns. & H. 259; Evans v. Bear, L. R. 10 Ch. 76; Lewis v. Nobbs, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 591, 594; Spencer v. Spencer, 11 Paige, 299; Clark v. Clark, 8 Paige, 152, 35 Am. Dec. 676; Monell v. Monell, 5 Johns. Ch. 283, 296, 9 Am. Dec. 298; Elmendorf v. Lansing, 4 Johns. Ch. 562; Banks v. Wilkes, 3 Sand. Ch. 99; Mesick v. Mesick, 7 Barb. 120; Smith v. Rathbun, 22 Hun, 150; Bates v. Underhill, 3 Redf. 365; Schenck v. Schenck, 2 N. J. Eq. 174; Irwin's Appeal, 35 Pa. St. 294; Ducommun's Appeal, 17 Pa. St. 268; Jones's Appeal, 8 Watts & S. 141, 147, 42 Am. Dec. 282; Pim v. Downing, 11 Serg. & R. 66; Wayman v. Jones, 4 Md. Ch. 500; Ringgold v. Ringgold, 1 Har. & G. 11, 18 Am. Dec. 250; Latrobe v. Tiernan, 2 Md. Ch. 474; Maccubbin v. Cromwell's Ex'rs, 7 Gill & J. 157; Worth v. McAden, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 199; Graham v. Davidson, 2 Dev. & B. Eq. 155; Taylor v. Roberts, 3 Ala. 83, 86; Royall's Adm'r v. Mc-Kenzie, 25 Ala. 363; Hall v. Carter, 8 Ga. 388; State v. Guilford, 15 Ohio, 593; Edmonds v. Crenshaw, 14 Pet. 166.

§ 1083, 1 See ante, §§ 964, 965; Walker v. Symonds, 3 Swanst. 1, 64; Wedderhurn v. Wedderburn, 4 Mylne & C. 41; Munch v. Cockerrell, 5 Mylne & C. 178; Cockerell v. Cholmeley, 1 Russ. & M. 418, 425; Strange v. Fooks, 4 Giff. 408; Burrows v. Walls, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 233; Life Ass'n v. Siddal, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 58, 74; Farrant v. Blanchford, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 107, 119, 120; Aveline v. Melhuisb, 2 De Gex, J. & S. 288; Zambaco v. Cassavetti, L. R. 11 Eq. 439; Sleeman v. Wilson, L. R. 13 Eq. 36; Jones v. Higgins, L. R. 2 Eq. 538; Clark v. Clark, 8 Paige, 152, 35 Am. Dec. 676; Banks v. Wilkes, 3 Sand. Ch. 99; Monell v. Monell, 5 Johns. Ch. 283, 9 defense to the beneficiary's right of action, yet a great delay after knowledge of the breach of trust may be a bar. If a *cestui que trust* is a party to, or concurs in, or even assents to, a breach of trust by the trustee, he debars himself thereby of all claim for relief.² b

Am. Dec. 298; Jones's Appeal, 8 Watts & S. 141, 147, 42 Am. Dec. 282; Pim v. Downing, 11 Serg. & R. 66; Wayman v. Jones, 4 Md. Ch. 500; Ringgold v. Ringgold, 1 Har. & G. 11, 18 Am. Dec. 250; State v. Guilford, 15 Ohio, 593; Royall's Adm'r v. McKenzie, 25 Ala. 363. As to delay, see Bright v. Legerton, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 606; Hodgson v. Bibby, 32 Beav. 221; Clanricarde v. Henning, 30 Beav. 175; Browne v. Cross, 14 Beav. 105; Obee v. Bishop, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 137; Scott v. Haddock, 11 Ga. 258.

Acquiescence, assent, release, and like acts, in order to be operative, must be made by a *cestui que trust* who *is sui juris*. If a trustee relies upon a release or discharge given by the beneficiary, it is incumbent upon the trustee to show that he gave the *cestui que trust* full information as to all his rights; and it is, in fact, a part of the trustee's general duty to impart knowledge of his own legal rights to the beneficiary:^a March v. Russell, 3 Mylne & C. 31; Lloyd v. Attwood, 3 De Gex & J. 614; Aveline v. Melhuish, 2 De Gex, J. & S. 288; Farrant v. Blanchford, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 107, 119, 120; Williams v. Reed, 3 Mason, 405; Bond v. Bond, 7 Allen, 1; Negley v. Lindsay, 67 Pa. St. 217, 5 Am. Rep. 427; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Sherman, 20 Md. 117.

§ 1083, ² Mere knowledge, however, of a breach of trust is not an assent, much less a concurrence: Brice v. Stokes, 11 Ves. 319; Walker v. Symonds, 3 Swanst. 1, 64; March v. Russell, 3 Mylne & C. 31; Life Ass'n etc. v. Siddal, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 58, 61; Phipps v. Lovegrove, L. R.

§ 1083, (a) Acquiescence must be With Full Knowledge.—The author's note is cited in White v. Sherman, 168 Ill. 589, 606, 61 Am. St. Rep. 132, 140, 48 N. E. 128; Zimmerman v. Fraley, 70 Md. 561, 17 Atl. 560; Wilson v. Maryland Life Ins. Co., 60 Md. 150; Gibney v. Allen, 156 Mich. 301, 120 N. W. 811 (there can be no waiver by or in behalf of infants or incompetent persons); Wieters v. Hart, 67 N. J. Eq. 507, 63 Atl. 241 (where cestwis were under dominating will of trustee, no waiver will be found); International Trust Co. v. Preston, 24 Wyo. 163, 156 Pac. 1128.

§ 1083, (b) See, also, in general, Fletcher v. Collis, [1905] 2 Ch. 24 (consent need not be in writing); Williamson v. Grider, 97 Ark. 588, 135 S. W. 361 (estoppel to deny validity of mortgage by receiving proceeds); McCoy v. Poor, 56 Md. 197 (laches); Pope v. Farnsworth, 146 Mass. 339, 16 N. E. 262; Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N. E. 381; In re Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 172 Mich. 600, 138 N. W. 205; Oellien v. Galt, 150 Mo.

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§ 1084. Third. The Trustee's Compensation and Allowances.—It is the well-settled doctrine of the English equity that the trustee's office is, as a rule of law, wholly gratuitous. In the absence of a provision for compensation contained in the instrument creating the trust, he is not entitled to make any charge for his services, trouble, or loss of time, even though great advantage had resulted therefrom to the beneficiaries.¹ Where the trustee is also an attorney, 'and acts as such on behalf of the estate, he is even not enti-

16 Eq. 80; Town of Verona v. Peckham, 66 Barb. 103. Where there are several beneficiaries, and one of them takes a part in a breach of trust, whereby a loss is occasioned, his interest in the trust property may be reached, retained, and applied to make good the loss for the henefit of the other beneficiaries; and this equity extends, not only to the interest while in the hands of the wrong-doing *cestui que trust*, but also to those claiming it under or through him: Woodyatt v. Gresley, 8 Sim. 180; Priddy v. Rose, 3 Mer. 86; Williams v. Allen, 32 Beav. 650; and see Jacubs v. Rylance, L. R. 17 Eq. 341; Butler v. Carter, L. R. 5 Eq. 276. If third persons are parties to a breach of trust, they are equally liable with the trustee: Dixon v. Dixon, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 587; Rolfe v. Gregory, 11 Jur., N. S., 98; Bridgman v. Gill, 24 Beav. 302.

§ 1084, 1 Even a settled account which contained items of such charges would be set aside: Robinson v. Pett, 3 P. Wms. 249; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 512, 514-537, note of English editor; Ayliffe v. Murray, 2 Atk. 58; Barrett v. Hartley, L. R. 2 Eq. 789; the court will sometimes, however, make an allowance for compensation in special cases: Forster

App. 537, 131 S. W. 158 (trustee at beneficiary's request allows penalties for non-payment of taxes to accumulate); Butterfield v. Cowing, 112 N. Y. 486, 20 N. E. 369; Vohmann v. Michel, 185 N. Y. 420, 113 Am. St. Rep. 921, 78 N. E. 156; Nagle v. Von Rosenberg, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 354, 119 S. W. 706.

§ 1083, (c) Note 2 is quoted in Jones v. Lynch, (Tex. Civ. App.) 137 S. W. 395.

§ 1083, (d) Liability of Third Persons Who are Parties to a Breach of Trust. — See American Nat. Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 129 Ga. 126, 12 Ann. Cas. 666, 58 S. E. 867 (bank knowing that trustee is committing breach in withdrawing funds); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Cahn, 102 Md. 530, 62 Atl. 819; Andrews v. Tuttle-Smith Co., 191 Mass. 461, 78 N. E. 99; Goodell v. Monroe, (N. J. Eq.) 100 Atl. 238; Putnam v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co., 191 N. Y. 166, 83 N. E. 789 (trustee de son tort, by intermeddling with possession, management and disposition of the trust estate); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. People's Bank, 127 Tenn. 720, 157 S. W. 414.

tled to full costs or attorney's fees as against the *cestui* que trust, but can only be allowed for costs actually out of pocket, or disbursements.² ^a The testator, or other person who creates a trust, may expressly provide for a salary or compensation of any form to be paid to the trustee, and such provision will be binding, and will be followed by the courts.³ This stringent, and certainly unwise, rule of the

v. Ridley, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 452; Marshall v. Holloway, 2 Swanst. 432; and see Douglas v. Archbutt, 2 De Gex & J. 148; Bainbrigge v. Blair, 8 Beav. 588.

§ 1084, ² Cradock v. Piper, 1 Macn. & G. 664; New v. Jones, 1 Macn. & G. 668, note; Broughton v. Broughton, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 160; Gomley v. Wood, 3 Jones & L. 678, 688; Mayer v. Galluchat, 6 Rich. Eq. 1. This rule is applied also where the legal business is done by the trustee's partner, who is not himself a trustee:^b Lincoln' v. Windsor, 9 Hare, 158; Christophers v. White, 10 Beav. 523; Lyon v. Baker, 5 De Gex & S. 622. With regard to trustee's costs, see, also, King v. King, 1 De Gex & J. 663; In re Woodburn's Will, 1 De Gex & J. 332; Ex parte Tomlinson, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 745; Smith v. Dresser, L. R. 1 Eq. 651; In re Whitton's Trusts, L. R. 8 Eq. 352; Bowyer v. Griffin, L. R. 9 Eq. 340; In re Elliot's Trusts, L. R. 15 Eq. 194; Ex parte Angerstein, L. R. 9 Ch. 479; Walters v. Woodbridge, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 504.

§ 1084, ³ Webb v. Earl of Shaftesbüry, 7 Ves. 480; Baker v. Martin, 8 Sim. 25. A contract for compensation between the trustee and the *cestui que trust may* be valid; but if treated as any other agreement by which a trustee obtains an advantage from its beneficiary,—the most perfect good faith is required: Moore v. Frowd, 3 Mylne & C. 45, 48; Douglas v. Archbutt, 2 De Gex & J. 148.^e

§ 1084, (a) Trustee Who is Attorney.—See Clarkson v. Robinson, [1900] 2 Ch. 722; In re White, [1898] 2 Ch. 217; Stone v. Lickorish, [1891] 2 Ch. 363; In re Doody, [1893] 1 Ch. 129; Kentucky Nat. Bank v. Stone, 93 Ky. 623, 20 S. W. 1040 ("the temptation to earn fees as counsel was liable to warp his judgment, and is more than human nature ought to be required to meet in the execution of so important a trust"); Gamble v. Gibson, 59 Mo. 585; see Morgan v. Hannas, 49 N. Y. 667. But, as in other cases, the trust deed may allow compensation: See Bennett v. Bennett, [1893] 2 Ch. 413; In re Webb, [1894] 1 Ch. 73; or if a trustee is appointed receiver he is entitled to compensation: In re Bignell, [1892] 1 Ch. 59. See note (e), *infra*, for the general American rule.

§1084, (b) In re Dunn, [1904] 1 Ch. 648.

§1084, (c) Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass. 262; Ladd v. Pigott, 215 Mo. 361, 114 S. W. 984.

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English equity has not been followed in the United States. With very few, if any, exceptions among the various states, trustees, as well as executors and administrators, are allowed compensation for their services; in most of the states the right to the compensation and the amount of it have been fixed by statutory legislation. Where the instrument creating the trust provides that the trustee shall have a compensation for his services, such provision will be enforced. If the instrument declares the rate of compensation, it must be followed; if it establishes no rate, the trustee is entitled to a reasonable amount, which will be ascertained by means of a judicial investigation, as to the value of his services.^{4 d} Where no provision is made by the creator of the trust, the trustee is allowed the amount fixed by statute, or in the absence of statute, the amount determined by the court to be reasonable and just.⁵

§ 1084, 4 In the Matter of Schell, 53 N. Y. 263, 265; Mcacham v. Sternes, 9 Paige, 398; Wagstaff v. Lowerre, 23 Barb. 209.

§ 1084, ⁵ In the note of the American editor to Robinson v. Pett, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 512, 538-600, the statutes of the various states and the decisions thereon are collected; see, also Perry on Trusts, sec. 918. A person who is both executor and trustee is not entitled to commissions by way of compensation in both capacities on the same fund for the same time: Hall v. Hall, 78 N. Y. 535.[•] A trustee who commits

§ 1084, (d) The English rule followed in Illinois: Cook v. Gilmore, 133 Ill. 139, 24 N. E. 524; Buckingham v. Morrison, 136 Ill. 437, 27 N. E. 65; Stead v. President & Trustees of Commons of Kaskaskia, 243 Ill. 239, 90 N. E. 654; Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill. 384, 95 N. E. 498; and was in Delaware: State v. Platt, 4 Harr. 154; but see Laws of Delaware, [1893] p. 712, allowing commission in the discretion of the court.

§ 1084, (e) Extra Compensation.— ' That a trustee who is also a lawyer is entitled to extra compensation for his professional services to the estate, see Perkins's Appeal, 108

Pa. St. 314, 56 Am. Rep. 208; Turnbull v. Pomeroy, 140 Mass. 117, 3 N. E. 15; Jenkins v. Whyte, 62 Md. 427; Taylor v. Denny, 118 Md. 124, 84 Atl. 369; Shirley v. Shattuck, 28 Miss. 13; but see Cobb v. Fant. 36 S. C. 1, 14 S. E. 959. See, also, to the same effect, but that no extra compensation will be allowed for skill in the general management of the estate, whereby the value is greatly increased, Grimball v. Cruse, 70 Ala. 534. As to extra compensation generally, see Vaughton v. Noble, 30 Beav. 34 (a trustee cannot receive a gift from the cestui); Pinekard v. Pinekard, 24 Ala. 250 (administrators); Abell v. Brady, § 1085. Allowances for Expenses and Outlays.—In addition to his compensation in this country, and without any compensation in England, the trustee is entitled to be allowed, as against the estate and the beneficiary, for all

a breach of trust is not entitled to commissions: Singleton v. Lowndes, 9 S. C. 465.^f

79 Md. 94, 28 Atl. 817; Ellis v. Ellis, 12 Pick. 178; Turnbull v. Pomeroy, 140 Mass. 117, 3 N. E. 15; May v. May, 109 Mass. 252 (guardian); Loud v. Winchester, 52 Mich. 174, 17 N. W. 784; Lent v. Howard, 89 N. Y. 169 (trustee not entitled to receive); Wilson v. Biggama, 73 Wash. 444, 132 Pac. 43 (no compensation for services outside of duties).

§ 1084, (f) Where Trustee has Committed Breach .--- In re Hodges's Estate, 66 Vt. 70, 44 Am. St. Rep. 820, 28 Atl. 663; Hanna v. Clark, 204 Pa. St. 145, 53 Atl. 757; see, also, Topping v. Windley, 99 N. C. 4, 5 S. E. 14 (failure to keep accounts); Pollard v. Lathrop, 12 Colo. 171, 20 Pac. 251; Brooks v. Jackson, 125 Mass. 307; Comingor v. Louisville Trust Co., 128 Ky. 697, 129 Am. St. Rep. 322, 108 S. W. 950, 111 S. W. 681; Folk v. Wind, 124 Mo. App. 577, 102 S. W. 1; H. B. Cartwright & Bro. v. United States Bank & T. Co., (N. M.) 167 Pac. 436; In re Reich's Estate, 230 Pa. 55, 79 Atl. 151; but see In re Fitzgerald, 57 Wis. 508, 15 N. W. 794; Cornet v. Cornet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S. W. 333; that commissions will not be refused because of mistakes of judgment on the part of the trustees, whereby the estate has suffered loss, or has been rendered insolvent, see Merkel's Estate, 131 Pa. St. 584, 18 Atl. 931; Fahnestock's Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 46; and see Denvir v. Park, 169 Mo. App. 335, 152 S. W. 604 (not deprived of compensation for mere error in judgment); Winslow v. Rutherford, 59 Or. 124, 114 Pac. 930 (mere failure to deliver property promptly, where doubt as to right). That trustees who have been grossly negligent are not entitled to commissions, see Ward v. Shire, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1279, 65 S. W. 8.

In General .- The following eases are added as illustrating the application of the general principles, though some of the cases are from jurisdictions where the matter is regulated partly by statutes; many of the statutes fix a maximum rate and allow the amount, not exceeding the limit, to be determined by the court: Griffin v. Pringle, 56 Ala. 486 (reasonable compensation, and trustee has a lien on the property for the payment); Biscoe v. State, 23 Ark. 592 (refusing to allow extra compensation, above the amount fixed in the deed); Moore v. Calkins, 95 Cal. 435, 29 Am. St. Rep. 128, 30 Pac. 583; In re Leavitt, 8 Cal. App. 756, 97 Pac. 916 (if duties relate only to income, no commissions on corpus); Hanson v. Jordan, 159 Cal. 401, 114 Pac. 810 (where will fixed fees for five years and trust lasted longer, court will compensate services): Clark v. Platt, 30 Conn. 282; Babcock v. Hubbard, 56 Conn. 284, 15 Atl. 791 (sec, also, for trustee as attorney,

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his proper expenses out of pocket, which include all payments expressly authorized by the instrument of trust, all reasonable expenses in carrying out the directions of the trust, and, in the absence of any such directions, all expenses reasonably necessary for the security, protection, and preservation of the trust property, or for the prevention of a failure of the trust. He is also entitled to

and fees for his services); Muscogee Lumber Co. v. Hyer, 18 Fla. 698, 43 Am. Rep. 332 (allowing a reasonable compensation); Guignon v. Union Trust Co., 156 III. 135, 47 Am. St. Rep. 186, 40 N. E. 556; Premier Steel Co. v. Yandes, 139 Ind. 307, 38 N. E. 849 (one not having a beneficial interest, and not intending to serve gratuitously is entitled to the reasonable value of his services); In re Gloyd's Estate, 93 Iowa, 303, 61 N. W. 975; Fleming v. Wilson, 6 Bush, 610; Ten Broeck v. Fidelity Co., 88 Ky. 242, 10 S. W. 798 (if the trustee has waived his right to charge for services, by indicating he intended to serve gratuitously, his administrator cannot recover for them); Tarbox v. Tarbox, 111 Me. 374, 89 Atl. 194 (allowed though case of a trust impressed on fund in hands of trustee); Jenkins v. Whyte, 62 Md. 427 (discretion of lower court, in allowing compensation, not interfered with); Abell v. Brady, 79 Md. 94, 28 Atl. 817; Dixon v. Homer, 2 Met. 420 (commission on the net income); Barrell v. Jay, 16 Mass. 221; Blake v. Pegram, 101 Mass. 592 (where one is both executor and trustee he is not entitled to comin both capacities); pensation Urann v. Coates, 117 Mass. 41; Parker v. Hill, (Mass.) 69 N. E. 336 (trustee is entitled to such compensation as the court may al-

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low, but it must be reasonable and just); In re Fidelity & Dep. Co. of Maryland, 172 Mich. 600, 138 N. W. 205 (denied); Kemp v. Foster, 22 Mo. App. 643; Niolon v. McDonald, 71 Miss. 337, 13 South. 870; Gordon v. West, 8 N. H. 444 (executortrustee); Tuttle v. Robinson, 33 N. H. 104 (same); Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 745, 66 Atl. 1076 (given though trustee is subject to surcharge); Marsh v. Marsh, 82 N. J. Eq. 176, 87 Atl. 91 (where statute fixes maximum. court should fix rate in each case); Purchase v. Atlantic Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 344, 87 Atl. 444; Johnson v. Lawrence, 95 N. Y. 154 (see as to when a trustee and executor may not charge double commission); Davis's Appeal, 100 Pa. St. 201; In re Vastine's Estate, 190 Pa. St. 443, 42 Atl. 1038; Hazard v. Coyle, (R. I.) 58 Atl. 987 (assumpsit cannot be maintained for compensation); Leach v. Cowan, 125 Tenn. 182, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 188, 140 S. W. 1070 (trustees allowed compensation in . Tennessec); Hubbard v. Fisher, 25 Vt. 539 (the trustee entitled to reasonable compensation. in the absence of statute); Wilson v. Biggama, 73 Wash. 444, 132 Pac. 43 (where apparent from instrument that no compensation was intended); Hoke v. Hoke, 12 W. Va. 427.

be indemnified in respect of all personal liabilities incurred by himself for any of these purposes.^{1 a} Where a trustee properly advances money for any of the above-mentioned

objects, so that he is entitled to reimbursement, he also has

§ 1085, ¹ He is thus entitled to be allowed for proper disbursements occasioned by the necessary employment of attorneys, agents, etc.: Macnamara v. Jones, 2 Dick. 587; "Every trustee is entitled to the necessary and proper expenses incurred in protecting the property committed to his care. If they have a right to protect the property from immediate and direct injury, they must have the same right, where the injury threatened is indirect but probable": Bright v. North, 2 Phill. Ch. 216, 220, per Lord Cottenham; Worrall v. Harford, 8 Ves. 4, 8; Phené v. Gillan, 5 Hare, 1, 9; Douglas v. Archbutt, 2 De Gex & J. 148; Benett v. Wyndham, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 259 (indemnity against liability); Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Clark & F. 894; Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & F. 507; Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, 11 H. L. Cas. 686; L. R. 1 H. L. 93; Jervis v. Wolferstan, L. R. 18 Eq. 18; Ellig v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 683; Beatty v. Clark, 20 Cal. 11, 30; New v. Nicoll, 73 N. Y. 127, 29 Am. Rep. 111.

§ 1085. (a) Text quoted in Shirkey v. Kirby, 110 Va. 455, 135 Am. St. Rep. 949, 66 S. E. 40; White v. Hall, 113 Va. 427, 74 S. E. 212, and cited in Bay Biscayne Co. v. Baile, (Fla.) 75 South. 860 (expenses in defending trust). See Stott v. Milne, 25 Ch. Div. 710; In re Beddoe, [1893] 1 Ch. 547; Rawley v. Ginnever, [1897] 2 Ch. 503; Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 26 L. Ed. 1157; Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567, 29 L. Ed. 940, 6 Sup. Ct. 870; Johnson v. Porterfield, 150 Ala. 532, 43 South. 228 (court has power to use corpus to defray expenses incurred which would have been authorized in advance); Hanson v. Jordan, 159 Cal. 401, 114 Pac. 810 (allowance for attorney's fees); More v. Calkins, 95 Cal. 435, 29 Am. St. Rep. 128, 30 Pac. 583; Bourquin v. Bourquin, 120 Ga. 115, 47 S. E. 639; Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill. 384, 95 N. E. 498 (attorney's fees); Stewart v. Fellows, 128 Ill. 480,

20 N. E. 657; Dolph v. Cincinnati, B. & C. R. Co., 56 Ind. App. 137, 103 N. E. 13 (attorney's fees); City of Bangor v. Peirce, 106 Me. 527, 138 Am. St. Rep. 363, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 770, 76 Atl. 945; Niolon v. McDonald, 71 Miss. 337, 13 South. 370; Oellian v. Galt, 150 Mo. App. 537, 131 S. W. 158 (reimbursements for advances); Denvir v. Park, 169 Mo. App. 335, 152 S. W. 604 (attorney's fees); Wiegand v. Woerner, 155 Mo. App. 227, 134 S. W. 596 (where trustee was also executor of beneficiary and insisted on expensive litigation, all charges imposed on him as executor); Thomson v. Smith, 64 N. H. 412, 13 Atl. 639; Rogers v. Genung, (N. J.) 76 Atl. 233 (where trustee pays taxes and insurance and neglects to collect them from life tenant, he cannot compel remainderman to reimburse him); Reynolds v. Cridge, 131 Pa. St. 189, 18 Atl. 1010; Stull

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a lien as security for the claim, either upon the *corpus* of the trust property, or upon the income, as the case may be; ^b but for moneys improperly paid there is no lien. Although in general a creditor who advances money to a trustee obtains only the personal liability of the trustee, and has no demand enforceable against the estate, yet if the expenditure is authorized, and the loan is necessary, the trustee may, at the time of procuring the advance, whether money or services, by an express agreement with the creditor, make the demand a charge upon the estate, and thus create a lien in favor of the creditor; or the trustee may so deal with the estate in the first instance as to acquire a lien in his own favor, and may then assign such lien to the creditor.² c It is hardly necessary to add that the fore-

§ 1085, ² In New v. Nicoll, 73 N. Y. 127, 130, 131, 29 Am. Rep. 111, the court held, per Earl, J.: "The general rule undoubtedly is, that a trustee cannot charge the trust estate by his executory contracts, unless

v. Harvey, 112 Va. 816, 72 S. E. 701 (discussion as to when trustee is entitled to employ counsel at expense of estate); see Cornet v. Cornet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S. W. 333 (expenses of unsuccessful defense to suit for trustee's removal not allowed).

Trustee's Right to Indemnity .--"A party who is sui juris and beneficially entitled to shares which he cannot disclaim is personally bound, in the absence of contract to the contrary, to indemnify the registered holder against calls upon them. It is immaterial whether the beneficial owner originally created the trust by which the registered holder was plainly affected, or accepted a transfer of the beneficial ownership with knowledge of the trust": Hardoon v. Belilos, [1901] App. Cas. 118, relying on Balsh v. Hyham, 2 P. Wms. 453; Phené v. Gillan, 5 Hare 1; Ex parte Chippendale, 4 Dø Gex, M. & G. 19. "Where a trustee seeks indemnity against liabilities arising from the mere fact of ownership, he need not prove any request from his cestui que trust to incur such liability": Hardoon v. Belilos, [1901] App. Cas. 118, citing Castellan v. Hobson, L. R. 10 Eq. 47; Loring v. Davis, 32 Ch. Div. 634; James v. May, L. R. 6 H. L. 328. For an exception to the rule of indemnity, in case of trustees of clubs, see Wise v. Perpetual Trustee Co., [1903] App. Cas. 139 (Priv. Coun.).

§ 1085, (b) The text is quoted in Turton v. Grant, 86 N. J. Eq. 191, 96 Atl. 993, 100 Atl. 979; Shirkey v. Kirby, 110 Va. 455, 135 Am. St. Rep. 949, 66 S. E. 40; White v. Hall, 113 Va. 427, 74 S. E. 212.

§ 1085, (c) Cited to this effect in Gates v. McClenahan, (Iowa) 100 N. W. 479, and quoted in H. B. Cartwright & Bro. v. United States Bank & T. Co., (N. M.) 167 Pac. 436. See, also, Mansfield v. Dis-

going rules concerning compensation, allowances, and liens do not apply to trustees *in invitum*. Since their paramount

authorized to do so by the terms of the instrument creating the trust. Upon such contracts he is personally liable, and the remedy is against him personally. But there are exceptions to this general rule. When a trustee is authorized to make an expenditure, and he has no trust funds, and the expenditure is necessary for the protection, reparation, or safety of the trust estate, and he is not willing to make himself personally liable, he may by express agreement make the expenditure a charge upon the trust estate. In such a case he could himself advance the money to make the expenditure, and he would have a lien upon the trust estate, and he can by express contract transfer this lien to any other party who may upon the faith of the trust estate make the expenditure." It was further held that where there was no original agreement giving a lien to the creditor, and no assignment by the trustee of his own lien, so that the creditor merely relied upon the trustee's personal liability, a lien upon the estate in favor of the creditor could not be created by the trustee's mere subsequent promise. In Ellig v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 683, it was held that where the trustee makes advances out of his own funds to the beneficiary, with the understanding that he should be repaid out of the rents and profits, he obtains a lien upon the future income, but not upon the corpus of the trust property; and the same is true of necessary advances made under like circumstances for the protection of the estate. Beatty v. Clark, 20 Cal. 11, 30, shows what payments made by a trustee out of his own funds, and what advances made to him by third persons, can be an equitable lien upon the trust property, namely, if the payment by himself, or the loan by the creditor, was not expressly authorized by the trust instrument, such payment or loan must be necessary for the preservation of the property, or to prevent a failure of the trusts: Noyes v. Blakeman, 6 N. Y. 567; 3 Sand. 531; Randall v. Dusenbury, 63 N. Y. 645; 7 Jones & S. 174; Stanton v. King, 8 Hun, 4; Worrall v. Harford, 8 Ves. 4, 8; Morison v. Morison, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 214; Ex parte Chippendale, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 19; McNeillie v. Acton, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 744; Francis v. Francis, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 108; Leedham v. Chawner, 4 Kay & J. 458; Ex parte Rogers, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 271; Tennant v. Trenchard, L. R. 4 Ch. 537; In re Leslie's Trusts, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 185. Notwithstanding these authorities, it seems to be held in Taylor v. Clark, 56 Ga. 309, that a trustee has no power to create a lien upon the estate nor upon the crops, for supplies furnished necessary to produce such crops; and

trict Agr. Ass'n No. 6, 154 Cal. 145, 97 Pac. 150 (trustee may convey trust property to pay expenses of litigation); Shirkey v. Kirby, 110 Va. 455, 135 Am. St. Rep. 949, 66 S. E. 40 (may mortgage life estate to pay transfer tax and repairs). duty is to convey the property at once to the beneficial owner, they are clearly not entitled to be reimbursed for

in Steele v. Steele's Adm'r, 64 Ala. 438, 38 Am. Rep. 15, that a trustee cannot create a lien in favor of a creditor without *express* authority given. See, also, with respect to the general subject of liens, Starr v. Moulton, 97 Ill. 525; Robinson v. Hersey, 60 Me. 225; Bradbury v. Birchmore, 117 Mass. 569, 580-582; Rensselaer etc. R. R. v. Miller, 47 Vt. 146; Williams v. Smith, 10 R. I. 280, 283; Ryder v. Sisson, 7 R. I. 341; Ferry v. Laible, 27 N. J. Eq. 146; Kearney v. Kearney, 17 N. J. Eq. 59.^d As to the effect of a statute giving a creditor an action at law for services rendered to the trust estate, see Askew v. Myrick, 54 Ala. 30.

§ 1085, (d) Dickinson v. Conniff, 65 Ala. 581; Foxworth v. White, 72 Ala. 224; Blackshear v. Burke, 74 Ala. 239; Johnson v. Leman, 131 Ill. 609, 19 Am. St. Rep. 63, 7 L. R. A. 656, 23 N. E. 435; Curran v. Abbott, 141 Ind. 492, 50 Am. St. Rep. 337, 40 N. E. 1091 (guardian); White v. Hall, 113 Va. 427, 74 S. E. 212.

Trustee's Power to Bind the Estate.-The general rule is, that persons dealing with a trustee must look to him for payment of their demands, and that, ordinarily, the creditor has no right to resort to the trust estate to enforce his demand for advances made or services rendered for the benefit of the trust estate: Worrall v. Harford, 8 Ves. 4, Ames's Cas. on Trusts, 415; Hall v. Lover, 1 Hare, 571; Strickland v. Symans, 26 Ch. Div. 245, Ames's Cas. on Trusts, 418; In re Pumfrey, 22 Ch. Div. 255; Janes v. Dawson, 19 Ala. 672; Dantzler v. McInnis, 151 Ala. 293, 125 Am. St. Rep. 28, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 297, 44 South. 193 (loan to trustee on unauthorized note. No claim against estate except by subrogation to trustee's right, if any); Knipp v. Bagby, 126 Md. 461, L. R. A. 1915F, 1072, 95 Atl. 60; Dunham v. Blood,

207 Mass. 512, 93 N. E. 804 (unauthorized loan; no claim against estate except by subrogation to trustee's right, if any); King v. Stowell, 211 Mass. 246, 98 N. E. 91 (if loan was within powers, action will lie in equity against estate); Delaware R. R. Co. v. Gilbert, 44 Hun, 202; Adams v. Mackey, 6 Rich. Eq. 75. In England, it is held that if the settlor has specifically dedicated a part of the trust estate for particular trade purposes, and the personal security of the trustee fails, the creditor may come against the specified property. In In re Johnson, 15 Ch. Div. 548, Ames's Cas. on Trusts, 426, it is said, the creditor had a right to say, "I had the personal liability of the man I trusted, and I have also a right to be in his place against the assets; that is, I have a right to the benefit of indemnity or lien which he has against the assets devoted to the purposes of the trade"; Ex parte Garland, 10 Ves. 110; Fairland v. Percy, L. R. 3 P. & D. 217, Ames's Cas. on Trusts, 423; see, also, Owen v. Delamere, L. R. 15 Eq. 134; Ex parte Edmands, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 488; Mason v. Pomeroy, 151 Mass. 164, 7 L. R. A. 771, 24 N. E. 202; Laible v. Ferry, 32 N. expenditures made, much less to be allowed compensation, while they are violating this obligation.^e

J. Eq. 791; Willis v. Sharp, 113 N. Y. 586, 4 L. R. A. 493, 21 N. E. 705. In such cases the right of the creditor, against the estate, can only extend to that property which the settlor intended to he used for the purpose: Burwell v. particular Mandeville, 2 How. 560, 11 L. Ed. 378; Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S. 320, 25 L. Ed. 955; Jones v. Walker, 103 U. S. 444, 26 L. Ed. 404; Cook v. Administrator, 3 Fed. 69; State v. Hunter, 56 Ark. 159, 19 S. W. 496; Wilson v. Fridenberg, 21 Fla. 386; Bacon v. Pomeroy, 104 Mass. 577; Laible v. Ferry, 32 N. J. Eq. 791; Stewart v. Robinson, 115 N. Y. 336, 4 L. R. A. 410, 22 N. E. 160, 163; Lucht v. Behrens, 28 Ohio St. 231, 22 Am. Rep. 378; Davis v. Christian, 15 Gratt. 11. The distinction made in England, as to the "dedication to particular trade purposes," is not always maintained in the United States; hut the rights of the creditor to reach the trust property, directly, are based on analogous reasoning; it is said "where expenditures have been made for the benefit of the trust estate, and it has not paid for them, directly or indirectly, and the estate is either indebted to the trustee, or would have been if the trustee had paid, or would be if he should pay the demand, and the trustee is insolvent or non-resident, so that the creditor cannot recover his demand from him, or will be compelled to follow him to a foreign jurisdiction, the trust estate may be reached directly by a proceeding in chancery": Norton v. Phelps, 54 Miss. 467, Ames's Cas. on Trusts, 421; quoted in Ranzau v. Davis, 85 Or. 26, 158 Pac.

279, 165 Pac. 1180. It is clear, on the weight of authority, that, as the creditor's right in such case depends on the trustee's claim for reimbursement or exoneration, there can be no right against the res if the trustee is in default, or for any reason is not entitled to proceed against the estate in person: Wilson v. Fridenberg, 21 Fla. 386; Greenfield v. Vason, 74 Ga. 126 (the declaration should set forth the deed, showing what powers the trustee had); Clopton v. Gholson, 53 Miss. 466 (but the creditor must proceed, as in any case of subrogation, by first exhausting his remedy against the trustee); Bushong v. Taylor, 82 Mo. 660; Adams v. Mackey, 6 Rich. Eq. 75; Owens v. Mitchell, 38 Tex. 589. This general rule has been intentionally departed from in at least one jurisdiction; the court saying: "But if this modern principle is to be understood as maintaining that, where the trustee, in this class of trusts, is in arrears to the trust estate, the creditor who has furnished articles for the use and henefit of the trust estate, and which are necessary and proper for it, is not entitled to payment, unless the trust estate is in debt to the trustee, so that the creditor may be subrogated to his rights-equity making that party responsible, at once, on whom the burden must ultimately fall, we are compelled to withhold from it our

§1085, (e) Snow v. Hazlewood, 179 Fed. 182, 102 C. C. A. 448 (no credit for advantageous services or money expended). As to compensation, see §1084, note (f). § 1086. Fourth. Removal and Appointment of Trustees.—The power of courts of equity over the removal and appointment of trustees, independently of any statutory authority, or any directions in the instrument of trust, is well established.^{1 a} This power is confined to cases of

§ 1086, ¹ For the details of this subject the reader must be referred to treatises upon trusts and trustees. The power is somewhat discretionary, and each case must largely depend upon its own circumstances. The settled doctrines of equity are fairly summed up in sections 2279–2289 of the Civil Code of California, which are copied from the corresponding sections 1208–1215 of the proposed New York Civil Code. These provisions are as follows: "Sec. 2279: A trust is extinguished by the entire fulfillment of its object, or by such object becoming impossible or unlawful. Sec. 2280: A trust cannot be revoked after its acceptance, ex-

assent": Wylly v. Collins, 9 Ga. 223. In the case of Manderson's Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 631, 6 Atl. 893, the court indulged in analogous reasoning, where allowing a claim for professional services, rendered at the request of a defaulting trustee; the court said: "It was the trust estate, and not the trustee individually, that was benefited by appellant's well-directed and successful services; and because it is both reasonable and just that they should he paid out of the trust fund . . . there is no reason why the absconding trustee's sins, either of omission or commission, should be visited on a creditor of any class, who at the instance of the trustee, having authority to employ him, has rendered necessary and beneficial services to the trust, and has not yet been compensated therefor." In thus placing the creditor's right upon a quasi-contractual basis the court seems moved by the spirit of an earlier Pennsylvania case-Mathews v. Stephenson, 6 Pa. St. 496, stating "The stock of the beneficiaries was repaired and removed by these debts contracted; they got the bene-

fit of them, and the trust property ought to be liable"; Clopton v. Gholson, 53 Miss. 466, while not a case of a defaulting trustee, is based on the same reasoning; but, as shown by the cases cited, authority is against such reasoning. As to creating a lien against the res, generally, see Satterwhite v. Bcall, 28 Ga. 525 (statutory); Blodgett v. American Nat. Bank, 49 Conn. 9; Jackson v. Pool, 73 Ga. 801; Stanton v. King, 8 Hun, 4; Fowler v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 28 Hun, 195; Mathews v. Stephenson, 6 Pa. St. 496. In Willis v. Sharp, 113 N. Y. 586, 4 L. R. A. 493, 21 N. E. 705, and many of the cases cited above in this note the point at issue was "did the trustee have an express or implied power to carry on the husiness"? if so, he could withdraw the assets for that purpose; where instead of withdrawing the assets, he created a debt, it is generally held to bind the estate, on the ground that it is equivalent to a pledge.

§ 1086, (a) The text is quoted in Ex parte Jonas, 186 Ala. 567, 64 South. 960. actual express trusts. It cannot, in the nature of things, extend to implied trustees, or trustees *in invitum*; nor does it apply to those persons who stand in fiduciary relations, and are for some purposes treated as trustees. A court of equity may remove a trustee on his own application when he wishes to be discharged; and it may and will remove a trustee who has permanently changed his residence to another country, or has absconded, or has been guilty of some breach of trust, or violation of duty, or has become insolvent, or is incapable, through age or other infirmity, of performing the trust duties. The exercise of this function by a court of equity belongs to what is called its *sound judicial discretion*, and is not controlled by positive rules, except that the discretion must not be abused.² b

cept by the consent of all the beneficiaries, unless a power of revocation is reserved in the instrument of trust. Sec. 2281: The office of a trustee is vacated by his death, or by his discharge. Sec. 2282: A trustee can be discharged from his trust only as follows: By the extinction of the trust; by the completion of his duties under the trust; by such means as may be prescribed by the declaration of trust; by the consent of the beneficiary, if he had capacity to contract; by the judgment of a competent tribunal, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, that he is of unsound mind; or by the superior court [i. e., by a court of general equity jurisdiction]. Sec. 2283: The court may remove any trustee who has violated or is unfit to execute the trust; or may accept the resignation of a trustee. Sec. 2287: The court may appoint a trustee whenever there is a vacancy, and the declaration of trust does not provide a practicable method of appointment. Sec. 2288: On the death, renunciation, or discharge of one of several co-trustees, the trust survives to the others. Sec. 2289: When a trust exists without any appointed trustee, or where all the trustees renounce, die, or are discharged, the court must appoint another trustee. The court may, in its discretion, appoint the original number or any less number of trustees."

§ 1086, ² People v. Norton, 9 N. Y. 176; In re Cohn, 78 N. Y. 248;
Preston v. Wilcox, 38 Mich. 578; In re Bernstein, 3 Redf. 20 (resignation); North Carolina R. R. v. Wilson, 81 N. C. 223; McPherson v. Cox, 96 U. S. 404; Satterfield v. John, 53 Ala. 127; Farmers' Loan etc. Co. v.

§ 1086, (b) This section is cited in Yates v. Yates, 255 Ill. 66, Ann.
Cas. 1913D, 143, 99 N. E. 360; 73 S. W. 938; Barker v. Barker, 73 Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. v. De
N. H. 353, 6 Ann. Cas. 596, 1 L. E. § 1087. Appointment of New Trustees.—The principle has already been stated that an express trust validly created shall not fail for want of a trustee. Courts of equity, therefore, independently of statute, possess the inherent

Hughes, 18 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 130 (removing to a foreign country); Bloomer's Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 45; Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 114 Mass. 356; Ketchum v. Mobile etc. R. R., 2 Woods, 532; Scott v. Rand, 118 Mass. 215; In re Adams's Trust, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 634; Ex parte Hopkins, L. R. 9 Ch. 506; as to accepting a voluntary resignation, see Wilkinson v. Parry, 4 Russ. 272, 276; Coventry v. Coventry, 1 Keen, 758; Greenwood v. Wakeford, 1 Beav. 576, 581; Forshaw v. Higginson, 20 Beav. 485; In re Stokes's Trusts, L. R. 13 Eq. 333; Chalmer v. Bradley, 1 Jacob & W. 51, 68; Cruger v. Halliday, 11 Paige, 314; Shepherd v. McEvers, 4 Johns. Ch. 136, 8 Am. Dec. 561; Diefendorf v. Spraker, 10 N. Y. 246; as to removal in general, see Forster v. Davies, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 133, 138; In re Blanchard, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 131; Palairet v. Carew, 32 Beav. 564, 567; Cromhes v. Brookes, L. R. 12 Eq. 61; In re Roche, 2 Dru. & War. 287; and In re Watts's Settlement, 9 Hare, 106 (hankruptcy); as to foreign residence, see Mennard v. Welford, 1 Smale & G. 426; In re Bignold's Trusts, L. R. 7 Ch. 223; Withington v. Withington, 16 Sim. 104.

A. (N. S.) 802, 62 Atl. 166 (court may reduce the number of trustees when that is necessary for effectual performance of trust); and quoted in Ex parte Jones, 186 Ala. 567, 64 South. 960. See In re Newen, [1894] 2 Ch. 297 (the donee of a power to appoint cannot appoint himself); In re Earl of Stamford, [1896] 1 Ch. 288 (the court will not consider as invalid an appointment by the donee of a power, though it would not have made the appointment); In re Chetwynd's Settlement, [1902] 1 Ch. 692; Haines v. Elliot, (Conn.) 58 Atl. 718. See, also, Letterstedt v. Boers, 9 App. Cas. (Priv. Coun.) 371; In re Nash, 16 Ch. Div. 504 (lunatic); Irvine v. Dunham, 111 U. S. 327, 28 L. Ed. 444, 4 Sup. Ct. 501; Clay v. Edwards, 84 Ky. 548, 2 S. W. 147; Abernathy v. Abernathy, 8 Fla. 243; Williamson v. Grider, 97 Ark. 588, 135 S. W. 361

(should not be removed because, under direction of lower court, he engaged in business disapproved by higher); Tuckerman v. Currier, 54 Colo. 25, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 599, 129 Pac. 210 (distinction between removal of executor who has also trust duties and executor, who is also trustee); Stead v. President etc. of Commons of Kaskaskia, 243 Ill. 239, 90 N. E. 654 (should be removed if improperly elected, and new election ordered); Wylie v. Bushnell, 277 Ill. 484, 115 N. E. 618 (not removed for mere mistakes and lack of judgment, and carelessness in keeping books); Wheatcraft v. Wheatcraft, 55 Ind. App. 283, 102 N. E. 42 (misconduct and failure to carry out trust, though it affected only one of the beneficiaries); Waller v. Horsford, 152 Iowa, 176, 130 N. W. 1093 (honest mistake or misunderstanding of duties not ground

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power and jurisdiction to appoint new trustees whenever such action is necessary to protect the rights of the beneficiaries. In the absence of any other method prescribed by the instrument creating the trust, a court of equity will

for removal): Barbour v. Weld, 201 Mass. 513, 87 N. E. 909 (misconduct and failure to carry out trust; trustee may be removed although that would terminate the trust, which is a personal one); Nutt v. State, 96 Miss. 473, 51 South. 401 (removal for disobedience of orders); Wiegand v. Woerner, 155 Mo. App. 227, 134 S. W. 596 (want of fidelity or capacity must be shown); Lowe v. Montgomery, 117 Mo. App. 273, 92 S. W. 916 (should not be removed merely because he mingled trust funds with his own); Harvey v. Schwettman, (Mo. App.) 180 S. W. 413 (failure to endeavor to recover trust funds removed by co-trustee); Hawley v. Watkins, 109 Va. 122, 63 S. E. 560 (neglect).

Insolvency .--- In re Barker's Trusts, 1 Ch. Div. 43, Ames's Cas. on Trusts, 223 (the court said "a necessitous man is more likely to be tempted to misappropriate trust funds than one who is wealthy; and besides, a man who has not shown prudence in managing his own affairs is not likely to be successful in managing those of other people"); Paddock v. Palmer, 6 How. Pr. 215 (the court refused to remove one who was known to be insolvent when selected); Terry v. Fitzgerald, 32 Gratt. 843 (insolvency does not disqualify a trustee, but he should give bond before undertaking management of the property); Williams v. Nicholl, 47 Ark. 254, 1 S. W. 243 (refusing to remove an insolvent who was in the same financial condition as when selected); Shryock v. Waggoner, 28

Pa. St. 430 (one "hopelessly insolvent" is not disqualified); Van Boskerck v. Herrick, 65 Barb. 250 (insolvency was held not to disqualify though coupled with nonresidence, and friction between cotrustees).

Inability to Agree With the Beneficiary .--- In some cases it has been held that such inability was not sufficient to disqualify the trustee: McPherson v. Cox, 96 U. S. 404, 24 L. Ed. 746; In re Price's Estate, (Pa.) 58 Atl. 280; Gibbes v. Smith, 2 Rich. Eq. 131; Lathrop v. Smalley's Ex'rs, 23 N. J. Eq. 192; Polk v. Linthicum, 100 Md. 615, 69 L. R. A. 920, 60 Atl. 455 (mere unfriendliness not enough, but if trustee is evidently in hostility to plans of trustor, he should be removed); Lowe v. Montgomery, 117 Mo. App. 273, 92 S. W. 916; Wylie v. Bushnell, 277 Ill. 484, 115 N. E. 618; In re Mayfield, 17 Mo. App. 684; Nickels v. Phillips, 18 Fla. 732 (mere personal friction is not ground for removal; "the acts or omissions must be such as to endanger the trust property, or to show a want of honesty, or a want of proper capacity, or a want of reasonable fidelity"); Berry v. Williamson, 11 B. Mon. 245 ("although harmony and mutual confidence between the trustee and beneficiaries are certainly desirable, they are not actually necessary for the purposes and intercourse of business"). The ground of support for such cases is, that in them the trustee was a mere ministerial officer with no discreappoint trustees when none at all have been named by the creator of the trust, and will appoint new trustees when those originally named refuse to accept, or when a vacancy

tion as to the benefit the beneficiary. should receive; where such discretion exists, the rule is the opposite: See the *dictum* in McPherson v. Cox, *supra*, adopted in Wilson v. Wilson, 145 Mass. 490, 1 Am. St. Rep. 477, 14 N. E. 521; Scott v. Rand, 118 Mass. 215; May v. May, 167 U. S. 310, 42 L. Ed. 179, 17 Sup. Ct. 824; Maydwell v. Maydwell, 135 Tenn. 1, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1043, 185 S. W. 712.

Disagreement Between the Trustees. Where the trustees cannot agree among themselves, and thereby endanger the safety of the property, or its proper management, the courts should remove one of them: Paget v. Stevens, 8 Misc. Rep. 236, 28 N. Y. Supp. 549; Re Morgan, 63 Barb. 621 (especially where the cestui desires the removal, and sympathizes with those sought to be retained); Quackenboss v. Southwick, 41 N. Y. 117 (the selection of the one to be removed should depend largely on the choice of the beneficiaries); In re Myers's Estate, 205 Pa. St. 413, 54 Atl. 1093; May v. May, 167 U. S. 310, 42 L. Ed. 179, 17 Sup. Ct. 824; but see Van Boskerck v. Herrick, supra.

Trustee's Views at Variance With the Object of the Trust.—Such views should disqualify the trustee; see Att'y-Gen. v. Pearson, 7 Sim. 290, 3 Mer. 353; Baker v. Lee, Re IIminster School, 8 H. L. C. 495; Ross v. Crockett, 14 La. Ann. 811 (where a trustee of a church withdrew from it and joined a different one, it was considered ground for vacating his position).

Non-residence.-There seems to be

no absolute rule that the non-residence of a trustee is ground for his removal from office, nor an insuperable objection to his appointment, though it may influence the court in a given case by reason of the greater facility with which a resident trustee could perform the duties of the office: In re Walker, [1901] 1 Ch. 259; see Strobel's Estate, 11 Phila. 122 (non-residents appointed upon their giving bond). But a permanent removal from the jurisdiction would seem to justify the removal from office: Sloan v. Frothingham, 72 Ala. 589; Letcher's Trustee v. German Nat. Bk., 34 Ky. 24, 20 Ann. Cas. 815, 119 S. W. 236; Dorsey v. Thompson, 37 Md. 25; Woods v. Fisher, 3 W. Va. 536 (the departure from the jurisdiction was considered as a vacation of the office); Farmers Co. v. Hughes, supra, in author's note. The qualifications in this respect may be regulated by statute: see Rinker v. Bissell, 90 Ind. 375 (non-residents cannot be selected nor appointed); Meikel v. Green, 94 Ind. 344 (but the statute not extending to trusts by operation of law, a trustee of such trust may be a non-resident). Under certain circumstances the court may appoint a non-resident trustee; In re Simpson, [1897] 1 Ch. 256 (the beneficiary resident abroad, but the property within the jurisdiction); Dodge v. Dodge, 109 Md. 164, 130 Am. St. Rep. 503, 71 Atl. 519. See, in general, Waterman v. Alden, 144 Ill. 90, 32 N. E. 972.

occurs by their death, resignation, permanent residence in a foreign country, or removal from office, as heretofore described.^{1 a} The power of appointment will be exercised

§ 1087, 1 Leggett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445, 459; In re Robinson, 37 N. Y. 261; Quackenboss v. Southwick, 41 N. Y. 117; In re Stevenson, 3 Paige, 420; In re Van Schoonhoven, 5 Paige, 559; Mask v. Miller, 7 Baxt. 527; Green v. Blackwell, 31 N. J. Eq. 37; Att'y-Gen. v. Barbour, 121 Mass. 568; Ketchum v. Mobile etc. R. R., 2 Woods, 532; Collier v. Blake, 14 Kan. 250; Millard v. Eyre, 2 Ves. 94; Buchanan v. Hamilton, 5 Ves. 722; Dodkin v. Brunt, L. R. 6 Eq. 580; Coombes v. Brookes, L. R. 12 Eq. 61; In re Bignold's Trusts, L. R. 7 Ch. 223; In re Tempest, L. R. 1 Ch. 485. The court does not necessarily adhere to the original number, but may appoint more or less, unless the instrument of trust expressly requires the same number to be kept up: In re Tunstall's Will, 4 De Gex & S. 421; D'Adhemar v. Bertrand, 35 Beav. 19; In re Welch, 3 Mylne & C. 292; Miller v. Priddon, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 335; Emmet v. Clark, 3 Giff. 32, 35; as illustrations of appointments, see Ex parte Countess of Mornington, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 537; In re Boyce, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 205; In re Price's Trust, L. R. 6 Eq. 460; Dodkin v. Brunt, L. R. 6 Eq. 580; King of Hanover v. Bank of England, L. R. 8 Eq. 350; In re Raphael's Trust, L. R. 9 Eq. 233; In re Smirthwaite's Trusts, L. R. 11 Eq. 251; In re Davis's Trusts, L. R. 12 Eq. 214; In re Stokes's Trusts, L. R. 13 Eq. 333; In re Driver's Settlement, L. R. 19 Eq. 352; In re White, L. R. 5 Ch. 698; In re Sparrow, L. R. 5 Ch. 662; In re Donisthorpe, L. R. 10 Ch. 55; In re Rathbone, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 483; In re Dalgleish's Settlement. 4 Ch. Div. 143; In re Lamotte, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 325; In re Hodgson, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 888; In re Harford's Trusts, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 135; In re Liddiard, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 310.

§ 1087, (a) This section is cited in Hendrix College v. Arkansas Townsite Co., 85 Ark. 446, 108 S. W. 514; Barker v. Barker, 73 N. H. 353, 6 Ann. Cas. 596, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 802, 62 Atl. 166; Lanning v. Commissioners of Public Instruction, 63 N. J. Eq. 1, 51 Atl. 787. See In re Higginbottom, [1892] 3 Ch. 132 (the court will not appoint a new trustee if an existing trustee has a power to appoint and desires to execute it); see as to appointment under statute, Plomley v. Richardson & Wrench, [1894] App. Cas. 632. In general, see Kenaday v. Edwards, 134 U. S. 125, 10 Sup. Ct. 523; Farrar v. McCue, 89 N. Y. 140; Royce v. Adams, 123 N. Y. 402, 25 N. E. 386; Carruth v. Carruth, 148 Mass. 431, 19 N. E. 369; Tucker v. Grundy, 83 Ky. 540; Willis v. Alvey, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 96, 69 S. W. 1035 (where a corporation appointed trustee is incompetent, a court of equity will appoint another); Kennard v. Bernard, (Md.) 56 Atl. 793; Leman v. Sherman, 117 Ill. 657, 6 N. E. 872; Dean v. Lanford, 9 Rich. Eq. 423 ("it was declared to be the rule of on behalf of a beneficiary who has a real interest, even though it be contingent. Its exercise, as in the case of removal, is a matter of sound judicial discretion. In filling vacancies, therefore, the court is not necessarily confined

this court never to appoint the husband of a married woman as her trustee"); Ex parte Hunter, Rice Eq. 294; Boaz v. Boaz, 36 Ala. 334; Force v. Force, (N. J. Eq.) 57 Atl. 973; Re Hallatt's Trusts, 18 Weekly Reporter, 416, Ames's Cas. on Trusts, 221 (a husband was appointed cotrustee on giving bond to apply for the appointment of a new trustee in case of his becoming a sole trustee). In Wilding v. Balder, 21 Beav. 222, Ames's Cas. on Trusts, 221, the court said: "I cannot depart from the rule I have adopted of not appointing a near relative a trustee, unless I find it absolutely impossible to get some one unconnected with the family to undertake that office. I have always observed that the worst breaches of trusts are committed by relatives who are unable to resist the importunities of their cestui que trust, when they are nearly related to them"; approved in Parker v. Moore, 25 N. J. Eq. 228. That a contingent remainderman, being opposed in interest to the beneficiaries, should not be appointed, see Yates v. Yates, 255 Ill. 66, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 143, 99 N. E. 360. It is obvious that a beneficiary cannot also be sole trustee, but where there are several trustees the beneficiary may be one of them: Ex parte Conybeare's Settlement, 1 Weekly Reporter, 458, Ames's Cas. on Trusts, 222; see Armory v. Lord, 9 N. Y. 403; Wetmere v. Truslow, 51 N. Y. 338; Bundy v. Bundy, 38 N. Y. 410; Moke v. Norrie, 14 Hun, 128; Rogers v. Rogers, 18 Hun, 409; see, also, Craig v. Hone, 2 Edw. Ch. 564, and cases cited in the note; Gaskill v. Green, 152 Mass. 526, 25 N. E. 969.

In support of the text, see, also, the following recent cases: Speer v. Colbert, 200 U. S. 130, 50 L. Ed. 403, 26 Sup. Ct. 201 (trust not personal); Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U. S. 321, 53 L. Ed. 202, 29 Sup. Ct. 106; Blakeney v. Du Bose, 167 Ala. 627, 52 South. 746; Sacramento Bank v. Murphy, 158 Cal. 390, 115 Pac. 232; Dwyer v. Cahill, 228 Ill. 617, 81 N. E. 1142 (appointment where no trustee named); Roberts v. Roberts, 259 Ill. 115, 102 N. E. 239; Dean v. Northern Trust Co., 259 Ill. 148, 102 N. E. 244; Hite v. Hite's Ex'r, 133 Ky. 554, 118 S. W. 357; Petition of Pierce, 109 Me. 509, 84 Atl. 1070; Offutt v. Jones, 110 Md. 233, 73 Atl. 629; Hayward v. Spaulding, 75 N. H. 92, 71 Atl. 219; Hiles v. Garrisen, 70 N. J. Eq. 605, 62 Atl. 865; In re Earnshaw, 196 N. Y. 330, 89 N. E. 825 (appointment under statute may be without notice); McAfee v. Green, 143 N. C. 411, 55 S. E 828; Hill v. Hill, 49 Okl. 424, 152 Pac. 1122. The appointment of a new trustee will not be made where that would be a futile act; In re Kittinger's Estate, 9 Del. Ch. 71, 77 Atl. 24 (not for sole purpose of conveying legal title to person who already holds it); Friedley v. Security Trust & Safe Deposit Co., (Del. Ch.) 84 Atl. 883 (where sole remaining duty is to pay over persenal property to beneficiaries, no need of a new trustee).

to the original number of trustees. In the appointment as well as in the removal of trustees the court keeps in view and endeavors to accomplish three main objects: the wishes of the creator of the trust, the interests of *all* the beneficiaries, not *some* of them, and the effectual performance of the trust. Even when the power of appointment is conferred by the instrument of trust upon an individual, a court of equity may control its exercise so as to prevent an abuse of discretion.² b

SECTION VII.

CORPORATION DIRECTORS AND OTHER QUASI TRUSTEES.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1088. Quasi trustees; fiduciary persons.
- § 1089. Corporation directors and officers.
- § 1090. Trust relations in stock corporations.
- § 1091. Liability of directors for a violation of their trust.
- § 1092. First class: Directors guilty of fraudulent misrepresentations, etc.
- § 1093. Second class: Ultra vires proceedings of directors.
- § 1094. Third class: Wrongful dealing with corporate property.
- § 1095. Fourth class: The same; the corporation refuses to sue.
- § 1096. Special classes.
- § 1097. Guardians.

§ 1088. Quasi Trustees—Fiduciary Persons.^a—The conception of a trust runs through a large part of equity jurisprudence, and is the source of many doctrines applicable to conditions which are not strictly trusts. Wherever there

§ 1087, ² Bailey v. Bailey, 2 Del. Ch. 95.

§ 1087, (b) Cases where the power of appointment was so conferred: Webster v. Kautz, 22 Colo. App. 111, 123 Pac. 139; Walters v. Webster, 52 Colo. 549, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 23, 123 Pac. 952 (the method prescribed is exclusive); Yates v. Yates, 255 Ill. 66, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 143, 99 N. E. 360 (legal title passes to successor without conveyance by the former trustee); In re Cleven's Estate, 161 Iowa, 289, 142 N. W. 986.

§1088, (a) This and the following sections are cited in Byers v. Rollins, 13 Colo. 22, 21 Pac. 894; Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 61 N. E. 163. Sections 1088-1090 are cited in Ellis v. Ward, 137 Ill. 509, 25 N. E. 530. This section is cited in Adams v. Cowen, 177 U. S. 471, is a fiduciary relation, although the fiduciary may not hold the legal title to property in which the beneficiary has only an equitable estate, the dealings of the parties with each other and with the subject-matter of the relation are governed by the same rules which determine the duties of actual trustees towards their cestuis que trustent, and the beneficiaries are, in general, entitled to the same remedies which are given to cestuis que trustent against those who are truly express trustees.¹ It may be said, therefore, that the equitable obligations resting upon and the equitable remedies given against guardians, committees of persons non compotes mentis, corporation directors, partners. agents, as well as executors and administrators, are analogous to those resting upon and given against actual trustees; they result directly from the theory of trusts, and are not mere applications of the doctrine concerning accounting. I purpose, in the present section, to describe the operation of the theory of trusts upon certain species of fiduciary persons, especially corporation directors and officers; some other species will be considered in subsequent chapters.²

§ 1089. Corporation Directors and Officers.—The directors and supreme managing officers of corporations are constantly spoken of as trustees. They are not, however, true trustees with the corporation or the stockholders as their true *cestuis que trustent*, since they hold neither the legal title to the corporate property nor that to the stock. In fact, directors are clothed at the same time with a double character,—that of *quasi* trustees and that of agents.^{1 a} It

§ 1088, 1 See ante, §§ 955-965, 1044-1058, 1075-1078.

§ 1088, ² Namely, executors and administrators, partners, and agents.

§ 1089, ¹ In Ex parte Chippendale, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 19, 52, Turner, L. J., speaking of the relation between the directors and the *company*, said: "Although directors undoubtedly stand in the position of agents,

44 L. Ed. 851, 20 Sup. Ct. 668; Cowen v. Adams, 78 Fed. 536, 47 U. S. App. 676; Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, 99 N. E. 138. § 1089, (a) Quoted in Empire State Sav. Bank v. Beard, 81 Hun, 184, 30 N. Y. Supp. 756. is of the utmost importance to discriminate exactly between these two characters, and to determine accurately for whom, over what subject-matter, and to what extent they are thus trustees; for upon this trust relation primarily depend the equitable remedies which may be obtained against them by the corporation or by the stockholders.² With the character of agents belonging to directors, the present discussion has little or nothing to do. From their function of agency are derived their powers to act for the corporation as a legal entity; it measures the extent of these powers in the management of both the external and internal affairs; it fixes the rights and obligations of the corporation in dealings with stockholders and with third persons. The rights, duties, liabilities, and remedies which result from the directors' agency are therefore chiefly legal; the equitable rights, duties, and remedies are mainly referable to the *trust* element of the directors' functions.

and cannot bind their companies heyond the limits of their authority, they also stand, *in some degree*, in the position of trustees. There is no inconsistency in this double view of the position of directors. They are agents, and cannot bind their companies beyond their powers. They are trustees, and are entitled to be indemnified for expenses incurred by them within the limits of their trust." See, also, Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65, 70, 37 Am. Rep. 546; Kelley v. Greenleaf, 3 Story, 93, 101, Fed. Cas. No. 7657.

§ 1089, ² There has been some confusion upon this subject in the decisions. There are, as I shall show, several classes of suits against directors maintained by a stockholder, or hy the stockholders, or by the corporation; they are governed hy entirely distinct rules, and depend upon entirely different conditions of fact. Rules peculiar to one of these classes have sometimes been applied to cases belonging to another class. Such mistakes result from a failure to form a correct notion of the trust relation in which directors are placed. If it he possible to formulate a true statement of this relation, to show when directors are quasi trustees for the stockholders and when for the corporation, and over what species of property the trust extends in each of these instances, then all difficulties connected with the various kinds of suits against directors will be removed, and it will be apparent that all these equitable remedies are governed by a system of distinct but harmonious rules. I shall attempt to accomplish this result, and I helieve that the conclusions of the text are fully sustained by courts of the highest ability and authority.

§ 1090. Trust Relations in Stock Corporations.^a --- The trust character of directors is involved in the very organization of a corporation, and is necessarily twofold,towards the corporation, and towards the stockholders. The doctrines are fundamental and familiar that the corporation itself is a legal personality, and holds the full title, legal and equitable, to all corporate property. Stockholders, individually and separately, hold the full title, legal and equitable, to their respective shares of stock. A stockholder does not, by virtue of his stock, acquire any estate, legal or equitable, in the corporate property; he obtains only a right to participate in the lawful dividends while the corporation is in being, and to his proportionate share of the net assets upon its dissolution and final settlement. Shares of stock, however, are regarded by courts of law and of equity as a species of property, as vendible in the market, as having a pecuniary value, and as clothing their owner with proprietary rights which will be protected and enforced.¹ From this analysis it is obvious that, so far as the trust embraces or is concerned with the corporate property, the directors and managing officers occupy the position of *quasi* trustees towards the *corporation* only; there is no relation of beneficiary and trustee, having the corporate property for its subject-matter, between the stockholders and the directors. The directors are also agents for the corporation, but that fact does not prevent them from being in a partial sense trustees for the corporation. The important conclusion I repeat, that this phase of their trust is concerned with and confined to the corporate property; from it arise their fiduciary duties towards the corporation in dealing with such property,

§1090, ¹ Thus, for example, trover could be maintained for a wrongful conversion of shares.

§ 1090, (a) This section is cited in Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 15 Ariz. 424, 139 Pac. 879; Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232; Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co. of U. S., 176 III-158 Iowa, 362, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 230,
L. B. A. 1916E, 878, 157 N. W. 929;
Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Or.
70, 96 Pac. 528; Black v. Simpson,
94 S. C. 312, 77 S. E. 1023.

and the equitable remedies of the corporation for a violation of those duties. On the other hand, the directors and managing officers occupy the position of quasi trustees towards the stockholders alone, and not at all towards the corporation, with respect to their shares of stock. Since the stockholders own these shares, and since the value thereof and all their rights connected therewith are affected by the conduct of the directors, a trust relation plainly exists between the stockholders and the directors, which is concerned with and confined to the shares of stock held by the stockholders; from it arise the fiduciary duties of the directors towards the stockholders in dealings which may affect the stock and the rights of the stockholders therein, and their equitable remedies for a violation of those To sum up, directors and managing officers, in duties. addition to their functions as mere agents, occupy a double position of partial trust; they are quasi or sub modo trustees for the corporation with respect to the corporate property, and they are quasi or sub modo trustees for the stockholders with respect to their shares of the stock.² b

§ 1090, ² The conclusions of the text are fully sustained by the following cases, among others, although no *single* decision, so far as I am aware, attempts to give the complete analysis or to formulate the entire results. Different cases have announced different phases of the doctrine, and by a comparison of all, the general principle is established: Ex parte Chippendale, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 19, 52; Bagshaw v. Eastern Union R'y, 7 Hare, 114, 130, 131; 2 Hall & T. 201; Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare, 461, 493, 494;

§ 1090, (b) For a recent English case discussing the relation of corporation directors dealing directly with the individual shareholder, see Percival v. Wright, [1902] 2 Ch. 421 (they may purchase his shares without disclosing pending negotiations for the sale of the company's undertaking, which increase the value of the shares). See, also, Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 15 Ariz. 424, 139 Pac. 879; Bawden v. Taylor, 254 Ill. 464, 98 N. E. 941 (officer may purchase shares of stock freely; no confidential relation); Wann v. Scullin, 210 Mo. 429, 109 S. W. 688. On the other hand, that such officer is under a duty to disclose to the stockholder facts bearing on the value of the stock which the latter could not readily ascertain; see Black v. Simpson, 94 S. C. 312, 77 S. E. 1023, citing this paragraph of the text: Poole v. Camden, (W. Va.) 92 S. E. 454.

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§ 1091. Liability of Directors for a Violation of Their Trust.^a—Whenever directors or managing officers, acting within the scope of their general powers as agents, violate the rights of a stockholder, their act is binding upon the corporation; it is, in legal effect, the act of the corporation, and the stockholder has a remedy, legal or equitable as the case may be, by suit against the corporation.¹ With remedies of this kind against the corporation we are not at present concerned, since they result from the directors' powers as *agents*, and not at all from their functions as *quasi* trustees. In regard to the various remedies against the directors or managing officers for their breaches of trust, the conclusions reached in the preceding paragraph

Russell v. Wakefield etc. Co., L. R. 20 Eq. 474, 479; Duncomb v. New York etc. R. R., 84 N. Y. 190; Smith v. Rathbun, 22 Hun, 150; Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65, 70; Forbes v. Memphis etc. R. R., 2 Woods, 323; Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616; Smith v. Poor, 3 Ware, 148; Black v. Delaware etc. Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130, 393; Simons v. Vulcan Oil etc. Co., 61 Pa. St. 202, 100 Am. Dec. 628; Chetlain v. Republic Life Ins. Co., 86 Ill. 220; Deaderick v. Wilson, 8 Baxt. 108; Corbett v. Woodward, 5 Saw. 403; Ryan v. Leavenworth etc. R'y, 21 Kan. 365; Forbes v. Mc-Donald, 54 Cal. 98; Davis v. Rock Creek etc. Co., 55 Cal. 359, 36 Am. Rep. 40; Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419; Chouteau v. Allen, 70 Mo. 290; Van Dyck v. McQuade, 86 N. Y. 38, 45, 46, per Danforth, J.; Chase v. Vanderbilt, 62 N. Y. 307.

The *dictum* in Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11, 10 Am. Rep. 684, which describes directors as *mere* mandataries, cannot be reconciled with the general consensus of authorities.

§ 1091, 1 As, for example, when the directors or officers improperly refuse to recognize a transfer of stock, and to issue a new certificate to the assignee, or when they otherwise refuse to admit the rights of one who is really a stockholder, and to issue to him the stock to which he is justly entitled, their conduct, though wrongful in the particular instance, falls within the scope of their proper functions. The stockholder may therefore maintain an action at law against the corporation for damages, or he may sometimes resort to a suit in equity for the purpose of compelling it to issue the stock and to register it upon the books of the company.^b

§ 1091, (a) This section is cited in Hoffman Motor Truck Co. v. Erickson, 124 Minn. 279, 144 N. W. 952; Empire State Sav. Bank v. Beard, 81 Hun, 184, 30 N. Y. Supp. 756. § 1091, (b) See §§ 1411, 1412.

furnish a most clear and certain criterion. Whenever the acts of the directors do not consist of any wrongful misuse of the corporate property, or wrongful exercise of the corporate franchise, but are of such a nature that they directly and primarily affect the interest of the stockholders in their shares of stock, by diminishing its value, or otherwise impairing their proprietary rights in it, then the stockholders are directly injured and are primarily interested; as the cestuis que trustent whose rights have been violated, they must institute and maintain any equitable suits for relief against their defaulting trustees; the remedy is for their benefit and belongs to them alone. On the other hand, wherever the breach of trust consists in a wrongful dealing of any kind or in any manner with the corporate property or with the corporate franchises, the corporation itself is directly injured and is primarily interested; as the *cestui* que trust whose rights have been violated, it must institute and maintain any equitable suit for relief against its defaulting trustees; the remedy obtained, whether pecuniary or otherwise, is for its benefit, and belongs to it alone. Under certain special circumstances in cases of this latter kind, where the suit should be brought by the corporation as plaintiff, but it becomes impossible to institute such a proceeding, in order to prevent a complete failure of justice the stockholders are permitted to set the machinery of the court in motion by commencing the action in their own names: but otherwise the suit is treated in every respect as one brought by and for the corporation. In applying these general propositions, it will be found that there are several distinct classes of cases appropriate for different conditions of fact, and governed by different rules. These various classes I shall now proceed to describe.

§ 1092. First Class. Directors Guilty of Fraudulent Misrepresentations or Concealments.—Where directors or managing officers issue prospectuses, circulars, or reports containing fraudulent misrepresentations or concealments concerning the company's affairs, and persons are induced

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by these documents to purchase shares of the stock, or to enter into contracts for their purchase, and thereby sustain a loss, such defrauded stockholders may, as has already been shown, either obtain the relief by repayment or rescission against the corporation, or may obtain relief against the fraudulent directors personally by means of an equitable suit for an accounting and repayment of the money, or by an action at law for the deceit. The equitable suits against the directors must plainly be brought by the stockholders, and not by the corporation, since the wrong is not done to the corporate property or franchises, but consists wholly in a violation of the stockholders' proprietary rights in their shares of stock.¹ Such a suit cannot be maintained by one stockholder suing on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; the injury is several and individual; each defrauded stockholder must sue for himself.²

§ 1093. Second Class. Ultra Vires Proceedings of Directors.—In a second class of cases, where the directors are not charged with any misappropriation of the corporate property for their own benefit, nor with any breach of their fiduciary duty to the corporation, but, although purporting to act for the common welfare, they have adopted, or are about to adopt, some measure which is *ultra vires*, or beyond the scope of their corporate powers, a suit may be prosecuted against them by stockholders to obtain the appropriate relief, either of rescission or of prevention.¹

§ 1092, ¹Kisch v. Cent. R'y of Venezuela, 3 De Gex, J. & S. 122; Cent. R'y etc. v. Kisch, L. R. 2 H. L. 99; Hill v. Lane, L. R. 11 Eq. 215; Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 13 Eq. 79; L. R. 6 H. L. 377; Ship v. Crosskill, L. R. 10 Eq. 73, 82, 83; Henderson v. Lacon, L. R. 5 Eq. 249; Cargill v. Bower, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 502; Rohrschneider v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co., 76 N. Y. 216, 32 Am. Rep. 290; see *ante*, § 881, and cases in notes.

§ 1092, ² Turquand v. Marshall, L. R. 4 Ch. 376, 385.

§ 1093, ¹ In Russell v. Wakefield etc. Co., L. R. 20 Eq. 474, 481, Sir George Jessel, M. R., after describing the suits generally to be brought by the corporation, and stating that there are exceptions to this rule, adds: "It remains to consider what are those exceptional cases in which such a suit [i. e., by stockholders] should be allowed. We are all familiar with one large class of cases which are certainly the first exception to the Under some circumstances, even a single dissentient stockholder would not be bound by such an act, done by a unanimous board of directors, and approved by all the other stockholders except himself. The theory of this class of suits is, that a stockholder has a right that the operations of the corporation should be kept by the directors within the powers conferred by its charter; every measure which transcends those powers, although done in good faith, violates the rights which inhere in the ownership of stock, and puts the value of the stock itself at hazard. The suit may be brought by a single stockholder suing on his own account alone, or by a stockholder suing on behalf of himself and all others who are similarly situated. The corporation is, of course, made a co-defendant, and any other corporation or person who has joined in the ultra vires transaction may also be made a co-defendant.^{2 a} There is also a special

rule. They are cases in which an individual corporator snes to prevent the corporation either commencing or continuing the doing of something which is beyond the powers of the corporation."

§ 1093, ² Bagshaw v. Eastern Union R'y, 7 Hare, 114, 130, 131; Ware v. Grand Junction etc. Co., 2 Russ. & M. 470; Simpson v. Westminster Hotel Co., 2 De Gex, F. & J. 141; 8 H. L. Cas. 712; Hare v. London etc. R'y, 2 Johns. & H. 80; Simpson v. Denison, 10 Hare, 51; Beman v. Rufford, 1 Sim., N. S., 550; Salomons v. Laing, 12 Beav. 377; Colman v. Eastern Cos. R'y, 10 Beav. 1; Russell v. Wakefield etc. Co., L. R. 20 Eq. 474, 481; Clinch v. Financial Corporation, L. R. 5 Eq. 450; Att'y-Gen. v. Great Eastern R'y, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 449, 485-500, per Baggallay, L. J.; Menier v. Hooper's Tel. Works, L. R. 9 Ch. 350; MacDongall v. Gardiner, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 13; Kent v. Quicksilver Min. Co., 78 N. Y. 159; Butts v. Wood, 37 N. Y. 317; Manderson v. Commercial Bank, 28 Pa. St. 379; Black v. Delaware etc. Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130, 393; Marseilles etc. Co. v. Aldrich, 86 Ill. 504; Chetlain v. Republic Life Ins. Co., 86 Ill. 220; Heath v. Erie R'y, 8 Blatchf. 347; Ribon v. R. R. Cos., 16 Wall. 446.

§ 1093, (a) This section is quoted in Knapp v. Supreme Commandery U. O. G. C., 121 Tenn. 212, 118 S. W. 390 (suit to set aside *ultra vires* merger with another association, at suit of members, and for incidental accounting of assets); and cited to this effect in Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder, 113 Wis. 516, 90 Am. St. Rep. 867, 89 N. W. 460. See, also, Elyton Land Co. v. Dowdell, 113 Ala. 177, 59 Am. St. Rep. 105, 20 action strictly analogous to those properly belonging to this class. When the managing body are doing or are about to do an *ultra vires* act of such a nature as to produce *public* mischief, the attorney-general, as the representative of the public and of the government, may maintain an equitable suit for preventive relief.^{3 b}

§ 1093, ³ Some of the cases seem to hold that the attorney-general may thus interfere to restrain every *ultra vires* proceeding of a corporation, on the ground that the public and governmental rights must necessarily be invaded thereby. The later decisions, however, have established the himitation as stated in the text: Att'y-Gen. v. Great East R'y, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 449, 485-500; Att'y-Gen. v. Ely etc. R'y, L. R. 4 Ch. 194, 199; Att'y-Gen. v. Great West. R'y, L. R. 7 Ch. 767; Att'y-Gen. v. Cockermouth Local Board, L. R. 18 Eq. 172; Att'y-Gen. v. Great North. R'y, 1 Drew. & S. 154.

South. 981; Tillis v. Brown, 154 Ala. 403, 45 South. 589; Ellis v. Penn Beef Co., 9 Del. Ch. 213, 80 Atl. 666 (suit to cancel ultra vires stock issued); Elkins v. C. & A. R. R. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 5; Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 673, 53 Atl. 842; Coler v. Tacoma R'y & Power Co., (N. J. Eq.) 54 Atl. 413; Dittman v. Distilling Co. of America, 64 N. J. Eq. 537, 54 Atl. 570 (relief refused; action not ultra vires but in violation of statute; quo warranto only remedy); Schwab v. E. G. Potter Co., 194 N. Y. 409, 87 N. E. 670; Forrester v. Boston & M. Consol. C. & S. Min. Co., (Mont.) 74 Pac. 1088. A stockholder who has consented to an act cannot obtain relief therefrom in equity: Mc-Campbell v. Fountain Head R. Co., (Tenn.) 77 S. W. 1070; Wormser v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 184 N. Y. 83, 112 Am. St. Rep. 596, 6 Ann. Cas. 123, 76 N. E. 1036 (with knowledge of character of the acts, the plaintiff accepted pecuniary benefits under them); nor can an assignee of such stockholder obtain relief: Mc-Campbell v. Fountain Head R. Co., (Tenn.) 77 S. W. 1070; Hodge v. U. S. Steel Corp., 64 N. J. Eq. 90, 53 Atl. 601. See, also, Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, (Neb.) 93 N. W. 1024, and cases cited (holding that a purchaser of stock cannot complain of the prior acts and management of the corporation).

§1093, (b) The text is quoted in McCarter v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 372, 135 Am. St. Rep. 708, 18 Ann. Cas. 1048, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1194, 73 Atl. 80, 414, reversing 70 N. J. Eq. 291, 61 Atl. 705 (corporation engaged in a business that is affected with a public interest contracts to enter upon a line of conduct in respect to such business that tends to affect such public interest injuriously, and is contrary to public policy; may be restrained at suit of attorney-general, without regard to whether or not actual injury has resulted to the public).

§ 1094. Third Class. Wrongful Dealing With Corporate Property.^a-In this vastly most numerous and important class, the wrongful acts of the directors or officers primarily and immediately affect the corporation, either by misuse of its property or by abuse of its franchises. The kinds, forms, and modes of such wrongful acts are practically unlimited in number or variety. In general, where the directors or officers, or some of them, cause a loss of corporate property by negligence, or culpable lack of prudence, or failure to exercise their functions; or fraudulently misappropriate the corporate property in any manner, whether for their own benefit or for the benefit of third persons; or obtain any undue advantage, benefit, or profit for themselves by contract, purchase, sale, or other dealings under color of their official functions; or misuse the franchises, or violate the rules established by the charter or the bylaws for their management of the corporate affairs; or in any other similar manner commit a breach of their fiduciary obligations towards the corporation, so that it sustains an injury or loss, and a liability devolves upon themselves, -then the corporation is the party which must, as the plaintiff, bring an equitable suit for relief against the wrong-doers: the trust relation between itself as the *cestui* que trust and the defaulting directors or officers as trustees has been violated, and as in all like cases the cestui que trust is primarily the only party to sue for redress. As a general rule, courts of equity will not interfere with the internal management of corporations by means of suits brought by stockholders against directors, officers, or other stockholders.¹ In cases belonging to this class, there-

§ 1094, ¹ The doctrine is concisely stated in the quite recent cases of Greaves v. Gouge, 69 N. Y. 154, 157. A stockholder sues the president

§ 1094, (a) This section is cited in Tillis v. Brown, 154 Ala. 403, 45 South. 589; Yale Gas Stove Co. v. Wilcox, 64 Conn. 101, 42 Am. St. Rep. 159, 25 L. R. A. 90, 29 Atl. 303; Ellis v. Ward, 137 Ill. 509, 25 N. E. 530; Empire State Sav. Bank v. Beard, 81 Hun, 184, 30 N. Y. Supp. 756; Smith v. Stone, 21 Wyo. 62, 128 Pac. 612; McKee v. Chautauqua Assembly, 124 Fed. 808. fore, whatever be the nature of the particular wrong, whether intentional and fraudulent, or resulting from negligence or want of reasonable prudence, and whatever be the *indirect* loss occasioned to individual stockholders, no equitable suit for relief against the wrong-doing directors or officers can be maintained by a stockholder or stockholders individually, nor by a stockholder suing representatively on behalf of all others similarly situated, *unless the special condition of circumstances exists* to be described in the next following paragraph, namely, that the corporation

of a corporation, alleging that defendant had fraudulently misappropriated the surplus earnings and other property of the corporation, and that plaintiff's stock had thereby become worthless. He claims to recover, not only for the misappropriation of the corporate funds, hut also for the depreciation in the value of his own stock. The corporation is not made a party, and the complaint contains no averments showing why the suit was not brought by the corporation. In short, the case illustrates the doctrine in the most striking manner. The court say: "There is no doubt that a stockholder has a remedy for losses sustained by the fraudulent acts, and for the misapplication or waste of corporate funds and property by an officer of a corporation; but the weight of authority is in favor of the doctrine that an action for injuries caused by such misconduct must be brought in the name of the corporation, unless such corporation or its officers, upon being applied to for such a purpose by a stockholder, refuse to bring such action. In that contingency, and then only, can a stockholder bring an action for the benefit of himself and others similarly situated, and in such an action the corporation must necessarily be made a party defendant. When a stockholder brings such an action the complaint should allege that the corporation, on being applied to, refuses to prosecute; and as this averment constitutes an essential element of the cause of action, the complaint is defective and insufficient without it. The claim of the plaintiff that when the stockholder seeks to recover his share of the loss which might be recovered of the company, and only then, the company must be made a party, is not sustained by the authorities, and those cited do not uphold the doctrine contended for. The same remark is also applicable to the position taken. that when the loss is peculiar to the stockholder, and is caused by the depreciation of the market value of the stock, that the loss may be recovered against a director or other person causing it, without making the company a party."

either actually or virtually refuses to prosecute.^b Even if the stockholder alleges that the value of his own stock has been depreciated by the defendants' acts, or that he has sustained other special damage, he is not thereby entitled to maintain the suit. The reasons for this doctrine have already been explained. The stockholder, having no estate, legal or equitable, in the corporate property, has no *locus standi* in the courts while the corporation, in which alone are vested the corporate property and franchises, is able and willing to sue for their protection.² ^c Differing

§ 1094, ² In most of the following cases the doctrine of the text is established in an express and positive manner: Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare, 461, 491, per Wigram, V. C.; Mozley v. Alston, 1 Phill. Ch. 790, per Lord Cottenham; Lord v. Co. of Copper Miners, 2 Phill. Ch. 740, per Lord Cottenham; Russell v. Wakefield Water W. Co., L. R. 20 Eq. 474, 479, per Sir George Jessel, M. R.; Gray v. Lewis, L. R. 8 Ch. 1035, 1049, 1050; MacDougall v. Gardiner, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 13; Duckett v. Gover, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 82; Forbes v. Memphis etc. R. R., 2 Woods, 323; Fed. Cas. No. 4926; Morgan v. R. R. Co., 1 Woods, 15; Fed. Cas. No. 9806; Newby v. Oregon Cent. R. R., 1 Saw. 63; Fed. Cas. No. 10,145; Smith v. Poor, 3 Ware, 148; Fed. Cas. No. 13,093; Memphis City v. Dean, 8 Wall, 64, 19 L. Ed. 326; Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450, 26 L. Ed. 827; Huntington v. Palmer, 104 U. S. 482, 26 L. Ed. 833; Dannmeyer v. Coleman, 11 Fed. 97; Greaves v. Gouge, 69 N. Y. 154; Smith v. Rathbun, 22 Hun, 150; Black v. Huggins, 2 Tenn. Ch. 780; Jones v. Johnson, 10 Bush, 649; European etc. R'y v. Poor, 59 Me. 277; Henry v. Elder, 63 Ga. 347; Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419; Evans v. Brandon, 53 Tex. 56. In the following cases the same doctrine is recognized and followed as the basis of decision, although the actions are not in form the same as in the preceding cases: Duncomb v. New York etc. R. R., 84 N. Y. 190 (applied defensively by the corporation); Brooklyn etc. R. R. v. Strong, 75 N. Y. 591 (action at law); Craig v. Gregg, 83 Pa. St. 19; Union Pacific R. R. v. Durant, 3 Dill. 343; Fed. Cas. No. 14,377; Chetlain v. Republic Life Ins. Co., 86 Ill. 220. See, also, in support of the text, the cases cited under the next following paragraph, § 1095.

§ 1094, (b) The text is quoted in Tillis v. Brown, 154 Ala. 403, 45 South. 589.

§1094, (c) The text is quoted in Tillis v. Brown, 154 Ala. 403, 45 South. 589. See, also, Malder v. Buffalo Bill's Wild West Co., 132 Fcd. 280 (suit to compel declaration of dividends); Tuscaloosa Mfg. Co. v. Cox, 68 Ala. 71; Merchants &

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from this class merely in form, there is a special group of cases governed by the same doctrine. If the corporation has been dissolved, or is in the process of winding up, then the suit, which would otherwise have been brought in its name, may be maintained by the receiver, official liquidator, or other official representative who has succeeded to its property and franchises for the purpose of the final settlement.^{3 d}

§ 1095. Fourth Class. The Same Wrongful Dealing With Corporate Property—The Corporation Refuses to Sue. Although the corporation holds all the title, legal or equitable, to the corporate property, and is the *immediate cestui* que trust under the directors with respect to such property, and is theoretically the only proper party to sue for wrongful dealings with that property, yet courts of equity

§ 1094, ³ Land Credit Co. v. Lord Fermoy, L. R. 8 Eq. 7, 11; Joint Stock Co. v. Brown, L. R. 8 Eq. 381; 3 Eq. 139; Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65, 37 Am. Rep. 546; Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11, 10 Am. Rep. 684; Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52.

Planters' Line v. Wagoner, 71 Ala. 581; Decatur Mineral Land Co. v. Palm, 113 Ala. 531, 59 Am. St. Rep. 140, 21 South. 315; Johns v. Mc-Lester, 137 Ala. 283, 97 Am. St. Rep. 27, 34 South. 174; Roman v. Woolfolk, 98 Ala. 219, 13 South. 212; Bacon v. Irvine, 70 Cal. 221, 11 Pac. 646; Byers v. Rollins, 13 Colo. 22, 21 Pac. 894; Ide v. Bascomb, (Colo. App.) 72 Pac. 62; Smith v. Bulkley, (Colo. App.) 70 Pac. 958; Dunphy v. Traveller Newspaper Union, 146 Mass. 495, 16 N. E. 426; Siegman v. Maloney, (N. J. Eq.) 54 Atl. 405; Niles v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. Co., 176 N. Y. 119, 68 N. E. 142; Wallace v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 89 Tenn. 630, 24 Am. St. Rep. 625, 15 S. W. 448 (dictum to effect that demand upon president alone and refusal by him is not sufficient to authorize stockholder to sue); Rathbone v. Parkersburg Gas Co., 31 W. .Va. 798, 8 S. E. 570; State v. Milwaukee El. R'y & L. Co., 136 Wis. 179, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 672, 116 N. W. 900 (attorney-general has no right to sue).

§ 1094, (d) See, also, In re Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co., (Mo.) 180 Fed. 549 (on bankruptcy, the right to bring suit is vested in the trustee); Reed v. Hollingsworth, 157 Iowa, 94, 135 N. W. 37 (ordinarily, demand must be made upon the receiver before stockholder can sue, unless the receiver is implicated in the fraud); Sigwald v. City Bank, 82 S. C. 382, 64 S. E. 398 (same); Saunders v. Bank of Mecklenburg, 113 Va. 656, 75 S. E. 94 (must be demand on receiver before stockholder can sue).

recognize the truth that the stockholders are *ultimately* the only beneficiaries; that their rights are really, though indirectly, protected by remedies given to the corporation; and that the final object of suits by the corporation is to maintain the interests of the stockholders. While, in general, actions to obtain relief against wrongful dealings with the corporate property by directors and officers must be brought by and in the name of the corporation, yet if in any such case the corporation should refuse to bring a suit, the courts have seen that the stockholders would be without any immediate and certain remedy, unless a modification of the general rule were admitted. To that end the following modification of the general rule stated in the last preceding paragraph has been established as firmly and surely as the rule itself. Wherever a cause of action exists primarily in behalf of the corporation against directors, officers, and others, for wrongful dealing with corporate property, or wrongful exercise of corporate franchises, so that the remedy should regularly be obtained through a suit by and in the name of the corporation, and the corporation either actually or virtually refuses to institute or prosecute such a suit, then, in order to prevent a failure of justice, an action may be brought and maintained by a stockholder or stockholders, either individually or suing on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against the wrong-doing directors, officers, and other persons;^a but it is absolutely indispensable that the corporation itself should be joined as a party,—usually as a co-defendant. The rationale of this rule should not be misapprehended. The stockholder does not bring such a suit because his rights have been *directly* violated, or because the cause of action is his, or because he is entitled to the relief sought; he is permitted to sue in this manner simply in order to set in

§ 1095, (a) Quoted in Tillis v. Brown, 154 Ala. 403, 45 South. 589; Graham v. Dubuque Specialty Mach. Works, 138 Iowa, 456, 114 N. W. 619; Slattery v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 91 Mo. 217, 60 Am. St. Rep. 245, 4 S. W. 79; Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Or. 70, 96 Pac. 528; Smith v. Stone, 21 Wyo. 62, 128 Pac. 612. motion the judicial machinery of the court. The stockholder, either individually or as the representative of the class, may commence the suit, and may prosecute it to judgment; but in every other respect the action is the ordinary one brought by the corporation, it is maintained directly for the benefit of the corporation, and the final relief, when obtained, belongs to the corporation, and not to the stockholder-plaintiff.^b The corporation is, therefore, an indispensably necessary party, not simply on the general principles of equity pleading in order that it may be bound by the decree, but in order that the relief, when granted, may be awarded to it, as a party to the record, by the decree. This view completely answers the objections which are sometimes raised in suits of this class, that the plaintiff has no interest in the subject-matter of the controversy nor in the relief. In fact, the plaintiff has no such *direct* interest; the defendant corporation alone has any direct interest; the plaintiff is permitted, notwithstanding his want of interest, to maintain the action solely to prevent an otherwise complete failure of justice.^c When may such an action be brought? I have already stated the rule in its most general form, that a stockholder may thus sue whenever the corporation either actually or virtually refuses to permit a proceeding by itself. These are two distinct conditions of fact; and the circumstances must determine whether any particular case belongs to one or the other of the two conditions. In general, a case should come within the first condition; and it should appear that the board of directors or other managing body has actually refused to bring or permit an action in its own name. To this end the plaintiff should allege an application to the directors or managing body, a reasonable notice, request, or demand.

§ 1095, (b) The text is quoted in Dana v. Morgan, 232 Fed. 85, 146 C. C. A. 277; Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 Pac. 312; Smith v. Stone, 21 Wyo. 62, 128 Pac. 612. § 1095, (c) Quoted in Dana v. Morgan, 232 Fed. 85, 146 C. C. A. 277; Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551, 74 Am. St. Rep. 189, 55 N. E. 577; Graham v. Dubuque Specialty Mach. Works, 138 Iowa, 456, 114 N. W. 619 (as to recovery of the costs of the litigation).

that they would institute proceedings on the part of the corporation against the wrong-doers, and their refusal to do so after such reasonable request or demand. These allegations are material and issuable; if controverted by the defendant, they must be proved. If the proof of them fails, the whole foundation of the plaintiff's action is gone.^d This condition of fact, however, is not indispensable: the action may be maintainable without showing any notice, request, or demand to the managing body, or any actual refusal by them to prosecute; in other words, the refusal may be virtual.^e If the facts as alleged show that the defendants charged with the wrong-doing, or some of them, constitute a majority of the directors or managing body at the time of commencing the suit, or that the directors or a majority thereof are still under the control of the wrongdoing defendants, so that a refusal of the managing body, if requested to bring a suit in the name of the corporation, may be inferred with reasonable certainty, then an action by a stockholder may be maintained without alleging or proving any notice, request, demand, or express refusal.^{1 f}

§ 1095, ¹ These conclusions are fully sustained by the cases which have applied the rule under a great variety of circumstances: Atwool v. Merryweather, L. R. 5 Eq. 464, note; Mason v. Harris, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 97; MacDougall v. Gardiner, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 13; Duckett v. Gover, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 82; Menier v. Hooper's Tel. Works, L. R. 9 Ch. 350; Benson v. Heathorn, 1 Younge & C. 326; Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626, 21 L. Ed. 938; Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616, 22 L. Ed. 492; Memphis City v. Dean, 8 Wall. 64, 19 L. Ed. 326; Forbes v. Memphis etc. R. R., 2 Woods, 323; Fed. Cas. No. 4926; Newby v. Oregon Cent. R. R., 1 Saw.

§ 1095, (d) Quoted in Tevis V. Hammersmith, 31 Ind. App. 281, 66 N. E. 79, 912; Deveny v. Hart Coal Co., 63 W. Va. 650, 60 S. E. 789.

§ 1095, (e) Quoted in Tillis v. Brown, 154 Ala. 403, 45 South. 589; Tevis v. Hammersmith, 31 Ind. App. 281, 66 N. E. 79, 912; Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Or. 70, 96 Pac. 528; Deveny v. Hart Coal Co., 63 W. Va. 650, 60 S. E. 789. § 1095, (f) The text is quoted in Tillis v. Brown, 154 Ala. 403, 45 South. 589; Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Or. 70, 96 Pac. 528; Deveny v. Hart Coal Co., 63 W. Va. 650, 60 S. E. 789. This section is cited in Red Bud Realty Co. v. South, 96 Ark. 281, 131 S. W. 340; Hughes Mfg. & Lumber Co. v. Culver, 126 Ark. 72, 189 S. W. 850; Turner v. Markham, 155 Cal. 562, 102 Pac.

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In like manner, if the plaintiff's pleading discloses any

63; Fed. Cas. No. 10,145; Smith v. Poor, 3 Ware, 148; Fed. Cas. No. 13,093; Heath v. Erie R'y, 8 Blatchf. 347, Fed. Cas. No. 6306; Memphis etc. Gas Co. v. Williamson, 9 Heisk. 314; Hazard v. Durant, 11 R. I. 195; Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52; Young v. Drake, 8 Hun, 61; Rogers v. Lafayette etc. Works, 52 Ind. 296; eiting March v. Eastern R. R., 40 N. H. 548, 77 Am. Dec. 732; Brewer v. Boston Theatre, 104 Mass. 378; Peabody v. Flint, 6 Allen, 52; Hodges v. New Eng. Screw Co., 1 R. I. 312, 53 Am. Dec. 624; Sears v. Hotchkiss, 25 Conn. 171, 65 Am. Dec. 557; Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456; Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige, 222, 24 Am. Dec. 212; Goodin v. Cin. etc. Co., 18 Ohio St. 169, 98

272; Kimble v. Board, of Commissioners, (Ind. App.) 66 N. E. 1023; Zerelly v. Casper, 160 Ind. 455, 67 N. E. 103; Marcovich v. O'Brien, (Ind. App.) 114 N. E. 100; Sloan v. Clarkson, 105 Md. 171, 66 Atl. 18; Shaw v. Staight, 107 Minn. 152, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1077, 119 N. W. 951; Goodbody v. Delaney, 80 N. J. Eq. 417, 83 Atl. 988; Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 777, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 112, 99 N. E. 138; Beach v. Guaranty Sav. & Loan Ass'n, (Or.) 76 Pac. 16; Saunders v. Bank of Mecklenburg, 113 Va. 656, 75 S. E. 94; McKee v. Chautauqua Assembly, 124 Fed. 808.

In the following cases there was a sufficient demand and the suits were sustained: Mills v. City of Chicago, 127 Fed. 731; Brinckerhoff v. Roosevelt, 131 Fed. 955; City of Chicago v. Cameron, 120 Ill. 447, 11 N. E. 899; Voorhees v. Mason, 245 Ill. 256, 91 N. E. 1056; The Telegraph v. Lee, (Iowa) 98 N. W. 364; Wineburgh v. U. S., etc., Co., 173 Mass. 60, 73 Am. St. Rep. 261, 53 N. E. 145; Shaw v. Staight, 107 Minn. 152, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1077, 119 N. W. 951, citing this paragraph of the text; Kleinschmidt v. American Mining Co., 49 Mont. 7, 139 Pac. 785; Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 777, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 112, 96 N. E. 138; Wallace v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 89 Tenn. 630, 24 Am. St. Rep. 625, 15 S. W. 448 (demand upon trustee under general assignment is sufficient). "It is not enough, to enable a stockholder to bring a bill to enforce in behalf of a corporation the rights which, if successful, will inure to the corporation, to make a naked request that such a bill should be brought, without submitting to the directors, the facts on which it could be brought": Doherty v. Mercantile Trust Co., 184 Mass. 590, 69 N. E. 335. It is sometimes held that there must be a demand, not only upon the board of directors, but, in case of their refusal, upon the stockholders: Hagood v. Smith, 162 Ala. 512, 50 South. 374; Houze v. Harrison, 165 Ala. 150, 51 South. 614; Horst v. Traudt, 43 Colo. 445, 96 Pac. 259 (religious society); Deveny v. Hart Coal Co., 63 W. Va. 650, 60 S. E. 789; contra, Reed v. Hollingsworth, 157 Iowa, 94, 135 N. W. 37; Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 777, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 112, 99 N. E. 138; and, by implication at least,

other condition of fact which renders it reasonably certain

Am. Dec. 95; Bartholomew v. Bentley, 1 Ohio St. 37; Smith v. Prattville M. Co., 29 Ala. 503; Wright v. Oroville etc. Co., 40 Cal. 20; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 15 L. Ed. 401; Board of Commissioners v. Lafayette etc. R. R., 50 Ind. 85; Jones v. Johnson, 10 Bush, 649; Gray v. New York etc. Co., 3 Hun, 383; 5 Thomp. & C. 224; O'Brien v. O'Connell, 7 Hun, 228; Carpenter v. Roherts, 56 How. Pr. 216; Ryan v. Leavenworth etc. R'y, 21 Kan. 365; Gardner v. Butler, 30 N. J. Eq. 702; Deaderick v. Wilson, 8 Baxt. 108; Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419; Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43; Wilcox v. Bickel, 11 Neb. 154; 8 N. W. 436; Evans v. Brandon, 53 Tex. 56; Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450, 26 L. Ed.

most of the cases cited above in this note.

In the following cases demand was unnecessary: Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany & Susquehanna R. R. Co., 213 U. S. 435, 53 L. Ed. 862, 29 Sup. Ct. 540; Columbia Nat. Sand Dredging Co. v. Washed Bar Sand Dredging Co., 136 Fed. 710; Monmouth Inv. Co. v. Means, 151 Fed. 159, 80 C. C. A. 527; Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 155 Fed. 869 (to restrain another, controlling, corporation from voting stock, for the purpose of eliminating competition); Nathan v. Tompkins, 82 Ala. 437, 2 South. 747; Montgomery Traction Co. v. Harmon, (Ala.) 37 South. 371; Tillis v. Brown, 154 Ala. 403, 45 South. 589; Ellis v. Vandergrift, 173-Ala. 142, 55 South. 781; Moyle v. Landers, 83 Cal. 579, 23 Pac. 798; Ashton v. Dashaway Ass'n, 84 Cal. 61, 7 L. R. A. 809, 22 Pac. 660, 23 Pac. 1091; Sheehy v. Barry, 87 Conn. 656, 89 Atl. 259; Ellis v. Penn Beef Co., 9 Del. Ch. 213, 80 Atl. 666; Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551, 74 Am. St. Rep. 189, 55 N. E. 577; Green v. Hedenberg, 159 Ill. 489, 50 Am. St. Rep. 178, 42 N. E. 851; Reed v. Hollingsworth, 157 Iowa, 94, 135 N. W. 37; Lebus v. Stansifer, 154 Ky. 444, 157 S. W. 727 (claim was that directors were not legally elected and were acting without authority); Mason v. Carrothers, 105 Me. 392, 74 Atl. 1030; Davis v. Gemmell, 70 Md. 356, 17 Atl. 259; Von Arnim v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass. 515, 74 N. E. 680 (where defendant officers are majority stockholders and have full control of the corporation's affairs); Torrey v. Toledo Portland Cement Co., 150 Mich. 86, 113 N. W. 580; Hingston v. Montgomery, 121 Mo. App. 451, 97 S. W. 202; Kleinschmidt v. American Mining Co., 49 Mont. 7, 139 Pac. 785; McConnell v. Combination Min. & Mill. Co., (Mont.) 76 Pac. 194; Appleton v. American Malting Co., (N. J. Eq.) 54 Atl. 454; Berry v. Moeller, (N. J. Eq.) 59 Atl. 97; Herrick v. Dempster, 73 N. J. Eq. 145, 75 Atl. 810; Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52, per Rapallo, J.; 105 N. Y. 567, 12 N. E. 58; Jacobson v. Brooklyn Lumber Co., 184 N. Y. 152, 76 N. E. 1075 (officers are majority stockholders and dominate board of directors); North v. Union Savings & Loan Ass'n, 59 Or. 483, 117 Pac. 822; Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Or. 70, 96 Pac. 528, citing the text; Sigwald v. City Bank, 82 S. C. 382, 64 S. E. 398; Crumlish v. Shenandoah

that a suit by the corporation would be impossible, and that

827; Huntington v. Palmer, 104 U. S. 482, 26 L. Ed. 833; Dannmeyer v. Coleman, 11 Fed. 97. In Atwool v. Merryweather, L. R. 5 Eq. 464, note, 467, note, a suit by a stockholder was sustained, although no demand or request to sue had been made to the managing body, and no leave to sue had been obtained, because the principal defendant, a director, by means of the very fraud complained of, had control of a majority of the votes in the managing body. In Mason v. Harris, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 97, 107, Sir George Jessel, M. R., said: "As a general rule, the company must sue in respect of a claim of this nature, but general rules have their exceptions, and one exception to the rule requiring the company to be plain-

Valley R. R. Co., 28 W. Va. 623. It has been held, however, that "when a stockholder, being unable to induce the directors of a corporation, whose stock he holds, to bring an action at law, comes into a court of equity to aid him, he must, in order to excite the favorable action of that court, show to its satisfaction that the result of the action will be to promote justice, and will not produce any inequitable results": Siegman v. Malone, 63 N. J. Eq. 422, 51 Atl. 1003.

The corporation must be made a party plaintiff or defendant: Wilson v. American Palace Car Co., (N. J. Eq.) 54 Atl. 415; Groel v. United Electric Co., 132 Fed. 252 (reviewing cases, whether corporation should be joined as defendant or as plaintiff); also, Kelly v. Mississippi River Coaling Co., 175 Fed. 482; Lawrence v. Southern Pac. Co., 180 Fed. 822; Kleinschmidt v. American Mining Co., 49 Mont. 7, 139 Pac. 785; Groel v. United Electric Co. of N. J., 70 N. J. Eq. 616, 61 Atl. 1061; Starr v. Heald, 28 Okl. 792, 116 Pac. 188; Kelly v. Thomas, 234 Pa. 419, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 122, 83 Atl. 307; Elmergreen v. Weimer, 138 Wis. 112, 119 N. W. 836; Simon v. Weaver, 143 Wis. 330, 127 N. W. 950.

In general, see Metcalf v. American School Furn. Co., 122 Fed. 115; Hirsch v. Independent Steel Co. of America, 196 Fed. 104 (allegations of bill); Dana v. Morgan, 232 Fed. 85, 146 C. C. A. 277 (since suit is for corporation's benefit, after dismissal of suit a similar suit cannot be brought by another stockholder; citing this paragraph of the text): Northwestern Land Ass'n. v. Grady, 137 Ala. 219, 33 South. 874; Donald v. "Manufacturers' Export Co., 142 Ala. 578, 38 South. 841; Ross v. American Banana Co., 150 Ala. 268, 43 South. 817 (allegations of bill); Ex parte Gray, 157 Ala. 358, 131 Am. St. Rep. 62, 47 South. 286 (right of minority stockholder to intervene in an accounting suit between his and a controlling corporation); Grout v. First Nat. Bank of Grand Junction. 48 Colo. 557, 221 Ann. Cas. 418, 111 Pac. 556; Holmes v. Jewett, 55 Colo. 187, 134 Pac. 665 (failure to show demand on directors); Proctor v. Piedmont Portland Cement & Lime Co., 134 Ga. 391, 67 S. E. 942; Chicago Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Boggiano, 202 III. 312, 67 N. E. 17; Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14, 137 Am. St. Rep. 284, 19 Ann. Cas. 74. 91 N. E. 683; Wright v. Floyd, 43 Ind. App. 546, 86 N. E. 971; Mar-

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a demand therefor would be nugatory, the action may be

tiff is, that where a fraud is committed by persons who can command a majority of votes, the minority can sue. The reason is plain, as, unless such an exception were allowed, it would be in the power of a majority to defraud the minority with impunity. . . It appears that the defendant Harris holds such a number of shares that he can outvote those who wish the sale set aside [i. e., the sale alleged to be fraudulent]. By reason, therefore, of his influence with the directors and his number of votes, he has the sole control of the company. The case is precisely within the rules laid down by James, L. J., in Menier v. Hooper's Tel. Co." In Newby v. Oregon Cent. R. R., 1 Saw. 63, 67, 68, Fed. Cas. No. 10,145,

covich v. O'Brien, (Ind. App.) 114 N. E. 100 (citing this paragraph of the text); Wells v. Dana, 101 Me. 67, 63 Atl. 324; Sloan v. Clarkson, 105 Md. 171, 66 Atl. 18; Converse v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 209 Mass. 539, 95 N. E. 929; Pencille v. State F. M. H. Ins. Co., 74 Minn. 67, 73 Am. St. Rep. 326, 76 N. W. 1026 (suit by policy-holders in mutual insurance company); National Power & Paper Co. v. Rossman, 122 Minn. 355, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 830, 142 N. W. 818 (intervention in suit against an officer which corporation plans to discontinue); Vogeler v. Punch, 205 Mo. 558, 103 S. W. 1001; Brandt v. Mc-Intosh, 47 Mont. 70, 130 Pac. 413 (demand must be made on board of directors, not merely on individual members); Moss v. Goodhart, 47 Mont. 257, 131 Pac. 1071; Wildes v. Rural Homestead Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 452, 32 Atl. 676; Lillard v. Oil, Paint & Drug Co., (N. J. Eq.) 56 Atl. 254; Barrett v. Bloomfield Sav. Inst., 64 N. J. Eq. 425, 54 Atl. 543 (depositor in savings bank may enjoin officers from dissolving, when no sufficient reason for dissolution); Goodbody v. Delancy, 80 N. J. Eq. 417, 83 Atl. 988, citing this paragraph of the text (decree in the suit is a bar to a suit by another stockholder); Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. New York & N. R'y Co., 150 N. Y. 410, 55 Am. St. Rep. 689, 34 L. R. A. 76, 44 N. E. 1043; O'Connor v. Virginia Passenger & Power Co., 184 N. Y. 46, 76 N. E. 1082; Mitchell v. Aulander Realty Co., 169 N. C. 516, 86 S. E. 358; Starr v. Heald, 28 Okl. 792, 116 Pac. 188; Law v. Fuller, 217 Pa. 439, 66 Atl. 754; Williams v. Erie Mountain Consol. Min. Co., 47 Wash. 360, 91 Pac. 1091; Elliott v. Puget Sound Wood Products Co., 52 Wash. 637, 101 Pac. 228; Bergman Clay Mfg. Co. v. Bergman, 73 Wash. 144, 131 Pac. 485 (suit to collect unpaid stock subscriptions); Theis v. Durr, 125 Wis. 651, 110 Am. St. Rep. 880, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 571, 104 N. W. 985; Elmergreen v. Weimer, 138 Wis. 112, 119 N. W. 836. Equity will not interfere with the discretion of the directors at suit of minority stockholders unless the acts are ultra vires, fraudulent, or in disregard of the rights of plaintiff: Talbot J. Taylor & Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 122 Fed. 147; Dickinson v. Consolidated Traction Co., 119 Fed. 871, 56 C. C. A. 401; Roman v. Woolfolk, 98 Ala. 219, 13 South. 212; Sullivan v. Central Land Co., 173 Ala. 426, 55 South. 612; Troutman v. Council Bluffs Street Fair & Carnival Co., 142 Iowa, 140,

maintained without averring a demand or any other similar proceeding on the part of the stockholder-plaintiff.^j

plaintiff had averred in his bill a demand made upon the board of directors to sue in the name of the company, and their refusal; on the hearing it was conceded that this averment could not be proved, and the suit was therefore dismissed, upon the authority of Memphis City v. Dean, 8 Wall. 64, 19 L. Ed. 326, which is directly to the same point. The American courts fully adopt the rules as settled by English judges. In Young v. Drake, 8 Hun, 61, it was said: "Stockholders have a right to maintain an action against the trustees of the corporation for a fraudulent breach of trust, when it is apparent that the corporation itself will

120 N. W. 730; Bond v. Grey Imp. Co., 102 Md. 426, 62 Atl. 827; Stevens v. United States Steel Corp., 68 N. J. Eq. 373, 59 Atl. 905 (refusal to declare dividend); McCloskey v. Snowden, 212 Pa. St. 249, 108 Am. St. Rep. 867, 61 Atl. 796; Skeen v. Warren Irr. Co., 42 Utah, 602, 132 Pac. 1162.

Since the action is a representative one, and the corporation slone has any direct interest in the subject-matter and the relief, the stockholder cannot, in the one suit, recover for a wrong to himself individually; such joinder of causes of action is improper: Price v. Union Land Co., 187 Fed. 886, 110 C. C. A. 20 (fraud practiced on plaintiff in purchase of stock); Turner v. Markham, 155 Cal. 562, 102 Pac. 272, quoting the text; Pride v. Pride Lumber Co., 109 Me. 452, 84 Atl. 989 (stockholder, a creditor, seeks to have his debt paid); Pellio v. Bulls Head Coal Co., 224 Pa. St. 379, 73 Atl. 451.

As to acquiescence or laches on the part of the plaintiff stockholder, see Sausalito Bay Land Co. v. Sausalito Improvement Co., 166 Cal. 302, 136 Pac. 57 (delay of thirteen years, and payment of assessments a ratification); Boldenweck v. Bullis, 40 Colo. 253, 90 Pac. 634 (stockholders voting in favor of the transaction cannot complain); Bridges v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 136 Ga. 251, 71 S. E. 161; Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14, 137 Am. St. Rep. 284, 19 Ann. Cas. 74, 91 N. E. 683 (consent of assignor of stock binds r his assignee); Von Arnim v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass. 515, 74 N. E. 680 (no ratification without knowledge); Anderson v. Scandia Mining Syndicate, 26 S. D. 558, 128 N. W. 1016 (same); Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 109 N. W. 581, 110 N. W. 798.

That the requirements stated in the text do not apply to a suit to dissolve a corporation, see Briggs v. Traders' Co., (W. Va.) 145 Fed. 254; Stevens v. Empire Casualty Co., 180 Fed. 283; Minona Portland Cement Co. v. Reese, 167 Ala. 485, 52 South. 523 (since such a suit is not to redress a corporate wrong); and see Weber v. Nichols, 75 N. J. Eq. 117, 75 Atl. 997.

§ 1095, (j) Quoted in Tillis v. Brown, 154 Ala. 403, 45 South. 589; Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Or. 70, 96 Pac. 528; Eschweiler v. Stowell, 78 Wis. 316, 23 Am. St. Rep. 411, 47 N. W. 361. § 1096. Special Classes.—In addition to the foregoing general classes of suits, there are certain special classes, analogous to the former, and, like them, based upon the conception of an existing *quasi* trust relation, and of a breach of the fiduciary duty growing out of such relation. These special cases should be mentioned, in order to com-

not sue for their benefit. And where the corporation is still controlled by the same trustees who are accused of the fraud, or where such accused persons are a majority of the trustees, that is sufficient evidence that the corporation will not prosecute, and that an application to the trustees to direct a suit to be brought against themselves, or the derelict majority of their members, would be useless." The same rule is stated in the clearest manner in the important and well-considered case of Heath v. Erie R'v, 8 Blatchf. 347, Fed. Cas. No. 6306. In Wilcox v. Bickel, 11 Neb. 154, 8 N. W. 436, the plaintiff alleged that the wrong-doing officials, who constituted a majority of the directors, had absconded, and their whereabouts was unknown, and these facts, it was held, brought the case within the principle and operation of the rule. In Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43, the action was brought by a person to whom shares of the stock had been assigned as collateral security, and the court, in sustaining the action, held that a person holding stock of a corporation, not as a stockholder, but merely as a pledgee, may bring an action on his own account and in his own name to protect his rights and interests as pledgee, and cannot be required to act through the corporation. In the very recent case of Hawes v. Oakland, which was an action by a stockholder suing representatively against the board of directors, the corporation, and others, the supreme court of the United States summed up the general results of the English and American authorities as follows: "There must exist as the foundation of the suit some action or threatened action of the managing board of directors or trustees of the corporation which is beyond the authority conferred on them by their charter or other source of organization [Note.-This is identical with the "second class" of cases described in the text: what follows embraces the various conditions of fact which belong to the "fourth class"]; or such a fraudulent transaction completed or contemplated by the acting managers, in connection with some other party, or among themselves, or with other share-holders, as will result in serious injury to the corporation, or to the interests of the other share-holders; or where the board of directors, or a majority of them, are acting for their own interests, in a manner destructive of the corporation itself, or of the rights of the other share-holders; or where the majority of the share-holders themselves are oppressively and illegally pursuing a course in the name of the corporation which is in violation of the rights of the

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plete the view of partial trusts connected with the existence and management of corporations. In the first place, an action may be maintained by the corporation against its promoters, to set aside a transfer, or to rescind an agreement, or to obtain other proper relief, whenever, in the organization of the company, there has been a breach of

other share-holders, and which can only be restrained by a court of equity." To these general conclusions the court adds a statement of very minute averments which must be made by the plaintiff, tending to show that he has used all possible efforts, and exhausted all possible means, both with managing officers and with the other shareholders, to obtain redress through corporate action, or through a suit by the corporation itself.⁵ It is not claimed, however, that these specific and extraordinary allegations are demanded by the general course of English and American decisions. They are intended to guard the federal jurisdiction from encroachment, and are prescribed by a rule of the United States supreme court (rule 94)^h for the purpose of preventing collusive attempts to bring causes within that jurisdiction. To the same effect are Huntington v. Palmer and Dannmeyer v. Coleman, supra.¹

§ 1095, (2) See, also, Kessler v. Ensley Co., 123 Fed. 546.

§1095, (h) Now rule 27.

§1095, (i) The Federal Rule .---Dimpfell v. O. & M. R'y Co., 110 U. S. 209, 28 L. Ed. 121, 3 Sup. Ct. 573; Taylor v. Holmes, 127 U. S. 489, 32 L. Ed. 179, 8 Sup. Ct. 1192; Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold M. Co., 187 U. S. 455, 23 Sup. Ct. 156; Squair v. Lookout Mt. Co., 42 Fed. 729; Weidenfeld v. Allegheny & K. R. Co., 47 Fed. 11; Converse v. Dimock, 22 Fed. 573. See, further, Wathen v. Jackson Oil & Refining Co., 235 U. S. 635, 59 L. Ed. 395, 35 Sup. Ct. 635; Macon, D. & S. R. R. Co. v. Shailer, 141 Fed. 585, 72 C. C. A. 631; Venner v. Great Northern R'y Co., 153 Fed. 408; Bigelow v. Calumet & H. Min. Co., 155 Fed. 869; Perkins v. Northern Pacific R'y Co., 155 Fed. 445 (sufficient compliance with rule); Burroughs v. Interborough Metropolitan Co., 156 Fed. 389 (same); Continental Securities Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 165 Fed. 945 (same); Binney v. Cumberland Ely Copper Co., 183 Fed. 650 (same); Price v. Union Land Co., 187 Fed. 886, 110 C. C. A. 20 (same); Heinz v. National Bank of Commerce, 237 Fed. 942, 150 C. C. A. 592 (insufficient allegations). A showing of the futility of a demand will excuse compliance: Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & Susquehanna R. R. Co., 213 U. S. 435, 53 L. Ed. 862, 29 Sup. Ct. 540; Schultz v. Highland Gold Mines Co., 158 Fed. 337; Field v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 166 Fed. 607, affirmed, 179 Fed. 673, 103 C. C. A. 77; Howard v. National Telephone Co., 182 Fed. 215; Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 221 Fed. 529, 137 C. C. A. 239; Ross v. Quinnesec Iron Min. Co., 227 Fed. 337, 142 C. C. A. 33.

the fiduciary duty owed by the promoters to the future corporation.^{1 a} Secondly, under the same general circumstances in which an action may be maintained by a stockholder against wrong-doing directors or officers, if the corporation is municipal, or the trust is public and charitable, the attorney-general may sue, as a representative of the public beneficiaries, for appropriate relief.^{2 b} Finally, it seems that a person who has shares, not as a full stockholder, but as a pledgee or assignee for security, may bring a suit against defaulting directors or officers, for the pur-

§ 1096, ¹ This suit is clearly analogous to the "third general class" of the text. If the corporation is winding up, the suit may, of course, be brought by the receiver or official liquidator: Emma etc. Mining Co. v. Grant, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 918; Taylor v. Salmon, 4 Mylne & C. 134; Benson v. Heathorn, 1 Younge & C. 326; Simons v. Vulcan Oil Co., 61 Pa. St. 202, 100 Am. Dec. 628; McElhenny's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 188; Union Pac. R. R. v. Durant, 3 Dill. 343, Fed. Cas. No. 14,377.

§ 1096, ² Att'y-Gen. v. Wilson, Craig & P. 1, 9 Sim. 30, is an example of such suits.

§1096, (a) Suits Against Promoters .--- The text is cited to this effect in Yale Gas Stove Co. v. Wilcox, 64 Conn. 101, 42 Am. St. Rep. 159, 25 L. R. A. 90, 29 Atl. 303. See, also, Moore v. Warrior Coal & Land Co., 178 Ala. 234, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 173, 59 South. 219; Mason v. Carrothers, 105 Me. 392, 74 Atl. 1030 (suit by stockholder); Groel v. United Electric Co. of New Jersey, 70 N. J. Eq. 616, 61 Atl. 1061 (secret profits; stockholder may sue, subject to the rules described in section 1095 of the text); Stephany v. Marsden, 75 N. J. Eq. 90, 71 Atl. 598 (suit by stockholder); Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Or. 70, 96 Pac. 528: Simon v. Weaver, 143 Wis. 330, 127 N. W. 950 (stockholder's suit).

§1096, (b) Suits by Attorney.

general; Municipal or Charitable Corporations .- Stone v. Bevaus, 88 Minn. 127, 97 Am. St. Rep. 506, 92 N. W. 520 (suit by taxpayer); Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder, 113 Wis. 516, 90 Am. St. Rep. 867, 89 N. W. 460; Land, Log & Lumber Co. v. McIntyre, 100 Wis. 245, 69 Am. St. Rep. 915, 75 N. W. 964 (same). See, also, Trustees of Princeton University v. Wilson, 78 N. J. Eq. 1, 78 Atl. 393 (attorney-general proper party defendant to suit by trustees of a public charity); People ex rel. Smith v. Braucher, 258 Ill. 604, 101 N. E. 944; Bliss v. Linden Cemetery Ass'n, 81 N. J. Eq. 394, 87 Atl. 224 (in suit to enforce charitable trust, attorney-general should be joined as plaintiff and permitted to take charge of the case so far as public rights are concerned).

pose of protecting his own interests, without calling upon the corporation itself to interfere.^{3 c}

§ 1097. Guardians.—Guardians of infant wards, committees or guardians of persons non compotes mentis, and even agents where the agency is strictly fiduciary, stand in the relation of quasi trustees towards their wards or principals. It is true, they do not hold the title to the property which is the subject-matter of the relation, but their position and obligations are wholly fiduciary. Equity has, therefore, a general jurisdiction, at the suit of the wards or other beneficiaries, to compel a performance of the trust duties, to relieve against violations of these trust obligations, to direct an accounting and final settlement of the quasi trust, and to grant other special relief made requisite by the circumstances. This jurisdiction exists throughout the American states, except, perhaps, in a very few, where statutes have given exclusive control over such matters to

§ 1096, ³ Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43.

§ 1096, (c) Who are Stockholders. The proposition of Baldwin v. Canfield is by no means universally conceded at the present day. As to what persons are stockholders for the purposes of these suits, see Brown v. Duluth, M. & N. R'y Co., 53 Fed. 889 (unregistered stockholder not allowed to sue); also, Andrews Co. v. National Bank of Columbus, 129 Ga. 53, 121 Am. St. Rep. 186, 12 Ann. Cas. 616, 58 S. E. 633 (pledgee of stock may sue to prevent fraudulent sale of assets rendering stock worthless); Mitchell v. Aulander Realty Co., 169 N. C. 516, 86 S. E. 358 (unregistered pledgee of stock may sue); Breeze v. Lone l'ine-Surprise Consol. Min. Co., 39 Wash. 602, 81 Pac. 1050 (a mere nominal stockholder, acting in the interest of a rival corporation, can-

not sue). That a person who becomes a shareholder subsequently to the fraud or misconduct complained of may, as a general rule, bring the suit, see Bennett v. Havelock El. L. & P. Co., 21 Ont. L. R. 120, 18 Ann. Cas. 354; Harvey v. Meigs, 17 Cal. App. 353, 119 Pac. 941; Just v. Idaho C. & I. Co., 16 Idaho, 639, 133 Am. St. Rep. 140, 102 Pac. 381; Pollitz v. Gould, 202 N. Y. 11, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1098, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 988, and note, 94 N. E. 1088; Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 777, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 112, 99 N. E. 138; Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Or. 70, 96 Pac. 528. Contra, under the federal rule: Venner v. Great Northern R'v Co., 153 Fed. 408; Hitchings v. Cobalt Central Mines Co., 189 Fed. 241.

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some particular tribunal, to be exercised in some prescribed manner.^{1 a}

§ 1097, 1 In many of the states a jurisdiction over guardians is given to the probate courts; and modes of annual or final accounting are provided; but this legislation does not interfere with the inherent jurisdiction of equity, as a part of its general supervisory power over trusts. In a very few states, it seems, the legislation has gone farther, and has conferred an exclusive jurisdiction over guardians and their accounts upon these probate tribunals. For cases illustrating the text, and the fiduciary duties of guardians, and the jurisdiction of equity over them, see ante, § 961, and cases cited. With respect to these duties and this jurisdiction, committees or guardians of persons non compotes mentis stand upon exactly the same footing as gnardians of infant wards. The following recent cases are examples of the mode in which the jurisdiction is exercised: Fiduciary agents: Thornton v. Thornton, 31 Gratt. 212. Committees or guardians of insane persons: Stephens v. Marshall, 23 Hun, 641; Stumph v. Guard. of Pfeiffer, 58 Ind. 472; Polis v. Tice, 28 N. J. Eq. 432; Cole's Com. v. Cole's Adm'r, 28 Gratt. 365; Moody v. Bibb, 50 Ala. 245. Guardians of infants: Lewis v. Allred, 57 Ala. 628; overruling Spencer v. Spencer's Ex'r, 50 Ala. 445; Monnin v. Beroujon, 51 Ala. 196; Corbett v. Carroll, 50 Ala. 315; Chanslor v. Chanslor's Trustees, 11 Bush, 663; Tanner v. Skinner, 11 Bush, 120; Wood v. Stafford, 50 Miss. 370; Sledge v. Boone, 57 Miss. 222; McNeill v. Hodges, 83 N. C. 504; Lanier v. Griffin, 11 S. C. 565; Smith v. Davis, 49 Md. 470; Sage v. Hammonds, 27 Gratt. 651; Wyckoff v. Hulse, 32 N. J. Eq. 697; Wickiser v. Cook, 85 Ill. 68; Reed v. Timmins, 52 Tex. 84; Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 613, 26 L. Ed. 585; Micou v. Lamar, 17 Blatchf. 378, 1 Fed. Rep. 14; Bonrne v. Maybin, 3 Woods, 724, Fed. Cas. No. 1700; In re Dean, 86 N. Y. 398 (assignee).

§1097, (a) Stevenson v. Markley, 72 N. J. Eq. 686, 66 Atl. 185.

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CHAPTER SECOND. ESTATES AND INTERESTS OF MARRIED WOMEN.

SECTION I.

THE SEPARATE ESTATE OF MARRIED WOMEN.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1098. Origin and general nature.
- § 1099. Statutory legal separate estate in the United States.
- § 1100. How the separate estate is created; trustees not necessary.
- § 1101. The same: By what modes and instruments.
- § 1102. The same: What words are sufficient.
- § 1103. What property is included.
- § 1104. Her power of disposition.
- § 1105. The same, in the United States.
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- § 1107. Restraints upon anticipation.
- § 1108. What words are sufficient to create a restraint.
- §1109. Effect of the restraint.
- § 1110. End of the separate estate; its devolution on the wife's death.
- § 1111. Pin-money.
- § 1112. Wife's paraphernalia.
- § 1113. Settlement or conveyance by the wife in fraud of the marriage.

§ 1098. Origin and General Nature.^a — The married woman's separate estate, as recognized by equity, and independently of any statutory legislation, is merely a particular instance of trusts, and the jurisdiction of equity over it has been established from a very early day.¹ As the wife's interest in the property held to her separate use is wholly a creature of equity, the equitable jurisdiction over it is, of course, exclusive. The notion of an equitable separate estate free from the claims of the husband

§ 1098, ¹ See Drake v. Storr, 2 Freem. 205, which shows that in A. D. 1695, the wife's separate estate was a well-settled doctrine of equity.

§ 1098, (a) This section is cited in S. E. 567; Littleton v. Sain, 126 Flaum v. Wallace, 103 N. C. 296, 9 Tenn. 461, 150 S. W. 423. was avowedly introduced in order to evade the harsh and unjust dogmas of the law, and, in direct antagonism to the common-law theory which completely merges the legal personality of the wife in that of her husband, equity regards and treats the married woman, with relation to such separate property, in many respects as though she were unmarried.² This capacity or *status* of being as though a *feme*

§ 1098, ² The doctrine that equity regards a married woman as a *feme* sole has sometimes been stated too broadly. The true meaning of the doctrine, with its limitations and restrictions and the extent of its operation, has been explained in recent English cases, from which I shall quote a few passages. The capacity of a married woman to act as a feme sole may embrace, among other elements, a power to make contracts, a power to dispose of her property, and a freedom from the control which the common law gives to her husband. How far these elements are contained in the equitable conception of the wife's condition, and whether with or without limitation, is the question to be determined. In the most recent case of Pike v. Fitzgibbon, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 454, the particular question was as to the wife's power of making contracts. Cotton, L. J., said (p. 463): "I think that the ingenious and able argument on the part of the plaintiff has proceeded on one or two fallacies in the use of language. As I understand their argument it is this, that a court of equity deals with a married woman who has a separate estate as if she were a feme sole. Now, is that correct? First of all, there is one clear and absolute distinction. Can a *feme sole*, or can a man, be restrained from anticipating, or disposing by way of anticipation of any property to which she or he is entitled? No. A married woman under coverture can; but how and why? Simply as regards property settled to her separate use, and because equity can modify the incidents of separate estate, which is the creation of equity, and thus the position of a married woman having separate property differs materially from that of a *feme sole*. Is it true that she is regarded in equity as a feme sole? She is regarded as a feme sole to a certain extent, but not as a *feme sole* absolutely, and there is the fallacy. She, in my opinion, is regarded as a feme sole only as regards property which, under the trust, she is entitled to deal with as if she were a feme sole; but as regards property which she is restrained from anticipating, she is not, as regards persons other than her husband, in the position of a feme sole. As regards her husband, no doubt she is, as regards property settled to her separate use (whether there is a restraint upon anticipation or not), treated as a feme sole; that is to say, she, and not her husband, is the person who alone can receive and give a discharge for the money, and her husband is absolutely excluded; but as regards the out-

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sole is, however, only partial. As regards the husband and his common-law rights over the property, it is absolute; as regards third persons, and her power of disposing and contracting, it is never absolute, and may be restricted to any extent by the terms of the trust and of the instrument creating the separate estate. It should be carefully observed that a wife's trust estate and her separate estate are not synonymous or convertible terms. The separate estate of a married woman must, in contemplation of equity, be a trust estate, but an estate held in trust for her, in which she is the *cestui que trust*, is not necessarily a separate estate. The peculiar doctrine of the wife's "separate estate" applies only to such property as, being in contemplation of equity held in trust for her, is, by the terms of the conveyance or agreement, held or agreed to be held to

side world she is not regarded as a feme sole in respect of property subject to a restraint upon anticipation." See, also, p. 460, per James, L. J., and pp. 461, 462, per Brett, L. J. In the very important case of Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 494, the particular question was as to the wife's power of disposition, connected with her power of contracting. Turner, L. J., said (p. 509): "Before entering into the facts of the case, it may be as well to consider the nature and extent of the rights and remedies of such creditors, as established by the decisions of the courts of equity, or by conclusions which may fairly be drawn from these decisions. It is to be observed, in the first place, that the separate estate, against which these rights and remedies exist and are to be enforced, is the creature of courts of equity, and that the rights and remedies themselves, therefore, can exist and be enforced in those courts only. The courts of law recognize in married women no separate existence, no power to contract, and, except for some collateral and incidental purposes, no possession or enjoyment of property separate and apart from their husbands. They deny to married women both the power to contract and the power to enjoy. Courts of equity, on the other hand, have, through the medium of trusts, created for married women rights and interests in property, both real and personal, separate from and independent of their husbands. To the extent of the rights and interests thus created, whether absolute or limited, a married woman has, in courts of equity, power to alienate, to contract, and to enjoy; in fact, to use the language of all the cases from the earliest to the latest, she is considered in a court of equity as a feme sole in respect of property thus settled or secured to her separate use, It is from this position of married women, and from the rights and powers her separate use.³ The separate estate may include every species of property, real or personal, and the trusts upon which it is held may, except when modified or restricted by statute, be of every extent or variety, but must, of course, be express.⁴ In all those states which have made the

incident to it, that the claims of creditors against separate estates of married women have arisen." In Taylor v. Meads, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 597, 603, 604, Lord Westbury, dealing particularly with the wife's freedom from the control of her husband, and consequent power of disposition, said: "There is no difficulty as to the principle. When the courts of equity established the doctrine of the separate use of a married woman, and applied it to both real and personal estate, it became necessary to give the married woman, with respect to such separate property, an independent personal status, and to make her in equity a feme sole. It is of the essence of the separate use that the married woman shall be independent of and free from the control and interference of her husband. With respect to separate property the *feme covert* is by the form of trust released and freed from the fetters and disability of coverture, and invested with the rights and powers of a person who is sui juris. . . . The violence thus done by courts of equity to the principles and policy of the common law as to the status of the wife during coverture is very remarkable, but the doctrine is established, and must be consistently followed to its legitimate consequences." See, also, Picard v. Hine, L. R. 5 Ch. 274, 276, 277; Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Brown Ch. 16; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 679, 684, 732; Owens v. Dickenson, Craig & P. 48; Field v. Sowle, 4 Russ. 112; Aylett v. Ashton, 1 Mylne & C. 105, 112; Murray v. Barlee, 3 Mylne & K. 209; Lady Arundell v. Phipps, 10 Ves. 139; Nantes v. Corrock, 9 Ves. 182, 189; Heatley v. Thomas, 15 Ves. 596; Grigby v. Cox, 1 Ves. Sr. 517; Owen v. Homan, 4 H. L. Cas. 997; McHenry v. Davies, L. R. 10 Eq. 88.

§ 1098, ³ For example, if land is conveyed to A in fee, in trust for a married woman and her heirs, or in trust for a single woman and her heirs, and she afterwards marries, thus creating an ordinary passive trust in fee, the married woman's equitable estate in the land would not be a "separate estate"; her husband would be entitled to curtesy in it; her power of conveying it and the mode of conveying would be governed by the same rules which apply to her legal estates in fee; her capacity to contract would not be enlarged: Sce *ante*, §§ 989, 990, and cases cited; Taylor v. Meads, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 597, 604, 605, per Lord Westbury.

§ 1098, 4 The trust estate of the wife may be in fee, for life, or for years; it may be held upon a mere passive trust; or it may be held upon an active trust, where the trustee manages the *corpus* of the property, and pays over the rents, profits, and income to the wife.

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sweeping changes in the system of trusts, heretofore described, trusts of property held to the separate use of married women must, of course, conform to the general statutory regulations.⁵

§ 1099. Statutory Legal Separate Estate.^a—The separate estate thus described is wholly a creature of equity; the wife's interest is purely an equitable one, since the legal title is either vested in actual trustees, or is held by the husband in the character of a trustee; and the jurisdiction over it is exclusively equitable. Modern statutes in nearly all of the states have made most radical changes in the common-law relations of married women to their property, and have incidentally enlarged the jurisdiction of equity, so far as it is concerned with the contracts of married women. by extending it to their *legal* separate estates created by statute. These statutes do not, it is true, create any equitable estate in the property of wives; their effect is to vest a purely legal title in married women, and to free such title from the rights, interests, and claims which the common law gave to husbands. But while this legislation. empowers married women to acquire and hold property separate and distinct from their husbands, and while it renders their title and estate entirely legal, and dispenses with the necessity of trustees, it does not, in most of the states, entirely remove the common-law disabilities of entering into contracts, nor clothe married women with the general capacity of making contracts which are personally binding at law, and enforceable against them by legal actions and personal pecuniary judgments. The matter of married women's contracts, and of their enforcement against the property rather than the persons of wives, is therefore left exclusively to courts of equity, and is gov-

§ 1098, 5 See ante, §§ 1003-1005, New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, Dakota. In all these states a *passive* trust in land for the separate use of a married woman is forbidden.

§1099, (a) This section is cited in Bundy v. Cocke, 128 U. S. 185, 32 L. Ed. 396, 9 Sup. Ct. 242.

erned by equitable doctrines. The jurisdiction of equity in the enforcement of married women's liabilities against their separate property has thus been enlarged, since it has been extended in these states to all the property which a wife may now hold by a legal title, and is not confined to such equitable estate as is held by trustees for her separate use.¹ In a very few states the legislation has removed the

§ 1099, 1 These states may be divided into two groups, the legislation of each group following the same general type. By the first type the property of a married woman is declared to be her separate property, free from any interest or control of her husband, and not liable for his debts, but the statutes contain no provisions expressly authorizing her to make contracts. By the second type all the wife's property is likewise declared to be her own separate property, free from all claims of her husband; she furthermore possesses the sole power to manage it; may sell and convey it; and may make contracts in relation to it, but these contracts are not declared to be personally binding on her at law. Of course, equity is not concerned with these statutory differences in the extent of the wife's legal separate estate, and her legal powers over it. Equity is only interested in this legislation so far as the wife's contracts relating to her legal separate estate are enforced in equity, in the same manner as her contracts made upon the faith of her equitable separate estate. The states which have adopted the two foregoing types of legislation are as follows: Alabama: b Code 1876, secs. 2705, 2707. Arkansas: Dig. 1874, p. 756,

§ 1099, (b) Alabama: But by statute, Feb. 28, 1887, Code 1886, secs. 2341, 2351, all previous legislation on this subject was repealed. The distinction between "equitable" and "statutory" estates is abolished, and all separate property of married women is of the latter description, except such as is conveyed on an active trust for her benefit. The wife may contract with reference to her statutory estate only in writing, and with the assent of the husband expressed in writing; and may alienate the same or any interest therein only by the husband's joining in the alienation in the manner prescribed by law: Rooney v. Michael, 84 Ala. 585, 4 South. 421; Knox v. Childersburg Land Co., 86 Ala. 180, 5 South. 578.

Arkansas: Dig. of Stats. 1884, secs. 4624, 4625; Bundy v. Cocke, 128 U. S. 185, 32 **L. Ed.** 396, 9 Sup. Ct. 242.

Connecticut: Gen. Stats. 1888, secs. 2790-2794.

Georgia: Const. 1877, art. 3, sec. 11.

Illinois: Rev. Stats. 1889, c. 68, secs. 6, 7, 9.

Indiana: Rev. Stats. 1888, secs. 5115-5141.

Maryland: 1 Pub. Gen. Laws 1888, art. 45, sec. 1.

Massachusetts: Pub. Stats. 1882, c. 147, secs. 1-4, 10.

§ 1099

SEPARATE ESTATE OF MARRIED WOMEN.

statutory separate estate of married women entirely out of the equitable jurisdiction, by conferring upon them the

secs. 4193, 4194; Const. 1874, art. 9, sec. 7. Connecticut: Gen. Stats. (Rev. 1875), p. 186, secs. 1-4, 6. Delaware: Laws 1874, pp. 478, 479. Florida: McClellan's Dig. 1881, p. 754, secs. 1, 3, 4. Georgia: Code 1873, secs. 1754, 1756, 1772, 1773, 1783, 5136. Illinois: Hurd's Rev. Stats. 1880, p. 592, secs. 6, 7, 9. Indiana: 1 Gavin and Hord's Rev. Stats. 1870, p. 295, note 2, sec. 5; pp. 374-377; Acts of 1875, p. 178; Acts of 1879, p. 160; Acts of 1881, p. 528. Kansas: Dassler's Comp. Laws 1881, p. 539, c. 62, secs. 1, 2. Kentucky: Rev. Stats. 1873, p. 518, c. 52, art. 2, secs. 1, 5, 10. Maine: Rev. Stats. 1871, p. 491, c. 61, scc. 1. Maryland: Rev. Code 1878, p. 481, sec. 19. Massachusetts: Gen. Stats. 1860, p. 537, secs. 1, 3, 5; Laws 1874, c. 184, sec. 1. Michigan: 2 Comp. Laws 1871, p. 1477, sec. 1. Minnesota: Stats. 1878, p. 769, secs. 1, 2. Missouri: 1 Rev. Stats. 1879, secs. 3284-3286, 3295, 3296. Nebraska: Brown's Comp. Stats. 1881, p. 343, c. 53, secs. 1, 2, 4. New Hampshire: Gen. Laws 1878, p. 434, secs. 1, 4, 12. New Jersey: Rev. 1877, p. 636, secs. 1-4; p. 638, sec. 6; p. 639, sec. 18; Ibid., p. 637, sec. 5 (gives a married woman power to contract as a single woman, enforceable against her alone either at law or in equity, except that she cannot be an accommodation indorser, guarantor, or surety; on this section see Hinkson v. Williams, 41 N. J. L. 35; Wilson v. Herbert, 41 N. J. L. 454; 32 Am. Rep. 243). North Carolina: Battle's Rev. 1873, p. 592, sec. 29; Const., art. 10, sec. 6. Ohio: 1 Rev. Stats. 1880, pp. 806-809, secs. 3108, 3112. Oregon: Gen. Laws 1872, p. 663, secs. 4, 5; Const., art. 15, sec. 5. Pennsylvania: 2 Brightly's Purdon's Dig., p. 699, sec. 11. Rhode Island: Pub. Stats. 1882, p. 422, secs. 1-7; Tennessee: Stats. 1871, secs. 2486 a-2486 f. Texas: Rev. Stats. 1879, p. 411, secs. 2851, 2854; Const., art. 16, sec. 15. Vermont: Gen. Stats. 1862, p. 471, sec. 18. West Virginia: Kelly's Rev. Stats. 1879, p. 773, secs. 1-3; Const., art. 6, sec. 49. Wisconsin: 2 Rev. Stats. 1871, p. 1195, secs. 1-3.

Michigan: Howell's Stats. 1882, sec. 6295.

Minnesota: Kelly's Stats. 1891, sec. 3865.

North Carolina: Code 1883, sec. 1837.

Ohio: Act repealed March 19, 1887. Rev. Stats. 1890, sec. 3112: "A husband or wife may enter into any engagement or transaction with the other, or with any other person, which either might if unmarried." Sec. 3114: "A married person may take, hold, and dispose of property, real or personal, the same as if unmarried."

Oregon: 2 Hill's Laws 1887, secs. 2993, 2994.

Pennsylvania: Brightly's Purdon's Dig., ed. of 1883, tit. Marriage, sec. 13.

Tennessee: Code 1884, secs. 3346-3351.

Vermont: Rev. Laws 1880, sec. 2324.

Virginia: Code 1887, c. 103.

Wisconsin: 1 Sanborn and Berryman's Stats. 1889, secs. 2340-2342.

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power of making contracts in relation to it, and by rendering these contracts personally binding upon them at law, and enforceable against them personally by ordinary legal actions, pecuniary judgments, and executions.² c

§ 1099, ² Equity cannot, of course, deal with cases arising under this legislation.^d California: Civ. Code, secs. 158, 162, 171, 1556. Colorado:

§1099, (c) The most important portions of the English Marriel Women's Property Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 75), are as follows:

1. (1) A married woman shall, in accordance with the provisions of this act, be capable of acquiring, holding, and disposing by will or otherwise, of any real or personal property as her separate property, in the same manner as if she were *feme sole*, without the intervention of any trustee.

(2) A married woman shall be capable of entering into and rendering herself liable in respect of and to the extent of her separate property on any contract, and of suing and being sued, either in contract or in tort, or otherwise, in all respects as if she were a feme sole, and her husband need not be joined with her as plaintiff or defendant, or be made a party to any action or other legal proceeding brought by or taken against her; and any damages or costs recovered by her in any such action or proceeding shall be her separate property; and any damages or costs recovered against her in any such action or proceeding shall be payable out of her separate property, and not otherwise.

(3) & (4) as amended, 1893 [56 & 57 Vict. c. 63].

1. Every contract hereafter entered into by a married woman otherwise than as agent (a) shall be deemed to be a contract entered into by her with respect to and to

bind her separate property whether she is or is not in fact possessed of or entitled to any separate property at the time when she enters into such contract; (b) shall bind all separate property which she may at that time or thereafter be possessed of or entitled to; and (c) shall also be enforceable by process of law against all property which she may thereafter while discovert be possessed of or entitled to. Provided nothing in this section contained shall render available to satisfy any liability or obligation arising out of such contract any separate property which at that time or thereafter she is restrained from anticipating.

4. The execution of a general power by will by a married woman shall have the effect of making the property appointed liable for her debts and other liabilities in the same manner as her separate estate is made liable under this act.

§ 13. Separate property liable for her antenuptial debts.

§ 19. The act does not interfere with restraint on anticipation in existing or future settlements.

It is held that this legislation does not apply to property of which she is merely a trustee: In re Harkness and Allsopp's Contract, [1896] 2 Ch. 358; but it does apply to her interest as a mortgagee: In re Brooke and Fremliu's Contract, [1898] 1 Ch. 647.

§1099, (d) Colorado: Mills's Stats. 1891, secs. 3007-3021.

§ 1100. How the Separate Estate is Created—Trustees not Necessary.ª-Although the wife's separate estate is an equitable one, being, in conception of equity, a trust estate with the legal and the equitable titles separated, and although in strict theory and in every regular and formal settlement the legal title should be conveyed to or held by express trustees, yet it is well settled, whatever doubts may have once existed,¹ that the interposition of actual trustees is unnecessary.^b If property is in any mode, by sufficient and apt words to express the intention, given directly to a wife, either before or after marriage, for her sole and separate use, without the intervention of trustees, equity will carry the intention into effect, will regard the property as her separate estate, and will protect it against the claims of her husband and of his creditors. Equity accomplishes this result, in the absence of express trustees, by declaring and holding the husband himself as a trustee, with respect to such property, for his wife.² The *rationale*

Gen. Laws 1877, p. 614, sec. 1; p. 615, secs. 1-3. Dakota: Rev. Code 1877, secs. 78, 79, 83. Iowa: Miller's Rev. Code 1880, secs. 2202, 2213. Mississippi: Rev. Code 1880, sec. 1167. Nevada: 1 Comp. Laws 1873, p. 56, sec. 1; p. 58, secs. 17, 19. New Jersey: Rev. 1877, p. 637, sec. 5. New York: Rev. Stats. 1875, Banks's ed., p. 159, art. 6. South Carolina: Rev. Stats. 1873, p. 482, secs. 1-3; Const., art. 14, sec. 8.

§ 1100, 1 Some early cases had intimated that trustees were necessary: Harvey v. Harvey, 1 P. Wms. 125, per Lord Chancellor Cowper.

§ 1100, ² This rule operates in the clearest manner when a husband conveys or agrees to convey property directly to his wife; such a conveyance or agreement could be made effective in no other manner, since it would be void at the common law.^c As illustrating the general rule given in the text, see Newlands v. Paynter, 4 Mylne & C. 408; Gardner v. Gard-

Connecticut: See Laws 1877, c. 114; Gen. Stats. 1888, secs. 2796-2798.

Nevada: Gen. Stats. 1885, secs. 499, 515, 517.

New York: Rev. Stats., 8th ed., pp. 2600-2606.

Ohio: Rev. Stats. 1890, secs. 3112, 3114.

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South Carolina: Rev. Stats. 1882, secs. 2035-2037.

§ 1100, (a) This section is cited in Snodgrass v. Hyder, 95 Tenn. 568, 32 S. W. 764.

§1100, (b) This portion of the text is quoted in Miller v. Miller's Adm'r, 92 Va. 510, 23 S. E. 891.

§ 1100, (c)[,] See Smith v. Seiberling, 35 Fed. 677. of this rule is very clear. By the equitable conception, in order to the existence of a trust, there must be a separation of the legal and equitable titles. Although property is given directly to a married woman in such a way that she would hold the perfect legal title if she were single, still, by the operation of common-law doctrines, the husband, by virtue of the marriage, becomes himself vested with the legal estate in such property, either absolutely or for his life. Equity does not abrogate this common-law doctrine, nor deny the legal title acquired by the husband; on the contrary, it admits *his legal title*, but declares that he shall hold

ner, 1 Giff. 126; Parker v. Brooke, 9 Ves. 583; Rich v. Cockell, 9 Ves. 369, 375; Bennet v. Davis, 2 P. Wms. 316; Slanning v. Style, 3 P. Wms. 334, 337-339; Lucas v. Lucas, 1 Atk. 270; Darley v. Darley, 3 Atk. 399; Lee v. Prieaux, 3 Brown Ch. 381, 385; Major v. Lansley, 2 Russ. & M. 355; Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Russ. & M. 197; McMillan v. Peacock, 57 Ala. 127; Miller v. Voss, 62 Ala. 122; Pepper v. Lee, 53 Ala. 33; Crooks v. Crooks, 34 Ohio St. 610; Pribble v. Hall, 13 Bush, 61; Thomas v. Harkness, 13 Bush, 23; Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225, 25 L. Ed. 908; Payne v. Twyman, 68 Mo. 339; Loomis v. Brush, 36 Mich. 40; Holthaus v. Hornbostle, 60 Mo. 439; Davis v. Davis, 43 Ind. 561; City Nat. Bank v. Hamilton, 34 N. J. Eq. 158; Barron v. Barron, 24 Vt. 375; Porter v. Bank of Rutland, 19 Vt. 410; Shirley v. Shirley, 9 Paige, 363; Bradish v. Gibbs, 3 Johns. Ch. 523, 540; Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Bay, 4 Barb. 407; Blanchard v. Blood, 2 Barb. 352; Varner's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 140; Vance v. Nogle, 70 Pa. St. 176, 179; Shonk v. Brown, 61 Pa. St. 320; Jamison v. Brady, 6 Serg. & R. 466, 9 Am. Dec. 460; McKennan v. Phillips, 6 Whart. 571, 37 Am. Dec. 428; Trenton Bank Co. v. Woodruff, 2 N. J. Eq. 117; Steel v. Steel, 1 Ired. Eq. 452; Ellis v. Woods, 9 Rich. Eq. 19; Boykin v. Ciples, 2 Hill Eq. 200, 29 Am. Dec. 67; Whitten v. Jenkins, 34 Ga. 297; Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195; Hamilton v. Bishop, 8 Yerg. 33, 29 Am. Dec. 101; Long's Adm'r v. White's Adm'rs, 5 J. J. Marsh. 226; Freeman v. Freeman, 9 Mo. 772.^d The husband is thus bound if the property has been settled or given to the wife's separate use before marriage, unless such

§ 1100, (d) See, also, Templeton v. Brown, 86 Tenn. 50, 5 S. W. 441 (gift of notes by husband to wife); Richardson v. De Giverville, 107 Mo. 422, 28 Am. St. Rep. 426, 17 S. W. 974; Snodgrass v. Hyder, 95 Tenn. 568, 32 S. W. 764 (gift to wife of her earnings); Barnum v. Le Master, 110 Tenn. 638, 75 S. W. 1045 (conveyance from husband to wife); Carroll v. Lee, 3 Gill & J. 504, 22 Am. Dec. 350; Wassell v. Leggatt, [1896], 1 Ch. 554, affirming the rule of the text. See, further, Travis v. Sitz, 135 Tenn. 156, 185 S. W. 1075. it as a trustee for his wife,—impresses a trust upon it in her favor. In this manner equity effects a separation of the titles, although there are no words expressly creating a trust, or expressly vesting the legal title in a trustee.

§ 1101. The Same. By What Modes and Instruments. The wife's separate estate may include any species of property, and may be created by any of the following modes or instruments: 1. By a written antenuptial agreement with her intended husband, or marriage settlement, which may embrace her own property, or that of her intended husband, or that of third persons, and may covenant to bring in after-acquired property of either herself or her husband. 2. By a post-nuptial agreement with her husband, under certain circumstances.^a 3. By gifts from her husband during coverture, if made absolutely, and not intended as mere paraphernalia, or to be used merely as ornaments.^b The two latter modes are, however, so far subject to the rights of the husband's creditors, that if made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud such creditors, they would be void. 4. By gifts from strangers made directly to the wife during coverture. 5. By conveyance, devise, or bequest of property expressly limited to her separate use, made to her directly, either before or during coverture.¹

gift to her separate use has been destroyed by a marriage settlement: *Ibid.;* Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 Mylne & C. 377; In re Gaffee, 1 Macn. & G. 541; and interference by him, or persons claiming under or through him, may be restrained by injunction: Newlands v. Paynter, 4 Mylne & C. 408; Green v. Green, 5 Hare, 400, note; Allen v. Walker, L. R. 5 Ex. 187.

§ 1101, 1 Antenuptial agreements and marriage settlements.—A mere verbal antenuptial agreement is not hinding, and a settlement made after marriage in conformity with it would be voluntary, and liable to be impeached by the husband's creditors: Warden v. Jones, 2 De Gex & J. 76, 84; Spurgeon v. Collier, 1 Eden, 55, 61;^e still, if such agreement is acted

§1101, (a) The text is cited to this point in Moore v. Page, 111 U. S. 117, 28 L. Ed. 373, 4 Sup. Ct. 388.

§1101, (b) The text is cited to this point in Templeton v. Brown, 86 Tenn. 50, 5 S. W. 441. § 1101, (c) Flory v. Houck, 186 Pa. St. 263, 40 Atl. 482; Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481, 8 Am. Dec. 520. See, however, In re Holland, [1902] 2 Ch. 360.

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§ 1102. The Same: What Words are Sufficient.—No particular form of words is necessary in order to vest property in a married woman for her separate use, and to thus

upon by the property being voluntarily placed under the dominion of trustees, and treated as separate property, it may be effectual, at least as against the husband: See Simmons v. Simmons, 6 Hare, 352, 359. As to the effect of a covenant to bring in and settle after-acquired property, see Smith v. Lucas, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 531; Dawes v. Tredwell, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 354; Kane v. Kane, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 207; Ex parte Bolland, L. R. 17 Eq. 115; Campbell v. Bainbridge, L. R. 6 Eq. 269; In re Edwards, L. R. 9 Ch. 97; In re Jones's Will, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 362; In re Campbell's Policies, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 686.^d The following cases illustrate the text: Tullett v. Armstrong, 1 Beav. 1, 21; 4 Mylne & C. 377; In re Gaffee, 1 Macn. & G. 541; Hastie v. Hastie, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 304 (agreement to settle); Viret v. Viret, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 365, note (the same); Coatney v. Hopkins, 14 W. Va. 338; Radford v. Carwile, 13 W. Va. 572; Bank of Greensboro'v. Chambers, 30 Gratt. 202, 32 Am. Rep. 661; Herring v. Wickham, 29 Gratt. 628, 26 Am. Rep. 405; Brown v. Foote, 2 Tenn. Ch. 255; Reynolds v. Brandon, 3 Heisk. 593; Head v. Temple, 4 Heisk. 34; Wallace v. Wallace, 82 Ill. 530; Tucker's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 354; Hardy v. Holly, 84 N. C. 661; Caulk v. Fox, 13 Fla. 148.e

Post-nuptial agreements and settlements.—The question in most cases is, whether they are valid as against creditors of the husband:⁴ Warden v. Jones, 2 De Gex & J. 76, 84; Pride v. Bubb, L. R. 7 Ch. 64; Payne v. Hutcheson, 32 Gratt. 812; Dukes v. Spangler, 35 Ohio St. 119; Sproul v. Atchison Nat. Bank, 22 Kan. 336 (a verbal post-nuptial agreement executed by a conveyance); Majors v. Everton, 89 Ill. 56, 31 Am. Rep. 65; Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225, 25 L. Ed. 908; Blakeslee v. Mobile Life Ins. Co., 57 Ala. 205; Kilby v. Godwin, 2 Del. Ch. 61; Perkins v. Perkins, 1 Tenn. Ch. 537.

Absolute gifts from the husband.—These may be conveyances of land from the husband directly to the wife, which would be nullities by the

§ 1101, (d) See, also, in re Coghlan, [1894] 3 Ch. 76; In re Haden, [1898] 2 Ch. 220; Butcher v. Butcher, 14 Beav. 222; Lee v. Lee, 4 Ch. Div. 175, 179; In re De Ros's Trust, 31 Ch. Div. 81, 88; In re Dowding's Settlements Trusts, [1904] 1 Ch. 441; In re Simpson, [1904] 1 Ch. 1.

§ 1101, (e) See Williamson v. Yager, 91 Ky. 282, 34 Am. St. Rep. 184, 15 S. W. 660; Clay v. Walter, 79 Va. 92 (valid, unless intended wife knows of guilty purpose and participates in fraudulent intent).

§ 1101, (f) See § 973. Also, Moore v. Page, 111 U. S. 117, 28 L. Ed. 373, 4 Sup. Ct. 388 (valid when no fraud); Sanford v. Finkle, 112 Ill. 146; Smith v. Bradford, 76 Va. 758 (settlement of uncollected share of estate of which husband was distributee). create a separate estate. The intention to do so, although not expressed in terms, may be inferred from the nature of the provisos annexed to the gift. The intention, how-

common law, or gifts of personalty; or they may be in the form of declarations of trust by the husband, or his assent that the earnings or other property of the wife shall be regarded as her separate estate, which assent would be equivalent to a declaration of trust. The evidence of such assent or declaration must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing:^g Graham v. Londonderry, 3 Atk. 393; Mews v. Mews, 15 Beav. 529; Grant v. Grant, 34 Beav. 623; Byam v. Byam, 19 Beav. 58; Rycroft v. Christy, 3 Beav. 238; McLean v. Longlands, 5 Ves. 71; Rich v. Cockell, 9 Ves. 369; Hoyes v. Kindersley, 2 Smale & G. 195, 197; Lloyd v. Pughe, L. R. 14 Eq. 241; L. R. 8 Ch. 88; Marshal v. Crutwell, L. R. 20 Eq. 328; Ashworth v. Outram, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 923; In re Eykyn's Trusts, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 115; Parker v. Lechmere, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 256; Linker v. Linker, 32 N. J. Eq. 174; McMillan v. Peacock, 57 Ala. 127; Helmetag v. Frank, 61 Ala. 67; Crooks v. Crooks, 34 Ohio St. 610; Loomis v. Brush, 36 Mich. 40; Majors v. Everton, 89 Ill. 56, 31 Am. Rep. 65; Thomas v. Harkness, 13 Bush, 23; Irvine v. Greever, 32 Gratt. 411. Assent to use of earnings, etc.:h McCampbell v. McCampbell, 2 Lea, 661, 31 Am. Rep. 623; Pribble v. Hall, 13 Bush, 61; Jones v. Reid, 12 W. Va. 350, 29 Am. Rep. 455; Haden v. Ivey, 51 Ala. 381; Mounger v. Duke, 53 Ga. 277; Woodford v. Stephens, 51 Mo. 443; Brookville Nat. Bank v. Kimble, 76 Ind. 195; Syracuse etc.

§1101, (g) Ogden v. Ogden, 60 Ark. 70, 46 Am. St. Rep. 151; 28 S. W. 796 (husband becomes trustee); Marshall v. Jaquith, 134 Mass. 138 (gift of personalty -- "there should be clear, satisfactory and incontrovertible evidence, not only of the gift and delivery of the property, but of the separate custody of it by the wife"); Botts v. Gooch, 97 Mo. 88, 10 Am. St. Rep. 286, 11 S. W. 42 (husband's consent that personal property given by wife's father should be separate property); Chadbourne v. Gilman, 64 N. H. 353, 10 Atl. 701 (mortgage of land by husband to wife); Miller v. Miller, 17 Or. 423, 21 Pac. 938 (conveyance of land); Thompson v. Allen, 103 Pa. St. 44, 49 Am. Rep. 116 (conveyance of real estate valid when no fraud); Templeton v. Brown, 86 Tenn. 50, 5 S. W. 441 (gift of notes); Richardson v. Hutchins, 68 Tex. 81, 3 S. W. 276; Dugger's Children v. Dugger, 84 Va. 130, 144, 4 S. E. 171 (gift of personalty); Cummings v. Friedman, 65 Wis. 183, 56 Am. Rep. 628, 26 N. W. 575 (gift of money).

§ 1101, (h) Roberts v. Walker, 101 Mo. 597, 14 S. W. 631; Bailey v. Gardner, 31 W. Va. 94, 13 Am. St. Rep. 847, 5 S. E. 636 (land purchased with her earnings subjected to payment of husband's debts). As to ownership of husband's earnings handed by him from week to week to his wife, see valuable discussion in the very recent case of Fretz v. Roth, (N. J. Eq.) 59 Atl. 676.

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ever, must be clear and unequivocal, not merely to confer the use upon the wife for her benefit, but also to exclude the husband. The doctrine was very concisely and accurately stated by Vice-Chancellor Malins in a recent case: "There must be, in a will, or in any other instrument, an intention shown that the wife shall take and that the husband shall not."^{1a} The decisions upon particular expres-

Co. v. Wing, 85 N. Y. 421; Campbell v. Bowles's Adm'r, 30 Gratt. 652 (no assent); Kidwell v. Kirkpatrick, 70 Mo. 214 (ditto).

Gifts from third persons: Graham v. Londonderry, 3 Atk. 393; Steedman v. Poole, 6 Hare, 193; Haden v. Ivey, 51 Ala. 381; Holthaus v. Hornbostle, 60 Mo. 439.

Limitations to her separate use.—These may be by conveyance or by will,—devises or legacies,—made directly to her, or to trustees for her, while she is single or during the coverture: Goulder v. Camm, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 146; In re Benton, L. R. 19 Ch. Div. 277; Bland v. Dawes, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 794; Humphrey v. Humphrey, 1 Sim., N. S., 536 (gift of income); Gurney v. Goggs, 25 Beav. 334 (ditto); Troutbeck v. Boughey, L. R. 2 Eq. 534 (ditto); Radford v. Willis, L. R. 7 Ch. 7; Austin v. Austín, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 233; Miller v. Voss, 62 Ala. 122; Robinson v. O'Neal, 56 Ala. 541; Sprague v. Shields, 61 Ala. 428; Pepper v. Lee, 53 Ala. 33; Short v. Battle, 52 Ala. 456; Grain v. Shipman, 45 Conn. 572; Gray v. Robb, 4 Heisk. 74; Buckalew v. Blanton, 7 Cold. 214; Robertson v. Wilburn, 1 Lea, 633; Morrison v. Thistle, 67 Mo. 596; Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor, 53 Mo. 444; Musson v. Trigg, 51 Miss. 172; Prout v. Roby, 15 Wall. 471, 21 L. Ed. 58. As to effect of desertion by the husband, independently of statute, see Cecil v. Juxon, 1 Atk. 278.

§ 1102, ¹ In re Peacock's Trusts, L. R. 10 Cb. Div. 490, 495, 496; Bland v. Dawes, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 794, 797; to the same effect, see Stanton v. Hall, 2 Russ. & M. 175, 180; Darley v. Darley, 3 Atk. 399; Moore v. Morris, 4 Drew. 33, 37; Massy v. Rowen, L. R. 4 H. L. 288, 301; Tyler v. Lake, 2 Russ. & M. 183, 188; Massey v. Parker, 2 Mylne & K. 174, 181; Prout v. Roby, 15 Wall. 471; Wood v. Polk, 12 Heisk. 220; Buck v. Wroten, 24 Gratt. 250; Woodford v. Stephens, 51 Mo. 443; Charles v. Coker, 2 S. C. 122. The place of the words is immaterial; they need not be in the granting clause nor in the *habendum;* the intent governs: Morrison v. Thistle, 67 Mo. 596; compare Lippincott v. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 767,

§ 1102, (a) This section is cited in Miller v. Miller's Adm'r, 92 Va. 510, 23 S. E. 891; Laufer v. Powell, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 604, 71 S. W. 549; Stiles v. Japhet, 84 Tex. 91, 19 S. W. 450; Roberts v. Stevens, 84 Me. 325, 17 L. R. A. 266, 24 Atl. 873.

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sions are very numerous, and somewhat conflicting. From a comparison of the cases it would seem that the American courts have been more liberal than the English in giving effect to language. I have placed in the foot-note some ex-

24 L. Ed. 315. In Nix v. Bradley, 6 Rich. Eq. 43, 48, the cases in which a separate estate has been created were classified as follows: 1. Where the technical words "sole and separate use," or equivalent words, are used; 2. Where the husband's rights are expressly excluded; 3. Where the wife is empowered to do acts concerning the estate, inconsistent with the disabilities of coverture. See, also, Bullock v. Menzies, 4 Ves. 798; Barrow v. Barrow, 18 Beav. 529; Blacklow v. Laws, 2 Hare, 40, 49; Radford v. Willis, L. R. 7 Ch. 7; Austin v. Austin, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 233; Nightingale v. Hidden, 7 R. I. 115; Jarvis v. Prentice, 19 Conn. 272; Stuart v. Kissam, 2 Barb. 493; Snyder v. Snyder, 10 Pa. St. 423; Tritt's Adm'r v. Colwell's Adm'r, 31 Pa. St. 228; Clevenstine's Appeal, 15 Pa. St. 495, 499; Craig v. Watt, 8 Watts, 498; Evans v. Knorr, 4 Rawle, 66; Turton v. Turton, 6 Md. 375; Brandt v. Mickle, 28 Md. 436; Carroll v. Lee, 3 Gill & J. 504, 22 Am. Dec. 350; Nixon v. Rose, 12 Gratt. 425; Lewis v. Adams, 6 Leigh, 320; West v. West's Ex'rs, 3 Rand. 373, 378; Goodrum v. Goodrum, 8 Ired. Eq. 313; Heathman v. Hall, 3 Ired. Eq. 414; Davis v. Cain's Ex'r, 1 Ired. Eq. 304; Rudisell v. Watson, 2 Dev. Eq. 430; Ellis v. Woods, 9 Rich. Eq. 19; Martin v. Bell, 9 Rich. Eq. 42, 70 Am. Dec. 200; Tennant v. Ex'r of Stoney, 1 Rich. Eq. 222, 44 Am. Dec. 213; Ballard v. Taylor, 4 Desans. Eq. 550; Williams v. Avery, 38 Ala. 115; Ozley v. Ikelheimer, 26 Ala. 332; Cuthbert v. Wolfe, 19 Ala. 373; Brown v. Johnson, 17 Ala. 232; Hale v. Stone, 14 Ala. 803; Cook v. Kennerly, 12 Ala. 42; Newman v. James, 12 Ala. 29; Williams v. Claiborne, 7 Smedes & M. 488; Warren v. Haley, 1 Smedes & M. Ch. 647; Coatney v. Hopkins, 14 W. Va. 338; Griffith's Adm'r v. Griffith, 5 B. Mon. 113; Bridges v. Wood, 4 Dana, 610; Hamilton v. Bishop, 8 Yerg. 33, 29 Am. Dec. 101; Somers v. Craig, 9 Humph. 467; Beaufort v. Collier, 6 Humph. 487, 44 Am. Dec. 321; Woodrum v. Kirkpatrick, 2 Swan, 218; Eaves v. Gillespie, 1 Swan, 128; Houston v. Embry, 1 Sneed, 480; Gardenbire v. Hinds, 1 Head, 402; Burnley v. Thomas, 63 Mo. 390, 392; Boal v. Morgner, 46 Mo. 48; Clark v. Maguire, 16 Mo. 302; Roane v. Rives, 15 Ark. 328, 330; Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Brown Ch. 16; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 679, 709-713, 732-734.^b

§ 1102, (b) Vail v. Vail, 49 Conn.
 S. W. 121; Turner v. Shaw, 96 Mo.
 52; Duke v. Duke, 81 Ky. 308; 22, 9 Am. St. Rep. 319, 8 S. W. 897.
 Noland v. Chambers, 84 Ky. 516, 2

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amples of words held to be sufficient, and of those held to be insufficient.²

§ 1102, ² Expressions held sufficient to create a separate estate.—It will be seen that some of the earlier English decisions upon the words "sole use" have been overruled. For her "sole use and disposal": Bland v. Dawes, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 794; "sole benefit": Green v. Britten, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 649; "for her own sole use and henefit absolutely": In re Tarsey's Trust, L. R. 1 Eq. 561; "sole use": Adamson v. Armitage, 19 Ves. 416 (overruled: See Massy v. Rowen, infra); "for her own use, independent of her husband": Wagstaffe v. Smith, 9 Ves. 520; "for her own use and benefit, independent of any other person": Margetts v. Barringer, 7 Sim. 482; see Glover v. Hall, 16 Sim. 568; "for her own use and at her own disposal": Pritchard v. Ames, Turn. & R. 222; "for her own sole use, benefit, and disposition": Ex parte Ray, 1 Madd. 199; Lindsell v. Thacker, 12 Sim. 178; Hobson v. Ferraby, 2 Coll. C. C. 412; "her receipt to be a sufficient discharge to the executors": Lee v. Prieaux, 3 Brown Ch. 381; Cooper v. Wells, 11 Jur., N. S., 923; "to enjoy the profits": Tyrrell v. Hope, 2 Atk. 558, 561; "to be at her disposal, to do therewith as she should think fit": Kirk v. Paulin, 7 Vin. Abr. 95, pl. 43; "according to her appointment, whether covert or sole": Lumb v. Milnes, 5 Ves. 517; "solely and entirely for her own use and benefit during her life": Inglefield v. Coghlan, 2 Coll. C. C. 247; "to be delivered to her when she should demand it": Dixon v. Olmius, 2 Cox, 414; "to her absolutely, if living apart from her husband": Shewell v. Dwarris, Johns. 172; for her "sole and separate use": Parker v. Brooke, 9 Ves. 583; for her "sole and proper use, benefit, and behoof": Miller v. Voss, 62 Ala. 122; "sole and separate use": Robinson v. O'Neal, 56 Ala. 541; to a trustee "for her use and behoof": Sprague v. Shields, 61 Ala. 428; to a trustee "for the sole use and benefit of my wife during her natural life": Blakeslee v. Mobile Life Ins. Co., 57 Ala. 205; "to her own separate use, benefit, and behoof": Pepper v. Lee, 53 Ala. 33; to her "absolutely, and in her own right," to have and to hold, etc., "for her own, separate, and absolute use and behoof forever": Short v. Battle, 52 Ala. 456; "for the sole, separate, and exclusive use, benefit, and behoof": Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor, 53 Mo. 444; to her "sole aid and behoof": Gray v. Robb, 4 Heisk. 74; conveyance to a trustee, on trust, to pay the income to a wife "for and during the joint lives of her and her husband, taking her receipt therefor": Charles v. Coker, 2 S. C. 122; bequest to a daughter, "and to no other person," and providing that "her receipt for the same shall be conclusive evidence of its payment": Brookville Nat. Bank v. Kimble, 76 Ind. 195; conveyance, in trust, "for use of his wife as if she never had been married": Garland v. Pamplin, 32 Gratt. 305; "solely for her own use": Jamison v. Brady, § 1103. What Property is Included.—Property of any kind, real or personal, and any interest therein, may be conveyed, settled, or held to the wife's separate use. Her equitable separate estate may therefore include estates in

6 Serg. & R. 466, 9 Am. Dec. 460; "for the use, maintenance, and support of": Good v. Harris, 2 Ired. Eq. 630; "to be paid to her when she is divorced from her husband or voluntarily withdraws from him": Perry v. Boileau, 10 Serg. & R. 208; "for her sole use, benefit, and behoof:" Williman v. Holmes, 4 Rich. Eq. 475, 479.°

Expressions held insufficient to create a separate estate.-"Into their own proper and respective hands, to and for their own use and benefit": Tyler v. Lake, 2 Russ. & M. 183; "for and under their sole control": Massey v. Parker, 2 Mylne & K. 174; "to pay to a married woman and her assigns": Lumb v. Milnes, 5 Ves. 517; to trustees, in trust, to pay income to a wife "to be applied by her to and for the maintenance of herself and children": Wardle v. Claxton, 9 Sim. 524; "to her use": Jacobs v. Amyatt, 1 Madd. 376, note; "for her own use": Wills v. Sayers, 4 Madd. 409; "for her own use and henefit": Roberts v. Spicer, 5 Madd. 491; "to her own use and benefit": Kensington v. Dollond, 2 Mylne & K. 184; "to her own use": Johnes v. Lockhart, 3 Brown Ch. 383, note; "only for her": Spirett v. Willows, 11 Jur., N. S., 70; "for her and their own sole and absolute use and benefit": Lewis v. Mathews, L. R. 2 Eq. 177; a devise, without trustees, to a woman, "for her sole use and benefit": Gilbert v. Lewis, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 38; the precise meaning of "sole" was determined by the house of lords in Massy v. Rowen, L. R. 4 H. L. 288, in which it was held (approving of Lord Westbury's decision in Gilbert v. Lewis) that the words, per se, have no fixed, technical meaning, like the word "separate," though from the context it might be so construed; words vesting the fee in the wife, but containing no provision excluding the husband: Paul v. Leavitt, 53 Mo. 595; "for her use and benefit": Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195, 198; "but the said gift to extend to no other person": Ashcraft v. Little, 4 Ired. Eq. 236; as to the effect of a clause that the property "is not to be liable for her husband's debts," quære, see Lewis v. Elrod, 38 Ala. 17; Gillespie's Adm'r v. Burleson, 28 Ala. 551; Young v. Young, 3 Jones Eq. 216; Martin v. Bell, 9 Rich. Eq. 42, 70 Am. Dec. 200. For further illustrations of the effect of particular expressions, see the cases cited in the last preceding note.

§ 1102, (c) See, also, Wilson v. 1075, citing cases (to daughter, Bryn Mawr Trust Co., 225 Pa. 139, "free from the debts, liabilities and 73 Atl. 1070; In re Gilbert's Estate, 230 Pa. 502, 79 Atl. 715; Travis marry").
v. Sitz, 135 Tenn. 156, 185 S. W.

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fee in land, in possession or reversion, life estates, estates for years, things in action, securities, specific chattels, or money.¹ Where a wife has a separate estate, the rents, income, and profits thereof are, of course, her separate property; and if the savings of such income are invested by her, the investment so made will also be her separate property.² In general, when land or other property is purchased by or on behalf of the wife with proceeds of her separate estate it becomes impressed with the same character.³ The wife's earnings may also, by the assent of her husband, be her separate property.⁴ While equity thus provides a separate property for a wife free from the control of her husband, still, she may so deal with it that it will lose that character. If the wife, acting without any undue influence, expressly authorize or tacitly permit her

§ 1103, ¹ As to property to be acquired in future embraced in the covenants of a settlement, see Forster v. Davies, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 133; Smith v. Lucas, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 531; Dawes v. Tredwell, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 354; Kane v. Kane, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 207.^a

§ 1103, ² Gore v. Knight, ² Vern. 535; Gage v. Lister, ² Brown Parl. C. 4; Newlands v. Paynter, ⁴ Mylne & C. 408; Humphery v. Richards, ² Jur., N. S., 432; Barrack v. McCulloch, ³ Kay & J. 110; Brooke v. Brooke, ²⁵ Beav. 342; Muggeridge v. Stanton, ¹ De Gex, F. & J. 107; Askew v. Rooth, L. R. 17 Eq. 426; but see Ordway v. Bright, ⁷ Heisk. 681.

§ 1103, ³ Justis v. English, 30 Gratt. 565; City Nat. Bank v. Hamilton, 34 N. J. Eq. 158; Beals's Ex'r v. Storm, 26 N. J. Eq. 372 (proceeds of a sale of her contingent dower); but it must clearly appear that the purchase was actually made with the proceeds of her separate estate: Joyce v. Haines, 33 N. J. Eq. 99; and where the husband was permitted to receive the income or proceeds of his wife's separate property, and he purchased land therewith in his own name, without any agreement or understanding with her that the purchase was to be for her benefit, the land so purchased did not become her separate property:^b Kidwell v. Kirkpatrick, 70 Mo. 214.

§ 1103, 4 Jones v. Reid, 12 W. Va. 350, 29 Am. Rep. 455; Pribble v. Hall, 13 Bush, 61; Haden v. Ivey, 51 Åla. 381; Kidwell v. Kirkpatrick, 70 Mo. 214; and see cases cited under the last preceding paragraph.^c

§ 1103, (a) See, also, cases cited § 1103, (c) See, also, cases cited ante, § 1101, note 1, first part.
 § 1103, (b) See, also, Bristor v.

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husband to receive the income of her separate property and apply it to his own uses and purposes, or to receive it and apply it for the benefit of the family, it will thereby cease to be her separate property and become his; she can never recall it, nor claim any reimbursement.^{5 d}

§ 1103, 5 Powell v. Hankey, 2 P. Wms. 82; Milnes v. Busk, 2 Ves. 488; Caton v. Rideout, 1 Macn. & G. 599, 601, 603; Rowley v. Unwin, 2 Kay & J. 138, 142; Gardner v. Gardner, 1 Giff. 126; Payne v. Little, 26 Beav. 1; Squire v. Dean, 4 Brown Ch. 326; Parkes v. White, 11 Ves. 209, 225; Dalbiac v. Dalbiac, 16 Ves. 116, 126; Beresford v. Archbishop of Armagh, 13 Sim. 643; Howard v. Digby, 8 Bligh, N. S., 224; 2 Clark & F. 634; Green v. Carlill, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 882 (separate property not given up); Coleman v. Semmes, 56 Miss. 321; Kidwell v. Kirkpatrick, 70 Mo. 214; Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Mass. 336; Meth. Epis. Ch. v. Jaques, 3 Johns. Ch. 77, 90-92. In Caton v. Rideout, supra, Lord Cottenham thus stated the doctrine: "A wife, having property settled for her separate use, is entitled to deal with the money as she pleases. If she directly authorizes the money to be paid to her husband, he is entitled to receive it, and she can never recall it. If the husband and wife, living together, have for a long time so dealt with the separate income of the wife as to show that they must have agreed that it should come to the hands of the husband to be used hy him (of course for their joint purposes), that would amount to evidence of a direction on her part that the separate income, which she would otherwise be entitled to, should be received by him. . . . Separate money of the wife paid to the husband, with her concurrence or by her direct authority, to be inferred from their mode of dealing with each other, cannot be recalled." The court must be satisfied that the husband has not unduly influenced the action of his wife: See Hughes v. Wells, 9 Hare, 749, 773; and see cases cited in note 5, under § 963. If the husband, without the wife's consent, or in frand of her rights, purchases land or other property, and pays for the same with her separate estate and takes the title in his own name, a resulting, or perhaps a constructive, trust will arise in her favor, so that she can follow the property: See Darkin v. Darkin, 17 Beav. 578; Scales v. Baker, 28 Beav. 91, and cases cited in note 2, under § 1037.

§ 1103, (d) Bristor v. Bristor, 101 Ind. 47; Tyson v. Tyson, 54 Md. 35 (conversion of entire amount of legacy by husband, with wife's consent); Grover, etc., Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliff, 63 Md. 496 (where husband receives money with wife's consent, no promise to repay will be implied); Hauer's Estate, 140 Pa. St. 420, 23 Am. St. Rep. 245, 21 Atl. 445 (rents). And see McLure v. Lancaster, 24 S. C. 273, 58 Am. Rep. 259, where the court held that such circumstances are to be considered

§ 1104. Her Power of Disposition.^a-The general doctrine long settled by the English court of chancery is, that a *feme covert*, acting with respect to her separate property, is competent to act in all respects as if she were a feme sole.¹ Among these incidents of substantial ownership is the jus disponendi, which is possessed and may be exercised by the married woman without her husband's assent, unless the instrument creating the separate estate contains restrictions upon the power. It is therefore well settled, that so far as the separate estate embraces personal property, money, chattels, things in action, chattels real, rents and profits of land, although no power of disposition is given to her in express terms, she may dispose of it as though she were unmarried, by acts inter vivos or by will.² Where the separate estate embraces land, the wife's power of disposition over her life estates therein has never been doubted, and her contracts to sell or to mortgage such life estates have always been specifically enforced against her.³ With respect to estates in fee settled or held to her separate

§ 1104, ¹ Peacock v. Monk, 2 Ves. Sr. 190; Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Brown Ch. 16, per Lord Thurlow.

§ 1104, ² Fettiplace v. Gorges, 1 Ves. 46; 3 Brown Ch. 8; Rich v. Cockell, 9 Ves. 369; Wagstaff v. Smith, 9 Ves. 520; Sturgis v. Corp, 13 Ves. 190; Lady Arundell v. Phipps, 10 Ves. 139; Anderson v. Anderson, 2 Mylne & K. 427; Calvert v. Johnston, 3 Kay & J. 556; Thackwell v. Gardiner, 5 De Gex & S. 58; Hodgson v. Hodgson, 2 Keen, 704; Humphery v. Richards, 2 Jur., N. S., 432; Lechmere v. Brotheridge, 32 Beav. 353; Winter v. Easum, 2 De Gex, J. & S. 272; Farington v. Parker, L. R. 4 Eq. 116.

§ 1104, ³ Stead v. Nelson, 2 Beav. 245; Wainwright v. Hardisty, 2 Beav. 363; Major v. Lansley, 2 Russ. & M. 355, 357; Newcomen v. Hassard, 4 Ir. Ch. Rep. 268, 274; Wilcocks v. Hannyngton, 5 Ir. Ch. Rep. 38; Blatchford v. Woolley, 2 Drew. & S. 204.

as evidence as to whether there has been a gift. That the husband's receipt and use of the principal of the wife's separate estate presumptively raises a trust in her behalf, is held in Heymond v. Bledsoe, 11 Ind. App. 202, 54 Am. St. Rep. 502, 38 N. E. 530.

§ 1104, (a) This section is cited in Webster v. Helm, 93 Tenn. 322, 24 S. W. 488; Hackett v. Moxley, 55 Vt. 71, 25 Atl. 898.

use, there had formerly been some doubt arising from conflicting authorities. The general rule is now established, however, that the wife's power of disposition as a feme sole extends to estates in fee in lands as fully as to life estates or to personal property.⁴ It seems to have been formerly supposed that a difference existed, in the wife's power of alienation or disposition, between the case where the property is actually held by trustees to her separate use and the case where the property is conveyed directly to herself for her sole and separate use. All notion of any such difference has been abrogated; the same power of disposition belongs equally to both these conditions or forms of the separate estate.⁵ As an incident of her general power of disposition, unless she is expressly restrained from anticipation, a married woman renders her separate property liable for a breach of trust by her trustees in

§ 1104, 4 The doubt was, whether the wife could dispose of the *corpus* of the land held in fee by her will, without an express power of appointment, or by any act *inter vivos* other than a fine or recovery, or the acknowledged deed substituted hy statute in the place of a fine or recovery. The recent decisions hold that she may thus dispose without any express power of appointment, and without her husband's concurrence or consent, either by a will or by an instrument not acknowledged under the statute: Taylor v. Meads, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 597, 604-607, per Lord Westhury; Hall v. Waterhouse, 5 Giff. 64; 11 Jur., N. S., 361; Adams v. Gamble, 12 Ir. Ch. Rep. 102; Pride v. Bubb, L. R. 7 Ch. 64; and see Cooper v. Macdonald, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 288. Where the gift to the wife's separate use extends merely to her life interest, she has no power to dispose of the entire *corpus* of the estate, and an attempted disposition of the whole fee would be invalid: Troutbeck v. Boughey, L. R. 2 Eq. 534.

§ 1104, ⁵ Where the property is actually held by trustees, she can hind or dispose of her equitable interest without their consent, unless the instrument of trust makes that consent necessary: Essex v. Atkins, 14 Ves. 542; Hodgson v. Hodgson, 2 Keen, 704. Where the property has been conveyed directly to her, if her will or transfer *inter vivos* did not convey the *legal* estate, it would certainly convey her *equitable* estate, and either her husband, or after her death her heir, would be a trustee holding the legal estate for the person beneficially entitled: Hall v. Waterhouse, 5 Giff. 64; 11 Jur., N. S., 361.

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which she has concurred, and for a breach of trust which she herself commits.⁶

§ 1105. Her Power in This Country.-Such being the rules concerning the wife's jus disponendi as now settled in England, I shall next inquire how far these or other rules have been adopted by the courts of the various American states. One or two preliminary observations are very important in determining the present condition of the law upon this subject in our own country. In the first place, in very many of the states, under modern statutes, where property is conveyed or given to the wife directly, she now takes a full separate *legal* estate therein, wholly free from the interests and claims of the husband, and has over it the power of disposition given by the statute.¹ In the second place, in New York and the other states which have adopted the same type of legislation, where lands are given to trustees upon an express trust for the benefit of a married woman, the cestui que trust acquires no estate in the trust property, and she is prohibited from aliening, charging, or binding her own interest.² With regard to the main question concerning the wife's power of disposition, there is such a divergence of opinion among the American decisions that it would be very difficult, if not in fact impossible, to formulate any general rule as established by their author-

§ 1104, 6 Davies v. Hodgson, 25 Beav. 177, 186; Crosby v. Church, 3 Beav. 485; Mant v. Leith, 15 Beav. 524; Hanchett v. Briscoe, 22 Beav. 496; Brewer v. Swirles, 2 Smale & G. 219; Jones v. Higgins, L. R. 2 Eq. 538; Clive v. Carew, 1 Johns. & H. 199; Pemberton v. McGill, 1 Drew. & S. 266; but the *future income* of such property is not so liable: Clive v. Carew; Pemberton v. McGill; Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483, 488; it may also be liable for her actual fraud: See Sharpe v. Foy, L. R. 4 Ch. 35.

§ 1105, 1 See ante § 1099, note 2. In many states this statutory power is absolute, as though she were unmarried.

§ 1105, ² See ante, §§ 1003-1005. Express trusts in personal property for the separate use of wives seem to be left under the operation of the doctrines of equity.

ity.³ It may be doubtful whether in any single state all the conclusions reached by the English courts have been accepted without limitation or modification. The American states may be broadly separated into two generic classes; the decisions which mark the existence of these classes differ not in any matters of detail, but in the underlying principle. In the *first* class, the courts have accepted the principle of the English doctrine. They regard the wife's jus disponendi as resulting from the fact of an equitable separate estate over which she is, partially at least, a feme sole, and not as resulting from the permissive provisions of the instrument creating such separate estate. It follows, therefore, where the instrument creating the separate estate imposes no express restrictions, that the wife has a general power of disposing or charging it, even though no such authority is in terms conferred. This power of disposition, however, does not generally extend to the corpus of the land held for her separate use in fee; it is confined to personal property, the rents and profits of the land, and perhaps to her life estates in lands.^{4 a} In the states com-

§ 1105, 3 Indeed, in some instances it would be a difficult task to reconcile the decisions made by the courts of the same state. In several of the states the courts seem to have regarded the wife's separate property, instead of rendering her a *feme sole* with respect to its use, as depriving her of all rights of ownership except the single one of enjoying its income. These judges have forgotten that a nominal ownership, without any of the rights incident to ownership, without the power of aliening, managing, or in any way binding the property, is in reality no ownership. A wife holding a so-called separate estate, but whose hands are tied, and who is completely debarred from dealing with it, from obtaining credit upon it, and from using it in the affairs of life, is actually in a worse position than the wife under the operation of common-law rules, whose property is subject to the control and disposition of her hushand.

§ 1105, 4 In very many of the cases the power of disposition is discussed in connection with the power to bind the separate estate by her contracts or debts. In some decisions the two powers are treated as one and the same,—the same in extent, and subject to the same limitations. In

§1105, (a) The text is quoted in Cameron v. Hicks, 141 N. C. 21, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 407, 53 S. E. 728. posing the *second* class, the courts have widely departed from the principle of the English doctrine. They regard the wife's power over her separate estate as resulting, not from the existence of an equitable separate estate itself, but from the permissive provisions of the instrument creating such estate. They have accordingly adopted the general

others, a distinction seems to be drawn, and the power of disposing regarded as narrower or subject to greater restrictions than that of binding by contract. The recent case of Radford v. Carwile, 13 W. Va. 572, furnishes an excellent illustration of this first class, and I briefly state the points which it decides: "A married woman, as to the property settled to her separate use, is regarded as a feme sole, and has a right to dispose of all her separate personal estate, and the rents and profits of her real estate accruing during coverture, as if she were a feme sole, unless restrained by the instrument creating the estate. The restraint upon the power of alienating the property settled to her separate use must beequivalent to an express restraint; it will not be implied from her being authorized to dispose of the property in a particular manner. The jus disponendi and the liability to payment of all debts incurred are incidents of her separate estate, and can only be taken away or limited by express words, or by an intent so clear as to be equivalent to express words. But these incidents extend no further than to all her separate personal property, and the rents and profits of her separate real estate accruing during coverture. The corpus of her separate real estate is in no manner affected by the equitable doctrine of a separate estate." The following states may all be properly placed in this first class. It should be observed, however, that in some of them the general doctrine of the text is adopted only to a partial extent, and with limits which do not exist in other states. In a few instances the decisions are directly conflicting, the later cases adopting the doctrine which was rejected by the earlier. The decided cases in each state should be separately examined. Vermont: To a partial extent, and as applied to contracts: Frary v. Booth, 37 Vt. 78; Caldwell v. Renfrew, 33 Vt. 213; Dale v. Robinson, 51 Vt. 20, 31 Am. Rep. 669; Connecticut:b Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn. 146. New York: Jaques v. Meth. Epis. Ch., 17 Johns. 548, 8 Am. Dec. 447; overruling decision of Chancellor Kent in 3 Johns. Ch. 77; Dyett v. North Am. Coal Co., 20 Wend. 570, 32 Am. Dec. 598; 7 Paige, 9, 14; Powell v. Murray, 2 Edw. Ch. 636, 643; Alhany F. Ins. Co. v. Bay, 4 N. Y. 9; Wadhams v. Am. Home etc. Soc.,

§ 1105, (b) Connecticut: Stafford may be conveyed by her with con-Sav. Bank v. Underwood, 54 Conn. sent of husband). 2, 4 Atl. 248 (wife's real property rule that a married woman has only those powers of disposing or charging her separate property which are ex-

12 N. Y. 415. The following cases, as well as some of the preceding, relate particularly to contracts: Gardner v. Gardner, 7 Paige, 112, 116; Knowles v. McCamly, 10 Paige, 342, 346; Cumming v. Williamson, 1 Sand. Ch. 17, 25; Curtis v. Engel, 2 Sand. Ch. 287, 289; Mallory v. Vanderheyden, 3 Barb. Ch. 10; 1 N. Y. 452, 462; Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265, 72 Am. Dec. 503; 22 N. Y. 450, 78 Am. Dec. 216; Dickerman v. Abrahams, 21 Barb. 551; Coon v. Brook, 21 Barb. 546. Under the present statutes of New York these questions can seldom arise. New Jersey: c Leaveraft v. Hedden, 4 N. J. Eq. 512, 551; Perkins v. Elliott, 23 N. J. Eq. 526; Peake v. La Baw, 21 N. J. Eq. 269, 282; Homeopathie Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 32 N. J. Eq. 103. Delaware: Kilby v. Godwin, 2 Del. Ch. 61. Maryland: Buchanan v. Turner, 26 Md. 1, 5; Cooke v. Husbands, 11 Md. 492, overruling earlier cases. Virginia: The doctrine of the text is adopted with limitations; great weight seems to be given to the instrument creating the separate property; the wife's power of disposition is confined to personal property and rents and profits: Bank of Greensboro' v. Chambers, 30 Gratt. 202, 32 Am. Rep. 661; Justis v. English, 30 Gratt. 565; McChesney v. Brown's Heirs, 25 Gratt. 393; Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt. 503, 94 Am. Dec. 478; Nixon v. Rose, 12 Gratt. 425; Vizonneau v. Pegram, 2 Leigh, 183.^d West Virginia: Coatney v. Hopkins, 14 W. Va. 338; Radford v. Carwile, 13 W. Va. 572; Patton v. Merchants' Bank, 12 W. Va. 587. North Carolina: Newlin v. Freeman, 4 Ired. Eq. 312; Harris v. Harris, 7 Ired. Eq. 111, 53 Am. Dec. 393; but see Hardy v. Holly, 84 N. C. 661. Georgia: Dallas v. Heard, 32 Ga. 604; Robert v. West, 15. Ga. 122; Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195, 200; Wylly v. Collins, 9 Ga. 223. Florida: To a partial extent: Lewis v. Yale, 4 Fla. 418. Alabama: Miller v. Voss, 62 Ala. 122; Sprague v. Shields, 61 Ala. 428; McMillan v. Peacock, 57 Ala. 127; Blakeslee v. Mobile Life Ins. Co., 57 Ala. 205; Robinson v. O'Neal, 56 Ala. 541; Short v. Battle, 52 Ala. 456; Denechaud v. Berrey, 48 Ala. 591; Glenn v. Glenn, 47 Ala. 204; Ozley v. Ikelheimer.

§1105, (e) New Jcrsey.—Union Brick, etc., Co. v. Lorillard, 44 N. J. Eq. 1, 13 Atl. 613 (may contract to sell her real estate).

§ 1105, (d) Virginia.—Later decisions seem to place Virginia more clearly in the first class. Thus it is held that a grant of special power to dispose of her estate in a particular manner does not, in general, divest her of power to dispose of it in any other manner: Smith v. Fox's Adm'r, 82 Va. 763, 1 S. E. 200; and see, in general, Finch v. Marks, 76 Va. 207; Averett v. Lipscombe, 76 Va. 404; Bailey v. Hill, 77 Va. 492 (power to sell and reinvest does not include power to mortgage); Christian v. Keen, 80 Va. 369; Green v. Claiborne, 83 Va. 386, 5 S. E. 376; Chapman v. Price, 83 Va. 392, 11 S. E. 879.

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pressly or by necessary construction conferred upon her in the instrument conveying the property or creating the trust, and that in determining the extent of these powers the terms of the instrument are to be strictly construed.⁵ k

26 Ala. 332; Jenkins v. McConico, 26 Ala. 213; Bradford v. Greenway, 17 Ala. 797, 805, 52 Am. Dec. 203. Arkansas: Collins v. Wassell, 34 Ark. 17. Missouri: Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor, 53 Mo. 444; Kimm v. Weippert, 46 Mo. 532, 2 Am. Rep. 541; Whitesides v. Cannon, 23 Mo. 457; Segond v. Garland, 23 Mo. 547; Coats v. Robinson, 10 Mo. 757. Kentucky: Burch v. Breckinridge, 16 B. Mon. 482, 63 Am. Dec. 553; Lillard v. Turner, 16 B. Mon. 374; Bell v. Kellar, 13 B. Mon. 381; Coleman v. Wooley's Ex'r, 10 B. Mon. 320. Minnesota: Pond v. Carpenter, 12 Minn. 430. California: Miller v. Newton, 23 Cal. 554. District of Columbia: Smith v. Thompson, 2 McAr. 291, 29 Am. Rep. 621.^g

§ 1105, ⁵ According to this theory, not only the existence, but the nature, extent, and mode of exercise of the wife's powers, are to he determined by the affirmative provisions of the instrument creating her separate property. This remarkable deviation from the general doctrine of equity jurisprudence seems to have been first made by the courts of South Carolina, and was followed by the courts of the other states which constitute the second class, viz.: *Rhode Island*: Metcalf v. Cook, 2 R. I. 355; but see Ives v. Harris, 7 R. I. 413. New Hampshire: Cutter v. Butler, 25 N. H. 343, 57 Am. Dec. 330. Pennsylvania:^h Maurer's Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 380;

§1105, (e) Arkansas.—Rudd v. Peters, 41 Ark. 177 (may deal with property as *feme sole*); Petty v. Grisard, 45 Ark. 117.

§1105, (1) Missouri.—Richardson v. De Giverville, 107 Mo. 422, 28 Am. St. Rep. 426, 17 S. W. 974.

§ 1105, (5) Tennessee now belongs to the first class. In Webster v. Helm, 93 Tenn. 322, 24 S. W. 488, the court says: "In one of the two principal classes of cases it has been held that she has no power of disposition, except that clearly given by the terms of the instrument ereating the estate; while in the other the ruling has been that she has every power of disposition except such as may have been withheld expressly or by necessary implication. After some fluctuation, the latter is now the prevailing doctrine in Tennessee, as it is in England, where the wife's separate estate had its origin." In Bank of Shelby v. James, 95 Tenn. 8, 30 S. W. 1038, it was held that restraint was necessarily implied under the circumstances.

§ 1105, (h) Pennsylvania. — Mac-Connell v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. St. 476, 19 Atl. 306 ("The rule is now well settled that neither the *feme covert*, nor her husband, nor both together, have any powers over her separate estate, except what are given by the

§ 1105, (k) The text is quoted in Cameron v. Hicks, 141 N. C. 21, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 407, 53 S. E. 728. § 1106. Disposition Under a Power of Appointment.— If a married woman has a life estate in property to her separate use, and is also clothed with a general power of appointment over the *corpus* of the property, which in default of an appointment by her goes to other persons, and she exercises the power, the appointed property is not thereby made applicable to the payment of her debts, excepting only those which are fraudulent,—that is, her lia-

Hepburn's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 468; Wells v. McCall, 64 Pa. St. 207; Jones's Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 369; McMullin v. Beatty, 56 Pa. St. 389; Shonk v. Brown, 61 Pa. St. 320; Penn. Co. for Ins. v. Foster, 35 Pa. St. 134; Wright v. Brown, 44 Pa. St. 224; Rogers v. Smith, 4 Pa. St. 93; Lyne's Ex'r v. Crouse, 1 Pa. St. 111; Wallace v. Coston, 9 Watts, 137; Thomas v. Folwell, 2 Whart. 11, 16, 30 Am. Dec. 230; Lancaster v. Dolan, 1 Rawle, 231, 18 Am. Dec. 625. Maryland (the earlier cases): Miller v. Williamson, 5 Md. 219; Tarr v. Williams, 4 Md. Ch. 68. These cases are overruled hy subsequent decisions: See last preceding note. Virginia: Some of the most recent decisions incline towards the doctrine adopted by this class (see last note). North Carolina:¹ Hardy v. Holly, 84 N. C. 661 (for earlier cases see the last note). South Carolina: Ewing v. Smith, 3 Desaus. Eq. 417, 5 Am. Dec. 557 (the leading case of this class); Oliver v. Grimball, 14 S. C. 556; Porcher v. Daniel, 12 Rich. Eq. 349; Adams v. Mackey, 6 Rich. Eq. 75; Reid v. Lamar, 1 Strob. Eq. 27, 37; Magwood v. Johnston, 1 Hill Eq. 228; Robinson v. Ex'rs of Dart, Dud. Eq. 128, 31 Am. Dec. 569. Mississippi: Doty v. Mitchell, 9 Smedes & M. 435, 447; Montgomery v. Agricultural Bank, 10 Smedes & M. 566, Armstrong v. Stovall, 26 Miss. 575; Musson v. Trigg, 51 Miss. 172. Tennessee: ^J Hix v. Gosling, 1 Lea, 560; Robertson v. Wilburn, 1 Lea, 635; Brown v. Foote, 2 Tenn. Ch. 253; Cheatham v. Huff, 2 Tenn. Ch. 616; Reynolds v. Brandon, 3 Heisk. 593; Head v. Temple, 4 Heisk. 34; Gray v. Robb, 4 Heisk. 74; Kirby v. Miller, 4 Cold. 3; Ware v. Sharp, 1 Swan, 489; Marshall v. Stephens, 8 Humph. 159, 173, 47 Am. Dec. 601; but see Young v. Young, 7 Cold. 461. Ohio (partially): Machir v. Burroughs, 14 Ohio St. 519. Illinois: Wallace v. Wallace, 82 Ill. 530; Bressler v. Kent, 61 Ill. 426, 14 Am. Rep. 67; overruling Young v. Graff, 28 Ill. 20;

trust instrument, and that even these must be strictly construed"); In re Quinn's Estate, 144 Pa. St. 444, 22 Atl. 965.

§ 1105, (1) North Carolina.—Clayton v. Rose, 87 N. C. 106. See, also, Cameron v. Hicks, 141 N. C. 21, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 407, 53 S. E. 728, reviewing the North Carolina cases. § 1105, (i) *Tennessee* now belongs to the first class: Webster v. Helm, 93 Tenn. 322, 24 S. W. 488. See, also, cases cited under notes to first class. bilities arising from fraud.^{1 a} When the *jus disponendi* is conferred by means of a power,—that is when the wife has only a life estate to her separate use, with power to appoint the principal of the fund or the *corpus* of the property,—she can only dispose of such capital or *corpus* through an execution of the power by an appointment.²

§ 1107. Restraint upon Anticipation.—The large powers of dealing with her separate property as though she were single, thus given to the wife by the English courts of equity, tended in some degree to defeat the very object for which a separate estate is created. Since the wife had full power to dispose of, charge, or bind her separate property for the benefit of her husband as well as of herself or others, and since she was necessarily exposed to the moral influence of her husband, there was danger lest her separate estate should virtually be as much under his control and

Cookson v. Toole, 59 Ill. 515; Carpenter v. Mitchell, 50 Ill. 470; Rogers v. Higgins, 48 Ill. 211; Cole v. Van Riper, 44 Ill. 58; Swift v. Castle, 23 Ill. 209.

§ 1106, ¹ It is a settled doctrine of the English equity that, under the same circumstances, where the power is held and exercised by a man, the appointed property is liable for his debts. The different rule in case of a married woman is based upon the distinction between a "power" and "property." A power of appointment conferred on a married woman is not property held to her separate use: 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 690, 691; Vaughan v. Vanderstegen, 2 Drew. 165, 363; Shattock v. Shattock, L. R. 2 Eq. 182; 35 Beav. 489; Hobday v. Peters, 28 Beav. 354, 356; Blatchford v. Woolley, 2 Drew. & S. 204; but see London Bank of Australia v. Lemprière, L. R. 4 P. C. 572.

§ 1106, ² If the power authorize an appointment hy deed, its execution by her may be "immediate" during her lifetime; if by will only, then the disposition cannot take effect until after her death: See 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 690; Bradly v. Westcott, 13 Ves. 445, 451; Reid v. Shergold, 10 Ves. 370, 380; Anderson v. Dawson, 15 Ves. 532; Heatley v. Thomas, 15 Ves. 596; Richards v. Chambers, 10 Ves. 580; Sockett v. Wray, 4 Brown Ch. 483; Lee v. Muggeridge, 1 Ves. & B. 118; Nixon v. Nixon, 2 Jones & L. 416; and see Noble v. Willock, L. R. 8 Ch. 778; Bishop v. Wall, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 194.

§1106, (a) This rule is changed by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, §4 (ante, note to §1099).

liable for his debts as though no settlement to her own separate use had been made, and the property were left under the operation of common-law rules. Experience showed that this danger was actual. To obviate it, the plan was contrived of inserting in the settlement or conveyance **a** clause in restraint of anticipation, the object of which was to prevent the wife from aliening or charging her separate property, or from assigning or exercising other acts of dominion over the income until its payment was due and actually made. The experiment proved successful. The courts gave full force and effect to the clause against anticipation, and the rules concerning it became an established part of the doctrine concerning the wife's equitable separate estate.¹

§ 1108. What Words are Sufficient.—In order to constitute an effective restraint, the intention must be clear from the expressions used that the wife was to be restrained from anticipation. If such intention is shown, no particu-

§ 1107, 1 The clause is said to have been contrived by Lord Thurlow, and to have been first introduced by him into the settlement of a Miss Watson, for whom he was a trustee: Pybus v. Smith, 3 Brown Ch. 340, note 1; Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483, 487; Baggett v. Meux, 1 Coll. C. C. 138; 1 Phill. Ch. 627; Rennie v. Ritchie, 12 Clark & F. 204; Tullett v. Armstrong, 1 Beav. 1, 22; 4 Mylne & C. 390, 405; In re Gaffee, 1 Macn. & G. 541; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 713-722, 735-748, 765-772.^a As the wife's separate estate is wholly a creature of equity, the courts of equity had the power to impose upon it any limitations or restrictions, even though they might contravene the established doctrines which regulate the use of property in general. An attempt to impose such a restraint upon alienation in a conveyance to a man would, of course, be nugatory: Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429.

§1107, (a) For the history and original form of the restraint clause, see Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, [1896] App. Cas. 174, speeches of Lord Herschell and Lord Macnaghten.

In Maryland, it is held that a restraint on anticipation created by a married woman herself in contemplation of marriage was invalid against her debts contracted after marriage on the credit of her separate estate: Brown v. McGill, 87 Md. 161, 67 Am. St. Bep. 334, 39 L. B. A. 806, 39 Atl. 613. lar form of words is requisite, nor are express negative words essential.¹ In the American states which compose the first class heretofore described, the same general rule

§ 1108, 1 Moore v. Moore, 1 Coll. C. C. 54, 57; Harrop v. Howard, 3 Hare, 624; Brown v. Bamford, 1 Phill. Ch. 620; In re Sarel, 10 Jur., N. S., 876; Herbert v. Webster, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 610. The rule was very accurately stated in the recent case of Radford v. Carwile, 13 W. Va. 572: "The restraint upon her power of alienating property settled to her separate use must be equivalent to an express restraint; it will not be implied from her being authorized to dispose of the property in a particular manner. The jus disponendi, and the liability to payment of all debts incurred, can only be taken away or limited by express words, or by an intent so clear as to be equivalent to express words." The operation of this general rule can best be illustrated by examples, of which I add a few. Words and expressions held sufficient to constitute a restraint: A direction to pay the income to such person as the wife "shall, by writing, and as the same becomes due, but not by way of assignment, charge, or other anticipation, appoint": Brown v. Bamford, 1 Phill. Ch. 620; Harnett v. Macdougall, 8 Beav. 187; where the gift is of income to her separate use, not to be sold or mortgaged: Steedman v. Poole, 6 Hare, 193; Goulder v. Camm, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 146; a gift or trust to her sole and separate use with a direction that she shall not sell, charge, mortgage, or encumber the property: Baggett v. Meux, 1 Coll. C. C. 138; 1 Phill. Ch. 627; per contra, Medley v. Horton, 14 Sim. 222, is thus overruled; where the property is directed to be a separate, personal, and inalienable provision during coverture: Spring v. Pride, 10 Jur., N. S., 646; In re Sarel, 10 Jur., N. S., 876; where trustees were directed to receive the income "when and as often as the same should become due," and to pay it, etc., and that her receipts for such income after it should become due, should be valid discharges: Baker v. Bradley, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 597; Field v. Evans, 15 Sim. 375.ª Words and expressions held not sufficient: A direction to pay income to a wife as she should, from time to time, appoint, and in default of any appointment, into her proper hands for her separate use, does not create a restraint: Pybus v. Smith, 3 Browr Ch. 340; Witts v. Dawkins, 12 Ves. 501; nor a declaration that her receipts shall be, or shall alone he, good discharges: Sturgis v. Corp. 13 Ves. 190; Acton v. White, 1 Sim. & St. 429; unless there is also a direction that said receipts shall only he discharges after the income becomes due: See Baker v. Bradley and Field v. Evans, supra; nor a direction that the interest shall be paid on personal appearance and receipt: In re Ross's Trust, 1 Sim., N. S., 196; nor that it shall he for her absolute use, free

§1108, (a) See, also, Travis v. Sitz, 135 Tenn. 156, 185 S. W. 1075.

would necessarily be adopted. In the states forming the second class, however, a material modification of this rule must be made. Since the *jus disponendi* in those states is derived from the affirmative provisions of the instrument creating the separate property, the restraint upon the power of disposing or binding the property would be inferred from the whole tenor of the instrument, or from the absence of permissive language.² The subject-matter • on which the restraining clause is to operate may be any kind of property, real or personal, and any estate therein, absolute, for life, or for years.³

§ 1109. Effect of the Restraint.—The restraint, if valid, prevents the wife from doing any act, during her coverture, which would deprive her of her interest in the separate property; she can neither alien nor charge the *corpus* nor future income.¹^a With regard to the time during which

from all marital control: Symonds v. Wilkes, 11 Jur., N. S., 659; see, also, as illustrations of the general rule, Perkins v. Hays, 3 Gray, 405; Nixon v. Rose, 12 Gratt. 425; Nix v. Bradley, 6 Rich. Eq. 43; Weeks v. Sego, 9 Ga. 199.

§ 1108, ² Nix v. Bradley, 6 Rich. Eq. 43.

§ 1108, 3 Baggett v. Meux, 1 Phill. Ch. 627.

§ 1109, ¹ Horlock v. Horlock, ² De Gex, M. & G. 644; In re Sykes's Trusts, ² Johns. & H. 415; Pike v. Fitzgibbon, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 454 (not liable for her contracts); In re Ellis's Trusts, L. R. 17 Eq. 409; In re Benton, L. R. 19 Ch. Div. 277; Kenrick v. Wood, L. R. 9 Eq. 333; Clive v. Clive, L. R. 7 Ch. 433; but see Cooper v. Macdonald, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 288; In re Ridley, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 645 (restraint held void in this case). Where income of the separate property, being due, has been actually paid to the wife, the restraint clause does not prevent her from dealing with the money as she pleases. *Arrears* of income overdue are treated in the same manuer; she may assign them, but cannot, by any contrivance, anticipate income not yet due: See In re Brettle, 2 De Gex, J. & S. 79.^b

§1109, (a) This section is cited in Bank of Shelby v. James, 95 Tenn. 8, 30 S. W. 1038.

§ 1109, (b) The restraint on anticipation does not apply to arrears of income; a judgment creditor may enforce his judgment against income due at or before the date of the judgment, though it has not come into her hands or her agent's hands: Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, [1896] App. Cas. 174, reversing Loftus v. Heriot, they operate, the separate use itself and the restraint upon anticipation stand upon exactly the same principle, and are governed by exactly the same rules. Property may be given to a woman to her sole and separate use while she is single, and not in contemplation of any *particular* intended marriage, and the gift is valid in that form;² but

- restraint cannot even be overcome by making the property liable for her breach of trust or fraud: Arnold v. Woodhams, L. R. 16 Eq. 29; Clive v. Carew, 1 Johns. & H. 199; Stanley v. Stanley, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 589.°
- § 1109, ² Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 Mylne & C. 377. In Massey v. Parker, 2 Mylne & K. 174, it was held that a trust for the sole and separate use of a single woman, not in contemplation of a particular marriage, would be ineffectual, and that no separate estate would arise on her subsequent marriage. This decision, however, has been completely overruled. Partly on the authority of Massey v. Parker, and partly from peculiar views of trusts, the courts of Pennsylvania have established the rule that there can be no valid trust for the separate use of a woman unless she is married at the time of its creation, or unless it is created in expectation of an immediate intended marriage: Hamersley v. Smith, 4 Whart. 126; Snyder's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 504; In re Stirling, 11 Phila. 150; Pickering v. Coates, 10 Phila. 65; Ash v. Bowen, 10 Phila. 96; Ogden's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 501; Wells v. McCall, 64 Pa. St. 207; Springer v. Arundel, 64 Pa. St. 218.^d Similar decisions have been made in one or two other states:

[1895] 2 Q. B. 212, overruling the reasoning in Hood-Barrs v. Catheart, [1894] 2 Q. B. 559, 570, and following Pemberton v. McGill, 1 Drew. & Sm. 268; Fitzgibbon v. Blake, 3 Ir. Ch. Rep. 328; Rowley v. Unwin, 2 K. & J. 138; and Cox v. Bennett, [1891] 1 Ch. 617. It appears, however, that the judgment cannot be enforced against income which has become due after the date of the judgment: Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart, [1894] 2 Q. B. 559. A. legacy, with a restraint clause, was payable to a married woman on determination of a prior life interest. Held, the restraint ceases at the date when she is entitled to have the legacy paid to her; therefore, a covenant in her marriage settlement,

made before the testator's death, to settle after-acquired property, binds the legacy: In re Bankes, [1902] 2 Ch. 333 (citing In re Brown, 27 Ch. D. 411; In re Holmes, 67 L. T. 235).

§ 1109, (c) Nor can the restraint be overcome by virtue of an estoppel which would be binding on her in the absence of the restraint: Lady Bateman v. Faber, [1897] 2 Ch. 223, [1898] 1 Ch. 144. If she sells in violation of the restraint, return of the purchase price is not a necessary condition to disaffirmance, since that would defeat the purpose of the restraint: Travis v. Sitz, 135 Tenn. 156, 185 S. W. 1075.

§1109 (d) See, also, Carman v. Bumpns, 244 Pa. 136, 90 Atl. 544. the peculiar qualities of the separate estate do not, and cannot, exist until she is married.^e In like manner, and for the same reason, since they are inseparable, the restraint upon anticipation or upon the *jus disponendi* can only operate during coverture. If, therefore, she is single at the time of the gift of a separate estate with restraint upon anticipation, or if she becomes so afterwards, during the time when she is single or is a widow, she may alienate, dispose of, or charge the property, entirely irrespective of the clause of restraint. Her power over the property will then depend, not in the least upon the special clause of restraint, but upon the general nature of her estate in it, and of the trust upon which it is held.^{3 f} It is also settled that unless

See Lindsay v. Harrison, 8 Ark. 302, 311; Apple v. Allen, 3 Jones Eq. 120; but see Bridges v. Wilkins, 3 Jones Eq. 342. The doctrine of the text has, however, been generally followed in this country: See cases *infra*, under note.

§ 1109, 3 These positions are now thoroughly settled by the English cases: Tullett v. Armstrong, 1 Beav. 1, 22; 4 Mylne & C. 377, 392; In re Gaffee, 1 Macn. & G. 541, 547; Barton v. Briscoe, Jacob, 603; Wright v. Wright, 2 Johns. & H. 647, 655; Buttanshaw v. Martin, Johns. 89; Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Russ. & M. 197; Brown v. Foote, 2 Tenn. Ch. 255; Hepburn's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 468. The doctrine was stated by the master of rolls in Tullett v. Armstrong, supra, as follows: "If the gift be made for her sole and separate use, without more, she has, during her coverture, an alienable estate independent of her husband. If the gift be made for her sole and separate use, without power to alienate, she has, during the coverture, the present enjoyment of an inalienable estate independent of her husband. In either of these cases she has, when discovert, a power of alienation; the restraint is annexed to the separate estate only. and the separate estate has its existence only during coverture; whilst the woman is discovert, the separate estate, whether modified by restraint or not, is suspended, and has no operation, though it is capable of arising upon the happening of a marriage. The restriction cannot be considered distinctly from the separate estate, of which it is only a modification; to

§1109, (e) The text is quoted in Travis v. Sitz, 135 Tenn. 156, 185 S. W. 1075.

§ 1109, (f) That a conveyance in trust to the separate use of a married woman creates an active trust, not within the Statute of Uses, but that the title vests absolutely in the widow upon the death of the husband, is held in Temple v. Ferguson, 110 Tenn. 84, 100 Am. St. Rep. 791, 72 S. W. 455.

clearly restricted to one coverture, the clause in restraint of anticipation annexed to a gift of property to the separate use of a woman will operate upon all her covertures and be effectual, unless it be destroyed by her own act in alienating or dealing with the property while she is discovert, that is, before marriage or during widowhood.⁴ The clause in restraint, however, like the trust itself for separate use, may be confined in its operation to a particular coverture, but the words must be clear and unequivocal.⁵ The same rules have generally, though not uniformly, been adopted by the courts of this country.⁶ It follows, as a necessary

say that the restriction exists is saying no more than that the separate estate is so modified. . . If there be no separate estate, there can be no such restriction as that which is now under consideration. The separate estate may, and often does, exist without the restriction, but the restriction has no independent existence; when found, it is a modification of the separate estate, and inseparable from it."

§ 1109, 4 Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 Mylne & C. 377; 1 Beav. 1; In re Gaffee, 1 Macn. & G. 541; Scarborough v. Borman, 4 Mylne & C. 378; Anderson v. Anderson, 2 Mylne & K. 427; Hawkes v. Hubback, L. R. 11 Eq. 5; Newlands v. Paynter, 4 Mylne & C. 408.

§ 1109, ⁵ In re Gaffee, 1 Macn. & G. 541, 545; Moore v. Morris, 4 Drew.
33; Hawkes v. Hubback, L. R. 11 Eq. 5.

§ 1109, 6 The decisions are few, but they generally have followed the doctrine that the restraint upon anticipation operates during a second or subsequent coverture, unless destroyed by the act of the woman while discovert: Shirley v. Shirley, 9 Paige, 363; Waters v. Tazewell, 9 Md. 291; Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 195, 197; Robert v. West, 15 Ga. 122; Staggers v. Matthews, 13 Rich. Eq. 142, 154; Nix v. Bradley, 6 Rich. Eq. 43; Fellows v. Tann, 9 Ala. 999; Beaufort v. Collier, 6 Humph. 487, 44 Am. Dec. 321; Brown v. Foote, 2 Tenn. Ch. 255. In Pennsylvania and the few states which adopt the peculiar theory described in a previous note, the restraint only operates during the single marriage for which the separate use was originally created: Hamersley v. Smith, 4 Whart. 126; Kuhn v. Newman, 26 Pa. St. 227; Dubs v. Dubs, 31 Pa. St. 149; Freyvogle v. Hughes, 56 Pa. St. 228; Hepburn's Appeal, 65 Pa. St. 468; Bush's Appeal, 33 Pa. St. 85; McKee v. McKinley, 33 Pa. St. 92; Lindsay v. Harrison, 8 Ark. 302, 311; Miller v. Bingham, 1 Ired. Eq. 423, 36 Am. Dec. 58; Apple v. Allen, 3 Jones Eq. 120;^g and see cases ante, in note 5, under § 1105.

§1109, (5) See, also, Carman v. Bumpus, 244 Pa. 136, 90 Atl. 544.

§ 1109

SEPARATE ESTATE OF MARRIED WOMEN. § 1110

consequence from the foregoing conclusions, that where property has been given to the sole and separate use of a woman, even coupled with a restraint against alienation, she may, before her marriage or during her widowhood, terminate both the separate use and the restraint, either by disposing of the property and investing its proceeds in a new form, or by settling the property in a different manner at her marriage.⁷ A court of equity, however, has no power to disregard the restraint, nor to release a married woman from its operation, however beneficial that course might be in any particular case.⁸

§ 1110. End of the Separate Estate—Its Devolution on the Wife's Death.—The trust for the wife's separate use, like the restraint upon alienation, may be terminated before the coverture or after it ends, by her dealings with the property, as by disposing of it, and investing the proceeds in other property.¹ The adultery of the wife will not, in the absence of statute, affect her rights to property settled to her own separate use.² When a married woman holding a separate estate dies without making a disposition by will, it will devolve, subject to the future limitations, if any, in the settlement, in the same manner and to the same successors as her legal estates and her other equitable estates. In the absence of statutory regulations, the real estate in fee descends to her heirs, subject to the husband's life in-

§ 1109, 7 Wright v. Wright, 2 Johns. & H. 647, 655; Campbell v. Bainbridge, L. R. 6 Eq. 269; Brown v. Foote, 2 Tenn. Ch. 255.

§ 1109, 8 Robinson v. Wheelwright, 21 Beav. 214; 6 De Gex, M. & G. 535; In re Gaskell's Trusts, 11 Jur., N. S., 780; but see Sanger v. Sanger, L. R. 11 Eq. 470, decided under a statute.

§ 1110, ¹ See last preceding paragraph, and cases cited in note.

§ 1110, ² Seagrave v. Seagrave, 13 Ves. 439, 443; Evans v. Carrington, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 481; Duncan v. Campbell, 12 Sim. 616; and in the absence of statute it seems the rights of the husband under a marriage settlement are not forfeited or destroyed by a divorce procured by the wife, which could only be for the husband's adultery: Fitzgerald v. Chapman, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 563; Burton v. Sturgeon, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 318; per contra, Swift v. Wenman, L. R. 10 Eq. 15; Fussell v. Dowding, L. R. 14 Eq. 421.

terest as tenant by the curtesy; the cash, personal chattels, and chattels real will belong to the husband *juri mariti*; while the things in action will devolve upon him as her administrator.³ a

§ 1111. Pin-money.—Pin-money is a yearly allowance given by a marriage settlement, made by the husband to the wife, for the purchase of her clothes or ornaments, or for her other *personal* expenditure. Gifts or payments made by the husband to the wife, from time to time, after marriage, for the *same purposes*, are also treated as pin-money. Pin-money resembles the wife's separate estate in one feature, that she uses and disposes of it herself; it differs from her separate estate in not being an absolute gift to her own use, and in not being free from the *jus mariti*. The only object of pin-money is personal expenditure; the wife is not entitled to have her personal expenses otherwise defrayed by her husband, without drawing upon the pin-money fund, and then to demand payment of its arrears as a debt due to her from him or from his estate.¹

§ 1110, ³ Roberts v. Dixwell, 1 Atk. 607; Pitt v. Jackson, 2 Brown Ch. 51; Morgan v. Morgan, 5 Madd. 408; Follett v. Tyrer, 14 Sim. 125; Harris v. Mott, 14 Beav. 169; Appleton v. Bowley, L. R. 8 Eq. 139; Molony v. Kennedy, 10 Sim. 254; Johnstone v. Lumb, 15 Sim. 308; Proudley v. Fielder, 2 Mylne & K. 57; Musters v. Wright, 2 De Gex & S. 777; Stewart v. Stewart, 7 Johns. Ch. 229; Donnington v. Mitchell, 2 N. J. Eq. 243; Cooney v. Woodburn, 33 Md. 320. These common-law rules concerning succession have been greatly modified in many of the states, especially concerning the husband's rights as his wife's successor. In each state, the statutory regulations will, of course, govern.

§ 1111, ¹ The leading case upon this subject, in which most of the rules concerning it are laid down, is Howard v. Digby, 8 Bligh., N. S., 224, 245,

§ 1110, (a) Johnson v. Prairie, 91 N. C. 159; Meacham v. Bunting. 156 Ill. 586, 47 Am. St. Rep. 239, 28 L. R. A. 618, 41 N. E. 175. ("If it appears that the grantor intended to exclude the husband from the curtesy, courts will give effect to that intention. But the husband can be deprived of his marital rights only when the intention to do so clearly appears.") See, also, Donovan v. Griffith, 215 Mo. 149, 128 Am. St. Rep. 458, 15 Ann. Cas. 724, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 825, 114 S. W. 621 (husband entitled to curtesy); Travis v. Sitz, 135 Tenn. 156, 185 S. W. 1075 (same). § 1112. The Wife's Paraphernalia.—The wife's paraphernalia include the wearing apparel and ornaments given to her by her husband, reasonably suitable to her condition in society, with the express design of being worn by her as clothing, or as her own personal ornaments.^{1a} Parapher-

265-269; 2 Clark & F. 634; and see 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 729. Pin-money does not include the purchase of jewels, nor the cost of maintaining the house, grounds, carriage, and the like, but only the wife's current personal expenses. The wife is not liable to account for its expenditure; and if she fulfills the duty of applying it to her dress and other personal expenses, she is entitled to any surplus remaining out of what has been actually paid to her: Jodrell v. Jodrell, 9 Beav. 45; Howard v. Digby, supra; if the husband has actually paid or provided for all her personal expenses, she cannot claim any arrears from his estate at his death: Fowler v. Fowler, 3 P. Wms. 353, 355; Thomas v. Bennet, 2 P. Wms. 347; Howard v. Digby; except that, when he had not made the stipulated payments, and on her demanding them he had promised to pay them in full, she may claim all the arrears from his estate: Ridout v. Lewis, 1 Atk. 269; Foss v. Foss, 15 Ir. Ch. Rep. 215; Edgeworth v. Edgeworth, 16 Ir. Ch. Rep. 348; as a general rule she cannot claim more than the arrears for one year: Lord Townshend v. Windham, 2 Ves. Sr. 1, 7; Peacock v. Monk, 2 Ves. Sr. 190; Aston v. Aston, 1 Ves. Sr. 264, 267; Howard v. Digby, supra; finally, her own representatives have no claim for arrears upon the husband or his estate: Howard v. Digby.

§ 1112, 1 See Graham v. Londonderry, 3 Atk. 393; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 730, 731. Jewels and ornaments in the nature of heir-looms in her husband's family are not paraphernalia: Jervoise v. Jervoise, 17 Beav. 566, 570; Calmady v. Calmady, 11 Vin. Abr. 181, pl. 21; but where the husband makes presents to his wife of jewels, ornaments, and the like, for the purpose of being worn by her, they are considered as paraphernalia: Jervoise v. Jervoise, 17 Beav. 566, 571; Graham v. Londonderry, 3 Atk. 393, 394; see Whiton v. Snyder, 88 N. Y. 299; jewels and such articles may be given by the husband to his wife absolutely so as to become part of her separate estate, and presents which become paraphernalia should be distinguished from such gifts: Graham v. Londonderry, supra; and articles which, if given by her husband, would be paraphernalia, when given by a third person will rather be considered as her separate property: Graham v. Londonderry, supra; Lucas v. Lucas, 1 Atk. 270. The husband cannot bequeath the paraphernalia: Tipping v. Tipping, 1

§ 1112, (a) See, also, Farrow v. L. B. A. (N. S.) 389, 65 Atl. 1009 Farrow, 72 N. J. Eq. 421, 129 Am. (common-law rule has not been ab-St. Rep. 714, 16 Ann. Cas. 507, 11 rogated).

nalia are very different in their legal incidents from the wife's separate estate. While she is entitled to their possession and use, and may under some circumstances have a claim with respect to them in the nature of a debt against her husband's estate, she is not their absolute owner; she cannot dispose of them; on the contrary, her husband may dispose of them, and they are liable to the claims of his creditors.

§ 1113. Settlement or Conveyance by the Wife in Fraud of the Marriage.—By marriage at the common law the husband acquires large interests in the wife's property. Any alienation by her of her property in fraud of her husband's marital rights would therefore be set aside by a court of equity as null and void. In accordance with the commonlaw theory of marriage, and while that theory yet prevailed unmodified by statute, the doctrine on this subject was established by the English courts of equity as follows:¹

P. Wms. 729; Seymore v. Tresilian, 3 Atk. 358; but may dispose of them by gift or sale during her life: Seymore v. Tresilian, supra; they are liable to the claims of bis creditors, even though given to her before marriage: Boyntun v. Boyntun, 1 Cox, 106; Ridout v. Earl of Plymouth, 2 Atk. 104; Snelson v. Corbet, 3 Atk. 369; Campion v. Cotton, 17 Ves. 264, 273; but they are not subject to the claims of his legatees, general or specific: Graham v. Londonderry, supra. If ber paraphernalia have been pledged by her husband in his lifetime, and there are sufficient assets after payment of his debts, she is entitled to have them redeemed therewith: Graham v. Londonderry. If the paraphernalia have been used in payment of her husband's debts, she will be a creditor for their value against his personal estate, and the assets will be marshaled in her favor: Aldrich v. Cooper, 8 Ves. 382, 397; against the heir taking land by descent: Snelson v. Corbet, 3 Atk. 369; Tipping v. Tipping, 1 P. Wms. 729; and against devisees of land: Boyntun v. Boyntun, 1 Cox, 106; Incledon v. Northcote, 3 Atk. 430, 436; Tynt v. Tynt, 2 P. Wms. 542, 543; but see Ridout v. Earl of Plymouth, 2 Atk. 104; Probert v. Clifford, Amb. 6. The busband's possession of the paraphernalia at the time of his death is immaterial: Northey v. Northey, 2 Atk. 77, 79. It may be added, that as the legal title to the paraphernalia is held by the husband, he is the proper party to bring any legal action for their loss or for injury to them.

§ 1113, 1 Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes, 2 Brown Ch. 345; 1 Ves. 22; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 605, 611-617, 618-623. I add a brief abstract of the

"A conveyance by a wife, whatsoever may be the circumstances, and even the moment before the marriage, is prima facie good, and becomes bad only upon the imputation of fraud. If a woman, during the course of a treaty of marriage with her, makes, without notice to the intended husband, a conveyance of any part of her property, it should be set aside, though good prima facie, because affected with that fraud." The rules thus established by the English court of chancery have been repeatedly approved and adopted in various states of this country, where the common-law theory concerning the effect of marriage still prevailed.² a The extensive and radical changes made by

points settled by the English decisions. A woman, prior to the commencement of a marriage negotiation, may make such disposition of her property as she sees fit, and no fraud will be thereby committed upon the husband whom she finally marries; nor is it necessary that such disposition should be communicated to him: Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes, supra; Cotton v. King, 2 P. Wms. 358, 674; Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. 191, 193; England v. Downs, 2 Beav. 522. But a settlement or conveyance by the intended wife after the commencement of the negotiation for a marriage, which afterwards takes place, made without notice to her intended husband, is, in general, void as against bim, except when in favor of a bona fide purchaser for value: Goddard v. Snow, 1 Russ. 485; Lance v. Norman, 2 Ch. Rep. 79. A disposition made to a bona fide purchaser for value cannot be impeached: Blanchet v. Foster, 2 Ves. Sr. 264; Lewellin v. Cobbold, 1 Smale & G. 376. The rule is: "Deception will be inferred if, after the commencement of the treaty for marriage the wife should attempt to make any disposition of her property without her intended husband's knowledge or concurrence": Taylor v. Pugh, 1 Hare, 608, 614; Downes v. Jennings, 32 Beav. 290; Chambers v. Crabbe, 34 Beav. 457; but see St. George v. Wake, 1 Mylne & K. 610, 623; De Manneville v. Crompton, 1 Ves. & B. 354. There can be no such presumption of fraud where the intended husband assents to or has notice of the disposition: Hunt v. Matthews, 1 Vern. 408; Slocombe v. Glubb, 2 Brown Cb. 545; Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes, supra; Ashton v. McDougall, 5 Beav. 56; Wrigley v. Swainson, 3 De Gex & S. 458; Griggs v. Staplee, 2 De Gex & S. 572; Prideaux v. Lonsdale, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 433; and the husband's acquiescence to the disposition would bar any relief: Loader v. Clarke, 2 Macu. & G. 382.

§ 1113, ² Tucker v. Andrews, 13 Me. 124; Williams v. Carle, 10 N. J. Eq. 543; Robinson v. Buck, 71 Pa. St. 386; Belt v. Ferguson, 3 Grant Cas.

§1113, (a) Leary v. King, 6 Del. Ch. 108. 33 Atl. 621.

²⁵⁷⁵

§ 1114

modern legislation have rendered these rules obsolete in a majority of the states.³

SECTION II.

THE WIFE'S EQUITY TO A SETTLEMENT.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1114. General nature.
- § 1115. Extent of the wife's equity; to what property and against what persons.
- § 1116. When the equity does not arise.
- § 1117. Amount of the settlement.
- § 1118. Form of the settlement.
- § 1119. Maintenance of wife
- § 1120. Alimony,

§ 1114. General Nature.^a—The origin of this peculiar equity, as an application of the maxim, He who seeks equity must do equity, has been fully explained in a former chap ter.¹ The wife's equity to a settlement does not depend upon *her* right of property in the subject-matter, for it must be enforced for the benefit of herself and her children, and the amount is wholly discretionary with the court; it is an obligation which the court fastens, not upon the property, but upon the right to receive it,—the right of her husband

289; Duncan's Appeal, 43 Pa. St. 67; Waller v. Armistead's Adm'rs, 2 Leigh, 11, 21 Am. Dec. 594; Fletcher v. Ashley, 6 Gratt. 332, 339; Linker v. Smith, 4 Wash. 224; Logan v. Simmons, 3 Ired. Eq. 487, 494; Terry v. Hopkins, 1 Hill Eq. 1; Ramsay v. Joyce, 1 McMull. Eq. 236, 249, 37 Am. Dec. 550; McClure v. Miller, Bail. Eq. 108, 21 Am. Dec. 522; Manes v. Durant, 2 Rich. Eq. 404, 46 Am. Dec. 65; Freeman v. Hartman, 45 Ill. 57, 92 Am. Dec. 193; McAfee v. Ferguson, 9 B. Mon. 475; Cheshire v. Payne, 16 B. Mon. 618; overruling Hobbs v. Blandford, 7 Mon. 469.

§ 1113, 3 See ante, § 1099, note.

§ 1114, ¹ See ante, vol. 1, quotation from opinion of Lord Cottenham in the leading case of Sturgis v. Champneys, 5 Mylne & C. 97, 101, in note 1, under § 385; also § 389, and the numerous English and American cases cited under it.

§ 1114, (a) The text, §§ 1114- ton, 12 Mont. 122, 33 Am. St. Rep. 1120, is cited in Edgerton v. Edger- 557, 16 L. R. A. 94, 29 Pac. 966. and those claiming under him to receive it, as well as that of the wife.² The doctrine was first applied to cases only where the husband resorted to the jurisdiction of equity in order to enforce his jus mariti and reach assets belonging to his wife. Having been established in this application, it was soon extended to cases where the general assignees in bankruptcy or insolvency of the husband sought the aid of equity in reaching property of the wife; the court imposed on them the same conditions which it would impose on the husband himself.³ The next step was soon taken, and the doctrine was applied to particular assignees of the husband for a valuable consideration, whenever they attempted to enforce their assignments by a proceeding in equity.⁴ In these early stages of the doctrine, the court was always set in motion by the husband or his assignees, and it was formerly supposed that this was essential; it is now settled, however, that the wife may herself originate the proceeding, and may maintain a suit for a settlement.^{5 b} A court of equity will not, therefore, interfere with the purely

§ 1114, 2 Osborn v. Morgan, 9 Hare, 432, 434.

§ 1114, 3 Oswell v. Probert, 2 Ves. 680, 682; Dunkley v. Dunkley, 2 De Gex, M. & G. 390.

§ 1114, 4 Macaulay v. Philips, 4 Ves. 15, 19; Scott v. Spashett, 3 Macn.
& G. 599; Haviland v. Bloom, 6 Johns. Ch. 178, 180.

§ 1114, ⁵ Lady Elibank v. Montolieu, 5 Ves. 737; Ex parte Coysegame, 1 Atk. 192; Sturgis v. Champneys, 5 Mylne & C. 97; Duncombe v. Greenacre, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 509, 517; Wallace v. Auldjo, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 643; Giacometti v. Prodgers, L. R. 14 Eq. 253; 8 Ch. 338; Kenny v. Udall, 5 Johns. Ch. 464; 3 Cow. 590; Van Epps v. Van Deusen, 4 Paige, 64, 74, 25 Am. Dec. 516; Van Duzer v. Van Duzer, 6 Paige, 366, 368, 31 Am. Dec. 257; Martin v. Martin, 1 Hoff. Ch. 462, 467; Haviland v. Myers, 6 Johns. Ch. 25, 178; Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bland, 544, 20 Am. Dec. 402; Poindexter v. Jeffries, 15 Gratt. 363; but see Jackson v. Hill, 25 Ark. 223. In Duncombe v. Greenacre, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 509, 28 Beav. 472, it was held that where a legacy to a wife had been paid into the court, the wife could maintain a suit to restrain the husband's assignee from enforcing his legal remedies for the recovery of the legacy. Here it will be noticed that the subject-matter was already within the control and custody of the court.

§ 1114, (b) See, also, Salter v. 249, 4 S. E. 391; Tabor v. Tabor, 98 Salter, 80 Ga. 178, 12 Am. St. Rep. Ky. 173, 32 S. W. 414. III-162

legal rights of the husband, or of his assignees, which can be completely enforced at law, without the aid of equity, and where the property is not already in the custody or under the immediate control of the court of equity. The general doctrine may be formulated as follows: Where the husband, or some person claiming under him, is suing in equity to reach the wife's property; and where the property is already within the reach of the court,-as where it is vested in trustees, or has been paid into court, or is in any other situation which brings it under the control of the -court,-the court of equity will not grant the relief in the first instance, nor permit the property to be removed out of its jurisdiction and control in the second, until an adequate provision is made for the wife, unless special circumstances exist which defeat her right; and under a like condition of the property, the wife may herself institute a suit and obtain the relief.⁶

§ 1114, 6 Lady Elibank v. Montolieu, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 623, 639-669, 670-679; in addition to the English and American cases illustrating the general doctrine cited under § 389, vol. 1, see Duncombe v. Greenacre, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 509; Life Association v. Siddal, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 271; Smith v. Matthews, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 139; Martin v. Foster, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 98; Allday v. Fletcher, 1 De Gex & J. 82; Biddles v. Jackson, 3 De Gex & J. 544; Wallace v. Auldjo, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 643; Johnson v. Lander, L. R. 7 Eq. 228; Croxton v. May, L. R. 9 Eq. 404; Aitchison v. Dixon, L. R. 10 Eq. 589; In re Carr's Trusts, L. R. 12 Eq. 609; Giacometti v. Prodgers, L. R. 14 Eq. 253; 8 Ch. 338; Knight v. Knight, L. R. 18 Eq. 487; Ruffles v. Alston, L. R. 19 Eq. 539; In re Cordwell's Estate, L. R. 20 Eq. 644; Spirett v. Willows, L. R. 1 Ch. 520; In re Suggitt's Trusts, L. R. 3 Ch. 215; In re Lush's Trusts, L. R. 4 Ch. 591; Barnard v. Ford, L. R. 4 Ch. 247; Walsh v. Wason, L. R. 8 Ch. 482; In re Mellor's Trusts, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 127; Taunton v. Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 453; 11 Ch. Div. 779; In re Robinson's Estate, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 188; Ward v. Ward, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 506; In re Bryan, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 516; Shipway v. Ball, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 376; Pond v. Skeen, 2 Lea, 126; White v. Gouldin's Ex'rs, 27 Gratt. 491; Canby v. McLear, 13 Bank. Reg. 22; Beal's Ex'r v. Storm, 26 N. J. Eq. 372 (proceeds of sale of wife's contingent dower in her husband's lands will be secured to her); McCaleb v. Crichfield, 5 Heisk. 288; Jackson v. Hill, 25 Ark. 223; Atkinson v. Beall, 33 Ga. 153; Sabel v. Slingluff, 52 Md. 132; Moore v. Moore, 14 B. Mon. 208;

§ 1115. Extent of the Wife's Equity-To What Property and Against What Persons.-The rule is fundamental that the wife's equity does not exist where the husband is only exercising his *legal* right over the personalty of his wife's estate which vested in him by the marriage, or over his own joint life interest in her realty.¹ It only arises where the wife's interest being equitable, the property itself is originally under the control and jurisdiction of equity, or being legal, the husband or his assignees resort to courts of equity in order to enforce, protect, or perfect their claims. Realty-Estates in fee: The right extends to her equitable estates in fee, although the husband's possible estate by the curtesy will not be interfered with, and to her equitable estates in tail, with this limitation, however, that it cannot embrace the *corpus*, but only the rents, profits, and income.²

Bennett v. Dillingham, 2 Dana, 436; Coppedge v. Threadgill, 3 Sneed, 577; Phillips v. Hassell, 10 Humph. 197; Poindexter v. Jeffries, 15 Gratt. 363; Wiles v. Wiles, 3 Md. 1, 56 Am. Dec. 733; Lay's Ex'rs v. Brown, 13 B. Mon. 295; Andrews v. Jones, 10 Ala. 401; Ward v. Amory, 1 Curtis, 419, 432.º In a few states, including New Hampshire and North Carolina, the doctrine seems to have been expressly rejected. 'The modern legisla--tion in so large a portion of the American states, destroying the husband's interest in his wife's property, and making it her own separate legal estate, has, of course, taken away the very foundation for this equitable doctrine, and it has thus been rendered virtually obsolete. For this reason, I shall not attempt to give any detailed statement of its particular rules and applications.

§ 1115, 1 Warden v. Jones, 2 De Gex & J. 76, 87; Durham v. Crackles, 32 L. J. Ch. 111; Ward v. Ward, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 506; In re Bryan, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 516; Canby v. McLear, 13 Bank. Reg. 22.

§ 1115, 2 Smith v. Matthews, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 139; Life Ass'n v. Siddal, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 271; Wortham v. Pemberton, 1 De Gex & S. 644. In Life Association v. Siddal, Turner, L. J., while showing that the equity extended only to the income, and not to the corpus, of the land in such estates, laid down a fundamental rule as follows: "The equity for a settlement attaches on what the husband takes in right of the wife, and not on what the wife takes in her own right." A legacy to the wife

§1114, (c) Poulter v. Shackel, 39 Ch. Div. 471, 476 (right to settle- executor to retain the legacy for the ment out of a legacy to her is para- husband's debt to the testator).

mount to the right of the testator's

Even where the wife's estate in land is wholly legal, if the husband or his assignee comes into a court of equity as plaintiff with respect to it, and it is thus brought within the equitable jurisdiction, the wife's equity will attach and be protected.³ Terms of years: The equity extends to the wife's leasehold estates, and will be enforced against the husband and his assignees, unless her interest and his title in virtue thereof are wholly legal.⁴ Personalty—Things in action: That the equity embraces the wife's equitable personal property, and especially her things in action, unless "reduced to possession" by her husband, and will be enforced against him, and his general assignees, and even against his particular assignees for a valuable consideration, is settled beyond dispute.⁵ Life estates: It was formerly supposed that a radical distinction existed between the wife's absolute estates, and those which she held only for her life.⁶ The latest English decisions, however, have established the rule that a wife has the same equity to a settlement, as against her husband or his general assignee,

charged on lands devised to a third person is subject to her equity: Duncombe v. Greenacre, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 509.

§ 1115, ³ Sturgis v. Champneys, 5 Mylne & C. 97; see Atkinson v. Beall, 33 Ga. 153; Sabel v. Slingluff, 52 Md. 132.

§ 1115, ⁴ Hanson v. Keating, 4 Hare, 1; Clark v. Cook, 3 De Gex & S. 333; Hill v. Edmonds, 5 De Gex & S. 603.

§ 1115, ⁵ Scott v. Spashett, 3 Macn. & G. 599, 603; Barrow v. Barrow, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 782; Burdon v. Dean, 2 Ves. 607; Beresford v. Hobson, 1 Madd. 362; Ruffles v. Alston, L. R. 19 Eq. 539; In re Mellor's Trusts, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 127 (a life policy). As to the right against a particular assignee of the husband for a valuable consideration, see Earl of Salisbury v. Newton, 1 Eden, 370; Macaulay v. Philips, 4 Ves. 15, 19; Wright v. Morley, 11 Ves. 12, 16; Elliott v. Cordell, 5 Madd. 149, 156; Carter v. Taggart, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 286; 5 De Gex & S. 49; Tidd v. Lister, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 857.

§ 1115, 6 See Tidd v. Lister, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 857, 869, 870, and cases eited. It was therefore held that where she is living with and maintained by her husband, although, as she alleges, in a manner very inadequate to her fortune, she has no equity to a settlement out of her life estate: Vaughan v. Buck, 13 Sim. 404. This and similar cases which deal with her right as against her husband must be regarded as overruled. out of property in which she has only a life interest, as out of property in which she has an absolute interest; and the court will make no distinction between the two cases as regards the amount to be settled.⁷ The following general conclusions may be regarded as settled by a comparison of all the decisions: The wife's equity to a settlement out of her life estate exists against her husband while he has made no disposition of it; and against his general assignees or trustees in bankruptcy or insolvency in whom it has vested; but not against his particular assignee, to whom he has transferred it for a valuable consideration. In the latter case, however, the assignment only operates during coverture.⁸ The wife's right does not extend to her mere reversionary personal estate,⁹ nor to arrears of income accruing before she made a claim.¹⁰

§ 1116. When the Equity does not Arise.—Although the property may be such that, under ordinary circumstances,

§ 1115, ⁷ Taunton v. Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 453; see especially the observations of Malins, V. C., on p. 456, criticising the opinion of Lord Cranworth in Tidd v. Lister, *supra*; affirmed on appeal, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 779, 780, per James, L. J.; 781, per Brett, L. J.; Wilkinson v. Charlesworth, 10 Beav. 324; Koeber v. Sturgis, 22 Beav. 588; In re Ford, 32 Beav. 621.

§ 1115, ⁸ Against the husband: See Taunton v. Morris, *supra*; Wilkinson v. Charlesworth, 10 Beav. 324; Koeber v. Sturgis, 22 Beav. 588; In re Ford, 32 Beav. 621; *per contra*, Vaughan v. Buck, 13 Sim. 404, is virtually overruled. Against the husband's general assignees:^a See Elliott v. Cordell, 5 Madd. 149; Pryor v. Hill, 4 Brown Ch. 139; Ex parte Coysegame, 1 Atk. 192; Jacobs v. Amyatt, 1 Madd. 376, note; Squires v. Ashford, 23 Beav. 132. Against the husband's particular assignees for a valuable consideration: See Tidd v. Lister, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 857, 869, 870; 10 Hare, 140; Wright v. Morley, 11 Ves. 12, 22; Elliott v. Cordell, 5 Madd. 149; 1 Russ. 71, note; Stanton v. Hall, 2 Russ. & M. 175; In re Duffy's Trust, 28 Beav. 386.

§ 1115, 9 Osborn v. Morgan, 9 Hare, 432; but see In re Robinson's Estate, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 188; McCaleb v. Crichfield, 5 Heisk. 288.

§ 1115, 10 In re Carr's Trusts, L. R. 12 Eq. 609.

§1115, (a) Clark v. Hezekiah, 24 Fed. 663 (against assignce in bank-ruptcy).

the equity would attach, still the wife's own acts, conduct, or situation may prevent it from arising, or the husband's mode of dealing with the property may defeat it. The wife's equity to a settlement out of her things in action does not embrace those which the husband has fully "reduced into his own possession."¹^a If she alien or assign her property in such a manner as to *legally* bind herself, she is thereby precluded from asserting her equity as to such property.² The equity does not exist where the property is already the subject of or affected by a settlement;³ nor in general, where she is already otherwise well provided for;⁴ nor where the property is governed by a foreign law in which the equity is not recognized.⁵ The wife's own

§ 1116, 1 Purdew v. Jackson, 1 Russ. 1; Elliott v. Cordell, 5 Madd. 149; Stanton v. Hall, 2 Russ. & M. 175, 182; In re Duffy's Trust, 28 Beav. 386. What amounts to a reduction into his possession depends largely upon the circumstances of each case. Attempting no discussion of the question, I add a few cases merely as illustrations: Hornsby v. Lee, 2 Madd. 16; Ellison v. Elwin, 13 Sim. 309; Le Vassenr v. Scratton, 14 Sim. 116; Michelmore v. Mudge, 2 Giff. 183; Aitchison v. Dixon, L. R. 10 Eq. 589, 597, 598; Ex parte Norton, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 258; Allday v. Fletcher, 1 De Gex & J. 82; Widgery v. Tepper, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 423; In re Barber, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 442; Heirs of Holmes v. Adm'r of Holmes. 28 Vt. 765; Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Mass. 336; Howard v. Bryant, 9 Gray, 239; Bartlett v. Van Zandt, 4 Sand. Ch. 396; Burr v. Sherwood, 3 Bradf. 85; Needles's Ex'r v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432, 70 Am. Dec. 85; Corley v. Corley, 22 Ga. 178; Machem v. Machem, 28 Ala. 374; Lockhart v. Cameron, 29 Ala. 355; McNeill v. Arnold, 17 Ark. 154; Canby v. McLear, 13 Bank. Reg. 22 (a legacy).

§ 1116, ² It should be remembered, however, that, under the commonlaw incapacities of a married woman, her joining with her husband in an assignment of her property would ordinarily be nugatory: Williams v. Cooke, 9 Jur., N. S., 658; Tuer v. Turner, 20 Beav. 560.

§ 1116, 3 Brett v. Forcer, 3 Atk. 403; Pond v. Skeen, 2 Lea, 126.

§ 1116, ⁴ Spicer v. Spicer, 24 Beav. 365; Green v. Otte, 1 Sim. & St. 250; Giacometti v. Prodgers, L. R. 14 Eq. 253; 8 Ch. 338.

§ 1116, ⁵ A fund of money in England, the parties domiciled in Prussia: Campbell v. French, 3 Ves. 321, 323; where the fund was governed by

§ 1116, (a) This section is cited to this effect in Hart v. Leete, 104 Mo. 315, 15 S. W. 976.

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misconduct or inequitable acts will bar the right which might otherwise exist.⁶ A married woman may waive any agreement in respect of her equity, unless a fixed and certain provision for the benefit of her children would be thereby abrogated.⁷ She may, by examination and consent in court, waive her equity, and permit the property to be paid or transferred to her husband, unless she is an infant.⁸

§ 1117. Amount of the Settlement.—With respect to the amount of the fund settled upon the wife, there is no settled rule. Each case must depend upon its own circumstances. Sometimes even the whole of the fund in question is allowed to her as against assignees of the husband.¹ One half of

Scotch law; Anstruther v. Adair, 2 Mylne & K. 513; Hitchcock v. Clendinen, 12 Beav. 534; In re Todd, 19 Beav. 582; McCormick v. Garnett, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 278.

§ 1116, ⁶ Her adultery is, in general, a bar: Carr v. Estabrook, 4 Ves. 146; unless the circumstances are very special, as her want of any other means of maintenance, or her husband's adultery: See In re Lewin's Trust, 20 Beav. 378; Greedy v. Lavender, 13 Beav. 62; Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. 191; see Eedes v. Eedes, 11 Sim. 569. Her fraud is also a bar: In re Lush's Trusts, L. R. 4 Ch. 591. Her debts contracted before marriage, if unpaid, may prevent a settlement: Barnard v. Ford, L. R. 4 Ch. 247; Bonner v. Bonner, 17 Beav. 86; and see Knight v. Knight, L. R. 18 Eq. 487.

§ 1116, 7 Fenner v. Taylor, 2 Russ. & M. 190; Ex parte Gardner, 2 Ves. Sr. 671.

§ 1116, ⁸ Dimmoch v. Atkinson, 3 Brown Ch. 195; Beaumont v. Carter, 32 Beav. 586; Shipway v. Ball, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 376; the court will not take the consent of an infant wife: Stubbs v. Sargon, 2 Beav. 496; Abraham v. Newcombe, 12 Sim. 566; as to recalling a consent given by mistake or otherwise, see Watson v. Marshall, 17 Beav. 363; Penfold v. Mould, L. R. 4 Eq. 562. If a man marries an infant ward of the court without obtaining the consent of the court, the property belonging to her in custody of the court will not be paid out until a settlement is made on her, even if she should assent to such a payment: Martin v. Foster, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 98; Biddles v. Jackson, 3 De Gex & J. 544.^b

§ 1117, 1 The circumstances must be special, in order that the whole should be settled; the smallness of the fund, the entire absence of other

§ 1116, (b) See, also, § 1310, as to the marriage of infant wards.

the fund was formerly regarded as the general rule, and that amount is still generally given, in the absence of special circumstances. The later decisions declare that there is no rule; that the amount rests in the sound judicial discretion of the court, which looks at the total situation and environment of both the parties.²

§ 1118. Form of the Settlement.—There is no absolute rule applicable to all cases. In the absence of special circumstances, provision is made for the wife for her life, and on her death the fund goes to the issue, if any. On default of issue, the alternate limitation should be to the husband or wife, whichever should be the survivor. The latest decisions have settled the rule that the husband's marital rights should not be interfered with any further than is

means of support, the misconduct of the husband, his adultery, desertion, etc., have been important facts in such cases, on which the court has exercised its discretion:^a Taunton v. Morris, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 453; 11 Ch. Div. 779; Scott v. Spashett, 3 Maen. & G. 599; Gilchrist v. Cator, 1 De Gex & S. 188; Dunkley v. Dunkley, 2 De Gex, M. & G. 390; Barrow v. Barrow, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 782, 794; Gent v. Harris, 10 Hare, 383; Layton v. Layton, 1 Smale & G. 179; Smith v. Smith, 3 Giff. 121; In re Kincaid's Trusts, 1 Drew. 326; In re Cutler, 14 Beav. 220; Marshall v. Fowler, 16 Beav. 249; Watson v. Marshall, 17 Beav. 363; Francis v. Brooking, 19 Beav. 347; Duncombe v. Greenacre, 29 Beav. 578; In re Ford, 32 Beav. 621; In re Lewin's Trust, 20 Beav. 378; Johnson v. Lander, L. R. 7 Eq. 228; In re Cordwell's Estate, L. R. 20 Eq. 644; White v. Gouldin's Ex'rs, 27 Gratt. 491.

§ 1117, ² Brown v. Clark, 3 Ves. 166; Ex parte Pugh, 1 Drew. 202, 203; Carter v. Taggart, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 286, 289; Spirett v. Willows, L. R. 1 Ch. 520; In re Suggitt's Trusts, L. R. 3 Ch. 215; Giacometti v. Prodgers, L. R. 14 Eq. 253; 8 Ch. 338; Green v. Otte, 1 Sim. & St. 250; In re Erskine's Trusts, 1 Kay & J. 302; Coster v. Coster, 9 Sim. 597; Napier v. Napier, 1 Dru. & War. 407; Ex parte Pugh, 1 Drew. 202; In re Grove's Trusts, 3 Giff. 575; White v. Gouldin's Ex'rs, 27 Gratt. 491.

§1117, (n) See, also, Boxall v. Boxall, 27 Ch. Div. 220 (husband having deserted wife, capital as well as income settled); Fowke v. Draycott, 29 Ch. Div. 996 (rents being small, whole fund given); Reid v. Reid, 33 Ch. Div. 220 (on account of husband's misconduct, whole fund settled).

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necessary to protect the wife's equity for herself and her children.¹

§ 1119. Maintenance.---The power of courts of equity to compel a provision to be made for the maintenance of a married woman by her husband is somewhat analogous to that of enforcing her equity to a settlement, but still not identical; it is only exercised under special circumstances of her actual need, and then without regard to any equity to a settlement on her part; it is confined to her property, and does not extend to the property originally and exclusively belonging to the husband. If a husband has deserted his wife, leaving her unprovided for, a court of equity will order her maintenance out of her fortune, though neither settled nor agreed to be settled,-that is, although the husband's common-law rights over it remain unrestricted.1 When the husband has deserted his wife, or has by his cruelty compelled her to leave him, the court will order her maintenance out of the interest of her fortune, even though, by the marriage settlement, it was payable to him for his

§ 1118, ¹ Carter v. Taggart, ¹ De Gex, M. & G. 286; Croxton v. May, L. R. 9 Eq. 404; Spirett v. Willows, L. R. 1 Ch. 520; 4 Ch. 407; In re Suggitt's Trusts, L. R. 3 Ch. 215; Walsh v. Wason, L. R. 8 Ch. 482. Where a settlement under the wife's equity is ordered, provision will always he made for the children of the marriage: Murray v. Lord Elibank, 13 Ves. 1; 14 Ves. 496; Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Jacoh & W. 472, 475;^a and this rule includes the wife's children by any former marriage: Croxton v. May, *supra*. But where no settlement had been directed during the lifetime of the wife, her children have no independent right to enforce her equity and to claim a settlement after her death: Lloyd v. Williams, 1 Madd. 450; De la Garde v. Lemprière, 6 Beav. 344; Hodgens v. Hodgens, 4 Clark & F. 323, 372; Wallace v. Auldjo, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 643; McCaleb v. Crichfield, 5 Heisk. 288.

§ 1119, 1 Watkyns v. Watkyns, 2 Atk. 96, 98; Cecil v. Juxon, 1 Atk. 278; Guy v. Pearkes, 18 Ves. 196; Coster v. Coster, 1 Keen, 199; Newsome v. Bowyer, 3 P. Wms. 37; Nicholls v. Danvers, 2 Vern. 671; Dumond v. Magee, 4 Johns. Ch. 318, 322.

§1118, (a) See, also, Salter v. Salter, 80 Ga. 178, 12 Am. St. Rep. 249, 4 S. E. 391.

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life.² There is no jurisdiction in courts of equity to compel a husband generally to maintain his wife out of his own property or by his own labor. Such power, if it existed at all, belonged to the ecclesiastical courts, or was regulated by statute.

§ 1120. Alimony.—The subject of maintenance naturally suggests that of alimony, although the two have really nothing in common, except their being granted for the benefit of a wife. In its proper and only true sense, "alimony" is not a separate estate, nor is it a provision for maintenance generally, as described in the preceding paragraph. It is an incident of divorce; it is merely a provision for maintenance from day to day, decreed by a competent court to a wife legally separated from her husband, either by a divorce a mensa et thoro or ex vinculis. Under the judicial system originally prevailing in England, it was granted and regulated solely by the ecclesiastical courts, which had exclusive jurisdiction of divorce.¹ It is very clear that the original jurisdiction of equity did not include the power to decree alimony as an incident of divorce; nor is there any jurisdiction to grant alimony to a wife as a provision to be made by her husband for her maintenance, unconnected with proceedings for a divorce.² The American courts have

§ 1119, ² Ibid.; Oxenden v. Oxenden, 2 Vern. 493; Williams v. Callow, 2 Vern. 752; Eedes v. Eedes, 11 Sim. 569; Peters v. Grote, 7 Sim. 238. If the wife refuses to live with her husband, who is willing to receive her, or if she elopes from him, she is not entitled to any such maintenance: Bullock v. Menzies, 4 Ves. 798; Watkyns v. Watkyns, 2 Atk. 96.

§ 1120, 1 In many of the states, jurisdiction over divorce has been given by statute to the courts of equity, and the suit for a divorce is treated as a suit in equity. The jurisdiction to grant alimony as an incident of divorce may, perhaps, have been sometimes confounded with the general jurisdiction of equity. This may explain some American decisions concerning alimony eited in a subsequent note.

§ 1120, ² Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. 191, 195; Vandergucht v. De Blaquiere, 8 Sim. 315; 5 Mylne & C. 229. The only jurisdiction which the court of chancery exercises is to issue a writ of *ne exeat*, where a husband who has been ordered by the ecclesiastical court to pay alimony is about to leave the country.

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generally^a conformed to this view, and have denied the existence of any jurisdiction to award alimony as a provision for the maintenance of a wife by her husband.^{3 b} In several states; however, such a power has been asserted and exercised as belonging to the general jurisdiction of equity.^{4 c}

§ 1120, ³ Trotter v. Trotter, 77 Ill. 510; Parsons v. Parsons, 9 N. H. 309, 32 Am. Dec. 362; Pomeroy v. Wells, 8 Paige, 406; Rees v. Waters, 9 Watts, 90; Yule v. Yule, 10 N. J. Eq. 138, 143 (but see Paterson v. Paterson, 5 N. J. Eq. 389); Peltier v. Peltier, Harr. (Mich.) 19, 29; McGee v. McGee, 10 Ga. 477, 482; Fischli v. Fischli, 1 Blackf. 360, 12 Am. Dec. 251; Doyle v. Doyle, 26 Mo. 545, 549; Shannon v. Shannon, 2 Gray, 285; Sheafe v. Sheafe, 24 N. H. 564, 567; Chapman v. Chapman, 13 Ind. 396, 397; Lawson v. Shotwell, 27 Miss. 630, 633; Cory v. Cory, 11 N. J. Eq. 400; Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bland, 544, 568, 20 Am. Dec. 402; Wallingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 Har. & J. 485.

§ 1120, 4 Garland v. Garland, 50 Miss. 694; Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. 662, 15 Am. Dec. 781; Purcell v. Purcell, 4 Hen. & M. 507; Prather v. Prather, 4 Desaus. Eq. 33; Rhame v. Rhame, 1 McCord's Eq. 197, 16 Am. Dec. 597; Glover v. Glover, 16 Ala. 440, 446; Butler v. Butler, 4 Litt. 201; Logan v. Logan, 2 B. Mon. 142; Graves v. Graves, 36 Iowa, 310, 14 Am. Rep. 525; Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265; Sanderson and Sprague, JJ., dissenting. This conclusion seems to have been reached by a mistaken view as to the extent of the power to grant maintenance described in the preceding paragraph, by regarding it as including the husband's property as well as the wife's. In fact, these decisions seem to grant "maintenance" under the improper name of "alimony."

§1120, (a) Up to the year 1883, when the text was written.

§ 1120, (b) This paragraph of the text is cited in Ex parte Helmert, 103 Ark. 571, 147 S. W. 1143 (equity jurisdiction purely statutory).

§ 1120, (c) The text is cited in Hinds v. Hinds, 80 Ala. 225, following earlier Alabama cases, but admitting that the weight of authority is contra. See, also, Pearce v. Pearce, 132 Ala. 221, 90 Am. St. Rep. 901, 31 South. 85; Dye v. Dye, 9 Colo. App. 320, 48 Pac. 313; In re Popejoy, 26 Colo. 32, 77 Am. St. Rep. 222, 55 Pac. 1083; Tolman v. Tolman, 1 App. D. C. 299; Finn v. Finn, 62 Iowa, 482, 17 N. W. 739; Farber v. Farber, 64 Iowa, 362, 20 N. W. 472; Platner v. Platner, 66 Iowa, 378, 23 N. W. 764; Verner v. Verner, 62 Miss. 260; McFarland v. McFarland, 64 Miss. 449, 1 South. 508; Edgerton v. Edgerton, 12 Mont. 122, 33 Am. St. Rep. 557, 16 L. R. A. 94, 29 Pac. 966 (citing the text); Earle v. Earle, 27 Neb. 277, 43 N. W. 118; Cochran v. Cochran, 42 Neb. 612, 60 N. W. 942; Bueter v. Bueter, 1 S. D. 94, 8 L. R. A. 562, 45 N. W. 208; Milliron v. Milliron, 9 S. D. 181, 62 Am. St. Rep. 863, 68 N. W.

SECTION III.

THE CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1121. The general doctrine.
- § 1122. Rationale of the doctrine.

§ 1123. Extent of the liability.

- § 1124. For what contracts her separate estate is liable.
- § 1125. The same; the American doctrine.
- § 1126. To what contracts the American doctrine applies.

§ 1121. The General Doctrine.—At the common law the contracts of married women are absolutely void. Equity has never attempted to invade this fundamental policy of the law; it has never clothed married women with the capacity to bind themselves personally by contract. Their contracts, as recognized by equity, are only contracts *sub* modo; the indebtedness which they create is not a legal indebtedness, but only an equitable liability, enforced in a peculiar manner by courts of equity. After it was settled that a married woman might hold property as a separate estate to her own separate use, free from the claims and

286. A number of the states reach the same result by reason of statute. See monographic note, 77 Am. St. Rep. 228ff. The trend of recent cases favors the jurisdiction: Clisby v. Clisby, 160 Ala. 572, 135 Am. St. Rep. 110, 49 South. 445; Wood v. Wood, 56 Fla. 882, 47 South. 560; Taylor v. Taylor, 108 Md. 129, 69 Atl. 632; McCaddin v. McCaddin, 116 Md. 567, 82 Atl. 554; Robertson v. Robertson (Minn.), 164 N. W. 980; Rhoades v. Rhoades, 78 Neb. 495, 126 Am. St. Rep. 611, 111 N. W. 122; Cureton v. Cureton, 117 Tenn. -103, 96 S. W. 608; Lang v. Lang, 70 W. Va. 205, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1129, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 950, and valuable monographic note, 73 S. E. 716. In Tolman v. Tolman, 1 App. D. C. 299. the reason for the rule was stated as follows: "It being the duty of the husband to support his wife, his failure or refusal to do so without justification is a wrong at the common law, but inasmuch as the common law furnishes no remedy. because the wife cannot sue the husband, courts of equity will and do supply the remedy." In analogy with the above cases it is held that the statutory duty imposed upon the wife to support the husband under certain circumstances may be enforced in equity, since there is no adequate legal remedy: Livingston v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. 633, 38 L. R. A. 175, 49 Pac. 836, and Hagert v. Hagert, 22 N. D. 290, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 925, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 966. 133 N. W. 1035 (a well-reasoned opinion).

interest of her husband, for some time the common-law incapacity of contracting was still applied to her. The glaring injustice of this condition soon became apparent. To permit a wife to hold separate property to her own use, to enjoy its benefits, to deal with it in many respects as though she were a *feme sole*, and thus to be clothed with many indicia of complete ownership, but at the same time to withhold from her creditors all claim against it or against 'her, was in the highest degree inequitable. The wife might, by her own act, directly dispose of her separate estate, and for the same reasons she ought to be able to render it liable for her obligations. Influenced by these considerations, the courts of equity gradually, by progressive steps, introduced and developed the doctrine, that although a married woman can create no personal liability against herself, her separate estate may be liable for her contracts made with reference to it. Her contracts thus become equitable obligations, and may be enforced in equity against her separate estate. No other doctrine of equity jurisprudence better illustrates its wonderful freedom and power in modifying legal dogmas. Without attempting to trace 'the progress of the general doctrine through its whole course of development as it is now settled by the English courts, it is correctly formulated as follows: "If a married woman, having separate property, enters into an engagement, which if she was a *feme sole* would constitute a personal obligation against her, and in entering into such engagement she purports to contract, not for her husband [i. e., not on behalf of her husband as his agent], but for herself, and on the credit of her separate estate, and it was so intended by her, and so understood by the person with whom she is contracting, that constitutes an obligation for which the person with whom she contracts has the right to make her separate estate liable."¹a

§ 1121, ¹ Mrs. Matthewman's Case, L. R. 3 Eq. 781, 787, per Kindersley, V. C.; Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 494, 509-520, per

§ 1121, (a) This portion of the text is quoted in Filler v. Tyler, 91 Va. 458, 22 S. E. 235. § 1122. Rationale of the Doctrine.^a—It was once supposed that the doctrine was properly explained by regarding the wife's contract as in reality the execution of her power of appointment, so that the contract, being an appointment, created an equitable charge or lien in the nature of a disposition upon her separate estate. This theory has been abandoned as utterly untenable.¹ The true *rationale*

Turner, L. J. See Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Brown Ch. 16; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 679, 692-700, 703-705, 735-765, and the elaborate collection of English and American authorities in the editors' notes. It should be remarked that the doctrine is here stated in its most general form. How the wife must purport to contract on the credit of her estate, and how she must show such an intention, I do not now inquire. These requisites, however, must exist, in order that her separate estate shall be liable. Upon this point all the cases, English and American, are agreed. Whenever her separate estate is liable for her bond, note, or other written engagement, although the instrument, in terms, is her own personal obligation, and makes no reference to her separate property, this is so held because the writing conclusively implies the intention, and purports to be made on the credit of her separate estate. The marked difference between the conclusions reached by the English cases and a large class of the American decisions does not arise from any dispute as to the general doctrine, which they all alike adopt; it relates solely to the proper mode of applying this doctrine; it turns only upon the question whether the intent to deal upon the credit of her separate property must expressly appear in the very terms of the contract or from its essential nature, or whether it may be implied from the mere form of the contract as being under seal or in writing, or be inferred from the circumstances of the case.

§ 1122, ¹ Owens v. Dickenson, Craig & P. 48, 53, 54, per Lord Cottenham; Murray v. Barlee, 3 Mylne & K. 209, 223. The true *rationale* of the doctrine has been admirably explained by eminent English judges in several recent cases, and I add a few extracts from their opinions. In the very recent and most carefully considered case of Pike v. Fitzgibbon, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 454, Brett, L. J., said (p. 461): "At common law, for reasons of high social policy, a married woman is not allowed to make any contract binding upon herself or upon any property of hers; in fact, the common law did not recognize that she had any property, or could do any act binding herself. It seems to me that it is not true to say that equity has recognized or invented a *status* of a married woman to make contracts;

§1122, (a) This section is cited in Sidway v. Nichol, 62 Ark. 146, 34 S. W. 529.

of the doctrine is, that the liability of a wife's separate property for her engagements is a mere equitable incident of her separate estate, which is itself a creature of equity.^b In the language of Lord Justice James: "In equity, the liability is to have her separate estate taken from her for the benefit of a person with whom she has contracted on

neither does it seem to me that equity has ever said that what is now called a contract is a hinding contract upon a married woman. What equity seems to me to have done is this: it has recognized a settlement as putting a married woman into the position of having what is called a separate estate, and has attached certain liabilities, not to her, but to that estate. The decisions appear to me to come to this, that certain promises (I use the word 'promises' in order to show that, in my opinion, they are not contracts) made by a married woman, and acted upon by the persons to whom they are made on the faith of the fact, known to them, of her being possessed at the time of a separate estate, will be enforced against such separate estate as she was possessed of at that time, or so much of it as remains at the time of judgment recovered." In the same case, James, L. J., said (p. 460): "It is said that a married woman having separate estate has not merely a power of contracting a debt to be paid out of that separate estate, but, having a separate estate, she has acquired a sort of equitable status of capacity to contract debts, not in respect only of that separate estate, but in respect of any separate estate which she may thereafter in any way acquire. It is contended that because equity enables her, having estate settled to her separate use, to charge that estate and to contract debts payable out of it, therefore she is released altogether, in the contemplation of equity, from the disability of coverture, and is enabled in a court of equity to contract debts to be paid and satisfied out of any estate settled to her separate use, which she may afterwards acquire. In my opinion, there is no authority for that contention." In Shattock v. Shattock, L. R. 2 Eq. 182, Lord Romilly, M. R., stated the general doctrine and its rationale, as it seems to me, in a most admirable manner, accurately giving not only its grounds, but its exact extent and limits (pp. 188, 189): "The principle of the courts of equity relating to this subject, in my opinion, is, that, as regards her separate estate, a married woman is a feme sole, and can act as such, but only so far as is consistent with the other principle, namely, that a married woman cannot enter into a contract. These principles are reconciled in this way: Equity attaches to the separate estate of the married woman a quality incidental to that property, viz., a capacity of heing disposed of hy her; in other words, it gives

§ 1122, (b) This portion of the text is quoted in Warren v. Freeman, 85

Tenn. 513, 3 S. W. 513; Groves v. Osburn, (Or.) 79 Pac. 500.

the faith of it. It is a special equitable remedy, arising out of a special equitable right." In the pointed language of Lord Justice Cotton: "It is not the woman, as a woman, who becomes a debtor, but her engagement has made that particular part of her property which is settled to her separate use *a debtor*; and liable to satisfy the engagement." The same theory is more fully expressed in the words of Lord Cottenham: "The view taken of the matter by Lord Thurlow in Hulme v. Tenant is correct. According to that view, the separate property of a married woman being a creature of equity, it follows that if she has a power to deal with it, she has the other power incident to property in general, namely, the power of contracting debts to be paid out of it; and inasmuch as her creditors have not the means

her a power of dealing with that property as she may think fit; but the power of disposition is confined to that property, and the property must be the subject-matter that she deals with; and therefore, if she makes a contract, the contract is nothing, unless it has reference, directly or indirectly, to that property. This is, in my opinion, the extent of the doctrine of equity relating to the separate estate of a married woman. It is on this principle that every bond, promissory note, and promise to pay given by a married woman has, for the reason I have already stated, been held to be a charge made by her on her separate estate; that is to say, it is a disposal of so much of her property, the whole of which, if she pleased, she might give away. But if equity goes beyond this, it appears to me that it is laying down this principle, that where a married woman has separate estate, she may bind herself by contract exactly as if a feme sole; or in other words, that the possession of separate property takes away the distinction between a feme covert and a feme sole, and makes them equally able to contract debts." In Ex parte Jones, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 484, the nature of the liability was very clearly explained by the court of appeal. The question for decision was, whether a married woman, having a separate estate, could be proceeded against as a hankrupt, and the answer turned upon the further question whether she was a "debtor." James, L. J., said (p. 488): "In equity, the liability was to have her separate estate taken from her for the benefit of a person with whom she had contracted on the faith of it. That was a special equitable remedy arising out of a special equitable right. But the married woman who contracts in that way is not a debtor, in any sense of the word." Brett, L. J., said (p. 489): "The procedure of courts of equity for making the separate estate of a married woman available to satisfy her engagements did not enable any one to sue a married woman as upon and for a debt in a at law of compelling payment of those debts, a court of equity takes upon itself to give effect to them, not as personal liabilities, but by laying hold of the separate property as the only means by which they can be satisfied.² c

court of equity, and certainly not in a court of common law. It was a peculiar remedy against the separate property of the married woman, but it was not a remedy against her as upon and for a debt." Cotton, L. J., said (p. 490): "A debtor must be a person who can be sued personally for a debt, and who is liable to all the consequences of a personal judgment against him. But that is not at all the position of a married woman, even though she has separate estate; proceedings cannot be taken against her personally to enforce payment of a debt. Formerly, courts of equity compelled the satisfaction of her general engagements out of her separate property, and now that is done by all the divisions of the high court. But it is only a proceeding to compel the satisfaction out of her separate property of engagements made with reference to and upon the credit of it. As Lord Justice James said in London Chartered Bank of Australia v. Lemprière, L. R. 4 P. C. 597: 'The married woman intended to contract so as to make herself-that is to say, her separate property-the debtor.' It is not the woman, as a woman, who becomes a debtor, but her engagement has made that particular part of her property which is settled to her separate use a debtor, and liable to satisfy the engagement." In the great and leading case of Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 494, Turner, L. J., after an elaborate examination of authorities, speaking of the effect of the wife's contracts upon her separate property, said (p. 519): "The doctrine of appointment seems to me, however, to be exploded; and it is scarcely less clear that the transactions do not create any lien or charge on the scparate estate. It may well be asked, then how do they operate? I think the answer to this question is to be found in Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Brown Ch. 16. When a man contracts debt, both his person and his property are, by law, liable to the payment of it. A court of equity, having created the separate estate, has enabled married women to contract debts in respect of it. Her person cannot be made liable either at law or in equity, but in equity her property may. This court, therefore, as I conceive, gives execution against the property just as a court of law gives execution against the property of other debtors." See, also, Hooton v. Ransom, 6 Mo. App. 19.

§ 1122, 2 Owens v. Dickenson, Craig & P. 48, 54, per Lord Cottenbam. The mistaken notion that the wife's contract creates an equitable *lien* or

§ 1122, (c) This statement from 4 S. W. 386; Groves v. Osburn, (Or.) Owens v. Dickenson is quoted in 79 Pac. 500. Eckerly v. McGhee, 85 Tenn. 661,

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§ 1123. Extent of the Liability.^a—The restraint upon anticipation, when inserted in the instrument creating the separate estate, applies to the wife's contracts as well as to her alienations. The separate property, therefore, which she holds subject to the restraint upon alienation or anticipation is not liable for any contracts or engagements which she can make.^{1 b} Furthermore, it is now settled that her contracts can only be enforced against the separate estate, free from such restraint, which she held at the time of entering into the engagement, or so much thereof as remains in her ownership at the time when the judgment is rendered, and not against separate estate which she acquired after the time of making the engagement.² c It is

distinct charge upon her separate property is found in some of the American decisions, but is wholly rejected by others. This notion is utterly inconsistent with the well-settled rules concerning the extent of the liability and its enforcement. If there were a lien, it would follow the property into the hands of purchasers with notice from the wife.

§ 1123, ¹ Pike v. Fitzgibbon, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 454, 459, 462, 463; overruling L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 837; In re Sykes's Trusts, 2 Johns. & H. 415; Roberts v. Watkins, 46 L. J. Q. B. 552. By parity of reasoning, in those states where the separate estate itself is regarded as a restraint upon alienation, and the wife can only dispose of it when and in the manner affirmatively permitted by the instrument creating it, it should also follow that her separate property is only liable for her contracts when and to the extent as affirmatively provided for in such instrument.

§ 1123, ² Pike v. Fitzgihhon, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 454, 460, 462, 465; In re Sykes's' Trusts, 2 Johns. & H. 415; Roberts v. Watkins, 46 L. J. Q. B. 552. This view has not been adopted by some of the American courts, at least in regard to the liability of the wife's *legal* separate estate under the statutes.

§ 1123, (a) This section is cited in Williamson v. Cline, 40 W. Va. 194, 20 S. E. 917; Price v. Planters' Nat. Bank, 92 Va. 468, 32 L. R. A. 214, 23 S. E. 887; Kocher v. Cornell, 59 Neb. 315, 80 N. W. 911.

§1123, (b) This portion of the text is quoted in Eckerly v. Mc-Ghee, 85 Tenn. 661, 4 S. W. 386.

§ 1123, (c) So far as regards afteracquired separate estate, the law is changed in England by the express provision of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, s. 1. subs. 4, and subsequent amendments: Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart, [1894] 2 Q. B. 562. For interpretation of the act before the amendment of 1893, see In re Fieldwick (Johnson v. Adamson), [1909] 1 Ch. 1. See, in support of the text, Crockett v. Doriot, 85 Va. 240, 3 S. E. 128. also now settled, contrary to the view which formerly prevailed, that when the wife has a life interest only to her own separate use, with power of appointment over the *corpus*, either by deed or by will, such separate property is liable for her contracts, as well as when her interest is absolute.^{3 d} With regard to the remedy, of course no personal decree can be made against a married woman.⁴ So far as the separate estate is personalty, its *corpus* may be reached by the decree, and applied in discharge of the wife's engagement; so far as it is land, the remedy was confined by the earlier cases to the rents and profits, unless the contract enforced be a specialty; and this is the ordinary form of the decree in England.⁵

§ 1124. For What Contracts Her Separate Estate is Liable.—Although the fundamental doctrine of liability is that the contract purported or was intended to be made on the credit of the separate estate, yet this intention need not be expressed in the terms of the contract itself. The rule is firmly settled, and may be regarded as the peculiar feature of the English law on this subject, which distinguishes it from that prevailing in many of our states, that

§ 1123, ³ London Chartered Bank of Australia v. Lemprière, L. R. 4 P. C. 572; Godfrey v. Harben, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 216; Hughes v. Wells, 9 Hare, 749, 772; Mayd v. Field, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 587.

§ 1123, 4 Francis v. Wigzell, 1 Madd. 258, 264.

§ 1123, ⁵ Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Brown Ch. 16, per Lord Thurlow; Francis v. Wigzell, 1 Madd. 258; Aylett v. Ashton, 1 Mylne & C. 105, 112; Radford v. Carwile, 13 W. Va. 572; Frank v. Lilienfeld, 33 Gratt. 377. Since the modern decisions that the wife may alien her separate real estate by an informal instrument, there seems to be no reason why the *corpus* of the land held to her separate use should not be liable to be taken and sold under a decree in satisfaction of all her engagements, whenever necessary. The early English rule, as given in the text, is followed in some of the American states, especially in those which treat the wife's general power of alienation as only limited and partial. In those states where the wife's contracts are enforced in equity against her legal statutory separate property, land which she thus owns in fee is generally liable to be sold under the decree, and the proceeds applied in satisfaction of the demand.

§ 1123, (d) See ante, § 1106.

the intent to contract on the credit of the separate estate is conclusively inferred from the very form and nature of many kinds of engagements, including at least all those in the form of written instruments.¹ It is thus settled beyond dispute, by the English decisions, that the wife's separate estate is liable for her contracts under seal;² for her bills of exchange and promissory notes;³ and for all her written agreements.⁴ Finally, after some fluctuation in the decisions, the liability is extended to her ordinary general verbal engagements and implied promises, if it appear that they were made with reference to and on the faith and credit of her separate property; and whether so made, will be determined by a consideration of all the surrounding circumstances.⁵

§ 1124, ¹ In other words, although the wife's contract be in the ordinary form, without mentioning or referring to her separate property, it is enforceable against such property.

§ 1124, ² And this, although her husband or a stranger may have joined with her in the instrument: Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Brown Ch. 16; Heatley v. Thomas, 15 Ves. 596; Pike v. Fitzgibbon, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 837; 17 Ch. Div. 454 (her covenant).

§ 1124, ³ Bullpin v. Clarke, 17 Ves. 365; Stuart v. Lord Kirkwall, ³ Madd. 387; Field v. Sowle, 4 Russ. 112; Vandergucht v. De Blaquiere, 5 Mylne & C. 229; Owen v. Homan, 4 H. L. Cas. 997; McHenry v. Davies, L. R. 10 Eq. 88; Davies v. Jenkins, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 728 (note by herself and husband for money loaned him).

§ 1124, ⁴ Master v. Fuller, 4 Brown Ch. 19; 1 Ves. 513; Owens v. Dickenson, Craig & P. 48; Murray v. Barlee, 3 Mylne & K. 209; Owen v. Homan, 4 H. L. Cas. 997; Picard v. Hine, L. R. 5 Ch. 274; Morrell v. Cowan, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 166 (her guaranty for her husband).

§ 1124, ⁵ This conclusion is sustained by the most recent decisions. If, at the time when her engagement was made, there was no other means from which payment could reasonably be expected but her separate estate, then the intent to contract on its credit will be presumed: Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 494; Mrs. Matthewman's Case, L. R. 3 Eq. 781; Shattock v. Shattock, L. R. 2 Eq. 182; Butler v. Cumpston, L. R. 7 Eq. 16; Wainford v. Heyl, L. R. 20 Eq. 321, 324; Picard v. Hine, L. R. 5 Ch. 274, 277; Mayd v. Field, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 587; Hodgson v. Williamson, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 87 (money loaned to her for her support when living apart from her husband).

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§ 1125. The American Doctrine.—The general doctrine established by the English court of chancery, that the wife's separate estate is liable for her engagements which purport to be with reference to it, and are intended to be made upon its faith and credit, has been accepted in all the American states where the system of equity jurisprudence prevails. The divergence in many of the states from the conclusions reached by the English courts relates, not to this general doctrine, but to its applications; it is wholly confined to the question what kinds and forms of contracts do thus purport to be entered into with reference to the separate estate, and are intended to be made on its faith and credit? As described in a preceding paragraph, the equitable jurisdiction in enforcing the contracts of married women has been greatly enlarged by modern legislation in this country. Wherever the statutes have declared that the wife's property, real and personal, belonging to her in her own right, and by a legal title, shall constitute her legal or statutory separate estate, but have not further provided that her contracts shall create personal liabilities against her to be enforced by ordinary legal actions and judgments, it is settled that her contracts shall be enforced in equity against this legal separate estate in the same manner and subject to the same rules as against an equitable separate estate.¹

§ 1126. To What Contracts the American Doctrine Applies.^a—It should be observed that, under the New York type of legislation concerning express trusts in land, where the express trust which is permitted for the benefit of a wife

§ 1125, ¹ This was undoubtedly a remarkable extension of the equitable jurisdiction, but it was necessary to prevent a failure of justice. It is a ^{*} most instructive example of the mode in which established principles and doctrines may be applied to entirely new conditions of fact: Colvin v. Currier, 22 Barb. 371; Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265, 72 Am. Dec. 503; 22 N. Y. 450, 78 Am. Dec. 216; 68 N. Y. 329; Ogden v. Guice, 56 Miss. 330; Levi v. Earl, 30 Ohio St. 147; and see collection of cases in the last note under § 1126, post.

§1126, (a) This section is cited in Webster v. Helm, 93 Tenn. 322, 24 S. W. 488. is created, the beneficiary takes no estate, has no power of disposition, and, as a consequence, cannot charge her interest by contract, however express.¹ With regard to the applications of the general doctrine there is a great variety of opinion and wide divergence of decision among the American cases.² These cases, however, when classified according to broad lines of division, will be found to fall under three general types. *First type*: This includes a comparatively few states, in which the wife has no power of disposition over her separate estate, except such as is expressly or by necessity given in the instrument creating it. Her separate estate is liable for those contracts which are made for its benefit, and for those which benefit the wife, if expressly and in terms charged upon it or made upon its credit, but is not, in general, liable for her contracts of suretyship made entirely for the benefit of another.³ Tn

§ 1126, ¹ See ante, vol. 2, §§ 1003-1005; Noyes v. Blakeman, 6 N. Y. 567; 3 Sand. 531; Bramhall v. Ferris, 14 N. Y. 41, 67 Am. Dec. 113.

§ 1126, ² The decisions are so very numerous, and the conclusions which they reach are so various, that I shall make no attempt to analyze them and to formulate distinct rules for each state or class of states. Indeed, it would be impossible to arrange the states in any general classes. I have, therefore, collected the most important cases in each state, and have placed them in order in a subsequent note.

§ 1126. 3 The view which belongs to this type is clearly expressed in Willard v. Eastham, 15 Gray, 328, 77 Am. Dec. 366, as follows: "The rule adopted by most of the courts in the United States has been materially different from that established in England; and the general current of American authorities supports the principle that a married woman has no power in relation to her separate estate but such as is expressly conferred in the creation of the estate; and that her separate estate is not chargeable with her debts or obligations, unless where a provision for that purpose is contained in the instrument creating the separate estate." I would remark that the foregoing statement that this narrow view is adopted by most of the courts in the United States, and is supported by the general current of the American authorities, is clearly and entirely erroneous as a matter of fact. On the contrary, as shown in previous paragraphs, the great majority of the state courts have adopted the English doctrine that a wife has a power of disposition over her separate property, unless such power is taken away or curtailed by the instrument creating it. The

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order, however, that any contract may be thus enforceable, it must be within the express or necessarily implied permission of the instrument creating the estate. Second type: In the states belonging to this type, with perhaps a very few exceptions, the English doctrine concerning the wife's power of alienation is substantially adopted. The peculiar feature which distinguishes the type is, that the intent to contract upon the faith and credit of the separate estate, and thus to render it liable, must affirmatively and ex-

and thus to render it liable, must affirmatively and expressly appear, and will not be implied or presumed from any mere external form of the engagement. The separate property is liable for all contracts of the wife made directly for *its* benefit, for all her contracts made for her own benefit, if expressly and in terms purporting to be on its faith and credit, and for her contracts of suretyship for the benefit of another, if the intention to charge the separate

Massachusetts court is, in reality, uttering the sentiments of a comparatively very small minority of the state tribunals. The opinion further proceeds: "We think, upon mature and full consideration, that the whole doctrine of the liability of her separate estate to discharge her general engagements rests upon grounds which are artificial, and which depend upon implications which are too subtile and refined. Our conclusion is, that when, by the contract, the debt is made expressly a charge upon the separate estate, or is expressly contracted upon its credit, or when the consideration goes to the benefit of such estate, or to enhance its value, then equity will decree that it shall be paid from such estate or its income to the extent to which the power of disposal by the married woman may go. But where she is a mere surety, or makes the contract for the accommodation of another, without consideration received by her, the contract being void at law, equity will not enforce it against her estate, unless an express instrument makes the debt a charge upon it." The general tenor of this passage is one example, among very many, of the tendency often exhibited by the Massachusetts court to limit, and even abrogate, well-settled doctrines of equity, sometimes even to emasculate equitable principles which are elementary and fundamental. The Massachusetts decisions would often, therefore, be very misleading in other states where the equity jurisprudence prevails in its entirety, and the great learning and high ability of the court may sometimes render its decisions only the more dangerous as guides and precedents. See, also, Rogers v. Ward, 8 Allen, 387, 85 Am. Dec. 710; Tracy v. Keith, 11 Allen, 214; Heburn v. Warner, 112 Mass. property thereby is clearly and unequivocally expressed.⁴ Third type: In the states of this type the conclusions reached by the English courts have been more closely followed. Its distinguishing feature is, that the intent to deal on the credit of the separate estate need not be expressed, but will be inferred from the nature or form of the con-The wife's separate estate is liable for all her contract. tracts entered into for its own benefit, and for all her written contracts made for her own benefit, such as her bonds, notes, bills of exchange, and the like, even though no intention to bind it is expressed in their very terms. In many, and probably most, of the states belonging to this class, the wife's contracts of suretyship must be expressly charged upon her separate property, in order to bind it, and her general verbal engagements must likewise appear in some affirmative manner to be made on its faith and credit: with regard to such contracts no intent is generally presumed.⁵ As it would be impossible to determine with accuracy the rules on this subject which prevail in any particular state without examining the decisions of its own courts. I have collected the more recent and important cases, and have arranged them in the foot-note under their respective states.⁶ It has been uniformly held that the

271, 17 Am. Rep. 86; Adams v. Mackey, 6 Rich. Eq. 75; James v. Mayrant, 4 Desaus. Eq. 591, 6 Am. Dec. 630; Cater v. Eveleigh, 4 Desaus. Eq. 19, 6 Am. Dec. 596; Magwood v. Johnston, 1 Hill Eq. 228; for other examples of this type, see the decisions in Mississippi and Tennessee, cited *post*, in the last note under this paragraph.

§ 1126, ⁴ If the contract is in writing, and is not directly for the benefit of the separate estate, the intention to make it liable should appear in the writing itself: Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265, 72 Am. Dec. 503; 22 N. Y. 450, 456, 78 Am. Dec. 216; 68 N. Y. 329; for further illustrations of this type, see the decisions in Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont, cited in the last foot-note under this paragraph.

§ 1126, ⁵ As illustrations of this type, see the decisions in Alabama, Missouri, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia, cited in the next following note.

§ 1126, 6 The reader will be able from an examination of these cases to ascertain the exact position occupied by the courts of each state. I have

wife's equitable separate estate, and the equitable rules which govern it, do not come within the purview of the

not attempted to distinguish between decisions relating to a married woman's equitable separate property, and those relating to her legal statutory separate property, since both are governed by the same rules. The latter class have become much the more numerous. In several of the states I have cited decisions rendered prior to their recent statutes which make her contracts personally binding upon the wife, and enforceable by ordinary legal actions and judgments.

Alabama:^b Sprague v. Tyson, 44 Ala. 338 (her bill of exchange); Brame v. McGee, 46 Ala. 170 (her note); Jones v. Reese, 65 Ala. 134 (her mortgage to secure a debt of her husband); Miller v. Voss, 62 Ala. 122; Sprague v. Shields, 61 Ala. 428; Lee v. Tannenbaum, 62 Ala. 501; Shulman v. Fitzpatrick, 62 Ala. 571; Short v. Battle, 52 Ala. 456; Williams v. Baldridge, 66 Ala. 338; Paulk v. Wolfe, 34 Ala. 541; Fry v. Hammer, 50 Ala. 52; Riley v. Pierce, 50 Ala. 93; Booker v. Booker's Adm'r, 32 Ala. 473; Drake v. Glover, 30 Ala. 382; Gunter v. Williams, 40 Ala. 561, 572; Smyth v. Oliver, 31 Ala. 39; Canty v. Sanderford, 37 Ala. 91; Rogers v. Boyd, 33 Ala. 175; Pickens v. Oliver, 29 Ala. 528; Ozley v. Ikelheimer, 26 Ala. 332; Bradford v. Greenway, 17 Ala. 797, 52 Am. Dec. 203.

Arkansas: Collins v. Underwood, 33 Ark. 265 (must be for her own benefit, or for that of the separate estate); Stillwell v. Adams, 29 Ark. 346; Collins v. Wassell, 34 Ark. 17; Roberts v. Wilcoxon, 36 Ark. 355; Ward v. Estate of Ward, 36 Ark. 586; Scott v. Ward, 35 Ark. 480; Dyer v. Arnold, 37 Ark. 17; Henry v. Blackburn, 32 Ark. 445.

California (prior to present statute): Drais v. Hogan, 50 Cal. 121, 128; Friedberg v. Parker, 50 Cal. 103; Terry v. Hammonds, 47 Cal. 32; Miller v. Newton, 23 Cal. 554; Maclay v. Love, 25 Cal. 367. For cases under present statute, see *post*.

Connecticut:^d Donovan's Appeal, 41 Conn. 551 (money borrowed and used by her for the benefit of her separate property, on her verbal promise to repay); Hitchcock v. Kiely, 41 Conn. 611; Gore v. Carl, 47 Conn. 291; Whiting v. Beckwith, 31 Conn. 596; Jennings v. Davis, 31 Conn. 134;

§ 1126, (b) Alabama.—By statute of Feb. 28, 1887, Code 1886, secs. 2341-2351, she may contract with reference to her separate estate only in writing, with the assent or concurrence of her husband expressed in writing: Rooney v. Michael, 84 Ala. 585, 4 South. 421; Knox v. Childersburg Land Co., 86 Ala. 180, 5 South. 578; Osborne v. Cooper, 113 Ala. 405, 59 Am. St. Rep. 117, 21 South. 320; Equitable B. & L. Ass'n v. King, (Fla.) 37 South. 131.

§ 1126, (c) Arkansas.—Bundy v. Cocke, 128 U. S. 188, 32 L. Ed. 396, 9 Sup. Ct. 242.

§ 1126, (d) Connecticut.—The statutes permit suits against a married woman, jointly with her husband, upon any contract entered into

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recent legislation concerning married women's property, and are not affected by its provisions. These modern stat-

Jackson v. Hubbard, 36 Conn. 10; Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn. 146, 175.

Delaware: • State v. Gorman, 4 Houst. 624; Ross v. Singleton, 1 Del. Ch. 149, 12 Am. Dec. 86 (a contract made by a wife through fraud, enforced against her after she became a widow).

Florida:¹ Alston v. Rowles, 13 Fla. 117; Tison v. Mattair, 8 Fla. 107; Lignoski v. Bruce, 8 Fla. 269; Sanderson v. Jones, 6 Fla. 430, 63 Am. Dec.

jointly with him for the benefit of her estate or of their joint estate, or made by her, upon her personal credit, for the benefit of herself, her family, or her separate or joint estate; and, in such actions, executions may be levied on her property as if she were unmarried: Gen. St., §§ 984, 985, 987. See Shelton v. Hadlock, 62 Conn. 143, 25 Atl. 483; Belden v. Sedgwick, 68 Conn. 560, 37 Atl. 417. The legislation has validated contracts between husband and wife: Mathewson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn. 23, 6 Ann. Cas. 1027, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 611, 63 Atl. 285; see this case for an interesting review of the history of married women's separate property in Connecticut.

§ 1126, (e) Delaware.—Kohn v. Collison, 1 Marv. (Del.) 109, 27 Atl. 834 (a married woman can make any and all manner of contracts necessary to be made with respect to her own property. "In no case has the wife been permitted to contract generally in respect to matters other than her own property unless expressly authorized so to act as a *feme sole*." She is not liable upon an indorsement of her husband's promissory note, which is used for the security or payment of his debts).

§1126, (1) Florida.—Thrasher v. Doig, 18 Fla. 809 (intent to charge reparate estate may be shown by parol); Staley v. Hamilton, 19 Fla. 275 ("in the case of the separate statutory property, especially under our statutes regulating alienation, the equitable rule cannot prevail, and it cannot be inferred that a married woman intends to alienate her property, except by the prescribed method, when the contract is not for the benefit of herself or her separate property, for the law will not permit her to do indirectly what it forbids her to do directly"); Schnabel v. Betts, 23 Fla. 178, 1 South. 692 (real estate of wife charged with value of improvements which she procures to be erected thereon); Thompson v. Kyle, 39 Fla. 582, 63 Am. St. Rep. 193, 23 South. 12 (mortgage to secure debt of husband is valid); Nutt v. Codington, 34 ·Fla. 77, 15 South. 667; Halle v. Einstein, 34 Fla. 589, 16 South. 554; Halle v. Meinhard, 34 Fla. 607, 16 South. 559; Fritz v. Fernandez, (Fla.) 34 South. 315; Macfarlane v. Southern Lumber & Supply Co., (Fla.) 36 South. 1029. Under the Constitution 1885, art. 11, § 2, a married woman's separate property can be charged only in equity, and then only in a limited number of instances; viz., for the purchase price, for certain improvements, or on an agreement in writing for its benefit: See Micou v. McDonald, 55 Fla. 776. 46 South. 291; King v. Hooton, 56

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utes giving to the wife a legal separate estate have, in combination with the equitable doctrine concerning married

217; Maiben v. Bohe, 6 Fla. 381; Lewis v. Yale, 4 Fla. 418; Adm'r of Smith v. Poythress, 2 Fla. 92, 48 Am. Dec. 176.

Georgia: Dallas v. Heard, 32 Ga. 604; Robert v. West, 15 Ga. 123; Cherokee Lodge v. White, 63 Ga. 742; Kent v. Plumb, 57 Ga. 207; Humphrey v. Copeland, 54 Ga. 543; Clark v. Valentino, 41 Ga. 143; Huff v. Wright, 39 Ga. 41.

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Illinois:⁴ Patterson v. Lawrence, 90 Ill. 174, 32 Am. Rep. 22 (her contracts concerning her separate real estate, void at law, may be enforced in equity); Thompson v. Scott, 1 Ill. App. 641 (her own mortgage on land is void at law, but the lien may be enforced in equity); McCullough v. Ford, 96 Ill. 439; Robinson v. Brems, 90 Ill. 351; Emmert v. Hays, 89 Ill. 11; Elder v. Jones, 85 Ill. 384; Whitford v. Daggett, 84 Ill. 144; Yazel v. Palmer, 81 Ill. 82; Husband v. Epling, 81 Ill. 172, 25 Am. Rep. 273; Harrer v. Wallner, 80 Ill. 197; Doyle v. Kelly, 75 Ill. 574; McDavid v. Adams, 77 Ill. 155; Kase v. Painter, 77 Ill. 543; Indianapolis etc. R'y v. McLaughlin, 77 Ill. 275; Bauman v. Street, 76 Ill. 526; Patten v. Patten, 75 Ill. 446; Williams v. Hugunin, 69 Ill. 214, 18 Am. Rep. 607; Haight v. McVegh, 69 Ill. 624; Halley v. Ball, 66 Ill. 250; Cookson v. Toole, 59 Ill. 515.

Indiana: ^j Kantrowitz v. Prather, 31 Ind. 92, 99 Am. Dec. 587; Lindley v. Cross, 31 Ind. 106, 99 Am. Dec. 610; O'Daily v. Morris, 31 Ind. 111;

Fla. 805, 47 South. 394 (bill to enforce charge must show that written contract was for benefit of separate estate); McGill v. Art Stone Const. Co., 57 Fla. 498, 131 Am. St. Rep. 1106, 49 South. 539 (charge of expense for improvements contracted for by husband and acquiesced in by wife).

§ 1126, (Ξ) Georgia.—Section 1783 of the Code provides: "The wife is a *feme sole*, unless controlled by the settlement. Every restriction upon her power in it must be complied with; but while the wife may contract, she cannot bind her separate estate by any contract of suretyship, nor by any assumption of the debts of her husband, and any sale of her separate estate, made to a creditor of her husband, in extinguishment of his debts, shall be absolutely void." See Howard v. Simkins, 70 Ga. 322; Wingfield v. Rhea, 73 Ga. 477.

§ 1126, (h) Idaho. — A married woman cannot bind herself personally for the debt of her husband, or for a community debt, and it is error to reuder judgment jointly against the husband and wife, on a note signed by both, in the absence of a showing that the debt was created for the separate use and benefit of the wife, or for the use and benefit of her separate estate: Jaeckel v. Pease, 6 Idaho, 131, 53 Pac. 399.

§ 1126, (1) Illinois.—Post v. First Nat. Bank, 138 Ill. 559, 28 N. E. 978.

§ 1126, (j) Indiana.—Section 5115, Rev. St. 1881, provides that "all the

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women's contracts, created a very anomalous condition in the jurisprudence of most of the states,—an extension of

Montgomery v. Sprankle, 31 Ind. 113; Bellows v. Rosenthal, 31 Ind. 116; Putnam v. Tennyson, 50 Ind. 456 (these cases hold that the wife's separate property is liable for her contracts made directly for its improvement, but is not liable for her general engagements, although made for her own benefit and on the credit of her separate property, when they were not expressly, in very terms, charged upon it); Miller v. Albertson, 73 Ind. 343; Vail v. Meyer, 71 Ind. 159; Smith v. Smith, 80 Ind. 267; Wooden v. Wampler, 69 Ind. 88; Jackman v. Nowling, 69 Ind. 188; Patton v. Rankin, 68 Ind. 245, 34 Am. Rep. 254; Williams v. Wilbur, 67 Ind. 42; Smith v. Howe, 31 Ind. 233.

Kansas: Miner v. Pearson, 16 Kan. 27; Tallman v. Jones, 13 Kan. 438; Faddis v. Woollomes; 10 Kan. 56; Larimer v. Kelley, 10 Kan. 298; Wicks v. Mitchell, 8 Kan. 80; Deering v. Boyle, 8 Kan. 525, 12 Am. Rep. 480; Going v. Orns, 8 Kan. 85; Knaggs v. Mastin, 9 Kan. 532; Monroe v. May, 9 Kan. 466.

Kentucky:^k Young v. Smith, 9 Bush, 421 (income of her separate estate liable for her debts contracted for support of herself and children); Penn

legal disabilities of married women to make contracts are hereby abolished, except as herein otherwise provided." The exceptions prohibit a married woman from conveying or mortgaging her real estate and from becoming a surety. It is held, however, that a husband seeking to enforce a contract against his wife must resort to equity. "The contract is not valid in the sense that it can be enforced strictly as a contract. This is so because in strict law the husband cannot recover solely upon a contract made with his wife, since the theory of the unity of the person still exists. But while the husband cannot enforce the contract as contracts between other parties than husband and wife may be enforced, still the express contract may constitute an essential element of an equitable claim that the courts will enforce." Harrell v. Harrell, 117 Ind. 94, 19 N. E. 621; Bowles v. Trapp, 139 Ind.

55, 38 N. E. 406 (wife cannot become surety for husband); Leschen v. Guy, 149 Ind. 17, 48 N. E. 344 (same).

§ 1126, (k) Kentucky. -- Section 2127 of the statutes provides: "No part of a married woman's estate shall be subjected to the payment or satisfaction of any liability, upon a contract made after marriage, to answer for the debt default or misdoing of another, including her husband, unless such estate shall have been set apart for that purpose by deed of mortgage or other conveyance, but her estate shall be liable for her debts and responsibilities contracted or incurred before marriage, and for such contracted after marriage, except as in this act provided." See Miller v. Sanders, 98 Ky. 535, 33 S. W. 621; Quisenberry v. Thompson, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 723, 43 S. W. 723 ("We take it to be a well-settled rule of law that the separate estate of a married woman

a jurisdiction most distinctively equitable to an ordinary legal ownership of property. When the common-law dog-

v. Young, 10 Bush, 626; Hannon v. Madden, 10 Bush, 664; Moreland v. Myall, 14 Bush, 474; Uhrig v. Horstman, 8 Bush, 172; Lillard v. Turner, 16 B. Mon. 374; Burch v. Breckinridge, 16 B. Mon. 482, 63 Am. Dec. 553.

Maine:¹ Sampson v. Alexander, 66 Me. 182; Mayo v. Hutchinson, 57 Me. 546; Bean v. Boothby, 57 Me. 295; Hanson v. Millett, 55 Me. 184; Duren v. Getehell, 55 Me. 241; Beals v. Cobb, 51 Me. 348; Winslow v. Gilbreth, 50 Me. 90; Brookings v. White, 49 Me. 479; Springer v. Berry, 47 Me. 330; Eaton v. Nason, 47 Me. 132; Beale v. Knowles, 45 Me. 479; Hancock Bank v. Joy, 41 Me. 568; Merrill v. Smith, 37 Me. 394; Southard v. Piper, 36 Me. 84; Southard v. Plummer, 36 Me. 64; Johnson v. Stillings, 35 Me. 427; Howe v. Wildes, 34 Me. 566; Motley v. Sawyer, 34 Me. 540; Eldridge v. Preble, 34 Me. 148; Clark v. Viles, 32 Me. 32; McLellan v. Nelson, 27 Me. 129.

Maryland:^m Wilson v. Jones, 46 Md. 349 (it must affirmatively appear that her contracts were made with direct reference to her separate estate, and with the intention to charge it); Kerchner v. Kempton, 47 Md. 568; Trader v. Lowe, 45 Md. 1; Plummer v. Jarman, 44 Md. 632; Oswald v. Hoover, 43 Md. 360; Hoffman v. Rice, 38 Md. 284; Rice v. Hoffman, 35 Md. 344; Warner v. Dove, 33 Md. 579; Barton v. Barton, 32 Md. 214; Kubn v. Sťansfield, 28 Md. 210, 92 Am. Dec. 681; Smith v. McAtee, 27 Md. 420, 92 Am. Dec. 641; Niller v. Johnson, 27 Md. 6; Six v. Shaner, 26 Md. 415; Buchanan v. Turner, 26 Md. 1; Cooke v. Husbands, 11 Md. 492. Massachusetts:ⁿ (Liability very restricted: See quotations ante, in note

3 under § 1126): Nourse v. Henshaw, 123 Mass. 96; Merriam v. Boston etc.

is not liable for her debts, contracted even for necessaries, unless such be the agreement at the time of the contract, or evidenced by writing showing that such was the contract executed by her"). See, also, Luirgart v. Lexington Turf Club, 130 Ky. 473, 113 S. W. 814 (equitable-lien can be created only in the manner pointed out by statute).

§ 1126, (1) Maine. — Haggett v. Hurley, 91 Me. 542, 41 L. R. A. 362, 40 Atl. 561 (the statute makes the wife liable for debts contracted in her own name. "The words 'in her own name' seem to indicate that the wife's power to contract is not unlimited; that it is confined to her separate business or estate").

§ 1126, (m) Maryland.—Girault v. Adams, 61 Md. 1 (where money is borrowed for the improvement of the wife's property, with her knowledge, and is so applied, the separate property is answerable for the amount actually advanced); Fowler v. Jacob, 62 Md. 326 (intent to charge may be shown by circumstances); Wingert v. Gordon, 66 Md. 106, 6 Atl. 581.

§ 1126, (n) Massachusetts.—Fowle v. Torrey, 135 Mass. 90 (contract between husband and wife void); Atkins v. Atkins, 195 Mass. 124, 122 Am. St. Rep. 221, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) mas were to be invaded, when the wife's legal estate and title were to be removed from all interest and control of

R. R., 117 Mass. 241; Pierce v. Kittredge, 115 Mass. 374; Towle v. Towle, 114 Mass. 167; Stevens v. Reed, 112 Mass. 515; Heburn v. Warner, 112 Mass. 271, 17 Am. Rep. 86; Faucett v. Currier, 109 Mass. 79; McCluskey v. Provident Inst., 103 Mass. 300; Labaree v. Colby, 99 Mass. 559; Eastabrook v. Earle, 97 Mass. 302; Tracy v. Keith, 11 Allen, 214; Rogers v. Ward, 8 Allen, 387, 85 Am. Dec. 710; Willard v. Eastham, 15 Gray, 328, 77 Am. Dec. 366; Commonwealth v. Williams, 7 Gray, 337; Conant v. Warren, 6 Gray, 562; Beal v. Warren, 2 Gray, 447.

Michigan:[•] Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 91, 90 Am. Dec. 225; Glover v. Alcott, 11 Mich. 470; Watson v. Thurher, 11 Mich. 457; Farr v. Sherman, 11 Mich. 33; Starkweather v. Smith, 6 Mich. 377; Durfee v. McClurg, 6 Mich. 223.

Minnesota: Northwestern etc. Co. v. Allis, 23 Minn. 337; Wampach v. St. Paul etc. R. R., 22 Minn. 34; Spencer v. St. Paul etc. R. R., 22 Minn. 29; Leighton v. Sheldon, 16 Minn. 243; Williams v. McGrade, 13 Minn. 46; Rich v. Rich, 12 Minn. 468; Wilder v. Brooks, 10 Minn. 50, 88 Am. Dec. 49; Carpenter v. Wilverschied, 5 Minn. 170; Carpenter v. Leonard, 5 Minn. 155.

Mississippi: Musson v. Trigg, 51 Miss. 172 (the instrument creating the wife's equitable separate estate is the measure of the extent and mode by which he may bind it by contract; the statutes regulating her power to make contracts concerning her *legal* separate property have no application); Morrison v. Kinstra, 55 Miss. 71 (her contract to purchase land on credit creates no liability against her separate estate); Ogden v. Guice, 56 Miss. 330.

Missouri:^q (The English doctrine seems to be accepted to its full extent. Her separate estate is liable for her notes and other written contracts, the

273, 80 N. E. 806 (same); Porter v. Wakefield, 146 Mass. 25, 14 N. E. 792; Robertson v. Rowell, 158 Mass. 94, 35 Am. St. Rep. 466, 32 N. E. 898 (separate estate bound by indorsement of husband's note); Fitcher v. Griffiths, 216 Mass. 174, 103 N. E. 471 (wife entitled to subrogation against her husband when she has paid his mortgage debt).

§ 1126, (•) *Michigan.*—Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Wayne Co. Bank, 68 Mich. 116, 35 N. W. 853 (contract must clearly appear to have been made with intent to bind her scparate estate); Naylor v. Minock, 96 Mich. 182, 35 Am. St. Rep. 595, 55 N. W. 664 (has power "only to contract and bind herself in relation to her property and estate already possessed, or referring to it, or in relation to property to be acquired by the contract, or in consideration of it"); Detroit Chamber of Commerce v. Goodman, 110 Mich. 498, 35 L. R. A. 96, 68 N. W. 295.

§ 1126, (**p**) *Mississippi.*—McDougal v. People's Savings Bank, 62 Miss. 663.

§ 1126, (a) *Missouri.*—Macfarland v. Heim, 127 Mo. 327, 48 Am. St. Rep. 629, 29 S. W. 1030.

her husband, and she was to be permitted to make contracts based upon its ownership, the better policy would have been

intent to charge it thereby being necessarily inferred; even in her general verbal engagements the intent will be presumed, unless the circumstances show that credit was not given to it): De Baun v. Van Wagoner, 56 Mo. 347, 349 (her note or other written form of promise); Gay v. Ihm, 69 Mo. 584 (her covenant to pay rent in a lease); Hooton v. Ransom, 6 Mo. App. 19; Morrison v. Thistle, 67 Mo. 596 (her note); Nash v. Norment, 5 Mo. App. 545 (her general engagements are presumed to be on the credit of her separate property); Dameron v. Jamison, 4 Mo. App. 299 (her deed, in which her husband does not join); Pratt v. Eaton, 65 Mo. 157 (her general engagements and promises); Maguire v. Maguire, 3 Mo. App. 458 (her written contract); Meyers v. Van Wagoner, 56 Mo. 115 (her note); Lincoln v. Rowe, 15 Mo. 571 (note by herself and her husband); Kimm v. Weippert, 46 Mo. 532, 2 Am. Rep. 541 (the same); Schafroth v. Ambs, 46 Mo. 114 (the same); Pemherton v. Johnson, 46 Mo. 342 (note for the price of land purchased); Miller v. Brown, 47 Mo. 504, 4 Am. Rep. 345 (her verbal contract); Boeckler v. McGowan, 9 Mo. App. 373 (damages for the breach of her written agreement); Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor, 53 Mo. 444; 62 Mo. 338 (ber notes); Clark v. National Bank, 47 Mo. 17; Burnley v. Thomas, 63 Mo. 390; Eystra v. Capelle, 61 Mo. 578; Gage v. Gates, 62 Mo. 412; Davis v. Smith, 75 Mo. 219; Klenke v. Kocltze, 75 Mo. 239; Boatmen's Sav. Bank v. Collins, 75 Mo. 280; Staley v. Howard, 7 Mo. App. 377.

Nebraska:^{**r**} McCormick v. Lawton, 3 Neb. 449; Webb v. Hoselton, 4 Neb. 308, 19 Am. Rep. 638; Davis v. First Nat. Bank, 5 Neb. 242, 25 Am. Rep. 484; Aultman v. Obermeyer, 6 Neb. 260; Hall v. Christy, 8 Neb. 264; Savings Bank v. Scott, 10 Neb. 83; Barnum v. Young, 10 Neb. 309.

New Hampshire: Cooper v. Alger, 51 N. H. 172; Bachelder v. Sargent, 47 N. H. 262; George v. Cutting, 46 N. H. 130, 88 Am. Dec. 195; Hill v. Pine River Bank, 45 N. H. 300; Patterson v. Patterson, 45 N. H. 164; Shannon v. Canney, 44 N. H. 592; Ames v. Foster, 42 N. H. 381; Wood-

§ 1126, (r) Nebraska.—Only contracts made with reference to and upon the faith and credit of her separate property, trade, or business are valid. A wife may, however, mortgage her separate property to secure a loan to her husband: Holmes v. Hull, 50 Neb. 656, 70 N. W. 241; Stenger Benev. Ass'n v. Stenger, 54 Neb. 427, 74 N. W. 846. As to power to bind her after-

acquired property, see Burns v. Cooper, 140 Fed. 273, 72 C. C. A. 25. § 1126, (s) New Hampshire. — "Every married woman shall have the same rights and remedies, and shall be subject to the same liabilities, in relation to property held by her in her own right as if she were unmarried, and may make contracts, and sue and be sued in all matters in law and equity, and upon any to abrogate her common-law incapacities entirely, and to render her contracts enforceable against her as though she

ward v. Seaver, 38 N. H. 29; Albin v. Lord, 39 N. H. 196; Bailey v. Pearson, 29 N. H. 77; Blake v. Hall, 57 N. H. 373; Muzzey v. Reardon, 57 N. H. 378; Whipple v. Giles, 55 N. H. 139; Hammond v. Corbett, 51 N. H. 311.

New Jersey:^t Homœopathic Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 32 N. J. Eq. 103 (her mortgage, to seeure a debt contracted for the benefit of her separate estate, although not acknowledged in any way, creates a charge enforceahle in equity); Huyler's Ex'rs v. Atwood, 26 N. J. Eq. 504 (her contract to pay off a mortgage on land conveyed to her); Pierson v. Lum, 25 N. J. Eq. 390 (debt for benefit of the estate); Perkins v. Elliott, 23 N. J. Eq. 526 (not liable for her contract of suretyship, unless it appears that she or the estate is benefited thereby); Merchant v. Thompson, 34 N. J. Eq. 73 (her mortgage to secure a debt of her husband, or of a third person); Porch v. Fries, 18 N. J. Eq. 204; Dilts v. Stevenson, 17 N. J. Eq. 407; Beals's Ex'r v. Storm, 26 N. J. Eq. 372; Vreeland v. Vreeland, 16 N. J. Eq. 512; Belford v. Crane, 16 N. J. Eq. 265, 84 Am. Dec. 155; Vreeland's Ex'rs v. Ryno's Ex'r, 26 N. J. Eq. 160; Armstrong v. Ross, 20 N. J.

contract by her made, or for any wrong by her done, before marriage, as if she were unmarried: provided, however, that the authority hereby given to make contracts shall not affect the laws heretofore in force as to contracts between husband and wife: and provided, also, that no contract or conveyance by a married woman of property held by her in her own right, as surety or guarantor for her husband, nor any undertaking by her for him, or in his behalf, shall be binding on her." Gen. Laws, c. 183, § 12. See Parsons v. McLane, 64 N. H. 478, 13 Atl. 588. See, also, Kimball v. Kimball, 75 N. H. 291, 73 Atl. 408 (contract between husband and wife enforceable in equity, though not at law, but subject to equitable defenses).

§1126, (t) New Jersey.—Contracts between husband and wife are still

enforceable only in equity: Farmer v. Farmer, 39 N. J. Eq. 211; Wood v. Chetwood, 44 N. J. Eq. 66, 14 Atl. 21; affirmed in Chetwood v. Wood, 45 N. J. Eq. 369, 19 Atl. 622; Harrison v. Patterson, (N. J. Ch.) 50 Atl. 113; Buttlar v. Buttlar, 71 N. J. Eq. 671, 65 Atl. 485 (therefore a suit to recover money on a separation agreement, after divorce, is exclusively of equitable jurisdiction, and subject to equitable defenses). Executory contracts for payment of debts of third persons cannot, under the statute, be enforced, but after they have become executed, she cannot rescind: Warwick v. Lawrence, 43 N. J. Eq. 179, 3 Am. St. Rep. 299, 10 Atl. 376; Walker v. Dixon Crucible Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 342, 20 Atl. 885. See, also, Realty Title & Mortgage Co. v. Schaaf, 81 N. J. Eq. 115, 85 Atl. 602 (invalid mortgage enforced as an equitable lien).

were single by legal actions and pecuniary recoveries of judgment. In a few states the legislatures have carried this

Eq. 109; Compton v. Pierson, 28 N. J. Eq. 229; Johnson v. Vail, 4 N. J. Eq. 423; Johnson v. Cummins, 16 N. J. Eq. 97, 84 Am. Dec. 142.

New York: Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265, 72 Am. Dec. 503; 22 N. Y. 450, 78 Am. Dec. 216; 68 N. Y. 329 (this leading case holds that the separate estate is liable for the wife's contracts,—1. When the consideration is directly for the benefit of the separate property and on its credit, although nothing is expressly said in the contract about its being thus a charge; and 2. Any other contract, whatever be its nature or purpose, and although it does not benefit her separate property, when in the very terms of the contract she expressly charges it upon her separate estate, and if the contract is written this intent must be expressed in the writing); Ballin v. Dillaye, 37 N. Y. 35; Owen v. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 600; Vanderheyden v. Mallory, 1 N. Y. 452; Jaques v. Meth. Epis. Church, 17 Johns. 548, 8 Am. Dec. 447; Dyett v. North Am. Coal Co., 20 Wend. 570, 32 Am. Dec. 598; Gardner v. Gardner, 7 Paige, 112; Knowles v. McCamly, 10 Paige, 342. For decisions under the existing statute, see *post*.

North Carolina:^{**u**} Hall v. Short, 81 N. C. 273; Pippen v. Wesson, 74 N. C. 437; Webb v. Gay, 74 N. C. 447; Manning v. Manning, 79 N. C. 300, 28 Am. Rep. 324; Kirkman v. Bank of Greensboro, 77 N. C. 394; Knox v. Jordan, 5 Jones Eq. 175; Harris v. Harris, 7 Ired. Eq. 111, 53 Am. Dec. 393; Frazier v. Brownlow, 3 Ired. Eq. 237, 42 Am. Dec. 165.

Ohio: V Avery v. Vansickle, 35 Ohio St. 270 (is liable for deficiency arising at a foreclosure sale, on her mortgage to secure her note); Williams v. Urmston, 35 Obio St. 296, 35 Am. Rep. 611 (her note as surety, her inten-

North Carolina. ---§1126, (u) Dougherty v. Sprinkle, 88 N. C. 300; Flaum v. Wallace, 103 N. C. 296, 9 S. E. 567 (limitations or special provisions in the deed of settlement or statute must be construed as giving no powers beyond those expressly given or implied); Thurber v. La Roque, 105 N. C. 301, 11 S. E. 460; Farthing v. Shields, 106 N. C. 295, 10 S. E. 998; Thompson v. Smith, 106 N. C. 357, 11 S. E. 273; Wood v. Wheeler, 106 N. C. 513, 11 S. E. 590; Blake v. Blackley, 109 N. C. 257, 26 Am. St. Rep. 566, 13 S. E. 786 (the statutes "impose no limit upon the wife's power to acquire property by contracting with her husband or any other person, but only operate to restrain her from or protect her in disposing of property already acquired by her"); Harvey, Blair & Co. v. Johnson, 133 N. C. 352, 45 S. E. 644; Jones v. Craigmiles, 114 N. C. 613, 19 S. E. 638; Vann v. Edwards, 135 N. C. 661, 47 S. E. 785. See Bushnell v. Bertolett, 153 N. C. 564, 69 S. E. 610, for observations on the condition of the laws of North Carolina.

§ 1126, (v) Ohio.—By section 3109 of the Revised Statutes (Act April 14, 1884; 81 Ohio Laws, 209) "the separate property of the wife shall

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legal reform to its logical results, and have thus produced a system which is, in my opinion, consistent with itself, and

tion to charge her separate property thereby is presumed); Rice v. Railroad Co., 32 Ohio St. 380, 30 Am. Rep. 610 (in her general engagement, an intent to deal on the credit of her separate estate must be shown); Levi v. Earl, 30 Ohio St. 147 (the same, and her separate estate not liable for her mere accommodation indorsement, without any further evidence of an intent); Phillips v. Graves, 20 Ohio St. 371, 5 Am. Rep. 675 (liable for her note given for her own debt); Patrick v. Littell, 36 Ohio St. 79, 38 Am. Rep. 552; Fallis v. Keys, 35 Ohio St. 265; Swasey v. Antram, 24 Ohio St. 87; Jenz v. Gugel, 26 Ohio St. 527; Meiley v. Butler, 26 Ohio St. 535; Westerman v. Westerman, 25 Ohio St. 500; Logan v. Thrift, 20 Ohio St. 62; Clark v. Clark, 20 Ohio St. 128; Allison v. Porter, 29 Ohio St. 136; Machir v. Bnrroughs, 14 Ohio St. 519.

Oregon: Kennard v. Sax, 3 Or. 263, 267; Brummet v. Weaver, 2 Or. 168; Starr v. Hamilton, 1 Deady, 268, Fed. Cas. No. 13,314; Dick v. Hamilton, 1 Deady, 322, Fed. Cas. No. 3890.

Pennsylvania: W Bower's Appeal, 68 Pa. St. 126; Speakman's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 25; Silveus's Ex'rs v. Porter, 74 Pa. St. 448; Berger v. Clark, 79 Pa. St. 340; Lippincott v. Leeds, 77 Pa. St. 420; Wright v. Brown, 44 Pa. St. 224; Bear's Adm'r v. Bear, 33 Pa. St. 525; Walker v. Reamy, 36 Pa. St. 410; Trimhle v. Reis, 37 Pa. St. 448; Thorndell v. Morrison, 25 Pa. St. 326; Peck v. Ward, 18 Pa. St. 506; Shnyder v. Noble, 94 Pa. St. 286; Appeal of Germania Sav. Bank, 95 Pa. St. 329; Innis v. Templeton, 95 Pa. St. 262, 40 Am. Rep. 643; Sawtelle's Appeal, 84 Pa. St. 306.

be under her sole control, and shall not be taken by any process of law for the debts of her husband, or be in any manner conveyed or encumbered by him; and she may, in her own name, during coverture, contract to the same extent and in the same manner as if she were unmarried." By section 4996 (Act March 20, 1884; 81 Ohio Laws, 65) she may sue and be sued as if unmarried. See Elliott v. Lawhead, 43 Ohio St. 171, 1 N. E. 577; Card Fabrique Co. v. Stanage, 50 Ohio St. 417, 34 N. E. 410.

§ 1126, (**w**) *Pennsylvania*. — Act June 3, 1887, anthorizes a married woman to acquire property, and to contract in regard to her separate property as if unmarried. See Lat-

robe B. & L. Ass'n v. Fritz, 152 Pa. St. 224, 25 Atl. 558, 31 Wkly. Notes Cas. 330; Steffen v. Smith, 159 Pa. St. 207, 28 Atl. 295, 33 Wkly. Notes Cas. 520; McNeal v. McNeal, 161 Pa. St. 109, 28 Atl. 997, 34 Wkly. Notes Cas. 259; Mitchell v. Richmond, 164 Pa. St. 566, 30 Atl. 486; Moore v. Copeley, 165 Pa. St. 294, 44 Am. St. Rep. 664, 30 Atl. 829, 35 Wkly. Notes Cas. 563; Patrick v. Smith, 165 Pa. St. 526, 30 Atl. 1044, 36 Wkly. Notes Cas. 10 (wife cannot become a surety). See, also, Heckman v. Heckman, 215 Pa. St. 203, 114 Am. St. Rep. 953, 64 Atl. 425 (may in equity protect the statutory separate estate against fraud or wrongdoing of husband).

simple and practical in its operation. To furnish some illustrations of the workings of this system, and to present

Rhode Island:^x Eliott v. Gower, 12 R. I. 79 (a wife may charge her equitable separate estate by any written contract which expressly states her intention to charge, or by a verbal declaration, if the contract is for the benefit of herself or of her separate estate); Angell v. McCullough, 12 R. I. 47 (her legal statutory separate estate is not liable to such equitable charge); Petition of O'Brien, 11 R. I. 419; Berry v. Teel, 12 R. I. 267, 268; Warner v. Peck, 11 R. I. 431.

South Carolina: Adams v. Mackey, 6 Rich. Eq. 75; Magwood v. Johnston, 1 Hill Eq. 228; Cater v. Eveleigh, 4 Desaus. Eq. 19, 6 Am. Dec. 596; James v. Mayrant, 4 Desaus. Eq. 591, 6 Am. Dec. 630. For decisions under existing statute, see *post*.

Tennessee: y Owens v. Johnson, 8 Baxt. 265 (not liable for her debt for money borrowed to pay off a mortgage on her land); Myers v. James, 2 Lea, 159 (the authority expressly given in the instrument creating her equitable separate estate measures her power to bind it by contract; when such instrument gave her power "to sell, mortgage, or lease," her mortgage or trust deed to secure a debt contracted for the benefit of her separate estate creates a valid charge); Robertson v. Wilburn, 1 Lea, 633 (in absence of express authority as above, she cannot bind her separate property by her note as surety); Davis v. Jennings, 3 Tenn. Ch. 241 (in absence of express authority as above, her contract to sell land will not be en-'forced); Arrington v. Roper, 3 Tenn. Ch. 572 (in absence of express authority as above, her notes, although expressly charged, create no liability); Chatterton v. Young, 2 Tenn. Ch. 768; Moseby v. Partee, 5 Heisk. 26; Shacklett v. Polk, 4 Heisk. 104; Head v. Temple, 4 Heisk. 34; Hughes v. Peters, 1 Cold. 67; Young v. Young, 7 Cold. 461; Sherman v. Turpin, 7 Cold. 382.

Texas: Hutchinson v. Underwood, 27 Tex. 255; Hamilton v. Brooks, 51 Tex. 142; Hall v. Dotson, 55 Tex. 520; Bradford v. Johnson, 44 Tex. 381;

§ 1126, (x) Rhode Island.—Fallon v. McAlonen, 15 R. I. 223, 2 Atl. 213. § 1126, (y) Tenńessee.—Bedford v. Burton, 106 U. S. 341, 27 L. Ed. 112, 1 Sup. Ct. 98; Menees v. Johnson, 12 Lea, 561; Warren v. Freeman, 85 Tenn. 513, 3 S. W. 513; Eckerly v. McGhee, 85 Tenn. 661, 4 S. W. 386 (there must be an express promise or engagement to create a charge, and the method in which such engagement is expressed or created must be within the express or necessarily implied powers of the instrument creating the estate); Theus v. Dugger, 93 Tenn. 41, 23 S. W. 135; Webster v. Helm, 93 Tenn. 322, 24 S. W. 488; National Exchange Bank v. Cumberland Lumber Co., 100 Tenn. 479, 47 S. W. 85 (married woman may charge her separate estate for payment of debt for which she is liable only as a surety).

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a complete view of the reformatory legislation dealing with married women's property, I have placed at the end of the

Wallace v. Finberg, 46 Tex. 35; Rhodes v. Gibbs, 39 Tex. 432; Ferguson v. Reed, 45 Tex. 574; Gregory v. Van Vleck, 21 Tex. 40; Cartwright v. Hollis, 5 Tex. 152; Hollis v. Francois, 5 Tex. 195, 51 Am. Dec. 760.

Vermont:² Dale v. Robinson, 51 Vt. 20, 31 Am. Rep. 669 (is liable for debts contracted for its benefit, or for her benefit on its credit); Priest v. Cone, 51 Pt. 495, 31 Am. Rep. 695 (contracts to obtain necessaries for her separate estate, or for herself and family on its credit); Webster v. Hildreth, 33 Vt. 457, 78 Am. Dec. 632; White v. Hildreth, 32 Vt. 265; Peck v. Walton, 26 Vt. 82.

Virginia:^{**nn**} Harshberger's Adm'r v. Alger, 31 Gratt. 52 (the intention to charge her separate estate must appear); Garland v. Pamplin, 32 Gratt. 305 (her equitable separate estate is liable for her bond; the intention to charge it will be presumed); Burnett v. Hawpe's Ex'r, 25 Gratt. 481 (the same as to her bond as surety for her husband); Muller v. Bayly, 21 Gratt. 521 (and her deed of trust or mortgage to secure her husband); Frank v. Lilienfeld, 33 Gratt. 377 (the *corpus* of the personalty, and the rents and profits only of her realty, belonging to her equitable separate estate, are liable for her *general* debts; but it seems the land itself may be liable for a contract specifically charged upon it); Triplett v. Romine's Adm'r, 33 Gratt. 651; Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt. 503, 94 Am. Dec. 478.

West Virginia:^{bb} Radford v. Carwile, 13 W. Va. 572 (only the rents and profits of her separate real estate are liable. Her equitable separate estate is liable for any engagement which would create a debt if she were a *feme sole*, except on a bond or covenant without consideration. Her engagement, in order to bind such separate estate, need not be for her own benefit, or for that of the separate estate, but her contract of suretyship must be in writing, in order to bind it); Weinberg v. Rempe, 15 W. Va. 829.

§ 1126, (z) Vermont.—Sargeant v. French, 54 Vt. 384 (credit must be given to the estate, and not to the individual).

§ 1126, (an) Virginia. — French v. Waterman, 79. Va. 619 (following Frank v. Lilienfeld); Jones v. Degge, 84 Va. 685, 5 S. E. 799; Crockett v. Doriott, 85 Va. 240, 3 S. E. 128 (her contracts cannot bind her after-acquired separate estate, either statutory or equitable); Price v. Planters' Nat. Bank, 92 Va. 468. 32 L. R. A. 214, 23 S. E. 887. ("When it is once established that the contract which it is sought to enforce is hers, it is presumed, as a matter of law, that she intended to make liable for it such separate estate as she owned, free from restraint, at the time of entering into the engagement, unless the contrary intention is expressed in the contract; and a court of equity will so subject it, or so much of it as may then be owned by her.")

§ 1126, (bb) West Virginia. - Section 15 of chapter 66 of the Code, as

foot-note a few important decisions based upon these stat-

Wisconsin: cc Beard v. Dedolph, 29 Wis. 136; Todd v. Lee, 15 Wis. 365; 16 Wis. 480; Krouskop v. Shontz, 51 Wis. 204, 37 Am. Rep. 817, 8 N. W. 241; McKesson v. Stanton, 50 Wis. 297, 36 Am. Rep. 850; 6 N. W. 881; Meyers v. Rahte, 46 Wis. 655, 1 N. W. 353; Conway v. Smith, 13 Wis. 125.

United States: Bank of America v. Banks, 101 U. S. 240, 25 L. Ed. 850; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 119, 19 L. Ed. 604.

States in which the wife is personally liable on her contracts, where she has a legal or statutory separate estate. For the purpose of completing the view of the modern legislation on this subject, I add a few decisions illustrating the statute which renders such contracts enforceable against her, as though she was a *feme sole*, by ordinary legal actions and pecuniary judgments. These decisions do not belong to equity, but they may throw some light on the question, What contracts *do* charge her separate estate? *California*: **dd** Wood v. Orford, 52 Cal. 412; Parry v. Kelley, 52 Cal. 334; Marlow v. Barlew, 53 Cal. 456; Alexander v. Bouton, 55 Cal. 15.

found in chapter 3, Acts 1893, provides that "a married woman may sue and be sued in any court of law or chancery in this state, which may have jurisdiction of the subjectmatter, the same in all cases as if she were a feme sole; and any judgment rendered against, her in any such suit shall be a lien against the corpus of her separate real estate, and an execution may issue thereon and be collected against the separate personal property of a married woman as though she were a feme sole." See Williamson v. Cline, 40 W. Va. 194, 20 S. E. 917; Camden v. Hiteshew, 23 W. Va. 236 ("The debts of a married woman, for which her separate estate is liable, are such as arise out of any transaction, out of which a debt would have arisen, if she had been a feme sole, except that her separate estate is not bound by a bond or covenant based on no consideration"); Howe v. Stortz, 27 W. Va. 555.

§ 1126, (ee) Wisconsin. — Ritter v. Bruss, 116 Wis. 55, 92 N. W. 361 (there can be no recovery against

her in an action at law unless it is shown that the transaction was necessary and convenient for the use and enjoyment of her separate estate, or the carrying on of her separate business, or in relation to her personal services); Kriz v. Peege, 119 Wis. 105, 95 N. W. 108 ("The conclusion from the foregoing is irresistible that the possession by a married woman of a separate estate or business, or contemplation by her to engage in business, is not essential to her statutory right to contract, as regards the acquirement of property; that while separate estate is essential to the making of a contract by her merely to charge her separate estate, binding in equity, it is not to make a contract authorized by the statute"). See, also, Goll v. Fehr, 131 Wis. 141, 111 N. W. 235 (may bind her property in equity for payment of husband's debt).

§ 1126, (dd) California.—Goad v. Moulton, 67 Cal. 537, 8 Pac. 63; Burkle v. Levy, 70 Cal. 250, 11 Pac. 642; Bull v. Coe, 77 Cal. 54, 11 Am. St. Rep. 235, 18 Pac. 808.

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utes, although their subject-matter does not strictly belong to equity jurisprudence.

Colorado: Wells v. Caywood, 3 Colo. 487; Coon v. Rigden, 4 Colo. 275.

Iowa: Mitchell v. Smith, 32 Iowa, 484, 487; First Nat. Bank v. Haire, 36 Iowa, 443; Miller v. Hollingsworth, 36 Iowa, 163; Spafford v. Warren, 47 Iowa, 47; Sweazy v. Kammer, 51 Iowa, 642, 2 N. W. 506.

New Jersey: Hinkson v. Williams, 41 N. J. L. 35; Wilson v. Herbert, 41 N. J. L. 454, 32 Am. Rep. 243.

Nevada: ee Darrenberger v. Haupt, 10 Nev. 43; Beckman v. Stanley, 8 Nev. 257.

New York:^{ff} Corn Exch. Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y. 613, 1 Am. Rep. 601; Maxon v. Scott, 55 N. Y. 247; Hier v. Staples, 51 N. Y. 136; Hinckley v. Smith, 51 N. Y. 21; Freeking v. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422, 426; Blanke v. Bryant, 55 N. Y. 649; Loomis v. Ruck, 56 N. Y. 462; Manhattan etc. Co. v. Thompson, 58 N. Y. 80; Cashman v. Henry, 75 N. Y. 103, 31 Am. Rep. 437; Tiemeyer v. Turnquist, 85 N. Y. 516, 39 Am. Rep. 674; Ackley v. Westervelt, 86 N. Y. 448; McKeon v. Hagan, 18 Hun, 65; Williamson v. Duffy, 19 Hun, 312; Embree v. Franklin, 23 Hun, 203; People v. Williams, 8 Daly, 264.

South Carolina: 55 Belzer v. Campbell, 15 S. C. 581, 40 Am. Rep. 705; Clinkscales v. Hall, 15 S. C. 602; Ross v. Linder, 12 S. C. 592.

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§1126, (ee) Nevada.—Cartan v. David, 18 Nev. 310, 4 Pac. 61.

§ 1126, (11) New York.—Saratoga Co. Bank v. Pruyn, 90 N. Y. 256; Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17, 45 Am. Rep. 160; Dickerson v. Rogers, 114 N. Y. 406, 21 N. E. 992; Hendricks v. Isaacs, 117 N. Y. 411, 15 Am. St. Rep. 524, 6 L. R. A. 559, 22 N. E. 1029; Manchester v. Tibbetts, 121 N. Y. 219, 18 Am. St. Rep. 816, 24 N. E. 304; Third Nat. Bank v. Guenther, 123 N. Y. 568, 20 Am. St. Rep. 780, 25 N. E. 986.

§ 1126, (SS) South Carolina.— Habenicht v. Rawls, 24 S. C. 461, 58 Am. Rep. 268; Gwynn v. Gwynn, 27 S. C. 525, 4 S. E. 229; Greig v. Smith, 29 S. C. 426, 7 S. E. 610; Brown v. Thomson, 31 S. C. 436, 17 Am. St. Rep. 40, 10 S. E. 95; Gwynn v. Gwynn, 31 S. C. 482, 10 S. E. 221; Building & Loan Ass'n v. Jones, 32 S. C. 308, 10 S. E. 1079.

§ 1126, (hh) Washington.—Section 2406 of the Code of 1881 provides: "Contracts may be made by a wife and liabilities incurred, and the same may be enforced by or against her, to the same extent and in the same manner as if she were unmarried." A woman cannot, however, make a contract of partnership with her husband: Board of Trade v. Hayden, 4 Wash. 263, 31 Am. St. Rep. 919, 16 L. R. A. 530, 30 Pac. 87, 32 Pac. 224.

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CHAPTER THIRD.

ESTATES AND INTERESTS ARISING FROM SUC-CESSION TO A DECEDENT.

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LEGACIES.

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§ 1127. Jurisdiction of Equity.—At the common law no action could be maintained to recover a legacy, unless it was a specific legacy of goods, and the executor had assented to it so that the property therein had vested in the legatee.¹

§ 1127, ¹ Deeks v. Strutt, ⁵ Term Rep. 690; Doe v. Guy, ³ East, 120. Although each individual creditor might recover a judgment at law for the amount of his demand, and although there is nothing in the nature of things to make it impossible for a general legatee to recover judgment at

The power of the ancient ecclesiastical courts over the subject-matter of successions and administration was also very limited and imperfect, and was at best but a lame jurisdiction.² The court of chancery, therefore, took and exercised a concurrent jurisdiction over legacies, as a part of its broader jurisdiction over administrations. This jurisdiction, as well over legacies as administrations, is based upon the trust relation existing between an executor or administrator and the creditors, legatees and distributees; upon the necessity of a discovery, an accounting or a distribution of assets in order to determine the rights of all interested parties; and upon the fact that the remedies given by all other courts are inadequate, incomplete, and uncertain. The jurisdiction, originally concurrent, but necessarily exclusive in certain species of legacies, became, and still continues to be, practically exclusive in England over the entire subject of legacies.^{3 a}

law for the amount of his legacy, yet the legal procedure furnished absolutely no means by which the rights and claims of *all* creditors, legatees, and distributees could be ascertained and ratably adjusted, the assets proportionably distributed among those having demands of an equal degree as to priority, and the estate finally settled. There are a few early cases which seem to authorize an action at law to recover a general legacy when the executor has expressly assented thereto, but these decisions have long been disregarded, and their doctrine has become obsolete in England. Such action is permitted by certain early American cases: See Dewitt v. Schoonmaker, 2 Johns. 243; Beecker v. Beecker, 7. Johns. 99, 5 Am. Dec. 246; and an action at law is given to the legatee, under various conditions of fact, by the statutes of several states.

§ 1127, ² See Pamplin v. Green, 2 Cas. Ch. 95; Matthews v. Newby, 1[•] Vern. 133; Petit v. Smith, 5 Mod. 247.

§ 1127, ³ See Adair v. Shaw, 1 Schoales & L. 243, 262, per Lord Redesdale; Anonymous, 1 Atk. 491, per Lord Hardwicke; Hurst v. Beach, 5 Madd. 351, 360; Farrington v. Knightly, 1 P. Wms. 544, 549, 554; Atkins v. Hill, Cowp. 284, 287; Franco v. Alvares, 3 Atk. 342, 346; Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mason, 95, 105; Prescott v. Morse, 62 Me. 447.

§ 1127, (a) See, also, § 156. The text is cited in Domestic & Foreign Missionary Society v. Gaither, 62 Fed. 422, holding that a bill to recover a legacy which the executor has refused to pay is within the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts; Spencer v. Watkins, 169

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§ 1128. Where Jurisdiction of Equity was Exclusive.-Over certain species of legacies the jurisdiction of chancery was originally and necessarily exclusive, since the ecclesiastical courts possessed no jurisdiction in such cases. These were legacies charged upon land,¹ and legacies given in trust, or which involve the carrying into effect of a trust, either express or arising by operation of law.² In certain other cases the equitable jurisdiction was necessarily exclusive, because the relief given by the ecclesiastical courts was wholly inadequate to protect the rights of all the parties interested in the legacy or in the estate.³ Among the most important of these cases were the following: Where a discovery of assets or a final settlement of the whole estate is required,^{4a} when a legacy is given to a married woman,⁵ or is given to an infant,⁶ and where a general legacy is given payable at a future day, since the court of equity, for purposes of security, can direct the executor to pay the amount into court, or such security to be given as the circumstances may require;⁷ and finally, when a specific legacy

§ 1128, ¹ Reynish v. Martin, ³ Atk. ³³⁰, ³³³; Sherman v. Sherman, ⁴ Allen, ³⁹². The jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was confined to personal legacies.

§ 1128, ² Anonymous, 1 Atk. 491; Hill v. Turner, 1 Atk. 515; Farrington v. Knightly, 1 P. Wms. 544, 549; Prescott v. Morse, 62 Me. 447.

§ 1128, 3 In such cases the court of chancery would, as a matter of course, restrain by injunction the proceedings begun in the ecclesiastical courts.

§ 1128, 4 Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mason, 95, 105, Fed. Cas. No. 11,376.

§ 1128, 5 Because if the husband sues for it in the ecclesiastical court there was no power to compel him to make a settlement, and thus to protect the wife's equity: Anonymous, 1 Atk. 491; Hill v. Turner, 1 Atk. 515; Meals v. Meals, 1 Dick. 373.

§ 1128, 6 Because the ecclesiastical court could not provide for investing, securing, or accumulating the fund: Horrell v. Waldron, 1 Vern. 26.

§ 1128, 7 See Slanning v. Style, 3 P. Wms. 334; Blake v. Blake, 2

Fed. 379, 94 C. C. A. 659 (suit by heirs to declare void a bequest to charity is within the federal equity jurisdiction); Rensford v. Joseph A. Magnus & Co., 150 Ala. 288, 43 South. 853. See, also, Brendel v. Charch, 82 Fed. 262.

§1128, (a) As to discovery, see §§235, 236, 346.

is given to one person for life, and on his death to another person absolutely, since a court of equity can protect the remainderman by requiring the life owner to give security where there is waste or danger of waste and consequent loss of the property.^{8 b} None of these incidents connected with a decree for the payment of legacies came within the cognizance of the ecclesiastical courts.

§ 1129. Equitable Jurisdiction in the United States.--Such being the original jurisdiction as exercised by the English court of chancery, it exists to its full extent, unabridged by statutes, in but a few of the states; in very many states it has been largely restricted, in some it has become practically obsolete, and in a few it has been expressly abrogated. The general nature, scope, and powers of the probate courts in this country have already been described.¹ These courts have generally the power to decree payment of legacies, on the application of individual legatees, during the pendency of an administration, and to call the executor to a final account, and to decree a final settlement and distribution of the estate, and therein to determine and protect the rights of legatees, at least in all ordinary cases. In such proceedings the probate courts follow the settled doctrines of equity, and are able to grant some of the

Schoales & L. 26; Johnson v. Mills, 1 Ves. Sr. 282; Phipps v. Annesley, 2 Atk. 57, 58; thus where a legacy is given upon a contingency, the court may order the entire sum out of which it would be payable to be handed over to the residuary legatee upon his giving security for its payment upon the happening of the contingency: Webber v. Webber, 1 Sim. & St. 311.

§ 1128, ⁸ Foley v. Burnell, 1 Brown Ch. 274, 279; Slanning v. Style, 3 P. Wms. 334, 336; Leeke v. Bennett, 1 Atk. 470; and see Randall v. Russell, 3 Mer. 190, 193; Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth, 7 Ves. 137; Mills v. Mills, 7 Sim. 501; Fryer v. Buttar, 8 Sim. 442; Benn v. Dixon, 10 Sim. 636; Neville v. Fortescue, 16 Sim. 333; Cafe v. Bent, 5 Hare, 24, 36; Hunt v. Scott, 1 De Gex & S. 219; Covenhoven v. Shuler, 2 Paige, 122, 132.

§ 1129, 1 See vol. 1, § 347.

§ 1128, (b) See, also, Peters' v. Bresler v. Bloom, 147 Ala. 504, 41 Rhodes, 157 Ala. 25, 47 South. 183; South. 1010.

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remedies originally peculiar to the court of chancery.² While the equitable jurisdiction is thus rendered unnecessary under ordinary circumstances, it nevertheless still exists in all those special cases which are not embraced within the legislation, and in some of the states it remains in its original extent, entirely unabridged.³ ^a I purpose to add a very brief outline only of the equitable doctrines concerning legacies,⁴—doctrines which control the action of probate courts, and which are embodied in the modern statutes upon the subject enacted in several of the states.

§ 1130. Kinds of Legacies—Specific Legacies.—With regard to their intrinsic nature and qualities, legacies are of three kinds: specific, general, and demonstrative. A spe-

§ 1129, ² See *ante*, vol. 1, §§ 348, 349, and cases cited in the notes. In addition to these extensive powers conferred upon the probate courts, the jurisdiction of the common-law courts has been eularged by statute in several of the states; in some, an action at law against the executor is given to the legatee; in others, after a decree of distribution by the probate court, the legatee is permitted to sue the executor and his sureties on his official bond. In the face of such legislation, the equity jurisdiction has naturally fallen into disuse, even where it is not expressly abrogated by the statutory language.

§ 1129, ³ The equitable jurisdiction remains unrestricted in the United States courts in all cases of federal cognizance on account of the citizenship of the parties: *Ante*, § 293; Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mason, 95, 105, Fed. Cas. No. 11,376; and in certain states it is unaffected by the statutes: See Frey v. Demarest, 16 N. J. Eq. 236, 238, 239, and cases cited; and *ante*, § 350. For a more extended examination of the present condition of the equitable jurisdiction over the general subject of administrations in the various states; see *ante*, vol. 1, §§ 348-352, and *post*, sec. iii. of this present chapter, §§ 1152-1154.

§ 1129, 4 The subject is so extensive that it requires volumes for its full discussion. I shall attempt nothing more than the barest outline, and for an exhaustive treatment must refer the reader to such works as Roper on Legacies, Jarman on Wills, Redfield on Wills, and the like.

§ 1129, (a) Concurrent jurisdiction to recover legacies exists in Delaware; Walker v. Caldwell, 8 Del. Ch. 91, 67 Atl. 1085; in Maryland: Matthews v. Targarona, 104 Md. 442, 10 Ann. Cas. 153, 65 Atl. 60 (even where executor has given bond to pay debts and legacies); Coudon v. Updegraf, 117 Md. 71, 83 Atl. 145. cific legacy is a bequest of a specific article of the testator's estate, distinguished from all others of the same kind; as, for example, a particular horse, or piece of plate, or money in a certain purse or chest, a particular stock in the public funds, a particular bond or other instrument for the payment of money.^{1 a} Whether a legacy is specific depends

§ 1130, ¹ If the article is sufficiently distinguished from all others of the same kind, it is immaterial whether it is described as being part of the testator's estate at the time of making the will or at the time of his death; it is essential, however, that the article should form a part of his estate at the death of the testator: Stephenson v. Dowson, 3 Beav. 342, 347, 349, per Lord Langdale; Ashburner v. Macguire, 2 Brown Ch. 108; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 600, 605, 646. In Tifft v. Porter, 8 N. Y. 516, the testator at the date of his will owned 360 shares of the stock of the Cayuga County Bank. His will gave "240 shares of Cayuga County Bank stock" to A, and 120 shares of the same stock to B, not adding any further words to indicate the testator's intent. The court held that a legacy is general and not specific, unless by its terms it indicates a particular part of the testator's estate as the thing bequeathed. These legacies were therefore general. If the testator had said "240 shares of my Cayuga County Bank stock," the legacy would have been specific. In Loring v. Woodward, 41 N. H. 391, 394, 395, the will gave to a legatee "one half of all my stock in the following railroads [naming them], and one half of my stock in the Webster Bank." At the time, the testator owned these stocks. The court. after giving the definition as in the text, held that the legacy was specific, adding: "A legacy of my stock, or in my stock, or a part of my stock, is deemed specific"; citing Wallace v. Wallace, 23 N. H. 149; Ford v. Ford, 23 N. H. 212; Kirby v. Potter, 4 Ves. 750; Guy v. Sharp, 1 Mylne & K. 589; Sibley v. Perry, 7 Ves. 529; and see Kunkel v. Macgill, 56 Md. 120. In Farnum v. Bascom, 122 Mass. 282, a testatrix gave her wearing apparel to a legatee; held, a specific legacy. She gave "the use, improvement, and income" of a certain piece of land to A for life, remainder in fee to B; held, a specific devise. She also gave a certain mortgage, and note secured thereby, for two thousand five hundred dollars to H. F., in trust to pay the amount when collected to two of her nephews, one half to each on their coming of age. Held, a specific legacy; and the court said (p. 285): "Where the intent is to bequeath a certain sum (say \$1,000 or \$5,000) and the circumstance that it is then out on mortgage or other security is incidental merely, and does not constitute an ingredient in the gift, the legacy

§ 1130, (a) The text is quoted in 1026; M May v. Sherrard's Legatees, 115 Va. 672, 114 617, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1131, 79 S. E.

1026; Martin v. Barger, 62 Wash. 672, 114 Pac. 505.

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wholly upon the language of the will. Unless the language described points out and identifies the particular thing given as a part of the testator's estate, distinguishing it from all other things of the same kind, then it is not specific. Although the testator may, at the time of executing the will, have an article or articles of the same kind as that which he purports to give, still, unless his language is sufficient to refer to, designate, and identify the very article itself as forming a part of his estate, which he thereby gives, the legacy is not specific, but general. Under these circumstances, the words "my" is often operative in identifying the article.² b A specific legacy only becomes operative in

is general: Le Grice v. Finch, 3 Mer. 50. But if the gift be of the sum due upon a mortgage of particular premises, or upon a certain note described, the legacy is specific: Sidebotham v. Watson, 11 Hare, 170; Gillaume v. Adderley, 15 Ves. 384; Chaworth v. Beech, 4 Ves. 555; Innes v. Johnson, 4 Ves. 568; Giddings v. Seward, 16 N. Y. 365. So if the gift is the proceeds of a certain mortgage, or all the money due on the bond of A B, or all the money standing to the testator's credit in a particular bank, such legacy is specific: Stout v. Hart, 6 N. J. Eq. 414. Where the bequest is not of the sum of money due on a particular security, but of a particular security described, the gift is not the less specific, for nothing will fulfill the terms of the bequest but the very thing itself." In Towle v. Swasey, 106 Mass. 100, the will gave to a legatee "whatever sum may be on deposit in the Provident Institution for Savings"; held, a specific legacy.

§ 1130, ² The following abstract of decisions will furnish illustrations of these rules under a great variety of circumstances: *Gifts of money*: While legacies of particular sums not expressly identified—e. g., \$1,000, \$5,000—are general, a bequest of certain money which is identified as the money in a certain bag, or deposited in a certain bank, and the like, is specific:^e Lawson v. Stitch, 1 Atk. 507; Towle v. Swasey, 106 Mass. 100;

§ 1130, (b) The text is cited in May v. Sherrard's Legatees, 115 Va. 617, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1131, 79 S. E. 1026.

§ 1130, (c) Gifts of Money.—See, also, Hart v. Brown, 145 Ga. 140, 88 S. E. 670 (sums of money specified as on deposit in certain banks; specific, though more than these sums in the banks); Morehead's Ex'r v. France, 153 Ky. 44, 154 S. W. 378 ("all of notes, bonds, cash in hand or in bank"); Bullard v. Leach, 213 Mass. 117, 100 N. E. 57 ("all of my money deposited in the M. Savings Bank"; and legacy to be paid "only out of the moneys now deposited" in certain banks); In re Bush's Estate, 89 Neb. 334, 131 N. W. 602 ("all money that I may given continues to form a part of the

case the very article given continues to form a part of the testator's estate at the time of his death. In such case

Smith v. McKitterick, 51 Iowa, 548; Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. 35; Cagney v. O'Brien, 83 Ill. 72. Chattels: A bequest of personal chattels described so as to be identified and separated from the rest of the testator's estate, as the furniture in a particular house, and also gifts of all other personal property thus identified by description, are specific: Gayre v. Gayre, 2 Vern. 538; Clarke v. Butler, 1 Mer. 304; Robinson v. Webb, 17 Beav. 260; Powell v. Riley, L. R. 12 Eq. 175; Golder v. Littlejohn, 30 Wis. 344; Stall v. Wilbur, 77 N. Y. 158 (bequest of a growing crop on land devised); Spencer v. Higgins, 22 Conn. 521; Lilly v. Curry's Ex'r, 6 Bush, 590; McGuire v. Evans, 5 Ired. Eq. 269.d Stock: Bequests of the whole or part of shares, stocks, bonds, and such securities, either governmental or issued by corporations, given in language which "marks the specific thing, the very corpus," are specific; e. g., when the testator says "my stock," so much "in" or "of" "my stock," "my shares," "invested by me" in a company named, "which I have," or "possess," or "standing in my name," or "all my property in the funds," and the like: e Sibley v. Perry, 7 Ves. 522, 529; Barton v. Cooke, 5 Ves. 461; Kirby v. Potter, 4 Ves. 748, 750; Measure v. Carleton, 30 Beav. 538; Shuttleworth v. Greaves, 4 Mylne & C. 35; Miller v. Little, 2 Beav. 259; Kermode v. Macdonald, L. R. 3 Ch. 584; 1 Eq. 457; Humphreys v. Humphreys, 2 Cox, 184; Gordon v. Duff, 3 De

have in the O. Bank, except therefrom the sum of \$1,500"; and three other bequests in the form, "I direct that \$500 of said money (herein above referred to in the O. bank) be paid to my grandson"; all specific); Kearns v. Kearns, 77 N. J. Eq. 453, 140 Am. St. Rep. 575, 76 Atl. 1042 ("cash on hand or in bank").

§ 1130, (d) Chattels. -- See, also, McFadden v. Hefley, 28 S. C. 317, 13 Am. St. Rep. 675, 5 S. E. 812; Weed v. Hoge, 85 Conn. 490, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 543, 83 Atl. 636 ("all the rest, residue and remainder of my personal effects, including furniture, bric-a-brac, etc.," specific; "the fact that the descriptive language may include numerous articles does not render the bequest any less specific"); Gardner v. McNeal, 117 Md. 27, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 119, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 553, 82 Atl. 988; In re Corby's Estate, 154 Mich. 353, 117 N. W. 906 ("my furniture"); Kearns v. Kearns, 77 N. J. Eq. 453, 140 Am. St. Rep. 575, 76 Atl. 1042 ("my household goods"); Rock v. Zimmerman, 25 S. D. 237, 126 N. W. 265 ("all wheat of which I am owner or in which I have any interest, stored" on certain lands).

§ 1130, (e) Stock.—See, also, Mc-Clellan v. Clark, 50 L. T. (N. S.) 616; In re Pratt, [1894] 1 Ch. 491; In re Nottage, [1895] 2 Ch. 657; Gardner v. McNeal, 117 Md. 27, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 119, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 553, 82 Atl. 988; Tomlinson v. Bury, 145 Mass. 346, 1 Am. St. Rep. 464, 14 N. E. 137; Harvard Unitarian Soc. v. Tufts, 151 Mass. 76, 7 L. R. A. 390, 23 N. E. 1006; Hood v. Haden, 82 Va. 588; but see Mahoney v. Holt, 19 R. I. 660, 36 Atl. 1. the legatee acquires a title to the article at the death, by virtue of the will, although the payment may be deferred,

Gex, F. & J. 662; Hayes v. Hayes, 1 Keen, 97; Vincent v. Newcombe, 1 Younge, 599; In re Jeffery's Trusts, L. R. 2 Eq. 68 ("the pink coupons in the pigeon-hole for £3,666"); In re Gibson, L. R. 2 Eq. 669; Oliver v. Oliver, L. R. 11 Eq. 506; Davies v. Fowler, L. R. 16 Eq. 308; Pollock v. Pollock, L. R. 18 Eq. 329; Page v. Young, L. R. 19 Eq. 501; Bothamley v. Sherson, L. R. 20 Eq. 304; Loring v. Woodward, 41 N. H. 391; Wallace v. Wallace, 23 N. H. 149; Ford v. Ford, 23 N. H. 212; Ludlam's Estate, 3 Pa. L. J. Rep. 332; Gilmer's Legatees v. Gilmer's Ex'rs, 42 Ala. 9; Brainerd v. Cowdrey, 16 Conn. 1; Blackstone v. Blackstone, 3 Watts, 335, 27 Am. Dec. 359; Alsop's Appeal, 9 Pa. St. 374; Manning v. Craig, 4 Pa. St. 436, 41 Am. Dec. 739; McGuire v. Evans, 5 Ired. Eq. 269. A bequest of certain stock, part of a larger amount owned by the testator, is specific: Morley v. Bird, 3 Ves. 628; Hosking v. Nicholls, 1 Younge & C. Ch. 478; Hill v. Hill, 11 Jur., N. S., 806;^f but a bequest of money merely, out of stock, is general: Ibid.; Kirby v. Potter, 4 Ves. 748. General gifts of stock: On the other hand, where the bequest is merely descriptive generally of the stock, shares, etc., given, the legacy is not specific, although the testator may at the time own stock answering to the description, and even may own the exact number of shares given; e. g., as where he gives so much stock, or so many shares, and the like, not using additional words pointing to any identical shares, as "my" stock, or the stock which "I now possess," etc.:s Partridge v. Partridge, Cas. t. Talbot, 226; Wilson v. Brownsmith, 9 Ves. 180; Lambert v. Lambert, 11 Ves. 607; Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Sim. 313; Boys v. Williams, 2 Russ. & M. 689; Mullins v. Smith, 1 Drew. & S. 204; Robinson v. Addison, 2 Beav. 515; Bishop of

§ 1130, (f) In re Clifford (Mallam v. McFie), [1912] 1 Ch. 29; Thayer v. Paulding, 200 Mass. 98, 85 N. E. 868.

§ 1130, (2) General Gifts of Stock. This sentence of note 2 is quoted in Mecum v. Stoughton, 81 N. J. Eq. 319, 86 Atl. 52 (though testator at date of will owned exact number of shares given). See Evans v. Hunter, 86 Iowa, 413, 41 Am. St. Rep. 503, 17 L. E. A. 308, 53 N. W. 277. See, also, In re Gillins (Inglis v. Gillins), [1909] 1 Ch. 345; Thayer v. Paulding, 200 Mass. 98, 85 N. E. 868; Blair v. Scribner, 67 N. J. Eq. 583, 60 Atl. 211; Snyder's Estate, 217 Pa.

St. 71, 118 Am. St. Rep. 900, 10 Ann. Cas. 488, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49, and note, 66 Atl. 157. But it seems that the fact that the amount given is exactly equal to the amount owned has a strong tendency to show that the gift was intended to be specific; In re Largue's Estate, 267 Mo. 104, 183 S. W. 608; In re Ferreck's Estate, 241 Pa. 340, 88 Atl. 505 (rest of will makes intent clear, by expressly apportioning debts and expenses ratably among the legacies); Gardner v. Viall, 36 R. I. 436, 90 Atl. 760 (other language of the will shows the legacies to be specific).

and must be obtained from the executor. Since his right of property is thus fixed, he is entitled to all income, profits,

Peterborough v. Mortlock, 1 Brown Ch. 565; Webster v. Hale, 8 Ves. 410; Fielding v. Preston, 1 De Gex & J. 438; Tifft v. Porter, 8 N. Y. 516. The reason is, that in all such cases the testator may mean that stocks, or shares, or securities of such a kind and amount are to be purchased and paid for out of his assets by the executor for the legatee; the bequest is therefore, in effect, the gift of a sum of money equivalent in value to the specified amount of stock, etc., and the legacy is strictly general. Debts and evidences of debt: Bequests of particular debts owing by named persons or otherwise identified, or of particular securities for the payment of money, or of the money due on them, are specific; e. g., notes, bonds, mortgages, a debt owing on a mortgage, and the like:^h Chaworth v. Beech, 4 Ves. 555; Fryer v. Morris, 9 Ves. 360; Innes v. Johnson, 4 Ves. 568; Davies v. Morgan, 1 Beav. 405; Nelson v. Carter, 5 Sim. 530; Duncan v. Duncan, 27 Beav. 386; Sidebotham v. Watson, 11 Hare, 170; Walpole v. Apthorp, L. R. 4 Eq. 37 (the amount due on a policy of life insurance); Farnum v. Bascom, 122 Mass. 282; Titus v. McLanahan, 2 Del. Ch. 200; Gardner v. Printup, 2 Barb. 83; Stout v. Hart, 6 N. J. Eq. 414; Mellon's Appeal, 46 Pa. St. 165; Sparks v. Weedon, 21 Md. 156; Howell v. Hooks, 4 Ired. Eq. 188; Le Grice v. Finch, 3 Mer. 50, which seems to be contrary, has been overruled. Land: As a devise of land is always specific:¹ Forrester v. Lord Leigh, Amb. 171; Mirehouse v. Scaife, 2 Mylne & C. 695; Hensman

§1130, (h) Debts and Evidences of Debts .--- See, also, Georgia Infirmary v. Jones, 37 Fed. 750; Gelbach v. Shively, 67 Md. 498, 10 Atl. 247 (a bequest of one thousand dollars "out of the portion or share of my father's estate that may come to me" is specific and not demonstrative); Hayes v. Hayes, 45 N. J. Eq. 461, 17 Atl. 634; Davis v. Crandall, 101 N. Y. 311, 4 N. E. 721; Rogers v. Rogers, 67 S. C. 168, 100 Am. St. Rep. 721, 45 S. E. 176 (bequest of all the claims held by the testator against his father and all his inter-. est in his father's estate). See, further, In re Wedmore (Wedmore v. Wedmore), [1907] 2 Ch. 277 (gift of debts owing to testator by legatees, specific); Weed v. Hoge, 85 Conn. 490, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 543, 83 Atl. 636 (mortgage); Robiuson v. Cogs-

well, 192 Mass. 79, 78 N. E. 389 (all moneys which might be recovered in a certain lawsuit); In re Black's Estate, 223 Pa. 382, 72 Atl. 631 (proceeds of bonds); Hazard v. Gushee, 35 R. I. 438, 87 Atl. 201 (mortgages); Martin v. Barger, 62 Wasb. 672, 114 Pac. 505 (legacy of \$1,000 to be credited on note owing by legatee, specific). Life insurance policies, or money due thereon: Nusly v. Curtis, 36 Colo. 464, 118 Am. St. Rep. 113, 10 Ann. Cas. 1134, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 592, and note, 85 Pac. 846; Kearns v. Kearns, 77 N. J. Eq. 453, 140 Am. St. Rep. 575, 76 Atl. 1042; In re Pruner's Estate, 222 Pa. 179, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561, 70 Atl. 1000.

§1130, (1) See May v. Sherrard's Legatees, 115 Va. 617, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1131, 79 S. E. 1026.

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and proceeds arising or accruing on the article after the testator's death, and before its delivery or payment to himself.^{3 1}

v. Fryer, L. R. 3 Ch. 420; so the bequest of a lease or term of years is also specific: Long v. Short, 1 P. Wms. 403; Fielding v. Preston, 1 De Gex & J. 438; Sampson v. Sampson, L. R. 8 Eq. 479; Farguhar v. Hadden, L. R. 7 Ch. 1. Residuary bequests: A specific legacy may be included in a residuary bequest: Mills v. Brown, 21 Beav. 1; Davies v. Fowler, L. R. 16 Eq. 308; Golder v. Littlejohn, 30 Wis. 344.^j It will appear in the sequel that where a testator gives a bequest not of or a part of specific property, but the property is merely designated as the particular fund out of which the legacy is payable, such a legacy is or may be demonstrative, not specific; but where the testator deals with specific property belonging to himself, not by giving legacies or sums of money out of it, but by dividing and apportioning out the very property itself, or the proceeds of it if it is directed to be sold and converted into money, then the bequests of the parts thus apportioned among the legatees will be specific:^k Page v. Leapingwell, 18 Ves. 463; Newbold v. Roadknight, 1 Russ. & M. 677; Elwes v. Causton, 30 Beav. 554; Walpole v. Apthorp, L. R. 4 Eq. 37.

§ 1130, 3 A will operates upon a specific legacy somewhat in the manner of an assignment or transfer of property; it does not merely create a right

§ 1130, (i) Sec, also, Kemp v. Dandison, 169 Mich. 578, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1042, 135 N. W. 270.

§1130, (k) Gift of Part of Identified Fund .--- This sentence of note 2 is quoted in May v. Sherrard's Legatees, 115 Va. 617, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1131, 79 S, E. 1026. See, also, the following instances of specific legacies, where a part of an identified fund is given: In re De Bernal's Estate, 165 Cal. 223, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 26, 131 Pac. 375 (five acres, unspecified, out of a tract of twenty-five acres, specific devise); In re Goodfellow's Estate, 166 Cal. 409, 137 Pac. 12 ("\$5,000 out of her share in her father's estate," which was not yet settled, specific, not demonstrative, since nothing to show that the money was to be paid from any source except the designated fund); Weed v. Hoge, 85 Conn. 490, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 543, 83 Atl. 636 (gift

of twenty twenty-firsts of the proceeds of deceased's Connecticut real estate, specific); Carpenter's Estate v. Wiley, 166 Iowa, 48, 147 N. W. 175 (an extreme case); Stilphen's Appeal, 100 Me. 146, 4 Ann. Cas. 158, 60 Atl. 888 (for a demonstrative legacy, must appear "that the testator intended to make an unconditional gift in the nature of a general legacy," and indicated the fund); Gelbach v. Shively, 67 Md. 498, 10 Atl. 247; Bullard v. Leach, 213 Mass. 117, 100 N. E. 57; In re Bush's Estate, 89 Neb. 334, 131 N. W. 602; Allen v. Allen, 76 N. J. Eq. 245, 139 Am. St. Rep. 758, 74 Atl. 274 (gift of \$17,000, "to be paid out of securities which I now hold," specific).

§ 1130, (1) The text is quoted in Martin v. Barger, 62 Wash. 672, 114 Pac. 505. See, also, Thayer v. Paulding, 200 Mass. 98, 85 N. E. 868

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§ 1131. Ademption of Specific Legacies.-Specific legacies are governed by certain rules which distinguish them from other kinds, and which determine the rights of the legatees with respect to them. Of these rules the most particular and distinctive is that of ademption.¹ Ademption is the taking away or removal of the legacy; or in other words, the extinguishment of it as a legacy, so that the legatee's rights under or claim to it are gone. The doctrine of ademption results from the very nature of a specific legacy as already defined. By its very nature as the gift of a specific, identified thing, operating as the mere gratuitous transfer of the thing without any executory obligation resting on the testator or his personal representatives, it follows that unless the very thing bequeathed is in existence at the death of the testator, and then forms a part of his estate, the legacy is wholly inoperative; the legatee has no right or claim; the executors are under no obligation to replace the thing by purchasing another one of the same kind as described in the will by means of other assets in their hands belonging to the estate.^{2 a} If the testator never

of action in favor of the legatee against the testator: Kirby v. Potter, 4 Ves. 748, 751; Jacques v. Chambers, 2 Coll. C. C. 435, 440; Loring v. Woodward, 41 N. H. 391, 395; Smith v. McKitterick, 51 Iowa, 548.

§ 1131, 1 This word, derived from the Latin verb *adimere, ademptum*, literally signifies a taking away or removal of the legacy.

§ 1131, ² Ashburner v. Macguire, 2 Brown Ch. 108; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 600, 620–634, 662–674; Badrick v. Stevens, 3 Brown Ch. 431; Barker v. Rayner, 2 Russ. 122; Sidebotham v. Watson, 11 Hare, 170; Hayes v. Hayes, 1 Keen, 97; Gilliat v. Gilliat, 28 Beav. 481; Jones v. Southall, 32 Beav. 31; Ford v. Ford, 23 N. H. 212; Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 258, 11 Am. Dec. 456; Blackstone v. Blackstone, 3 Watts, 335, 337, 27 Am. Dec. 359; Ludlam's Estate, 1 Pars. Cas. 116; 13 Pa. St. 188; 3 Pa. L. J. Rep. 332; Philson v. Moore, 23 Hun, 152; and cases eited in the next note. Where the testator has actually used the thing, or has

(dividend accrning after testator's death); In re Largue's Estate, 267 Mo. 104, 183 S. W. 608 (same); Allen v. Allen, 76 N. J. Eq. 245, 139 Am. St. Rep. 758, 74 Atl. 274.

§1131, (a) The text is quoted in

Rue v. Connell, 148 N. C. 302, 62 S. E. 306. This paragraph, notes 2 and 3, cited in May v. Sherrard's Legatees, 115 Va. 617, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1131, 79 S. E. 1026.

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had the article purported to be specifically bequeathed, or if he had it at the time of making the will, but has afterwards consumed it, or used it, or sold, assigned, or other-

parted with it completely, so that neither the thing nor any of its proceeds remains in the estate at his death, there is clearly an ademption. The only questions of doubt or difficulty arise when the testator, having given some specific thing, or a thing described in some specific shape or condition, afterwards changes its shape, form, or condition, so that the very identical thing which he bequeathed no longer exists, although the proceeds thereof, or some other thing perhaps of the same kind substituted in its place, still remain, and form a portion of the testator's assets at his death; for example, having bequeathed a debt due from A, the debt is afterwards paid by A to the testator; or having bequeathed a certain mortgage given by A, the debt thus secured is afterwards paid by A and the mortgage is canceled; or, having bequeathed certain shares of stock in a named corporation, the testator sells those identical shares, but with the proceeds he buys other shares, either in the same or in another company, which he still owns at his death; or, having bequeathed the furniture in a certain specified house, the testator afterwards removes the furniture from . that house, and puts it in some other place where it remains at the time of his death;—in all these instances, the corporeal thing (as the furniture) or the proceeds of the thing (as the money paid on the debt, mortgage, etc., or the shares of stock substituted) remain in the testator's estate at his death; yet there is generally an ademption, because the specific character of the thing given, as described in the bequest, is wholly lost. should be observed, however, that such changes, in order to work an ademption, must be effected by the testator himself, or hy his procurement, or with his knowledge and consent, or be afterwards assented to by him. If the changes should be effected by a fraud as against the testator, or without his knowledge or consent, expressed or implied from all the circumstances, then there would be no ademption which would operate to cut off the rights of the legatee. It is proper to notice, in this connection, certain legislation adopted in several of the states, and perhaps in most of them, of which sections 1301-1303 of the California Civil Code may be taken as the type. These sections, and the similar statutes of other states, provide that when property is specifically devised or bequeathed, the testator's executory agreement to sell it, or his charge or encumbrance put upon it, or his "conveyance, settlement, or other act" whereby his interest in the property is altered, but not wholly divested, shall not work a revocation,-that is, an ademption of the gift,-but the devisee or legatee shall still take the property subject to the rights of the third person thus created. These statutory provisions do not seem to interfere with the general docwise parted with it, or if with his knowledge and consent its specific form and character have been wholly altered, so that the identical thing given by the will has ceased to exist, then the legacy is gone, extinguished, and the legatee's rights to it are destroyed. Whatever thus puts an end to the existence of the specific thing given by the will, so that at the testator's death it does not form a part of his estate, is an ademption of the legacy. There may be a partial as well as a total ademption, when a portion of the thing only remains in its original specific character among the testator's assets at his death.³ The doctrine of ademption does

trine concerning the ademption of specific legacies. The last of them, by its terms, applies only to a partial alteration in the testator's interest in the thing bequeathed; it does not apply to an alteration in the nature or condition of the thing itself, by which its specific character as described in the bequest is wholly changed. These settled doctrines concerning ademption seem to be untouched by these statutes; in fact, the statutes are merely declaratory of equitable rules with respect to the revocation of wills: See Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. 35.^b

§ 1131, ³ The following abstract will furnish illustrations of the doctrine, and will show circumstances under which an ademption does or does not take place. Where the thing bequeathed formed no part of the testator's estate at the date of the will or at his death: Gordon v. Duff, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 662; where the thing, debt, security, stock, etc., has been totally or partly sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of hy the testator before his death, there is an ademption total or partial; and this result is the same even though with the proceeds of the thing sold—say stock, and the like—he purchases others of the same kind which he holds at his death. If the testator, having sold shares of stock, should repurchase the same identical shares, perhaps there would be no ademption:^c See the

§ 1131, (b) See, also, Rue v. Connell, 148 N. C. 302, 62 S. E. 306, quoting the text (option given by testator, which results in suit and sale after his death; no ademption, but devisee entitled to proceeds of sale).

§ 1131, (c) See, also, In re Slater (Slater v. Slater), [1907] 1 Ch. 665, 8 Ann. Cas. 141 (exchanging the stock mentioned in the will for stock in a corporation which succeeded to the rights, duties and property of the first is an ademption; compare In re Jameson (King v. Winn), [1908] 2 Ch. 111, a case of misdescription of the stock, not of ademption); contrast cases when the original shares were merely subdivided and there was no ademption: In re Clifford (Mallam v. McFie), [1912] 1 Ch. 29; In re Leeming (Turner v. Leeming), [1912] 1 Ch. 828. Pope v. Hinckley, 209 Mass.

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not apply to demonstrative legacies, since they are payable out of the general assets if the fund out of which they are primarily payable fails. Nor does it apply to general or

English cases cited in the last preceding note, and also In re Gibson, L. R. 2 Eq. 669; Oliver v. Oliver, L. R. 11 Eq. 506; Watts v. Watts, L. R. 17 Eq. 217; Macdonald v. Irvine, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 101; Castle v. Fox, L. R. 11 Eq. 542, 551; Miles v. Miles, L. R. 1 Eq. 462; Douglas v. Douglas, Kay, 400, 404; Drinkwater v. Falconer, 2 Ves. Sr. 623, 625; Partridge v. Partridge, Cas. t, Talb. 226; Philson v. Moore, 23 Hun, 152; Newcomb v. Trustees of St. Peter's Ch., 2 Sand. Ch. 636; Langdon v. Astor's Ex'rs, 16 N. Y. 9, 37; Blackstone v. Blackstone, 3 Watts. 335, 27 Am. Dec. 359; Alsop's Appeal, 9 Pa. St. 374; Whitlock v. Vaun, 38 Ga. 562. Again, where a particular debt, or the security for a debt, such as a mortgage, bond, or note, or a public debt secured by governmental bonds or other governmental security, has been specifically bequeathed, and the same has been paid to the testator, so that the debt is discharged, there is an ademption; and it is wholly immaterial whether the payment is voluntary on the part of both creditor and debtor, or has been compelled by the creditor, or has been compelled by the debtor by operation of law, as in case of a public debt paid off pursuant to statute. The distinction between a voluntary and a compulsory payment in such case has been entirely abrogated. The result is the same whether the proceeds are mingled up with other moneys of the testator, or are invested by bim in other securities, even in those of the same kind as the original, which are retained by him until his death; Innes v. Johnson, 4 Ves. 568, 574; Gardner v. Hatton, 6 Sim. 93; Sidney v. Sidney, L. R. 17 Eq. 65; Harrison v. Jackson, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 339; In re Lane, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 856 (exercising an option and surrendering up the stock bequeathed and accepting an entirely different stock of the same company in lieu thereof); Ludlam's Estate, 3 Pa. L. J. Rep. 332; 1 Pars. Cas. 116; 13 Pa. St. 188; Cuthbert v. Cuthbert, 3 Yeates, 486; Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 258, 11 Am. Dec. 456; Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. 35.d Again, where a specific bequest is made of goods situated

323, 95 N. E. 798, if it be taken to be a case of specific legacies (which was not decided), seems at variance with these English cases. See, further, Gardner v. McNeal, 117 Md. 27, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 119, 40 L. E. A. (N. S.) 553, 82 Atl. 988; Lang v. Vaughn, 137 Ga. 671, 40 L. E. A. (N. S.) 542, and note, 74 S. E. 270. But where the gift is of the proceeds of the sale of land, and testator sold the land and invested. it in notes, no ademption: Durham's Adm'r v. Clay, 142 Ky. 96, 134 S. W. 153; so, a bequest of the proceeds of bonds, where the proceeds can be traced: In re Black's Estate, 223 Pa. St. 382, 72 Atl. 631.

§ 1131, (d) Georgia Infirmary v. Jones, 37 Fed. 750; Rogers v. Rogers, 67 S. C. 168, 100 Am. St. Rep. 721, 45 S. E. 176. See, also,

pecuniary legacies. The "satisfaction" of general legacies, which is sometimes improperly called their "ademp-

or being in or at a particular place, a removal of them to another place by the act or consent of the testator will, in general, operate as an ademption, since it destroys the specific character of the thing as bequeathed: Green v. Symonds, 1 Brown Ch. 129, note; Heseltine v. Heseltine, 3 Madd. 276; Colleton v. Garth, 6 Sim. 19; Spencer v. Spencer, 21 Beav. 548; Blagrove v. Coore, 27 Beav. 138. But there are important exceptions. No ademption is produced by a removal merely for purposes of use by the testator: Land v. Devaynes, 4 Brown Ch. 537; or for purpose of repair: Lord Brooke v. Earl of Warwick, 2 De Gex & S. 425; or for purpose of safe custody: Domvile v. Taylor, 32 Beav. 604; or for purpose of preservation from fire: Chapman v. Hart, 1 Ves. Sr. 271, 273. If articles specifically bequeathed are destroyed by fire during testator's lifetime, the legatee is not entitled to their insurance money: Durrant v. Friend, 5 De Gex & S. 343. A wrongful removal, or conversion of the form, or change in the nature of goods or funds specifically bequeathed, done without the procurement, or knowledge, or consent of the testator, and in order to cut off the legatee, will not operate as an ademption, nor destroy his rights: Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury, 2 Vern. 747; Domvile v. Taylor, 32 Beav. 604. For a like reason, if a testator becomes insane after making his will, the acts of persons having no lawful authority to deal with his property, which interfere with specific bequests, will not affect the rights of the specific legatees: Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Hare, 475; Jenkins v. Jones, L. R. 2 Eq. 323; but it seems that the acts of those who are lawfully appointed as representatives of the insane testator produce the same effect as the acts of the testator himself; where shares specifically bequeathed by a testator who was afterwards judicially found to be a lunatic, and a committee appointed, were ordered by the court to be sold, an ademption was wrought: Jones v. Green, L. R. 5 Eq. 555;e and payment of a debt bequeathed, to the committee of the testator, works an ademption: Hoke v.

Re Goodfellow's Estate, 166 Cal. 409, 137 Pac. 12 (bequest of a portion of testatrix's share in her father's unsettled estate; testatrix received her share prior to her death); Nusly v. Curtis, 36 Colo. 464, 118 Am. St. Rep. 113, 10 Ann. Cas. 1134, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 592, 85 Pac. 846 (bequest of all money due from insurance on testatrix's husband's life at the time it shall be actually collected by her executors, adeemed by collection by testatrix and commingling with other funds); In re Pruner's Estate, 222 Pa. St. 179, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561, 70 Atl. 1000 (bequest of life insurance policies; testator collected the insurance money and invested it in bonds; held, ademption).

§1131, (e) See, also, Freer v. Freer, 22 Ch. Div. 622. But a transfer, under an order in lunacy, of stock into the name of the paymaster-general out of the name of Herman, 21 Pa. St. 301. Acts which do not work an ademption: While an actual transfer by the testator amounts to an ademption, there is no ademption where stock standing in the name of trustees for the testator at the date of the will was afterwards simply transferred into the testator's own name: Dingwell v. Askew, 1 Cox, 427; Lee v. Lee, 27 L. J. Ch. 824; Moore v. Moore, 29 Beav. 496; nor where stock has been mortgaged by the testator: Ashburner v. Macguire, 2 Brown Ch. 108, 113; Knight v. Davis, 3 Mylne & K. 358; or pledged hy him; but, on the contrary, the executors should redeem it: Bothamley v. Sherson, L. R. 20 Eq. 304; nor where the fund bequeathed has been changed by an agent of the testator without his authority: Basan v. Brandon, 8 Sim. 171; or changed by a corporation, as where common shares in a railway company were converted by the action of the company into consolidated stock: Oakes v. Oakes, 9 Hare, 666. The same general limitation extends to payment of a debt specifically bequeathed. While a payment which discharges the debt operates as an ademption, there is no ademption where the payment is merely one in form, where the original debt is left remaining, and there is nothing but a new investment of the same debt, or a mere change in the form of the security, leaving the same debt still existing: Morgan v. Thomas, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 176; In re Johnstone's Settlement, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 162; Ford v. Ford, 23 N. H. 212; Havens v. Havens, 1 Sand. Ch. 324; Gardner v. Printup, 2 Barb. 83, 88, 93; Doughty v. Stillwell, 1 Bradf. 300, 309; Stout v. Hart, 6 N. J. Eq. 414, 418. There appears to be some slight tendency in some of the American cases not to press the doctrine of ademption, and to favor the claims of the legatee, although the doctrine of the English courts is avowedly adopted. In a few cases, following some early Massachusetts decisions, it has been held that ademption is a matter of actual intention," and the result might be defeated by extrinsic evidence of the testator's real intention. The more recent cases are unanimous against this departure from the true doctrine.^g An ademption which would otherwise have taken place may always he prevented by the testator's express language in his will declaring, in substance, that the legatee is to have the proceeds of the debt if paid, or of the stock or other things if sold, and

the testatrix who had become of unsound mind, is not an ademption: In re Wood, [1894] 2 Ch. 577. But see Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 176 Fed. 896, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 401, 100 C. C. A. 366 (no ademption by guardian of insanc person).

§1131, (1) See, for example, Wil-

merton v. Wilmerton, 176 Fed. 896, 28 L. B. A. (N. S.) 401, 100 C. C. A. 366.

§ 1131, (g) May v. Sherrard's Legatees, 115 Va. 617, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1131, 79 S. E. 1026, citing the author's notes 2 and 3. fic legacies.^{4 h}. They may, of course, be a "revocation" of demonstrative and of general legacies.

§ 1132. General Legacies.—The term "general" legacies comprises all those which are not either specific or demonstrative,—that is, those which are not gifts of some identical article or fund forming part of the testator's estate, nor gifts of a sum payable out of such an identified fund. They are, therefore, rather gifts of *amounts* than of things or pieces of property specially described and identified.^a Since all general legacies are, in their legal effect, equivalent to gifts of money equal in amount to the value of the thing actually described in the bequest, the term "pecuniary" is also sometimes used as synonymous with "general."¹ Gifts of sums of money, the amounts of which

the like. Such a provision in fact amounts to a gift of a fund to be acquired in future: Earl of Thomond v. Earl of Suffolk, 1 P. Wms. 461; Clark v. Browue, 2 Smale & G. 524; Spencer v. Higgins, 22 Conn. 521; Langdon v. Astor's Ex'rs, 3 Duer, 477; Gardner v. Printup, 2 Barb. 83, 88; Doughty v. Stillwell, 1 Bradf. 300, 309; Corbin v. Mills's Ex'rs, 19 Gratt. 438. In order that a specific thing bequeathed may pass by a will, it must belong to the testator at his death, and therefore stocks which were directed to be purchased, hut which were not purchased, will not pass by a bequest in general terms of all his stock: Thomas v. Thomas, 27 Beav. 537; but stocks would pass under such a gift which had actually been purchased, 'although not yet delivered or not fully transferred on the corporation books at the time of the death: Ellis v. Eden, 25 Beav. 482; Field v. Peckett, 29 Beav. 573, 575.

§ 1131, ⁴ As to "satisfaction" of general legacies, see vol. 2, § 520-526, 544-564. As to demonstrative legacies, see Mann v. Copland, 2 Madd. 223; Vickers v. Pound, 6 H. L. Cas. 885, and *post*, §§ 1133, 1138.

§ 1132, 1 "Pecuniary legacies" are therefore "general legacies." The term is not, however, strictly accurate as descriptive of a class, since specific legacies may be, and often are, gifts of nothing but money.

§ 1131, (h) The doctrine of ademption applies to an appointment by will, whether made under a general or under a special power. An appointment by will fails in case of the non-existence at the death of the testator of either the object or the subject of the appointment: In re Moses, [1902] 1 Ch. 100; Dawsitt v. Meakin, [1901] 1 Ch. 398, explaining Gale v. Gale, 21 Beav. 349; Blake v. Blake, 15 Ch. Div. 481; Collinson v. Collinson, 24 Beav. 269, and In re Johnstone's Settlement, 14 Ch. Div. 162.

§ 1132, (a) The text is quoted in Martin v. Barger, 62 Wash. 672, 114 Pae. 505. only are stated, are always general; as, for example, "I bequeath to A B five hundred dollars." A gift of any chattel or chattels—as a white horse, or furniture, or goods, or of any kind of securities, such as shares in any stock, or governmental bonds, and the like—may be general, and will be general, even though the testator owns at the time articles of the same kind, or even owns an article precisely answering to the description, unless the language of the bequest describes and certainly points out as the thing given some identical article, horse, furniture, goods, or some identical shares of stocks, bonds, or fund, existing as a part of the testator's estate.² ^b The peculiar effect of a gen-

§ 1132, ² Ashburner v. Macguire, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 605-612, 646-652; Fielding v. Preston, 1 Dc Gex & J. 438; Macdonald v. Irvine, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 101; Hawthorn v. Shedden, 3 Smale & G. 293; Fairer v. Park, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 309; Tifft v. Porter, 8 N. Y. 516; Bliven v. Seymour, 88 N. Y. 469; Pearce v. Billings, 10 R. I. 102; Parker's Ex'rs v. Moore, 25 N. J. Eq. 228; Harper v. Bibb, 47 Ala. 547; Gilmer's Legatees v. Gilmer's Ex'rs, 42 Ala. 9; Randle v. Carter, 62 Ala. 95; Brown v. Grimes, 60 Ala. 647; Scofield v. Adams, 12 Hun, 366; England v. Vestry of Prince George's Parish, 53 Md. 466; Osborne v. McAlpine, 4 Redf. 1; Enders v. Enders, 2 Barb. 362; Corbin v. Mills's Ex'rs, 19 Gratt. 438; Davis v. Gain's Ex'r, 1 Ired. Eq. 304; that a gift of so much stock, etc., is general, although the testator at the time owns the same kind, or even the very same amount, in the absence of further descriptive and identifying language, see ante, cases cited in note 2 under § 1130; but see Kunkel v. Macgill, 56 Md. 120, in which, under the special circumstances, such a legacy was held to be specific. A gift of a specified amount or sum of money is none the less general because the testator may add the particular purpose for which he makes the bequest; as, to buy a ring: Apreece v. Apreece, 1 Ves. & B. 364; or to purchase an annuity; Gibbons v. Hills, 1 Dick. 324; or land: Hinton v. Pinke, 1 P. Wms. 359; or stock: Edwards v. Hall, 11 Hare, 1, 23. "If a testator leaves a legacy absolutely as regards his estate, but restricts the mode of the legatee's enjoyment of it, to

§ 1132, (b) The text is quoted in Mecum v. Stoughton, 81 N. J. Eq. 319, 86 Atl. 52. See, also, Robertson v. Broadbent, 8 App. Cas. (H. L.) 812; affirming same case sub nom. Broadbent v. Barrow, 20 Ch. Div. 676; Miller v. Cooch, 5 Del. Ch. 161; In re Parson's Estate, 150 Iowa, 230, 129 N. W. 955; In re Corby's Estate, 154 Mich. 353, 117 N. W. 906; Asbury v. Shain, 191 Mo. App. 667, 177 S. W. 666: Ranney v. Byers, 242 Pa. 450, 89 Atl. 570.

eral legacy is, that, instead of operating as a voluntary assignment of the identical thing to the legatee, and so taking effect only when the specific thing or fund remains in existence as a part of the testator's estate, it creates an obligation resting upon the executor to pay to the legatee the amount specified, if there are sufficient assets left in the estate. It takes effect, therefore, and creates a right in the legatee to the payment, if there are sufficient assets, even though the particular thing, fund, stock, or security mentioned in the bequest is not left existing as a part of the testator's estate at his death, and even though it had never belonged to the testator during his lifetime. If the assets are not sufficient to pay the legacy in full, the legatee is entitled to a ratable portion thereof. This obligation, or executory right of the legatee, created by a general legacy, renders it in this respect much more advantageous to him than the specific legacy. For this reason it is an established rule of construction of wills to lean strongly in favor of an interpretation which makes a legacy general rather than specific.³

§ 1133. Demonstrative Legacies.—Demonstrative legacies are a peculiar kind which partake of the nature of both specific and general legacies, and combine the advantages of each. Demonstrative legacies are bequests of sums of

secure certain objects for the benefit of the legatee, upon failure of such objects, so that the prescribed mode of enjoyment become impossible, then the absolute gift prevails; but if there be no absolute gift as between the legatee and the estate, but particular modes of enjoyment are prescribed, and those modes of enjoyment fail, the legacy forms part of the testator's estate, as not having in such event been given away from it": Lassence v. Tierney, 1 Macn. & G. 551, 561, 562, per Lord Cottenham; Kellett v. Kellett, L. R. 3 H. L. 160, 169; Campbell v. Brownrigg, 1 Phill. Ch. 301; Churchill v. Churchill, L. R. 5 Eq. 44; Palmer v. Fowler, L. R. 13 Eq. 250.

§ 1132, ³ Where the language is at all doubtful, the courts will always hold a legacy to be general rather than specific, if the terms of the bequest will admit of that interpretation: Tifft v. Porter, 8 N. Y. 516; Norris v. Ex'rs of Thomson, 16 N. J. Eq. 222, 542; and see cases in last preceding note.

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money, or of quantity or amounts having a pecuniary value and measure, not in themselves specific, but made payable *primarily* out of a particular designated fund or piece of property belonging, or assumed to belong, to the testator.^{1a} Their effect is peculiar. Although made

§ 1133, 1 In Robinson v. Geldard, 3 Macn. & G. 735, 744, 745, Lord Truro, quoting the definition of Mr. Justice Williams, said: "A legacy of quantity is ordinarily a general legacy; but there are legacies of quantity in the nature of specific legacies, as of so much money with reference to a particular fund for payment; this kind of legacy is called by the civilians a demonstrative legacy, and it is so far general, and differs so much in effect from one properly specific, that if the fund be called in or fail, the legatee will not be deprived of his legacy, but be permitted to receive it out of the general assets; yet the legacy is so far specific that it will not be liable to abate with general legacies upon a deficiency of assets." See, also, Tempest v. Tempest, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 470, 473, per Lord Cranworth. In Paget v. Huish, 1 Hem. & M. 663, 668, the testator gave five annuities for various amounts, describing them, and added: "I declare that each of the said five annuities shall be paid out of the rents of my real estate hereby devised, half-yearly." Held, demonstrative. Page Wood, V. C., after defining "general" and "specific" legacies, added: "The third class is intermediate to these, where a legacy or annuity is, as it is termed, demonstrative, there being a clear general gift, but a particular fund pointed out as that which is to be primarily liable, on failure of which the general personal estate remains liable." In Giddings v. Seward, 16 N. Y. 365, the will said: "I give unto Antha Seward the sum of twelve

§1133, (a) The text is quoted in May'v. Sherrard's Legatees, 115 Va. 617, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1131, 79 S. E. 1026; Martin v. Barger, 62 Wash. 672, 114 Pac. 505; and cited in Hailey v. McLaurin's Estate, 112 Miss. 705, 73 South. 727. See, also, In re Walford (Kenyon v. Walford), [1912] 1 Ch. 219, affirmed, [1912] App. Cas. 658; Kramer v. Kramer, 201 Fed. 248, 119 C. C. A. 482; Matthews v. Targarona, 104 Md. 442, 10 Ann. Cas. 153, 65 Atl. 60; Harrison v. Denny, 113 Md. 509, 77 Atl. 837; Gardner v. McNeal, 117 Md. 27, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 119, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 553, 82 Atl. 988; Bradford v. Brinley, 145 Mass. 81, 13 N. E. 1;

Tichenor v. Tichenor, 41 N. J. Eq. 39, 2 Atl. 778; White v. White, 73 S. C. 261, 53 S. E. 371; Morris v. Garland's Adm'r, 78 Va. 215. The fact that the sum is payable out of a designated fund does not necessarily render the legacy demonstrative; such a gift is often specific; it must . appear, it is said, "that the testator" intended to make an unconditional gift in the nature of a general legacy," in addition to designating the fund: Stilphen's Appeal, 100 Me. 146, 4 Ann. Cas. 158, 60 Atl. 888. See ante, § 1130, end of note 2, and editor's annotations: In re Goodfellow's Estate, 166 Cal. 409, 137 Pac. 12.

primarily payable out of a particular fund, these legacies do not fail—are not adeemed—because such fund may not exist as a part of the testator's estate at his death, but they are then payable out of his general assets, like general legacies. On the other hand, if such particular fund is in existence as a part of the testator's estate at his death, they are not liable to abatement in common with general leg-

hundred dollars and interest on the same, contained in a bond and mortgage given to me by O. W. S., dated," etc. The bond and mortgage referred to was for the payment of twelve hundred dollars and interest in ten years from its date. Held, a demonstrative legacy, and not adeemed by assignment, or payment, or other extinguishment of the bond and mortgage during the testator's lifetime. See, also, Gillaume v. Adderley, 15 Ves. 384; Campbell v. Graham, 1 Russ. & M. 453; Vickers v. Pound, 6 H. L. Cas. 885; Gordon v. Duff, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 662; Disney v. Crosse, L. R. 2 Eq. 592; Hodges v. Grant, L. R. 4 Eq. 140; Mytton v. Mytton, L. R. 19 Eq. 30; Pierrepont v. Edwards, 25 N. Y. 128; Florence v. Sands, 4 Redf. 206; Manice v. Manice, 1 Lans. 348; Enders v. Enders, 2 Barb. 362; Armstrong's Appeal, 63 Pa. St. 312; Knecht's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 333; Gallagher v. Gallagher, 6 Watts, 473; Corbin v. Mills's Ex'rs, 19 Gratt. 438; Smith v. Lampton, 8 Dana, 69; Snow v. Foley, 119 Mass. 102. In this class the bequest is not of or of a part of specific property, so as to operate as an assignment of that specific property, but the property is simply pointed out, demonstrated, as a particular fund, out of which it is payable. The following are examples of what bequests are thus demonstrative: Gifts of specified sums or amounts payable out of a mass of property real or personal:^b Savile v. Blacket, 1 P. Wms. 777; Disney v. Crosse, L. R. 2 Eq. 592; gifts of a particular sum out of or from a specified amount of stock: Kirby v. Potter, 4 Ves. 748; Attwater v. Attwater, 18 Beav. 330; c or out of or a share of the capital employed in a certain business: Sparrow v. Josselyn, 16 Beav. 135; Bevan v. Att'y-Gen., 4 Giff. 361; a bequest of money now vested in particular bonds or securities: Gillaume v. Adderley, 15 Ves. 384; or of a sum to be paid by and out of moneys due to the testator on a bond or other security: Roberts v. Pocock, 4 Ves. 150; Acton v. Acton, 1 Mer. 178; Smith v. Fitzgerald, 3 Ves. & B. 2.

§1133, (b) Hailey v. McLaurin's Estate, 112 Miss. 705, 73 South. 727, citing the text.

§1133 (c) Ives v. Canby, 48 Fed. 718; Spinney v. Eaton, 111 Me. 1, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 535, 87 Atl. 378 (gift of "50 shares of my preferred stock in the T. Co.," demonstrative; sed quære: by most authorities, such gift is specific).

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acies, but are entitled to payment under the circumstances in exactly the same manner as true specific legacies.^{2 d}

§ 1134. Annuities.—An annuity, when given by will, is the bequest of some certain specified amount of money to be paid at prescribed recurring intervals of time during some period, which may be any definite number of years, or for life, or perpetual.^{1a} When an annuity is given *simpliciter*, —that is, given to the annuitant without specifying its duration,—it is for life, and not perpetual.² The mere gift of the interest on a certain sum of money is not an an-

§ 1133, ² If the particular fund fails in whole or in part, or ceases to exist as a part of the estate, the demonstrative legacies then hecome in all respects like general legacies, and are payable out of the general assets, in full if such assets are sufficient, ratably if insufficient. If the fund continues in existence and is sufficient, then the demonstrative legacies are not liable to abatement with the general legacies; but like specific legacies, they are payable in full in preference to the general legacies, even though the latter wholly fail. They plainly possess the advantages and are free from the defects belonging to each of those kinds: Mann v. Copland, 2 Madd. 223; Vickers v. Pound, 6 H. L. Cas. 885; Mullins v. Smith, 1 Drew. & S. 204, 210; Acton v. Acton, 1 Mer. 178; Paget v. Huish, 1 Hem. & M. 663; Armstrong's Appeal, 63 Pa. St. 312; Welch's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 363; Walls v. Stewart, 16 N. J. Eq. 275, 281; Giddings v. Seward, 16 N. Y. 365; Pierrepont v. Edwards, 25 N. Y. 128; Newton v. Stanley, 28 N. Y. 61; Manice v. Manice, 1 Lans. 348; and cases in last preceding note.

§ 1134, ¹ In construing a will, annuities will, as a general rule, he comprised within the word "legacies": Duke of Bolton v. Williams, 4 Brown Ch. 297; Sihley v. Perry, 7 Ves. 522, 534; Swift v. Nash, 2 Keen, 20; thus where "legacies" are directed to be paid out of real estate, an annuity will also be included: Mullins v. Smith, 1 Drew. & S. 204, 211.

§ 1134, ² Yates v. Maddan, ³ Macn. & G. 532; Lett v. Randall, ² De Gex, F. & J. 388; Kerr v. Middlesex Hospital, ² De Gex, M. & G. 576, 583.

§1133, (d) The text is quoted in Martin v. Barger, 62 Wash. 672, 114 Pac. 505.

§ 1134, (a) The text is cited in Moore v. Downey, 83 N. J. Eq. 428, 91 Atl. 116 (provision for payment annually, in quarterly payments, of half the net income of the estate, is not for an annuity). See, also, Steelman v. Wheaton, 72 N. J. Eq. 626, 66 Atl. 195 (where testator directs executor to invest a sum sufficient to produce \$1,200 annually for a legatee, the gift is an annuity). nuity.³ An annuity may be given in general terms, so as to be payable out of the general assets of the estate. It is then a "general" legacy, governed by all the rules applicable to that kind of legacy, and subject to abatement with them.^{4b} It is ordinarily, however, made payable out of some designated fund; as, for example, out of certain stock, or the interest arising from certain mortgages, or the rents and profits of certain lands. Such an annuity is in all respects a "demonstrative" legacy, and is governed by the rules regulating that species of legacies.⁵c

§ 1135. Abatement of Legacies.—The order in which the different kinds of property and funds belonging to an estate should be appropriated in the payment of debts, legacies, and other claims may, of course, be determined by the testator, and these directions contained in his will are followed in the final settlement and distribution. In the absence of any such directions by the testator, courts of equity have adopted certain fundamental principles, and have established a certain order upon the basis of these principles, by which the rights of all claimants upon the estate, as among themselves, are to be finally settled, and in accordance with which the estate is to be applied in the discharge of their claims. These fundamental principles may be stated as follows: Creditors are entitled to be paid in full out of all assets subject to their debts, in preference to all mere volunteers, whether heirs, next of kin, legatees. or devisees.¹ In the absence of contrary directions in the

§ 1134, 3 Whitson v. Whitson, 53 N. Y. 479.

§ 1134, 4 Alton v. Medlicot, cited 2 Ves. Sr. 417.

§ 1134, ⁵ Mann v. Copland, 2 Madd. 223; Paget v. Hnish, 1 Hem. & M. 663; Attwater v. Attwater, 18 Beav. 330; Pierrepont v. Edwards, 25 N. Y. 128. For further particulars concerning annuities, see 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 613-619.

§ 1135, ¹ In the states of this country, and at present in England, the land of the deceased testator or intestate is an asset liable for his debts.

 § 1134, (b) Emery v. Batchelder,
 § 1134, (c) Additon v. Smith, 83

 78 Me. 233, 3 Atl. 733.
 Me. 551, 22 Atl. 470.

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will, the personalty is the primary fund for the payment of debts and legacies. Property undisposed of by the will is primarily liable in preference to that which is expressly bequeathed or devised.^a By applying these principles, in combination with the general classes of directions which the testator *may* prescribe, the order has been established as given in the foot-note.²

§ 1135, ² This order has been modified to a greater or less extent by the statutes of various states. It forms, however, the basis of the legislation, and its fundamental principles have been substantially followed in the statutory system of most of the states which have legislated on the subject. In a few,-as, for example, in California,-all discrimination between real and personal property has been practically abrogated. So far as the statutes have not interfered, the principles and order established by the court of chancery have been followed by the American courts: See Hoover v. Hoover, 5 Pa. St. 351; Armstrong's Appeal, 63 Pa. St. 312. The true meaning of the doctrine involved in this order should not he misapprehended. It furnishes a rule by which the rights of claimants and of those entitled to the different classes of funds, as among themselves, are to be adjusted in the final apportionment and distribution of the whole estate. It does not necessarily and under all circumstances compel creditors or legatees to resort to the various classes of funds in the order laid down for the satisfaction of their demands. On the contrary, so far as the rights of creditors are alone concerned, all the classes of funds are in . general liable; and so far as the rights of general legatees are alone concerned, several of the classes are certainly liable. The doctrine simply means that whenever subsequent classes of funds (e.g., the fourth or fifth) have been appropriated for the payment of debts or legacies which are primarily chargeable upon prior classes (e. g., the first, second, or third), so that the persons properly entitled to those subsequent classes would be disappointed, then such disappointed claimants may have the assets composing those prior classes of funds marshaled in their own favor,-in other words, they then become entitled to resort to those prior classes (first, second, or third, as the case may be) for the satisfaction of their own demands which were otherwise primarily chargeable upon the subsequent classes (the fourth or fifth). In this manner the doctrine secures, as far as possible, the equitable rights of all classes of claimants upon the estate, and an equitable appropriation of all the classes of funds of which it is composed. The order in which the different classes of assets

§1135, (a) The text is quoted in Hope v. Wilkinson, 14 Lea, 21, 52 Am. Rep. 149. § 1136. Nature of Abatement—"Abatement" literally means a subtraction from the legacy, so that the full amount given by the will is not actually received by the legatee. It assumes that the total estate left by the testator is not sufficient to pay all the debts and other charges upon it, and all of the gifts which he has made in the will. If the estate is sufficient for both these purposes, there can be no place for any diminution of legacies or devises. When all the expenses and charges and debts have been paid or provided for, and there are not assets enough left to pay

are to be appropriated and administered, so as to secure, if possible, the equitable rights of all claimants, creditors, and volunteers, is the following: 1. The general personal property not disposed of at all by the will, or only disposed of by being included in the residuary clause: Davies v. Topp, 1 Brown Ch. 524, 526; Duke of Ancaster v. Mayer, 1 Brown Ch. 454. It should be noticed that a disposition of the "residue," in the residuary clause, does not change the nature of the personal property included in it,—does not make it different from that which is not disposed of at all; for there really is no residue until all the debts and all the legacies mentioned have been paid: See Lyne's Estate, L. R. 8 Eq. 482. 2. Real estate expressly devised to be sold for the payment of debts, and not merely charged with the payment of debts:^b Lanoy v. Duke of Athol, 2 Atk. 444; Davies v. Topp, 1 Brown Ch. 524, 527; Harmood v. Oglander, 8 Ves. 106, 124, 125; Manning v. Spooner, 3 Ves. 114, 117; Phillips v. Parry, 22 Beav. 279. 3. Real estate descending to the heir, not charged with debts: Davies v. Topp, supra; Harmood v. Oglander, supra; Row v. Row, L. R. 7 Eq. 414;° 4. Real estate devised and personal property specifically bequeathed charged with the payment of debts; that is, specifically given to devisees or legatees subject to the payment of debts: Harmood v. Oglander, supra; Barnewell v. Lord Cawdor, 3 Madd. 453; Irvin v. Ironmonger, 2 Russ. & M. 531; Wood v. Ordish, 3 Smale & G. 125; Harris v. Watkins, Kay, 438. 5. General pecuniary legacies, or, to speak more accurately, the personal property which would otherwise be needed to pay the general legacies. All the property of this class must contribute ratably.^d 6. Real estate devised, not charged with debts, including the real estate embraced

§1135, (b) In re Balls (Trewby v. Balls), [1909] 1 Ch. 791.

§1135, (c) Hope v. Wilkinson, 14 Lea, 21, 52 Am. Rep. 149.

§1135, (d) That general pecuniary legacies are to be resorted to after a devise of real estate charged with the payment of debts, see In re Roberts, [1902] 2 Ch. 834, following In re Stokes, [1892] 67 L. T. 223, and In re Salt, [1895] 2 Ch. 203.

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all the legacies and devises in full, plainly there must be some subtraction from the amounts specified in the will. Does this abatement extend to all alike? or are some entitled to a preference over others? Must all be diminished by a pro rata deduction? or must the abatement be first applied to a certain class, even so far as to wholly absorb and extinguish it if necessary, before resort is made to another and more favored class? There is such a preference

in a residuary devise, since *every* devise of land is essentially specific, and personal property specifically bequeathed; that is, articles or funds given as specific legacies. These kinds of property, being *specifically* given, stand on the same footing, and they all contribute ratably with each other in case of a deficiency; as to lands, see Hensman v. Fryer, L. R. 3 Ch. 420; 2 Eq. 627; Gibbins v. Eyden, L. R. 7 Eq. 371; Collins v. Lewis, L. R. 8 Eq. 708; Pearmain v. Twiss, 2 Giff. 130; as to legacies, see Long v. Short, 1 P. Wms. 403; Tombs v. Roch, 2 Coll. C. C. 490; Gervis v. Gervis, 14 Sim. 654; Young v. Hassard, 1 Jones & L. 466, 472; Fielding v. Preston, 1 De Gex & J. 438; of course, one kind may be made primarily liable by the will: Bateman v. Hotchkin, 10 Beav. 426.^e 7. Property which the testator *appoints*, under a *general* power of appointment, in favor of volunteers: Thompson v. Towne, 2 Vern. 319; Bainton v. Ward, 2 Atk. 172; Fleming v. Buchanan, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 976; Hawthorn v. Shedden, 3 Smale & G. 293, 305; In re Davies's' Trusts, L. R. 13 Eq. 163.^f

§1135, (e) A few cases hold that specific legacies are liable before specific devises: See McFadden v. Hefley, 28 S. C. 317, 13 Am. St. Rep. 675, 5 S. E. 812; Gordon v. James, 86 Miss. 719, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 461, 39 South. 18; and see 2 Jarman on Wills, Perkins's ed. (547), 391, 392; but the great weight of authority supports the rule as given above: Maybury v. Grady, 67 Ala. 147, 159, per Stone, J.; Armstrong's Appeal, 63 Pa. St. 312; Cranmer v. Mc-Swords, 24 W. Va. 594. In some devises jurisdictions, residuary abate before specific devises: Pace v. Pace, 271 Ill. 114, 110 N. E. 878; In re Sutton's Estate, (Del.) 97 Atl. 624. Pecuniary legacies charged on residuary real and personal estate

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are not liable to contribute to the payment of debts, but the residuary real estate must contribute to the debts ratably with the specific devisees and legatees, according to its full value without deducting the amount of the pecuniary legacies: In re Bawden, [1894] 1 Ch. 693, following In re Saunders-Davies, 34 Ch. Div. 482; Raikes v. Boulton, 29 Beav. 41.

§ 1135, (f) See, also, Tuell v. Hurley, 206 Mass. 65, 91 N. E. 1013; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N. Y. 266, 85 N. E. 59. As to who is a volunteer, see In re Lawley, [1902] 2 Ch. 673, 799; affirmed, sub nom. Beyfus v. Lawley, [1903] App. Cas. 411. based upon the distinction between *specific* gifts—legacies and devises—and those which are general. The doctrine of "abatement" determines the priority among the classes, and the order in which the necessary subtraction must be made, so that the preferred class shall not be abated until the assets appropriate for the legacies of the inferior class have been exhausted; and it also determines the rule by which all the legacies of the same class, as between themselves, shall be reduced, whenever a deficiency of assets occurs. This latter rule is a striking application of the maxim, Equality is equity.¹

§ 1137. Abatement of Specific Legacies.—Among legacies, the specific constitute the preferred class. Specific legacies do not abate in common with general legacies; they only abate if the deficiency of assets is so great as to render a resort to them necessary when the fund representing the general legacies is exhausted. Whenever it becomes necessary to resort to the class composed of the specific legacies and devises, all the legacies and devises in that class will abate *pro rata.*^a Specific legacies and devises stand upon the same footing, are subject to the same liability, are abated together under the same circumstances, and contribute ratably for the payment of debts and charges.¹

§ 1138. Abatement of Demonstrative Legacies.—If the fund out of which they are primarily made payable exists as a part of the testator's estate at his death, demonstrative legacies are governed by the same rules as specific legacies, and abate only with them *ratably*; but if the fund does not

§ 1136, 1 See ante, vol. 1, § 411.

§ 1137, ¹ Long v. Short, ¹ P. Wms. 403; Sleech v. Thorington, ² Ves. Sr. 560, 561, 564; Page v. Leapingwell, ¹⁸ Ves. 463; Harley v. Moon, ¹ Drew. & S. 623; Wright v. Weston, ²⁶ Beav. 429; Fielding v. Preston, ¹ De Gex & J. 438; Walpole v. Apthorp, L. R. 4 Eq. 37; Powell v. Riley, L. R. 12 Eq. 175; In re Jeffery's Trusts, L. R. 2 Eq. 68; Gilmer's Legatees v. Gilmer's Ex'rs, 42 Ala. 9; Lightfoot v. Lightfoot's Ex'r, 27 Ala. 351;

§1137, (a) Carpenter's Estate v. Wiley, 166 Iowa, 48, 147 N. W. 175.

so exist, they become, in effect, general legacies, and must contribute *pro rata* with all the other general legacies.^{1a}.

§ 1139. Abatement of General Legacies.—The rule is settled, that, with one or two particular exceptions, and in the absence of a contrary intention expressed by the testator, *all* general legacies are liable to be abated to the extent of complete obliteration, in order to pay the debts in full, before resort is had to the specific legacies and devises, if the deficiency of assets is so great as to require such an entire appropriation of the funds otherwise applicable to the payment of these legacies. When the deficiency is only partial, so that a complete abatement is unnecessary, all the general legacies must contribute ratably; in other words, they are all subject to a *pro rata* abatement. General annuities stand upon the same footing, and abate *pari passu* with other general legacies.¹

Bevan v. Cooper, 7 Hun, 117; Bonham v. Bonham, 33 N. J. Eq. 476; Towle v. Swasey, 106 Mass. 100; Brainerd v. Cowdrey, 16 Conn. 1, 498; Nash v. Smallwood, 6 Md. 394; Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471; Armstrong's Appeal, 63 Pa. St. 312.

§ 1138, ¹ Mullins v. Smith, ¹ Drew. & S. 204, 210; Acton v. Acton, ¹ Mer. 178; Armstrong's Appeal, 63 Pa. St. 312; Manice v. Manice, ¹ Lans. 348; Florence v. Sands, ⁴ Redf. 206; and see cases cited *ante*, under § 1133. When annuities are demonstrative, they are, of course, governed by the same rule.

§ 1139, 1 This general doctrine is accurately stated in Titus's Adm'r v. Titus, 26 N. J. Eq. 111, as follows: "The rule in regard to bequests in the form of general legacies and of pure bounty, where there are no expressions in the will, or inferences to be drawn therefrom, manifesting an intention to give them priority, is, that in the event of an insufficiency of assets to pay them in full, they shall abate ratably. Neither the relationship of certain legatees to the testator, nor a provision against lapse of the legacies, nor a direction that all the legacies shall be paid 'in the order in which they are stated in the will, and out of the first moneys that shall come into the executor's hands after payment of debts and funeral expenses,' where the will shows that the testator contemplated a residue after payment of all the legacies in full, constitutes any ground for preference."

§ 1138, (a) The text is quoted in See, also, Matthews v. Targarona, O'Day v. O'Day, 193 Mo. 62, 4 104 Md. 442, 10 Ann. Cas. 153, 65 L. R. A. (N. S.) 922, 91 S. W. 921. Atl. 60.

§ 1140. Limitations—Intention of the Testator.—This doctrine, although nearly universal, may still be overcome by a contrary intention of the testator plainly expressed in the will. If a testator uses language sufficiently showing an intention that a certain legacy or legacies otherwise general shall have preference, and be paid in full before the others, and not abate *pro rata* with them, such intention will be carried out, and the legacy or legacies will be preferred, although general.^{1a} Some additional rules, show-

The doctrine is also concisely expressed in the very recent case of Appeal of Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, 97 Pa. St. 187: "Where there is a deficiency after payment of debts, expenses, and specific legacies, the loss shall be borne entirely and proportionally by pecuniary legacies which are in their nature general. A general legacy to a volunteer will not be entitled to any exemption from abatement on the ground of its being applied to any particular object, as a bequest to a wife or child, or charity. Where, however, there is a valuable consideration for a testamentary gift, such legacy is entitled to a preference over those which are mere bounties. Although a testator may exempt a legacy from abatement at the expense of the others, yet among legacies which are in their nature mere bounties, the presumption of intended equality exists and governs. unless overcome by unequivocal evidence to the contrary." See, also, Miller v. Huddlestone, 3 Macn. & G. 513; Thwaites v. Foreman, 1 Coll. C. C. 409; Brown v. Brown, 1 Keen, 275; Coore v. Todd, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 520; Farrer v. St. Catharine's College, L. R. 16 Eq. 19; Hensman v. Fryer, L. R. 3 Ch. 420; Bonham v. Bonham, 33 N. J. Eq. 476; Osborne v. Mc-Alpine, 4 Redf. 1; Alsop v. Bowers, 76 N. C. 168; Bliven v. Seymour, 88 N. Y. 469.

§ 1140, ¹ Lewin v. Lewin, ² Ves. Sr. 415; Marsh v. Evans, ¹ P. Wms. 668; Att'y-Gen. v. Robins, ² P. Wms. 23; Beeston v. Booth, ⁴ Madd. 161, 170; Stammers v. Halliley, ¹² Sim. 42; Brown v. Brown, ¹ Keen, 275; Haynes v. Haynes, ³ De Gex, M. & G. 590; McLean v. Robertson, 126 Mass. 537; Bancroft v. Bancroft, 104 Mass. 226; Appeal of Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, 97 Pa. St. 187. But this intention must be clear; there will be no deviation from the general rule, where the testator has left it doubtful whether he intended to give such a preference: Blower v. Morret, ² Ves. Sr. 420; Beeston v. Booth, *supra*; Eavesstaff v. Austin, 19 Beav. 591; Appeal of Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, *supra*.^b

§1140, (a) In re Hardy, 17 Ch. Div. 798; dissented from, In re Schweder's Estate, [1891] 3 Ch. 44. § 1140, (b) Additon v. Smith, 83 Me. 551, 22 Atl. 470. ing what language will or will not sufficiently express such an intention, will be found in the foot-note.

§ 1141. Exceptions—Legacies to Near Relatives.—It is the settled rule of equity, independent of statutes, that among general legacies there is no precedence, no exemption from *pro rata* or complete abatement, in favor of legacies to a wife, child, or other near relative of the testator.^{1a} If, however, the testator shows an intent to give

A general legacy acquires no preference over others of the same class, and no exemption from the liability of abatement pro rata with all the others, from the fact that the will directs it to be paid at once, or to be paid out of the first moneys in the executor's bands, or that the legacies should be paid in the order in which they are given by the will, or the like: Blower v. Morret, 2 Ves. Sr. 420; Beeston v. Booth, 4 Madd. 161, 168; Brown v. Brown, 1 Keen, 275; Thwaites v. Foreman, 1 Coll. C. C. 409; Titus's Adm'r v. Titus, 26 N. J. Eq. 111.º But if a testator gives a general legacy, and adds a direction that it "shall be paid in full" or "shall be paid at all events," or other direction to the same effect, such legacy will have precedence, and will not abate in common with the others, but must be paid in full, if possible, even though all the other general legacies should wholly fail: Marsh v. Evans, 1 P. Wms. 668; Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Sim. 313; McLean v. Robertson, 126 Mass. 537. But if two or more general legacies are accompanied with such directions, and there are not assets sufficient to pay them all in full, they will, of course, abate pro rata as among themselves, while all the other general legacies not thus preferred fail entirely: Ibid.; Bancroft v. Bancroft, 104 Mass. 226. An intention may also be inferred to give priority to one legacy or class of legacies, where the testator, after giving them, adds that as there will be a surplus, he gives further legacies; the former will in such case have a priority; they will, however, abate ratably as among themselves; and in all these and similar cases the result is a matter of intention: Att'y-Gen. v. Robins, 2 P. Wms. 23; Brown v. Brown, 1 Keen, 275; Stammers v. Hallilev, 12 Sim. 42.

§ 1141, ¹ Blower v. Morret, ² Ves. Sr. 420; Titus's Adm'r v. Titus, ²⁶ N. J. Eq. 111; Appeal of Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, 97 Pa. St. 187; see Bliven v. Seymour, 88 N. Y. 469.

§ 1140, (c) See, also, In re Schweder's Estate, [1891] 3 Ch. 44 (legacy to wife for immediate requirements abates, though directed to be paid within three months after testator's decease). § 1141, (a) See, also, In re Schweder's Estate, [1891] 3 Ch. 44 (legacy to wife); In re Parson's Estate, 150 Iowa, 230, 129 N. W. 955 (legacy to a daughter). such legacies the preference, his intention will be followed; and a court of equity would easily discover such intention in favor of a widow, child, or descendant.² This general rule has been changed in several states by statutes which give legacies to near family relatives the preference over all other general legacies, and perhaps over those which are special or demonstrative.³

§ 1142. The Same. Legacy for a Valuable Consideration.—One exception to the general rule of abatement has always been admitted by courts of equity. A general legacy given for a valuable consideration—as, for example, to a widow in lieu and satisfaction of her dower, or to a creditor in payment or discharge of a debt—has priority, and does not abate with the other legacies, provided the dower right or the debt still exists at the testator's death.¹*

§ 1141, ² Lewin v. Lewin, 2 Ves. Sr. 415. The court leans in favor of such an intention in case of a widow or child, but against it in case of legatees who are wholly volunteers and *strangers*.

§ 1141, ³ See Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 1361 (husband, widow, children, or other family kindred); Scofield v. Adams, 12 Hun, 366 (husband).

§ 1142, ¹ Burridge v. Bradyl, ¹ P. Wms. 127; Blower v. Morret, ² Ves. Sr. 420; Heath v. Dendy, ¹ Russ. 543; Davies v. Bush, ¹ Younge, 341; Potter v. Brown, ¹¹ R. I. 232 (dower); Sanford v. Sanford, ⁴ Hun, 753 (legacy in lieu of dower is only entitled to preference in payment out of the personal property, and is not a charge on the real estate); Matter of Dolan, ⁴ Redf. 511 (dower); McLean v. Robertson, 126 Mass. 537 (for a debt).

§ 1142, (a) The text is cited in Matthews v. Targurona, 104 Md. 442, 10 Ann. Cas. 153, 65 Atl. 60 (the debt must be a subsisting, valid one, not given merely by reason of a sense of moral olligation or as compensation for gratuitous services); Gordon v. James, 86 Miss. 719, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 461, 39 South. 18 (same). See, also, Harper's Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 243, 2 Atl. 861; Brown v. Brown, 79 Va. 648; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 27 R. I. 520, 63 Atl. 804 (legacy in consideration for services, preferred). In lieu of dower: Ballantine v. Ballantine, 152 Fed. 775; Security Co. v. Bryant, 52 Conn. 311, 52 Am. Rep. 599; Moore v. Alden, 80 Me. 301, 6 Am. St. Rep. 203, 14 Atl. 199, citing this paragraph of the text; Borden v. Jenks, 140 Mass. 565, 54 Am. Rep. 507, 5 N. E. 623; Pope v. Pope, 209 Mass. 432, 95 N. E. 864; Estate of Gotzian, 34 Minn. 159, 57 Am. Rep. 43, 24 N. W. 920; Roll v. Roll, 68 N. J. Eq. 227, 59 Atl. 296; Plum v. Smith, 70 N. J. Eq. 602, 62 Atl. 763. For a § 1143. Appropriation of a Fund.—If a particular fund has been set apart and appropriated by the executor for the payment of a legacy, with the consent of the legatee, and afterwards, through the wrongful act of the executor or otherwise, this fund becomes deficient, the legatee is not entitled to contribution from the other legatees of the same class, in order to make up the deficiency, but can only resort to the residue, if there be any. It is otherwise if the appropriation was made without the consent of the legatee; in that case he is entitled to call upon the other legatees, so that the loss should be borne by all of them ratably.¹

§ 1144. Lapsed Legacies.—When the legatee is dead at the time of making the will, or dies afterwards during the testator's lifetime, by the common-law rule the legacy to him is said "to lapse"; the gift to him wholly fails; it does not pass to his personal representatives, next of kin, or heirs, nor has he the power to dispose of it by his own will. In short, the legacy becomes entirely nugatory. The same general rule of the common law applies to a devise of any real estate.¹ Where a gift is made to a number of per-

§ 1143, ¹ Baker v. Farmer, L. R. 3 Ch. 537, reversing L. R. 4 Eq. 382; Ex parte Chadwin, 3 Swanst. 380; Willmott v. Jenkins, 1 Beav. 401; Page v. Leapingwell, 18 Ves. 463, 466; Humphreys v. Humphreys, 2 Cox, 184; Fonnereau v. Poyntz, 1 Brown Ch. 472, 478. The reason of this distinction is, that where the legatee has consented to such an appropriation, he has made the executor his *personal* debtor; he has, as it were, received payment of his legacy, and then loaned it back to the executor; but in the other case, the act is that of the executor alone.

§ 1144, 1 Maybank v. Brooks, 1 Brown Ch. 84; Goodright v. Wright, 1 P. Wms. 397; Elliott v. Davenport, 1 P. Wms. 83; Appleton v. Rowley,

limitation on the general rule, see In re Greenwood, [1892] 2 Ch. 295. In In re Wedmore (Wedmore v. Wedmore), [1907] 2 Ch. 277, Kekewich, J., decided that it had never been expressly held that a legacy given in payment of an ascertained debt was entitled to priority; although he admitted that the rule was laid down as stated in the text by such authorities as Williams on Executors and Theobald on Wills. In In re Whitehead (Whitehead v. Street, [1913] 2 Ch. 56, however, In re Wedmore was doubted; and the rule of the text treated as well established by *dicta*; but held not to apply to a case where the legatee's release of his claim would not benefit the testator's estate, but a third party. sons as a class, such class to be ascertained and fixed as it exists at the death of the testator or at any other specified time, the predecease of any member of the class will not occasion a lapse of his share; the class as it exists at the time designated will take the whole property.²a Whenever a legacy lapses, the specific property bequeathed, if it was specific, or the amount of assets which would be requisite for its payment if it was general, falls into the residue, and passes by the residuary clause, if there be one; but if there be no residuary clause, then as to such property the testator would in fact die intestate; the amount would be actually undisposed of by will. Where a devise lapsed, by the common-law rule the land given by it would not fall into any residuary clause of the testator's real state, but would descend to his heirs or heirs at law. This latter rule of the common law has been altered in England and generally in the American states by statute.³

L. R. 8 Eq. 139; Browne v. Hope, L. R. 14 Eq. 343. This common-law rule is very stringent. No mere words of the will, however express, showing an intent of the testator that a lapse should not take place, would prevent it: Appleton v. Rowley and Browne v. Hope, *supra*. The only possible mode of preventing the lapse was for the testator to substitute some other legatee or devisee, in place of the one first named, to whom the property should go on his death. There must be an actual gift over to another legatee or devisee in case the first-named dies: Aspinall v. Duckworth, 35 Beav. 307; Browne v. Hope, *supra*.

§ 1144, ² Shuttleworth v. Greaves, 4 Mylne & C. 35; Lee v. Pain, 4 Hare, 201, 250; Leigh v. Leigh, 17 Beav. 605; Fitz Roy v. Duke of Richmond, 27 Beav. 186; Sanders v. Ashford, 28 Beav. 609; Aspinall v. Duckworth, 35 Beav. 307. There are one or two other particular exceptions to the general rule. The most important is a bequest for *payment of debts* to the creditors themselves, which will not lapse, but will go to their representatives upon their predecease: Philips v. Philips, 3 Hare, 281.

§ 1144, 3 1 Vict., c. 26, sec. 25. A lapsed devise is made to fall into the residue like a lapsed legacy. The reason of the common-law rule was found in the doctrine that a will of land, unlike that of personal property,

§1144, (a) See, also, In re Moss, [1899] 2 Ch. 314; Hall v. Smith, 61 N. H. 144. Where the intention of the testator is not merely bounty to the legatee, but to discharge a moral obligation recognized by the testator, the legacy does not lapse: Stevens v. King, [1904] 2 Ch. 30.

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§1145. The Same. Statutory Changes.—The foregoing rules of the common law were generally adopted in this country, and still forms a part of our jurisprudence, except in the particular cases or under the particular circumstances where they have been altered by statute. Such modifying legislation, within certain well-defined limits, has been extensively enacted. One common type seems to have been followed. In England the modification is confined to a legacy or devise to a child or other descendant of the testator who shall predecease leaving *issue* living at the

testator's death. The gift in such case shall not lapse.¹ American statutes have sometimes made the alteration of the old rule a little broader in its operation, but still have confined it to gifts bestowed upon near family relatives of the testator.² Under the language of the English statute,

speaks as from the date of its execution, and not from the testator's death. This distinction has been generally abrogated by statute, so that in England and in most of our states wills of real and of personal property alike speak as at the time of the testator's death.

§ 1145, 1 1 Vict., c. 26, sec. 33: "Where any person, being a child or other issue of the testator, to whom any real or personal estate shall be devised or bequeathed, . . . shall die in the lifetime of the testator leaving issue, and any such issue of such person shall be living at the time of the death of the testator, such devise or bequest shall not lapse, but shall take effect as if the death of such person had happened immediately after the death of the testator." It is held, under this section, that the *same* issue need not be living at the death of the legatee or devisee, and of the tes-"tator. It is enough if one person is living at the death of the legatee or devisee, and another person at the death of the testator, but both belonging to the same line of *issue*. In the Goods of Parker, 1 Swab. & T. 523.

§ 1145, 2 The provision is also generally retained, that a lapse is only prevented when the legatee or devisee leaves "issue" or "descendants," or perhaps only in behalf of such issue or "descendants." As illustrations, in New York, a legacy or devise to "a descendant, or a brother, or sister" of the testator does not lapse if such legatee or devisee predecease leaving "a descendant or descendants" who survive the testator: 2 Rev. Stats., p. 66, sec. 52. In construing this provision, it is held that the "descendants" of the legatee or devisee, in order to prevent a lapse, must be lineal descendants,—issue; that the word is used in its ordinary, popular meaning, and not in its purely technical sense of "heirs," either collateral or it is held that the issue are not *substituted* in place of their deceased parent, but the legacy or devise actually *vests* in the original legatee or devisee to whom the testator gave it, so that it will pass by a will made by such legatee or devisee who dies before the original testator.³ It would seem, however, that the language of some of the American statutes does not admit such an interpretation.

SECTION II.

DONATIONS CAUSA MORTIS.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1146. General nature.
- § 1147. Is not testamentary.
- § 1148. The subject-matter of a valid gift.
- § 1149. Delivery.
- § 1150. Revocation.
- §1151. Equitable jurisdiction.

§ 1146. General Nature.^a—A donation *causa mortis* is a gift absolute in form, made by the donor in anticipation of his speedy death, and intended to take effect and operate as a transfer of the title upon, and only upon, the happening

lineal: Van Beuren v. Dash, 30 N. Y. 393. In California, the provision prevents a lapse "when any estate is devised to any child or other relative of the testator, and the devisee dies before the testator, leaving lineal descendants": Civ. Code, sec. 1310. It is very remarkable that the language of this section is confined to "devisee" and "devise," and no mention is made of "legatee," "legacy," or "hequest." It is to be presumed that the courts will extend its operation by interpretation, but such interpretation must certainly be a very strained one. Unfortunately for the cause of codification, the Civil Code of California contains too many such imperfect, partial, ambiguous provisions.

§ 1145, ³ Winter v. Winter, 5 Hare, 306; Wisden v. Wisden, 2 Smale & G. 396. This statute does not in any way affect gifts to children as a class: Olney v. Bates, 3 Drew. 319; Browne v. Hammond, Johns. 210.

 §.1146, (a) Sections 1146–1151 are
 Bank v. Daniels, 32 Okl. 121, Ann.

 cited in Foley v. Harrison, 233 Mo.
 Cas. 1914A, 520, 40 L. B. A. (N. S.)

 460, 136 S. W. 354; Apache State
 901, 121 Pac. 237.

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of the donor's death. Between the time when the gift is made and the article donated is delivered, and the time when the donor dies, the donation is wholly inchoate and conditional; the property remains in the donor, awaiting the time of his death, and passes to the donee when the death, in anticipation of which the gift was made, happens, unless the donation has in the meantime been revoked by the donor; the donee thus becomes a trustee for the donor, with respect to the article delivered into his possession, until the gift is made perfect by the donor's death. The gift must be absolute, with the exception of the condition inherent in its nature depending upon the donor's death, as above described, and a delivery of the article donated is a necessary element; but it is subject to revocation by the act of the donor prior to death, and is completely revoked by the donor's recovery from the sickness or escape from the danger in view of which it was made.^{1b} Such a dona-

§ 1146, 1 Since the whole doctrine is avowedly borrowed from the Roman law, it may be useful to give the definition contained in the Institutes: "Mortis causa donatio est, quæ propter mortis fit suspicionem; cum quis ita donat ut, si quid humanitus ei contigisset, haberet is qui accipit; sin autem supervixisset is qui donavit, reciperet, vel si eum donationis pœnituisset, aut prior decesserit is cui donatum sit." "A donation mortis causa is that which is made in expectation of death; as when anything is so given that if any fatal accident befalls the donor, the person to whom it is given shall have it as his own; but if the donor should survive, or if he should repent of having made the gift, or if the person to whom it has been given should die before the donor, then the donor shall receive back the thing given": Just. Inst., lib. 2, tit. 7, sec. 1; Sandars's Inst. 218. The California Civil Code thus defines it: "Sec. 1149: A gift in view of death

§ 1146, (b) This section is quoted in Foley v. Harrison, 233 Mo. 460, 136 S. W. 354; Scott v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 123 Tenn. 258, 130 S. W. 757; and cited in Ridden v. Thrall, 125 N. Y. 572, 21 Am. St. Rep. 758, 11 L. R. A. 684, 26 N. E. 627; Allen v. Allen, 75 Minn. 116, 74 Am. St. Rep. 442, 77 N. W. 567; Larrabee v. Hascall, 88 Me. 511, 51 Am. St. Rep. 440, 34 Atl. 408; Thomas's Adm'r v. Lewis, 89 Va. 1, 37 Am. St. Rep. 848, 18 L. R. A. 170, 15 S. E. 389; Leyson v. Davis, 17 Mont. 220, 31 L. R. A. 429, 42 Pac. 775; Johnson v. Colley, 101 Va. 414, 99 Am. St. Rep. 884, 44 S. E. 721; Smith v. Smith's Adm'r, 92 Va. 696, 24 S. E. 280; and in Northrip v. Burge, 255 Mo. 641, 164 S. W. 584. § 1146

tion may be made by a donor who anticipates his speedy death because he is suffering at the time under an attack of severe illness which he supposes to be his last, or because

is one which is made in contemplation, fear, or peril of death, and with intent that it shall take effect only in case of the death of the giver." "Sec. 1151: A gift in view of death may be revoked by the giver at any time, and is revoked by his recovery from the illness, or escape from the peril, under the presence of which it was made, or by the occurrence of any event which would operate as a revocation of a will made at the same time." In Edwards v. Jones, 1 Mylne & C. 226, 235, Lord Cottenham said: "A party making a donatio mortis causa does not part with the whole interest, save only in a certain event; and it is of the essence of such a gift that it shall not otherwise take effect. A donatio mortis causa leaves the whole title in the donor, unless the event occurs which is to divest him." To the same effect is Staniland v. Willott, 3 Macn. & G. 664, 674-677, 680, per Lord Truro, who concludes his discussion as follows: "I therefore feel bound to declare that the original transaction constituted a donatio mortis causa, and that the shares (given) after the plaintiff's (donor's) recovery from the illness during which the gift was made were held by the defendant (donee) as a trustee for the plaintiff."

On the general nature and essentials of gifts causa mortis, and as illustrations of the text, e see Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1205, 1219–1229, 1230–1251; Hedges v. Hedges, Prec. Ch. 269; Jones v. Selby, Prec. Ch. 300; Miller v. Miller, 3 P. Wms. 356; Lawson v. Lawson, 1 P. Wms. 441; Blount v. Burrow, 1 Ves. 546; Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. 111, 120; Gardner v. Parker, 3 Madd. 184; Snellgrove v. Baily, 3 Atk. 214; Duffield v. Elwes, 1 Sim. & St. 239; 1 Bligh, N. S., 497, 527; Powell v. Hellicar, 26 Beav. 261; Cosnahan v. Grice, 15 Moore P. C. C. 215; Boutts v. Ellis, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 249; Mitchell v. Smith, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 422; Hewitt v. Kaye, L. R. 6 Eq. 198; In re Beak's Estate, L. R. 13 Eq. 489; Moore v. Moore, L. R. 18 Eq. 474; Rolls v. Pearce, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 730; In re Mead, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 651; Rohinson v. Ring, 72 Me. 140, 39 Am. Rep. 308; Walter v. Ford, 74 Mo. 195, 41 Am. Rep. 312; West v. Cavins, 74 Ind. 265; Pierce v. Boston Sav. Bank,

§ 1146, (c) Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602, 27 L. Ed. 500, 2 Sup. Ct. 415; Barnes v. Barnes, 174 Ala. 166, 56 South. 958; Calvin v. Free, 66 Kan. 466, 71 Pac. 823; McCoy's Adm'r v. McCoy, 126 Ky. 783, 104 S. W. 1031; Peck v. Scofield, (Mass.) 71 N. E. 109; O'Neil v. O'Neil, 43 Mont. 505, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 268, 117 Pac. 889, (Montana statute defining gifts inter vivos and causa mortis); Emery v. Clough, 63 N. H. 552, 56 Am. Rep. 543, 4 Atl. 796; Deneff v. Helms, 42 Or. 161, 70 Pac. 390; Seabright v. Seabright, 28 W. Va. 412; monographic note to Johnson v. Colley. 101 Va. 414, 99 Am. St. Rep. 884, 44 S. E. 721. he is exposed, or expects soon to be exposed, to some great and unusual peril of his life; as by a soldier soon before entering into battle, or by a person immediately before

129 Mass. 425, 37 Am. Rep. 371; Turner v. Estabrook, 129 Mass. 425, 37 Am. Rep. 371; Conser v. Snowden, 54 Md. 175, 39 Am. Rep. 368; Estate of Barclay, 11 Phila. 123; Brooks v. Brooks, 12 S. C. 422; Darland v. Taylor, 52 Iowa, 503, 35 Am. Rep. 285; Conklin v. Conklin, 20 Hun, 278; Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass. 472, 26 Am. Rep. 680; McCarty v. Kearnan, '86 Ill. 291; Kilby v. Godwin, 2 Del. Ch. 61; Trorlicht v. Weizenecker, 1 Mo. App. 482; McGrath v. Reynolds, 116 Mass. 566; Clough v. Clough, 117 Mass. 83; Carr v. Silloway, 111 Mass. 24; Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 18 Am. Rep. 178; Stevens v. Stevens, 5 Thomp. & C. 87; Fiero v. Fiero, 5 Thomp. & C. 151; Case v. Dennison, 9 R. I. 88, 11 Am. Rep. 222; Tillinghast v. Wheaton, 8 R. I. 536, 5 Am. Rep. 621, 94 Am. Dec. 126; Smith v. Dorsey, 38 Ind. 451, 10 Am. Rep. 118; Baker v. Williams, 34 Ind. 547; Rockwood v. Wiggin, 16 Gray, 402; Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, 96 Am. Dec. 464; Southerland v. Southerland's Adm'r, 5 Bush, 591; Prickett v. Prickett's Adm'rs, 20 N. J. Eq. 478; Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Me. 422; Borneman v. Sidlinger, 15 Me. 429, 33 Am. Dec. 626; Weston v. Hight, 17 Me. 287, 290, 35 Am. Dec. 250; Holley v. Adams, 16 Vt. 206, 210, 212, 42 Am. Dec. 508; Smith v. Kittridge, 21 Vt. 238, 245; Meach v. Meach, 24 Vt. 591; Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick. 198, 203, 204, 25 Am. Dec. 378; Grover v. Grover, 24 Pick. 261, 35 Am. Dec. 319; Sessions v. Moseley, 4 Cush. 87; ⁴ Bates v. Kempton, 7 Gray, 382; Grattan v. Appleton, 3 Story, 755, 763; Raymond v. Sellick, 10 Conn. 480; Harris v. Clark, 2 Barb. 94, 96; 3 N. Y. 93; Delmotte v. Taylor, 1 Redf. 417; Ogilvie v. Ogilvie, 1 Bradf. 356; Westerlo v. De Witt, 35 Barb. 215; Wells v. Tucker, 3 Binn. 366; Nicholas v. Adams, 2 Whart. 17; Hebb v. Hebb, 5 Gill, 506; Bradley v. Hunt, 5 Gill & J. 54, 23 Am. Dec. 597; Pennington v. Gittings, 2 Gill & J. 208; Miller v. Jeffress, 4 Gratt. 472; Chevallier v. Wilson, 1 Tex. 161.

With regard to the nature of the peril, it has been held that a gift made by a soldier in time of war, not upon eve of battle or in anticipation of any *immediate* danger, but in anticipation of the general peril incident to his occupation, might be a valid gift *causa mortis*: Baker v. Williams, 34 Ind. 547; Gass v. Simpson, 4 Cold. 288; and see Smith v. Dorsey, 38 Ind. 451, 10 Am. Rep. 118. The contrary is decided in Irish v. Nutting, 47 Barb. 370; Dexheimer v. Gautier, 5 Rob. (N. Y.) 216; Gourley v. Linsenbigler, 51 Pa. St. 345.^d In my opinion, these latter decisions are clearly correct. If such gifts were valid as donations *causa mortis*, on the same

§ 1146, (d) And compare Parcher v. Ertrachter), (Mich.), 162 N. W.
v. Savings Institution, 78 Me. 470, 978 (denor need not expect that 7 Atl. 266; In re Reh's Estate (Reh death will be speedy).

undergoing a dangerous surgical operation. If a gift is actually made by the donor during his last sickness, or under any other circumstances which would naturally impress him with an expectation of speedy death, it will be presumed to be a donation *causa mortis*, although the donor does not, in express terms, declare it to be such.² Although courts do not lean against gifts *causa mortis*, yet the evidence to establish them should be clear and unequivocal, and will be closely scrutinized. The burden of proof lies on the donee.^{3 f}

ground gifts made at any time by persons having a chronic disease, although in no immediate danger, would be equally good, because their lives are more likely to be shortened than those of persons in health.

§ 1146, ² Lawson v. Lawson, 1 P. Wms. 441; Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 1150. It is never necessary that the donor should expressly say that the gift is to be conditional on his death; this fact may be inferred from the circumstances: Gardner v. Parker, 3 Madd. 184, 185; Tate v. Leithead, Kay, 658; Ogilvie v. Ogilvie, 1 Bradf. 356.^e

§ 1146, ³ Cosnahan v. Grice, 15 Moore P. C. C. 215; Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 18 Am. Rep. 178; Delmotte v. Taylor, 1 Redf. 417; Westerlo v. De Witt, 35 Barb. 215; Conklin v. Conklin, 20 Hun, 278; Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass. 472, 26 Am. Rep. 680; Rockwood v. Wiggin, 16 Gray, 402; Rhodes v. Childş, 64 Pa. St. 18; Dean v. Dean's Estate, 43 Vt. 337; Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, 96 Am. Dec. 464; First Nat. Bank v. Balcom, 35 Conn. 351; Prickett v. Prickett's Adm'rs, 20 N. J. Eq. 478.

§ 1146, (e) Seabright v. Seabright, 28 W. Va. 412, 475. But circumstances from which a contemplation of impending death may be inferred must be present, otherwise a gift causa mortis cannot be supported: Nogga v. Savings Bank of Ansonia, 79 Conn. 425, 65 Atl. 129; Stark v. Kelley, 132 Ky. 376, 113 S. W. 498 (gift several months before death).

§ 1146, (f) The text is quoted in Scott v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 123 Tenn. 258, 130 S. W. 757. Sec, also, Smith v. Smith's Adm'r, 92 Va. 696, 24 S. E. 280, citing the text; Seabright v. Seabright, 28 W. Va. 412; Mellor v. Bank of Willows, 173 Cal. 454, 160 Pac. 567; Schuyler v. Stephens, 28 R. I. 506, 68 Atl. 311; Hecht v. Shaffer, 15 Wyo. 34, 85 Pac. 1056. But see Baber v. Caples, 71 Or. 212, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1025, 138 Pac. 472 (only a fair preponderance of evidence is necessary to support a gift causa mortis). That the gift must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is stated in Foley v. Harrison, 233 Mo. 460, 136 S. W. 354; Stewart v. Stokes, 177 Mo. App. 390, 164 S. W. 156. § 1147. Is not Testamentary.—A gift causa mortis is not a testamentary act; if it becomes absolute, the title of the donee is derived directly from the donor in his lifetime, and not from or through his executors or administrators.^{1a} For this reason, if a person intends to make a testamentary gift, which for any reason is ineffectual, it cannot be supported as a donation causa mortis;^{2b} nor can an imperfect

§ 1147, 1 Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431; Grattan v. Appleton, 3 Story, 755.

§ 1147, ² Mitchell v. Smith, ⁴ De Gex, J. & S. 422; McGrath v. Reynolds, 116 Mass. 566.

§1147, (a) Emery v. Clough, 63 N. H. 552, 56 Am. Rep. 543, 4 Atl. 796.

§1147, (b) Ineffectual Testamentary Gift.-The text is quoted in Foley v. Harrison, 233 Mo. 460, 136 S. W. 354; Trenholm v. Morgan, 28 S. C. 268, 5 S. E. 721. In Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602, 27 L. Ed. 500, 2 Sup. Ct. 415, the donor delivered to the donee a certificate of deposit with the following indorsement: "Pay to Martin Basket, of Henderson, Ky.; no one else; then not till my death. My life seems to be uncertain. I may live through this spell. Then I will attend to it myself." The donor afterwards died. Held, not a valid gift. The court say, through Matthews, J., at page 609 of 107 U.S.: "A donatio causa mortis must be completely executed, precisely as required in the case of a gift inter vivos, subject to be divested by the happening of any of the conditions subsequent; that is, upon actual revocation by the donor, or by the donor surviving the apprehended peril, or outliving the donee, or by the occurrence of a deficiency of assets necessary to pay the debts of the deceased donor. These conditions are the only qualifications that distinguish gifts causa mortis and inter vivos. On the other hand, if the gift does not take effect as an executed and complete transfer to the donee of possession and title, either legal or equitable, during the life of the donor, it is a testamentary disposition, good only if made and proved as a will." Page 614 of 107 U.S.: "A delivery which does not confer upon the donee the present right to reduce the fund into possession, by enforcing the obligation according to its terms, will not suffice. A delivery, in terms, which confers upon the donee power to control the fund only after the death of the donor, when by the instrument itself it is presently payable, is testamentary in character, and not good as a gift." Compare Williams v. Guile, 117 N. Y. 343, 6 L. R. A. 366, 22 N. E. 1071, where it was held that the insertion of a power of revocation by the donor, in an assignment of a policy of insurance, did not render the assignment invalid as a gift causa mortis, although the evidence showed that the instrument was not to take effect in præsenti at all. It is said (p. 348): "No present possession or dominion did or could pass to the donee; ... but there was sufficient in the case as made

gift inter vivos be sustained as a valid donation causa mortis.³^c It partakes, however, so much of the nature of a testamentary bequest that it is liable for the debts of the testator in case of a deficiency of assets.⁴ A valid gift may be made to any person, to the wife of the donor,⁵ or to one standing in fiduciary or confidential relations to him,⁶ as well as to all others.

§ 1148. The Subject-matter of a Valid Gift.—All kinds of personal property,^a using the word in its broad, mercantile sense, as equivalent to *assets*, which are *capable* of manual delivery, and of which the title, either legal or *equitable*, can be transferred by delivery, may be the subjectmatter of a valid donation *causa mortis*. That all actual chattels, including money, either coin or bank notes, may be donated, has never been questioned. Whatever doubt may

§ 1147, ³ Edwards v. Jones, 1 Mylne & C. 226; Kilby v. Godwin, 2 Del. Ch. 61.

§ 1147, 4 Tate v. Leithead, Kay, 658; Smith v. Casen, cited 1 P. Wms. 406; Borneman v. Sidlinger, 15 Me. 429, 33 Am. Dec. 626; House v. Grant, 4 Lans. 296.

§ 1147, 5 Boutts v. Ellis, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 249.d

§ 1147, 6 In such case the evidence must be most unequivocal: Thompson v. Heffernan, 4 Dru. & War. 285 (to donor's spiritual adviser); Walsh v. Studdart, 4 Dru. & War. 159 (to his attorney).^e

to establish a gift causa mortis." It is difficult to resist the impression that the language last quoted indicates a wrong conception of the nature of gifts causa mortis.

§ 1147, (c) See Schultz v. Becker, 131 Wis. 235, 110 N. W. 214. See, however, Williams v. Guile, 117 N. Y. 343, 6 L. R. A. 366, 22 N. E. 1071.

§ 1147 (d) Davie v. Davie, 47 Wash. 231, 91 Pac. 950 (husband, a few days before his death, with his wife, executed a deed to certain property to be placed in escrow. The husband directed before two wituesses that his wife's name be used, as it was for her. Held valid gift causa mortis); Mellor v. Bank of Willows, 173 Cal. 454, 160 Pac. 567.

§ 1147, (e) Baber v. Caples, 71 Or. 212, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1025, 138 Pac. 472 (man and woman engaged; gift by the woman must be shown not to have been obtained by undue influence or fraud); Schuyler v. Stephens, 28 R. I. 506, 68 Atl. 311.

§1148, (a) The doctrine does not apply to real property: In re Reh's Estate (Reh v. Ertrachter), (Mich.) 162 N. W. 978 (leasehold for more than a year). have once been entertained, the rule is now well established that all things in action which consist of the promises or undertakings of third persons, not the donor himself, of which the legal or equitable title can pass by delivery, may be the subjects of a valid gift, including promissory notes, bills of exchange, checks, bonds, mortgages, savings-bank pass-books, certificates of deposit, policies of insurance, and the like; and it is settled by the recent cases that a valid donation of negotiable instruments may thus be made without indorsement.^{1b} Debts due from the donee himself may

§ 1148, ¹ The following cases will furnish illustrations of the various kinds of articles, things in action, etc., with respect of which gifts have been sustained: Chattels and money, whether coin or bills: Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431; Shanley v. Harvey, 2 Eden, 126; Miller v. Miller, 3 P. Wms. 356; Drury v. Smith, 1 P. Wms. 404; Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt 224; Kilby v. Godwin, 2 Del. Ch. 61; Baker v. Williams, 34 Ind. 547; Dean v. Dean's Estate, 43 Vt. 337; Estate of Barclay, 11 Phila. 123; and see Coleman v. Parker, 114 Mass. 30. Promissory notes of third persons:^c Stevens v. Stevens, 5 Thomp. & C. 87; Bedell v. Carll, 33 N. Y. 581; House v. Grant, 4 Lans. 296; Coutant v. Schuyler, 1 Paige, 316; Craig v. Craig, 3 Barb. Ch. 76, 117; Southerland v. Southerland's Adm'r, 5 Bush, 591; Ashbrook v. Ryon's Adm'r, 2 Bush, 228, 92 Am. Dec. 481; Turpin v. Thompson, 2 Met. (Ky.) 420; Borneman v. Sidlinger, 15 Me. 429, 33 Am. Dec. 626; Caldwell v. Renfrew, 33 Vt. 213; Grover v. Grover, 24 Pick. 261, 35 Am. Dec, 319; Sessions v. Moseley, 4 Cush. 87; Chase v. Redding, 13 Gray, 418; Brown v. Brown, 18 Conn. 410, 46 Am. Dec. 328; Gourley v. Linsenbigler, 51 Pa. St. 345; Jones v. Deyer, 16 Ala. 221. Unindorsed bills or notes: d In re Mead, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 651; Veal v. Veal, 27 Beav. 303: Rankin v. Weguelin, cited 27 Beav. 308, 309; Bates v. Kempton, 7 Grav. 382; Chase v. Redding, 13 Gray, 418, 420. Certificates of deposit:e

§ 1148, (b) The text is quoted in Philpot v. Temple Banking Co., 3 Ga. App. 742, 60 S. E. 480; and see Foley v. Harrison, 233 Mo. 460, 136 S. W. 354.

§ 1148, (c) Promissory Notes of Third Persons.—Pace v. Pace, 107 Miss. 292, 65 South. 273; Baber v. Caples, 71 Or. 212, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1025, 138 Pac. 472; Clayton v. Pierson, (W. Va.) 46 S. E. 935 (voucher signed by third person acknowledging indebtedness). § 1148, (d) Unindorsed Bills or Notes.—Druke v. Heiken, 61 Cal. 346, 44 Am. Rep. 553; Blazo v. Cochrane, 71 N. H. 585, 53 Atl. 1026; Baker v. Moran, 67 Or. 386, 136 Pac. 30; but where both parties know the importance of a written assignment, a strong presumption is raised against considering the transfer a gift: Varick v. Hitt, (N. J. Eq.) 55 Atl. 139.

§ 1148, (e) Certificates of Deposit. In re Dillon, 44 Ch. Div. 76; and see

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be donated, either by giving back to him the written evidence of debt, or by canceling or destroying the same, or

Moore v. Moore, L. R. 18 Eq. 474 (a "deposit note" which seems to be substantially the same as our certificate of deposit); Amis v. Witt, 33 Beav. 619 (same); Brooks v. Brooks, 12 S. C. 422; Westerlo v. De Witt, 36 N. Y. 340, 93 Am. Dec. 517. Bonds, or bonds and mortgages: Duffield v. Elwes, 1 Bligh, N. S., 497, 527, 542; Gardner v. Parker, 3 Madd. 184; Hnrst v. Beach, 5 Madd. 351; Clavering v. Yorke, 2 Coll. C. C. 363, note; In re Patterson, 10 Jur., N. S., 578; Snellgrove v. Baily, 3 Atk. 214; and see Conklin v. Conklin, 20 Hun, 278; Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, 96 Am. Dec. 464; Lees' Ex'r v. Boak, 11 Gratt. 182; Bradley v. Hunt, 5 Gill & J. 54; 23 Am. Dec. 597; Pennington v. Gittings, 2 Gill & J. 208. Savings-bank pass-books: Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass. 472, 26 Am. Dec. 680; Pierce v. Boston Sav. Bank, 129 Mass. 425, 37 Am. Rep. 371; Turner v. Estabrook, 129 Mass. 425, 37 Am. Rep. 371; Vandermark v. Vandermark, 55 How. Pr. 408; Tillinghast v. Wheaton, 8 R. I. 536, 5 Am. Rep. 621, 94 Am. Dec. 126; Case v. Dennison, 9 R. I. 88, 11 Am. Rep. 222; Dean v. Dean's Estate, 43 Vt. 337; Camp's Appeal, 36 Conn. 88, 4 Am. Rep. 39; Penfield v. Thayer, 2 E. D. Smith, 305; but see Ashbrook v. Ryon's Adm'r, 2 Bush, 228, 92 Am. Dec. 481 (pass-book of a hank).^h

Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602, 27 L. Ed. 500, 2 Sup. Ct. 415, ante, note (b) to § 1147. See, also, Philpot v. Temple Banking Co., 3 Ga. App. 742, 60 S. E. 480 (need not be indorsed); Lowe v. Hart, 93 Ark. 548, 125 S. W. 1030; Scott v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 123 Tenn. 258, 130 S. W. 757 (though deceased died before certificate was paid); Mellor v. Bank of Willows, 173 Cal. 454, 160 Pac. 567.

§ 1148, (1) Bonds, or Bonds and Mortgages.—Kiff v. Weaver, 94 N. C. 274, 55 Am. Rep. 601; Henschel v. Maurer, 69 Wis. 576, 2 Am. St. Rep. 757, 34 N. W. 926.

§ 1148, (g) Savings-bank Passbooks.—In re Andrews, [1902] 2 Ch. 394; In re Weston, [1902] 1 Ch. 680 (citing In re Dillon, 44 Ch. Div. 76; Cassidy v. Belfast Banking Co., 22 L. R. Ir. 68); McCoy's Adm'r v. Mc-

Coy, 126 Ky. 783, 104 S. W. 1031; Larrabee v. Hascall, 88 Me. 511, 51 Am. St. Rep. 440, 34 Atl. 408; Pfeifer v. Badenhop, 86 N. J. L. 492, 92 Atl. 273; Van Wagenen v. Bonnot, 72 N. J. Eq. 143, 65 Atl. 239; Ridden v. Thrall, 125 N. Y. 572, 21 Am. St. Rep. 758, 11 L. R. A. 684, 26 N. E. 627; Providence Inst. for Savings v. Taft, 14 R. I. 502; but a delivery of a pass-book of an ordinary bank of deposit creates no right in the donee: Jones v. Weakley, 99 Ala. 441, 42 Am. St. Rep. 84, 19 L. R. A. 700, 12 South. 420; Szabo v. Speckman, (Fla.) 74 South. 411; Pace v. Pace, 107 Miss. 292, 65 South. 273; Thomas's Adm'r v. Lewis, 89 Va. 1, 37 Am. St. Rep. 848, 18 L. R. A. 170, 15 S. E. 389.

§ 1148, (h) Also, Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 177, 9 Am. St. Rep. 83, 1 L. R. A. 535, 15 Atl. 470. by delivering a receipt.² Things in action, on the other hand, in which the donor himself is the debtor party, cannot be the subject-matter of a valid gift. The reason is, that, whatever be their form, these gifts would amount to nothing more than the donor's own naked executory *promise* to pay at some further day, without any consideration to support it; and such a voluntary promise cannot be enforced

Check of a third person:¹ Boutts v. Ellis, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 249. Policy of insurance: 1 Witt v. Amis, 1 Best & S. 109. Stock of corporations: It is held in England that shares of stock are not capable of being the subject-matter of a valid donation, because no title can be transferred by delivery; no title can pass except by transfer on the company's own hooks: Moore v. Moore, L. R. 18 Eq. 474; Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431.k Under the law of this country, with respect to the title of the assignee before transfer is made on the company's hooks, there seems to be no reason why a certificate of stock may not be the subject of a valid gift,certainly if it has been indorsed in blank; but in my opinion, such indorsement is not necessary.¹ Things in action in general: See, also, Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 18 Am. Rep. 178; Wing v. Merchant, 57 Me. 383; Reed v. Spaulding, 42 N. H. 114; Champney v. Blanchard, 39 N. Y. 111; Waring v. Edmonds, 11 Md. 424; Phipps v. Hope, 16 Ohio St. 586; Connor v. Trawick's Adm'r, 37 Ala. 289, 295, 79 Am. Dec. 58. It may be remarked that, with regard to what may be given, the rules concerning the subject-matter of gifts causa mortis and of gifts inter vivos are the same.

§ 1148, 2 Moore v. Darton, 4 De Gex & S. 517 (giving a receipt); Darland v. Taylor, 52 Iowa, 503, 35 Am. Rep. 285, 3 N. W. 510 (destroying notes of the donee); Lee's Ex'r v. Boak, 11 Gratt. 182.

§ 1148, (1) Check of a Third Person.—Clement v. Cheeseman, 37 Ch. Div. 631 (unindorsed).

§ 1148, (J) Policy of Insurance. Stout v. McNab, 157 Cal. 356, 107 Pac. 1005; Williams v. Guile, 117 N. Y. 343, 6 L. R. A. 366, 22 N. E. 1071.

• § 1148, (k) Stock of Corporations. In re Weston, [1902] 1 Ch. 680; and see Baltimore Retort, etc., Co. v. Mali, 65 Md. 93, 57 Am. Rep. 304, 3 Atl. 286. This sentence of the note is quoted in Foley v. Harrison, 233 Mo. 460, 136 S. W. 354; and cited in Talbot v. Talbot, 32 R. I. 72, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1221, 78 Atl. 535.

§ 1148, (1) This is quoted in Leyson v. Davis, 17 Mont. 220, 31 L. B. A. 429, 42 Pac. 775, where it is held that a delivery without indorsement is valid; quoted, also, in Foley v. Harrison, 233 Mo. 460, 136 S. W. 354; and see Grimes v. Barndollan 58 Colo. 421, 148 Pac. 256. See, however, Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey, 55 Ind. App. 40, 100 N. E. 1049, 102 N. E. 282.

against the donor nor against his executors or administrators.³

§ 1148, 3 This rule has been universally recognized and applied to different forms of promise. The donor's own promissory note cannot constitute a valid gift:^m West v. Cavins, 74 Ind. 265; Flint v. Pattee, 33 N. H. 520, 66 Am. Dec. 742; Copp v. Sawyer, 6 N. H. 386; Smith v. Kittridge, 21 Vt. 238; Holley v. Adams, 16 Vt. 206, 42 Am. Dec. 508; Raymond v. Sellick, 10 Conn. 480; Grymes v. Hone, 49 N. Y. 17, 10 Am. Rep. 313; Whitaker v. Whitaker, 52 N. Y. 368, 11 Am. Rep. 711; Johnson v. Spies, 5 Hun, 468; Kenistons v. Sceva, 54 N. H. 24; Brown v. Moore, 3 Head, 671. The donor's own check: For the same reason the donor's own check. if not paid before his death, cannot be a valid gift: In re Mead, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 651; Hewitt v. Kaye, L. R. 6 Eq. 198; In re Beak's Estate, L. R. 13 Eq. 489; Harris v. Clark, 3 N. Y. 93, 110, 51 Am. Dec. 352; Second Nat. Bank v. Williams, 13 Mich. 282; McKenzie v. Downing, 25 Ga. 669; see Walter v. Ford, 74 Mo. 195, 41 Am. Rep. 312;ⁿ but the gift may be operative if the check is paid hefore the donor's death, since the gift is then in reality one of money merely; and the same is true if acts are done prior to the donor's death, which are tantamount to payment; e. g., the check is certified, or that of a third person is substituted in its place, so that the gift is no longer the mere voluntary promise of the donor: • Rolls

§ 1143, (m) Donor's Own Promissory Note.—See, also, In re Leaper (Blythe v. Atkinson), [1916] 1 Ch. 579; Mason v. Gardiner, (Mass.) 71 N. E. 952.

§ 1148, (n) Donor's Own Check.--The note is cited in Provident Institution for Savings v. Sisters of the Poor (N. J. Eq.) 100 Atl. 894. See, also, In re Beaumont, [1902] 1 Ch. 889; Appeal of Waynesburg College, 111 Pa. St. 130, 56 Am. Rep. 252, 3 Atl. 19: Pullen v. Placer County Bank, 138 Cal. 169, 94 Am. St. Rep. 19, 71 Pac. 83; contra, Phinney v. State, (Wash.) 78 Pac. 927 (reviewing many cases, but entirely ignoring any distinction between gifts of choses in action where the donor is the debtor and those where a third person is the debtor); and see Varley v. Sims, 100 Minn. 331, 117 Am. St. Rep. 694, 10 Ann. Cas. 473, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 828, 111 N. W. 269 (held, donor's check for part of deposit not valid subject-matter of gift causa mortis, but check for whole amount of donor's deposit, given in view of death, is valid though unaccepted by bank prior to donor's death, since such check is an equitable assignment).

§ 1148, (•) See Wober v. Salisbury, 149 Ky. 327, 148 S. W. 34, in which there was held to be a good gift causa mortis where a man mortally wounded drew a check for "all the money which I have on deposit with you," and gave it to S. with instructions for its use, S. presenting the check to the bank before donor's death and being told it was all right and leaving check with bank until after donor's death, when bank refused to honor it). § 1149. Delivery.—It is essential to the validity of a donation that the thing given be delivered to the donee or to his use. Without a delivery the transaction would only amount to a promise to give, which being without consideration, would be a nullity. The intention to give must be accompanied by a delivery, and the delivery must be made with an intention to give. The practical question therefore is, What is a sufficient delivery ?¹^a The delivery

v. Pearce, L. R. 5 Ch Div. 730; Bromley v. Brunton, L. R. 6 Eq. 275; Boutts v. Ellis, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 249; Rhodes v. Childs, 64 Pa. St. 18; Trorlicht v. Weizenecker, 1 Mo. App. 482.

A deed of land made by a woman in expectation of death, in consideration of services rendered by the grantee, was held not to be a donation *causa mortis*, but an absolute irrevocable conveyance for a sufficient consideration, which would not be set aside at the suit of the grantor upon her recovery from the illness: McCarty v. Kearnan, 86 Ill. 291.

§ 1149, 1 The mere fact that the alleged donee acquires possession is clearly insufficient; in order to establish a gift, he must show affirmatively that the possession or custody was conferred upon him by the donor, or was assented to by the donor with the intention thereby of divesting the donor of all control, and of making and perfecting a gift, and not with any other intention.^b I add a brief abstract of some of the more recent decisions, which will illustrate, better than any general description, the essential elements of a sufficient delivery.^c The same rules concerning de-

§ 1149, (a) The text is quoted in Foley v. Harrison, 233 Mo. 460, 136 S. W. 354; Scott v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 123 Tenn. 258, 130 S. W. 757.

§ 1149, (b) Keller v. McConville, 175 Mich. 479, 141 N. W. 652; Scott v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 123 Tenn. 258, 130 S. W. 757. It is even said of gifts causa mortis that "although the delivery may have been at one time complete, yet this will not be sufficient unless the possession be constantly maintained by the donee; if the donor again has possession, the gift becomes nugatory": Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, 96 Am. Dec. 464; Dunbar v. Dunbar, 80 Me. 152, 6 Am. St. Rep. 166, 13 Atl. 578; O'Gorman v. Jolley, 34 S. D. 26, 147 N. W. 78.

§ 1149, (c) Delivery of keys to donee who takes possession in the presence of the donor is sufficient: Goulding v. Horbury, 85 Me. 227, 35 Am. St. Rep. 357, 27 Atl. 127. Delivery of voucher for money with oral direction to collect, is sufficient: Claytor v. Pierson, (W. Va.) 46 S. E. 935. A verbal direction by creditor to debtor to pay to donee is valid as a gift causa mortis when the debtor accepts the order and promises the donee to make payment to him: Castle v. Persons, 117 Fed. S35, 54 C. C. A. 133. may be made directly to the donee, or to an agent or trustee on his behalf, but not to an agent for the donor. It may be actual—a manual possession of the article itself by the

livery apply alike to gifts causa mortis and to gifts inter vivos. A lady holding several notes made by her grandson destroyed them during her last illness, saying that she did not want him to pay them; held, a complete gift causa mortis, and the donee's acceptance would be presumed: Darland v. Taylor, 52 Iowa, 503, 35 Am. Rep. 285, 3 N. W. 510. Delivery of a savings-bank pass-book, accompanied by a written assignment to the donee, creates a valid gift of the money on deposit: Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass. 472, 26 Am. Rep. 680;^d and a delivery of such a book without any written assignment is also sufficient: Pierce v. Boston Savings Bank, 129 Mass. 425, 37 Am. Rep. 371.^e Actual delivery is essential, and if the delivery will not complete a gift inter vivos, it will not create a gift causa mortis.f A mother, during her last sickness, delivered bank notes and chattels belonging to her separate estate to a third person for the henefit of her minor children; held, a valid gift to these children: Kilby v. Godwin, 2 Del. Ch. 61.^g Money having been deposited in a savings hank by the donor to the credit of the donee, the donor delivered to him a locked box containing the bank pass-hook of such deposit, and accompanied the delivery with words of donation; held, a sufficient delivery to constitute a valid gift causa mor-

§ 1149, (d) Frenz v. Schwarze, 122 Md. 12, 89 Atl. 439; Larrabee v. Hascall, 88 Me. 511, 51 Am. St. Bep. 440, 34 Atl. 408.

§ 1149, (e) Contra, Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 177, 9 Am. St. Rep. 83, 1 L. R. A. 535, 15 Atl. 470. Previous and continuing possession of such a book by the donee, it is said, does not dispense with the necessity of actual delivery: Drew v. Hagerty, 81 Me. 231, 10 Am. St. Rep. 255, 3 L. R. A. 230, 17 Atl. 63; and see Shankle v. Spahr, (Va.) 93 S. E. 605 (acquiescence in donee's possession of money does not constitute delivery); but see Providence Inst. for Sav. v. Taft, 14 R. I. 502, where the contrary ruling is made in the case of a gift inter vivos; and Davis v. Kuck, (Minn.) 101 N. W. 165 (disapproving Drew v. Hagerty),

where it was held that if the gift of a chattel was made and accepted in good faith, new and formal acts of delivery were not necessary where the property was already in possession of the donee, and the subsequent possession and control thereof prior to the donor's death were consistent with ownership.

§ 1149, (f) Beebe v. Coffin, 153 Cal. 174, 94 Pac. 766; Stratton v. Athol Savings Bank, 213 Mass. 46, 99 N. E. 454; Baber v. Caples, 71 Or. 212, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1025, 138 Pac. 472; Fite v. Perry, 8 Cal. App. 85, 96 Pac. 102 (possession to be taken at death of donor not sufficient to support gift); Shankle v. Spahr, (Va.) 93 S. E. 605 (same).

§ 1149, (g) And see Sourwine v. Claypool, 138 Pa. St. 126, 20 Atl. 840. donee or his agent—or constructive. If constructive, it must be more than any mere words, and more than any mere *symbolic* act. A constructive delivery must be some-

tis, although the key of the box was found in the donor's pocket-book after his death: Vandermark v. Vandermark, 55 How. Pr. 408. A delivery to an agent or trustee for the donee, sufficient:^h Clough v. Clough, 117 Mass. 83. A delivery is no more essential to gifts causa mortis than to all other gifts. Things in action are transferable in writing, and the only question of doubt as to the requirement of delivery is, not whether the securities must be delivered, but whether the memorandum of transfer must be delivered. The execution and delivery of a written assignment of securities would constitute a valid gift: Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 18 Am. Rep. 178.¹ A person, in expectation of death, gave a sealed package to another, informing him that it contained money and savings-bank books, with directions what was to be done with the property. On the donor's death the package was found to contain directions that the balance, after payment of certain debts, was to be divided among certain named persons; held, a valid gift causa mortis to the donee, in trust for the last-named persons: Turner v. Estabrook, 129 Mass. 425, 37 Am. Dec. 371. When money is already in the hands of the donee, a delivery of the receipt to him is sufficient: Champney v. Blanchard, 39 N. Y. 111. If a promissory note is already in the possession of the donee, no further delivery of it is necessary: Wing v. Merchant, 57 Me. 383; Stevens v. Stevens, 5 Thomp. & C. 87. When a note is in possession of a trustee, the cestui que trust may give it to a third person without an actual delivery: Southerland v. Southerland's Adm'r, 5 Bush, 591. In the following cases the delivery was held to be insufficient: A wife, a few days before her husband's death, took certain bonds of his, and kept continuous possession thereof until after

§ 1149, (h) Caylor v. Caylor, 22 Ind. App. 666, 72 Am. St. Rep. 331, 52 N. E. 465; Johnson v. Colley, 101 Va. 414, 99 Am. St. Rep. 884, 44 S. E. 721; Sharpe v. Sharpe, 105 S. C. 459, 90 S. E. 34.

§ 1149, (1) As an insurance policy, although company had not approved the assignment before death of donor: Stout v. McNab, 157 Cal. 356, 107 Pac. 1005. Also, see Scott v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 123 Tenn. 258, 130 S. W. 757 (order on bank for admission to donor's safe deposit box to get securities held good delivery of securities although donor died before donee with order reached the bank).

§ 1149, (J) Delivery of a pass-book of an ordinary bank of deposit is not sufficient: Jones v. Weakley, 99 Ala. 441, 42 Am. St. Rep. 84, 19 L. R. A. 700, 12 South. 420; Thomas's Adm'r v. Lewis, 89 Va. 1, 37 Am. St. Rep. 848, 18 L. R. A. 170, 15 S. E. 389; Szabo v. Speckman, (Fla.) 74 South. 411. And putting account in joint names of donor and donee, donor still retaining the pass-book, held to be insufficient delivery to thing which completely terminates the donor's custody and control of the article donated, and which places it wholly under the donee's power, and enables him without further

his death; no gift: Conklin v. Conklin, 20 Hun, 278. A third person's taking the key of a trunk from its usual place, putting goods into the trunk, and then returning the key to its former place, at the request of the owner during his last sickness, who accompanied his directions by the expression of a desire to make a gift of the trunk and contents, do not constitute a valid gift. The owner does not part with the control of the goods: Coleman v. Parker, 114 Mass. 30. A donor delivered to the donee a paper, not so attested as to be a will, purporting to give a sum of money, and at the same time handed him two savings-hank books, and added that the rest of the money was in his pantaloons' pocket, turning in his hed and looking towards the closet in which they hung, and that the owner of the house would give it to the donee; held, that the different acts could not be separated, the transaction must be treated as one intended entire gift, and the delivery was insufficient to complete it: McGrath v. Reynolds, 116 Mass. 566. A donor verhally gave to her husband, during her last sickness, a note which was then in a drawer in the house, but doing nothing more to perfect the gift; insufficient: Stevens v. Stevens, 5 Thomp. & C. 87.k A woman, during her last sickness, told a girl who lived with her to bring her bank-book, which heing done, she said, "Take that and keep it, and lock it up," and the girl retained the book; held, no evidence of an intention to make a gift: Fiero v. Fiero, 5 Thomp. & C. 151. A delivery of the key of a trunk containing money and honds is not a delivery of such contents:¹ Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, 96 Am. Dec. 464; and see, also, Carr

support gift causa mortis of the account: In re Behring's Estate, 80 N. J. Eq. 165, 82 Atl. 931. Where donor gave donee bank-book with instructions to put same in donor's bible, held donor's direction as to placing book was evidence of dominion inconsistent with intention to relinquish all control, and no gift causa mortis: Kelly v. Perkins, (N. J.) 78 Atl. 14. Where the donor indorsed a note, put it in an envelope addressed to the donee, laid it on a table, and then committed suicide, there was not a sufficient delivery: Liebe v. Battman, 33 Or. 241, 72 Am. St. Rep. 705, 54 Pac. 179.

§ 1149, (**k**) And see Wilcox v. Matteson, 53 Wis. 23, 40 Am. Rep. 754, 9 N. W. 814; Barnes v. Barnes, 174 Ala. 166, 56 South. 958 (where donee prior to gift held certificate of deposit in name of donor and donor told him to keep same if he (donor) did not return from a trip he was embarking upon, held no sufficient change of possession to support gift causa mortis). A mere verbal gift of donor's money on deposit in **a** bank in a third person's name, insufficient: Hawn v. Stoler, 208 Pa. St. 610, 57 Atl. 1115.

§1149, (1) It has been held that a delivery of a key of a locked box act on the donor's part to reduce it to his own manual possession. All the cases which hold a constructive delivery to be good, whatever be their special circumstances, will be found to conform to this criterion: that the donor parts with all control and power of exercising dominion, while the donee obtains the exclusive power of taking physical possession and custody of the article, so that it is in fact placed under his sole dominion.^{2m} As a delivery is necessary, it

v. Silloway, 111 Mass. 24; Case v. Dennison, 9 R. I. 88, 11 Am. Rep. 222; Prickett v. Prickett's Adm'rs, 20 N. J. Eq. 478; Conser v. Snowden, 54 Md. 175, 39 Am. Rep. 368; Robinson v. Ring, 72 Me. 140, 39 Am. Rep. 308.

§ 1149, ² The leading case on the subject of delivery is Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1205, in which Lord Hardwicke discussed the doctrine on principle and authority in a most exhaustive manner. See, also,ⁿ Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 224, 227; Irons v. Smallpiece, 2 Barn. & Ald. 551; Thompson v. Heffernan, 4 Dru. & War. 285; Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. 111, 120; Reddel v. Dobree, 10 Sim. 244; Noble v. Smith, 2 Johns. 52, 3 Am. Dec. 399; Harris v. Clark, 3 N. Y. 93, 51 Am. Dec. 352; Jackson v. Twenty-third St. R'y, 88 N. Y. 520; Craig v. Craig, 3 Barb. Ch. 76, 117; Brinckerhoff v. Lawrence, 2 Sand. Ch. 400; French v. Raymond, 39 Vt. 623; Dow v. Gonld etc. Min. Co., 31 Cal. 629.

is not a delivery of the contents when the box is not in the presence or immediate control of the donor: Keepers v. Fidelity Title, etc., Co., 56 N. J. Law, 302, 44 Am. St. Rep. 397, 23 L. R. A. 184, 28 Atl. 585. And where donor gives donee's agent key to receptacle with instructions to get bank-book at that time, but donee's agent cannot find same, held to be no delivery sufficient to support gift causa mortis: Day v. Richards, 197 Mass. 86, 83 N. E. 324; and see Apache State Bank v. Daniels, 32 Okl. 121, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 520, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 901, 121 Pac. 237 (an instructive opinion; held, transfer by wife of husband's key to her ring at his request was not sufficient delivery of tin box then in the safe: See L. R. A. note

on transfer of keys to receptacles as a delivery of possession to support gifts causa mortis).

§ 1149, (m) This portion of the text is quoted in Yancy v. Field, 85 Va. 756, 8 S. E. 721; Foley v. Harrison, 233 Mo. 460, 136 S. W. 354; Scott v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 123 Tenn. 258, 130 S. W. 757.

§ 1149, (n) Daniel v. Smith, 64 Cal. 346, 30 Pac. 575; Yancy v. Field, 85 Va. 756, 8 S. E. 721; Seabright v. Seabright, 28 W. Va. 412. See Mackenzie v. Steeves, (Wash.) 167 Pac. 50 (automobile; where nature of the chattel is such that manual or constructive delivery is impossible, the requirements of the law are satisfied by the donee's taking possession. follows, as a further requisite to a valid donation, that the

A delivery to an agent of the donor is not sufficient: Farquharson v. Cave, 2 Coll. C. C. 356, 367; ^o but a valid and sufficient delivery may be made to a third person as agent for the donee: Drury v. Smith, 1 P. Wms. 404; Moore v. Darton, 4 De Gex & S. 517; Kemper v. Kemper's Adm'r, 1 Duvall, 401, 85 Am. Dec. 636; Baker v. Williams, 34 Ind. 547.^p The delivery must be in the lifetime of the donor; ^q a delivery to a third person, with directions to deliver to the donee after the donor's death, is not sufficient: Walter v. Ford, 74 Mo. 195, 41 Am. Rep. 312; sed quære.^{*} The gift may also be made upon trust, and the delivery to a trustee on behalf of the donee who is the ultimate beneficiary:^s Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass. 472, 26 Am. Rep. 680; Kilby v. Godwin, 2 Del. Ch. 61; Trorlicht v. Weizenecker, 1 Mo. App. 482; Clough v. Clough, 117 Mass. 83; Turner v. Estabrook, 129 Mass. 425, 37 Am. Rep. 371.

With regard to a constructive delivery, it has been held that a delivery of the key of a locked receptacle was a sufficient delivery of the contents;

§ 1149, (•) To Agent of Donor.— Nelson v. Peterson, 202 Mass. 369, 132 Am. St. Rep. 503, 88 N. E. 916; Stratton v. Athol Savings Bank, 213 Mass. 46, 99 N. E. 454; Varley v. Sims, 100 Minn. 331, 117 Am. St. Rep. 694, 10 Ann. Cas. 473, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 828, 111 N. W. 269; Hillman v. Young, 64 Or. 73, 127 Pac. 793, 129 Pac. 124. But see Williams v. Guile, 117 N. Y. 343, 6 L. R. A. 366, 22 N. E. 1071.

§ 1149, (P) To Agent for Donee .---Stout v. MeNab, 157 Cal. 356, 107 Pae. 1005; Szabo v. Speekman, (Fla.) 74 South. 411; Sharpe v. Sharpe, 105 S. C. 459, 90 S. E. 34; Woodburn v. Woodburn, 123 Ill. 608, 14 N. E. 58, 16 N. E. 209; Caylor v. Caylor, 22 Ind. App. 666, 72 Am. St. Rep. 331, 52 N. E. 465; Varley v. Sims, 100 Minn. 331, 117 Am. St. Rep. 694, 10 Ann. Cas. 473, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 828, 111 N. W. 269; Sourwine v. Claypool, 138 Pa. St. 126, 20 Atl. 840; Johnson v. Colley, 101 Va. 414, 99 Am. St. Rep. 884, 44 S. E 721; Davie v. Davie, 47 Wash. 231, 91 Pac. 950 (placed in escrow in donee's name). The presumption, in the absence of evidence to the

contrary, is that a third person to whom delivery is made for the donee is the agent or trustee of the donee: Weber v. Salisbury, 149 Ky. 327, 148 S. W. 34; Varley v. Sims, 100 Minn. 331, 117 Am. St. Rep. 694, 10 Ann. Cas. 473, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 828, 111 N W. 269.

§1149, (q) Fite v. Perry, 8 Cal. App. 85, 96 Pac. 102.

§1149, (r) Beebe v. Coffin, 153 Cal. 174, 94 Pac. 766 (gift defeated where release of mortgage was given to donee in a sealed envelope not to be opened until donor's death, the donee not knowing nature of the contents); Augusta Savings Bank v. Fogg, 82 Me. 538, 20 Atl. 92; Duryea v. Harvey, 183 Mass. 429, 67 N. E. 351 (to be delivered on death or when donee should direct). But see In re Podhajsky's Estate, 137 Iowa, 742, 115 N. W. 590 (gift upheld where delivery to third party for donee, but donee never heard of gift until after death of donor.)

§1149, (s) Hamlin v. Hamlin, 59 Wash. 182, 109 Pac. 362; In re Podhajsky's Estate, 137 Iowa, 742, 115 N. W. 590. 2667

donee must accept it. Such acceptance, however, will be

thus a delivery of the key of a trunk was held, in an old case, to be a good delivery of the trunk and its contents:^t Jones v. Selhy, Prec. Ch. 300; a delivery of the key of a warehouse in which the furniture donated was locked was held to be a good delivery of the furniture: Smith v. Smith, 2 Strange, 955;^u and the delivery of the key of a locked room in which was an unlocked trunk containing things in action, written securities, was beld a good delivery of those securities: Penfield v. Thayer, 2 E. D. Smith, 305; and see Vandermark v. Vandermark, 55 How. Pr. 408; Cooper v. Burr, 45 Barb. 9; Miller v. Jeffress, 4 Gratt. 472, 479. But this rule should be applied with the most careful limitation, and perhaps it may be regarded as doubtful under the light of recent decisions. At all events, there should be the clearest evidence of the donor's intention to make the gift, and something more than the mere delivery of the key.v Unless the donor completely divests himself of all power over the article, if he retains in any manner any custody over it, or exercises any acts of dominion over it, the delivery of a key will not be a sufficient delivery to perfect the gift: Powell v. Hellicar, 26 Beav. 261; Reddel v. Dohree, 10 Sim. 244; Farquharson v. Cave, 2 Coll. C. C. 356; Trimmer v. Danby, 25 L. J. Ch. 424; Hawkins v. Blewitt, 2 Esp. 663; Maguire v. Dodd, 9 Ir. Ch. 452-459; and the supreme-court of Maine has expressly decided that the delivery of the key of a trunk in which money and bonds were locked up was not a sufficient constructive delivery of such contents :* Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, 96 Am. Dec. 464.

§1149, (t) Delivery of Keys of bureau drawer, of safe, and of box in bank, sufficient: In re Wasscrberg (Union of London & Smith's Bank v. Wasserberg), [1915] 1 Ch. 195; Harrison v. Foley, 206 Fed. 57, 124 C. C. A. 191; Foley v. Harrison, 233 Mo. 460, 136 S. W. 354; Thomas's Adm'r v. Lewis, 89 Va. 1, 37 Am. St. Rep. 848, 18 L. R. A. 170, 15 S. E. 389. In In re Wasserberg, supra, the English cases were carefully reviewed, and the conclusion reached that delivery of the key was enough, coupled with the intention, though insufficient of itself to enable donee to get at the bonds, since the bank would require further authority; it was, however, a partial delivery, and a deprivation of donor's facilities for dealing with the bonds. A late case goes so far as to uphold a gift causa mortis of bank stock to donor's granddaughter where delivery is based solely on donee's prior knowledge of the combination of donor's safe, even when stock was not found in the safe after donor's death: Teague v. Abbot, 51 Ind. App. 604, 100 N. E. 27.

§1149, (u) Szabo v. Speckman, (Fla.) 74 South. 411.

§ 1149, (v) Delivery of keys to trunk containing securities proved, but intention of donor to make gift not clear and conclusive enough to satisfy common-law rule: Farnsworth v. Whiting, 106 Me. 430, 76 Atl. 909; and see Foley v. Harrison, 233 Mo. 460, 136 S. W. 354.

§1149, (w) And see Parker v. Copland, 70 N. J. Eq. 685, 64 Atl. presumed when the gift is for his advantage, in the absence of all contrary evidence.^{3 x}

§ 1150. Revocation.—The peculiar element of the donation causa mortis, which distinguishes it from the one inter vivos, is its revocable nature.^a Although it be absolute in its form, and although the thing must be delivered to the donee, yet the transaction is inchoate, and the property remains in the donor until his death. He may, therefore, at any time prior to his death, revoke and annul the gift by language sufficiently indicating such intent.^b If the donce

§ 1149, ³ De Levillain v. Evans, 39 Cal. 120; Darland v. Taylor, 52 Iowa, 503. In the first of these cases the court held that both by the Roman law and the common law, a donation is not valid and binding unless accepted. But if the donee is *sui juris*, he will be presumed to have accepted the donation, when it is for his advantage, unless the contrary is shown; and when the donee is *non sui juris*, if the gift is for his advantage, the law accepts it for him, and no proof of acceptance is necessary. The theory given in this case was applied to a deed of land, but the same doctrine applies, of course, to gifts of all kinds. In the second case cited, an acceptance was held to be presumed.

129 (delivery not sufficient if key after having been given to donee by donor is returned to its old place); Newsome v. Allen, 86 Wash. 678, 151 Pac. 111 (key of safe deposit box; said that delivery must be as complete as nature of case and circumstances permit). But a delivery of a key accompanied by taking of possession of the subject-matter in the presence of the donor is sufficient: Goulding v. Horbury, 85 Me. 227, 35 Am. St. Rep. 357, 27 Atl. 127.

§ 1149, (x) In re Podhajsky's Estate, 137 Iowa, 742, 115 N. W. 590; Varley v. Sims, 100 Minn. 331, 117 Am. St. Rep. 694, 10 Ann. Cas. 473, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 828, 111 N. W. 269; Sourwine v. Claypool, 138 Pa. St. 126, 20 Atl. 840 (donee being *feme covert*, law accepts the gift for her); Scott v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 123 Tenn. 258, 130 S. W. 757.

§1150, (a) This paragraph is cited, generally, on the distinction between the two kinds of gifts, in Williams v. Finnigan, (Mo. App.) 185 S. W. 1165.

§ 1150, (b) Redelivery of article or evidence of gift to donor during his lifetime is *ipso facto* a revocation of the gift: Van Wagenen v. Bonnot, 72 N. J. Eq. 143, 65 Atl. 239; O'Gorman v. Jolley, 34 S. D. 26, 147 N. W. 78; Parker v. Copland, 70 N. J. Eq. 685, 64 Atl. 129 (rule applied where box and key given by donor to donee but by him returned to their accustomed places in donor's house). But see Philpot v. Temple Banking Co., 3 Ga. App. 742, 60 S. E. 480 (gift *causa mortis* of certificate of deposit is not defeated by the

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did not, therefore, voluntarily surrender up possession of the thing, he would retain it as a trustee for the donor's executors or administrators, who could recover the same, or its value.¹ The donor's recovery from his sickness, or his escape from the anticipated peril with his life, also operates as a revocation, and the donee would then hold the article as a trustee for the donor.^{2 c} When a gift causa mortis is made during sickness, it is essential, in order to perfect it and prevent a revocation, that the donor should die of the very same sickness from which he is then suffering, and that there should be no intervening recovery between that illness and his final death; and it seems that the donee must affirmatively show the existence of all these facts.^{3 d} The gift cannot, it seems, be revoked by the donor's will, although it may be satisfied by a legacy given thereby.40

§ 1150, ¹ Staniland v. Willott, 3 Macn. & G. 664; and see Fiero v. Fiero, 5 Thomp. & C. 151; Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 18 Am. Rep. 178.

§ 1150, ² Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1245; Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. 111; 4 Brown Ch. 286; Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 224; and see the cases cited *ante*, under § 1146.

§ 1150, 3 Conser v. Snowden, 54 Md. 175, 39 Am. Rep. 368.

§ 1150, 4 Jones v. Selby, Prec. Ch. 300; Johnson v. Smith, 1 Ves. Sr.

donor's subsequently indorsing certificate and depositing same to his account when he, as part of the same transaction, gives donee of certificate a check for same amount on deposit of certificate. And this is so although the donee does not deposit or cash check until after death of donor).

§ 1150, (c) O'Kane v. Whelan, 124 Cal. 200, 71 Am. St. Rep. 42, 56 Pac. 880. But it has been held that a partial recovery does not necessarily work a revocation: Castle v. Persons, 117 Fed. 835, 54 C. C. A. 133.

§ 1150, (d) But it is held that he need not die of the same disease of which he was apprehensive; as where a gift was made in anticipation of a surgical operation, which was successful, but before the donor left the hospital he died of heart disease, from which he was also suffering at the time of the gift: Ridden v. Thrall, 125 N. Y. 572, 21 Am. St. Rep. 758, 11 L. R. A. 684, 26 N. E. 627; Stevens v. Provident Inst. for Savings, 226 Mass. 138, 115 N. E. 404. See, also, Larrabee v. Hascall, 88 Me. 511, 51 Am. St. Rep. 440, 34 Atl. 408.

§1150, (e) The mere fact that a donor subsequently makes a will by which he gives to the donee a legacy of equal amount does not raise the presumption that the legacy was intended as a satisfaction of the donation: Hudson v. Spencer, [1910] 2 Ch. 285, Warrington, J.

§ 1151. Equitable Jurisdiction.—Since a donation causa mortis is not in any sense a testamentary act, and does not require the assent or interposition of the executor or administrator to perfect the donee's title, and does not belong to a "succession" or "administration," it did not come within the jurisdiction of the English ecclesiastical courts.¹ The enforcement of the gift at the suit of the donee undoubtedly fell within the jurisdiction of courts of law; but since the gift was not absolute, but was always subject to the rights of the donor's creditors, the remedy conferred by this jurisdiction was necessarily uncertain and incomplete: under some circumstances, it would be clearly impossible to adjudicate finally upon the claim of the donee until there had been a general accounting and settlement of the donor's estate. Indeed, there were substantially the same difficulties in the way of exercising the jurisdiction at law over these gifts which prevented the enforcement of general legacies by legal actions.² For these reasons courts of equity assumed jurisdiction over the enforcement of gifts causa mortis, and the grounds of this jurisdiction were to some extent the same as those which support the jurisdiction over legacies, and over administrations generally. This jurisdiction, however, unlike that over legacies and administrations, never became exclusive; it was always merely concurrent; it was based, not upon any equitable right, title,

314; but the California Civil Code somewhat modifies this rule. "Sec. 1152: A gift in view of death is not affected by a previous will; nor by a subsequent will, unless it expresses an intention to revoke the gift."

§ 1151, ¹ Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431; Miller v. Miller, 3 P. Wms. 356; Thomson v. Batty, 2 Strange, 777. Of course, I refer to a "succession" or "administration" under the English law, and not to administrations as enlarged by the statutes in many of our states.

§ 1151, ² Where the gift had been revoked, or was not complete, the donor or his personal representatives could, without any difficulty, recover it or its value in an action at law, and there would then be no reason for the interposition of equity. But where the donee sued at law, and the executor or administrator set up a deficiency of assets, it would be very difficult at best to try that issue before a jury, and almost impossible for the donee to prove a sufficiency of assets previous to an accounting.

or interest of the donee in the thing donated, but solely upon the uncertainty, incompleteness, and inadequacy of the remedies which courts of law furnished to the donee. The jurisdictions in equity and at law were exercised concurrently.³ There are, however, special circumstances in which the jurisdiction of equity must be necessary and exclusive, since the right and interest of the donee in the subject-matter is only equitable,—is not a legal title and ownership. Where bonds due to the donor, or bonds and mortgages, or negotiable instruments payable to order, but unindorsed, are given by a mere verbal donation, without any written transfer, although delivered into the donee's possession, the legal title to such securities passes to the executors or administrators of the donor on his death; but they hold this legal title as trustees for the donee, who can enforce his equitable title only in a court of equity. This is the theory on which verbal gifts of such securities were supported.^{4a} Whenever, also, a gift is made to one person upon a trust in favor of others, there is ample ground for the jurisdiction of equity in enforcing the donation on behalf of these beneficiaries.⁵ The same jurisdiction as established by the English court of chancery should exist in all of the American states which have adopted the full equitable jurisdiction and jurisprudence, although the concurrent jurisdiction at law may be

§ 1151, ³ Duffield v. Elwes, 1 Bligh, N. S., 497; Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431; Miller v. Miller, 3 P. Wms. 356; Thomson v. Batty, 2 Strange, 777. For more recent English illustrations, see Staniland v. Willott, 3 Macn. & G. 664; Boutts v. Ellis, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 249; Mitchell v. Smith, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 422; Hewitt v. Kaye, L. R. 6 Eq. 198; In re Beak's Estate, L. R. 13 Eq. 489; Moore v. Moore, L. R. 18 Eq. 474; Rolls v. Pearce, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 730; In re Mead, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 651.

§ 1151, 4 Duffield v. Elwes, 1 Bligh, N. S., 497, 530, 534; Staniland v. Willott, 3 Macn. & G. 664, 675, 676; and see cases concerning unindorsed notes ante, under § 1148.

§ 1151, 5 See Trorlicht v. Weizenecker, 1 Mo. App. 482.

§1151, (a) This section is cited in Trenholm v. Morgan, 82 S. C. 268, 5 S. E. 721.

more frequently exercised, and the powers of the courts of probate may be enlarged by statute.⁶ Practically, the equitable jurisdiction over this gift is exercised in the American states concurrently with that at law, and that of the probate courts in the regular course of administration. Under the large powers given by statute to these courts in many of the states, the claim of the donee, like that of an ordinary creditor, may be presented and determined, either on a special application, or in the final settlement of the estate by a decree of the probate court.⁷ While the equitable jurisdiction is exercised concurrently with that at law, substantially as in England, in some states, in others it is exercised only under special circumstances, where the remedy at law on the particular facts would be inadequate, and is governed by considerations similar to those which regulate the equitable jurisdiction over administrations in general. I have placed some recent examples, by way of illustration, in the foot-note.8

§ 1151, 6 The only ground for denying or restricting the equitable jurisdiction is the principle that the jurisdiction only exists where there is not an adequate remedy at law. In applying this doctrine, it cannot be denied that the courts of some of the states seem to have overlooked or to have ignored the equally clear and fundamental principle that where the equitable jurisdiction has once existed, it is not destroyed, nor even lessened, because other courts have acquired the power of granting the same or other adequate remedy, either by their own action or by statute, in the absence of statutory language *necessarily* restrictive. In this manner the equitable jurisdiction has heen practically abandoned or curtailed in many instances, in direct violation of this well-settled and familiar doctrine.

§ 1151, 7 As illustrations, see Stevens v. Stevens, 5 Thomp. & C. 87; Estate of Barclay, 11 Phila. 123; Walter v. Ford, 74 Mo. 195, 41 Am. Rep. 312.

§ 1151, ⁸ Actions at law.—In a few of these cases the action is against the donee to recover the thing in his possession, or its value. In some, the action is by the donee upon the note, or other thing in action donated, to recover the amount thereof from the debtor party. In the remainder, the action is by the donee to enforce the gift: Vandermark v. Vandermark, 55 How. Pr. 408; Coleman v. Parker, 114 Mass. 30; Clough v. Clough, 117 Mass. 83; Pierce v. Boston Sav. Bank, 129 Mass. 425, 37 Am. Rep. 371; Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185, 18 Am. Rep. 178; Fiero v. Fiero, 5 Thomp.

SECTION III.

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ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1152. Equitable jurisdiction in the United States.
- § 1153. The same; fundamental principle; Rosenberg v. Frank.
- § 1154. The jurisdiction as administered in the several states; general résumé—the states alphabetically arranged in foot-note.

§ 1152. Equitable Jurisdiction in the United States.^a— The grounds upon which the jurisdiction of the English court of chancery over the subject of administrations was originally based have been explained in the preceding section concerning legacies.¹ I have already described, in a very general manner, the extent and nature of the equitable jurisdiction over the same matters in the various states of this country.² Without repeating the conclusions there formulated, but rather adopting them as the foundation of

& C. 151; Case v. Dennison, 9 R. I. 88, 11 Am. Rep. 222; House v. Grant, 4 Lans. 296; Rhodes v. Childs, 64 Pa. St. 18.

Equitable actions.—The following are either suits in equity, or actions equitable in their nature and belonging to the equitable jurisdiction: Brooks v. Brooks, 12 S. C. 422; Darland v. Taylor, 52 Iowa, 503, 35 Am. Rep. 285; Conklin v. Conklin, 20 Hun, 278; Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass. 472, 26 Am. Rep. 680; Kilby v. Godwin, 2 Del. Ch. 61; Trorlicht v. Weizenecker, 1 Mo. App. 482; McGrath v. Reynolds, 116 Mass. 566; Carr v. Silloway, 111 Mass. 24; Smith v. Dorsey, 38 Ind. 451, 10 Am. Rep. 118; Baker v. Williams, 34 Ind. 547; Tillinghast v. Wheaton, 8 R. I. 536, 5 Am. Rep. 621, 94 Am. Dec. 126; Dean v. Deau's Estate, 43 Vt. 337; Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, 96 Am. Dec. 464; Southerland v. Southerland's Adm'r, 5 Bush, 591; Prickett v. Prickett's Adm'rs, 20 N. J. Eq. 478; Turner v. Estabrook, 129 Mass. 425, 37 Am. Rep. 371; Conser v. Snowden, 54 Md. 175, 39 Am. Rep. 368; West v. Cavins, 74 Ind. 265; Robinson v. Ring, 72 Me. 140, 39 Am. Rep. 308.

§ 1152, ¹ See ante, §§ 1127, 1128.
§ 1152, ² See vol. 1, §§ 346-350.^b

§1152, (a) This section is cited in Benedict v. Wilmarth, (Fla.) 35 South. 84. § 1152, (b) Also, §§ 156, 187, 235.

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further discussion, I propose in the present section to furnish a somewhat more detailed and practical description of this branch of the equitable jurisdiction as it is now actually administered throughout the American states. Such a sketch must necessarily be very imperfect. The great diversity in the legislation, and the divergent and often conflicting theories of interpretation held by different courts in applying these statutes to the settled doctrines of equity, render it impossible to give anything more than a partial and fragmentary account of the resulting jurisdiction as it prevails in all the states. I make no attempt. therefore, to present in an exhaustive manner the complete system as it exists in any single state. I shall endeavor merely to furnish such a general view, drawn from the most recent decisions based upon existing statutes, that the reader in every state shall be able to form an accurate general notion of the systems prevailing in each of the other commonwealths, and to apprehend the spirit and tendency of their decisions, and to determine whether those decisions may be regarded as authoritative in the tribunals of his own state, or whether they would be misleading because proceeding upon a different theory from that adopted by his own courts. To fully accomplish even this limited object is a task of extreme difficulty. I hope, however, that the results of the discussion may render some assistance to members of the bar with respect to a branch of the equitable jurisdiction second to none other in importance, but which has fallen, in this country, into a condition of confusion and uncertainty.

§ 1153. The Same. The Fundamental Principle.^a—One fundamental principle should be constantly kept in mind; it underlies all particular rules, and furnishes the solution for most of the special questions which can arise. In all those states which have adopted the entire system of equity

§ 1153, (a) This paragraph is Benedict v. Wilmarth, (Fla.) 35 quoted in full in Oles v. Wilson, 57 South. 84. Colo. 246, 141 Pac. 489; and cited in

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jurisprudence, whatever be the legislation concerning the powers and functions of the probate courts, and whatever be the nature and extent of the subjects committed to their cognizance, the original equitable jurisdiction over administrations does and must still exist, except so far and with respect to such particulars as it has been abrogated by express prohibitory, *negative* language of the statutes, or by necessary implication from *affirmative* language conferring exclusive powers upon the probate tribunals. This equitable jurisdiction may be dormant, but, except so far as thus destroyed by statute, it must continue to exist, concurrent with that held by the courts of probate, ready to be exercised whenever occasion may require or render it expedient.^{1b} This general principle, so familiar, so funda-

§ 1153, 1 This principle, which is sometimes lost sight of, is fully sustained by a recent decision of the supreme court of California, and the opinion is so remarkable that I shall quote from it at some length. The constitution of the state provided that "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction in all cases in equity," and established courts of probate. The legislation with reference to the probate courts and the subject of administration is exceedingly full, comprehensive, and minute. The power 4 conferred upon these tribunals is co-extensive with the entire subjectmatter of administration and final settlement of the estates of decedents, testate or intestate. No state in the Union has a more full and complete statutory system. In Rosenberg v. Frank, 58 Cal. 387, a testator bequeathed, "To my sisters E. F., H. R., and H. R. one hundred thousand dollars each; to my sisters T. W. and L. C. fifty thousand dollars each; to * J. R., in trust for H. G., C. M., and R. F., one hundred and fifty thousand dollars." After several other bequests, the residuary clause gave the residue "to be divided pro rata between my sisters E. F., H. R., H. R., T. W., L. C., and the children of Mary F., deceased, namely, H. G., C. M., and R. F." These residuary legatees were the same persons named in the former bequest. The will was duly admitted to probate, and while the administration was proceeding under the control of the probate court, the executors brought this equitable action to obtain a construction of the said

§ 1153, (b) The author's note is cited, and the principle applied, in Moulton v. Smith, 16 R. I. 126, 27 Am. St. Rep. 728, 12 Atl. 891. The text is quoted in Domestic & F. Missionary Soc. of the P. E. Church v. Eells, 68 Vt. 497, 54 Am. St. Rep. 888, 35 Atl. 463; Burns v. Smith, 21 Mont. 251, 69 Am. St. Rep. 653, 53 Pac. 742; Oles v. Wilson, 57 Colo. 246, 141 Pac. 489. mental, running through all branches of the equitable jurisdiction, but so often lost sight of by American courts in dealing with the jurisdiction as applied to administrations, was admirably stated by one of the ablest of American judges: "There is nothing in the nature of jurisdiction, as applied to courts, which renders it exclusive. It is a

clauses, and especially of the residuary clause. Objection was raised that the court had no jurisdiction. It was urged that the probate court had power to construe the will (which it certainly had under the statute) and that its jurisdiction over the subject was complete and exclusive. The supreme court, however, asserted the equitable jurisdiction, and the grounds upon which their decision is rested are broad and general. Thornton, J., said (p. 400): "In our opinion, the jurisdiction of the district court was ample and plenary. The jurisdiction of the district court was conferred by the amendments of 1862 to the constitution of 1849. [See the clause quoted above.] The jurisdiction could hardly have been conferred in clearer or broader language; and the language of the article as it was adopted in 1849 was no less broad. This section as amended in 1862 has been construed by this court as conferring on the district courts the same jurisdiction in equity as that administered by the high courts of chancery in England: People v. Davidson, 30 Cal. 379. In Willis v. Farley, 24 Cal. 500, it was held that the constitution invests the district court with original jurisdiction in all cases in equity. The court further said in that case: 'Powers which are granted by the constitution cannot be taken away by legislative enactment, and remedies which are secured to the citizen by the organic law cannot be destroyed by a department of the government that exists in subordination to the constitution.' This was in an action brought against the administrator of a deceased mortgagor and his heirs to foreclose a mortgage. See, also, Clarke v. Perry, 5 Cal. 60, 63 Am. Dec. 82; Sanford v. Head, 5 Cal. 298; Deck v. Gerke, 12 Cal. 436, 73 Am. Dec. 555. In the last-cited cause Baldwin, J., in the opinion of the court, says on this subject: 'Apart from the previous decisions of this court, it might be questioned whether the probate court, under our constitution, did not possess an exclusive jurisdiction over testamentary and probate matters: Blanton v. King, 2 How. (Miss.) 856; Carmichael v. Browder, 3 How. (Miss.) 252; Faroe's Heirs v. Graves, 4 Smedes & M. 707. But this court has recognized a different rule. In Clarke v. Perry, 5 Cal. 60, 63 Am. Dec. 82, it was held that "the probate court is a court of special and limited jurisdiction. Most of its general powers belong peculiarly and originally to the court of chancery, which still retains all its jurisdiction. Where, therefore, a bill is filed in chancery against an administrator, to compel him to account by one who has not been an actual party to a proceeding

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matter of common experience that two or more courts may have concurrent powers over the same parties and the same subject-matter. Jurisdiction is not a right or privilege belonging to the judge, but an authority or power to do justice in a given case, when it is brought before him. There is, I think, no instance in the whole history of the law where

or settlement in the probate court, he may totally disregard such proceeding or settlement; and although the settlement in the probate court is a final settlement, the complainant, who was no party to it, may treat it as a nullity, and proceed to invoke the equitable powers of the district court, and compel the administrator to a full account." And in Sanford v. Head, 5 Cal. 298, the same doctrine was reaffirmed in emphatic terms. The ground upon which equity took jurisdiction in England in such cases was, that the spiritual courts were not able, from their constitution, to afford adequate and complete relief. Though much of the reason of this rule is removed in most of the states of the Union where prohate courts exist, yet the power of the chancery court to interpose for the settlement of accounts, and the enforcement of trusts of this sort, is maintained. Under the decisions of this court, chancery has assumed jurisdiction over such subjects, and as, probably, rights have vested under their decrees, and the principle asserted is more convenient in practice, we think it is not permissible now to question the jurisdiction.' The court in this case sustained a very broad jurisdiction in the district court. The jurisdiction here invoked was exercised in the case of Payne v. Payne, 18 Cal. 291, in construing the will of Theodore Payne. One of the points determined in that case was as to whom the estate was devised, which might have been determined by the probate court on the distribution of the estate by that tribunal. The court held that the whole estate was devised to the widow, to the exclusion of the children. There was no doubt expressed or intimated as to the jurisdiction in that case. The power of the court of chancery in England over the administration of estates does not seem to have heen thoroughly established until near the close of the reign of Charles II. After the statute in England had been enacted, empowering the spiritual courts to make distribution, it was contended that that court ought to make distribution, and that the courts of chancery no longer had jurisdiction. In answer to this contention, the Lord Chancellor King said, in 1682, the 'spiritual court had but a lame jurisdiction, and there being no negative words in the act of Parliament, he thought a bill for distribution very proper in this court': Story's Eq. Jur., secs. 542, 543, 1065; Gould v. Hayes, 19 Ala. 449. The jurisdiction of the probate courts is not defined in the constitution. In article VI, section 8, constitution of 1849, it is provided that 'the county judges shall also hold in their several counties

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the mere grant of jurisdiction to a particular court, without any words of exclusion, has been held to oust any other court of the powers which it before possessed. Creating a new forum with concurrent jurisdiction may have the effect of withdrawing from the courts which before existed a portion of the causes which would otherwise have been brought

probate courts, and perform such duties as probate judges as may be prescribed by law.' . . . It seems from the above that the legislature may make the jurisdiction of the probate judge or court what it pleases, within the limits of that jurisdiction which is understood as usually pertaining to probate courts. But the position that it can, under this power, take away from the district courts any of the equity jurisdiction conferred on them by the constitution is manifestly untenable: See Willis v. Farley, 24 Cal. 499; Gould v. Hayes, 19 Ala. 450. Nor could this be done if the full probate jurisdiction was conferred on the county or probate courts by the constitution. This very point was so held in Courtwright v. Bear River etc, Co., 30 Cal. 573, in relation to the jurisdiction to abate nuisances under the constitutional amendments of 1862. This constitution gave jurisdiction to the county courts in plain terms 'to abate a nuisance.' An action was brought in the district court to abate a nuisance, and it was sustained as an equity case, under the grant of equity jurisdiction. This ruling was subsequently approved in Yolo County v. City of Sacramento, 36 Cal. 195; and see Caulfield v. Stevens, 28 Cal. 118; Stoppelkamp v. Mangeot, 42 Cal. 325. [The judge also quotes the admirable language of Bronson, J., in Delafield v. State of Illinois, 2 Hill, 159, 164, which I have incorporated into the text.] For the reasons above given, we are of opinion that the district court has jurisdiction of this cause. But it is said that the probate court first acquired jurisdiction, and therefore must be allowed to exercise it, to the exclusion of the district court. We do not think that this rule can be properly applied here. The will had only been admitted to probate in the probate court. The matter of distribution was not before it. Moreover, the probate court held its jurisdiction subject to the exercise of this jurisdiction by the district court. Of the probate the jurisdiction of the probate court is exclusive: San Francisco v. Lawton, 18 Cal. 465, 79 Am. Dec. 187. Until that was done the district court could not exercise the jurisdiction invoked in this case. To hold that the probate court had first acquired jurisdiction, to the exclusion of any other court, by the will having been admitted to probate in it, would be to oust the jurisdiction of the district court entirely. The probate court taking jurisdiction under these circumstances, it holds it subject to the jurisdiction of the district court, and must be bound by the decree of the district court. We are of opinion that this jurisdiction in the district court is a beneficial

before them; but it cannot affect the power of the old courts to administer justice when it is demanded at their hands."² \circ

§ 1154. The Jurisdiction as Administered in the Several States.^a—In order to present the most complete view possible of the equitable jurisdiction as it is now actually administered in this country, and as an introduction to the further discussions on the subject, I have placed in the footnote an abstract of the more important and recent decisions in nearly all of the states.¹ From a comparison of these

one, and can be usefully employed in expediting the settlement of estates." This is an instructive opinion, and, considering the tendency in so many American courts to limit the equitable jurisdiction upon the alleged ground that there is an adequate remedy at law, it is not a little remarkable. It will be observed that the court does not base its decision upon the wellknown doctrine that equity has a jurisdiction to construe wills,-a doctrine accepted even in states where the probate jurisdiction over administrations in general is regarded as exclusive. It may be doubted whether the case falls within that doctrine as it is ordinarily expressed, since the clause of the will for which a construction was asked contained and created no trust. The decision is rested on the broad and universal ground that the conferring jurisdiction by mere affirmative language in a statute or constitution does not destroy similar or identical jurisdictions already existing; upon the broad and universal ground that the original jurisdiction of equity over administration still remains, notwithstanding a complete jurisdiction over the same subject-matter given to the probate courts.

§ 1153, 2 Delafield v. State of Illinois, 2 Hill, 159, 164, per Bronson, J.

§ 1154, 1 To give a complete account of the system in any one state would require a detailed examination of all its statutes concerning administration,—a matter entirely foreign to the purposes of this work, and which would demand for its full treatment a whole volume by itself. Furthermore, the decisions are so conflicting, and, so to speak, fragmentary, that it seems inexpedient, if not impossible, to discuss the *doctrines* in their entirety, as though they prevailed uniformly throughout all of the com-

§ 1153, (c) The text is quoted in Burns v. Smith, 21 Mont. 251, 69 Am. St. Rep. 653, 53 Pac. 742; Oles v. Wilson, 57 Colo. 246, 141 Pac. 489.

§ 1154, (a) Sections 1154 et seq. are cited in Turner v. Rogers, 49 Ark. 51, 4 S. W. 193; Steele v. Kelley, 32 Okl. 547, 122 Pac. 934. Section 1154 and note are cited in In re Cilley, 58 Fed. 977, 986; Chapman v. American Surety Co., 261 Ill. 594, 104 N. E. 247; Nolan v. Garrison, 156 Mich. 397, 120 N. W. 977; Brown v. Strom, 113 Minn. 1, 129 N. W. 136.

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decisions, it will be seen that the states may be roughly

monwealths. It seemed to be the better plan to collect the decisions in each state separately, and to arrange them in the order of the several states. This method may involve some repetition, where the same rule has been adopted by the courts of various states; but the amount of such repetition is very little. Since the decisions are largely based upon the legislation, and since the statutory systems are so different in their detail in the different states, there are comparatively few instances of common doctrines and rules. By presenting each state separately, and thus indicating the tendency of judicial decision therein, and the theory adopted by its courts, this abstract will enable the practicing lawyer in a particular state to ascertain the decisions in other commonwealths which are analogous to or in harmony with those of his own courts, so that they can be used as authoritative, and also those which are based upon a wbolly different theory of the jurisdiction, so that they may be distinguished as being without binding authority. This is practically the extent of the aid which the necessary limits of the present discussion permit; but even such aid will, I believe, be of substantial benefit to members of the bar and to the bench in all parts of the country. In connection with this note the reader should consult vok 1, §§ 348-351.

Alabama.—Although the probate court has an ample jurisdiction over the subject of administrations, the concurrent, and sometimes even exclusive, jurisdiction of equity over the same subject-matter is still preserved to a very large extent, and is constantly exercised. The decisions in no other state, perhaps, are more instructive as illustrating the equitable jurisdiction left unobstructed by an elaborate statutory system of administration in the courts of probate. The general principle is asserted in the clearest manner, that the original jurisdiction of equity over administrations is not taken away by the affirmative language of statutes giving a like jurisdiction to probate courts. The doctrine is firmly established that equity retains its original jurisdiction over administrations, the marshaling and distribution of assets, the compulsory payment of legacies, and the like, which may be invoked by the heirs, distributees, or legatees, at any time before the concurrent jurisdiction of the court of probate [the "orphans' court"] has attached, without the assignment of any special reason for so doing. If, however, the concurrent jurisdiction of the probate court has already attached by the commencement of proceedings therein, these parties cannot invoke the aid of equity in the matter of the administration, unless the circumstances of the case involve some elements of distinctively equitable cognizance. Where, on the other hand, an executor or administrator is the actor, he must ordinarily institute proceedings in the probate court in the first instance, and cannot resort to equity, in the absence of some special ground of equitable cognizance. Finally, an

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grouped into three classes, although there is still a con-

administrator de bonis non is regarded as directly representing the distributees, and may go into equity in the first instance whenever and as they may: Teague v. Corbitt, 57 Ala. 529; Weakley v. Gurley's Adm'r, 60 Ala. 399; Glenn's Adm'r v. Billingslea, 64 Ala. 345; Randle v. Carter, 62 Ala. 95; McNeill's Adm'r v. McNeill's Creditors, 36 Ala. 109, 76 Am. Dec. 320; Park's Distributees v. Park's Adm'rs, 36 Ala. 132; Moore v. Lesneur, 33 Ala. 237; James v. Faulk, 54 Ala. 184; Hill v. Armistead, 56 Ala. 118; Hause v. Hause, 57 Ala. 262; Hooper v. Smith, 57 Ala. 557; Whorton v. Moragne, 59 Ala. 641; Gould v. Hayes, 19 Ala. 438; Horton v. Moseley, 17 Ala. 794.^b In pursuance of the general doctrine, although the jurisdiction of the probate court has attached by proceedings being commenced therein, the court of equity may take cognizance of the administration for the purpose of a final accounting and settlement therein in the following cases: By an administrator, where he has paid moncys belonging to the estate of a deceased wife, by mistake, to the husband's personal representatives, such moneys being distributed and the distributees not being parties to the settlement in the probate court: Hemphill v. Moody, 64 Ala. 468; by an executrix, when she is entitled to a decree in her favor for the amount due her for the excess of her disbursements over her receipts, the probate court not being able to render such a judgment: Reaves v. Garrett's Adm'r, 34 Ala. 558; when a creditor of the deceased seeks to pursue certain real and personal property standing in the name of a trustee for the debtor's wife and children, alleging that such property was fraud-

§1154, (b) See, also, Bragg v. Beers. 71 Ala. 151 (before probate jurisdiction has attached, devisees or heirs, legatees or distributees may resort to equity without assigning any special cause); Shackelford v. Bankhead, 72 Ala. 476 (personal representative cannot resort to equity in the first place, and other parties cannot remove the administration to equity, unless there is a special ground for equity jurisdiction); Trawick v. Davis, 85 Ala. 342, 5 South. 83; Noble v. Tait, 119 Ala. 399, 24 South. 438. See, further, Greenhood v. Greenhood, 143 Ala. 440, 39 South. 299; Colquitt v. Gill, 147 Ala. 554, 41 South. 784; Bresler v. Bloom, 147 Ala. 504, 41 South. 1010; Rensford v. Joseph A. Magnus & Co., 150 Ala. 288, 43 South. 853;

Hurt v. Hurt, 157 Ala. 126, 47 South. 260 (removal on application of executor); Hardwick v. Hardwick, 164 Ala. 390, 51 South. 389; Swope v. Swope, 173 Ala. 157, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 937, 55 South. 418; Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 176 Ala. 160, 57 South. 474; Spiers v. Zeigler, 175 Ala. 664, 57 South. 699; Seay v. Graves, 178 Ala. 131, 59 South. 469; Swope v. Swope, 178 Ala. 172, 59 South. 661. As to what acts constitute a taking jurisdiction by the probate court for a final settlement, so as to require a special showing to justify a removal of the administration into chancery, see Ligon v. Ligon, 105 Ala. 460, 17 South. 89 (citing Gamble v. Jordan, 54 Ala. 432; James v. Faulk, 54 Ala. 184; Glenn v. Billingslea, 64 Ala. 345).

siderable diversity among the individuals composing each

ulently transferred by the deceased, and that her estate is insolvent. A court of probate cannot give adequate relief in such a case: Pharis v. Leachman, 20 Ala. 662; by an administrator when the distributees seek to charge him with the payment of money, against which he has an equitable defense not available in the prohate court: Stewart's Adm'r v. Stewart's Heirs, 31 Ala. 207; by the distributees, legatees, etc., when they sue for a discovery of assets which the administrator has failed to return in his inventory: Wilson v. Crook, 17 Ala. 59; Hunley v. Hunley, 15 Ala. 91; Dobbs v. Distributees of Cockerham, 2 Port. 328; where a discovery is necessary: Horton v. Moseley, 17 Ala. 794; by the distributees, etc., where assets are withheld by an administrator claiming them as his own by a secret gift: Blakey v. Blakey's Heirs, 9 Ala. 391; where there are complicated and numerous matters of account to be settled, and trusts created, which the probate court cannot enforce: Gould v. Hayes, 19 Ala. 438; Apperson v. Cottrell, 3 Port. 51, 29 Am. Dec. 239.d On the contrary, when the administration has begun in the probate court, equity should not assume jurisdiction in the following cases,-the grounds are not sufficient: That the administrator is also guardian of a distributee who has come of age, or that he has committed an error in the allotment of exempt property to a minor child, are not sufficient: Draper's Adm'r v. Draper, 64 Ala. 545. Equity will not take jurisdiction and distribute upon a bill filed for an entirely different purpose: Scott v. Abercombie, 14 Ala. 270; and see Horton v. Moseley, 17 Ala. 794; Harrison v. Harrison, 9 Ala. 470.

§ 1154, (c) Seay v. Graves, 178 Ala. 131, 59 South. 469. Where it is shown that a discovery and accounting on the part of some of the distributees of the estate is necessary to a proper adjustment and settlement of the estate, this furnishes sufficient reason for the interference of a court of equity: Hurt v. Hurt, 157 Ala. 126, 47 South. 260.

§ 1154, (d) Where trusts are to be executed which the probate court cannot enforce, the court of chancery may take jurisdiction: Peters v. Rhodes, 157 Ala. 25, 47 South. 183. Where, in the settlement of an insolvent estate, it is desirable that an allotment of homestead be declared invalid, and that the property be sold free of encumbrances: Carr v. Shackelford, 68 Ala. 241.

§1154, (e) Where the estate has been declared insolvent, a clear and strong case is necessary to justify removal: Clark v. Eubank, 65 Ala. 245, 247; Shackelford v. Bankhead, 72 Ala. 476. See, also, J. Pollock & Co. v. Haigler, 195 Ala. 522, 70 South. 258 (discovery of assets in hands of executor insufficient ground of jurisdiction at suit of creditor, since probate court has ample powers). Omission of property from the inventory, waste or conversion of assets, and failure to make a settlement are no grounds for removal, since the powers of the probate court are adequate: Shackelford v. Bankhead, 72 Ala. 476.

class. In the states of the first class, the original equitable

Equity has jurisdiction to compel a final accounting, settlement, and distribution in the following special cases: Where an administrator has died before making a final account and settlement, the probate court has authority under the code to order an accounting; and decree a settlement of the estate against his personal representatives, but such decree is not conclusive against the sureties of the deceased administrator, nor does it support an action at law against them on the bond; equity, therefore, has jurisdiction in such a case; a bill for a final account and settlement may be filed by the administrator de bonis non against the personal representatives of the deceased administrator, and the sureties on his bond: Stallworth's Adm'r v. Farnham, 64 Ala. 259; see, also, Chaquette v. Ortet, 60 Cal. 591; Bush v. Lindsey, 44 Cal. 121, 125;^f where an administrator dies before a final accounting, and his executor is appointed the administrator de bonis non, equity alone has jurisdiction to compel an accounting and settlement: Hays v. Cockrell, 41 Ala. 75. Equity has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver of the assets, and thus virtually to take control of the administration when necessary for the protection of creditors and legatees from irreparable loss through the acts of the administrator or executor, but the danger of such loss must be manifest: Randle v. Carter, 62 Ala. 95.5 Equity has concurrent jurisdiction in the assignment of dower: Hause v. Hause, 57 Ala. 262; and has jurisdiction of a suit to foreclose a mortgage upon the estate of a deceased mortgagor: Gayle v. Singleton, 1 Stew. 566; and of a suit by a distributee to compel payment of his distributive share as determined by the final settlement of the probate court: Cherry v. Belcher, 5 Stew. & P. 133; and has concurrent jurisdiction of suits by legatees, and exclusive jurisdiction when the relief demanded involves the execution of a trust, or a discovery, or the taking an account: Pearson v. Darrington, 18 Ala. 348; and wherever the jurisdiction of the probate court is imperfect: Leavens v. Butler, 8 Port. 380. Where a ward dies, and his guardian is appointed his administrator, equity has jurisdiction to compel a final accounting and settlement against him in both capacities: Carswell v. Spencer, 44 Ala. 204. Where an executor is domiciled in another state, a legatee may proceed in equity against him for an account and payment: Colbert v. Daniel, 32 Ala. 314.h On the other

§ 1154, (1) To the same effect, see Wood v. Legg, 91 Ala. 511, 8 South. 342.

§ 1154, (3) See, also, Walker v. Johnson, 82 Ala. 347, 2 South. 744; Dickens v. Dickens, 154 Ala. 440, 45 South. 630 (bill by distributee of estate of a deceased partner, the surviving partner being also the administrator, praying for the removal of the administration into chancery, the removal of the administrator, an accounting, an injunction to preserve the assets, and the appointment of a receiver).

§1154, (h) See, also, Walker v. Johnson, 82 Ala. 347, 2 South. 744. Where there has been no administra-

jurisdiction over administrations remains unabridged by

hand, in respect to the admission of wills to probate, the jurisdiction of the orphans' court is exclusive; there is no need of a resort to equity in case of a destroyed will; the orphans' court can grant probate: Apperson v. Cottrell, 3 Port. 51, 29 Am. Dec. 239.¹ Equitable jurisdiction after a final decree by the probate court: In the absence of fraud or some other element of special equitable cognizance, a court of equity has no power to interfere with the final decree of the orphans' court: King v. Smith, 15 Ala. 264. The decree of a court of probate, on a final settlement of the administration, being complete, is of equal dignity, and as final and conclusive as the judgment of a court of law or decree of a court of chancery. Equity will not interfere with a decree of a court of probate, nor detract from its conclusiveness, nor reopen the litigation unless on facts or grounds of which the party complaining could not have availed himself, when the decree was rendered, because of accident, or fraud, or act of his adversary, unmixed with fault or negligence on his part: Waring v. Lewis, 53 Ala. 615; Gamble v. Jordan, 54 Ala. 432; Bowden v. Perdue, 59 Ala. 409; ^j but the decree of the probate court, in order to be thus conclusive, must be actually complete; when the settlement in the orphans' court, though purporting to be final, actually remains to be completed as to various sums, and there are still assets in the hands of the administrator unadministered, equity may take jurisdiction for a final accounting and settlement: Dement v. Boggess's Adm'rs, 13 Ala. 140. It is the universal rule in Alabama that when the court of equity has, and has assumed, jurisdiction of an administration for any particular purpose, however special and partial, it may and will retain the jurisdiction for all purposes, and go on to a final accounting, settlement, and distribution of the estate. In doing so, it will be governed by the same rules of law which would control the probate court in determining the rights of the parties, but will follow the rules of procedure belonging to courts of equity. If proceedings had already been commenced in the probate court, they are suspended, and the court of equity will, if necessary, restrain the parties from any further prosecution of those proceedings: Hause v. Hause, 57 Ala. 262 (assignment of

tion, but the heirs or next of kin have settled and divided the estate by voluntary arrangement among themselves, a creditor may maintain a suit to compel the payment of his demand out of the property, without the necessity of taking out an administration: Cameron v. Cameron, 82 Ala. 392, 3 South. 148, citing the text of this paragraph, post, at note iiii. § 1154, (1) But by statute (Code, § 4298) the validity of a will may be contested by a bill in chancery: Breeding v. Grantland, 135 Ala. 497, 33 South. 544; Kaplan v. Coleman, 180 Ala. 267, 60 South. 885.

§1154, (j) Humphreys v. Burleson, 72 Ala. 1; Waldrom v. Waldrom, 76 Ala. 285; Seals v. Weldon, 121 Ala. 319, 25 South. 1021.

the statutes, concurrent with that possessed by the probate

dower); Cowles v. Pollard, 51 Ala. 445 (construction of a will); Pearson v. Darrington, 21 Ala. 169; Stewart's Adm'r v. Stewart's Heirs, 31 Ala. 207; Wilson v. Crook, 17 Ala. 59 (discovery of assets); Taliaferro v. Brown, 11 Ala. 702; Hall v. Heirs of Wilson, 14 Ala. 295; Gayle v. Singleton, 1 Stew. 566 (foreclosure of a mortgage); Hunley v. Hunley, 15 Ala. 91 (discovery); Blakey v. Blakey's Heirs, 9 Ala. 391.^k

Arkansas.-The system prevailing in this state is very different from that of Alahama, and the equitable jurisdiction is confined within the narrowest limits. It is the settled doctrine that the probate court has the exclusive jurisdiction to grant and revoke letters of administration and testamentary, to pass upon all questions touching the bonds of administrators and executors, to call executors and administrators to account, and to decree final settlement. A court of equity has no jurisdiction, in general, over administrators, or to withdraw an administration from the probate court, to assume cognizance thereof, and compel a settlement. The clause in the state constitution conferring jurisdiction in matters of equity upon the circuit courts does not conflict with this conclusion, because the settlement of an estate is not a matter of equity. (This ruling, it will he seen, is directly opposed to that of the Alabama and California courts.) The only exception to this general doctrine arises in cases where there has been fraud or waste in the process of administration of such a nature that the relief given by the probate court would not be adequate: Moren v. Mc-Cown, 23 Ark. 93; Reinhardt v. Gartrell, 33 Ark. 727; Mock v. Pleasants, 34 Ark. 63; Flash v. Gresham, 36 Ark. 529; Haag v. Sparks, 27 Ark. 594; Shegogg v. Perkins, 34 Ark. 117.¹ In cases of fraud or waste during the

§ 1154, (k) Bragg v. Beers, 71 Ala. (having taken jurisdiction, 151 equity will order a sale of lands when, under like circumstances, a court of probate would have ordered it); Sharp v. Sharp, 76 Ala. 312 (same); Carroll v. Richardson, 87 Ala. 605, 6 South. 342 (construction of will); Tygh v. Dolan, 95 Ala. 269, 10 South. 837. See, also, Hurt v. Hurt, 157 Ala. 126, 47 South. 260; Roy v. Roy, 159 Ala. 555, 48 South. 793 (provisions of statute with reference to ordering sale of decedent's lands for distribution must be complied with); Hamby v. Hamby, 165 Ala. 171, 138 Am. St. Rep. 23, 51 South. 732 (bill for partition does not involve administration); Rucker v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 176 Ala. 456, 58 South. 465 (chancery procedure followed); Kimball v. Cunningham Hardware Co., 197 Ala. 631, 73 South. 323.

§ 1154, (1) Jones v. Graham, 36 Ark. 383; Jackson v. McNabb, 39 Ark. 111; Nathan v. Lehman, 39 Ark. 256; Trimble v. James, 40 Ark. 393, 401; Dyer v. Jacoway, 42 Ark. 186, 190, 50 Ark. 222, 6 S. W. 902; Turner v. Rogers, 49 Ark. 51, 4 S. W. 193; McLeod v. Griffis, 51 Ark. 1, 8 S. W. 837; Brice v. Taylor, 51 Ark. 80, 9 S. W. 854; Blevins v. Case, 66 Ark. 416, 51 S. W. 65. See, also, Nelson v. Cowing, 77 Ark. 351,

courts. In many of them a suit for the administration,

process of administration which cannot be relieved against by the probate court, equity may interfere while the administration is pending in the probate court, or even after its final decree. Thus where the removal of the fraudulent administrator by the probate court would not have disclosed the fraud, nor canceled a deed obtained through fraud or duress, equity may interpose and control the proceedings and give relief after the final decree in probate. But such interposition of equity on the ground of fraud or waste of assets is merely corrective; it does not enable the court of equity to go on with the administration and compel a final accounting and settlement; if further proceedings in the matter of a settlement and distribution are necessary, the cause must be remitted to the probate court, and the final settlement must be completed in that tribunal in accordance with the corrections made by the court of equity: Freeman v. Reagan, 26 Ark. 373; Reinhardt v. Gartrell, 33 Ark. 727; Shegogg v. Perkins, 34 Ark. 117.^m When an executor or administrator dies, a suit in equity cannot be maintained by the administrator de bonis non or by the public administrator against the personal representatives or sureties of the deceased to hold them accountable for property of the estate lost, wasted, or converted by the deceased: State v. Rottaken, 34 Ark. 144; contra in Alabama and California. Where a suit in equity is maintainable against an executor or administrator, and the relief sought is purely equitable, the court will not allow stale demands, although not barred by the statute of limitations: Martin v. Campbell, 35 Ark. 137.ⁿ

California.—The probate system in this state is very comprehensive, detailed, and complete, embracing not only administrations proper, but the

113 Am, St. Rep. 155, 91 S. W. 773 (attempted suit to charge guardian for negligence in collection of rents); McCracken v. McBee, 96 Ark. 251, 131 S. W. 450; Hall v. Cox, 104 Ark. 303, 149 S. W. 80. A court of equity may, after the estate of a surety is finally closed, decree satisfaction of his bond out of his real estate in possession of his heirs: Hall v. Cole, (Ark.) 76 S. W. 1076; and a creditor can proceed in equity against heirs who have received the ancestor's estate for satisfaction of his claim which has accrued after the time limited for proving it against the administrator or after he has been discharged; Cole v. Hall, 85 Ark. 144, 107 S. W. 175.

§1154, (m) Hankins v. Layne, 48 Ark. 544, 3 S. W. 821. See, also, Robinson v. Black, 84 Ark. 92, 104 S. W. 554.

§ 1154, (n) Relief against judgments of the probate court can be had only on the usual grounds of fraud, accident, or mistake; Gorman v. Bonner, 80 Ark. 339, 97 S. W. 282; Williams v. Risor, 84 Ark. 61, 104 S. W. 547; Steele v. Kelley, 32 Okl. 547, 122 Pac. 934, reviewing Arkansas cases (probate sale cannot be set aside in equity for mere defect in notice).

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settlement, and distribution of an estate may be brought,

appointment of guardians, and the supervision of the wards' estates in their hands. It may be added, in order to explain passages in judicial opinions which might appear strange to lawyers in other states, that the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased falls within the scope of the administrator's or executor's functions to be administered. Upon the death of an owner intestate, the title to his land does not immediately and absolutely vest in the heirs; they derive their title, if not directly from the administrator, at least through him, and not until the estate is fully administered. Under the present judicial system, the probate jurisdiction is given to the single court of original, general jurisdiction in law and in equity,-the superior court,-so that there is no separate prohate tribunal. The proceedings in this superior court for a final accounting, settlement, and distribution are virtually the same as upon a hill in chancery in au administration suit. It would have been well, in my opinion, to have abandoned the name of a separate probate jurisdiction, and to have called the proceedings in administration a branch of the equitable jurisdiction held by the superior court as a court of equity. With regard to the equitable jurisdiction exercised by the "civil action," distinct from the statutory probate proceedings, there appears to be some conflict in the decisions, or at least in the judicial dicta. This apparent conflict may, however, have been ended by the very recent case of Rosenberg v. Frank, quoted in a preceding note. The ratio decidendi in that case is the broad principle that the affirmative grant, either in statutes or in the constitution, of jurisdiction to the prohate court, does not destroy nor lessen the general jurisdiction in equity conferred upon other courts, and that this general equitable jurisdiction includes administrations. Alabama decisions are cited with approval as sustaining this conclusion. These Alabama cases also hold that resort may always he had in the first instance to a court of equity instead of to a court of probate, and this is a necessary consequence of the principle. The courts of California, however, have not followed the principle to this length, and probably they will not. On the contrary, they expressly hold that parties cannot resort to equity in matters of adminis-

§ 1154, (o) The recent decisions have very nearly reached this result: Toland v. Earl, 129 Cal. 148, 153, 79 Am. St. Rep. 100, 61 Pac. 914, per Temple, J.: "The special proceeding may as well be in the nature of a proceeding in equity as at law, and it is before the same chancellor, to whom it would be necessary to appeal in a personal action to instruct the administrator or executor and the court as to the proper construction of the will. . . . If it is necessary or proper to appeal to a court of chancery, the probate court is such a court, and the proceeding is in fact for that purpose. It is the same court when sitting in matters of probate, and may exercise all equity powers necessary for a complete administration."

as a matter of course, in a court of equity in the first in-

tration except upon some special ground of exclusive equitable cognizance. Some of the later decisions, laying down this rule very emphatically, seem to be somewhat conflicting with the course of decision in Rosenberg v. Frank. So far as any such conflict exists, the most recent and authoritative decision in Rosenberg v. Frank must be regarded as limiting the expressions of opinion in some of these late cases, and as returning to the more liberal view of the equitable jurisdiction taken by several of the earlier California cases, which are cited and approved.^{**P**} It is held that

§1154, (P) Williams v. Williams, 73 Cal. 99, 14 Pac. 394. Some doubt has been cast on the authority of Rosenberg v. Frank on the question of jurisdiction. In Siddall v. Harrison, 73 Cal. 560, 15 Pac. 130, it is pointed out that only a minority of the court concurred in the opinion of Thornton, J., in the former case, on the question of the jurisdiction, and that that case, as well as Payne v. Payne, 18 Cal. 292, and Williams v. Williams, 73 Cal. 99, 14 Pac. 394, were, in a sense, consent cases, as no one objected to the jurisdiction, and all parties interested desired the decision. It was held in Siddall v. Harrison that a court of equity is not bound to entertain an action brought to construe a will which has been duly admitted to probate, and should not do so, except in a case where there is some special reason for seeking its interposition; nor, in the absence of special reasons shown, can a person claiming to be the heir, but who takes nothing under the will, maintain an action in equity for the purpose of determining his heirship, and having the residuary and other legacies in the will pronounced invalid, pending proceedings in probate for the settlement of the estate. Speaking of Rosenberg v. Frank, Garoutte, J., in Mc-Daniel v. Pattison, (Cal.) 27 Pac. 651, says: "We might add, the correctness of the law there found, as

to the jurisdiction of a court of equity to construe a will under the laws of this state, is not only doubted, but the effect of the decision is very much limited, in Siddall v. Harrison." A recent decision appears to place California in the author's second class. In Toland v. Earl, 129 Cal. 148, 79 Am. St. Rep. 100, 61 Pac. 914, Temple, J., points out that Rosenberg v. Frank arose under the former constitution, which provided for courts of probate as separate and inferior courts, and says, in part: "The legislature has provided a special proceeding for the administration of the estates of deceased persons, whether testate or intestate. For the conduct of this special proceeding a minute code has been provided, through which every purpose for which resort was formerly had to courts of equity is attained. . . . In the probate proceeding provision is made for the presentation and allowance of the claims of creditors, and, when the assets of the estate have been fully ascertained, upon notice the claims of creditors are ordered paid, if the assets are insufficient to pay all, in a certain order. Certainly this provision must be exclusive of the jurisdiction of a court of equity to marshal the assets and to direct the payment of claims. If a legacy falls due, or a partial distribution of an intestate estate should be made, the

stance, instead of in the court of probate. In most, the

the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction of administrations, under all ordinary circumstances, of the accounting of executors and administrators, so that no suit in equity can be maintained in the first instance for an accounting or distribution; whatever jurisdiction in equity exists is wholly corrective : Auguisola v. Arnaz, 51 Cal. 435. A court of equity has, therefore, no jurisdiction of an action against an administrator seeking to charge the estate with the expenses of administration: Gurnee v. Malonev. 38 Cal. 85, 99 Am. Dec. 352; nor over the allowance of commissions to executors or administrators: Hope v. Jones, 24 Cal. 89; and if no court of equity can interfere with the final settlement and decree of a court of probate, it cannot set aside such decree on the ground of fraud, or other like ground of equitable cognizance, and leave the parties to make another settlement in probate; and it is even doubtful whether equity could interfere at all, unless an opportunity to open the account or to appeal from the decree had been lost: Hope v. Jones, 24 Cal. 89; nor has a court of equity jurisdiction of an action by a ward against his guardian to compel an accounting; the jurisdiction to determine the accounts between guardian and ward belongs exclusively to probate: Allen v. Tiffany, 53 Cal. 16. Under the existing organization of the courts, a court of equity or of law has no jurisdiction to try issues of fact framed in the court of probate: In the Matter of the Will of Bowen, 34 Cal. 682; for former practice on the trial of such issues, see Pond v. Pond, 10 Cal. 495. (It is certainly very difficult to reconcile some of these cases, or the grounds upon which their ruling is based, with the ratio decidendi in Rosenberg v. Frank, supra, especially as they were all determined under the same constitutional provision.) On the other hand, equity has jurisdiction in the following cases: Where an executor or administrator had died without rendering a final

probate court can order the personal representative to make the payment or distribution. . . . Surely thismust be exclusive of a suit in equity, in which the parties are necessarily limited. The same is true as to the settlement of the accounts of the administrator or executor....But the most conclusive reason, to my mind, why this jurisdiction must be held to be exclusive is that, under our probate system, all deraignment of title to the property of deceased persons is through the decree of distribution entered as the final act in the administration of an estate.

whether testate or intestate. No one will contend that this decree can be made by any other court or in any other proceeding. . . . Here the probate court not only may, but should, and often must, construe the trusts created by the will. . . . If it is necessary or proper to appeal to a court of chancery, the probate court is such a court, and the proceeding is in fact for that purpose. It is the same court when sitting in matters of probate, and may exercise all equity powers for a complete administration."

general principle regulating the exercise of all concurrent

account, equity has jurisdiction of a suit by the administrator de bonis non, to compel his personal representatives to account, and the judgment therein is conclusive upon the sureties of the deceased executor or administrator. This case is omitted from the powers conferred upon the court of probate, and that court has no jurisdiction except what is expressly given to it by the statute: Chaquette v. Ortet, 60 Cal. 594; Bush v. Lindsey, 44 Cal. 121 (this rule agrees with decisions in Alabama);^q where a settlement purporting to be final has been decreed by the probate court, a person who was not an actual party to it may maintain a suit in equity against the administrator, and compel him to a full and final accounting, treating the former settlement as a nullity: Clarke v. Perry, 5 Cal. 58, 63 Am. Dec. 82; Deck v. Gerke, 12 Cal. 433, 73 Am. Dec. 555; and a court of equity may also take jurisdiction of the settlement of an estate when there are peculiar circumstances of difficulty and embarrassment in its administration, and when the assuming of jurisdiction would prevent great delay, expense, inconvenience, and waste, and thus conclude by one action and decree a protracted and vexatious litigation: Deck v. Gerke, supra (these two cases are cited and approved in Rosenberg v. Frank); equity has exclusive jurisdiction of actions to compel the enforcement of trusts created by will, to call the trustee to an account, and to perform his trust duties: Haverstick v. Trudel, 51 Cal. 431; Auguisola v. Arnaz, 51 Cal. 435;" and of actions against the administrator and heirs of a deceased mortgagor, to foreclose a mortgage:" Meyers v. Farquharson, 46 Cal. 190; Willis v. Farley, 24 Cal. 490, 500; a court of equity has jurisdiction of a suit to set aside a decree of a probate court obtained by fraud: Sanford v. Head, 5 Cal. 297; but see Hope v. Jones, 24 Cal. 89 (the case of Sanford v. Head is cited with approval in Rosenberg v. Frank);^t and has

§ 1154, (**q**) But see King v. Chase, 159 Cal. 420, 115 Pac. 207 (since the passage of section 639 of the Code of Civil Procedure, giving probate court such power, equity has no longer jurisdiction).

§ 1154, (r) And where a legacy on its face is absolute, heirs seeking to establish a secret trust must bring an independent action in equity: In re Sharp's Estate, 17 Cal. App. 634, 120 Pac. 1079.

§1154, (*) Hibernia S. & L. Soc. v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 138 Cal. 257, 71 Pac. 334 (to establish lien against grantee and heir).

§ 1154, (*) Equity may give relief against a fraudulent probate sale by declaring the purchaser a trustee: Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell, 152 Cal. 201, 92 Pac. 184. A decree of distribution may be reviewed in equity for fraud or mistake; jurisdiction in equity is conferred by the Constitution of the state, and the remedy by motion is merely cumulative: Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477, 89 Pac. 317. See Goodrich v. Ferris, (Cal.) 145 Fed. 844,

jurisdiction prevails, that when either court has assumed

jurisdiction of a suit by the administrator of a deceased partner against the survivors to compel a settlement of the partnership affairs; the jurisdiction given to the probate court in the administration of the decedent's estate does not interfere with the general equitable jurisdiction over such causes: Griggs v. Clark, 23 Cal. 427.^{**u**} It was held in an early case that the court of equity has the same control over the persons and estates of infants which the court of chancery in England possesses: Wilson v. Roach, 4 Cal. 362; but this can hardly be true under the existing statutes: See Allen v. Tiffany, 53 Cal. 16. The court of probate has exclusive jurisdiction in the matters relating to the probate of wills; and *every* will must be regularly admitted to probate, before it can be given in evidence in any court in support of a title under it: Castro v. Richardson, 18 Cal. 478.^{**v**}

Connecticut.-The courts of probate have not only a complete jurisdiction over all matters of administration and the settlement and distribution of estates, but are clothed with large equitable powers in granting reliefs and determining rights of property. Their jurisdiction, except under some very exceptional circumstances, is exclusive; equity has no jurisdiction over administrations, either in the first instance or by way of correcting errors in probate proceedings, under all ordinary circumstances. For example, the court of probate has full power to correct inventories, to compel the filing of additional inventories, and to settle the accounts of executors and administrators upon a basis of equity. That specific legacies are given by ambiguous language, that there are difficulties in the settlement arising from conveyances of land by the executors pursuant to covenants of the testator, and from their acceptance of mortgaged lands in lieu of the debts due to the deceased secured by the mortgages thereon, are not sufficient grounds to make the interference of equity either necessary or proper: Beach v. Norton, 9 Conn. 182; Pitkin v. Pitkin, 7 Conn. 315 (suit by executors to charge real estate of testator with expenses incurred in the administration); Bailey v. Strong, 8 Conn. 278 (where an insolvent heir indebted to the estate to the full amount of his share therein had fraudulently assigned his interest in the estate, equity will not interfere; full power in the probate court); Sheldon v. Sheldon, 2 Root, 512; Gates v. Treat, 17 Conn. 388 (equity will not correct an error in carrying out

and review of cases. But the determination of the genuineness of an alleged will is solely for the probate court, and its judgment cannot be set aside by a court of equity (it is admitted that this rule is an exception to the general jurisdiction of equity over judgments, and that it has been criticised as resting on no satisfactory ground): Tracy v. Muir, 151 Cal. 363, 121 Am. St. Rep. 117, 90 Pac. 832.

§ 1154, (**u**) See Raisch v. Warren, 18 Cal. App. 655, 124 Pac. 95.

§1154, (v) In McDaniel v. Pattison, (Cal.) 27 Pac. 651, it was held

jurisdiction of a particular case, the other tribunal will

the final settlement and distribution in the probate court). Probate court has full power to correct any error made in a prior and partial settlement, and to do equity among the parties interested, and there is no jurisdiction in courts of equity for such a purpose: Mix's Appeal, 35 Conn. 121, 95 Am. Dec. 222. On the other hand, equity has full and exclusive jurisdiction over all trusts of real or personal property created by will, of calling the trustees to account, of settling their accounts and compelling a performance of the trust; the probate jurisdiction does not extend to trusts: Cowles v. Whitman, 10 Conn. 121, 25 Am. Dec. 60; Parsons v. Lyman, 32 Conn. 566; Prindle v. Holcomb, 45 Conn. 111. Illustration of the extraordinary circumstances under which the equitable jurisdiction exists: All the heirs signed an agreement that the estate should be settled in the probate court, in accordance with the draught of a will prepared, but not executed, by the deceased. One of these heirs, who was weak-minded and ignorant of his rights, and who claimed to have been unduly influenced by the others to sign the agreement, wherehy he relinquished a larger interest than he received, filed a bill in equity to set aside the agreement, and to enjoin the proceedings in the probate court under it; held, that courts of probate have sole jurisdiction in all ordinary matters relating to the settlement of estates, but that this was an extraordinary matter, and equity had jurisdiction.

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Georgia.—There is some discrepancy among the decisions, chiefly arising, however, from the different statutory systems prevailing at different periods. It may be accurately stated, as a general description of the present condition, that while the jurisdiction of probate is sufficient for all ordinary purposes, so that courts of equity will not interfere under ordinary circumstances to *exercise* a jurisdiction which they really possess, yet the equitable jurisdiction will be exercised freely, where the circumstances are special, and where equitable relief is needed, which cannot adequately be conferred by the probate courts. The extent of the equitable jurisdiction

that a chancery court has no jurisdiction to probate a will, although such relief is sought only incidentally to the main equitable relief.

§ 1154, (w) Florida.—The circuit courts as courts of equity have jurisdiction to compel accounting and discovery and to give appropriate relief in cases of mismanagement of estates by administrators and executors, particularly where the probate, courts cannot administer the relief necessary to complete justice: Opitz v. Morgan, 68 Fla. 469, 67 South. 67. Where a personal representative has made a voluntary distribution, and there is a deficiency of assets, equity has jurisdiction to compel the legatee or distributee to refund his proportionate share of the deficiency, where the personal representative acted in good faith and with due care: Clifton v. Clifton, 54 Fla. 535, 45 South. 458.

not ordinarily interfere. These states are Alabama,

is far greater than in Arkansas and Connecticut, and greater perhaps than in California, but more circumscribed than in Alabama. In some of the earlier cases, under the then existing statutes, it was held that the general equitable jurisdiction over administrations existed, substantially the same as that possessed by the English court of chancery; that when a court of equity had obtained jurisdiction over a case of administration, and the administrator is removed from office, it may appoint a receiver who could dispose of the assets and settle the estate under a decree of the court: Walker v. Morris, 14 Ga. 323; Mills v. Lumpkin, 1 Ga. 511, 44 Am. Dec. 677. Later cases described the probate jurisdiction over matters of accounting, final settlement, and distribution as exclusive under ordinary circumstances, and held that equity could only interfere to grant relief which a court of probate cannot and a court of equity can give: Slade v. Street, 27 Ga. 17; Perkins v. Perkins, 21 Ga. 13; Moody v. Ellerbie, 36 Ga. 666.* Finally, the very recent cases, under existing statutes, admit a broader equitable jurisdiction in the matter of ordinary administrations. It is held that a concurrent jurisdiction of equity over the matter of accounting and settlement by administrators is specially retained by the Code of 1873, sec. 2600: Ewing v. Moses, 50 Ga. 264; y still it is said that there should be a strong cause to authorize a court of equity to exercise this jurisdiction, and to interfere with the regular administration of an estate: Mayo v. Keaton, 54 Ga. 496; and see Collins v. Stephens, 58 Ga. 284. The following are particular conditions of fact, or instances of particular relief, in which equity has jurisdiction: Marshaling of assets: Equitable suits for the marshaling of assets will be maintained whenever such relief is actually required, and is songht to be obtained; but the mere fact that there are numerons claims against the estate, or that the estate is insolvent, does not constitute a case for marshaling: Bryan v. Hickson, 40 Ga. 405; Irvin v. Creditors of Bond, 41 Ga. 630; Jeter v. Barnard, 42 Ga. 43. Destroyed will: It has been held that equity has no jurisdiction of a suit to establish a will destroyed by accident, since the powers of the probate court are ample in such a case: Sladc v. Street, 27 Ga. 17; Perkins v. Perkins, 21 Ga. 13 (equity will interfere only in case of destruction by spoliation); but as equity has jurisdiction in cases of fraud, it may entertain a suit to establish a will destroyed by fraud, notwithstanding the exclusive jurisdiction in general of the court of ordinary over probate matters: Harris v. Tisereau, 52 Ga. 153, 21 Am. Rep. 242; equity, however, has no jurisdiction to establish a copy of a lost will: Ponce v. Underwood, 55 Ga. 601.

§ 1154, (x) See, also, McArthur
v. Jordan, 139 Gå. 304, 77 S. E. 150.
§ 1154, (y) Johnston v. Duncan, 67
Ga. 61; McCook v. Pond, 72 Ga. 150;

McGowan v. Lufburrow, 82 Ga. 523, 14 Am. St. Rep. 178, 9 S. E. 427.

§1154, (*) Stephens v. James, 77 Ga. 139, 3 S. E. 160. Fraud or waste: Equity has a corrective jurisdiction in cases of fraud or waste in the course of an administration or settlement, except fraud in the execution of a will;^{aa} thus a court of equity may set aside letters of administration procured by fraud, and require the administrator to account for and pay over to the lawful foreign executor the assets received by him: Wallace v. Walker, 37 Ga. 265, 92 Am. Dec. 70; and may entertain a suit by a ward against an administrator for various equitable relief against the latter's fraud and waste: Ware v. Ware, 42 Ga. 408; and has jurisdiction in all cases of fraud, except fraud in the execution of a will: Harris v. Tisereau, 52 Ga. 153, 21 Am. Rep. 242; bb a court of equity has no jurisdiction, therefore, to set aside a will regularly admitted to prohate, and to declare the same, or any part thereof, null and void: Tudor v. James, 53 Ga. 302; see ante, vol. 2, § 913; where the heirs agree to distribute an estate without a regular administration in the probate court, and appoint an agent for that purpose, and put him in possession of the property, a suit in equity against him by one or more of the distributees may be maintained, as against an administrator: Moore v. Gleaton, 23 Ga. 142; a husband procured a policy of life insurance for the benefit of his wife and children. On his death the amount was paid to the widow, and she paid it over to her father, who was co-administrator with her of her husband's estate. The father died without accounting for this fund in his hands. The children bring a suit in equity against the executor of this deceased father for an account and payment of the fund. Held, that the suit should have been brought by the widow, and the children could not maintain it without adding her as a party defendant, and showing why she did not sue herself as the plaintiff: Fletcher v. Collier, 61 Ga. 653.cc Equitable remedies of creditors: When an estate has been settled and distributed, and the

§ 1154, (aa) 'It is well settled in this state that courts of equity have concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of ordinary in the administration of the estates of deceased persons in all cases where equitable interference is necessary, or proper to the full protection of the rights of the parties at interest." Hence an heir can resort to equity when the property is being mismanaged or wasted: Bivins v. Marvin, 96 Ga. 268, 22 S. E. 923; Thompson v. Orser, 105 Ga. 482, 30 S. E. 626. The mere insolvency of the administrator will not give equity jurisdiction, however: Duggan v. Lamar, (Ga.) 29 S. E. 19.

§ 1154, (bb) A judgment of the probate court granting letters of administration may be set aside in equity for fraud perpetrated on the court by the misrepresentation of jurisdictional facts: Neal v. Boykin, 129 Ga. 676, 121 Am. St. Rep. 237, 59 S. E. 912.

§ 1154, (cc) It was held in Bailey v. Ross, 68 Ga. 735, that where, after due notice, leave has been regularly granted by the court of ordinary (probate) to an administrator to sell realty of a decedent, equity will

Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee (in cer-

executor discharged by a decree of the probate court rendered with the consent of the heirs, a creditor who subsequently obtained a judgment against the estate may maintain a suit in equity upon it against the heirs to reach the property distributed to them, the executor being insolvent: Long v. Mitchell, 63 Ga. 769; and a judgment creditor of the estate may sue in equity to reach assets already distributed, when the executor is a non-resident and insolvent, and all the assets are distributed, the executor himself being a devisee and being made a defendant. In such a case, if the executor has committed waste, his share should be first applied in discharge of the judgment, before taking the shares of other devisees: Redd v. Davis, 59 Ga. 823.

Illinois.-The theory is admitted by later as well as earlier cases in this state that equity retains a general jurisdiction over administrations, concurrent with, but paramount to, that possessed by the probate courts, and the only practical question is, When will that jurisdiction be exercised? The earlier decisions allowed its exercise somewhat more freely than is done by the later ones; they seem to have permitted a resort to equity in the first instance, instead of to the probate court, for the purpose of an accounting and final settlement, without any special ground alleged; and also for the purpose of re-examining and correcting a settlement made by a probate court, with which a party was dissatisfied: Grattan v. Grattan, 18 Ill. 167, 65 Am. Dec. 726; Mahar v. O'Hara, 4 Gilm. 424; Jennings v. Mc-Connel, 17 Ill. 148; Heward v. Slagle, 52 Ill. 336. The more recent cases, while fully admitting the existence of this jurisdiction, have repeatedly declared the rule to be: "Courts of equity will not exercise jurisdiction over the administration of estates except in extraordinary cases; some special reason must be shown why the administration should be taken from the probate court": Freeland v. Dazey, 25 Ill. 294; Townsend v. Radcliffe, 44 Ill. 446; Garvin v. Stewart's Heirs, 59 Ill. 229; Harris v. Douglas, 64 Ill. 466; Blanchard v. Williamson, 70 Ill. 647; Heustis v. Johnson, 84 Ill.

not restrain the sale by injunction at the instance of an heir on account of reasons — as that there were no debts against the estate which could have heen as readily urged at the time when such order was granted; but it is said in a similar case that where the estate is ready for distribution, and this is asked for in the bill, equity may assume jurisdiction, and incidentally enjoin the administrator from making such a sale: McCook v. Pond, 72 Ga. 150. In Simmons v. Crumbley, 84 Ga, 495, 10 S. E. 1090, it was held that where the probate court cannot revoke authority for an administrator's sale because the sale was to be made hetween terms, equity will enjoin the sale if it appears that sufficient has not heen set apart, in accordance with statute, for a twelve months' support of minor children.

tain special cases), Virginia, District of Columbia, and

61; Crain v. Kennedy, 85 Ill. 340; Hales v. Holland, 92 Ill. 494.dd The following are examples of such special facts in which this concurrent jurisdiction is properly exercised: Where a court of probate ordered an administrator to pay over money in his hands to the person *legally* entitled to receive it, without determining who were equitably entitled to the fund: Townsend v. Radcliffe, 44 Ill. 446; a suit by a creditor against an administrator for an accounting and a sale of land for purpose of satisfying the claim, where the court of probate had committed error in passing upon the demand, and all the papers and records in the probate court had been destroyed by accidental fire: Clark v. Hogle, 52 Ill. 427; in a case involving complicated equities, a court of equity may entertain a creditor's suit against the heirs of a deceased debtor, and may then retain the case, in order to decree a final settlement: Garvin v. Stewart's Heirs, 59 Ill. 229; where the payment of debts is made a charge on the testator's real estate, equity has jurisdiction in the first instance, on the ground of its jurisdiction over trusts: Harris v. Douglas, 64 Ill. 466; see, also, case of a special agreement for distribution and accounting made by heirs and devisees: Pool v. Docker, 92 Ill. 501. In the following cases the facts are not sufficient to admit the exercise of this equitable jurisdiction: Equity will not take jurisdiction of a suit to establish a simple legal claim or debt, where there are no equitable incidents: Hales v. Holland, 92 Ill. 494; Armstrong v. Cooper, 11 Ill. 560; even that the claim is equitable is not of itself sufficient: Garvin v. Stewart's Heirs, 59 Ill. 229; one of several executors cannot call his co-executors to account in equity: Crain v. Kennedy, 85 Ill. 340; it is not a sufficient ground for a suit in equity by a creditor that he has not presented his claim, and that the presentation was barred by the statutory period of limitation, that the administrator was discharged by order of the probate court, and that there were assets not inventoried: Blanchard v. Williamson, 70 Ill. 647.ee In the following cases equity has

§ 1154, (dd) Harding v. Shepard, 107 Ill. 264; Winslow v. Leland, 128 Ill. 304, 21 N. E. 588. The court of equity will not interfero when the equitable powers of the probate court are adequate: Shepard v. Speer, 140 Ill. 238, 29 N. E. 718 (affirming 41 Ill. App. 211, and eiting Wadsworth v. Connell, 104 Ill. 378; Spencer v. Boardman, 118 Ill. 555 Jl. App. 469; Goodman v. Kopperl, 169 Ill. 136, 48 N. E. 172 (affirming 67 11. App. 42, and citing these additional cases: Wood v. Johnson, 13 Ill.
App. 548; Scripps v. King, 103 Ill.
469); Shepard v. Speer, 140 Ill. 238,
29 N. E. 718; Strauss v. Phillips, 189
Ill. 9, 59 N. E. 500, affirming 91 Ill.
App. 373.

§ 1154, (ee) A court of equity will not ordinarily assume jurisdiction until the claimant shall have exhibited his claim and had it allowed in the county (probate) court: Strauss v. Phillips, 189 Ill. 9, 59 N. E. 560, and cases cited, affirming an exclusive, or at least a certain, jurisdiction: Where a legacy is charged upon land devised, equity has jurisdiction of its enforcement, on the ground of trust, and courts of equity have jurisdiction in all cases of legacies: Mahar v. O'Hara, 4 Gilm. 424; where the object of a suit is to charge an administrator for violating the duties of his trust in regard to land, a court of equity not only has jurisdiction, but is the only court which can give adequate relief: McCreedy v. Mier, 64 Ill. 495; heirs who are dissatisfied with the settlement of an estate which is complicated should proceed by bill in equity, and not hy appeal from the decree of the probate court: Heward v. Slagle, 52 Ill. 336; see vol. 1, § 349, note 1.^{ff}

Indiana.—Under the earlier statutes it was held that the probate courts had jurisdiction of all matters of administration, and the decrees of final

91 Ill. App. 373; Winslow v. Leland, 128 Ill. 304, 21 N. E. 588; and then, if any special reasons that may be deemed sufficient can be assigned why the court cannot afford the requisite relief, equity will assist him, but not otherwise; in this respect, judgment creditors, except so far as their judgments are liens on real estate, and simple contract creditors, are on the same footing. For waste by, or fraud, mistake, or incompetency of, the administrator, relief may be had in the county court. The fact that the administrator failed, through fraud or negligence, to collect assets in the hands of surviving partners of the intestate is not sufficient ground for the interposition of a court of equity: See Winslow v. Leland, 128 Ill. 304, 21 N. E. 588. Equity will not take jurisdiction of an administration bill by creditor of an insol-. vent estate, of which no administrator has been appointed, for the purpose of setting aside a fraudulent conveyance: Goodman v. Kopperl, 169 Ill. 136, 48 N. E. 172, affirming 67 Ill. App. 42; Houston v. Maddux, 179 Ill. 377, 70 Am. St. Rep. 98, 53 N. E. 599, reversing 73 Ill. App. 203. The jurisdiction to set aside the probate of a will is derived solely from statute and can be exercised only in the mode and under the limitations prescribed by statute: Storrs v. St. Luke's Hospital, 180 Ill. 368, 72 Am. St. Rep. 211, 54 N. E. 185.

§1154, (ff) An act which gives a probate court jurisdiction of claims against estates, when the decedent has received money in trust for any purpose, does not confer on those. courts exclusive jurisdiction; the legislature has no power to deprive circuit courts of equity jurisdiction over trusts: Howell v. Moores, 127 Ill. 67, 19 N. E. 863, citing the author's note. Suit may be maintained by a creditor to follow assets into the hands of heirs or legatees where the claim does not arise until after distribution: Union Trust Co. v. Shoemaker, 258 Ill. 564, 101 N. E. 1050.

Where no administrator has been appointed, the heirs may maintain an action in equity to recover property procured from the deceased by fraud and undue influence; and in such an action the court will not stop with a decree for the recovery of the property, but will retain jurisdiction for the purpose of adjusting all the rights of the parties, even § 115 F

class, the jurisdiction of the probate courts over everything

settlement made therein were prima facie correct, and that a court of equity could only interfere with such decrees or with pending administrations in clear cases of fraud or mistake, but the jurisdiction did exist to correct fraud or mistake: Allen v. Clark, 2 Blackf. 343; Brackenridge v. Holland, 2 Blackf. 377, 20 Am, Dec. 123; Mnrdock v. Holland's Heirs, 3 Blackf. 114. Where the guardian of A's children had died without accounting, and not leaving personal property sufficient, and the accounts were complicated, a suit in equity by these children and A's representatives against the guardian's personal representatives and heirs for an accounting and settlement, was held proper: Peck v. Braman, 2 Blackf. 141. Under the existing statutory system (2 Rev. Stats., p. 17, and act of March 6, 1873, sec. 79), the probate jurisdiction held by the circuit courts over all probate and testamentary matters, and over administrations, the accounting, settlement, and distribution of decedents' estates, is practically exclusive: Ex parte Shockley, 14 Ind. 413; Williams v. Perrin, 73 Ind. 57; Ramsey v. Fouts, 67 Ind. 78; Heaton v. Knowlton, 65 Ind. 255; Noble v. McGinnis, 55 Ind. 528; Alexander v. Alexander, 48 Ind. 559. Notwithstanding this general conclusion, it seems hardly possible that the original and most salutary jurisdiction of equity over fraud and mistake has been entirely abrogated so as to prevent a court of equitable powers from setting aside or correcting any case of fraud or mistake in an administration. however clear, although no recent cases involving this question seem to have arisen.³⁵ It is plain that the equitable jurisdiction in this state is confined within the narrowest limits.

Iowa.—The decisions in this state are few, but they show very clearly that a large original, as well as supervisory or corrective, jurisdiction in equity is left unaffected by statutes; that the probate system is not com-

though in doing this it may be, in part, administering purely equitable remedies: Moore v. Brandenburg, 248 III. 232, 140 Am. St. Rep. 206, 93 N. E. 733.

Guardians may be compelled to account in chancery hefore or after the termination of the guardianship, since the statutory equitable jurisdiction conferred on probate courts in the matter of guardianship is not a complete code: Chapman v. American Surety Co., 261 III. 594, 104 N. E. 247.

§1154, (55) In Denny v. Denny, 113 Ind. 22, 14 N. E. 593, a widow

sued to enjoin the executors of her husband's will from selling certain grain which she had selected under the provisions of Rev. St. Ind. 1881, \$ 2269, giving the widow the right to select property of certain value out of her husband's estate. She alleged that if the sale should be made she would be left without necessary feed for her animals, and that other corn could not he readily secured. The court held that under these circumstances a suit on the bond of the executors would not be an adequate remedy, and the injunction was granted as prayed.

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pertaining to the regular administration and settlement

plete, does not extend to many matters of a distinctively equitable cognizance, and over such matters the jurisdiction of equity will be exercised without question. Substantially, a concurrent jurisdiction in equity exists. and the practical inquiry is, When will it be exercised? Ordinary claims against an estate come within the probate jurisdiction, but this does not apply to matters of an equitable nature, of which a court of chancery has cognizance. The probate jurisdiction over all matters connected with the settlement of estates is not exclusive; the equitable jurisdiction is not taken away expressly, or by any fair construction of the statutes.^{hh} The probate court has not the power to entertain a suit by creditors to compel the administrator to sell real estate; jurisdiction of such a suit must be confined to equity: Waples v. Marsh, 19 Iowa, 381. Under the statute, a will admitted to probate may be contested either by appeal, or by an original suit in the court of equity: Havelick v. Havelick, 18 Iowa, 414; and equity has jurisdiction to set aside and declare void probate proceedings, on the ground of their fraud: Cowin v. Toole, 31 Iowa, 513. Still, the circuit court, as a court of equity, will not review and correct the acts of an administrator while the administration is pending,-that is, will not remove a pending administration from the control of probate: Hutton v. Laws, 55 Iowa, 710.

Kansas.—While the decisions in this state are very few, they clearly show that the grant of a broad jurisdiction to the probate courts is not regarded as having destroyed the original jurisdiction of equity over administrations, but it still exists concurrently with that of the probate courts. Although the concurrent jurisdiction of equity thus *exists*, it is practically exercised only as an ancillary, supplementary, and corrective jurisdiction; it is invoked under circumstances or to grant reliefs where the powers and remedies of probate are inadequate, and to correct the proceedings of the probate court where there is fraud, mistake, or perhaps plain error;¹¹ but it will not interpose with a pending administration, where the estate is still unsettled, in order to determine matters which come within the probate jurisdiction and over which the probate powers are certain and adequate.

§ 1154, (hh) An administrator can maintain a creditors' bill against the grantee of the decedent to set aside a fraudulent conveyance: Mallow v. Walker, 115 Iowa, 238, 91 Am. St. Rep. 158, 88 N. W. 452. The mere fact that an estate remains unsettled is insufficient ground for equitable relief against the statutory bar for failure to notice a claim within the prescribed time: In re? Jacob's Estate, 119 Iowa, 176, 93 N. W. 94.

§ 1154, (11) A fraudulent sale of a decedent's land resulting from a fraudulent allowance of a claim against the estate will be set aside in equity after the estate is closed: McAdow v. Boten, 67 Kan. 136, 72 Pac. 529.

of decedents' estates is virtually exclusive. The equitable

While all these conclusions are not, perhaps, expressly formulated by any of the decisions, they seem to be necessarily involved in or implied by those decisions. In an equitable suit by an administrator de bonis non to subject certain lands of the estate to the payment of claims which had been adjudged, upon final settlement in the probate court, to be due to the administrator, held, that the court of equity had jurisdiction; that the grant of jurisdiction to the probate courts was not intended to limit the jurisdiction of equity in such matters: ^{jj} Shoemaker v. Brown, 10 Kan. 383. On the other hand, where a creditor, whose claim was allowed by the probate court, sought to have lands of the estate sold in satisfaction, it was held that in such a case, where the creditor had no specific lien on the land, and the administration was still pending in the probate court, the remedy given by the probate court was adequate, and therefore the jurisdiction of equity would not be exercised. The probate court had ample powers to order the administrator to sell land, for payment of debts, when there was a deficiency of personal assets, and the creditor should resort to this statutory method, and not to a suit in equity: Johnson v. Cain, 15 Kan. 532. This decision undoubtedly conforms to the rule prevailing in the great majority of states, where power to sell land under the direction and control of the probate court is given to an administrator.kk

Kentucky.—The equitable jurisdiction in this state is broad,—concurrent with that of the probate courts, so that parties may in the first instance proceed by a suit in equity for an accounting and final settlement; but ordinarily, the court which first assumes jurisdiction of an administration will retain it unto the end, without interference with the other. Equity has also a jurisdiction in special cases, where the powers of the probate court are not adequate, or perhaps do not at all exist. The equitable jurisdiction over administrations is not taken away by the statutes. Courts of chancery may entertain jurisdiction of suits for a final accounting, settlement, and distribution: Moore v. Waller's Heirs, 1 A. K. Marsh. 488. But this jurisdiction is concurrent with that possessed by the probate courts, and in general, the first court which assumes jurisdiction of an adminis-

§ 1154, (13) A creditor's bill for discovery, etc., against parties who have frandulently converted and concealed assets of the deceased may be maintained: Culp v. Mulvane, 66 Kan. 143, 71 Pac. 273. Equity has jurisdiction to enforce the payment of a demand which accrues after the death of the deceased: In re Hyde, 47 Kan. 277, 27 Pac. 1001. § 1154, (kk) Quoted in Turner v. Rogers, 49 Ark. 51, 4 S. W. 193. A suit lies by a creditor to have his judgment declared a lien on the interest of the heir in the ancestor's property, where it is necessary to examine the will in order to see whether there was an equitable conversion: Smith v. Henson, 89 Kan. 792, 132 Pac. 997. 2701

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jurisdiction over the subject is neither concurrent nor

tration may retain it. If a suit had been commenced in chancery, any subsequent proceedings by way of settlement in the probate court would be nugatory, or would not be permitted; and conversely, if proceedings for a settlement had been begun in the probate court, a court of chancery would not, under ordinary circumstances, interfere with the administration : Saunders's Heirs v. Saunders's Ex'rs, 2 Litt. 314; Blackerby v. Holton, 5 Dana, 520. There are, however, special cases in which equity will exercise its jurisdiction because the powers and reliefs of the probate court are inadequate, or perhaps do not exist. Where an executor, at the request of heirs and devisees, sold a negro, taking a note for the price to himself as executor, the remedy of the heirs and devisees for their share of the note or purchase-money is by suit in equity: Cartmel v. Rench, 2 J. J. Marsh. 118. After an administrator has distributed the estate among the heirs, a creditor whose debt has not been paid, and who had obtained no judgment, may resort to equity for relief: Stroud's Heirs v. Barnett, 3 Dana, 391. A suit in equity is also proper to obtain a discovery of assets and appropriation thereof in satisfaction of a judgment which the plaintiff had recovered against the administrator, on which the execution had been returned unsatisfied: Pilkington's Ex'x v. Gaunt's Adm'x, 5 Dana, 410. A court of equity has jurisdiction of a suit to annul and set aside settlement made by an executor in the probate court, on the ground of fraud, or to obtain a discovery of assets; and having assumed jurisdiction for such a purpose, the court will retain the suit and give full and final relief: Speed's Ex'r v. Nelson's Ex'r, 8 B. Mon. 499, 507. A suit in equity for an accounting may be maintained by an administrator de bonis non against the personal representatives and heirs of a deceased administrator, who died before the estate was settled: Bellomy's Adm'r v. Bellomy, 3 Bush, 109. (The same rule prevails in Alahama and California.) A court of equity will not entertain a suit to establish a lost will, when the same relief can be granted by a probate court: Hunt v. Hamilton, 9 Dana, 90.

Maine.—From the limited nature of the equity jurisdiction conferred by statute, hitherto held by the courts of this state: See ante, vol. 1, §§ 286, 322–337; and from the absence of decided cases in which any such jurisdiction has been exercised,—it appears that the equitable jurisdiction in matters connected with administrations is extremely narrow,—that it is confined, in fact, to testamentary trusts and to the construction of wills as a branch of the general jurisdiction over trusts.¹¹ The jurisdiction of pro-

§1154, (11) "A bill for the construction of a will cannot be maintained unless the plaintiff has such interest, personal or official, legal or equitable, in the estate, or under the will, as would be served by a construction of the will": Burgess v. Shepherd, 97 Me. 522, 55 Atl. 415.

auxiliary and corrective. It exists only in matters which

bate over all matters connected with the settlement of the estates of decedents appears to be virtually exclusive; the instances in which equity can interfere, in addition to the two above mentioned, seem to be referable to some other distinct bead of equity jurisdiction,-such, for example, as that in aid of creditors whose remedies at law have been exhausted, or perhaps that of fraud. An administrator of an insolvent estate is entitled to the aid of a court of equity to reach property of the deceased, for the purpose of satisfying the claims of creditors, which has been conveyed or is held in fraud of the rights of such creditors; but his legal remedies must be exhausted before resorting to equity: Caswell v. Caswell, 28 Me. 232; Fletcher v. Holmes, 40 Me. 364;mm but while the administrator may thus invoke the aid of equity, a creditor of the deceased, who has not exhausted his legal remedies, cannot maintain a suit to have such property appropriated in payment of his debt: Caswell v. Caswell, supra. A had obtained a decree in an equitable suit against the administratrix of B, brought to procure a deposit made by B in a bank, and pledged to A as security for a debt due him by B, to be paid to him. Upon the subsequent death of the administratrix, A brought a second suit in equity against the administrator de bonis non of B to recover indemnity for certain extraordinary expenses in the first litigation caused by the fraud of the administratrix. Held, that the suit could not be maintained: Boynton v. Ingalls, 70 Me. 461. Equity has a complete jurisdiction over trusts created by wills, for the enforcement of the trusts and the control of the trustees: Richardson v. Knight, 69 Me. 285, 289; Nason v. First etc. Church, 66 Me. 100; Elder v. Elder, 50 Me. 535; Morton v. Southgate, 28 Me. 41; and see other cases cited in note 5 under § 329, ante, in vol. 1.nn

Maryland.—The equitable jurisdiction in this state is equally broad as and quite similar to that in Kentucky and several other commonwealths. Notwithstanding the statutory probate system, it is perfectly well settled that the original jurisdiction of equity in administrations remains, and will be exercised in calling executors and administrators to account, in superintending the administration of assets, and in making final settlement and distribution of the estate among legatees, distributees, and the like: Davis

A court of equity will not decree specific performance of a contract by a decedent, when the probate court, after hearing a petition, has refused to order a conveyance: May v. Boyd, 97 Me. 398, 94 Am. St. Rep. 509, 54 Atl. 938.

§1154, (mm) Frost v. Libby, 79 Me. 56, 8 Atl. 149. § 1154, (nn) For statutory suit in equity by a creditor whose claim against the estate has not been presented within the time allowed, see Holway v. Ames, 100 Me. 208, 60 Atl. 897; Beale v. Swasey, 106 Me. 35, 20 Ann. Cas. 396, 75 Atl. 134.

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lie outside of the regular course of administration and

v. Clabaugh, 30 Md. 508; Barnes v. Compton's Adm'rs, 8 Gill. 391; as an illustration, a suit in equity by the representatives of a ward against the executors of a deceased guardian, who had died before an accounting and final settlement of the ward's estate, was held to he clearly maintainable: Barnes v. Compton's Adm'rs, supra.ºº This jurisdiction, however, is only concurrent with that of the probate court, and will not be exercised, in the absence of special equitable features, where probate has already assumed jurisdiction. Equity will not ordinarily interfere with an administration begun and pending in the orphans' court. The powers of the latter tribunal are generally adequate to protect the rights of those interested in the estate: Lee v. Price, 12 Md. 253.PP In matters of distinctively equitable cognizance, the jurisdiction of equity is exclusive. Thus where a sale had been made under an order of the orphans' court, and this sale was afterwards vacated by a subsequent order, the orphans' court has no power to pass upon and to adjust the rights and equities of the purchaser growing out of the order of vacation; such matters belong exclusively to the jurisdiction of equity: Eichelberger v. Hawthorne, 33 Md. 588.99

§1154, (00) Where some of the parties claiming distribution are non-residents, and refuse to appear in the orphans' court, as that court has no power to issue process to bring them in, or to make publication against them, a proper case is presented for equity to administer and distribute the estate: Alexander v. Leakin, 72 Md. 199, 19 Atl. 532. A suit by a legatee to obtain payment of his legacy is properly brought in equity, especially where it appears that many of the parties are non-residents: Coudon v. Updegraf, 117 Md. 71, 83 Atl. 145.

§1154, (PP) See, also, Redwood v. Howison, 129 Md. 577, 99 Atl. 863. If, for example, a personal representative apprehends a loss from the neglect or misconduct of his coexceutor or co-administrator, adequate relief may be obtained in the probate court: Beal v. Hilliary, 1 Md. 186, 54 Am. Dec. 649; Whiting v. Whiting's Adm'r, 64 Md. 157, 20 Atl. 1030. Likewise, equity has no jurisdiction of a bill alleging that the executor of a will has died and that one of the children of the testator is concealing the property: Macgill v. Hyatt, 80 Md. 253, 30 Atl. 710.

§ 1154, (aa) And a statute providing that the administrator de bonis non may be empowered by a probate court to execute the powers of sale of realty conferred by the will upon the executor has not affected the general superintending power exercised by the court of chancery over trusts; such administrator de bonis non may therefore administer the estate and execute the power of sale under the direction and protection of a court of equity: Keplinger v. Maccubbin, 58 Md. 206. A court of equity has jurisdiction to determine whether an advancement has been converted into personalty; and having taken jurisdiction, it may retain it and distribute the estate: Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Baker, 91 Md. 297, 46 Atl. 1071. Where the will

Massachusetts.-It is not enough to say that the equitable jurisdiction in this state is narrow; the only conclusion to be drawn from decisions heretofore made is, that there is no equitable jurisdiction whatever in matters belonging properly to the administration and settlement and distribution of estates. The statutory powers given to courts of equity in cases of trust, fraud, discovery, and the like, are held not to be any grounds for interposition in administrations. Not only will a court of equity not interfere with a pending administration in the probate court, but it will not entertain a suit to correct or invalidate a settlement made by the probate court on the ground of fraud or mistake, or because a discovery is needed, etc. These conclusions are sustained by the entire course of decisions: Jennison v. Hapgood, 7 Pick. 1, 19 Am. Dec. 258; Grinnell v. Baxter, 17 Pick. 383; Sever v. Russell, 4 Cush. 513, 50 Am. Dec. 811; Wilson v. Leishman, 12 Met. 316; Hathaway v. Thayer, 8 Allen, 421; Southwick v. Morrell, 121 Mass. 520; Sykes v. Meacham, 103 Mass. 285; see ante, vol. 1, § 320, note 3, for a quotation from the opinion in Wilson v. Leishman, which expresses the theory maintained by the court.^{rr} This doctrine is earried to such an extent as to deny the jurisdiction of equity to interfere with a settlement made in the probate court by an executor, which was impeached on the ground of his fraud and misconduct, although his account was rendered and the settlement made without notice to the parties interested: Sever v. Russell, supra. Matters which are collateral to or incidentally affect an administration may sometimes come within the equitable jurisdiction; for example, where A claims the rights of a child and heir of the intestate under an agreement made between the intestate and A's father, and also under an adoption in pursuance of a statute and judicial decree in Pennsylvania, the question of his rights to the estate under

requires an appraisal of the real estate, without naming any donee of the power, the orphans' court is without jurisdiction to exercise the power; the court of equity, therefore, may take jurisdiction for this purpose, and may retain jurisdiction for the complete settlement of the estate: Magin v. Niner, 110 Md. 299, 73 Atl. 12.

§ 1154, (**rr**) Muldoon v. Muldoon, 133 Mass. 111; Allen v. Hunt, 213 Mass. 276, 100 N. E. 552 (no jurisdiction to settle accounts of executor). By St. 1891, c. 415, equity jurisdiction is given to probate courts concurrent with that of other equity courts. The equitable relief sought may be tested by supposing the bill to have been brought in the superior court. "An application in equity to the probate judge for equitable relief stands like a bill in equity in other courts, and cannot be helped out by considering his powers in another capacity." Upon these principles it has been held that a probate court will not entertain a bill to enjoin an administrator from performing his duties: Bennett v. Kimball, 175 Mass. 199, 55 N. E. 893.

which do not come within the scope of the probate juris-

the agreement may be determined in equity, but not until his *status* as a child of the intestate has been settled in the probate court: Ross v. Ross, 123 Mass. 212.⁸⁸ Another instance is that of creditors who may resort to equity for aid when their legal remedies have been exhausted, and thus a creditor may maintain a suit in equity against the executor and devisees whose devises are subject to debts, when the statutory period of limitation has elapsed: Fairfield v. Fairfield, 15 Gray, 596.^{tt}

Michigan.—The equitable jurisdiction over the subject-matter in this state is of the narrowest extent. This state is to be ranged in the same class with Maine and Massachusetts. The rule is settled that the jurisdiction over everything pertaining to administration belongs exclusively to the probate courts. Equity has no jurisdiction to interfere with anything directly belonging to the course of administration, accounting, settlement, or distribution. Even frauds, mistakes, abuse of his trust, and the like acts of an administrator or executor must be dealt with by the probate court. Whatever equitable jurisdiction relating to the estates of decedents exists is confined to matters of purely equitable cognizance, and *auxiliary* or ancillary to the administration and remedies granted by probate tribunals: Holbrook v. Campau, 22 Mich. 288; Dickinson v. Seaver, 44 Mich.

§1154, (ss) And as trustees may ask instructions, not only as to the construction of the will, but as to their duties under it, so executors may properly ask instructions as to their duties under the will, in advance of the final settlement of their account, when grave embarrassments may result from delay, the probate court having no power to give directions as to how future accounts shall be rendered or the duties of executors performed: Welch v. Adams, 152 Mass. 74, 81, 9 L. R. A. 244, 25 N. E. 34. A bill to ascertain the validity and construction of assignments of a legatee's interest may be maintained. The probate court does not take cognizance of assignments made by legatees or distributees of their interests, but deals only with those primarily entitled to the legacies or distributive shares. An injunction will issue to restrain payment to the

assignor: Lenz v. Prescott, 144 Mass. 505, 11 N. E. 923. See, also, Coram v. Davis, 209 Mass. 229, 95 N. E. 298. Equity will take jurisdiction of an agreement between next of kin to divide the estate, in compromise of the threat of one of them to contest the will: Blount v. Dillaway, 199 Mass. 330, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1036, 85 N. E. 477. While there is no jurisdiction to compel a probate accounting, claimants of a trust fund which has been diverted are entitled to sue for preservation of the fund and determination of their rights; Holmes v. Holmes, 194 Mass. 552, 80 N. E. 614.

§1154, (tt) A creditor of the deceased cannot maintain a bill to reach land fraudulently conveyed by the deceased in his lifetime. The proper person to bring such suit is the personal representative: Putney v. Fletcher, 148 Mass. 247, 19 N. E. 370.

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diction. These states are Connecticut, Indiana, Maine,

624, 7 N. W. 182; Winegar v. Newland, 44 Mich. 367, 6 N. W. 841; Kellogg v. Aldrich, 39 Mich. 576; Shelden v. Walbridge, 44 Mich. 251, 6 N. W. 681."" As illustrations of cases which do not furnish sufficient grounds for the interference of equity: A suit by a sister of an intestate entitled to a distributive share of bis estate, alleging fraud in the appointment of a guardian and administrator, and asking that he may be removed and a receiver appointed, was held not maintainable; the relief must be obtained from the probate court: Kellogg v. Aldrich, supra; and when a father had obtained allowance of a claim upon his son's estate, but the son's widow, who was the executrix, refused to pay it, and conveyed away property out of which it should be satisfied, the remedy was not in equity, but in probate: Winegar v. Newland, supra. In the following case equity exercised jurisdiction: A suit brought by an administrator against the grantee to set aside a deed of conveyance made by an heir of the deceased intestate was dismissed on the facts; but an injunction was allowed to the grantee to restrain the administrator and heir from selling the real estate, since it appeared that the personal property was sufficient to pay all debts and claims against the estate: Hill v. Mitchell, 40 Mich. 389.vv

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§ 1154, (uu) Aldrich v. Annin, 54 Mich. 230, 19 N. W. 964. See, also, Draper v. Brown, 153 Mich. 120, 117 N. W. 213; Davis v. McCamman, 165 Mich. 287, 130 N. W. 691; Graham v. Graham, 171 Mich. 307, 137 N. W. 153; Brooks v. Hargrave, 179 Mich. 136, 146 N. W. 325 (mere complexity of executor's accounts will not give equity jurisdiction); Powell v. Pennock, 181 Mich. 588, 148 N. W. 430.

§ 1154, (vv) A court of equity has jurisdiction to restrain a sale of lands by the executor to pay debts and legacies in any other order than that prescribed by statute; and jurisdiction having been assumed, the court may go on and declare for what specific purpose a sale may be ordered: Ireland v. Miller, 71 Mich. 119, 39 N. W. 16. When a probate court, acting under the influence of fraudulent representations, orders an estate distributed to persons who are not the heirs, equity has jurisdiction of a bill by the true heirs to recover

their shares. The probate courts "cannot correct their decrees and orders, and equity is the only tribunal that can bring all of the parties together, and put an end to the matter, by doing full and complete justice to all concerned": Maney v. Casserly, 134 Mich. 258, 96 N. W. 478. The court of equity has jurisdiction to set aside a judgment of the probate court ordering distribution of the estate, on the ground that it was procured by the fraudulent suppression of the will: Ewing v. Lamphere, 147 Mich. 659, 118 Am. St. Rep. 563, 111 N. W. 187. The probate court has authority to order a rehearing of an administrator's account on a showing of mistake or fraud. Conceding that where fraud has been discovered too late to apply to the probate court for relief, the court of chancery has jurisdiction in aid of the probate proceedings, the plaintiff must show that he has been diligent in prose-

Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-

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Mississippi.—In describing the equitable jurisdiction of this state, it is necessary to keep two statutory systems perfectly distinct, the former and the present. By the act of May 4, 1870, a sweeping change was made in the judicial powers and organization. The entire powers and functions of the probate courts were transferred to the courts of chancery, so that courts of equity were clothed with a complete and exclusive jurisdiction over all testamentary matters, matters of probate, and of the administration, accounting, settlement, and distribution of estates of decedents, and of all questions and reliefs incidental, collateral, or auxiliary to regular administrations. Still, the decisions under this statute held that the two jurisdiction of equity was not enlarged, but that the same court simply

cuting his remedy at law: Davis v. McCamman, 165 Mich. 287, 130 N.W. 691. In Berdan v. Milwaukee Mut. Life Ins. Co., (Mich.) 99 N. W. 411, it was held that equity has jurisdiction to set aside as fraudulent a settlement of a minor's claim on an insurance policy made by his guardian under direction of the probate court. See, also, Carr v. Lyle, 126 Mich. 655, 8 Detroit Leg. N. 185, 86 N. W. 145, where an executor was allowed to maintain a bill to force a wife to abide by an antenuptial contract, although the wife had raised the question of the validity of the contract in the probate court. In Canfield v. Canfield, (Mich.) 118 Fed. 1, it was held that settlement of the accounts of a trustee under a will and distribution of the trust fund on the termination of the trust are matters exclusively of equitable jurisdiction in Michigan. A bill was properly brought by an administrator alleging that defendant had managed a farm for the decedent and had misappropriated money received; the probate court could not give an adequate remedy because the relationship between the deceased and the defendant resembled a partnership: Graham v. Graham, 171 Mich. 307, 137 N. W. 153.

The administrator may interplead in equity a judgment creditor and his attorney elaiming a lien on the judgment against the estate, though the funds are under the jurisdiction of the probate court: Michigan Trust Co. v. McNamara, 165 Mich. 200, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 986, 130 N. W. 653.

Where there are no claims against the estate, and the heirs settle and adjust the estate between themselves, one heir may maintain a bill against another to obtain his share which the other has secreted: Powell v. Pennock, 181 Mich. 588, 148 N. W. 430.

§ 1154, (ww) Minnesota. — The views expressed in Peterson v. Vanderburgh, 77 Minn. 218, 77 Am. St. Rep. 671, 79 N. W. 828, appear to place Minnesota in the third class. The syllabus, by the court, is as follows: "A court of equity will entertain an action brought by an executor on the part of the estate against a co-executor to determine the amount of a disputed claim, or to force an account, or to foreclose

shire, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. In the states of the

held and exercised all the powers of the probate court, and all those of a court of chancery, in the same manner as a court may at once be a court of law and of equity. Under the present constitution, however, and the Code of 1871, sec. 976, it seems that the two jurisdictions have been somewhat amalgamated, and that the equity jurisdiction has been enlarged. In the language of a recent case, the design of this last legislation was to restore the chancery jurisdiction to its original dimensions: See ante, vol. 1, § 350, note 1: Wells v. Smith, 44 Miss. 296; Bernheimer v. Calhoun, 44 Miss. 426; Saxon v. Ames, 47 Miss. 565; Troup v. Rice, 49 Miss. 248; Smith v. Everett, 50 Miss. 575. The following cases are decided under the last statute: Walker v. State, 53 Miss. 532; Bank of Miss. v. Duncan, 52 Miss. 740; Brunini v. Pera, 54 Miss. 649; Evans v. Robertson, 54 Miss. 683; Buie v. Pollock, 55 Miss. 309; Clopton v. Haughton, 57 Miss. 787; Hunt v. Potter, 58 Miss. 96. As examples of the present system:** A suit in equity may be maintained against the executor or administrator, and his sureties; legatees, distributees, and creditors are enabled to bring executors or administrators into chancery for investigation and adjudication of questions relating to the execution of their trusts, and their sureties can also be made parties: Buie v. Pollock, supra; judgment creditors

a mortgage, or in any other case, where justice requires it, there being no remedy at law." The opinion of Collins, J., asserts the existence of a concurrent jurisdiction: "Even if it be admitted that the probate court can have jurisdiction by holding the debt to have become an asset in defendant's hands immediately upon his qualification as executor, and hy enforcing its collection in the settlement of his trust account, it would not follow that, where justice required it, and there was no remedy at law, an equitable action could not be maintained in the district court for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of a disputed claim and for such other purpose as equity might require. Such a case would simply be one of concurrent jurisdiction, and not at all new or novel." See, also, Brown v. Strom, 113 Minn. 1, 129 N. W. 136,

citing this paragraph of the text, and holding that the court of equity, by virtue of its ancillary jurisdiction to aid the probate court in the performance of its proper functions, may maintain the status quo until the probate court has opportunity to perform its functions with respect to the estate, and may restrain third persons over whom the probate court has no jurisdiction from interfering with the estate until controversies have been settled. That the probate court is clothed with all the equity powers necessary for purposes of administration, see Appleby v. Watkins, 95 Minn. 455, 5 Ann. Cas. 470, 104 N. W. 301.

§ 1154, (**xx**) Equity will not recognize nor act upon a will until it has been admitted to probate: Pratt v. Hargreaves, 76 Miss. 955, 71 Am. St. **Rep.** 551, 25 South. 658.

third class, the equitable jurisdiction is not concurrent, but

of an estate may maintain a suit in equity against an executor to compel a final settlement and payment, and for a personal decree against him if he has committed a devastavit; and if the executor dies, the suit should be revived against his representatives: Clopton v. Haughton, supra; an administrator of an attorney may maintain a suit in equity against the executor of a deceased client to recover the amount justly due for professional services: Hunt v. Potter, supra. The former system: Although the former system has been superseded, it is necessary to give a brief abstract of the decisions under it, in order to show what cases are still authoritative, and what have been rendered obsolete and nugatory. The general doctrine was settled that with respect to all matters directly and properly belonging to the administration and settlement of estates, the jurisdiction of the probate courts was exclusive; equity had no jurisdiction: Gildart's Heirs v. Starke, 1 How. 450; Blanton v. King, 2 How. 856; Edmundson v. Roberts, 2 How. 822; Carmichael v. Browder, 3 How. 252; McRea v. Walker, 4 How. 455; Hamberlin v. Terry, 7 How. 143 (has no jurisdiction of a suit to set aside a probate of a will on the ground of testator's insanity or of fraud in the probate); Farve's Heirs v. Graves, 4 Smedes & M. 707; Gaines v. Smiley, 7 Smedes & M. 53, 45 Am. Dec. 295; Ragland v. Green, 14 Smedes & M. 194; Nevlans v. Burge, 14 Smedes & M. 201; Hill v. McLaurin, 28 Miss. 288; Ratliff v. Davis, 38 Miss. 107; Hart v. Hart, 39 Miss. 221, 77 Am. Dec. 668; Capers v. McCaa, 41 Miss. 479; Gilliam v. Chancellor, 43 Miss. 437, 5 Am. Rep. 498. Notwithstanding this general rule, there were certain classes of cases in which it was settled that equity had jurisdiction under the former system. These cases are still useful under the present system, for they illustrate what controversies, rights, and remedies connected with administration are proper subject-matter of equitable cognizance in general. These cases may be arranged in three principal classes: 1. In matters which are incidental and collateral to the regular course of administration, where the question is one peculiarly of equitable cognizance, and the probate courts could not give adequate relief: Carmichael v. Browder, 3 How. 252; as where an heir sought the specific delivery up of a family negro slave: McRea v. Walker, 4 How. 455. Where there was fraud in an executor's settlement, a court of equity might set it aside, and order a new settlement in the probate court: Neylans v. Burge, 14 Smedes & M. 201; Green v. Creighton, 10 Smedes & M. 159, 48 Am. Dec. 742; Searles v. Scott, 14 Smedes & M. 94; but a suit in equity to set aside a fraudulent sale by an administrator could not be maintained: Hart v. Hart, 39 Miss. 221, 77 Am. Dec. 668. A suit in equity was proper to set aside and cancel a title, so that the property held under it could be regularly administered upon and distributed: Hill v. McLaurin, 28 Miss. 288. A sale of land ordered by a probate court to pay a debt barred by the stat-

is simply auxiliary or ancillary and corrective. The

ute of limitations might be enjoined in equity, at the suit of a party who had no opportunity to contest the proceedings in the probate court: Moody v. Harper, 38 Miss. 599. And where a widow claimed under an antenuptial agreement, and also under her husband's will, a suit could be maintained to determine whether she was entitled to both, or whether she was put to her election; and the court of equity, having acquired jurisdiction, may restrain proceedings in the probate court, and grant full and final relief: Gilliam v. Chancellor, 43 Miss. 437, 5 Am. Rep. 498. 2. A second class included cases where there was no administration at all pending in the probate court. It was at first held that where no letters testamentary or of administration had been issued, so that no administration at all had been commenced, a court of equity might assume jurisdiction in the first instance of the administration by suit, and might thus decree a final settlement and distribution. This rule was then extended to the cases where an administration in the probate court had been entirely ended, the estate settled and distributed; a party who had not been included in this final settlement might resort to equity for a further independent accounting and settlement: Farve's Heirs v. Graves, 4 Smedes & M. 707; Rabb v. Griffin, 26 Miss. 579; Archer v. Jones, 26 Miss. 583; Wood v. Ford, 29 Miss. 57; Manly v. Kidd, 33 Miss. 141; Hill v. Boyland, 40 Miss. 618. 3. Finally, there were some cases in which equity had an exclusive jurisdiction, hecause a court of prohate was not competent to give the relief to which the plaintiff was entitled: Suit by administrator of a deceased partner against a surviving partner for an account and settlement: Scott v. Searles, 5 Smedes & M. 25; 7 Smedes & M. 498, 45 Am. Dec. 317 (suit to restrain interference with assets); American etc. Soc. v. Wade, 8 Smedes & M. 610 (appointment of a receiver over certain property).

Missouri.—There is some direct conflict among the decisions; and the court has, at different times, adopted different views with respect to the extent of the equitable jurisdiction. The plain tendency of the most recent cases is to restrict that jurisdiction within very narrow limits. The present system seems to be, that the probate court has absolutely exclusive jurisdiction over admission of wills to probate, granting and revoking letters testamentary, and an *original* jurisdiction, generally exclusive, over all matters pertaining to the administration itself, the accounting of executors and administrators, the appropriation of assets in payment of debts, the final settlement and distribution of estates. Equity has no original jurisdiction to maintain a suit in the first instance for any of these purposes; its jurisdiction is only corrective in special cases after a settlement has been made, or auxiliary, to grant equitable relief in some incidental matters belonging distinctively to the equitable cognizance, such as trusts and the like: Butler v. Lawson, 72 Mo. 227 (equity has exclusive jurisdiction

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probate court takes cognizance originally of all adminis-

to follow trust funds, etc., although the trustee is dead, and an administration is pending in the probate court); Pearce v. Calhoun, 59 Mo. 271; Titterington v. Hooker, 58 Mo. 593 (on failure of personal property and after final settlement, a suit in equity cannot be maintained by a creditor to reach lands descended to the heirs of the intestate. The doctrine of equitable assets, and equitable suits for marshaling assets, or for a discovery, accounting, and the like, are abrogated, except so far as they are incorporated in the statutory rules controlling the probate courts; these courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all such matters); Chandler v. Dodson, 52 Mo. 128 (the same); Overton v. McFarland, 15 Mo. 312; Jackson v. Jackson, 4 Mo. 210 (no jurisdiction in equity to establish a lost or destroyed will); Graham v. O'Fallon, 3 Mo. 507. It was at one time held that equity had an original jurisdiction, and could entertain a suit in the first instance for an administration: Erwin v. Henry, 5 Mo. 469; but this case was soon overruled, and the doctrine established that equity only had a concurrent jurisdiction over such matters as were not expressly and specifically given by the statute to the jurisdiction of the probate court. Matters incidental to the regular administration: Miller v. Woodward, 8 Mo. 169 (suit by a surety on a bond of the deceased for subrogation and exoneration); Berry v. Robinson, 9 Mo. 273 (correcting a settlement); Clark v. Henry's Adm'r, 9 Mo. 336 (the same); Jones v. Brinker, 20 Mo. 87 (to falsify accounts and settlement). It would seem that the doctrine of these cases has been somewhat limited by the more recent decisions first quoted.yy

§1154, (yy) The statutes authorize a suit to contest a will, or to establish one which has been rejected by the probate court. Although technically a suit at law, yet in many respects it partakes of the nature of a proceeding in chancery: Lilly v. Tobbein, 103 Mo. 477, 23 Am. St. Rep. 887, 15 S. W. 618. Where the probate court orders a sale, which is made, and orders a deed to be made, which is not, equity may establish the rights of the purchaser as against the heirs: Sherwood v. Baker, 105 Mo. 472, 24 Am. St. Rep. 399, 16 S. W. 938. The court of equity has no jurisdiction to order a sale of real estate to pay debts of the estate; such order is void, and the purchaser at the sale gets nothing: Scott v. Royston, 223 Mo. 568, 123 S. W. 454. Where defendant as executrix of her husband did not inventory certain funds which she claimed were given her by him, the proper place for a creditor to raise the question is in the probate court, and not by a suit in equity to set aside the transfers as fraudulent: Lemp Brewing Co. v. Stackman, 180 Mo. App. 320, 168 S. W. 226. A judgment of the probate court settling the administrator's account is conclusive, unless attacked directly for fraud. Such fraud need not be positive and actual, with intent to cheat those interested, but it is sufficient if some improper act § 1154

trations, and has powers sufficient for all ordinary

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Nebraska.—The reported decisions throw no light upon the subject, except so far as the absence of an equitable jurisdiction may be inferred from the absence of cases. There is a full statutory system of probate, and the jurisdiction of the prohate courts over all matters properly belonging to an administration seems to be practically exclusive. There is no jurisdiction in a court of equity to set aside a will admitted to probate: Loosemore v. Smith, 12 Neb. 343.^{ana}

Nevada.—In this state, also, the statutory probate jurisdiction is so full and complete that there was ground for the argument that a court of equity was deprived of the power to entertain a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage, where the mortgagor was dead, but that the power belonged wholly to the probate court to decree payment of a mortgage in the same

or concealment on the part of the administrator is shown, which operates as a fraud and results in loss, whatever the motive may be: Mueller v. Grunker, 145 Mo. App. 611, 123 S. W. 469. The statute providing that claims of creditors allowed may, upon motion made within four months after allowance, be set aside does not oust the court of equity of jurisdiction to set aside such allowance for fraud in obtaining the same: Fitzpatrick v. Stevens, 114 Mo. App. 497, 89 S. W. 897. That a broker may sue in equity to have his commissions for finding a purchaser of the land allowed as an expense of administration, see Matson v. Pearson, 121 Mo. App. 120, 97 S. W. 983.

§ 1154, (zz) Montana.—The jurisdiction over administrations is diseussed, and § 1153 quoted with approval, in Burns v. Smith, 21 Mont. 251, 69 Am. St. Rep. 653, 53 Pac. 742 (court of equity has at least coneurrent jurisdiction to specifically enforce an agreement to make a will).

§1154, (aaa) A bill in equity may be maintained in the probate court to set aside an order admitting a will to probate, when the plaintiff alleges "that he had no actual knowledge that such will was to be offered for probate or probate proceedings ,had on the day when the order of probate was made, and was informed by the sole beneficiary of the will, and led to believe, that it would only be opened and read at that time": Genau v. Abbott, (Neb.) 93 N. W. 942. The district court has jurisdiction in equity of actions to construe wills in cases where a trust relation exists by reason of the terms of the instrument itself, and to determine the rights of partics thereunder, while the county court has exclusive original jurisdiction in the probate and contest of wills, and in their construction, for the purposes of administration and settlement of estates: Andersen v. Andersen, (Neb.) 96 N. W. 276; Youngson v. Bond, (Neb.) 95 N. W. 700. District courts have jurisdiction in cases of ownership of property held in trust, though in the possession of and claimed by the administrator; Adams v. Dennis (Bently v. Jun), 76 Neb. 682, 107 N. W. 865.

purposes. Equity interposes only in special or extraordi-

manner as they would deal with any other claim in the course of the administration. It is held, however, that equity has jurisdiction of a suit to foreclose a mortgage against the estate of a decedent; that this jurisdiction is exclusive, where it is necessary to bring in other parties; but where the only parties are the mortgagee and the representatives of the deceased mortgagor, the equitable jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the probate court. In the latter class of cases a court of equity may, in its discretion, assume the jurisdiction, or may decline to exercise it, and may thus leave the parties to the relief given by the probate proceedings: Corbett v. Rice, 2 Nev. 330. In this state, the statutory probate jurisdiction and the ordinary jurisdiction in equity and law are conferred upon the same court, the district court; but the proceedings in each branch are separate and distinct: Lucich v. Medin, 3 Nev. 93, 93 Am. Dec. 376.

New Hampshire.-Although the general statutory equitable jurisdiction in this state has always been exercised more liberally and broadly than in Massachusetts and Maine, still it is settled, as in those states, that the various heads of jurisdiction-"trusts," "accounting," "discovery," and the like-do not include nor give a jurisdiction to entertain administration suits, or suits for accounting, settlement, and distribution of decedents' estates; all matters properly pertaining to administration belong exclusively to the probate courts: Walker v. Cheever, 35 N. H. 339, 349. Where a trust, however, is created by a will, the probate court has no power to compel the trustee to carry out the trust, nor to decide upon the rights of the cestuis que trustent, nor the duties of the trustee; all matters relating to the due execution of the trust belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of equity: Hayes v. Hayes, 48 N. H. 219; Wells v. Pierce, 27 N. H. 503; Wheeler v. Perry, 18 N. H. 307; Petition of Baptist Church, 51 N. H. 424; Methodist Epis. Soc. v. Heirs of Harriman, 54 N. H. 444; and see ante. vol. 1, § 305.bbb

§ 1154, (**bbb**) An administrator can maintain a bill in equity for the discovery of assets and the recovery of property conveyed by the deceased in fraud of his creditors, so far as it is needed to pay the debts of the deceased: Preston v. Cole, 64 N. H. 460, 13 Atl. 788. The superior court has no power to require executor to account for his administration on a bill in equity, nor to revise probate proceedings except on appeal: Glover v. Baker, 76 N. H. 393, 83 Atl. 916. Equitable relief against a probate decree will not be granted except where some substantial ground, such as fraud, accident or mistake, renders it against conscience to execute the decree, and of which the plaintiffs were prevented from availing themselves by fraud, accident or mistake unmixed with any fraud or negligence on their part: Knight v. Hollings, 73 N. H. 495, 63 Atl. 38. Where a husband made an agreement to accept a certain

nary cases, which have either been wholly omitted from the

New Jersey.-The equitable jurisdiction in this state is theoretically broad, and practically it is exercised constantly and freely. It is the settled doctrine that the court of chancery possesses a concurrent inrisdiction with the probate court over administrations, over accounting by executors and administrators, the settlement and distribution of decedents' estates, and over all matters incident thereto, to the same extent as that possessed by the English court of chancery. This jurisdiction may always be exercised in the first instance-that is, before any proceedings for a settlement are hegun in the orphans' court-at the suit of legatees, distributees, or creditors.ccc Even after such proceedings have been begun in the orphans' court, the equity jurisdiction is not thereby defeated; while they are pend-"ing in the probate court, the court of chancery may assume jurisdiction, and draw the final accounting and settlement to itself. Still, while the power to interfere in this manner with an administration already pending in the orphans' court undoubtedly exists, the court of chancery will not, as a general rule, exercise the power, unless there is some substantial reason for invoking the aid of equity. If there be such good reason,---if there are special facts rendering the relief given by the orphans' court inadequate,---the equitable jurisdiction will then be exercised as a matter of course. The most recent decisions show a decided tendency to a more stringent construction of this rule; they require a plain case of inadequacy in the remedies of the probate court, or that the reasons for interference should be plain and convincing, before the equitable jurisdiction can be invoked, where the proceedings for a settlement have already been begun in the orphans' court: ddd See ante, vol. 1, § 350, note 1; Salter v. William-

sum from his wife's estate in full, amounting to an equitable assignment of his rights, inasmuch as the agreement is not enforceable until distribution, a bill in equity may be maintained to establish the rights of the parties: Crockett v. Sibley, 73 N. H. 322, 61 Atl. 469.

§1154, (ccc) Gillen v. Hadley, 75 N. J. Eq. 602, 73 Atl. 847, 849.

§ 1154, (**ddd**) That special reasons are necessary to warrant interference with an administration already pending in the orphans' court, see, further, Filley v. Van Dyke, 74 N. J. Eq. 219, 69 Atl. 200; Wyckoff v. O'Niel, 71 N. J. Eq. 681, 63 Atl. 982 (recovery of legacy); Vineland Historical & Antiquarian Society v. Landis, (N. J. Eq.) 66 Atl. 946; Gillen v. Hadley, 72 N. J. Eq. 505, 66 Atl. 1087; Woolsey v. Woolsey, 72 N. J. Eq. 898, 67 Atl. 1047 (reviewing cases); Bower v. Bower, (N. J. Eq.) 69 Atl. 1077 (recovery of legacy); Filley v. Van Dyke, 75 N. J. Eq. 571, 72 Atl. 943, reversing 74 N. J. Eq. 219, 69 Atl. 200 (question one of discretion, which may be reviewed on appeal; here, long delays, retention of assets by an administrator who has been removed. and the action of the judge in passing an important item of account in which he was personally interested, furnish sufficient reasons); Van

statutory grant of probate jurisdiction, or for which its

son, 2 N. J. Eq. 480, 35 Am. Dec. 513; King v. Executors of Berry, 3 N. J. Eq. 44, 261; Smith v. Executor of Moore, 4 N. J. Eq. 485; Meeker v. Marsh, 1 N. J. Eq. 198; Van Mater v. Sickler, 9 N. J. Eq. 483; Clarke v. Johnston, 10 N. J. Eq. 287; Mallory's Adm'r v. Craige, 15 N. J. Eq. 73; Frey v. Demarest, 16 N. J. Eq. 236; Search's Adm'r v. Search's Adm'rs, 27 N. J. Eq. 137; Decker v. Decker's Adm'x, 27 N. J. Eq. 239 (suit by a creditor for a final settlement dismissed, on the ground that no sufficient reason appeared for not proceeding with the settlement in the probate

Dyke v. Van Dyke, 72 N. J. Eq. 300, 65 Atl. 215 (jurisdiction to ascertain distributive share, under special circumstances); Streeter v. Braman, 76 N. J. Eq. 371, 74 Atl. 659; Jordan v. Logue, 76 N. J. Eq. 471, 79 Atl. 426 (bill by creditor whose claim has been barred); Outwater v. Benson, 81 N. J. Eq. 154, Atl. 206. "In case the ad-85 ministration of an estate in the orphans' court be imperfect or incomplete, and serious complications are presented, it is proper for the parties seeking relief to ask the aid of this court": Bechtold v. Read, 49 N. J. Eq. (4 Dick.) 111, 22 Atl. 1085. Equity may enjoin an executor who is acting as trustee from acting as such: Bentley v. Dixon, 60 N. J. Eq. 353, 46 Atl. 689. An injunction will lie to restrain a sale by an administrator which would result in an unnecessary sacrifice to the prejudice of an infant: Doll v. Cash, 61 N. J. Eq. 108, 47 Atl. 1059. The court of chancery has no jurisdiction, however, to order executors to sell land to pay debts, for the orphans' court has full power in that respect: Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, (N. J. Eq.) 20 Atl. 1085. The jurisdiction of equity to construe a will can only be involved when such construction involves some equitable relief sought: Hoagland v. Cooper, (N. J. Eq.) 56 Atl. 705. A claimant under a devise of the purely legal title to lands who seeks to establish his title by construction of the will must resort to law: Hayday * v. Hayday, (N. J. Eq.) 39 Atl. 373; Torrey v. Torrey, 55 N. J. Eq. 410, 36 Atl. 1084; Fahy v. Fahy, 58 N. J. Eq. 210, 42 Atl. 726. The fact that proceedings have been started in the probate court to compel an executor to account does not prevent a court of equity from taking jurisdiction of a bill to allow him to settle in equity and to foreclose mortgages: Mulford v. Mulford, (N. J. Eq.) 53 Atl. 79.

The next of kin may maintain a suit in equity to recover property of the estate when, and only when, the personal representative is derelict in the performance of his duty: Buchanan v. Buchanan, 75 N. J. Eq. 274, 138 Am. St. Rep. 563, 20 Ann. Cas. 91, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454, 71 Atl. 745, reviewing cases.

Allegations of indebtedness of the executor to the estate, compromise of unfounded claims, wasting of assets, and imprudent investments, held sufficient to give a court of equity jurisdiction: Nelson v. Errickson, 81 N. J. Eq. 226, 87 Atl. 116. So, of a bill for an accounting and the recovery of a legacy, charging fraudulent conduct in the administration of the estate: Vaiden v. Edson, 85 N. J. Eq. 184, 95 Atl. 980. § 1154

methods and reliefs are imperfect and inadequate, or where

court). Side by side with this general doctrine is the rule that where a party seeks relief on grounds of peculiarly equitable cognizance, and which is itself purely equitable, the jurisdiction of chancery is not simply concurrent, but paramount to that of probate. For example, a suit, not only for an account, but to compel executors to give security, to restrain them from calling in and receiving portions of the estate, and to have a receiver appointed if necessary, belongs solely to the equity jurisdiction: King v. Executors of Berry, 2 N. J. Eq. 44, 261. Where an administrator retains funds of the estate in his own hands mingled with his own, a party interested may maintain a snit for a discovery and accounting: Frey v. Demarest, 16 N. J. Eq. 236. Where for any special purpose-such as the construction of a will-the court of chancery assumes jurisdiction, it may, and generally will, retain the case so as to decree a final settlement and distribution: Mallory's Adm'r v. Craige, 14 N. J. Eq. 73; Youmans v. Youmans, 26 N. J. Eq. 149.eee Finally, a suit in equity may be maintained to look behind, impeach, and correct a final settlement in the probate court on the ground of fraud or mistake: Frey v. Demarest, supra. Where a sale had been made under a decree in a mortgage foreclosure suit of land belonging to an intestate, and the administrator, who was a party, on being requested by creditors, refused to apply to have the sale set aside, held, that a creditor, on behalf of himself and other creditors, might apply, on petition in the suit, and obtain the relief: Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 31 N. J. Eq. 176. fff

New York.—The system in New York is so fully described in the first volume that very little needs to be added here: See *ante*, vol. 1, § 349, note 1, extract from the opinion in Chipman v. Montgomery. Although the equitable jurisdiction is not expressly abrogated by anything in the statutes, yet it is *displaced* in all ordinary cases by the probate system; the surrogate's court is the only appropriate tribunal for the control of administrations under all ordinary circumstances. The equitable jurisdiction will not be exercised except for some very special and substantial reasons,—in some extraordinary circumstances which render the action of the surrogate's court and its remedies im-

§ 1154, (eee) Coddington v. Bispham, 36 N. J. Eq. 574, 578.

§ 1154, (fff) New Mexico. — The probate court cannot grant equitable relief. The district court has concurrent jurisdiction of claims against the estate. The probate court has only a very limited power to pass upon the validity of a will; in approving a will the judge acts merely in an administrative capacity. The district courts have the same chancery powers in administration of estates that are possessed by the federal courts. New Mexico is, therefore, plainly in the first class: Garcia y Perea v. Barela, 6 N. M. 239, 27 Pac. 507.

its proceedings have miscarried and require correction.

perfect and inadequate. In the apt language of the court in the case of Chipman v. Montgomery, the equitable jurisdiction is rather auxiliary than concurrent. Thus a court of equity may maintain a suit to construe a will, to enforce a trust created by a will, and nndoubtedly to set aside a decree of the surrogate's court on the ground of fraud, and to grant relief in particular instances not included within the statutory powers conferred upon the probate tribunal:"gg Seymour v. Seymour, 4 Johns Ch. 409; Thompson v. Brown 4 Johns. Ch. 619; Whitney v. Monro, 4 Edw. Ch. 5; Rogers v. King, 8 Paige, 210; Christy v. Libby, 35 How. Pr. 119; Chipman v. Montgomery, 63 N. Y. 221, 235, 236. In Rogers v. King, and especially in Christy v. Libby, supra, the equitable jurisdiction is described in a somewhat broader manner than is admissible since the decision in Chipman v. Montgomerv. See, also, Peyser v. Wendt, 87 N. Y. 322; Haddow v. Lundy, 59 N. Y. 320, in which the jurisdiction was exercised without question. As illustrations of special circumstances and peculiar reliefs for which the equitable jurisdiction may be properly exercised: Under the old system of courts and procedure a bill for a discovery of assets was proper, but under the existing procedure no suit for a discovery is permitted: Thompson v. Brown, 4 Johns. Ch. 619; where a suit for a construction of a will is proper, the court may determine the validity of any of its provisions, so far as it concerns the plaintiff's interest in the property, and may render a decree in his favor for such portions of the property as he is entitled to receive: Bowers v. Smith, 10 Paige, 193; and the probate of a will obtained through fraud may be set aside by a suit in equity: De Bussierre v. Holladay, 55 How. Pr. 210; it seems that a suit may be maintained by an administrator to enjoin the surrogate from disregarding, in a final settlement, certain sealed instruments executed by next of kin releasing him from liability for their distributive shares; but a complaint which did not allege that these releases were valid was fatally defective: Wright v. Fleming, 76 N. Y. 517.hhh

§ 1154, (252) Bankers' Surety Co. v. Meyer, 205 N. Y. 219, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1218, 98 N. E. 399. In order to obtain a correct and binding execution of the trusts and other provisions of wills, the supreme court is clothed with that equity jurisdiction through which an authoritative decision of practical questions arising may be anticipated for the safety of the executor, trustee, cestui que trust, or beneficiary: Bryant v. Thompson, 59 Hun, 627, 14 N. Y. Supp. 386.

§ 1154, (hhh) A court of equity cannot administer on estates of decedents. Therefore it cannot take jurisdiction to order the sale of land to pay legacies when there has been no administration: Hogan v. Kava-

This class includes Arkansas, California, Georgia, Kansas,

North Carolina.—The equitable jurisdiction in this state is full and active, substantially the same as in Alabama,—more freely exercised than in New Jersey. Although there seems to be some discrepancy in the judicial dicta, the doctrine is settled by the most recent decisions that the jurisdiction of equity over administrations, the calling of executors and administrators to account, the final settlement and distribution of estates, and all matters properly belonging thereto, is concurrent with that of the probate court. If proceedings for a settlement have been begun in either court, such court has, in general, the paramount authority to go on and conclude the settlement. A suit for an accounting and settlement may be brought in the first instance in a court of equity; and if so, it will enjoin any proceedings which may afterwards be instituted in the probate court: Pegram v. Arm-

naugh, 138 N. Y. 417, 34 N. E. 292. Equity will not assume jurisdiction where the powers of the surrogate are adequate, unless for some special reason. When it once takes jurisdiction, however, it will retain it until all questions involved have been adjusted: Blake v. Barnes, 63 Hun, 633, 28 Abb. N. C. 401, 18 N. Y. Supp. 471; Meeks v. Meeks, 34 Misc. Rep. 465, 69 N. Y. Supp. 737. In the case of Sanders v. Soutter, 126 N. Y. 193, 27 N. E. 263, it was held that a surrogate's court has no power to annul or set aside, on the ground of fraud, a release executed by parties interested in an estate to the executors thereof; that such relief may and can only be obtained from a court of equity; and that in an action brought for such purpose the court, in the exercise of its concurrent jurisdiction with the surrogate's court, may grant full relief, and decree an accounting by executors, a settlement and distribution of the estate. Equity has jurisdiction of an action by residuary legatees against executors for an accounting, where the fund to which plaintiffs are entitled is held by parties to whom it has been paid under a decree of distribution which is not binding on plaintiffs: Pfister v. Writer, 33 Misc. Rep. 701, 68 N. Y. Supp. 976.

Where deceased made a series of notes falling due a year apart, beginning 1914, of which plaintiff is the holder, and then died in 1909, and plaintiff presented a claim to the representatives of the estate, which was rejected, and alleges that there is danger that the estate will be wound up before the notes fall due, he is entitled to bring an action to have the notes held good and to compel provision to be made for their retirement: Bankers' Surety Co. v. Meyer, 205 N. Y. 219, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1218, 98 N. E. 399.

A suit may be maintained by creditors for the distribution among them of the estate in New York of a non-resident testator, where it was impossible, under the statutes, to prove his will and obtain letters of administration in the state; De Coppet v. Cone, 199 N. Y. 56, 139 Am. St. Rep. 844, 20 Ann. Cas. 841, 92 N. E. 411.

Missouri, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee,

strong, 82 N. C. 326; Haywood v. Haywood, 79 N. C. 42; Finger v. Finger, 64 N. C. 183 (the court may in such a suit enjoin a sale of land for payment of debts under an order made by the probate court); the case of Hunt v. Sneed, 64 N. C. 176, seems to be conflicting, and it is difficult to reconcile some of its dicta with the foregoing decisions.¹¹¹ A suit by a legatee against an executrix who was alleged to be wasting the property was dismissed on the ground that the probate court has original jurisdiction over all proceedings for the settlement of decedents' estates, which is exclusive when adequate. The only mode of reconcilement is to regard this latter proposition as only intended to be applicable to cases where the probate jurisdiction has already attached by reason of proceedings for a final settlement having been begun therein. The following are some special instances of the equitable jurisdiction: A legatee or distributee may maintain a suit for an accounting against the personal representatives of a deceased executor or administrator who died before a final settlement, although there is a surviving co-executor, or an administrator de bonis non has been appointed: Brotten v. Bateman, 2 Dev. Eq. 115, 22 Am. Dec. 732; • Thompson v. McDonald, 2 Dev. & B. Eq. 463; in a suit to declare the trusts of a will, and to determine the liability of lands devised subject to the payment of legacies, the court has jurisdiction to retain the cause, and decree the application of the personalty, and that failing, to apply the lands in payment of the legacies: Devereux v. Devereux, 81 N. C. 12; a court of equity has exclusive jurisdiction where a creditor brings a suit against an administrator, alleging that the intestate bought certain land, and for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, he being insolvent, precured the land to be conveyed to his son, who became, and is, the administrator, and praying that the administrator be declared a trustee, and that the land be sold to satisfy the debts of the intestate. Such a case has no resemblance to the ordinary sale of real estate of a deceased person for the purpose of paying his debts, and the probate court has no jurisdiction over it: Greer v. Cagle, 84 N. C. 385. An administrator cannot apply to a court of equity for instructions as to the distribution, where the alleged titles of the claimants are wholly legal: JIJ Ferrand v. Howard, 3 Ired. Eq. 381. It

§ 1154, (111) The probate courts and superior courts, as courts of equity, have concurrent jurisdiction in the settlement of estates. Where necessary to apply to a court of equity for a sale of land to create a fund to pay debts, the court will retain jurisdiction for full relief; quoting §§ 231, 235, and 351 of the text, and reviewing the North Carolina cases: Settle v. Settle (State v. Settle), 141 N. C. 553, 54 S. E. 445. § 1154, (jjj) An executor can maintain a bill for construction of

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Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin.^{hhhh} Among the pratic-

seems that a single creditor cannot sue in equity for a payment of his own debt, and a discovery of assets: Wilkins v. Finch, Phill. Eq. 355; and see Wadsworth v. Davis, 63 N. C. 251.

Ohio.-Under the existing statutory system, the jurisdiction of the probate court over administrations, accounting of executors and administrators, settlement and distribution of estates, is generally exclusive. The jurisdiction of equity is entirely auxiliary, and can be exercised only when the remedies conferred by the probate court would be imperfect or inadequate: Piatt v. Longworth's Devisees, 27 Ohio St. 159, 186; see ante, § 349, note 1; McDonald v. Aten, 1 Ohio St. 293; Taylor v. Huber's Ex'rs, 13 Ohio St. 288; as examples, a creditor may maintain a suit to reach assets and place them in the administrator's hands, but that being accomplished, the distribution of such assets will go on under direction of the probate court: McDonald v. Aten; and equity may decree payments under a trust to be made without a pending administration: Taylor v. Huber's Ex'rs. Under former statutes, the equitable jurisdiction was much more extensive, and seems to have been concurrent in all matters of administration with that of the probate court: Cram v. Green, 6 Ohio, 429; Stiver v. Heirs of Stiver, 8 Ohio, 217.

Oregon.—The absence of decisions upon the general question indicates that the statutory system of probate jurisdiction is exclusive, and that there is practically no equity jurisdiction.^{kkk} The very few cases upon incidental subjects show that matters and reliefs connected with an administration, which are ordinarily of a purely equitable cognizance, and which in most other states, even where there was a full probate jurisdiction, would confessedly belong to the equitable jurisdiction, are embraced within this statutory probate system, and are taken away from the courts of equity. Thus it is held that the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to the

the will where there is a present, existing question of right to be acted upon, the determination of which can be made the subjectmatter of a decree. Having taken jurisdiction, equity may order a valuation of real estate, if necessary to afford complete relief, though it involve the granting of a remedy ordinarily granted in a special proceeding: Balsley v. Balsley, 116 N. C. 472, 21 S. E. 954.

§ 1154, (kkk) Quoted in Esterly v. Rua, 122 Fed. 609, 58 C. C. A. 548, holding that a claim by a surviving partner against the estate of a deceased partner, involving an account of the partnership affairs, is within the jurisdiction of the probate court.

§ 1154, (hhhh) This portion of the text, containing the author's classification of the states, is quoted in Garcia y Perea v. Barela, 6 N. M. 239, 27 Pac. 507, and cited, as respects the third class, in Lauraine v. Ashe, (Tex.) 191 S. W. 563.

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ular instances in which it has been held by courts of states

transfer of title to the personal property of decedents. Even where there was an antenuptial agreement made by the deceased, the rights of the parties claiming under it cannot be determined in equity; it should be presented and proved in the regular course of the administration pending in the probate court, and all rights arising out of it determined by that court in the final settlement: Winkle v. Winkle, 8 Or. 193. A creditor whose demand has been rejected by the administrator, and who has failed to bring an action against the administrator for the purpose of establishing it, cannot, after the final settlement, maintain a suit in equity against the next of kin to compel payment out of their distributive shares: Grange Union v. Burkhart, 8 Or. 51.¹¹¹

Pennsylvania.-This state, like Massachusetts and Maine, belongs to the class in which the statutory probate jurisdiction is exclusive in all matters pertaining to ordinary administration. Equity has jurisdiction only of matters and reliefs incidental to the regular course of administration which are distinctly of equitable cognizance, and for which the methods and remedies of the probate court are imperfect or inadequate. In other words, equity cannot interfere in the settlement of decedents' estates, except upon some extraordinary and substantial ground: Campbell's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 298; Dundas's Appeal, 73 Pa. St. 474, 479; Linsenbigler v. Gourley, 56 Pa. St. 166, 172, 94 Am. Dec. 51; Whiteside v. Whiteside, 20 Pa. St. 473, per Black, C. J.mmm See ante, vol. 1, § 348, note 1. As recent illustrations of such special grounds for invoking the aid of equity: Although the statute gives the orphans' court jurisdiction to decree the specific performance of decedents' contracts for the purchase and sale of land, that court has no power to take cognizance of partnership matters, and to compel an accounting between the personal representatives of a deceased partner and the survivors, or where a full and final settlement of partnership affairs and the specific performance of firm agreements are necessarily involved in the carrying out of decedents' contracts; all such matters still belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of equity: Wiley's Executors' Appeal, 84 Pa. St. 270; while equity has jurisdiction of a suit to declare the trusts of a will void, it will not exercise the jurisdiction where the

§ 1154, (111) Where a court of probate has once acquired jurisdiction, no other court will interfere with its decrees except on appeal or review. But if it appears that the estate is insolvent, and the testator made or suffered a transfer of his

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property to defraud his creditors, his executor may apply to a court of equity to have such transfer set aside: Hillman v. Young, 64 Or. 73, 127 Pac. 793, 129 Pac. 124.

§1154, (mmm) York's Appeal, 110 Pa. St. 69, 1 Atl. 162, 2 Atl. 65.

composing the third class, that equity has jurisdiction of

party seeking the relief has no interest nor title in the land, nor where the relief is only a nominal part of the entire relief sought for by the suit, and the main questions involved therein are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the orphans' court: Norris v. Farrell, 33 Leg. Int. 129; 2 Week. Not. Cas. 423.^{**nnn**} The equitable jurisdiction clearly extends to trusts created by will.

Rhode Island.—It seems that the supreme court, as a court of equity, has a concurrent original jurisdiction with the probate court over administrations, and according to the settled doctrine in such case, where one court has first assumed jurisdiction of a case, the other will not interfere.⁰⁰⁰ Held, therefore, that where there had been an accounting by an administrator and a final decree thereon in the probate court, a suit in equity to review the accounting would not be maintained, even though it charged that a release obtained by the administrator from the next of kin was fraudulent, and sought to have the same declared void, since full relief could be granted by means of an appeal from

§1154, (nnn) In the case of a legacy charged upon real estate, the jurisdiction of the orphans' court is exclusive: Brotzman's Appeal, 119 Pa. St. 645, 13 Atl. 483. A court of equity in another county from that in which the estate is being ad ministered has no jurisdiction to determine the amount of a distributive share: Henderson v. Stryker, 164 Pa. St. 170, 35 Wkly. Notes Cas. 151, 30 Atl. 386. A bill may be maintained against an administrator to fix a liability against the estate: Hamilton v. Clarion, M. & P. R. Co., 144 Pa. St. 34, 13 L. R. A. 779, 23 Atl. 53. Likewise, a bill in equity may be maintained to reach property of a debtor, since deceased, conveyed in fraud of creditors, even such property may be though reached by the legal remedy: Houseman v. Grossman, 177 Pa. St. 453, 35 Atl. 736. Where executors are about to convey without authority a right of way to a railroad through the land of their testator, they will be enjoined at the suit of the

devisees. The reason given by the court is that equity has jurisdiction to establish rights under wills: Me-Clane v. McClane, 207 Pa. St. 465, 56 Atl. 996.

§1154, (000) It is held that a grant of jurisdiction to the probate court does not oust the equity jurisdiction: Moulton v. Smith, 18 R. I. 126, 27 Am. St. Rep. 728, 12 Atl. 891. Thus, an administrator of an administrator was allowed, in this case, to recover in equity from the administrator de bonis non for sums advanced personally by his intestate. Where, between classes of heirs, questions arise which affect the equitable marshaling of the debts and assets, a court of equity will intervene: Jenks v. Steere, 23 R. I. 160, 49 Atl. 698. The statutes provide a procedure for compelling an administrator to sell property to pay debts. Hence a bill for that purpose cannot be maintained, for there is an adequate remedy at law: Gavitt v. Berry, 23 R. I. 14, 49 Atl. 99.

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matters belonging to administrations, the following are

the final decree of the probate court: Blake v. Butler, 10 R. I. 133. See ante, vol. 1, § 349, note 1. See, also, the following cases in the United States circuit court, which arose in this state: Mallett v. Dexter, 1 Curt. 178; Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mason, 95.

South Carolina.—It seems that the equitable jurisdiction in this state is restricted to those special circumstances and extraordinary reliefs which do not fall at all within the scope of the probate cognizance, or for which its remedies are wholly inadequate. In ordinary and regular administrations, the jurisdiction of the probate court seems to be exclusive. A court of equity may interfere with a pending administration where an executor has committed a *devastavit*, or is insolvent and wasting the assets: Ragsdale v. Holmes, 1 S. C. 91.^{**PP**} But a court of equity cannot order a sale of real estate to pay debts where the personal property is insufficient: Eno v. Calder, 14 Rich. Eq. 154; and cannot remove an executor or administrator: Campbell v. Bank of Charleston, 3 S. C. 384.

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§ 1154, (PPP) When a legatce has been overpaid, and the executor is insolvent and refuses to sue, the other legatees may proceed in equity against the overpaid legatee without first exhausting their remedics against the executor: Miller v. Stark, 29 S. C. 325, 7 S. E. 501. An administrator de bonis non may sue in equity to set aside a fraudulent deed executed by one who was a debtor by note and judgment to the first administrator, as such: Shell v. Boyd, 32 S. C. 359, 11 S. E. 205. Α creditor may maintain a bill to marshal the assets of the estate and to set aside fraudulent conveyances by the decedent: Sheppard v. Green, 48 S. C. 165, 26 S. E. 224. Equity can interfere with the improper exercise of a limited power by an executor: Ashley v. Holman, 55 S. C. 124, 32 S. E. 992.

§ 1154, (aaa) South Dakota has ranked itself in the author's third class, with Wisconsin and similar states, by the express language of the · court, adopting the author's section 349. "By reason of the constitutional provisions conferring unlimited probate jurisdiction upon the county [probate] courts, and because of the statutes enacted pursuant thereto, it has become the settled policy of the law of this state that, except in special cases, all such matters shall, in the first instance, be adjudicated in the county courts": Welsh v. Krause, 38 S. D. 264, 161 N. W. 189. Courts of equity will exercise their "concurrent" or auxiliary jurisdiction when the powers of the probate court are inadequate for the purposes of perfect justice. Therefore, when an administrator refuses to bring an action upon a claim due the estate, a person interested in its collection may sue thereon in equity in his own name: Trotter v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 9 S. D. 596, 62 Am. St. Rep. 887, 70 N. W. 843. An action by a legatee to set aside a release of her share of the estate

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some of the most important, although it must not be under-

Tennessee.—There is a very unusual power conferred by statute upon the court of chancery in this state. If six months have elapsed after the death of the intestate, and no one will apply or can be procured to apply to the probate court for appointment as administrator, and for the issue of letters of administration, then a suit may be maintained in equity by a creditor or next of kin, but not by the widow of the decedent, for the appointment of an administrator. In such a case the court of chancery has jurisdiction to appoint an administrator, and, it seems, to go on and control the entire administration thus begun, to compel an accounting, and to decree a final settlement and distribution. The operation of the statute is confined to the exceptional circumstances as described. It does not confer upon the courts of equity any concurrent jurisdiction with the probate courts over administrations generally. In all other cases, the equitable jurisdiction is limited to such extraordinary matters and reliefs as do not come within the scope of the powers conferred on the courts of probate.^{rrr} Evans v. Evans, 2 Cold. 143; Bruce v. Bruce, 11 Heisk. 760; Rankin v. Anderson, 8 Baxt. 240. A court of equity has no jurisdiction whatever in the matter of admitting wills to probate: Townsend v. Townsend, 4 Cold. 70, 94 Am. Dec. 185.888

Texas.—The earlier decisions recognize an original jurisdiction of the equity courts concurrent with that of probate, over administrations, the accounting of executors and administrators, the settlement of estates, and the like, with power to remove an executor and to appoint a receiver. This jurisdiction would especially be exercised in cases of trust, delay, fraud, fraudulent combination between an administrator and others, and similar circumstances of ordinary equitable cognizance: Long v. Wortham, 4 Tex. 381; Dobbin v. Bryan, 5 Tex. 276 (fraud of an administrator); Newson v. Chrisman, 9 Tex. 113; Smith v. Smith, 11 Tex. 102 (delay, fraud, or trust; suit by an heir); Crain v. Crain, 17 Tex. 80 (fraudulent combination by an executor or administrator with third persons).^{ttt} By the later decisions, however, this equitable juris-

to other legatees, on the ground of fraud, is of equitable cognizance: Ward v. Pree, (S. D.) 94 N. W. 397.

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§1154, (**FFF**) A creditors' bill may be maintained to compel a sale of the assets of a decedent: Waddell v. Waddell, (Tenn. Ch. App.) 42 S. W. 46.

§1154, (***) A court of chancery, however, has jurisdiction to determine the question of fraud in procuring a will, incidental to a proceeding to declare an escheat of property claimed thereunder: State v. Lancaster, 119 Tenn. 638, 14 Ann. Cas. 953, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991, 105 S. W. 858.

§1154, (ttt) See, also, Love v. Keowne, 58 Tex. 191.

stood that such cases have arisen and such decisions been

diction is much restricted, and is confined to cases in which the probate courts are unable to grant full and adequate relief. In all cases where the probate court can give such relief, its jurisdiction is practically exclusive, and a court of equity cannot, or at least will not, interfere."" As illustrations: Where questions of title are involved depending upon the construction of a will, a court of equity is the more appropriate tribunal: Little v. Birdwell, 21 Tex. 597, 73 Am. Dec. 242. In an action brought by an executor on notes given for the price of land belonging to the estate sold by the executor, the defendants filed a cross-bill alleging a debt in their favor against the estate larger than the amount of the notes in suit, that it constituted a lien on the land which had priority over other claims, that the other debts of the estate were small and owed to a very few persons, and praying that all the parties intcrested might be brought in as defendants to the cross-bill, and the estate finally settled and distributed in that suit; held, that the court, as a court of equity, should not entertain jurisdiction, but that the probate court was fully competent to determine all the questions thus raised, and to adjudicate upon all the rights of all the parties: Atchison v. Smith, 25 Tex. 228. A court of probate has full power to enforce the licn of a mortgage upon the real estate of a deceased person as a step in the regular course of administration, and a court of equity will not entertain a suit for the foreclosure of such a mortgage, unless there are some special and substantial grounds for its interference; resort to a court of equity in matters connected with the administration of estates is discouraged where the powers of the probate court are adequate: Cannon v. McDaniel, 46 Tex. 303. Although the jurisdiction of equity in Texas is the same as that held by the English court of chancery, yet there is no power, as a part of this original jurisdiction, to order the sale of lands of a deceased for the payment of his debts, while an administration on his estate is pending in the probate court: Rogers v. Kennard, 54 Tex. 30. vvv On the other hand, where no administrator had been appointed, and there was only one debt against the estate, and the heirs voluntarily settled and distributed the estate among themselves by agreement without paying this debt, the creditor, it was held, could maintain an equitable suit to compel payment of the debt, and to enforce the lien which it created on lands of the deceased, against all the heirs as defendants, without

§ 1154, (uuu) The jurisdiction of the district court is auxiliary and ancillary to that of the probate court, and in some extraordinary instances it may be corrective: Lauraine v. Ashe, (Tex.) 191 S. W. 563, citing the author's description of "class third."

§1154, (**vvv**) Lauraine v. Ashe, (Tex.) 191 S. W. 563. made in all of these states. If a court of equity in those states where its jurísdiction is merely auxiliary and corrective can take cognizance of such special circumstances, then *a fortiori* a court of equity may do so in those states

instituting proceedings for an administration in the probate court:**www** Patterson v. Allen, 50 Tex. 23.

Vermont.-The jurisdiction of the probate court is complete, sufficient, and practically exclusive in all matters belonging to the regular, ordinary course of an administration, and the equitable jurisdiction is purely ancillary and auxiliary.*** The doctrine here prevailing is identical with that adopted by the New York courts. The proper place to have the accounts of executors, administrators, and trustees appointed by the probate court settled is in the probate court; the jurisdiction of chancery is only in aid of the probate court: Merriam v. Hemmenway, 26 Vt. 565. In one leading case, this view is set forth so clearly, and the opinion is so admirable a statement of the doctrine adopted in all the other states which belong to the same class with Vermont and New York, that I shall quote from it at some length. "Where courts of chancery have interfered in the settlement of estates, it has been merely in aid of the powers of the court of probate, and where, from defect of adequate means, it was not in its power to do the same justice as a court of equity. As a general rule, chancery retains its ancillary jurisdiction to the same extent over probate matters which it has over those in common-law courts. Unreasonable delay in probate courts in proceeding with the settlement, the fact that some of

§1154, (www) Courts of equity have the power to cancel a conveyance made by an executor in violation of an order of the probate court confirming a sale of land, when necessary for the protection of devisees, heirs, or creditors, and this power they have notwithstanding a similar power may exist in the probate court: Fisher v. Wood, 65 Tex. 199. Pending an appeal from a judgment of the county court refusing to compel an administrator to execute a deed to a purchaser of land at an administrator's sale, the administrator may be enjoined from making a second sale: Claridge v. Lavenburg, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 155, 26 S. W. 324.

The jurisdiction of the district (equity) court to partition estates and in such suit require an accounting and adjust the equities between the owners in common of the estate cannot be exercised in such a way as to defeat the constitutional jurisdiction of the county court to probate wills and grant letters testamentary and to administer estates: Buchner v. Wait, (Tex. Civ. App.) 137 S. W. 383.

§1154, (xxx) "It can only aid that [probate] court, and merely furnishes auxiliary powers when the functions of the probate court are inadequate": Clark v. Peck's Ex'rs, 79 Vt. 275, 65 Atl. 14.

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where its original jurisdiction is preserved concurrent with that of the probate tribunals. In states of the second class, however, the probate courts would furnish the only relief in all these cases. Where an executor or administrator

the parties affected by a decree were infants without guardians, or the fact that an administrator rendering his accounts will not produce books and papers, and is not compelled to do so, do not constitute sufficient grounds for the interference of chancery [i. e., such matters come within the powers of the probate court to relieve, or if that court commits an error, ample relief can be obtained on appeal from its decree]. But chancery will examine and adjust claims between an administrator and the estate [i. e., claims which an administrator sets up in his own favor personally, independently of the regular course of administration]. Claims against an administrator for moneys or property coming into his hands during administration are exclusively within the probate court's jurisdiction, as is also the entire subject of advancement. Chancery will enjoin administrators from asserting title to themselves under deeds obtained by fraud, and will require an account for the land as the property of the estate. Where administrators have received money for trespasses on intestate's land, chancery, to avoid all doubt, may take jurisdiction, so far as to cause an account to be rendered, although the matter *might* be adjusted in the probate court'': Heirs of Adams v. Adams, 22 Vt. 50. (This decision has been eited with approval by the New York court of appeals in the recent case of Chipman v. Montgomery, supra.) Where, in the course of administration, an administrator sets up a claim on his own behalf, adverse to that of the creditors, the latter may resort to chancery to have the controversy determined; but the equitable suit is merely aneillary, and after its decision settling the rights of the parties, the case is remitted to the probate court for final settlement and distribution; Morse v. Slason, 13 Vt. 296. yyy

§ 1154, (**yyy**) An equity court has no jurisdiction to set up spoliated, suppressed, and destroyed wills: Domestic & Foreign Miss. Soc. v. Eells, 68 Vt. 497, 54 Am. St. Rep. 888, 35 Atl. 463. Though a court of equity has no jurisdiction to establish or set aside a will, these matters being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court, yet, when a will which charged a legacy upon land has fraudulently been procured to be disallowed by the probate court, a court of equity may take jurisdiction, on the ground of the fraud, to charge the legacy upon the land: Wetherbee v. Chase, 57 Vt. 347. And a court of equity has ancillary jurisdiction to compel the executor to pay a legacy which the probate court has ordered to be paid: Bellows v. Sowles, 57 Vt. 411. Before a testamentary trustee can recover a legacy in has died without rendering a final account, equity has jurisdiction of a suit to compel *his* personal representatives to account at the instance of an administrator *de bonis non* or other party interested in the original estate, even, as

Virginia.—So far as is indicated by the tenor of decided cases, it seems to be clear that the original jurisdiction of equity over administrations, the accounting of executors and administrators, the settlement and distribution of estates, and all matters incidental thereto, is fully preserved, concurrent with that of the probate tribunal, even if not exclusive. Any person interested in the settlement of an estate, as legatee, distributee, or creditor, may maintain a suit in equity for an administration. The system prevailing in this state appears to be substantially the same as that in Alabama. Courts of equity have jurisdiction in all cases to compel the delivery of a specific legacy by the executor: Nelson's Adm'r v. Cornwell, 11 Gratt. 724; and a fortiori

equity, he must show that he has resorted to the probate court in vain, and that he has no adequate remedy there, or that it is necessary that a trustee be appointed: School District No. 3 v. Sheldon, 71 Vt. 95, 41 Atl. 1041. A bill by a ward to impeach his guardian's account for fraud and concealment, but which does not attack the decree of confirmation, is demurrable: Scoville v. Brock, 75 Vt. 243, 54 Atl. 177. But with proper averments, such a bill may be maintained: Scoville v. Brock, (Vt.) 57 Atl. 967. The equity powers conferred upon the probate court and upon appellate courts of law do not extend to the establishment of purely equitable claims and equitable rights. Such claims and rights must be established in equity: Leonard's Adm'r v. Leonard's Ex'r, 67 Vt. 318, 31 Atl. 783.

Injunction against squandering the estate held unnecessary on the allegations of the bill, since the executors could be removed and new ones appointed by the probate court:

Clark v. Peck's Ex'rs, 79 Vt. 275. 65 Atl. 14. The trust relationship of a widower in possession with consent of the executors is one of which the probate court has jurisdiction: Ibid. The heirs of an intestate may sue to recover property fraudulently obtained from the intestate, when the administrator refuses to sue, since the probate court is without power to reach it: Marsh v. Marsh, 78 Vt. 399, 63 Atl. 159. Where commissioners of an estate failed to allow or disallow a claim duly presented, and omitted to mention it in their report, and the creditor, without legal fault, did not discover the failure until his statutory remedies had expired, he could have relief in equity: Batchelder v. White's Adm'r, 82 Vt. 132, 71 Atl. 1111. When an insolvent executor made an unauthorized deed in fraud of creditors, it may be set aside in equity at their suit; and it is not necessary first to remove the executor: Wetmore & Morse Granite Co. v. Bertoli, 87 Vt. 257, 88 Atl. 898.

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some cases hold, where there is a surviving executor or administrator, and the decree so rendered has been held to be binding upon the sureties of the deceased executor or administrator. This particular condition of fact seems to

the equitable jurisdiction should exist in case of a general legacy. A suit in the nature of a creditor's suit may be maintained by a creditor against the executor, devisees, and legatees, to compel an accounting, and no other creditor can then maintain a separate suit for his own debt, since all the creditors can come in under the decree in the original action, and the estate can thus be settled: Kent's Adm'r v. Cloyd's Adm'r, 30 Gratt. 555.zzz An administrator may maintain a suit in equity against a general agent of his intestate for a discovery and an accounting of all the transactions growing out of the agency.""" Simmons v. Simmons's Adm'r, 33 Gratt. 451. A, having taken out a fire policy running from year to year, died intestate, leaving a widow and son. The widow, as administratrix, continued to pay the premiums until the loss occurred; held, that the administratrix and the heir might unite and maintain a suit in equity against the company to recover the amount due on the policy, there being a question whether this insurance money should be treated as real or as personal property: Portsmouth Ins. Co. v. Reynolds's Adm'x, 32 Gratt. 613. bbbb

§1154, (zzz) See, also, Carter v. Hampton's Adm'rs, 77 Va. 631; Wilson v. Wilson, 93 Va. 546, 25 S. E. 546.

§ 1154, (anan) An administrator may sue for the settlement of an estate and have assignees of life insurance policies which the estate claims made defendants, although there may be a remedy at law: National Life Ass'n v. Hopkins' Adm'r, 97 Va. 167, 33 S. E. 539.

§ 1154, (bbbb) West Virginia.— The authority of the Virginia cases decided previous to the formation of the state is recognized. In the very carefully considered case of Dower v. Seeds, 28 W. Va. 113, 57 Am. Rep. 646, it was decided, after an elaborate review of the decigions upon the subject, that courts of probate and of equity have con-

current jurisdiction for the establishment of lost, suppressed, or destroyed wills. Where the personal estate is insufficient for the payment of the debts of the estate, a creditor may bring suit in equity for the ascertainment of debts due from the testator, for the settlement of the estate, and for the sale of the lands for the payment of debts, on the failure of the executor to institute such suit within the time limited by statute: Broderick v. Broderick, 28 W. Va. 378. While in Crawford v. Turner, 58 W. Va. 600, 112 Am. St. Rep. 1014, 52 S. E. 716, Price v. Laing, 67 W. Va. 373, 68 S. E. 24, and Shepherd v. Craig, 70 W. Va. 218, 73 S. E. 712, the grounds asserted by creditors in suits to recover their debts were held insufficient to confer equity

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have been omitted from the statutory jurisdiction of the probate courts in several states. When a settlement purporting to be final has been decreed in the probate court, a person interested in the estate, who was not a party to such

Wisconsin.-The system prevailing in this state, as settled by the decisions, is the same in principle, and substantially the same in practice, as that existing in New York, although the powers conferred upon the probate courts seem to be somewhat greater in number and extent than those given to the surrogates in the latter state. The probate courts have a plenary jurisdiction in all matters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estates, and much of this jurisdiction, and many of the reliefs granted in its exercise, are really equitable in their nature, and are necessarily concurrent with the jurisdiction of equity. Although the statutes have given such a broad jurisdiction to the probate courts, the original jurisdiction of equity is not abrogated; it still exists, dormant and suspended, but alive, ready to be invoked when necessary to do complete justice in special cases. It is well settled as the practical rule that a court of equity will not, in general, entertain or exercise jurisdiction wherever a complete, adequate, and full remedy can be obtained in the probate court: Batchelder v. Batchelder, 20 Wis. 452; Tryon v. Farnsworth, 30 Wis. 577; Brook

jurisdiction. Equity has jurisdiction at suit of administrator or trustee to determine amount due an estate under a deed of trust: Pendleton v. Bower, 49 W. Va. 146, 38 S. E. 487. Jurisdiction in equity to construe wills is limited and special, and will only be exercised as incident to general equify jurisdiction, and then, in a particular case, only to the extent of determining whether or not the relief sought ean be granted: Martin v. Martin, 52 W. Va. 99, 44 S. E. 198; Matthews v. Tyree, 53 W. Va. 298, 44 S. E. 526. The exceutor or administrator may apply to equity for relief when the affairs of the estate are so involved that he cannot safely administer except under the direction of the court. In such case it is competent for him to institute a suit against creditors generally for the purpose of having their claims adjusted and obtaining a final decree settling the order and payment of assets: Hanna v. Galford, (W. Va.) 47 S. E. 359. A single creditor cannot maintain for himself a suit in equity upon a legal demand against an executor who had rendered an account, without surcharging or falsifying: Thompson & Lively v. Mann, 53 W. Va. 432, 44 S. E. 246. Since the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction in all purely probate and ordinary administrative matters, a court of equity cannot, as incident to a suit by administrator c. t. a. for construction of a will, restrain the qualifying as executrix of the person named as . such in the will: Stone v. Simmons, (W. Va.) 48 S. E. 841 (reviewing statutes on the general subject).

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proceeding, may maintain a suit in equity against the administrator or executor, and compel him to a full and final account, treating the former settlement as a nullity. It has been held in some of these states that a court of equity may

v. Chappell, 34 Wis: 405. And the probate court has jurisdiction to give construction to a will, and may exercise such jurisdiction as fully as a court of equity, but the power of equity to construe wills does not seem to be thereby abrogated or abridged: cccc Appeal of Schaeffner, 41 Wis. 260; Wolf v. Schaeffner, 51 Wis. 53, 8 N. W. 8. * In an equitable suit against the executor of A, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff and A were partners in the ownership of certain mills, the title to which stood in the name of A alone, but was held by him in trust for the firm; that A sold and conveyed the mills, and received the purchase-money, and had also received large sums as rents of the mills; that A was bound to pay the plaintiff two-thirds of the sum received as the price of the mills and two-thirds of said rents, but the plaintiff had received nothing; the plaintiff demanded an accounting of the rents and payment by the executor of what was found due the plaintiff on such accounting, and also payment of two-thirds of the sum received by A on the sale of the mills. There was no allegation of a specific lien or any real property or fund in the executor's hands, nor of any failure by the probate court to fix a time for the presenting of claims against the estate. Held, that the suit was one merely to recover money due to the plaintiff from the deceased, since no equitable lien in plaintiff's favor upon any fund nor against other creditors was alleged to exist, and that the action could not be maintained; a court of equity had no jurisdiction; that of the probate court was complete and adequate: Lannon v. Hackett, 49 Wis. 261. The correctness of the decision may, I think, be questioned. It denies an equitable jurisdiction which is, I believe, generally, if not universally, recognized and exercised. Even in states where the probate jurisdiction is so broad that the equitable jurisdiction is ordinarily dormant, like California and New York, it is held that an equitable action for an accounting and settlement of the partnership affairs may be maintained by the administrator of a deceased partner against the survivor, or by the

§1154, (cece) "The jurisdiction of courts of equity for the construction of wills and giving directions in respect to the execution of them has long been established and well understood, and devolves upon the circuit court in all proper cases, as a part of its proper constitutional

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jurisdiction, particularly in cases of trust": Miller v. Drane, 100 Wis. 1, 75 N. W. 413. Equity will not construe a will, however, when only legal interests are involved: Kelley v. Kelley, 80 Wis. 486, 50 N. W. 334. take jurisdiction in the first instance, or even after proceedings in probate have been begun, of an administration, and may decree a final settlement and distribution, when there are peculiar circumstances of difficulty in the adminis-

survivor against the administrator of a deceased partner; the power of a court of probate over the estate of a deceased partner is not regarded as restricting the jurisdiction of equity over such actions. Among the special cases in which the equitable jurisdiction is not dormant, but may be freely exercised, are the following: To compel the performance of trusts created by a will: Batchelder v. Batchelder, 20 Wis. 452; and also in matters of legacies, their enforcement and payment, although a concurrent jurisdiction is held by the probate court: Catlin v. Wheeler, 49 Wis. 507.^{ddd}

District of Columbia.—The original general jurisdiction of equity over administrations and the settlement of estates seems to be preserved: Creswell v. Kennedy, 3 McAr. 78; Keefe v. Malone, 3 McAr. 236.

United States Courts.—The full original jurisdiction of the English court of chancery over administrations and matters pertaining to the settlement of estates is possessed by the United States circuit courts. Whenever these courts obtain jurisdiction of such a matter on account of the state citizenship of the parties, they will exercise the full powers and grant the full reliefs of chancery, unlimited and unaffected by any restrictive legislation of the state in which the matter arose, or in which the parties are resident. The state statutes abrogating the equitable jurisdiction of the state courts, and conferring an exclusive jurisdiction upon the probate courts, have no effect whatever upon the powers

§1154, (dddd) An action brought by infants having an interest in the estate of a testator, seeking to set aside fraudulent sales of real cstate made by the executor as trustee, is of equitable cognizance, on the ground that the action is to enforce a trust: Hawley v. Tesch, 72 Wis. 299, 39 N. W. 483. A creditors' bill may be maintained to reach assets of the decedent: Richter v. Leiby, 99 Wis. 512, 75 N. W. 82; but it cannot be maintained against executors to reach property in custodia legis: Williams v. Smith, 117 Wis. 142, 93 N. W. 464. A creditor may sue to enforce an equitable lien upon the testator's realty: Pym

v. Pym, 118 Wis. 662, 96 N. W. 429. But a suit by a widow against her husband's executor to subject real property of which he died seised to a constructive trust, and also for an accounting of moneys dissipated by him belonging to her, should be remitted to the county court: Wisdom v. Wisdom, 155 Wis. 434, 145 N. W. 126.

An administrator may institute an equitable action for a discovery of the property of the estate, and for an accounting, against persons withholding such property under claim of ownership: Eisentraut v. Cornelius, 134 Wis. 532, 126 Am. St. Rep. 1027, 115 N. W. 142.

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tration, and when such exercise of the equitable jurisdiction would prevent great delay, expense, inconvenience, and waste, and would thus conclude by one suit and decree a protracted and vexatious litigation. It cannot be said that these circumstances would be regarded as sufficient grounds for exercising the equitable jurisdiction in all the states of the third class, although they would undoubtedly be sufficient in all those of the first class. It is generally held that a court of equity has jurisdiction to set aside the decree of a probate court obtained by fraud, both in states of the first and of the third classes, but not in those of the second. A judgment creditor of the deceased may maintain a suit virtually to take the administration out of the hands of the administrator, and for a final settlement, where the intestate had, with the connivance of the person afterwards appointed administrator, make a disposition of his property fraudulent as against his creditors, and the administrator is engaged in carrying out such fraudulent scheme. It is also generally held that equity may interfere with a pending administration when the administrator has committed a *devastavit*, or is wasting the assets, especially if

of the United States tribunals. This jurisdiction of the United States courts is, however, concurrent with that of the state tribunals; and if a state probate or other court has already assumed jurisdiction, and an administration is pending before it, the United States circuit court will not interfere, in the absence of fraud or other like ground of equitable cognizance.^{eeee} But a suit may be maintained in the circuit court to avoid a settlement obtained in a state probate court through fraud: Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mason, 95; Mallett v. Dexter, 1 Curt. 178; see *ante*, vol. 1, § 293.^{ffff} The United States courts, as courts of equity, have no jurisdiction to set aside a will, nor the prohate of a will, on the ground of fraud: Case of Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 504, 22 L. Ed. 599.^{EEEEE}

§ 1154, (eeee) This paragraph of the note is quoted in Johnson v. Johnson, 225 Fed. 413. See, also, Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 27 L. Ed. 1006, 3 Sup. Ct. 327; Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 86, 32 L. Ed. 630, 9 Sup. Ct. 237. §1154, (ffff) Sullivan v. Andoe, 6 Fed. 641, 647, 4 Hughes, 290.

§ 1154, (2222) Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 27 L. Ed. 1006, 3 Sup. Ct. 327.

he be insolvent, or is guilty of fraud in the management of his trust. Although the accounting by the administrator for property of the estate in his hands belongs to the pro-^w bate court, yet equity has jurisdiction of personal claims between an administrator and the estate; that is, claims personal to himself, growing out of dealings with the deceased, which the administrator sets up adverse to creditors, distributees, and other persons interested in the estate: as, for example, claims set up under a deed to himself from the deceased, or under an agreement with the deceased, and the like. Where there has been no administration, but the heirs or next of kin have settled and divided the estate by voluntary arrangement among themselves, it seems that a creditor may maintain a suit in equity to compel a payment of his demand out of the property, without the necessity of taking out an administration;ⁱⁱⁱⁱ and in some states it is held that equity has jurisdiction both when there has been no administrator, and when the administrator has made a final settlement and has been discharged. By virtue of the auxiliary jurisdiction of equity, a creditor may maintain a suit, somewhat in the nature of a "creditor's bill," to reach assets which justly and equitably belong to the estate, and to bring them within the power and control of the administrator, so that they may be administered upon and distributed by him. When a partner dies, although the probate court may have ample power to settle his estate, yet the auxiliary jurisdiction of equity still remains, and will be generally exercised in states of the first and third classes, and probably in many of the second, by means of a suit for an accounting and settlement of the partnership affairs, either brought by the representatives of the deceased partner against the survivors, or by the survivors against such representatives. In all the states of the first and third classes, and in a great majority it seems of those belonging to the second, equity retains its

§1154, (iiii) The text is cited to this effect in Cameron v. Cameron, 82 Ala. 392, 3 South. 148.

jurisdiction of suits for the foreclosure of mortgages upon the lands of deceased mortgagors or other deceased owners of land encumbered by mortgage; but in a very few of the states forming the second class, it appears that the mortgage must be enforced, like any other demand against the estate of the deceased mortgagor, in the regular course of administration pending before the probate court. Finally, throughout all the states, the original jurisdiction of equity over trusts remains unabridged and virtually unaffected by the jurisdiction given to probate courts. It is exercised in enforcing the performance of trusts and in controlling the conduct of trustees as well when trusts of real or of personal property are created by will as by deed. The equitable jurisdiction concerning the enforcement of testamentary trusts is universally regarded as entirely separate and distinct from the jurisdiction over administrations.

SECTION IV.

CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF WILLS.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1155. Origin of the jurisdiction.
- § 1156. Extent of the jurisdiction; a branch of that over trusts.
- § 1157. The same; a broader jurisdiction in some states.
- § 1158. Suit to establish a will.

§ 1155. Origin of This Jurisdiction.^{a.}—Since in England the court of chancery possesses and exercises a full jurisdiction over the administration and settlement of decedents' estates, whether the deceased died testate or intestate, it has never been doubted that equity has there the power, as an incident of this jurisdiction, to construe and

§ 1155, (a) Sections 1155-1158 are cited in Rowley v. Rowley, 143 Wis. 325, 127 N. W. 1002; Hart v. Darter, 107 Va. 310, 13 Ann. Cas. 1, 15 **L. R. A. (N. S.)** 599, 58 S. E. 590. This section is cited in Torrey v. Torrey, 55 N. J. Eq. 410, 36 Atl. 1084; Benedict v. Wilmarth, (Fla.) 35 South. 84.

enforce wills of personal property.^b Under its general jurisdiction over trusts, a court of equity has also the power to construe and enforce wills of real as well as of personal property, so far as they create, or their dispositions involve the creation of, trusts.^c So far as a will of real property bequeaths purely legal estates, and the devisees therein obtain purely legal titles to the land given, the enforcement thereof belongs to the courts of law by means of the action of ejectment; the courts of law have full power to construe and interpret the instrument and to determine the rights of the devisees; there is no necessity, and therefore no power, of resorting to a court of equity, in order to obtain a construction of such wills.^d The same rules would be recognized as regulating the action of the courts in all of the states of this country which have preserved the original jurisdiction of equity over administrations, either as exclusive or as concurrent with that given to the courts of probate. In the great majority of the states, as has been shown, this original jurisdiction of equity over administrations has either been completely abrogated, or has been so curtailed and restricted that it exists merely as auxiliary to and corrective of the principal jurisdiction held by the probate tribunals. Throughout the American states there has necessarily arisen, as a supplement to the ordinary functions of the probate courts, and for the purpose of supplying the defects in their methods and remedies, a special jurisdiction of equity "for the construction of wills," which it is the object of the present section to describe.

§ 1155, (b) The text is cited in Hart v. Darter, 107 Va. 310, 13 Ann. Cas. 1, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 599, 58 S. E. 590 (same in Virginia as in England).

§1155, (c) The text is quoted in Miller v. Drane, 100 Wis. 1, 75 N. W. 413, and cited to this effect in Hart v. Darter, 107 Va. 310, 13 Ann. Cas. 1, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 599, 58 S. E. 590.

§ 1155, (d) This portion of the text is quoted in Kelley v. Kelley, 80 Wis. 486, 50 N. W. 334, and Hart v. Darter, 107 Va. 310, 13 Ann. Cas. 1, 15 L. R. A. 599, 58 S. E. 590, and cited in Norris v. Beardsley, (N. J. Eq.) 62 Atl. 425 (Stevenson, V. C.).

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§ 1156. Extent of the Jurisdiction—A Branch of That Over Trusts.—Although there is not an entire uniformity in the decisions by courts of different states upon this particular subject, yet the doctrine which seems to be both in harmony with principle and sustained by the weight of authority is, that the special equitable jurisdiction to construe wills is simply an incident of the general jurisdiction over trusts; that a court of equity will never entertain a suit brought *solely* for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of a will without any further relief, and will never exercise a power to interpret a will which only deals with and disposes of purely legal estates or interests, and which makes no attempt to create any trust relations with respect to the property donated.¹ a In the language of recent

§ 1156, ¹ Sellers v. Sellers, 35 Ala. 235; Cowles v. Pollard, 51 Ala. 445; Clay v. Gurley, 62 Ala. 14; Clark v. Clark, 17 Ga. 485; Strubher v. Belsey, 79 Ill. 307; Whitman v. Fisher, 74 Ill. 147; Mallory's Adm'r v. Craige, 15 N. J. Eq. 73; Youmans v. Youmans, 26 N. J. Eq. 149; Benham v. Hendrickson, 32 N. J. Eq. 441; Bowers v. Smith, 10 Paige, 193; Emmons v. Cairns, 2 Sand. Ch. 369; Onderdonk v. Mott, 34 Barb. 106; Woodruff v. Cook, 47 Barb. 304; Bailey v. Southwick, 6 Lans. 356; Bailey v. Briggs, 56 N. Y. 407; Chipman v. Montgomery, 63 N. Y. 221, 230; Dill v. Wisner, 88 N. Y. 153, 160; Delaney v. McCormack, 88 N. Y. 174; Post v. Hover, 33 N. Y. 593, 602; 30 Barb. 312, 324; Walrath v. Handy, 24 How. Pr. 353; Stinde v. Ridgway, 55 How. Pr. 301; Duncan v. Duncan, 4 Abb. N. C. 275; Marlett v. Marlett, 14 Hun, 313; Wager v. Wager, 21 Hun, 93; Powell v. Demming, 22 Hun, 235; Bullock v. Bullock, 2 Dev. Eq. 307; Ferrand v. Howard, 3 Ired. Eq. 381; Simmons v. Hendricks, 8 Ired. Eq. 84, 85, 86, 55 Am. Dec. 439; Tayloe v. Bond, Busb. Eq. 5; Marrow v. Marrow, Busb. Eq. 148; Devereux v. Devereux, 81 N. C. 12; Houston v. Howie, 84 N. C. 349; Rothgeb v. Mauck, 35 Ohio St. 503; Goddard v. Brown, 12 R. I. 31; Bussy v. McKie, 2 McCord Eq. 23, 16 Am. Dec. 628; Gibbes v. Elliott, 5 Rich. Eq. 327; Appeal of Schaeffner, 41 Wis. 260; Wolf v. Schaeffner, 51 Wis. 53; 8 N. W. 8; Rexroad v. Wells, 13 W. Va. 812; Magers v. Edwards's Adm'r, 13 W. Va. 822.

§ 1156, (a) The text is cited in Lake View M. & M. Co. v. Hannon, 93 Ala. 87, 9 South. 539; Carroll v. Richardson, 87 Ala. 605, 6 South. III-172 342; Torrey v. Torrey, 55 N. J. Eq.
410, 36 Atl. 1084; Bryant v. Thompson, 59 Hun, 627, 14 N. Y. Supp.
386; Martin v. Martin, 52 W. Va.

and well-considered cases, "The rule is, that to put a court of equity in motion, there must be an actual litigation in respect to matters which are the proper subjects of the jurisdiction of that court as distinguished from a court of law. It is by reason of the jurisdiction of courts of chancery over trusts that courts having equitable powers, as an inci-

381, 44 S. E. 198; Andersen v. Andersen, (Neb.) 96 N. W. 276; Hoagland v. Cooper, (N. J. Eq.) 56 Atl. 705; also in Ashurst v. Ashurst, 175 Ala. 667, 57 South. 442; Booe v. Vinson, 104 Ark. 439, 149 S. W. 524; Strawn v. Trustees of Jacksonville Female Academy, 240 Ill. 111, 88 N. E. 460; Miller v. Rowan, 251 Ill. 344, 96 N. E. 285, dissenting opinion; Knox v. Knox, 87 Kan. 381, 124 Pac. 409; Tonnele v. Wetmore, 195 N. Y. 436, 88 N. E. 1068 (jurisdiction not dependent on the trust being upheld); Harris v. Harris, 79 Vt. 22, 64 Atl. 75; Buskirk v. Ragland, 65 W. Va. 749, 65 S. E. 101; quoted in Toland v. Earl, 129 Cal. 148, 79 Am. St. Rep. 100, 61 Pac. 914; Frank v. Frank, 88 Ark. 1, 129 Am. St. Rep. 73, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 176, 113 S. W. 640; Cornet v. Cornet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S. W. 333; Hart v. Darter, 107 Va. 310, 13 Ann. Cas. 1, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 599, 58 S. E. 590. See, also, Williamson v. Grider, 87 Ark. 588, 135 S. W. 361; Ackerman v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 90 Conn. 63, 96 Atl. 149; Mansfield v. Mansfield, 203 Ill. 92, 67 N. E. 497; Harrison v. Owsley, 172 Ill. 629, 50 N. E. 227; Fletcher v. Root, 240 Ill. 429, 88 N. E. 987; Bieber v. Porter, 242 Ill. 616, 90 N. E. 183; Harris v. Bow, 156 Mich. 28, 120 N. W. 17; Appleby v. Watkins, 95 Minn. 455, 5 Ann. Cas. 470, and note, 104 N. W. 301; Wager v. Wager, 89 N. Y. 161; Weed v. Weed, 94 N. Y. 243; Davis v. Tremain, 205

N. Y. 236, 98 N. E. 383; Hoagland v. Cooper (N. J. Eq.) 56 Atl. 705; Fahy v. Fahy, 58 N. J. Eq. 210, 42 Atl. 726; Hayday v. Hayday, (N. J. Eq.) 39 Atl. 373; Gillen v. Hadley, 72 N. J. Eq. 505, 66 Atl. 1087; Beard v. Beard, (N. J. Eq.) 63 Atl. 25; Kellogg v. Burnett, 74 N. J. Eq. 304, 69 Atl. 196; Outwater v. Benson, 81 N. J. Eq. 154, 85 Atl. 206; Cozart v. Lyon, 91 N. C. 282; Woodlief v. Merritt, 96 N. C. 226, 2 S. E. 350; Heptinstall v. Newson, 146 N. C. 503, 60 S. E. 416; Reid v. Alexander, 170 N. C. 303, 87 S. E. 125; Martin v. Martin, 52 W. Va. 381, 44 S. E. 198; Mathews v. Tyree, 53 W. Va. 298, 44 S. E. 526; Kelley v. Kelley, 80 Wis. 486, 50 N. W. 334. It has been held that the bill cannot be sustained unless the construction may affect the rights of the complainant in person or property, or unless it may affect the performance of his duties under the will, as executor, trustee, or otherwise: Burgess v. Shepherd, 97 Me. 522, 55 Atl. 415. Jurisdiction sustained in the following cases, a trust being involved: Hurt v. Hurt, 157 Ala. 126, 47 South. 260; Williamson v. Grider, 97 Ark. 588, 135 S. W. 361; Davidson v. I. M. Davidson Real Estate & Investment Co., 226 Mo. 1, 136 Am. St. Rep. 615, 125 S. W. 1143; or where the suit is one to quiet title, which involves the construction of a will: Kellers v. Kellers, 79 N. J. Eq. 412, 82 Atl. 94; Rowley v. Rowley, 143 Wis. 325,

deut of that jurisdiction, take cognizance of and pass upon the interpretation of wills. They do not take jurisdiction of actions brought solely for the construction of instruments of that character, nor when only legal rights are in controversy. It is when the court is moved on behalf of an executor, trustee, or *cestui que trust*, and to insure a correct administration of the power conferred by a will, that jurisdiction is had to give a construction to a doubtful or disputed clause in a will. The jurisdiction is incidental to that over trusts."² Even by courts which maintain this restricted doctrine, it has been held that the jurisdiction extends to the construction of a doubtful will of personal property at the suit of the executor or of a legatee, although the instrument creates no express trusts, on account of the implied trust relation always existing between the executor and the legatees.³ In accordance with this doctrine, which

§ 1156, ² Chipman v. Montgomery, 63 N. Y. 221, 230, per Allen, J.; Bailey v. Briggs, 56 N. Y. 407, per Folger, J.

§ 1156, 3 Thus in Bowers v. Smith, 10 Paige, 193, it is held that "an executor takes the legal estate in the personal property of the testator as trustee for the legatees or next of kin, and chancery having general jurisdiction in cases of trusts, any person having an interest in such property may file a bill in that court to have the construction of the will settled, or to have the question as to the validity of any of its provisions determined, so far as concerns the interest of the claimant in the property, and to have a decree for such portions of the property as he is entitled to receive. But testator's heir at law, or devisee claiming a mere legal estate, where there is no trust, cannot come into equity for the mere purpose of obtaining a construction to a will." This decision clearly distinguishes between a will of personal property and one of land, and does not require any trust to be created by the instrument in the former. And see Onderdonk v. Mott, 34 Barb. 106; Bliven v. Seymour, 88 N. Y. 469. Some later New York decisions fail to recognize this distinction, and deny the jurisdiction unless the will

127 N. W. 1002. If the court exercises the jurisdiction, where there is no trust, its judgment is not vold, but merely erroneous: Miller v. Rowan, 251 Ill. 344, 96 N. E. 285, following the distinction explained in §129 of the text; Wakefield v. Wakefield, 256 Ill. 296, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 414, 100 N. E. 275; Tonnele v. Wetmore, 195 N. Y. 436, 88 N. E. 1068. regards a trust express or implied as essential to the jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the suit can only be maintained by some party *directly* interested in the trust under the will; that is, by an executor or a trustee, or by a *cestui que trust* or a legatee; it cannot be maintained by an heir at law, or a devisee of a mere legal title, and much less by a creditor.⁴ c

§ 1157. The Same. A Broader Jurisdiction in Some States.—It cannot be denied that there are decisions by able courts which take another and less restricted view of the jurisdiction. According to the doctrine of these cases, the jurisdiction to construe wills is not necessarily connected with the general jurisdiction over trusts; the presence of a trust express or implied is not made a criterion of its existence nor of its proper exercise; it is regarded as arising wholly from the complicated character of provisions in a will, from the difficulty of understanding their meaning, or the doubt and uncertainty as to the rights and interests of the parties claiming under them. In short, the jurisdiction to construe a will exists and is exercised when-

of personal property creates a trust as well as one of lands: Walrath v. Handy, 24 How. Pr. 353; Wager v. Wager, 21 Hun, 93; but in Bliven v. Seymour, 88 N. Y. 469, a will of personal property was construed, although no trust whatever was created; and see Dill v. Wisner, 88 N. Y. 153, 160.^b

§1156, 4 See cases cited in the second note before the last.

§ 1156, (b) In Wager v. Wager, 89 N. Y. 161, the same case in the court below was reversed, and the above distinction was recognized, per Rapallo, J.: see, also, Read v. Williams, 125 N. Y. 560, 21 Am. St. Rep. 748, 26 N. E. 730.

§ 1156, (c) See, also, Beccaise v. Beccaise, 65 Fla. 441, 62 South. 209; Glover v. Baker, 76 N. H. 393, 83 Atl. 916; Steen v. Steen, 68 N. J. Eq. 472, 59 Atl. 675 (but such bill, by an heir in possession asserting that a claim 15 void, may be amended to become a bill to quiet title); Warren v. Warren, 75 N. J. Eq. 415, 72 Atl. 960; Smith v. Morrow, 84 N. J. Eq. 395, 93 Atl. 695; Buskirk v. Ragland, 65 W. Va. 749, 65 S. E. 101; but see McCutcheon v. Pullman Trust & Sav. Bank, 251 Ill. 550, 96 N. E. 510 (heir denying validity of testamentary trust may come into equity to have its existence determined); Comstock v. Redmond, 252 Ill. 522, 96 N. E. 1073.

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ever its terms are really difficult or doubtful, or their validity is contested, without reference to the presence or absence of any trust.^{1 a} It is well settled that a court will never entertain a suit to give a construction or declare the rights of parties upon a state of facts which has not yet arisen, nor upon a matter which is future, contingent, and uncertain;^{2 b} nor upon a matter which is wholly past, as

§ 1157, ¹ Rosenberg v. Frank, 58 Cal. 387; see extract from opinion ante, under § 1153. The clause construed in this case was a residuary bequest, creating no trust, and the opinion does not treat the jurisdiction as incidental to the power of equity over express trusts, but as an incident of the power over administrations: Sellers v. Sellers, 35 Ala. 235; Trotter v. Blocker, 6 Port. 269; Baldwin v. Bean, 59 Me. 481; First Baptist Church v. Robberson, 71 Mo. 326; Benham v. Hendrickson, 32 N. J. Eq. 441; Purvis v. Sherrod, 12 Tex. 140; Howze v. Howze, 14 Tex. 232; Little v. Birdwell, 21 Tex. 597, 73 Am. Dec. 242; Gibbes v. Elliott, 5 Rich. Eq. 327.

§ 1157, ² Minot v. Taylor, 129 Mass. 160; Tayloe v. Bond, Busb. Eq. 5; Marrow v. Marrow, Busb. Eq. 148; Goddard v. Brown, 12 R. I. 31.

§1157, (a) The text is cited in Carroll v. Richardson, 87 Ala. 605, 6 South. 342; Harris v. Harris, 79 Vt. 22, 64 Atl. 75; Ashurst v. Ashurst, 175 Ala. 667, 57 South. 442 (bill by executrix, alleging that parts of will are complicated and that parts are void, and therefore she seeks advice of court of chancery that she may properly administer her trust). See, also, Kaplan v. Coleman, 180 Ala. 267, 60 South. 885; Hanna v. Prewitt, 153 Ky. 310, 155 S. W. 726; Haseltine v. Shepherd, 99 Me. 495, 59 Atl. 1025; Hunt v. Gower, 80 S. C. 80, 128 Am. St. Rep. 862, 61 S. E. 218. Such jurisdiction has been conferred in some states by statute: Illinois Laws 1911, p. 253; Rev. Stats., c. 22, § 50; Wakefield v. Wakefield, 256 Ill. 296, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 414, 100 N. E. 275; McCarty v. McCarty, 275 Ill. 573, 114 N. E. 322; New York Code, § 1866; Davis v. Tremain, 205 N. Y. 236, 98 N. E. 383; Vermont Sess. Laws 1896, No. 40, p. 28, §1; Clark v. Peck's Ex'rs, 79 Vt. 275; 65 Atl. 14.

§1157, (b) Future, Contingent, and Uncertain Matters.-The text is cited to this effect in Strawn v. Trustees of Jacksonville Female Academy, 240 Ill. 111, 88 N. E. 460. See, also, Little v. Thorne, 93 N. C. 69; Foudray v. Foudray, 44 Ind. App. 444, 89 N. E. 499 (court refuses to determine the question of the power of a life tenant to dispose of the fee, in advance of its exercise); Fuller v. McKim, 187 Mich. 667, 154 N. W. 55; Gebhard v. Lenox Library, 74 N. H. 416, 68 Atl. 540 (will not construe a will when a proceeding is pending in the probate court to re-examine the probate); Norris v. Beardsley (N. J. Eq.) 62 Atl. 425 (will not construe will as to disposition of funds which are not yet in executor's hands). upon the past conduct of the executor.³ ^c The jurisdiction will not, it seems, be extended so as to permit an administrator to obtain the direction of a court of equity with regard to the proper discharge of his duties.⁴

§ 1158. Suit to Establish a Will.—The rule is settled in England that a devisee in possession is entitled at any time to maintain a suit against the heir at law of the testator for the purpose of establishing the will, although the heir has brought an action of ejectment to recover the land, although the will creates no trusts, but gives the devisee a purely legal estate, and although it is not necessary to administer the estate under the direction of the court of chancery.¹ A devisee may maintain a similar suit against

§ 1157, ³ Sohier v. Burr, 127 Mass. 221; Tayloe v. Bond, Busb. Eq. 5; Marrow v. Marrow, Busb. Eq. 148. In short, a construction ean only be given when it will determine and direct some present or continuing act or conduct of the executor or trustee: Powell v. Demming, 22 Hun, 235.

§ 1157, 4 Clay v. Gurley, 62 Ala. 14; Ferrand v. Howard, 3 Ired. Eq. 381; but see Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass. 564.

§ 1158, 1 Boyse v. Rossborough, Kay, 71; 3 De Gex, M. & G. 817; affirmed *sub nom*. Colclough v. Boyse, 6 H. L. Cas. 1. This case was very carefully considered by all of the courts, and the previous authorities were quoted and examined in a most exhaustive manner.

But in Haseltine v. Shepherd, 99 Me. 495, 59 Atl. 1025, it is held that under this rule a widow may maintain a bill to determine whether she has power to sell property under the terms of a devise. "It may not be that the time has arrived, or that it ever will arrive, when she will need to sell the estate or her interest in it. But to know whether she can sell it when needed may, and, we think, naturally will, affect her plans of living. It will enable her to deal with the property more advantageously."

§1157, (c) Warren v. Warren, 279 Ill. 217, 116 N. E. 613 (not where no ambiguity or uncertainty, and no equitable estate to be protected, merely to obtain decree that contingent remainders had been destroyed and that plaintiff had a fee simple); Clark v. Carter, 200 Mo. 515, 98 S. W. 594 (after an executrix has sold land to A, who has paid part cash and given a mortgage for the balance, it is too late for A to bring a suit to construe the will and have it determined whether she had power to make the sale to him); Hall v. Lawton, 80 Vt. 535, 68 Atl. 657 (bill to construe will cannot be maintained where there has been a decree of distribution and any person interested could appeal therefrom and have the matter determined).

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parties claiming under another will of the same testator.² In both instances the suit is in the nature of a bill to quiet title. For obvious reasons, no such jurisdiction probably exists in any of the states,—certainly not in the great majority of them.^{3 a}

§ 1158, ² Lovett v. Lovett, 3 Kay & J. 1; and see In re Tayleur, L. R. 6 Ch. 416.

§ 1158, 3 The sole ground of this jurisdiction in England was a condition of the law which does not exist in any American state, and no longer exists in that country. Until the statute creating the probate court (about 1857: 20 & 21 Vict., c. 77), there was no jurisdiction whatever to admit a will of land to probate; the only mode of testing the validity of such will was by an action of ejectment between the heir and devisee. If the devisee is in possession, he cannot, of course, bring an action of ejectment, but must await an action brought by the heir. For this reason, to enable the devisee to test the validity of the will at once, and to relieve him from the cloud hanging indefinitely over his title from the heir's adverse claim, the jurisdiction described in the text exists. No such reasons exist in this country. A will of land as well as one of personal property may be admitted to probate, and in some states the probate is conclusive upon all parties. The devisee can therefore, at any time, establish the validity of the will in the probate court, and is under no possible necessity of resorting to equity for such relief. On the contrary, the doctrine seems to be general, if not universal, throughout the states, that a court of equity will not recognize nor act upon a will of land or of personalty until it has been admitted to probate: b See cases cited ante, in note under § 1154.

§1158, (a) So held in In re Cilley, 58 Fed. 977, 986; Anderson v. Anderson, 112 N. Y. 104, 2 L. R. A. 175, 19 N. E. 427, citing the author's text and note. This note is also cited in McDaniel v. Pattison, (Cal.) 27 Pac. 651; Domestic & Foreign Miss. Soc. of the P. E. Church v. Eels, 68 Vt. 497, 54 Am. St. Rep. 888, 35 Atl. 463 (no jurisdiction to establish a lost will). See, also, Mather v. Minard, 260 Ill. 175, 102 N. E. 1062 (jurisdiction to establish a lost or destroyed will is exclusively in the probate court). In Missouri the statutes authorize a suit to contest a will, or

to establish one which has been rejected by the probate court. Although technically a suit at law, yet in many respects it partakes of the nature of a proceeding in chancery: Lilly v. Tobbein, 103 Mo. 477, 23 Am. St. Rep. 887, 15 S. W. 618.

As to the statutory jurisdiction to contest wills in Illinois, see Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, 233 Ill. 327, 122 Am. St. Rep. 169, 84 N. E. 256. § 1158, (b) Quoted in Pratt v. Hargreaves, 76 Miss. 955, 71 Am. St.

Rep. 551, 25 South. 658. See, also, Kaplan v. Coleman, 180 Ala. 267, 60 South. 885.

CHAPTER FOURTH. EQUITABLE ESTATES ARISING FROM CON-VERSION.

SECTION I.

THE CONVERSION OF REAL ESTATE INTO PERSONAL, AND OF PERSONAL ESTATE INTO REAL.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1159. Definition and general nature.
- § 1160. I. What words are sufficient to work a conversion.
- § 1161. The same; under a contract of sale.
- § 1162. II. Time from which the conversion takes effect.
- § 1163. The same; in contracts of sale with option.
- §1164. III. Effects of a conversion; land directed or agreed to be sold.
- § 1165. The same; money directed or agreed to be laid out in land.
- § 1166. Limitations on these effects.
- § 1167. Conversion by paramount authority; compulsory sale of land under statute; sale by order of court.
- § 1168. Conversion as between life tenant and remainder-man.

§ 1159. Definition and General Nature.^a—The fundamental principle that equity regards that as done which ought to be done, which underlies the doctrine of equitable conversion, and of which it is the most remarkable illustration, has been fully discussed and explained in a former volume.¹ Conversion has been briefly and accurately defined as "that change in the nature of property by which, for certain purposes, real estate is considered as personal,

§ 1159, 1 See ante, vol. 1, §§ 364-371.

§1159, (a) This chapter is cited in Llewellyn v. Llewellyn, 122 Mo. App. 467, 99 S. W. 809. This and the following sections are cited in Haward v. Peavey, 128 Ill. 430, 15 Am. St. Rep. 120, 21 N. E. 503. This section is cited in Clift v. Moses, 116 N. Y. 144, 22 N. E. 393; Carr v. Branch, 85 Va. 597, 8 S. E. 476; Sickles v. City of New Orleans, 80 Fed. 868, 26 C. C. A. 204; Hutchings v. Davis, 68 Ohio St. 160, 67 N. E. 251; Everett v. Griffin, (N. C.) 93 S. E. 474; Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill. 384, 95 N. E. 498.

and personal estate as real, and transmissible and descendible as such."²^c No express declaration in the instrument

§ 1159, ² See the more full definition given by Sir Thomas Sewell, M. R., in Fletcher v. Ashburner, 1 Brown Ch. 497, quoted ante, in § 371, and cases cited in note 2 thereunder. In Lorrillard v. Coster, 5 Paige, 172, 218, Chancellor Walworth thus described the doctrine: "Upon the principles of equitable conversion, money directed by the testator to be employed in the purchase of land, or land directed to be sold and turned into money, is in this court, for all the purposes of the will, considered as that species of property into which it is directed to be converted, so far as the purposes for which such conversion is directed to be made are legal, and can be carried into effect. The same principle is also applicable to the case of a direction in a will to sell one piece of land and to convert it into another. for the purposes of the will, by investing the proceeds of the sale in the purchase of such other lands, under a valid power in trust to make such sale and reinvestment. The whole doctrine of equitable conversion depends upon the well-established and familiar principle that a court of equity looks upon that as done which the parties to an agreement or marriage settlement have contracted to do, or which the testator by his will has directed to be done, so far as the contract of the parties, or the will of the decedent, could have been carried into effect without violating any equitable principle or rule of law." In addition to the cases cited under § 371, see the following illustrations of the general doctrine:^b Abbott v. Lee, 2 Vern.

§1159, (b) Matter of Corrington, 124 Ill. 363, 16 N. E. 252; Perkins v. Coughlan, 148 Mass. 30, 18 N. E. 600; Parker v. Glover, 42 N. J. Eq. 559, 9 Atl. 217; Robert v. Corning, 89 N. Y. 225; Delafield v. Barlow, 107 N. Y. 535, 14 N. E. 498; Greenland v. Waddell, 116 N. Y. 239, 15 Am. St. Rep. 400, 22 N. E. 367; Fraser v. Trustees, 124 N. Y. 480, 26 N. E. 1034. See, also, cases cited to §§ 1160-1166, and the following: In re Dunphy's Estate, 147 Cal. 95, 81 Pac. 315 (conversion of money into land by direction to invest); Weed v. Hoge, 85 Conn. 490, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 543, 83 Atl. 636; Darst v. Swearingen, 224 Ill. 229, 115 Am. St. Rep. 152, 79 N. E. 635; French v. Calkins, 252 Ill. 243, 96 N. E. 877; Walling v. Scott, 50 Ind.

App. 23, 96 N. E. 481, 97 N. E. 388; Ross v. Ware's Adm'rs, 131 Ky. 828, 116 S. W. 241; Collins v. Combs. 160 Ky. 325, 169 S. W. 721; Llewellyn v. Llewellyn, 122 Mo. App. 467, 99 S. W. 809; Barnard v. Keathley, 230 Mo. 209, 130 S. W. 306; Ackerman v. Ackerman, 81 N. J. Eq. 437, 86 Atl. 542; Keen v. Plume, 82 N. J. Eq. 526, 90 Atl. 1027; Re Caldwell, 188 N. Y. 115, 80 N. E. 663; In re Earnshaw, 196 N. Y. 230, 89 N. E. 825; Haywood v. Wachovia L. & T. Co., 149 N. C. 208, 62 S. E. 915; Phifer v. Phifer, 157 N. C. 221, 72 S. E. 1006; Sears v. Scranton Trust

§ 1159, (c) The text is quoted in Geiger v. Bitzer, 80 Ohio St. 65, 17 Ann. Cas. 151, 22 L. B. A. (N. S.) 285, 88 N. E. 134.

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is needed that land shall be treated as money although not sold, or that money shall be deemed land although not actually laid out in the purchase of land. The only essential requisite is an absolute expression of an intention that the land *shall* be sold and turned into money, or that the money *shall* be expended in the purchase of land. If this intention is sufficiently expressed, the circumstance that the land has not yet been sold and turned into money, or that the money has not yet been laid out in land, is the very condition of

284; Symons v. Rutter, 2 Vern. 227; Lancy v. Fairechild, 2 Vern. 101; Kettlehy v. Atwood, 1 Vern. 298; Annand v. Honeywood, 1 Vern. 345; Lingen v. Sowray, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 175; 1 P. Wms. 172; Edwards v. Countess of Warwick, 2 P. Wms. 171, 175, and note; Chaplin v. Horner, 1 P. Wms. 483; Green v. Smith, 1 Atk. 572; Walker v. Denne, 2 Ves. 170; Griffith v. Ricketts, 7 Hare, 299; Taylor v. Taylor, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 190; Holland v. Cruft, 3 Gray, 162, 180; Prentice v. Janssen, 79 N. Y. 478; Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 602, 35 Am. Rep. 550; Van Vechten v. Keator, 63 N. Y. 52; Moncrief v. Ross, 50 N. Y. 431; White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144; Hood v. Hood, 85 N. Y. 561; Delaney v. McCormack, 88 N. Y. 174; Wells v. Wells, 88 N. Y. 323; Lawrence v. Elliott, 3 Redf. 235; Klock v. Buell, 56 Barb. 398; Arnold v. Gilbert, 5 Barb. 190; Pleasants's Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 356; Eby's Appeal, 84 Pa. St. 241; McClure's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 414; Jones v. Caldwell, 97 Pa. St. 42; Page's Estate, 75 Pa. St. 87; Brolasky v. Gally's Ex'rs, 51 Pa. St. 509; Estate of Dobson, 11 Phila. 81; Estate of McAvoy, 12 Phila. 83; Parkinson's Appeal, 32 Pa. St. 455; Burr v. Sim, 1 Whart. 252, 29 Am. Dec. 48; Cook's Ex'r v. Cook's Adm'r, 20 N. J. Eq. 375; Smith v. Bayright, 34 N. J. Eq. 424; Scudder's Ex'rs v. Vanarsdale, 13 N. J. Eq. 109; Orrick v. Boehm, 49 Md. 72; Lynn v. Gephart, 27 Md. 547, 563; Thomas v. Wood, 1 Md. Ch. 296; Ex parte McBee, 63 N. C. 332; Tayloe v. Johnson, 63 N. C. 381; Masterson v. Pullen, 62 Ala. 145; High v. Worley, 33 Ala. 196; Succession of Gamble, 23 La. Ann. 9; Collins v. Champ's Heirs, 15 B. Mon. 118, 61 Am. Dec. 179; Green v. Johnson, 4 Bush, 164, 167; Hocker v. Gentry, 3 Met. (Ky.) 463; Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70; 1 N. W. 92; 50 N. W. 1103; Gould v. Taýlor Orphan Asylum, 46 Wis. 106; 50 N. W. 422; Janes v. Throckmorton, 57 Cal. 368; Hilton v. Hilton, 2 McAr. 70.

Co., 228 Pa. St. 126, 20 Ann. Cas. 1145, 77 Atl. 423; Koehne v. Beattie, 36 R. I. 316, 90 Atl. 211; In re Adams, 32 R. I. 41, 78 Atl. 524; Mowry v. Taft, 36 R. I. 427, 90 Atl. 815; Mattison v. Stone, 90 S. C. 146,
72 S. E. 991; Spencer v. Lyman, 27
S. D. 471, 131 S. W. 802; Hardin v.
Hassell, 118 Tenn. 143, 100 S. W.
720.

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fact in which the doctrine of conversion comes into play, to which the maxim, Equity regards that as done which ought to be done, applies.³ The true test in all such cases is a simple one: Has the will or deed creating the trust absolutely directed, or has the contract stipulated, that the real estate be turned into personal or the personal estate be turned into real? As this doctrine of conversion is wholly a creation of equity jurisprudence, the estates or interests which result from it are purely equitable, and of equitable cognizance alone.^d Equity has exclusive jurisdiction of suits to maintain and protect such interests, except where, in this country, the doctrine, as it affects the devolution of property, is recognized and followed by the probate courts

§1159, 3 In Lechmere v. Earl of Carlisle, 3 P. Wms. 211, 215, Sir Joseph Jekyll said: "The forbearance of the trustees in not doing what it was their office to have done shall in no sort prejndice the cestuis que trustent, since at that rate it would be in the power of trustees, either by doing or delaying to do their duty, to affect the right of other persons; which can never be maintained. Wherefore the rule in all such cases is, that what ought to have been done shall be taken as done; and a rule so powerful it is as to alter the very nature of things,---to make money land, and on the contrary, to turn land into money. Thus money articled to be laid out in land shall be taken as land, and descend to the heir, and on the other hand, land agreed to be sold shall be considered as personal estate." In Scudamore v. Scudamore, Prec. Ch. 543, where a sum of money had been bequeathed to be laid out in the purchase of land, Lord Macclesfield said: "If the purchase had been made, it [i. e., the land] must have gone to the heir; but if the trustee, by delaying the purchase, may alter the right and give it to the executors, this would be to make it the trustee's will, and not the will of the first testator, which would be very unreasonable and inconvenient." From the general definition given in the text, and from the foregoing extracts, and in fact from all the decisions upon the subject, it is plain that an equitable conversion, and the equitable estates or interests arising therefrom, can only exist while the directions of the will or deed or the stipulations of the contract remain, to some extent at least, executory and unperformed; there can be no place for the operation of the doctrine, after these directions or stipulations have been fully carried into effect and completely executed.

§1159, (d) Watson v. McLench, 416. The text is quoted in Bartlett 57 Or. 446, 110 Pac. 482, 112 Pac. v. Gill, 221 Fed. 476.

in the settlement and distribution of decedents' estates. The practical questions growing out of the operation of the doctrine are generally connected with the devolution inheritance or succession—of the property converted upon the death of the person for whose benefit it was originally given, or with his transfer of it by assignment, or with the claims to it of third parties.⁴

§1159, 4 For illustration, if money had been given by will or deed to trustees upon trust to purchase land therewith and convey the same to A in fee, and A died before the trustees had made the purchase, and while the money was in their hands, the important question as to A's interest would for the first time practically arise: Was that interest real estate, so that it descended to A's heirs if he died intestate? or was it personal estate, so that it devolved upon his administrator? Would it pass by a general bequest of personal property, or by a general devise of lands? If A was a married man, was his widow entitled to dower in it? If A was a married woman, was her husband entitled to curtesy? Where the parties to a contract for the sale of land die before execution, are the vendee's heirs or his personal representatives entitled to the benefit of the agreement? Does the purchase-money, when paid, belong to the heirs or to the administrators of the vendor? These are the kinds of questions which are determined hy the doctrine of conversion; and their solution depends upon the nature of the estates resulting from the operation of that doctrine upon the interests of the original parties to the will, deed, or contract. No other doctrine is perhaps more important in the equity jurisprudence of England, both because such trusts by wills, deeds, and family settlements are there very frequent, and because the common-law difference hetween the descent of land and the succession of personal property is still preserved in all of its integrity. The applications of the doctrine to settlements often give rise to questions of great difficulty. In our own country the doctrine is theoretically adopted in all the states; but its applications are much less frequent and more simple than in England. With us, trust estates and family settlements are comparatively very few, and the tendency of modern legislation in many of the states is toward a uniformity in the rules of law which regulates the descent of lands and the devolution of personal property. In a few of the states the difference has been completely abolished, and both real and personal estate devolve in the same proportions to the same parties. It necessarily follows that many of the questions connected with conversion of the most frequent occurrence and of the highest importance in England are practically unknown in this country, and need nothing more than a hare mention or even allusion in a treatise upon the American equity jurisprudence.

§ 1160. I. What Words are Sufficient to Effect a Conversion.-The whole scope and meaning of the fundamental principle underlying the doctrine are involved in the existence of a *duty* resting upon the trustees or other parties to do the specified act; for unless the equitable ought exists, there is no room for the operation of the maxim, Equity regards that as done which ought to be done.¹ The rule is therefore firmly settled, that in order to work a conversion while the property is yet actually unchanged in form, there) must be a clear and imperative direction in the will, deed, or settlement, or a clear imperative agreement in the contract, to convert the property,-that is, to sell the land for money/ or to lay out the money in the purchase of land.^a If the act of converting-that is, the act itself of selling the land or of laying out the money in land—is left to the option, discretion, or choice of the trustees or other parties, then no equitable conversion will take place, because no duty to make the change rests upon them.^{2 b} It is not essential,

§ 1160, 1 See ante, §§ 364, 365.

§ 1160, ² It should he carefully noticed that the option or discretion spoken of in this rule means an option with respect to the very act of changing the form of the property. If the option is *merely as to the time* when this shall be done, a conversion may take place, as will be more fully stated hereafter. The general rule of the text is illustrated by the following cases: ^c Curling v. May, cited 3 Atk. 255 (the leading case); Polley v.

§ 1160, (a) The text is quoted in West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Miller, 176 Fed. 284, 100 C. C. A.
176; Bartlett v. Gill, 221 Fed. 476; Flomerfelt v. Siglin, 155 Ala. 633, 130 Am. St. Rep. 67, 47 South. 106.
§ 1160, (b) This section is cited to this effect in Mills v. Harris, 104 N.
C. 626, 10 S. E. 704; Swisher v.
Swisher, 157 Iowa, 55, 137 N. W.
1076; Coyne v. Davis, 98 Neb. 763, 154 N. W. 547; and quoted in Bartlett v. Gill, 221 Fed. 476; Flomerfelt v. Siglin, 155 Ala. 633, 130 Am. St.
Rep. 67, 47 South. 106; Maxwell v. Barringer, 110 N. C. 76, 28 Am. St. Rep. 668, 14 S. E. 516.

§ 1160, (c) No Conversion Where Sale is Optional With Trustee.—In re L'Hommedieu, 138 Fed. 606; Christopher v. Mungen, 61 Fla. 513, 534, 55 South. 273; Haward v. Peavy, 128 III. 430, 15 Am. St. Rep. 120, 21 N. E. 503; Ducker v. Burnham, 146 III. 9, 37 Am. St. Rep. 135, 25 L. E. A. 746, 34 N. E. 558; De Lashmutt v. Teetor, 261 Mo. 412, 169 S. W. 34; McKiernan v. McKiernan, (N. J. Eq.) 74 Atl. 289; Meeker v. Forbes, 84 N. J. Eq. 271, 93 Atl. § 1160

however, that the direction should be express, in order to

Seymour, 2 Younge & C. 708; Swann v. Fonnereau, 3 Ves. 41; Amler v. Amler, 3 Ves. 583; Van v. Barnett, 19 Ves. 102; Bourne v. Bourne, 2 Hare, 35; Grieveson v. Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653; Lucas v. Brandreth, 28 Beav. 273; Smithwick v. Smithwick, 12 Ir. Ch. Rep. 181; De Beauvoir v. De Beauvoir, 3 H. L. Cas. 524, 548; Greenway v. Greenway, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 128; Wall v. Colshead, 2 De Gex & J. 683; Rich v. Whitfield, L. R. 2 Eq. 583; Hood v. Hood, 85 N. Y. 561; Prentice v. Janssen, 79 N. Y. 478; Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 602, 35 Am. Rep. 550; Fisher v. Banta, 66 N. Y. 468; Moncrief v. Ross, 50 N. Y. 431; White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144; Lawrence v. Elliott, 3 Redf. 235; Dominick v. Michael, 4 Sand. 374; Peterson's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 397; Jones v. Caldwell, 97 Pa. St. 42; McClure's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 414; Miller's and Bowman's Appeal, 60 Pa. St. 404; Estate of Dobson, 11 Phila, 81; Chew v. Nicklin, 45 Pa. St. 84; Anewalt's Appeal, 42 Pa. St. 414; Bleight v. Manufacturers' etc. Bank, 10 Pa. St. 131; Cook's Ex'r v. Cook's Adm'r, 20 N. J. Eq. 375; Pratt v. Taliaferro, 3 Leigh, 419; Hilton v. Hilton, 2 McAr. 70; Montgomery v. Milliken, Smedes & M. Ch. 495; Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70, 1 N. W. 92; 50 N. W. 1103; Gould v. Taylor Orphan Asylum, 46 Wis. 106, 50 N. W. 422; Janes v. Throckmorton, 57 Cal. 368. Whenever trustees are clothed with a discretion and exercise it, and thus actually make a conversion, the property will, in general, pass in the nature and form to which they have converted it:^d Bourne

887; Isenburg v. Rose, (N. J. Eq.) 99 Atl. 615; Chamberlain v. Taylor, 105 N. Y. 185, 11 N. E. 625; Scholle v. Scholle, 113 N. Y. 261, 21 N. E. 84; Clift v. Moses, 116 N. Y. 144, 22 N. E. 393; Matter of McComb, 117 N. Y. 378, 22 N. E. 1070; Coann v. Culver, 188 N. Y. 9, 80 N. E. 362; Mills v. Harris, 104 N. C. 626, 10 S. E. 704; In re Cooper's Estate, 206 Pa. St. 628, 98 Am. St. Rep. 799, 56 Atl. 67 (direction to lease if it could be done to advantage, otherwise to sell); Perot's Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 235; Hunt's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 128; Sheridan v. Sheridan, 136 Pa. St. 14, 19 Atl. 1068; Greenough v. Small, 137 Pa. St. 131, 20 Atl. 396, 553; In re Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. St. 367, 64 Atl. 554; In re Henszey's Estate, 220 Pa. St. 212, 69 Atl. 676; Dunshee v. Dunshee, 234 Pa. St. 550, 83 Atl. 422; In re Murray's Estate, 234 Pa. St. 520, 83 Atl. 473; In re Marr's Estate, 240 Pa. St. 38, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 167, 87 Atl. 621; In re Chamberlain's Estate, 257 Pa. St. 113, 101 Atl. 314; Bedford v. Bedford, 110 Tenn. 204, 75 S. W. 1017; Bennett v. Gallaher, 115 Tenn. 568, 92 S. W. 66; Ford v. Ford, 70 Wis. 19, 5 Am. St. Rep. 117, 33 N. W. 188; In re Stark's Will, 149 Wis. 631, 134 N. W. 389.

§ 1160, (d) Appeal of Gardner, 81 Conn. 171, 70 Atl. 653; Meeker v. Forbes, 84 N. J. Eq. 271, 93 Atl. 887; Martin v. Kimball, 86 N. J. Eq. 10, 96 Atl. 565; Lent v. Howard, 69 N. Y. 169; Personeni v. Goodale, 199 N. Y. 323, 92 N. E. 754; compare In re Alabone's Estate, 75 N. J. Eq. be imperative; it may be necessarily implied.^g Where a power to convert is given without words of command, so that there is an appearance of discretion, if the trusts or limitations are of a description exclusively applicable to one species of property, this circumstance is sufficient to outweigh the appearance of an option, and to render the whole imperative.^h Thus if a power is given to lay out money in land, but the limitations expressed are applicable only to land, this will show an intention that the money should be so laid out, and will amount to an imperative direction to convert, for otherwise the terms of the instrument could not be carried into effect.³ In fact, the whole result depends upon the intention. If by express language,

v. Bourne, 2 Hare, 35; In re Ibbitson's Estate, L. R. 7 Eq. 226; Rich v. Whitfield, L. R. 2 Eq. 583; Lawrence v. Elliott, 3 Redf. 235; Van Vechten v. Keator, 63 N. Y. 52; White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144. Mere discretion as to the time or manner of effecting the sale does not prevent a conversion from taking place:^e Stagg v. Jackson, 1 N. Y. 206; Tazewell v. Smith's Adm'r, 1 Rand. 313, 10 Am. Dec. 533; but see Christler's Ex'r v. Meddis, 6 B. Mon. 35. Money directed to be laid out in land with consent or on request, and not without, is not converted until consent is given or request made: Davies v. Goodhew, 6 Sim. 585; Sykes v. Sheard, 33 Beav. 114;^f but consent must not be withheld from improper or interested motives: Lord v. Wightwick, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 803.

§ 1160, ³ Earlom v. Saunders, Amb. 241; Johnson v. Arnold, 1 Ves. Sr. 169; Hereford v. Ravenhill, 5 Beav. 51; Simpson v. Ashworth, 6 Beav. 412; Cowley v. Hartstonge, 1 Dow, 361; Cookson v. Cookson, 12 Clark

527, 72 Atl. 427; Mellon v. Reed, 123 Pa. St. 1, 15 Atl. 906; Bell v. Bell, 25 S. C. 149; Ford v. Ford, 70 Wis. 19, 5 Am. St. Rep. 117, 33 N. W. 188. There is, in such case, no conversion until the sale takes place; if, therefore, the beneficiary dies before that time, the proceeds of the sale go, as land, to his heir; In re Dyson (Challinor v. Sykes), [1910] 1 Ch. 750; Meeker v. Forbes, 84 N. J. Eq. 271, 93 Atl. 887; In re Henszey's Estate, 220 Pa. St. 212, 69 Atl. 676.

§ 1160, (e) See, also, Lambert v. Morgan, 110 Md. 1, 132 Am. St. Rep. 412, 17 Ann. Cas. 439, 72 Atl. 407; Johnson v. Lee, 228 Ill. 167, 81 N. E. 834.

§1160, (f) See, also, In re Goswell's Trusts, [1915] 2 Ch. 106.

§ 1160, (g) The text is quoted in Bartlett v. Gill, 221 Fed. 476; Flomerfelt v. Siglin, 155 Ala. 633, 130 Am. St. Rep. 67, 47 South. 106.

§ 1160, (h) The text is quoted in Stake v. Mobley, 102 Md. 408, 62 Atl. 963; Flomerfelt v. Siglin, 155 Ala. 633, 130 Am. St. Rep. 67, 47 South. 106. or by a reasonable construction of all its terms, the instrument shows an intention that the original form of the property shall be changed, then a conversion necessarily takes place.^{4 i}

& F. 121; De Beauvoir v. De Beauvoir, 3 H. L. Cas. 524; In the Matter of De Lancey, L. R. 5 Ex. 102; Atwell v. Atwell, L. R. 13 Eq. 23; Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 602, 35 Am. Rep. 550.

\$ 1160, 4 Thornton v. Hawley, 10 Ves. 129; Davies v. Goodhew, 6 Sim. 585; Burrell v. Baskerfield, 11 Beav. 525; Cornick v. Pearce, 7 Hare, 477; Mower v. Orr, 7 Hare, 473; Fisher v. Banta, 66 N. Y. 468; Dodge v. Pond, 23 N. Y. 69; Stagg v. Jackson, 1 N. Y. 206; Wurts's Ex'rs v. Page, 19 N. J. Eq. 365; Page's Estate, 75 Pa. St. 87; Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70, 1 N. W. 92, 50 N. W. 1103; Gould v. Taylor Orphan Asylum, 46 Wis. 106, 50 N. W. 422; and see cases in the two preceding notes.

§1160, (i) Conversion, Where Duty to Sell is Implied .-- Quoted in In re Pforr's Estate, 144 Cal. 121, 77 Pac. 825; West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Miller, 176 Fed. 284, 100 C. C. A. 176; Flomerfelt v. Siglin, 155 Ala. 633, 130 Am. St. Rep. 67, 47 South. 106; Stake v. Mobley, 102 Md. 408, 62 Atl. 963. The text is cited in Grove v. Willard, 280 Ill. 247, 117 N. E. 489. See, also, Ramsey v. Hanlon, 33 Fed. 425; Brown v. Miner, 261 Ill. 543, 104 N. E. 150; Crane v. Crane, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 82, 105 S. W. 370 (fund for distribution created from blended realty and personalty); Boyce v. Kelso Home for Orphans of M. E. Church, 107 Md. 190, 68 Atl. 550 (fund for distribution created from blended realty and personalty); Greenman v. McVey, 126 Minn. 21, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 430, 147 N. W. 812; Willits v. Conklin, 88 Neb. 805, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 321, 130 N. W. 757; Harris v. Ingalls, 74 N. H. 339, 68 Atl. 34 (direction to convert implied from direction to divide the property); Roy v. Monroe, 47 N. J. Eq. 356, 20 Atl. 481; Schlereth v. Schlereth, 173 N. Y. 444, 93 Am. St. Rep. 616, 66

N. E. 130; Lent v. Howard, 89 N. Y. 169; Asche v. Asche, 113 N. Y. 233, 21 N. E. 70; Lee v. Baird, 132 N. C. 755, 44 S. E. 605; Penfield v. Tower, 1 N. D. 216, 46 N. W. 413; Hunt's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 128; Fahnestock v. Fahnestock, 152 Pa. St. 56, 34 Am. St. Rep. 623, 25 Atl. 313; Mellon v. Reed, 123 Pa. St. 14, 15 Atl. 906; Estate of Mustin, 194 Pa. St. 437, 75 Am. St. Rep. 702, 45 Atl. 313; In re Severns's Estate, 211 Pa. St. 65, 60 Atl. 492; In re Tasker's Estate, 215 Pa. St. 267, 64 Atl. 527 (blending of real and personal estate); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 226 Pa. St. 249, 75 Atl. 420 (same); Battenfeld v. Kline, 228 Pa. St. 91, 77 Atl. 416; Martin v. Provident Life & Trust Co., 235 Pa. St. 281, 83 Atl. 713 (no conversion); In re Bergdoll's Estate, 258 Pa. St. 108, 101 Atl. 950; King v. King, 13 R. I. 501; Clarke v. Clarke, 46 S. C. 230, 57 Am. St. Rep. 675, 24 S. E. 202; Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 76 Am. St. Rep. 924, 50 L. R. A. 307, 82 N. W. 345; Ford v. Ford, 70 Wis. 19, 5 Am. St. Rep. 117, 33 N. W. 188; In re Benner v. Mauer, 133 Wis. 325, 113 N. W. 663; Williams v. Williams, 135 Wis. 60, § 1161. Under a Contract of Sale.—A contract of sale, if all the terms are agreed upon, also operates as a conversion of the property, the vendor becoming a trustee of the estate for the purchaser, and the purchaser a trustee of the purchase-money for the vendor.^{1 a} In order to work a conversion, the contract must be valid and binding, free from inequitable imperfections, and such as a court of equity will specifically enforce against an unwilling purchaser.^{2 b} The fact that the contract of purchase is entirely at the option of the purchaser does not prevent its working a conversion, if he avails himself of the option.³

§ 1162. II. Time from Which the Conversion Takes Effect.—This, like all other questions of intention, must ultimately depend upon the provisions of the particular instrument. The instrument might in express terms contain an absolute direction to sell or to purchase at some specified

§ 1161, ¹ Green v. Smith, 1 Atk. 572; Pollexfen v. Moore, 3 Atk. 272; Atcherley v. Vernon, 10 Mod. 518; Masterson v. Pullen, 62 Ala. 145; and see *ante*, §§ 368, 372, and cases cited.

§ 1161, ² Garnett v. Acton, 28 Beav. 333; Ingle v. Richards, 28 Beav. 361. Nevertheless, it has been held that a verhal contract by an owner in fee who dies intestate before it is performed, if adopted by his heir voluntarily, and not under a mistake, will effect a conversion *retrospectively*, and the purchase-money will belong to the next of kin: Frayne v. Taylor, 10 Jur., N. S., 119.

§ 1161, ³ Lawes v. Bennett, 1 Cox, 167; Townley v. Bedwell, 14 Ves. 591; Collingwood v. Row, 3 Jur., N. S., 785; for further on the subject of such optional contracts, see *post*, § 1163.

115 N. W. 342; Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., 82 N. J. Eq. 323, 87 Atl. 222; but such intention must clearly appear, especially when no express power to sell is contained in the will: Hobson v. Hale, 95 N. Y. 588, and cases cited; Hale v. Hale, 125 Ill. 399, 17 N. E. 470; Appeal of Clarke, 70 Conn. 195, 39 Atl. 155 ("It is not enough to manifest an intent that lands shall pass as money, unless there is also, either in terms or by implication, a grant of III---173 the means of turning it into money"); St. John's German Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Dippoldsmann, 118 Md. 242, 84 Atl. 373.

§ 1161, (a) See *post*, §§ 1260, 1261, 1406. See, also, Clapp v. Tower, 11 N. D. 556, 93 N. W. 862.

§1161, (b) Quoted in Mills v. Harris, 104 N. C. 626, 10 S. E. 704, and in Flomerfelt v. Siglin, 155 Ala. 633, 130 Am. St. Rep. 67, 47 South. 106. future time; and if it created a trust to sell upon the happening of a specified event, which might or might not happen, then the conversion would only take place from the time of the happening of that event, but would take place when the event happened exactly as though there had been an absolute direction to sell at that time.^{1 a} Subject to this general modification, the rule is settled that a conversion takes place in wills as from the death of the testator, and in deeds, and other instruments *inter vivos*, as from the date of their execution.^{2 b}

§ 1162, ¹ Ward v. Arch, 15 Sim. 389; Polley v. Seymour, 2 Younge & C. 708; Moncrief v. Ross, 50 N. Y. 431; McClure's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 414.

§ 1162, ² Wills: ^c Beauclerk v. Mead, 2 Atk. 167; Fisher v. Banta, 66 N. Y. 468; Cook's Ex'r v. Cook's Adm'r, 20 N. J. Eq. 375; Jones v. Caldwell, 97 Pa. St. 42; McClure's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 414,

§ 1162, (a) The text is quoted in Flomerfelt v. Siglin, 155 Ala. 633, 130 Am. St. Rep. 67, 47 South. 106; Bennett v. Gallaher, 115 Tenn. 568, 92 S. W. 66. See, also, Massey v. Modawell, 73 Ala. 421; Bank of Ukiah v. Rice, 143 Cal. 265, 101 Am. St. Rep. 118, 76 Pac. 1020; Keller v. Harper, 64 Md. 74, 1 Atl. 65; Elliott v. Loftin, 160 N. C. 361, 76 S. E. 236 (land not to be sold till youngest child came of age).

§1162, (b) The text is quoted in Flomerfelt v. Siglin, 155 Ala. 633, 130 Am. St. Rep. 67, 47 South. 106; Bennett v. Gallaher, 115 Tenn. 568, 92 S. W. 66. This section is cited to this effect in Underwood v. Curtis, 127 N. Y. 523, 28 N. E. 585; Carr v. Branch, 85 Va. 597, 8 S. E. 476 (wills); Greenman v. McVey, 126 Minn. 21, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 430, 147 N. W. 812; Bartlett v. Gill, 221 Fed. 476; Grove v. Willard, 280 Ill. 247, 117 N. E. 489; and cited, generally, in Stubbs v. Pitts, 84 Ark. 160, 104 S. W. 1110. In Bennett v. Gallaher, 115 Tenn. 568, 92 S. W. 66 (quoting this paragraph of the text), the widow was authorized to distribute the land *in specie* during her lifetime, and a sale was directed at her death; no conversion took place at the time of the testator's death, since the sale directed by the will depended on the contingency that there should be land left to be sold.

§ 1162, (c) Wills: Conversion from Death of Testator .--- Morris v. Griffiths, 26 Ch. Div. 601; Doughty v. Bull, 2 P. Wms. 320;- Ramsey v. Hanlon, 33 Fed. 425; Appeal of Emery, 83 Conn. 235, 76 Atl. 529; Lash v. Lash, 209 Ill. 595, 70 N. E. 1049; Maginn v. McDevitt, 269 Ill. 196, 109 N. E. 1038 (direction to sell at end of ten years); In re Miller's Will, 128 Iowa, 612, 105 N. W. 105; Beaver v. Ross, 140 Iowa, 154, 17 Ann. Cas. 640, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 65, and note, 118 N. W. 287; Collins v. Combs, 160 Ky. 325, 169 S. W. 721 (deed; conversion immediate); Reiff v. Strite, 54 Md. 298; Lambert v. Morgan, 110 Md. 1, 132 Am. St. Rep. 412, 17 Ann. Cas. 439, 72 Atl.

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§1163. Time in Contracts of Sale With Option.—In contracts of sale upon the purchaser's option, the question whether or not a conversion is effected at all cannot, of course, be determined until the purchaser exercises his

Deeds:^d Griffith v. Ricketts, 7 Hare, 299, 311; Clarke v. Franklin, 4 Kay & J. 257; Hewitt v. Wright, 1 Brown Ch. 86. In Griffith v. Ricketts, supra, Wigram, V. C., explained the rule and its operation as follows: "A deed differs from a will in this material respect: the will speaks from the death, the deed from delivery. If, then, the author of the deed impresses upon bis real estate the character of personalty, that, as between his real and personal representatives, makes it personal, and not real, estate from the delivery of the deed, and consequently at the time of his death. The deed thus altering the actual character of the property is, so to speak, equivalent to a gift of the expectancy of the heir at law to the personal

407; Griffith v. Witten, 252 Mo. 627, 161 S. W. 708; Coyne v. Davis, 98 Neb. 763, 154 N. W. 547 (although time of sale is postponed); Dutton v. Pugh, 45 N. J. Eq. 426, 18 Atl. 207; Snover v. Squire, (N. J. Eq.) 24 Atl. 365; Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., 82 N. J. Eq. 323, 87 Atl. 222; Lent v. Howard, 89 N. Y. 169; Underwood v. Curtis, 127 N. Y. 523, 28 N. E. 585; Clifton v. Owens, 170 N. C. 607, 87 S. E. 502; Wood v. Pehrsson, 21 N. D. 357, 130 N. W. 1010; Estate of Mustin, 194 Pa. St. 437, 75 Am. St. Rep. 702, 45 Atl. 313; Carr v. Branch, 85 Va. 597, 8 S. E. 476; Lynch v. Spicer, 53 W. Va. 426, 44 S. E. 255; Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 76 Am. St. Rep. 924, 50 L. R. A. 307, 82 N. W. 345; Mangan v. Shea, 158 Wis. 619, 149 N. W. 378. In Bates v. Spooner, 75 Conn. 501, 54 Atl. 305, a will directed the executors to sell the real estate as soon as it could "be done in the exercise of their best business judgment." The court held that the conversion, for the purposes of succession, is to be regarded as if it were completely effected at the testator's decease. See, also, Jones

v. Probate Court, (B. I.) 55 Atl. 881 (to sell as soon as convenient). In Boland v. Tiernay, 118 Iowa, 59, 91 N. W. 836, a direction to sell when the youngest grandchild should attain the age of twenty-five years was held to work a conversion, for the purpose of distribution, from the date of the testator's death. In the following cases a direction in the will to sell on the death of a life tenant worked a conversion from the date of the testator's death: Iglehart v. Iglehart, 26 App. D. C. 209, 6 Ann. Cas. 732; Nelson v. Nelson, 36 Ind. App. 331, 75 N. E. 679; Miller's Ex'r v. Sageser, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 837, 99 S. W. 913; Cropper v. Gaar's Ex'r, 151 Ky. 376, L. R. A. 1916B, 1139, 151 S. W. 913; Johrden v. Pond, 126 Minn. 247, 148 N. W. 112 (on death of remainder-man, his interest goes to his next of kin); Security Trust Co. v. Lovett, 78 N. J. Eq. 445, 79 Atl. 616, but see Comer v. Light, 175 Ind. 367, 93 N. E. 660, 94 N. E. 325, reversing (Ind. App.) 92 N. E. 344.

§ 1162, (d) See, also, Dana v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 227 Mass. 562, 116 N. E. 941. option; but the moment when he *does* exercise it, the conversion, as between parties claiming title under the vendor, *relates back* to the time of the execution of the contract.^a Thus where a lessee with an option to purchase—or any other purchaser with an option—duly declares his option after the death of the lessor or vendor, who is the owner

estate of the author of the deed. The principle is the same in the case of a deed as in the case of a will; but the application is different, by reason that the deed converts the property in the lifetime of the author of the deed, whereas in the case of a will the conversion does not take place until the death of the testator, and there is no principle on which the court, as between the real and personal representatives (between whom there is confessedly no equity), should not be governed by the simple effect of the deed in deciding to which of the two elaimants the surplus belongs." In Clarke v. Franklin, supra, Wood, V. C., after referring to Hewitt v. Wright, which was a case of conversion of land into personalty, said: "The doctrine of the converse case of personalty directed by deed or will to be converted into land is fully discussed by Lord Eldon in Wheldale v. Partridge, 8 Ves. 227, where, upon the special terms of the instrument, it was held not to be one which upon its execution clothed the property with real uses; but Lord Eldon said that but for those special provisions, and if there had been nothing more in the deed, the 'property would, immediately upon the execution of the deed, have been impressed with real qualities and clothed with real nses, and the money would have been land'; clearly recognizing the rule that conversion takes effect from the moment of the execution of the deed; and the rights of the parties and the character in which the property is taken by them are to be determined according to that conversion. The principle of these authorities is therefore clearly settled; and where, as bere, real estate is settled by deed upon trust to sell for certain specified purposes, and one of those purposes fails, there, whether the trust for sale is to arise in the lifetime of the settlor or not until after his decease, the property to that extent results to the settlor as personality from the moment the deed is executed."

It should be observed, however, that mortgages, although containing trusts for sale, or powers in trust to sell, constitute an exception to the general rule that such deeds work a conversion from the date of their execution, since the real object of mortgages is simply to raise money and secure the repayment thereof, and not to effect a devolution of the property: Wright v. Rose, 2 Sim. & St. 323; Bourne v. Bourne, 2 Hare, 35; Jones v. Davies, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 205.

§1163, (a) The text is quoted in Hogg v. McGuffin, 67 W. Va. 456, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 491, 68 S E. 41.

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in fee, the realty is thereby converted *retrospectively* as between those claiming under the lessor or vendor, or under his will; that is, as between the heir or devisee on one side and the legatees or next of kin on the other, the proceeds will go to his personal representatives, though the heir or devisee will be entitled to the rents up to the time when the option is declared.^{1 b} It should be carefully

§1163, 1 Lawes v. Bennett, 1 Cox, 167; Townley v. Bedwell, 14 Ves. 591; Collingwood v, Row, 3 Jur., N. S., 785; Goold v. Teague, 5 Jur., N. S., 116; Weeding v. Weeding, 1 Johns. & H. 424; Woods v. Hyde, 31 L. J. Ch. 295; Ex parte Hardy, 30 Beav. 206; Drant v. Vause, 1 Younge & C. Ch. 580; Emuss v. Smith, 2 De Gex & S. 722; D'Arras v. Keyser, 26 Pa. St. 249; Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. St. 112, 114, 53 Am. Dec. 526. The cases of Drant v. Vause, and Emuss v. Smith may seem to be opposed to this rule, but they were decided upon their very special facts, and their true meaning is explained in Weeding v. Weeding.c This rule is plainly one which may operate very harshly, since the option might not be declared until possibly years after the vendor's death, and its correctness upon principle has been doubted by the ablest judges. It has recently been decided that it shall not be extended, that its operation is confined to the question of conversion as between the heir or devisee of the vendor and his personal representatives, and that it does not apply as between the vendor and purchaser themselves; as

§1163, (b) In re Isaacs, [1894] 3 Ch. 506. In the very recent case of In re Marlay (Rutland v. Bury), [1915] 2 Ch. 264, the court of appeal again reviewed the cases involving the dectrine of Lawes v. Bennett, and came to the conclusion (p. 275) that "the true view is that the heir or devisee has an estate in fee defeasible on the exercise of the option; in no other way can his right to the rents and profits until the option has been exercised be supported." Chas. J. Smith Co. v. Andersen, 84 N. J. Fq. 681, 95 Atl. 358, favored the doctrine, but found it unnecessary to the decision of the case. The dectrine has been rejected in several American cases: See Adams v. Peabody Coal Co., 230 111. 469, 82 N. E. 645; Ingraham v. Chandler, (Iowa) 161 N. W. 434 (a strong opinion, pointing out that the dectrine gives the helder of the option an unfair and wholly unintended advantage; he is in a position to demand concessions from the personal representative as the price for exercising, or from the heir or devisee as the price for not exercising, the option).

§ 1163, (c) These cases, with In re Pyle, [1895] 1 Ch. 725, establish the rule that when the testator, by a subsequent will, knowing of the existence of the contract, devises the specific property which is the subject of the contract, without referring in any way to the contract, an intention is indicated to give the devisee all the interest, whatever it may be, that the testator had in it. observed, however, that this rule is confined to conversion as between the parties claiming title under the vendor or lessor,—his heirs or devisees, or his legatees, next of kin, and personal representatives,—and does not apply as between the vendor and purchaser themselves.²

§ 1164. III. Effects of a Conversion—Land Directed or Agreed to be Sold.—So far as is necessary to carry out the lawful purposes of the instrument, will, deed, settlement, or contract, and to determine the property rights of all parties claiming under or through it, equity follows the doctrine into all of its legitimate consequences, and treats the property, from the time at which the conversion takes place, as to all intents of the kind and form into which it should have been changed, and determines the rights of parties to it as in that kind and form.¹ Land directed or agreed to be sold, although yet unsold, is regarded and treated as money. It will not pass under a devise of land or of real estate.² It will pass under a general gift, transfer, or bequest of personalty, or under a residuary bequest of personal property.^{3 a} In the absence of a will, it goes

between these two parties the conversion does not and cannot take place until the purchaser declares his option: Edwards v. West, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 858, 862, 863.

§ 1163, ² Edwards v. West, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 858, 862, 863.

§ 1164, 1 See cases cited ante, under §§ 1159, 1162.

§ 1164, ² Elliott v. Fisher, 12 Sim. 505; but see Klock v. Buell, 56 Barb. 398.

§ 1164, ³, Stead v. Newdigate, 2 Mer. 521; Farrar v. Earl of Winterton, 5 Beav. 1; Wall v. Colshead, 2 De Gex & J. 683; Chandler v. Pocock, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 648; 15 Ch. Div. 491; Blake v. Blake, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 481; Fisher v. Banta, 66 N. Y. 468; Estate of Dobson, 11 Phila. 81; and see cases in next following note. And thus such a bequest to a corporation may be valid, although it is incompetent to

§ 1164, (a) The text is quoted in Colonial Trust Co. v. Central Trust Co., 243 Pa. St. 268, 90 Atl. 189; Gilbreath v. Cosgrovc, 193 Mo. App. 419, 185 S. W. 1181. This section is cited in Hutchings v. Davis, 68 Ohio, 160, 67 N. E. 251; Koehne v. Beattie, 36 R. I. 316, 90 Atl. 211; West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Miller, 176 Fed. 284, 100 C. C. A. 176. See, also, Welsh v. Crater, 32 N. J. Eq. 177. to the personal representative of the intestate who would have been or was entitled to it.^b It is therefore always personal assets in the hands of executors and administrators for which they are accountable.⁴ ^c As in the case of a cor-

receive a devise of land: Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 70; Gould v. Taylor Orphan Asylum, 46 Wis. 106.

§1164, 4 Ashby v. Palmer, 1 Mer. 296; Elliott v. Fisher, 12 Sim. 505; Griffith v. Ricketts, 7 Hare, 299; Hoddel v. Pugh, 33 Beav. 489; Hood v. Hood, 85 N. Y. 561; Van Vechten v. Keator, 63 N. Y. 52; Moncrief v. Ross, 50 N. Y. 431; Fisher v. Banta, 66 N. Y. 468; Freeman v. Smith, 60 How. Pr. 311; Wurts's Ex'rs v. Page, 19 N. J. Eq. 365; Eby's Appeal, 84 Pa. St. 241; Jones v. Caldwell, 97 Pa. St. 42; McClure's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 414; Brolasky v. Gally's Ex'rs, 51 Pa. St. 509; Parkinson's Appeal, 32 Pa. St. 455; Johnson v. Bennett, 39 Barb. 237; Harris v. Slaght, 46 Barb. 470; Ferguson v. Stuart's Ex'rs, 14 Ohio, 140, 146; Collier v. Collier's Ex'rs, 3 Ohio St. 369; Rawlings's Ex'r v. Landes, 2 Bush, 158; Loftis v. Glass, 15 Ark. 680; Hurtt v. Fisher, 1 Har. & G. 88, 96; Carr v. Ireland, 4 Md. Ch. 251; Maddox v. Dent, 4 Md. Ch. 543; Smithers v. Hooper, 23 Md. 273; Washington's Ex'r v. Abraham, 6 Gratt. 66, 77; Siter v. McClanachan, 2 Gratt. 280; Commonwealth v. Martin's Ex'rs, 5 Munf. 117, 127; Brothers v. Cartwright, 2 Jones Eq. 113, 64 Am. Dec. 563; Croom v. Herring, 4 Hawks, 393; Ex parte McBee, 63 N. C. 332; Wilkins v. Taylor, 8 Rich. Eq. 291; and see 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1157-1160, 1160-1162.

§ 1164, (b) Walling v. Scott, 50 Ind. App. 23, 96 N. E. 481, 97 N. E. 388.

§1164, (c) It is not subject, as land, to the lien of a judgment against the person entitled to the proceeds of its sale: Henderson v. Henderson, 133 Pa. St. 399, 19 Am. St. Rep. 650, 19 Atl. 424; Turner v. Davis, 41 Ark. 270; Pasquay v. Pasquay, 235 Ill. 48, 85 N. E. 316; Cropper v. Gaar's Ex'r, 151 Ky. 376, L. R. A. 1916B, 1139, 151 S. W. 913; Morris v. Stephenson, 128 Mo. App. 338, 107 S. W. 449; Clifton v. Owens, 170 N. C. 607, 87 S. E. 502 (the property, until sold, cannot be levied upon under execution). This particular rule is subject to limitations in certain states: See post, § 1166,

note (c), end. A mortgage of it creates no lien on the land: Maginn v. McDevitt, 269 Ill. 196, 109 N. E. 1038; Stake v. Mobley, 102 Md. 408, 62 Atl. 963; and a record of such mortgage is no notice to the trustee: Lambert v. Morgan, 110 Md. 1, 132 Am. St. Rep. 412, 17 Ann. Cas. 439, 72 Atl. 407. That such mortgage operates as an equitable assignment, see Bailey v. Allegheny Nat. Bank, 104 Pa. St. 425; Lambert v. Morgan, 110 Md. 1, 132 Am. St. Rep. 412, 17 Ann. Cas. 439, 72 Atl. 407, but see Maginn v. McDevitt, 269 Ill. 196, 109 N. E. 1038 (such mortgage by beneficiary did not operate as assignment of proceeds where by terms of will his interest was contingent upon his surviving until the sale). Where

poration, so in that of an alien, a bequest of land thus converted into money is valid, although a devise of land is or may be void.^{5 d} The same rules apply to the conversion wrought by contracts for the sale of land.⁶

§ 1165. Money Directed or Agreed to be Laid Out in Land.—Money and other personal property directed or agreed to be laid out in the purchase of land becomes and is regarded as land in equity. It will therefore pass under a general devise of lands or of real estate; it will descend to the heir; and will not be included in a bequest of money or personal property.¹^a If the heir die intestate before the purchase has been made, the fund will descend to his heir.²

§ 1164, ⁵ Du Hourmelin v. Sheldon, 1 Beav. 79; 4 Mylne & C. 525; Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 563; Anstice v. Brown, 6 Paige, 448; De Barante v. Gott, 6 Barb. 492, 497; as to corporations, see preceding note.

§ 1164, 6 Masterson v. Pullen, 62 Ala. 145; and see ante, §§ 368, 372, and cases cited.

§ 1165, ¹ Biddulph v. Biddulph, 12 Ves. 161; Green v. Stephens, 17 Ves. 64, 77; Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 318, 443; Gott v. Cook, 7 Paige, 521, 534; Tayloe v. Johnson, 63 N. C. 381; Green v. Johnson, 4 Bush, 164; Collins v. Champ's Heirs, 15 B. Mon. 118, 61 Am. Dec. 179; and see 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1162–1171.

§ 1165, ² Scudamore v. Scudamore, Prec. Ch. 543; Edwards v. Countess of Warwick, 2 P. Wms. 171; Lechmere v. Earl of Carlisle, 3 P. Wms. 211, 222; Gillies v. Longlands, 4 De Gex & S. 372.

the trustees are among the beneficiaries, since their equitable interest is personal property, there is no merger of their equitable with their legal estates: Burbach v. Burbach, 217 Ill. 547, 75 N. E. 519. The text is quoted in Gilbreath v. Cosgrove, 193 Mo. App. 419, 185 S. W. 1181.

§ 1164, (d) The text is quoted in West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Miller, 176 Fed. 284, 100 C. C. A. 176 (devise to sell and pay proceeds to a religious corporation not within prohibition on such corporation owning more than a certain amount of land). §1165, (a) It is said, however, that before the executor consents to the legacy it is not relieved from contributing *pro rata* with other legacies to the payment of debts: McFadden v. Hefley, 28 S. C. 317, 13 Am. St. Rep. 675, 5 S. E. 812.

While the money passes under a general devise of lands, it does not pass under a devise of lands situated in a particular locality, though the money was the result of a sale of lands situated in such locality: In re Duke of Cleveland's Settled Estates, [1893] 3 Ch. 244.

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Money will be considered as thus converted, notwithstanding a direction for investment *until* a purchaser can be found.³ The money of a married woman directed to be laid out in land is liable to her husband's curtesy, and without doubt, under analogous circumstances, such a fund of a husband is liable to his wife's dower.⁴

§1166. Limitations on the Effects.—Notwithstanding these very general effects of a conversion, they are not absolutely universal. The doctrine seems to be correctly formulated by saying that the effects extend only to those persons who claim or are entitled to the property under or through the instrument, or directly from or under the author of the instrument.^a Some of the cases definitely hold that a conversion takes place no further than is necessary for the purposes of the will or other instrument.^{1 h} Two limitations appear to be well settled: one general, that the conversion does not take place as to persons whose claims or rights to the property are purely incidental, not at all connected with its devolution or transfer from the author or

§ 1165, 3 Edwards v. Countess of Warwick, 2 P. Wms. 171. There can be no doubt that the fund would be bound in equity by a judgment to the same extent that the land would have been if purchased: See Frederick v. Aynscombe, 1 Atk. 392.

§ 1165, 4 Sweetapple v. Bindon, 2 Vern. 536; and see ante, vol. 3, § 990, note 4.

§ 1166, ¹ See Orrick v. Boehm, 49 Md. 72; Hilton v. Hilton, 2 McAr. 70.

§ 1166, (a) The text is quoted in Geiger v. Bitzer, 80 Ohio, 65, 17 Ann. Cas. 151, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 285, 88 N. E. 134.

§ 1166, (b) Boyce v. Kelso Home for Orphans of M. E. Church, 107 Md. 190, 68 Atl. 550. It does not have the effect of enlarging the distributive share of one who takes independently of, or in hostility to, the will; thus, where the widow elected to take in opposition to the will, and received her dower, she could not claim to have her distributive share of the personalty enlarged by a direction in the will to convert real estate to personalty: Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 129 Md. 455, L. R. A. 1917D, 464, 99 Atl. 672; Geiger v. Bitzer, 80 Ohio, 65, 17 Ann. Cas. 151, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 285, 88 N. E. 134, overruling Hutchings v. Davis, 68 Ohio, 160, 67 N. E. 251; and see In re Thompson's Estate, 229 Pa. St. 542, 79 Atl. 173. through the instrument;² $^{\circ}$ and the other special, depending upon considerations of public policy, that the conversion shall not be permitted to take place so as to evade the stat-

§ 1166, ² Franks v. Bollans, L. R. 3 Ch. 717, 718. Where land was devised to trustees to sell and divide the proceeds among the testator's children, one of whom was a married woman, although the lady's share was converted as to her, it was held not to be converted as to her husband so as to enable him to dispose of it in the same manner in which he could dispose of her actual personal property; in other words, as to him it was still land.

§1166, (c) The text is cited in O'Bannon's Estate v. O'Bannon, 142 Mo. App. 268, 126 S. W. 215 (executor). In Wilder v. Ranney, 95 N. Y. 7, 12, it was held that real estate directed by the will to be converted could not be conveyed by one of the executors without the cooperation of the other. "It physically remained real estate, taxable as such, controllable as such, and it could only be conveyed as such, and the rules of law generally applicable to real estate remained applicable to this." Where, by statutory provision, a testator is deemed to have died intestate as to any child or children not named or provided for in the will, authority conferred by the will upon the executors to sell the testator's land does not work a conversion of the interest of such child or children in the estate: Northrop v. Marquam, 16 Or. 173, 187, 18 Pac. 449. In Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. 354, 34 South. 905, it was held that a conversion of real estate, authorized by a will for purposes of division, does not make it personalty, so far as concerns its liability for debts of the estate. See, in general, James v. Hanks, 202 Ill. 114, 66 N. E. 1034 (conversion directed by will for purpose of paying legacies does not cause the realty to be regarded as personalty for

benefit of heir at law); Connell v. Crosby, 210 Ill. 380, 71 N. E. 350 (doctrine is inapplicable to proceeding in county court to recover inheritance tax); McCurdy v. Mc-Curdy, 197 Mass. 248, 14 Ann. Cas. 859, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 329, 83 N. E. 881 (doctrine not to be invoked merely to subject property to taxation); Baptist Female Univ. v. Borden, 132 N. C. 476, 44 S. E. 47, 1007 (conversion for division does not change the character of the property with respect to its liability for debts and legacies). See, also, Eagan v. Mahoney, 24 Colo. App. 285, 134 Pac. 156 (doctrine should not be invoked so as to deny to the beneficiaries the right to bring an action to quiet title to the land, as land, against an adverse claimant, where the trustee has neglected that duty). It has been said that the doctrine operates only for certain purposes. The remedy or the mode of actual conversion from one species of property into the other is not affected: McElroy v. McElroy, 110 Tenn. 137, 73 S. W. 105.

Certain courts have had difficulty in reconciling themselves to the rule (ante, §§ 1162, 1164, note), in the common case where a life estate in land is given to A, with directions that cn A's death it be sold and the proceeds divided among B, C, etc., utes of mortmain, which invalidate gifts of land to charities.^{3 d}

§ 1167. Conversion by Paramount Authority—Compulsory Sale of Land Under Statute—Sale by Order of Court.— There is another phase of the doctrine of conversion of great importance in England, and a brief summary of the decisions may be useful under analogous circumstances in

§ 1166, 3 Brook v. Badley, L. R. 3 Ch. 672, 674, per Lord Cairns. A legacy payable out of the proceeds of land directed to be sold is an interest in land within the statutes of mortmain, and cannot, while it yet remains unpaid, be bequeathed by the legatee for charitable purposes. The decisions in some of the American states hold that the equitable conversion of partnership lands into personal property is not complete; that it is limited to the payment of partnership debts and to the settlement of the partnership affairs; and that it does not extend to the devolution of the estates of the individual partners: See Foster's Appeal, 74 Pa. St. 391, 397, 15 Am. Rep. 553; Estate of McAvoy, 12 Phila. 83.º The doctrine is settled in England that such conversion is complete for all purposes, and embraces the devolution of the individual partners' estates, and extends to all persons claiming under, from, or against them as a firm or individually: Forbes v. Steven, L. R. 10 Eq. 178, 188, 189; Att'y-Gen. v. Brunning, 8 H. L. Cas. 243, 265; Darby v. Darby, 3 Drew. 495, 503; Myers v. Perigal, 2 De Gex, M. & G. 599; in which Matson v. Swift, 8 Beav. 368, and Custance v. Bradshaw, 4 Hare, 315, are explained or overruled.

that conversion takes place at the death of the testator, so that a judgment against B in A's lifetime is not a lien on the land: See Comer v. Light, 175 Ind. 367, 93 N. E. 660, 94 N. E. 325, reversing (Ind. App.) 92 N. E. 344 (doctrine of equitable conversion does not apply where other rights intervene); Lantz v. Caraway, 180 Ind. 484, 50 L. B. A. (N. S.) 32, 103 N. E. 335 (B, C, etc., are "land owners" under the drainage statutes); Williams v. Lobban, 206 Mo. 399, 104 S. W. 58 (unless title was vested in the executor by the will, the estate of the beneficiary may be taken on execution). And in Kansas, it appears to be the rule that unless the legal title, pending the sale, is vested by devise or descent in some person other than the beneficiary, a judgment lien against the beneficiary attaches to the land: Penalosa State Bank v. Murray, 86 Kan. 766, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 817, 121 Pac. 1117; Smith v. Hensen, 89 Kan. 792, 132 Pac. 997.

§1166, (d) The text is cited in Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Horn, 120 Minn. 404, 139 N. W. 805.

§1166, (e) Lenow v. Fones, 48 Ark. 557, 4 S. W. 56; Fairchild v. Fairchild, 64 N. Y. 471; Greenwood v. Marvin, 111 N. Y. 423, 436, 19 N. E. 228. this country. This has been happily denominated conversion by paramount authority, and includes the particular instances of compulsory purchases and taking of land by railway companies, and others possessing such statutory powers, and sales of land by order of court for the purpose of settling the estates of infants and lunatics, or of partition, or of paying debts, and the like.^a In this aspect of the doctrine, the question to be examined is the exact converse of that which arises under the ordinary form of conversion, and which has been discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. The question then was. Is the property. although not actually converted, to be treated as converted? The question now presents itself, Is the property, although de facto converted, to be treated to any extent as not converted? The special rules which contain the answers to this question are placed in the foot-note.¹ Where land is

§ 1167, 1 Compulsory purchase or taking of land under statutory powers. The mere notice of an intention to take the land prescribed by statute, given to the owner in fee by a railway company or other persons having the compulsory power, does not, of itself, effect a conversion: Haynes v. Haynes, 1 Drew. & S. 426; In re Battersea Park. 9 Jur., N. S., 883. But as soon as the purchase price is agreed upon in a voluntary negotiation for a purchase with the owner sui juris, a conversion takes place, although the price is not yet paid; the owner's interest is personal estate; for him the land becomes money: Ex parte Hawkins, 13 Sim. 569; In re Manchester etc. R'y, 19 Beav. 365; Regent's Canal Co. v. Ware, 23 Beav. 575; Righton v. Righton, 36 L. J. Ch. 61; In re Skeggs, 2 De Gex, J. & S. 533. Where land has been taken, not by voluntary negotiation, but by the compulsory proceedings authorized by statute, and the money is paid into, court, it continues to be real estate until it is taken out by some person having a right to elect to treat it as money,-that is, by some person sui juris who is an unfettered owner. If the owner is an infant or a lunatic. or if the land is subject to a settlement, the money necessarily retains its character as real estate:^b In re Stewart, 1 Smale & G. 32, 39;

§ 1167, (a) Quoted in Hackett v. Moxley, 68 Vt. 210, 34 Atl. 949. This paragraph is cited, generally, in Staser v. Garr, Scott & Co., 168 Ind. 131, 79 N. E. 404. § 1167, (b) This distinction as to the effect of condemnation proceedings, depending upon whether the owner is *sui juris* or not, was ignored in United States v. Baker, 183 Fed.

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purchased or taken under compulsory powers conferred by statute, and the owner is *sui juris*, a conversion is effected; the purchase-money, although not yet actually paid, becomes to all intents personal property; but if the owner is an infant or a lunatic, or the land is in settlement, the purchase-money remains land; there is no conversion. Where land is sold by order of the court for any purpose, it is a fixed principle, upon which the court always proceeds, that the character of the property should be changed only so far as may be necessary to accomplish the particular purpose.² The court *may* control the acts of trus-

In re Bagot, 31 L. J. Ch. 772; Dixie v. Wright, 32 Beav. 662; In re Harrop, 3 Drew. 726; Kelland v. Fulford, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 491; and such money will not pass by a bequest of personal property: In re Skeggs, 2 De Gex, J. & S. 533; see, also, as to the effect of a statutory sale, Pleasants's Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 356; Richards v. Att'y-Gen., 6 Moore P. C. C. 381.

§ 1167, ² Sale of land by order of the court. Where land is thus sold, and there is any surplus of money after satisfying the purpose for which the sale was made, such surplus is always regarded and treated as real estate: Cooke v. Dealey, 22 Beav. 196; Jermy v. Preston, 13 Sim. 356; but see Steed v. Preece, L. R. 18 Eq. 192, per Sir George Jessel.^c Infants' estates: In general, a court of equity will not direct

280, holding that, in the absence of statutes regulating the matter, such proceedings work a conversion of an infant's land.

§1167, (c) See, also, Kitchens v. Jones, 87 Ark. 502, 128 Am. St. Rep. 36, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 723, 113 S. W. 29 (surplus on foreclosure sale is real estate); Kolars v. Brown, 108 Minn. 60, 133 Am. St. Rep. 410, 121 N. W. 229 (surplus on probate sale is deemed real estate, and subject to lien of judgment against the heir before the sale); Eubank v. Finnell, 118 Mo. App. 535, 94 S. W. 591 (surplus on foreclosure sale is real estate); In re Murray's Estate, 234 Pa. St. 520, 83 Atl. 473 (fund arising on probate sale is real estate); In re Buck's Estate, 256 Pa. St. 359,

100 Atl. 866 (proceeds of sale of incompetent's land remain real estate). There has been some fluctuation of opinion in the English courts on the matters-not of much practical importance to the American lawyerembraced within the scope of this note. The tendency of recent decisions appears to be to treat the actual conversion effected by judicial sale of the infant's or lunatic's lands as a conversion for all purposes. See Hyett v. Mekin, L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 735, holding that an absolute order of sale made within the jurisdiction of the court in an administration suit operates as a conversion from the date of the order, and referring to Arnold v. Dixon, L. R. 19 Eq. 113, and Wallace v. Greenwood,

tees and direct a conversion, where there is only a mere power of sale in the instrument.³

a conversion of one kind of property belonging to an infant into another kind:^d Ex parte Phillips, 19 Ves. 118, 122. As to the proceeds of timber ordered to be cut on an infant's estate, see Dyer v. Dyer, 34 Beav. 504; Field v. Brown, 27 Beav. 90; if the infant is owner in fee, the proceeds are realty; if he is a life tenant, they are personatly. *Lunatics' estates:* The court will not, without sufficient cause, change the nature of a lunatic's property: Oxenden v. Lord Compton, 2 Ves. 69, 72; In re Badcock, 4 Mylne & C. 440. If lunatics' lands are sold by order of court, the surplus of the money always remains real estate: In re Wharton, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 33; In re Sloper, cited 22 Beav. 198; In re Barker, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 241; and see Smith v. Bayright, 34 N. J. Eq. 424. The same rule prevails in sales ordered for purpose of *partition:* Foster v. Foster, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 588; Mildmay v. Quicke, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 553; Mordaunt v. Benwell, L. R. 19 Ch. Div. 302.

§ 1167, ³ Where there is thus a mere *power* of sale, the court will generally order a conversion of the property, if the intention of the testator will be the better effectuated thereby: Greenway v. Greenway, 1 Giff. 131; and the greater facility of making a division of the prop-

L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 365; Hartley v. Pendarves, [1901] 2 Ch. 498, a case of sale by order of court of timber growing on the land of a lunatic; per Cozens-Hardy, J .: "All the consequences of conversion must follow, and there is no equity as between the heir and legal personal representative of the owner in fee," approving Steed v. Preece, L. R. 18 Eq. 192, supra, Hyett v. Mekin, 25 Ch. Div. 735, supra, and Dyer v. Dyer, 34 Beav. 504, supra, and disapproving Field v. Brown, 27 Beav. 90, supra, and Cooke v. Dealey, 22 Beav. 196, supra. To the same effect: In re Grange (Chadwick v. Grange, [1907] 2 Ch. 20, affirming [1907] 1 Ch. 313; In re Dodson (Yates v. Morton), [1908] 2 Ch. 638; Burgess v. Booth, [1908] 2 Ch. 648, reversing [1908] 1 Ch. 880; Fauntleroy v. Beebe, [1911] 2 Ch. 257. As to charging expenses of repairs and improvements to the realty or the personalty, see In re Gist, [1904] 1 Ch. 398. § 1167, (d) In re Norton, [1900] 1 Ch. 101.

§ 1167, (e) Upshaw v. Upshaw, 180 Ala. 204, 60 Sonth. 804 (proceeds treated as land, for the purpose of the right to dower and homestead); In re Boyd, 138 Iowa, 583, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1220, 116 N. W. 700, citing this paragraph of the text (no conversion until the money is actually paid to those entitled to it); Hankins v. Hankins's Adm'r, 173 Ky. 475, 191 S. W. 258 (conversion not effected until the confirmation of the sale); In re Chapin, 148 Mass. 588, 2 L. R. A. 768, 20 N. E. 195; McLean v. Leitch, 152 N. C. 266, 67 S. E. 490 (as to infants, married women, etc., the proceeds of partition go as realty; as to persons sui juris, conversion takes place when the sale is confirmed by the court); Wentz's § 1168. Conversion as Between Life Tenant and Remainderman.—Many important questions arise in the English courts as between the conflicting rights of life tenants and remaindermen, and some of the cases involving them are collected in the foot-note.¹ When the testator has

erty, where many persons are interested, is an important circumstance in determining the action of the court: Mower v. Orr, 7 Hare, 473; Burrell v. Baskerfield, 11 Beav. 525; but where a discretion is given to the trustees, the court will not interfere to control its exercise: Shipperdson v. Tower, 1 Younge & C. Ch. 441; Walter v. Maunde, 19 Ves. 424; Lucas v. Brandreth, 28 Beav. 273; Yates v. Yates, 28 Beav. 637; In re Beaumont's Trusts, 32 Beav. 191.⁴

§ 1168, 1 Where the testator directs a conversion of his property,-that is, that it be sold and the proceeds invested in a certain manner,-the questions arise, whether the life tenant is entitled to income, and if so, to what income, before the conversion is effected and the investments made. If any directions are contained in the will, they must, of course, be followed: Sparling v. Parker, 9 Beav. 524. In some cases, where the conversion cannot be made in a year after the testator's death, the life tenant is entitled to income as from that time: See Sitwell v. Barnard, 6 Ves. 520; Kilvington v. Gray, 2 Sim. & St. 396; Tucker v. Boswell, 5 Beav. 607. In some cases he is entitled to income from the testator's death: See Augerstein v. Martin, Turn. & R. 232; Hewitt v. Morris, Turn. & R. 241; Caldecott v. Caldecott, 1 Younge & C. Ch. 312; Allhusen v. Whittell, L. R. 4 Eq. 295; Brown v. Gellatly, L. R. 2 Ch. 751; La Terriere v. Bulmer, 2 Sim. 18; Wilday v. Sandys, L. R. 7 Eq. 455. Under certain circumstances the property is considered as converted at the end of a year from testator's death: See Douglas v. Congreve, 1 Keen, 410; Dimes v. Scott, 4 Russ. 195; Morgan v. Morgan, 14 Beav. 72, 77; Taylor v. Clark, 1 Hare, 161; Macpherson v. Macpherson, 1 Macq. 243; Brown v. Gellatly, supra; Robinson v. Robinson, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 247. If the property cannot be converted except

Appeal, 126 Pa. St. 541, 17 Atl. 875; Turner v. Dawson, 80 Va. 841. As regards the English cases, the statement regarding partition sales is limited to instances where the person taking is *non sui juris*; the distinction between partition cases and those mentioned in-note (c), *supra*, depending on certain clauses in the partition statutes: Herbert v. Herbert, [1912] 2 Ch. 268 (share of married woman remains real estate); Hopkinson v. Richardson, [1913] 1 Ch. 284 (share of infant remains real estate).

§1167, (1) See, also, Appeal of Gardner, 81 Conn. 171, 70 Atl. 653 (fact that sale is made by order of court does not prevent a conversion when the sale was authorized by will). directed the property to be converted—that is, to be sold and the proceeds invested—the questions generally are as to the life tenant's right to the income. When the testator has not directed such a conversion, the principal questions

at a loss, a value will be set on it, and the life tenant will receive interest on such value:^a See Gibson v. Bott, 7 Ves. 89; Meyer v. Simonsen, 5 De Gex & S. 723; Brown v. Gellatly, *supra*.

Where the testator does not direct any such conversion, or sale and investment of his property.-Here the principal questions are, whether a conversion should be made,---that is, whether the property should be sold and the proceeds invested, and the interest thereon paid to the life tenant,--or whether the life tenant is to enjoy the property in specie. Where the personal property is given to different legatees in succession, it is generally to be converted into money, and the proceeds invested, and the interest thereon paid to the tenant or tenants for life:b See Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth, 7 Ves. 137; Thornton v. Ellis, 15 Beav. 193; Mills v. Mills, 7 Sim. 501; Sutherland v. Cooke, 1 Coll. C. C. 498; Johnson v. Johnson, 2 Coll. C. C. 441; Blann v. Bell, 2 De Gex, M. & G. 775; Hood v. Clapham, 19 Beav. 90. Certain provisions or deviations in the will are held to show an intention that the life tenant is to enjoy the property in specie, and that it should not therefore be converted: See Crowe v. Crisford, 17 Beav. 507; Hind v. Selby, 22 Beav. 373; Cafe v. Bent, 5 Hare, 24, 36; Collins v. Collins, 2 Mylne & K. 703; Pickering v. Pickering, 4 Mylne & C. 289; Harris v. Poyner, 1 Drew. 174; Hubbard v. Young, 10 Beav. 203; Hinves v. Hinves, 3 Hare, 609; Ellis v. Eden, 23 Beav. 543; Holgate v. Jennings, 24 Beav. 623; Simpson v. Lester. 4 Jur., N. S., 1269; Burton v. Mount, 2 De Gex & S. 383; Yates v. Yates, 28 Beav. 637; Alcock v. Sloper, 2 Mylne & K. 699: Daniel v. Warren, 2 Younge & C. Ch. 290; Skirving v. Williams, 24 Beav. 275; Rowe v. Rowe, 29 Beav. 276; Green v. Britten, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 649. When specific legacies are given to one for life and then

§ 1168, (a) As to rate of interest, see In re Woods, [1904] 2 Ch. 4.

§ 1168, (b) See In re Game, [1897] 1 Ch. 881. It has been held that the rule in Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth does not apply in the case of a settlement by deed, and that it apparently only applies when there is a disposition by will of residuary personal estate given as one fund to be enjoyed by several persons in succession: In re Van Straubenzee, [1901] 2 Ch. 779.

§ 1168, (c) Corle v. Monkhouse, 47 N. J. Eq. 73, 20 Atl. 367. As to the exceptions, see the following cases discussed in In re Game, [1897] 1 Ch. 381: Macdonald v. Irvine, 8 Ch. Div. 101, 124; Craig v. Wheeler, 29 Law J. (Ch.) 374, 376; Wearing v. Wearing, 23 Beav. 99; Vachell v. Roberts, 32 Beav. 140, 142; Goodenough v. Tremamondo, 2 Beav. 512. are as to whether a sale should be made and the proceeds invested, and the interest thereon paid to the life tenant, or whether he is entitled to enjoy the property *in specie* without any conversion.

SECTION II.

RESULTING TRUST UPON A FAILURE OF THE PURPOSES OF THE CONVERSION.

ANALYSIS.

§ 1169.	The questions stated; object and extent of the doctrine.
§ 1170.	A total failure of the purpose.
§ 1171.	Partial failure; wills directing conversion of land into money.
§ 1172.	The same; wills directing the conversion of money into land.
§ 1173.	The same; deeds directing the conversion of land into money.
§ 1174.	The same; deeds directing the conversion of money into land.

§ 1169. The Questions Stated—Object and Extent of the Doctrine.—The purposes for which a conversion is directed might be unlawful, or circumstances might arise after the execution of the instrument which rendered the conversion unnecessary. In other words, the purposes of a conversion might fail totally or partially, either before the instrument had come into operation, or after the conversion had been *de facto* made by a sale of the land or by a laying out of the money in land. The questions would then arise, To

to another absolutely, the life tenant is entitled to the income in specie: Vincent v. Newcombe, 1 Younge, 599; and see Phillips v. Sarjent, 7 Hare, 33; Harvey v. Harvey, 5 Beav. 134; In re Beaufoy, 1 Smale & G. 20. If property is taken by a railway company, and the money is paid into court and invested, the life tenant is entitled to the same benefit as if the property had not been taken:^d Jeffreys v. Conner, 28 Beav. 328; In re Phillips, L. R. 6 Eq. 250; In re Pfleger, L. R. 6 Eq. 426; In re Chamberlain, cited L. R. 6 Eq. 427; Littlewood v. Pattison, 10 Jur., N. S., 875.

§ 1168, (d) By analogy, it has been held that where a building held by a life tenant is accidentally destroyed by fire, the proceeds of the insurance are to be treated as realty: Green v. Green, 50 S. C. 514, 62 Am. St. Rep. 846, 27 S. E. 952.

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whom will the property—the entire amount in one case, the portion undisposed of in the other—then result,—the author of the trust, his heir, or his personal representatives? and in what form will it thus result,—in its original or in its converted form, as real or as personal estate?¹ The case of a total failure is simple; that of a partial failure presents questions of greater difficulty; and in discussing this branch of the subject it will be expedient to consider separately cases arising under wills, and those arising under deeds of settlement and other instruments *inter vivos*.

§ 1169, 1 All the fundamental questions involved in this discussion may be exhibited by a very simple case. A will devises all of the testator's real estate to trustees, upon trust, to sell the same and divide the proceeds equally between A and B, who are strangers, so that a lapse would be possible. If both A and B should die during the testator's lifetime, the object of the conversion would totally fail; there would be a lapse; no necessity would exist for converting the land into money by a sale; the land would remain entirely undisposed of; and by the well-settled doctrine of resulting trusts, it would result to the testator's heir. It should be observed, however, that under modern statutes it might result to the residuary devisee. If one only should die, say A, the purpose of the conversion would only partially fail; there would still remain the necessity of converting the whole land into money by a sale so as to pay to B his share of the proceeds, and the other half only would remain undisposed of, but in the actual condition of money. The question must arise, To what extent is the trust for a conversion still in force? Who is to benefit by the lapse,-the heir or the personal representatives of the testator? And in what character will either of them take the undisposed of surplus,-as real or personal estate? If any case, however complicated, is stripped of its incidental and unessential circumstances, the really important questions involved will be reduced to these three. From the great number, variety, and complication of trusts in wills and settlements so common in England, many subordinate questions have arisen before the English courts, generally depending upon the particular provisions of the instrument; and the decisions involving such questions are numerous. As these questions do not arise, and many of them could not arise, before our American tribunals, any detailed discussion of them is plainly unnecessary, and I shall simply refer to the more important cases of this kind in the foot-notes.

§ 1169

2771 Resulting trust on failure of conversion. § 1170

§ 1170. A Total Failure.—Where a conversion of land into money or of money into land is directed, either by a will or by an instrument *inter vivos*, and the purposes and objects for which such conversion was intended totally fail before the directions for a conversion are carried into effect, the property thus directed to be converted will remain in its original condition; it will result in its original unchanged form to the heirs or to the personal representatives of the testator, and to the settlor, or to his heirs or his personal representatives, as the case may be. If land is to be sold and converted into money, the property results as real estate to the heirs; if money is to be laid out in land, the fund results as personal estate to the personal representatives. This rule is universal.¹^a

§ 1170, ¹ Ackroyd v. Smithson, ¹ Brown Ch. 503; ¹ Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1171, 1181, 1197; Clarke v. Franklin, ⁴ Kay & J. 257; Smith v. Claxton, ⁴ Madd. 484, 492; Ripley v. Waterworth, ⁷ Ves. 425, 435; Chitty v. Parker, ² Ves. 271; Wilson v. Major, 11 Ves. 205; Edwards v. Tuck, ²³ Beav. 268; McCarty v. Deming, ⁴ Laus. 440, 443; Giraud v. Giraud, 58 How. Pr. 175; Slocum v. Slocum, ⁴ Edw. Ch. 613; Davis's Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 348; Morrow v. Brenizer, ² Rawle, 184; Commonwealth v. Martin's Ex'rs, ⁵ Munf. 117; Smith v. McCrary, ³ Ired. Eq. 204; but see Evans's Appeal, 63 Pa. St. 183. The general subject of a resulting trust upon a total or a partial failure of the purposes of the conversion is also discussed with more or less fullness in the following American cases:^b Craig v. Leslie, ³ Wheat. 563, 582; Holland v. Cruft, ³ Gray, 162, 180; Wood v. Cone, 7 Paige, 471, 476;

§ 1170, (a) The text is quoted in Painter v. Painter, 220 Pa. St. 82, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117, 69 Atl. 323. See, also, In re Lord Grimthorpe (Beckett v. Grimthorpe), [1908] 2 Ch. 675, affirming [1908] 1 Ch. 666.

§ 1170, (b) Rizer v. Perry, 58 Md. 112; Roy v. Monroe, 47 N. J. Eq. 356, 20 Atl. 481; Parker v. Linden, 113 N. Y. 28, 20 N. E. 858, 861; Read v. Williams, 125 N. Y. 560, 21 Am. St. Rep. 748, 26 N. E. 730; Sweeney v. Warren, 127 N. Y. 426, 24 Am. St. Rep. 468, 28 N. E. 413; Rudy's Estate, 185 Pa. St. 359, 64 Am. St. Rep. 654, 39 Atl. 968; Fifield v. Van Wyck, 94 Va. 557, 64 Am. St. Rep. 745, 27 S. E. 446; McHugh v. Mc-Cole, 97 Wis. 166, 65 Am. St. Rep. 106, 40 L. R. A. 724, 72 N. W. 631. In Painter v. Painter, 220 Pa. St. 82, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117, 69 Atl. 323, it was held, three judges dissenting, that there was no conversion although the failure occurred after the death of the testator and before the time when the sale could be effected. The decision seems very questionable; it appears to ignore the fact that the interest had vested.

§ 1171. Partial Failure—Wills Directing Conversion of Land into Money.-Where the purpose for converting land into money directed by a will wholly fails, it has been shown that the land results to the heir. Where the purpose only partially fails, the conversion must still be made by selling the land, in order to satisfy the purposes which remain effective.^a With respect to the surplus which is left after satisfying those purposes, the intention was shown by the testator to deprive the heir of it for a particular object only, and that object having failed, there is no reason which can be inferred from this disposition why it should not belong to the heir. In the absence of a contrary intent appearing from other provisions of the will, the undisposed of portion or surplus will therefore result to the heir. Since the conversion has, however, actually taken place, this surplus results to the heir as personal property, and not as real estate. The rule may be thus formulated: Wherever it is necessary to sell the land for purposes directed by a will which are effective, and the proceeds of the sale are only partially disposed of for such purposes, unless the will in some other provision shows a contrary intention, then the remaining portion or surplus results to the heir of the testator as money, and in case of his death, will go to his per-

Wood v. Keyes, 8 Paige, 365, 369; Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 318, 323, 486; Arnold v. Gilbert, 3 Sand. Ch. 531, 556; Arnold v. Gilbert, 5 Barb. 190, 195; Bogert v. Hertell, 4 Hill, 492, 495, 500; Wright v. Trustees etc., Hoff. Ch. 202, 205, 219; Marsh v. Wheeler, 2 Edw. Ch. 156, 160; Pennell's Appeal, 20 Pa. St. 515; Nagle's Appeal, 13 Pa. St. 260-264; Burr v. Sim, 1 Whart. 252, 262, 29 Am. Dec. 48; Pratt v. Taliaferro, 3 Leigh, 419, 423; Lindsay v. Pleasants, 4 Ired. Eq. 320, 323; Proctor v. Ferebee, 1 Ired. Eq. 143, 146, 36 Am. Dec. 34; Newby v. Skinner, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 488, 31 Am. Dec. 397; North v. Valk, Dud. Eq. 212, 216. It should be remembered that modern statutes have quite generally placed the residuary devisee in the same position as a residuary legatee; and therefore, in case of a will directing land to be sold, the land might result to the residuary devisee instead of the heir.

§1171, (a) The text is quoted in Meekins v. Branning Mfg. Co., 224 Fed. 202.

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sonal representatives even though the sale did not take place until his death.^{1 b}

§ 1171, ¹ The main branch of this rule, that the surplus results to the heir, was settled by the great ease of Aekroyd v. Smithson, 1 Brown Ch. 503; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1171, 1181, 1197. The other branch, as to the form in which it results, was first decided by Smith v. Claxton, 4 Madd. 484; see, also, Wright v. Wright, 16 Ves. 188; Jessopp v. Watson, 1 Mylne & K. 665; Hatfield v. Pryme, 2 Coll. C. C. 204; Collins v. Wakeman, 2 Ves. 683; Watson v. Hayes, 5 Mylne & C. 125; Jones v. Mitchell, 1 Sim. & St. 290, 294; Buchanan v. Harrison, 1 Johns. & H. 662; Fitch v. Weber, 6 Hare, 145; Taylor v. Taylor, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 190; Wall v. Colshead, 2 De Gex & J. 683; Speneer v. Wilson, L. R. 16 Eq. 501; McCarty v. Deming, 4 Lans. 440, 442; Wood v. Cone, 7 Paige, 471; Wright v. Trustees etc., Hoff. Ch. 202; Lindsay v. Pleasants, 4 Ired. Eq. 320; Newby v. Skinner, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 488, 31 Am. Dec. 397; North v. Valk, Dud. Eq. 212; Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 563, 4 L. Ed. 460.

In Steed v. Preece, L. R. 18 Eq. 192, Jessel, M. R., held that this rule did not apply where a sale of land had been made by order of court, but the surplus of the proceeds went to the personal representatives as personal estate. This rule is, however, directly opposed to other authorities, and it seems best to preserve the symmetry of the doctrine without arbitrary exceptions.

The English decisions are very strong in favor of the heir. The foregoing cases show that nothing less than an express gift of the undisposed surplus-not even a declaration that nothing shall result, or that the heir shall not take-will prevent it from resulting under the rule stated in the text. Even when by the directions of the will the proceeds of the realty and of the personal property are blended together into one common fund, this does not render the entire mass personal property so as to change the mode of devolution. The two kinds of proceeds are still separated, and the rule of the text is applied to that portion of the fund which comes from the sale of the land; it results to the heir: See Aekroyd v. Smithson, supra; Taylor v. Taylor, supra; Jessopp v. Watson, 1 Mylne & K. 665; Cruse v. Barley, 3 P. Wms. 20, 22, note by Mr. Cox; Edwards v. Tuek, 23 Beav. 268; Wall v. Colshead, 2 De Gex & J. 683; Beetive v. Hodgson, 10 H. L. Cas. 656; Amphlett v. Parke, 2 Russ. & M. 221; Robinson v. Governors of London Hospital, 10 Hare, 19; Barrs v. Fewkes, 2 Hem. & M. 60; 11 Jur., N. S., 669; Spencer v. Wilson, L. R. 16 Eq. 501. But the tendeney of some at least of the American cases is not so strongly in favor

§1171. (b) See, also, In re Reed's Estate, 237 Pa. St. 125, 85 Atl. 138.

§ 1172

§ 1172. The Same. Wills Directing the Conversion of Money into Land.—Where a will directs that money shall be laid out in land, and the purpose of the conversion wholly fails, the fund, as has been shown, results to the personal representatives of the testator in its original form. Where the failure of the purpose is but partial, the same rule controls the devolution. It is settled, by analogy with the foregoing case of real estate trusts, that the undisposed of

of the heir; an intention on the part of the testator to effect a complete conversion into personalty as between the heir and the personal representatives, next of kin, or residuary legatees is more readily and easily inferred. Thus it has been held that a direction to blend the proceeds of the realty and personalty into one common fund for the purposes of the will, even though not in pursuance of the English view "for all intents and purposes," will render the conversion of the whole complete, and will change the devolution of the undisposed surplus, when some of the purposes of the conversion failed: Sec especially Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 563, 4 L. Ed. 460; also Morrow v. Brenizer, 2 Rawle, 185; Burr v. Sim, 1 Whart. 252, 29 Am. Dec. 48.e Even in England the residuary bequest may interfere with the operation of the general rule, and may cause the undisposed of surplus to devolve upon the residuary legatee instead of the heir, when there is a partial failure of the purpose of the conversion. Where the land has been directed to be sold, and out of the proceeds thereof and the personal estate combined debts and legacies are to be paid, and the whole of the surplus consisting of the proceeds of the realty and of the personalty blended is given in the *residuary* bequest as personal property, then the proceeds of the land thus bequeathed will be personal estate, and will go to the residuary legatee, and not to the heir: See Mallabar v. Mallabar, Cas. t. Talb. 78; Hutcheson v. Hammond, 3 Brown. Ch. 128, 148; Durour v. Motteux, 1 Ves. Sr. 320; 3 P. Wms. 22, note 1; Kennell v. Abbott, 4 Ves. 802; Byam v. Munton, 1 Russ. & M. 503; Green v. Jackson, 2 Russ. & M. 238; Wildes v. Davies, 1 Smale & G. 475, 482; Salt v. Chattaway, 3 Beav. 576, per Lord Langdale.

It is for this reason that I have inserted the modification "in the absence of a contrary intention shown by the testator" in formulating the general rule. The rule is ordinarily stated by text-writers in a more general manner, but such a limitation seems to be necessary to its perfect accuracy.

§1171, (c) See, also, Hutchings v. Davis, 68 Ohio, 160, 67 N. E. 251, citing the text.

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portion or surplus of the fund results to the personal representatives of the testator for his next of kin or residuary legatee, as the case may be; and that it thus devolves in its original unconverted form as personal property; for it could go to the executor as assets in no other form.^{1 a}

§ 1173. The Same. Deeds Directing a Conversion of Land into Money.—Where a deed, settlement, or other instrument *inter vivos* directs land to be sold and converted into money, and the purposes thereof wholly fail, then, as in case of a will, the land results unconverted as real estate to the settlor or to his heir.¹ Where the failure of the purpose is only partial, the analogy to the case of a will is not perfect; the difference arises from the time at which a conversion takes place. According to the well-settled rule, the equitable conversion takes place at the date of the instrument, although the actual sale is postponed. The author of the instrument takes the undisposed of surplus converted in his lifetime as personal property; it forms a part of his general personal estate, and must devolve as such.²

§ 1172, ¹ Cogan v. Stephens, 1 Beav. 482, note; 5 L. J., N. S., Ch., 17;
Reynolds v. Godlee, Johns. 536, 582; Hereford v. Ravenhill, 1 Beav.
481; 5 Beav. 51; Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 318.

Where personal property is bequeathed upon trust for conversion into land to be held upon trusts which ultimately fail, it has recently been held that land purchased before such failure goes to the next of kin as real estate, and passes as such to the real representatives—heirs or devisees—of such next of kin, overruling Reynolds v. Godlee, *supra*, upon this point: Curteis v. Wormald, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 172.

§ 1173, ¹ See ante, § 1171.

§ 1173, ² Clarke v. Franklin, 4 Kay & J. 257; Hewitt v. Wright, 1 Brown Ch. 86; In re Newberry's Trusts, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 746; and see Van v. Barnett, 19 Ves. 102. In Clarke v. Franklin, there was a conveyance by deed upon trust, first for the settlor during his life, then upon trusts, first to sell, then out of the proceeds to pay certain sums, which were valid trusts, and all the remaining trusts were for charity and invalid. The effect of the deed was, that immediately upon its

§ 1172, (a) The text is cited and followed in Phillips v. Ferguson, 85 A. 837, 8 S. E. 241. § 1174

§ 1174. The Same. Deeds Directing the Conversion of Money into Land.—If a deed directs money to be laid out in land, and the purposes of the conversion totally fail, clearly the fund results to the author of the instrument or to his estate as personal property. If the purposes partially fail, the trust for conversion must still be carried out, and the portion then undisposed of will result to the author or his heir as land.¹

execution the whole property was impressed with a valid trust for conversion; in other words, an equitable conversion of the land into personalty at once took place, and at the same time a resulting trust arose in favor of the settlor as to that portion of this personalty which was invalidly given to charity.

§1174, ¹ Lechmere v. Lechmere, Cas. t. Talb. 80; Pulteney v. Earl of Darlington, 1 Brown Ch. 223. As an illustration, a man, by marriage settlement, covenants to pay a certain sum to trustees, to be laid out in land, to be settled to the use of himself for life, remainder to the use of his wife for life, remainder to the children of the marriage, remainder to his own right heirs. If his wife should die in his lifetime without issue, all the uses in the land, except for the benefit of the settlor himself, would be gone. The purposes of the trust for conversion would have utterly failed. There would be no obligation on the settlor to pay it out, and no room for the application of the maxim that equity considers that as done which ought to be done. In the language used by English courts, the money would be "at home in the settlor's pocket." If, on the other hand, the wife should survive the settlor, no matter for how short a time, but without issue, then the trust would not have wholly failed; there would be an obligation to pay the money to be laid out in land; the maxim would apply, and equity would, at the suit of the settlor's heir, compel the money to be laid out in land for him or to be paid over to him.

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SECTION III.

RECONVERSION.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1175. Definition: Rationale of the doctrine.
- § 1176. Who may elect to have a reconversion.
- § 1177. Mode of election.
- § 1178. Double conversion.

§ 1175. Definition-Rationale of the Doctrine.-By reconversion is meant "that notional or imaginary process by which a prior constructive conversion is annulled and taken away, and the *constructively* converted property is restored, in contemplation of a court of equity, to its original actual quality."¹ Thus real estate is devised upon trust to sell and to pay the proceeds to A. By virtue of this absolute direction, the land is, in equity, converted into personal estate; it belongs to A as personalty. It may, however, be made A's property as real estate; that is, A may prefer to receive it in its original unconverted form as land. In that event it is said to be reconverted, and the process is called reconversion. The *rationale* of this doctrine is clearly found in the right which every absolute owner or donee has to dispense with or forbid the execution of any trust in the performance of which he alone is interested. Reconversion is the result of an election expressly made or inferred by a court of equity. It depends wholly upon the right of election held by the person entitled to the property to choose whether he will take the property in its converted condition or in its original and unconverted The whole discussion consists of answers to the form. questions. Who may thus elect? and how may such an election be made?²^a

§ 1175, 1 Haynes's Outlines of Equity, 367.

§ 1175, ² Some writers have described reconversion as being of two kinds: 1. By voluntary act of the party,—an election; 2. By act of law.

§ 1175, (a) The right to elect to form exists where the trustee or exreceive the property in its original ecutor has a mere power to convert,

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§ 1176. Who may Elect to Have a Reconversion.—As to personal capacities, the party, in order to elect, must be *sui juris*, or at least must not be subject to any incapacity which prevents him from effectively dealing with his own

This is an erroneous conception. The so-called reconversion by act of the law is simply an instance where, under special circumstances, the party's election is inferred or presumed. It depends upon the notion of his voluntary election as much as any other instance. The subject of reconversion is one of great importance and interest in England; the cases involving it are numerous, and many of the questions are difficult. Although the doctrine *theoretically* belongs to our jurisprudence, it can hardly be said to have any *practical* existence in the law of many of the states; it has very rarely come before any of the American courts, and then in its simplest form. I shall attempt, therefore, to give no more than a bare outline of the doctrine, but shall cite cases sufficient in number and importance to enable the reader to pursue a more thorough and detailed examination.

as well as where the direction to convert is imperative: Howell v. Tompkins, 42 N. J. Eq. 305, 11 Atl. 333. For American authorities on the general doctrine of reconversion, see Bank of Ukiah v. Rice, 143 Cal. 265, 101 Am. St. Rep. 118, 76 Pac. 1020, citing this paragraph of the text and many cases. See, also, Dunham v. Slaughter, 268 Ill. 625, 109 N. E. 673; Williams v. Lobban, 206 Mo. 399, 104 S. W. 58; Givens v. Ott, 222 Mo. 395, 121 S. W. 23; De Lashmutt v. Teeter, 261 Mo. 412, 169 S. W. 34; Doyle v. Blake, 77 N. J. Eq. 142, 77 Atl. 347 (the right of election is a substantial and beneficial right, and the court should not permit it to be defeated by the existence of an obstacle which the beneficiary can, if permitted, remove); Collins v. Doyle's Ex'r, 119 Va. 63, 89 S. E. 88. The text is also cited in Carr v. Branch, 85 Va. 597, 8 S. E. 476; in Griffith v. Witten, 252 Mo. 627, 161 S. W. 708; in Tarnow v. Carmichael, 82 Neb. 1, 116 N. W. 1031; in Harris v. Ingalls, 74 N. H. 339, 68 Atl. 34; in Mattison v. Stone, 99 S. C. 151, 82 S. E. 1046; and quoted, in Condit v. Bigalow, 64 N. J. Eq. 504, 54 Atl. 160.

The recent case of In re Appleby, [1903] 1 Ch. 565, is of some importance. It is there said that the right of election is "only a consequence from the doctrine of equity that the persons who take the proceeds of sale are regarded in equity as the beneficial owners." Another consequence of the doctrine is, that when the direction for sale is invalid, within the rule against perpetuities, but the beneficiaries are ascertainable, and it is evident that the trust for sale is a mere piece of machinery for the purpose of division, the beneficiaries take the property as real estate independently of any election by them; following Goodier v. Edmunds, [1893] 3 Ch. 455; In re Daverson, [1893] 3 Ch. 421; Goodier v. Johnson, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 441,

property.¹ With regard to the nature and quantity of interest which must be owned in order that the party may effect a reconversion, if he is entitled to the whole *absolute interest in possession*, either to the land to be sold for money, or to the money to be laid out in land, then he may, of course, elect, since his election could affect no other

§ 1176, 1 A person absolutely entitled and *sui juris*: Benson v. Benson, 1 P. Wms. 130; Sisson v. Giles, 32 L. J., N. S., Ch. 606; 3 De Gex, J. & S. 614; Prentice v. Janssen, 79 N. Y. 478.

Infants cannot elect, but the court may, for their advantage:^a See Seeley v. Jago, 1 P. Wms. 389; Carr v. Ellison, 2 Brown Ch. 56; Van v. Barnett, 19 Ves. 102; Robinson v. Robinson, 19 Beav. 494; In re Harrop, 3 Drew. 726, 734.

Lunatics cannot: Ashby v. Palmer, 1 Mer. 296; In re Wharton, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 33; In re Barker, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 241.

Married women.—Under the former law they could only elect by means of a fine, or by a consent in open court: Oldham v. Hughes, 2 Atk. 452, 453; Binford v. Bawden, 1 Ves. 512; 2 Ves. 38; Frank v. Frank, 3 Mylne & C. 171; May v. Roper, 4 Sim. 360; Standering v. Hall, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 652; Wallace v. Greenwood, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 362. Under the statute 3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 74, sec. 77, a wife may elect by means of a deed in which her husband joins, and which is properly acknowledged by her: Briggs v. Chamberlain, 11 Haré, 69; Bowyer v. Woodman, L. R. 3 Eq. 313; Tuer v. Turner, 20 Beav. 560; Forbes v. Adams, 9 Sim. 462. A deed by husband and wife, not so acknowledged, or by either alone, would be insufficient: Sisson v. Giles, 32 L. J., N. S., Ch. 606; 3 De Gex, J. & S. 614; Franks v. Bollans, L. R. 3 Ch. 717. In this country a married woman can doubtless elect by means of any instrument sufficient to enable her to convey real estate.^b

§ 1176, (a) Infants.—See Bank of Ukiah v. Rice, 143 Cal. 265, 101 Am. St. Rep. 118, 76 Pac. 1020; Swann v. Garrett, 71 Ga. 566 (election by the court on infant's behalf; but see strong dissenting opinion of Jackson, C. J.); Beeler v. Barringer, 252 Ill. 288, 96 N. E. 874 (fact that sale was directed by the will to be made when infant beneficiaries became of age does not prevent reconversion; but reconversion, when made, does not accelerate their right to enjoyment of the land); Griffith v. Witten, 252 Mo. 627, 161 S. W. 708; Lincoln v. Wakefield, 237 Pa. St. 97, 85 Atl. 133 (agreement of guardian approved by the court); Mattison v. Stone, 99 S. C. 151, 82 S. E. 1046, citing this paragraph of the text; Chambers v. Preston, 137 Tenn. 324, 193 S. W. 109 (infants cannot elect); Carr v. Branch, 85 Va. 597, 8 S. E. 476.

§ 1176, (b) Married Women.—See Howell v. Tompkins, 42 N. J. Eq. 305, 11 Atl. 333; Lincoln v. Wakefield, 237 Pa. St. 97, 85 Atl. 133. person's rights. If he owns, not the whole subject-matter, but only an undivided share or a partial interest, the general rule is settled that he may elect, and can only elect, when such election could not by possibility injuriously affect the rights and interests of those who are associated with him in the total ownership as co-owners, life tenants, remaindermen, reversioners, and the like.²

§ 1176, ² The general question whether such a partial owner may elect to reconvert must be answered somewhat differently when the subject-matter consists of land to be turned into money, and when it consists of money to be laid out in land. A co-owner: When the direction is to turn land into money, one co-owner cannot elect to keep his share in land. The others are entitled to have their share sold so as to receive the money, and plainly the sale of an undivided share of the land would produce a comparatively less amount than would result from a sale of the whole: Holloway v. Radcliffe, 23 Beav. 163; Deeth v. Hale, 2 Molloy, 317; Fletcher v. Ashburner, 1 Brown Ch. 497, 500.^c On the contrary, when the direction is to lay out money in land for co-owners, one co-owner can elect to take his share in money; for this would plainly produce no injury to the others: Seeley v. Jago, 1 P. Wms. 389; and see Elliott v. Fisher, 12 Sim. 505. Remaindermen and other holders of future interests: The earlier cases seem to admit or

§1176, (c) Co-owner.—See, also, McWilliams v. Gough, 116 Wis. 576, 93 N. W. 550, citing the text and other authorities; Bank of Ukiah v. Rice, 143 Cal. 265, 101 Am. St. Rep. 118, 76 Pac. 1020, and cases cited. See, further, Hibler v. Oliver, 193 Ala. 369, 69 South. 477; Starr v. Willoughby, 218 Ill. 485, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 623, 75 N. E. 1029; Pasquay v. Pasquay, 235 Ill. 48, 85 N. E. 316; Walling v. Scott, 50 Ind. App. 23, 96 N. E. 481, 97 N. E. 388; Porter v. Porter, 135 Ky. 813, 123 S. W. 302; Mattison v. Stone, 99 S. C. 151, 82 S. E. 1046, citing the text; Chambers v. Preston, 137 Tenn. 324, 193 S. W. 109. The text is also cited in Gilbreath v. Cosgrove, 193 Mo. App. 419, 185 S. W. 1181. In this case the testator directed a sale, payment to the widow of so much, and a division of the proceeds between the children. They tendered her the amount due her, and requested that a sale be not made. Held, a reconversion; since the widow had no interest except in the sum of money. In Pasquay v. Pasquay, 235 III. 48, 85 N. E. 317, reconversion with respect to the share of one was orally agreed upon by all, and the agreement was carried out by possession taken by that one; held, a reconversion as to him but not as to the others.

A party who has no claim under the will need not join in the election: In re Loyd's Estate (Hicks v. Loyd), 175 Cal. 699, 167 Pac. 157 (pretermitted heir). § 1177. Mode of Election.—It being assumed that the party entitled to the property has the capacity to elect to receive it in its unconverted form, and thus to effect a reconversion, the further question remains, how such election must or may be made. An express declaration of the intention in language is always sufficient, but is not necessary.^{1 a} An election may be inferred from acts or writings. Any act or writing which shows an unequivocal intention to possess the property in its actual state and condition will amount to a valid election.²

assume that a remainderman may elect, but not so as to affect the interests of the owners of the prior estates. The recent decisions tend to a denial of any power in the remainderman to make an *absolute* election as against the life tenants and other prior owners. All the decisions admit that he may make an election binding upon his own real and personal representatives, whether the property shall devolve to one or the other of them as real or as personal estate: Triquet v. Thornton, 13 Ves. 345; Gillies v. Longlands, 4 De Gex & S. 372, 379; Sisson v. Giles, 32 L. J., N. S., Ch. 606; 3 De Gex, J. & S. 614; Meek v. Devenish, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 566; Walrond v. Rosslyn, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 640; Cookson v. Cookson, 12 Clark & F. 121; Prentice v. Janssen, 79 N. Y. 478.^d

§ 1177, ¹ Pulteney v. Earl of Darlington, 1 Brown Ch. 223, 236, 237; Wheldale v. Partridge, 8 Ves. 226, 236; Van v. Barnett, 19 Ves. 102, 109; Bradish v. Gee, Amb. 229.

§ 1177, ² The intention shown by the act need not be to reconvert; an intention to take the property in its actual condition is enough: Harcourt v. Seymour, 2 Sim., N. S., 12, 46; Cookson v. Cookson, 12 Clark & F. 121, 146; Biddulph v. Biddulph, 12 Ves. 161 (by a will); Prentice v. Janssen, 79 N. Y. 478; Beatty v. Byers, 18 Pa. St. 105.^b

§ 1176, (d) Remaindermen.—Nall v. Nall, 243 Mo. 247, 147 S. W. 1006 (remaindermen may elect as respects their interests); Clifton v. Owens, 170 N. C. 607, 87 S. E. 502 (remainderman cannot elect so as to injure his predecessor).

§ 1177, (a) See, also, Dunham v. Slaughter, 268 Ill. 625, 109 N. E. 673 (contract entered into by all parties).

§1177, (b) See, also, Lincoln v.

Wakefield, 237 Pa. St. 97, 85 Atl. 133. That the intention to reconvert must be manifested by some unequivocal act, and must be pleaded and proved by the party relying thereon, see Bank of Ukiah v. Rice, 143 Cal. 265, 101 Am. St. Rep. 118, 76 Pac. 1020; Mellen v. Mellen, 139 N. Y. 210, 34 N. E. 925; Wayne v. Fouts, 108 Tenn. 145, 65 S. W. 471. § 1178. Double Conversion.—Somewhat similar in its effects to a reconversion, but entirely different in its operation, is a double conversion. The one, as has been shown, operates in disregard of the direction in the will or deed; the other, in conformity with that direction, which it carries into effect. A double conversion takes place when land is directed to be sold and converted into money, and these proceeds are directed to be laid out again in land, the whole forming one continuous obligation. The property in such case is considered to be in that state in which

Particular acts, where land was directed to be sold, etc.: Entry on the land and receiving rents and profits: In re Gordon, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 531; Kirkman v. Miles, 13 Ves. 338;^c Granting leases:^d Crabtree v. Bramble, 3 Atk. 680; Mutlow v. Bigg, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 385. Retaining the land unsold a long time: Dixon v. Gayfere, 17 Beav. 433; Griesbach v. Fremantle, 17 Beav. 314; but see Kirkman v. Miles, supra.^e Acts showing that the trust is at an end: Davies v. Ashford, 15 Sim. 42; Sharp v. St. Sauveur, L. R. 7 Ch. 343; In re Davidson, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 341. Money directed to be laid out in land; actually receiving the money or securities, and other similar acts: Cookson v. Cookson, 12 Clark & F. 121, 147; Harcourt v. Seymour, 2 Sim., N. S., 12; Trafford v. Boehm, 3 Atk. 440; Rook v. Worth, 1 Ves. Sr. 460, 461; In re Pedder, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 890; Gillies v. Longlands, 4 De Gex & S. 372; Lingen v. Sowray, 1 P. Wms. 172, 176.

As a particular application of the same doctrine, where money directed or agreed to be laid out in land *comes into the hands of the person* who would be absolutely entitled to the land if purchased, it is then said to be "at home," and it will thenceforth be considered as money, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention, and will devolve as money. In other words, a presumption thence arises that the party intended to reconvert

§ 1177, (c) For circumstances under which continued receipt of rents is no evidence of such intention, see Foxwell v. Lewis, 30 Ch. Div. 656.

§ 1177, (d) Mortgaging the land: Nall v. Nall, 243 Mo. 247, 147 S. W. 1006. Making oil and gas leases, and granting a railroad right of way: Brandon v. McKinney, 233 Pa. St. 481, 82 Atl. 764. Making sales: In re McClarren's Estate, 238 Pa. St. 220, 85 Atl. 1119. §1177, (e) See, also, Atlee v. Bullard, 123 Iowa, 274, 98 N. W. 889 (where all the persons interested were parties to a partition suit); Condit v. Bigelow, 64 N. J. Eq. 504, 54 Atl. 160 (partition of the land by all the parties interested); but see Meekins v. Branning Mfg. Co., 224 Fed. 202 (delay of fourteen years in exercising power of sale explained by the character of the land and condition of lumber market).

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it is ultimately to be converted,—that is, to be land.^{1 a} Where real estate is directed to be sold and the proceeds invested in the purchase of other lands, the persons who would be interested in the latter if purchased take, in general, the same interests in the former until a sale is effected.²

the property by electing to keep it as moncy, and thus to impress upon it the character of personal estate as hetween his real and his personal representatives. If, however, the money is in the hands of some third person, the absolute owner *must do some act* showing an election to take it as money. The foregoing rule constitutes the conversion "by act of the law" according to the nomenclature of some writers: See Pulteney v. Earl of Darlington, 1 Brown Ch. 223; Wheldale v. Partridge, 8 Ves. 226, 235; Chichester v. Bickerstaff, 2 Vern. 295; In re Pedder, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 890.

§ 1178, 1 Pearson v. Lane, 17 Ves. 101; In re Pedder, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 890; White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144.

§ 1178, 2 Pearson v. Lane, 17 Ves. 101.

§ 1178, (a) The text is cited to Minn. 141, 65 Am. St. Rep. 559, 38 this effect in Lane v. Eaton, 69 L. R. A. 669, 71 N. W. 1031.

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CHAPTER FIFTH. MORTGAGES OF LAND.

SECTION I.

THE ORIGINAL OR ENGLISH DOCTRINE.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1179. The common-law doctrine: Statute of 7 Geo. II., c. 20.
- §1180. Origin and development of the equity jurisdiction; the "equity of redemption."
- § 1181. The equitable theory.
- § 1182. The double system at law and in equity.
- § 1183. The legal and the equitable remedies.
- § 1184. Peculiarities of the English system.
- § 1185. Subsequent mortgages equitable, not legal.

§ 1179. The Common-law Doctrine.—In no other department has the equity jurisprudence as administered in this country departed so widely from that administered in England as in the department which is concerned with mortgages, and the respective rights, liabilities, and remedies of the mortgagor and the mortgagee. No correct notion can be obtained of equity as it now exists within the United States without an accurate and full appreciation of these differences.¹ At the common law the ordinary mortgage

§ 1179, ¹ The subject of mortgages is so large, involving such a vast mass of detail, and presents so many differing aspects in the various states of our own country, that whole treatises are required for its adequate discussion. As in the case of trusts, I shall only attempt a statement of the principles and more general doctrines which constitute its framework; for the more special rules and practical applications the reader must be referred to more elaborate works. I desire at the outset to acknowledge the great assistance which I have received from Mr. Jones's most excellent treatise. I shall not dwell at large upon the ancient common-law dogmas, nor describe in detail the growth of the equity doctrines by which the effect of these dogmas was destroyed. It will suffice to state in general terms the two legal and equitable theories which exist simultaneously in England, and then to explain with some more fullness the modifications which have

was to all intents and purposes a conveyance of the legal estate. A mortgage in fee immediately vested the mortgagee with the legal title, subject, however, to be defeated by the mortgagor's performing the condition by paying the money upon the prescribed pay-day. If on that very day the mortgagor performed the condition by paying the money, he thereby put an end to the mortgagee's estate; the legal estate was revested in himself, and with it he had the right at once to re-enter upon the land, and to recover its possession by an appropriate action at law. But if the mortgagor for any reason suffered the pay-day to go by without paying or tendering the amount due, all his right was utterly and forever lost; the estate of the mortgagee, which had before been upon condition, now became absolute, with all the features and incidents of absolute legal ownership. This purely legal theory of the mortgage has continued in force in England to the present day, until the existing judicature act went into operation;² and during that interval it has constantly prevailed and been acted upon in the English courts of law without any modification except that introduced by a statute passed during the reign of George II.³ This statute has always been strictly con-

been made in the American states, and the resulting systems which form a part of our equity jurisprudence. It will be seen that little aid can be derived from the English decisions expounding the theory which prevails in that country, even in those very few states whose jurisprudence on this subject bears some resemblance to the English, while in a majority of the states the modern decisions of the English courts have no application whatever. It may be added that in all of the succeeding discussion I assume that the mortgage is in fee, which is almost invariably the fact in this country, although in England mortgages in fee are not, I believe, very common. Mortgages of long terms of years, so frequent in England, are virtually unknown with us.

§ 1179, ² See this act, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, secs. 24, 25, *ante*, vol. 1, § 40, note 1. Since this act declares that the rules of equity shall prevail over those of the law when conflicting, in all the courts, it seems to follow as a necessary consequence that the purely legal theory of the mortgage can no longer be enforced.

§ 1179, 3 7 Geo. II., c. 20. This statute enacted that when an action at law was brought on the bond, or ejectment to recover possession of the III-175 strued, and held applicable only in the cases mentioned by its express terms, where a suit at law is brought by the mortgagee.⁴

§ 1180. Origin and Development of the Equity Jurisdiction—The "Equity of Redemption."—As this common-law doctrine, with all of its accompanying incidents, was exceedingly harsh in its operation, and often worked grievous wrong to mortgagors, equity interfered, and by degrees built up a distinct theory of mortgages which is one of the most magnificent triumphs of equity jurisprudence. The basis of this system was the fundamental maxim that equity looks at the intent, rather than the form, and the resulting general principle that equity could and should relieve against legal penalties and forfeitures, when the person in whose behalf they were enforced could be fairly and suffi-

land on the mortgage, the mortgagor might, pending the suit, pay to the mortgagee the deht, interest, and all costs expended in any suit at law or in equity; or in case of a refusal to accept the same, might bring such money into court where the action was pending, which moneys so paid or brought into court were declared to be a satisfaction of the mortgage, and the court was required to compel, by an order of the court, the mortgagor. This statute has been substantially re-enacted in several of the American states: New Jersey: Nixon's Digest, 4th ed., 608; Connecticut: Gen. Stats. 1875, 471;^a Virginia Code: 1873, c. 131, sec. 21.^b

§ 1179, 4 Goodtitle v. Notitle, 11 Moore, 491; Doe v. Clifton, 4 Ad. & E. 809; Shields v. Lozear, 34 N. J. L. 496, 3 Am. Rep. 256; Davis v. Teays, 3 Gratt. 283; 1 Jones on Mortgages, sec. 9. In Shields v. Lozear, *supra*, Depue, J., said: "In cases strictly within the terms of this statute, the English courts of law have exercised an equitable jurisdiction to enforce a redemption on payment of the mortgage debt after default in payment, according to the condition, by compelling a reconveyance. Except in cases within this statute, the doctrine of the English courts is in accordance with the ancient common law, that at law a failure to pay at the day prescribed forfeits the estate of the mortgagor under the condition, leaving him only an equity of redemption, which chancery will lay hold of and give effect to by compelling a reconveyance on equitable terms."

§ 1179, (a) Connecticut. — Gen. § 1179, (b) Virginia.—Code 1887, Stats. 1888, sec. 1054. sec. 2742.

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ciently compensated by an award of money.¹ As early as the reign of James I. the court of chancery had begun to relieve the mortgagor; and in the reign of Charles I. his right to redeem after a failure to perform the conditionthat is, to come in and pay the debt and interest and recover the land after the pay-day-had become fully established and recognized as a part of the equity jurisprudence.² This equitable right of the mortgagor was termed his "equity of redemption," which is simply an abbreviation of his "right to redeem in equity." At first this right of the mortgagor was regarded as a mere right or thing in action; and at the close of the reign of Charles II. the equity of redemption was said to be a mere right to recover the land in equity after a failure to perform the condition, and not to be an estate in the land.³ This narrow view, however, was soon abandoned; the equitable theory was developed and became more consistent and complete, until, in 1737, Lord Hardwicke laid down the doctrine as already established, and which has since been regarded as the very central conception of the equitable theory that an equity of redemption is (in equity) an estate in the land which may be devised, granted, or entailed with remainders; that it cannot be considered as a mere right only, but such an estate whereof there may be a seisin; and that the person therefore entitled to the equity of redemption is considered as the owner of the land, and a mortgage in fee is considered as personal assets.⁴

§ 1180, ¹ See ante, vol. 1, §§ 378, 381, 382, 433, where this maxim and its effects are explained.

§ 1180, ² Emanuel College v. Evans, 1 Rep. in Ch. 18; 1 Jones on Mortgages, sees. 6. 7; Coote on Mortgages, 4th ed., 15.

§ 1180, 3 Roscarrick v. Barton, 1 Cas. in Ch. 217; 1 Jones on Mortgages, sec. 6. In this case, Lord Chief Justice Hale protested very vehemently against these encroachments of equity, and especially against any further extension of the right of redemption. He said, among other things: "By the growth of equity on equity, the heart of the common law is eaten ont, and legal settlements are destroyed."

§ 1180, 4 Casborne v. Scarfe, 1 Atk. 603. It was argued in this case that where a wife was the mortgagor, her equity of redemption was not an

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§ 1181. The Equitable Theory.²—While the mortgagee is still regarded at law as vested with the legal title followed by all of its incidents, the following general theory is established as a part of the equity jurisprudence. The mortgagor, both after and before a breach of the condition. is regarded as the real owner of the land subject to the lien of the mortgage, and liable to have all his estate, interest, and right finally cut off and destroyed by a foreclosure. Prior to such foreclosure, he is vested with an equitable estate in the land which has all the incidents of absolute ownership; it may be conveyed or devised, will descend to his heirs, may be cut up into lesser estates, and generally may be dealt with in the same manner as the absolute legal ownership, always subject, however, to the lien of the mortgage. On the other hand, the mortgage is regarded primarily as a security; the debt is the principal fact, and the mortgage is collateral thereto; the interest which it confers on the mortgagee is a *lien on* the land, and not an *estate in* the land; it is a thing in action, and may therefore be assigned and transferred without a conveyance of the land itself; it is personal assets, and on the death of the mortgagee it passes to his executors or administrators, and not to his heirs.^{1 b}

estate in the land so that her husband could be entitled to curtesy therein; that she was not seised, since the legal estate was vested in the mortgagee, but she only had a right of action whereby she might compel a reconveyance of the land to herself upon payment of the amount due. This narrow view was rejected by the court.

§ 1181, 1 3 Washburn on Real Property, c. 16, sec. 4.

§ 1181, (a) This section is cited in Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 11 Am. St. Rep. 288, 19 Pac. 641; Bredenberg v. Landrum, 32 S. C. 215, 10 S. E. 956, and in First State Bank of Le Sueur v. Sibley County Bank, 96 Minn. 456, 105 N. W. 485, 489 (since a mortgage is a thing in action a parol trust for the benefit of others may be attached to it).

§1181, (b) Its descent as per-

sonalty is not altered by the fact that the mortgagee had been in possession for three years, and that thereafter his widow, as life tenant, remained in possession until the equity of redemption was barred by the statute of limitations: In re Loveridge, [1902] 2 Ch. 859, following Attorney-General v. Vigor, 8 Ves. 256, 277, and Flack v. Longmate, 8 Beav. 420, 424.

§ 1182. The Double System at Law and in Equity.—As these two conflicting theories have existed side by side, it follows that the rights, liabilities, and remedies of the mortgagor and the mortgagee in England have been very different when administered by the courts of law or the court of chancery. In law, the mortgagee is clothed with the entire legal estate, while the mortgagor has no estate whatever, and after a default no right except that given by the statute, mentioned in a former paragraph.¹ In equity, the mortgagee has no estate, but only a lien; while the mortgagor is clothed with the equitable estate called the "equity of redemption," which is to all intents and purposes the full ownership, except that it is subject to be cut off and destroyed by a proceeding to enforce the mortgage. It should be carefully noticed that by this theory the mortgagor's estate is wholly an equitable one; neither in equity nor at law is he regarded as retaining the legal estate. In law, the mortgagee is entitled to possession of the land even before the condition is broken, and may recover such possession upon his legal title, either before or after condition broken, in an action of ejectment against the mortgagor, or against any other person not having a paramount title; while the mortgagor cannot maintain ejectment for the possession even against a third person, since the legal title is outstanding in the mortgagee, and a plaintiff can recover in ejectment only upon the strength of his own legal title.² In equity, neither the mortgagee nor the mortgagor can maintain an action for the mere possession, since that remedy is wholly a legal one; but the mortgagor may maintain a suit to redeem from the mortgagee in possession,

§ 1182, 1 See ante, sec. 1179.

§ 1182, ² The English law is strictly logical in these conclusions, but the American *legal* theory, by a curious inconsistency, rejects them. The difference between the English legal theory and the American legal theory in this respect should be carefully noted. Even in those states which have preserved the legal and the equitable theories distinct, and which have to some extent adopted the English system, the legal theory has been more or less modified by the equity doctrines.

and having thus redeemed is entitled to a reconveyance and delivery of possession. In law, the mortgagee may convey the land itself by deed, or devise it by will, and on his death intestate, it will descend to his heirs. In equity, his interest is a mere thing in action assignable as such, and a deed of the land by him would operate merely as an assignment of the mortgage; and in administering the estate of a deceased mortgagee, a court of equity treats the mortgage as personal assets, to be dealt with by the executor or administrator.^{3 a}

§ 1183. The Legal and Equitable Remedies.—The mortgagee can avail himself of both legal and equitable remedies; he may sue at law for the debt, or recover possession of the land by ejectment, or resort to the equitable remedy of foreclosure. As a matter of fact, the mortgagee, in England, ordinarily enforces his security, upon the mortgagor's default, by obtaining possession of the land and appropriating the rents and profits. This possession he acquires either by voluntary surrender from the mortgagor or by a recovery in ejectment. Having obtained the possession, he may by a suit in equity cut off and destroy the mortgagor's estate or equity of redemption by a decree for a strict foreclosure. The method of foreclosing by a decree for a sale of the premises, which so generally prevails in the United States, is very seldom adopted in England. The mortgagee having obtained possession either by voluntary surrender, by entry, or by ejectment, the mortgagor may regain his title by means of the equitable suit for a redemption, whereby the mortgagee is compelled to account for the rents and profits which he has received, the amount due to him is fixed, and on its payment the interest of the mortgagee is ended, and the mortgagor becomes entitled to a reconveyance and the possession.¹

§ 1182, 3 1 Washburn on Real Property, c. 16, secs. 4, pars. 10–14, 34. **§ 1183**, 1 1 Washburn on Real Property, c. 16, secs. 5, pars. 16–18.

§1182, (a) Quoted in Barrett v. Hinckley, 124 Ill. 32, 7 Am. St. Rep. 331, 14 N. E. 863.

2791 MORTGAGES: THE ENGLISH DOCTRINE. §§ 1184, 1185

§ 1184. Peculiarities of the English System.—The peculiarity of this double system should be remarked: that while equity has carefully built up its own theory, so different in all points from that prevailing at law, it has never attempted to interfere directly with the legal doctrines, nor have the law courts modified their own legal theory by voluntarily introducing equitable notions. The two theories have stood side by side, each administered by its own tribunals as though the other had no existence. Equity has so refrained from any direct invasion of the legal domain, that whenever a mortgagor has redeemed after a default, either by a payment of the debt voluntarily accepted or by means of a decree in a suit to redeem, the legal title does not thereby return to the mortgagor; having once been vested in the mortgagee, it can only be restored to the mortgagor by a legal conveyance. After a redemption of any kind, therefore, a deed from the mortgagee to the mortgagor is necessary to invest the latter with the full legal title, and a decree in a suit for redemption directs such a conveyance to be executed as the only means of restoring the mortgagor to his original legal estate.^{1 a}

§ 1185. Subsequent Mortgages Equitable.—Another striking, but strictly logical, result of the system exists when the same mortgagor, being originally the legal owner, gives successive mortgages on the same land to different persons, which are all outstanding together. If the legal owner in fee gives a first mortgage in fee to A, he thereby, as has been shown, conveys the entire legal estate, and A becomes vested with the legal title; and it is then impossible for the mortgagor to convey the legal estate to other persons by any subsequent deed or mortgage while the prior mortgage to A is outstanding, for he does not himself hold such legal estate. If, therefore, the mortgagor executes any subsequent mortgage or mortgages to B, C, D, upon the

§ 1184, 1 1 Washburn on Real Property, c. 16, sec. 5, pars. 16–18.

§1184, (a) This section is cited in Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Galeton Cotton Mills, 94 Fed. 269, 36 C. C. A. 236.

same land, these subsequent mortgagees do not thereby obtain the legal estate; they are not regarded, even by courts of law, as vested with a legal title; their estate and title are purely equitable, and such subsequent mortgages are in every sense, even in courts of law, regarded and treated as *equitable* and not legal mortgages. The same doctrine is expressed by the statement that a mortgage of the equity of redemption is necessarily an equitable mortgage.¹

SECTION II.

THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1186. In general: Two methods prevailing.
- § 1187. First method: Both the legal and the equitable theories; states arranged alphabetically in foot-note.
- § 1188. Second method: The equitable theory alone; states arranged in foot-note.
- § 1189. The same: The mortgagee in possession.
- § 1190. The same: Equitable remedies of the parties.
- § 1191. Definition of mortgage.

§ 1186. In General — Two Methods Prevailing.—The English system, with the two theories, legal and equitable,

§ 1185, ¹ By the legal theory the mortgagor, having parted with his legal estate, cannot, of course, convey it by a second deed to another person,—he has at law no estate left. By the equitable theory the mortgagor's estate—his equity of redemption—is purely equitable, and a conveyance of it simply transfers this equitable estate to the grantee, while a mortgage of it is simply the mortgage of an equitable estate, and therefore itself equitable. The fact that the first mortgagee has a legal title, while the subsequent mortgagees obtain only an equitable interest even at law, is the foundation of the English doctrine of "tacking": See *ante*, vol. 2, secs. 767–769.

By a strange inconsistency, this logical result of the legal theory is rejected by the courts of those states which have adopted the double system of law and of equity concerning mortgages; and they hold that in a series of prior and subsequent mortgages each and every mortgagee obtains the legal estate. This is one of the marked differences between the *legal* system in England and that prevailing in American states.

§ 1186

standing so opposed to each other in every point, and each complete in itself, has not been wholly adopted in any of our states. The equitable principles have penetrated the legal theory, and more or less modified it in every state. The result is, that even in those states which preserve the legal theory at all, and regard the mortgage as in any sense conveying a legal estate, many of the incidents of such legal title are abandoned; the mortgagee is the legal owner only for certain purposes and to a certain extent,the legal owner as between himself and the mortgagor,clothed with the legal title only so far as is considered necessary to preserve the mortgage as a valid security; while for all other purposes, and as against all other persons not claiming under or through the mortgagee, the mortgagor is regarded, even at law, as retaining the legal estate with all of its incidents and qualities.¹ The courts and legislatures of nearly one half of the states have taken a further step, and by adopting the equitable theory alone have completely reversed the positions occupied by the mortgagor and the mortgagee under the English system. In the jurisprudence of the various states and territories of this country, two differing conceptions of the total nature and effect of mortgages now exist,-two distinct modes of regarding and regulating the rights, liabilities, and remedies of the parties. These two methods must be separately described, and the states adopting them must be arranged in two corresponding classes.

§ 1186, ¹ See Glass v. Ellison, 9 N. H. 69; Barnard v. Eaton, 2 Cush. 294, 304; Conard v. Atlantic etc. Co., 1 Pet. 386, 441; Evans v. Merriken, 8 Gill & J. 39, 47; Clark v. Reyburn, 1 Kan. 281; Timms v. Shanhon, 19 Md. 296, 81 Am. Dec. 632. This conception of the mortgage is undoubtedly illogical and anomalous, a hybrid union of legal and equitable doctrines, and even more confusing than the sharply defined double system of the English jurisprudence. Such a result necessarily follows from the action of courts in admitting equitable principles to be blended with the legal dogmas, but without accepting those principles in all their length and breadth, and abandoning wholly the legal theory maintained by the English courts of law. This last step, when taken, produces a system single, uniform, consistent, and just. § 1187. First Method—Both the Legal and the Equitable Theories.—The essential feature of this system, adopted by the courts of all the states in which the system prevails, is the doctrine that as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, the mortgagee acquires and holds the legal estate *at law*, while the estate of the mortgagor—his equity of redemption—is entirely an equitable estate. To this extent the system agrees with that prevailing in the English courts; but this agreement is only partial.¹ In all the

§ 1187, ¹ I complete the general description of the text by adding a brief statement of the special and incidental doctrines adopted in each of the states which have followed this type. The reader will thus be enabled to compare the exact system of his own state with those prevailing in other commonwealths, and to determine how far the decisions in other states agree with the methods pursued by the courts of his own, and how far they may therefore be regarded as having authority.

Alabama.—The legal estate of the mortgagee and the equitable interest of the mortgagor are preserved very distinct. As against the mortgagor, the mortgagee is entitled to possession; but as against all other persons but the mortgagee and those holding under him, the mortgagor is the owner, and entitled to possession:^a Knox v. Easton, 38 Ala. 345; Welsh v. Phillips, 54 Ala. 309, 25 Am. Rep. 679. The mortgage conveys the legal estate, and the mortgagee is entitled to immediate possession: Knox v. Easton; Doe v. McLoskey, 1 Ala. 708.^b After default, the mortgagee's legal estate is absolute, his right to possession complete, and the mortgagor's only interest is equitable:^c Paulling v. Barron, 32 Ala. 9; Barker v. Bell, 37 Ala. 354. After default, it seems doubtful whether the mortgagor can regain the legal estate by mere payment, without a reconveyance from the mortgagee: Barker v. Bell; Powell v. Williams, 14 Ala. 476, 48 Am. Dec. 105.^d

Arkansas.—The legal estate passes to the mortgagee, and he is entitled to possession at once, unless the mortgage itself shows a contrary intent.^e

§1187, (a) Alabama.—See Cotton v. Carlisle, 85 Ala. 175, 7 Am. St. Rep. 29, and note, 4 South. 670.

§1187, (b) Brown v. Loeb, 177 'Ala. 106, 58 South. 330.

§ 1187, (c) See High v. Hoffman, 129 Ala. 359, 29 South. 658; Fields v. Clayton, 117 Ala. 538, 67 Am. St. Rep. 189, 23 South. 530; Brown v. Loeb, 177 Ala. 106, 58 South. 330 (mortgagee may recover in ejectment after law-day without proof of non-payment of debt; payment is an affirmative defense to be proved by the mortgagor).

§1187, (d) But the doubt is now resolved in favor of the mortgagor by statute: See Farris v. Houston, 78 Ala. 250.

§1187, (e) Arkansas.—Wilson v. Rogers, 97 Ark. 369, 134 S. W. 318. states which have adopted the method, the mortgagor while in possession is considered, at law as well as in equity, both after and before a breach of the condition, to be the legal:

hut he is certainly entitled to possession upon a default by the mortgagor: Kannady v. McCarron, 18 Ark. 166; Terry v. Rosell, 32 Ark. 478. The mortgagee may recover possession by ejectment, and upon the mortgagor's default may sne at law for the debt, and in ejectment to recover possession of the land, and in equity for a foreclosure and sale, pursuing all or any of these remedies at the same time: ¹ Fitzgerald v. Beehe, 7 Ark. 310, 46 Am. Dec. 285; Gilchrist v. Patterson, 18 Ark. 575; Reynolds v. Canal etc. Co., 30 Ark. 520.

Connecticut.g-The mortgagee acquires the legal estate in a modified and partial sense; that is, as against the mortgagor, and for the purpose of preserving his security, and hy virtue of this estate, he may obtain possession by ejectment: Rockwell v. Bradley, 2 Conn. 1, 5; Beach v. Clark, 6 Conn. 354; Chamberlain v. Thompson, 10 Conn. 243, 251, 26 Am. Dec. 390; Middletown Sav. Bank v. Bates, 11 Conn. 519, 523. Against all persons except the mortgagee and his assigns, the mortgagor is the owner; his estate as against the mortgagee is purely equitable, but as against others it is to all intents the legal ownership with all its incidents and qualities: Ibid. While the mortgagor is in possession, he is so far treated as possessing a legal right that he may maintain trespass against the mortgagee; but the mortgagee's estate is so much a legal one, that after a default the mortgagor's only right is in equity, and his only remedy is equitable,-a suit to redeem: Chamberlain v. Thompson, supra. If the mortgage is paid after a default, it is no longer an encumbrance, hut may he a cloud upon the mortgagor's title; which implies that payment under such circumstances does not ipso facto revest the mortgagor with the full legal estate: Griswold v. Mather, 5 Conn. 435, 440; Doton v. Russell, 17 Conn. 146, 154; Town of Clinton v. Town of Westbrook, 38 Conn. 9; New Haven etc. Bank v. McPartlan, 40 Conn. 90; and in such a case, if the mortgagee retains the legal title, he holds it as a trustee for the mortgagor: Dudley v. Cadwell, 19 Conn. 218, 227; Cross v. Robinson, 21 Conn. 379, 387.

Delaware.—The theory of this state is peculiar, and except for one feature of it, the state should be placed in the second class. Prior to any default of the mortgagor, the legal title remains in him; the mortgagee has

§ 1187, (1) Arkansas.—See Chollar v. Temple, 39 Ark. 238. Although the mortgagee is entitled to possession, until he takes it legally, the possession of the mortgagor is not illegal: Stewart v. Scott, 54 Ark. 187, 15 S. W. 463.

§1187, (g) Connecticut.---O'Brien v. Miller, 117 Fed. 1000. § 1187

owner as against all persons except the mortgagee and those claiming under him; and in most of the states he is regarded, against all such persons, as the legal owner, and

only a lien, and is not entitled to possession either in law or in equity. But after the mortgagor makes default and the mortgagee obtains possession, the legal title vests in the latter, and he can hold such possession against the mortgagor, who is then thrown upon his equitable remedy of redemption: Doe v. Tunnell, 1 Houst. $320.^{h}$ It seems, however, that upon a breach of the condition the mortgagee may recover possession from the mortgagor in ejectment, and this is the single feature which ranges the state in the first class. It is held that after default the mortgagee may pursue *all the remedies* which the law gives, and this seems to include ejectment, *sed quære*: Newhold v. Newbold, 1 Del. Ch. 310. As against all persons but the mortgagee and his assigns, the mortgagor is the true and legal owner: Cooch's Lessee v. Gerry, 3 Harr. (Del.) 280.

Illinois.—The legal and equitable theories are maintained in this state with great distinctness. The mortgagee acquires such a legal estate as against the mortgagor that he can recover the possession at once, unless the mortgage itself provides for possession to be retained by the mortgagor; and upon default in any payment he is always entitled to possession:⁴ Delahay v. Clement, 3 Scam. 201; Vansant v. Allmon, 23 Ill. 30; Carroll v. Ballance, 26 Ill. 9, 79 Am. Dec. 354; Nelson v. Pinegar, 30 Ill. 473; Jackson v. Warren, 32 Ill. 331; Pollock v. Maison, 41 Ill. 516; Harper v. Ely, 70 Ill. 581. Against all persons except the mortgagee and those holding under him, the mortgagor is the legal owner;^j while as against the mortgagee and his assigns, his estate is purely equitable, and his reme-

§1187, (h) Delaware.—See Fox v. Wharton, 5 Del. Ch. 200. Statements in recent cases, if taken at their face value, would seem to place Delaware in the second class: See Malsberger v. Parsons, 1 Boyce (24 Del.), 254, 75 Atl. 698, 100 Atl. 786.

§ 1187, (1) Illinois.—See Taylor v. Adam, 115 Ill. 570, 4 N. E. 837; and especially Barrett v. Hinckley, 124 Ill. 32, 7 Am. St. Rep. 331, 14 N. E. 863. In Kransz v. Uedelhofen, 193 Ill. 477, 62 N. E. 239, it is said, however, "that the equitable theory of a mortgage has, in process of time, made material encroachments upon this legal theory." Hence it is now held that the mortgagee cannot sue for possession before condition broken. See cases cited in Kransz v. Uedelhofen, *supra*. The mortgagee can bring ejectment only after condition broken. The mortgagee suing in ejectment may allege a fee, without describing it as a base or determinable fee. The mortgagor may show under the general issue that the debt has been satisfied; but the burden of proof is upon him: Ladd v. Ladd, 252 Ill. 43, 96 N. E. 561.

§ 1187, (J) Adams v. Shirk, 117 Fed. 801, 55 C. C. A. 25; Re Buchner, 202 Fed. 979. Where, however, the mortgage is by deed with a bond to reconvey, the legal as entitled to the possession, although he may not be in actual possession. The mortgage being a conveyance of the legal estate, and not a mere lien between the immediate

dies after condition broken are wholly equitable: *Ibid.;* Fitch v. Pinckard, 4 Scam. 69; Vallette v. Bennett, 69 Ill. 632. The mortgagee is permitted to pursue all his remedies at the same time,—action at law for the debt, ejectment for the possession, and in equity for a strict foreclosure or for a sale of the premises: Karnes v. Lloyd, 52 Ill. 113; Erickson v. Rafferty, 79 Ill. 209. Although the legal title is in the mortgagee as against the mortgagor, still a third person not claiming under the mortgagee cannot defeat the mortgagor's action of ejectment against himself by setting up such title outstanding in the mortgagee, even after that title has been made *legally* absolute by a breach of the condition: Hall v. Lance, 25 Ill. 277.

Kentucky.—The theory, legal and equitable, is the same as in Illinois. The mortgage is a conveyance of the legal estate to the mortgagee; he is entitled to possession after a default, and also before a default unless the mortgage itself provides for possession by the mortgagor. The mortgagor's estate as between him and the mortgagee is purely equitable,—a mere equity of redemption: Redman v. Sanders, 2 Dana, 68; Brookover v. Hurst, 1 Met. 665; Stewart v. Barrow, 7 Bush, 368; see Woolley v. Holt, 14 Bush, 788. It is held that a mortgagor cannot prevent the legal operation of the mortgage—that is, cannot defend an action at law—by showing that its execution was obtained from him by fraud: Brookover v. Hurst, supra.

Maine.^k—The mortgagee acquires the legal estate, and may recover possession before default if the mortgage does not otherwise provide: Blaney v. Bearce, 2 Me. 132. The mortgagee's possession is even declared by express statute: Rev. Stats. 1871, c. 90, sec. 2. As against the mortgagee and those holding under or through him, the mortgagor's estate is equitable only; but as against all others, it is the legal ownership with all of its incidents: Wilkins v. French, 20 Me. 111.

title not remaining in the mortgagor, his interest is not one that can be passed only by conveyance under seal, but an equitable interest which passes by assignment of the bond: Williams v. Williams, 270 Ill. 552, 110 N. E. 876.

§ 1187, (k) Maine.—Morse v. Stafford, 95 Me. 31, 49 Atl. 45; Golder v. Golder, 95 Me. 259, 49 Atl. 1050. See, however, Hussey v. Fisher, 94 Me. 301, 47 Atl. 525. See, also, W. A. Allen Co. v. Emerton, 108 Me. 221, 79 Atl. 905. Where the mortgagee under a mortgage conditioned for support joined in a lease of the property, this precludes her from suing for possession on account of default prior to the expiration of the term: Powers v. Hambleton, 106 Me. 217, 76 Atl. 675. parties thereto, the mortgagee is entitled to the possession of the premises, at least after the condition is broken, and may recover such possession from the mortgagor by a legal

Maryland. — The mortgagee obtains the legal estate, and with it the right to immediate possession: Brown v. Stewart, 1 Md. Ch. 87; McKim v. Mason, 3 Md. Ch. 186; Leighton v. Preston, 9 Gill, 201; Jamieson v. Bruce, 6 Gill & J. 72, 26 Am. Dec. 557; Sumwalt v. Tucker, 34 Md. 89; Annapolis etc. R. R. v. Gantt, 39 Md. 115. The mortgagee is permitted to enforce all his remedies at the same time: Brown v. Stewart; Wilhelm v. Lee, 2 Md. Ch. 322. Although he has the equitable estate only as against the mortgagee, as against third persons the mortgagor is the true owner, and holds the legal title subject to the rights of the mortgagee. The mortgagor, when permitted by the mortgagee to retain the possession, may recover in ejectment against a third person who cannot defend by the outstanding legal title in the mortgagee: Georges Creek etc. Co. v. Detmold, 1 Md. 225, 237; and as owner he may maintain a legal action for injury done to the estate by a third person: Annapolis etc. R. R. v. Gantt.

Massachusetts.-In this state the English theory is retained with more fullness than in any other of the states; and the absence of a full equitable jurisdiction through a large part of its judicial history has made the legal aspect of mortgages, and the legal remedies of mortgagees, more important perhaps than the equitable view. The legal estate of the mortgagee is complete, and accompanied with all its incidents; the mortgagor's estate is wholly equitable as between the parties, but as against third persons it has more the qualities of a legal ownership. The view of the Massachusetts courts can be most clearly explained in the language of one or two leading cases. In Ewer v. Hohbs, 5 Met. 1, 3, Shaw, C. J., said: "The first great object of a mortgage is, in the form of a conveyance in fee, to give to the mortgagee an effectual security, by the pledge or hypothecation of real estate, for the payment of a debt, or the performance of some other obligation. The next is, to leave to the mortgagor, and to purchasers, creditors, and all others claiming derivatively through him, the full and entire control, disposition, and ownership of the estate, subject only to the first purpose,---that of securing the mortgagee. Hence it is that, as between the mortgagor and mortgagee, the mortgage is to be regarded as a conveyance in fee; because that construction best secures him in his remedy

§ 1187, (1) Maryland. — Commercial Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Robinson, 90 Md. 615, 45 Atl. 449. Where the mortgage does not contain a provision that the mortgagor may remain in possession until default, the mortgagee has a right to possession at any time upon default: Mayor, etc., of Hagerstown v. Groh, 101 Md. 560, 4 Ann. Cas. 943, 61 Atl. 467. See, also, Baker v. Baker, 108 Md. 269, 129 Am. St. Rep. 439, 70 Atl. 418. action; but in many, and even in most, of these states the mortgagor may retain the possession until a default is made. In respect to the foregoing essential features there

and his ultimate right to the estate, and to its incidents, the rents and profits. But in all other respects, until foreclosure [i. e., a strict foreclosure], when the mortgagee becomes the absolute owner, the mortgage is deemed to be a lien or charge, subject to which the estate may be conveyed, attached, and in other respects dealt with as the estate of the mortgagor. And all statutes upon the subject are to be so construed; and all rules of law, whether administered in law or equity, are to be so applied as to carry these objects into effect." In Howard v. Robinson, 5 Cush. 119, 123, the same judge said: "Mortgaging is not such a conveying away of the estate as divests the entire title of the owner. It is a charge or encumbrance created out of that estate, and may amount to a small part only of its value. Although, as between the mortgagor and mortgagee, it is a transmission of the fee, which gives the mortgagee a remedy in the form of ā real action, and constitutes a legal seisin, yet as to most other purposes a mortgage, before the entry of the mortgagee, is but a pledge and real lien, leaving the mortgagor to most purposes the real owner." The mortgagee is entitled to enter and to hold possession; and after a default by the mortgagor an ordinary form of remedy by the mortgagee is a recovery of possession by an appropriate action at law,-a real action. Having thus obtained possession he is regarded as the legal owner, subject to the mortgagor's equitable remedy of redemption; he may convey the land, and on his death intestate it descends to his heirs. His legal estate is ordinarily made absolute by a strict foreclosure, rather than by a decree for a judicial sale: Bradley v. Fuller, 23 Pick. 1, 9; Hapgood v. Blood, 11 Gray, 400; Sparhawk v. Bagg, 16 Gray, 583; Steel v. Steel, 4 Allen, 417; Silloway v. Brown, 12 Allen, 30; Norcross v. Norcross, 105 Mass. 265.m Able text-writers who are accustomed to and familiar with the theory prevailing in Massachusetts and other New England states have sometimes failed. I think, to appreciate the extent to which the purely equitable

§ 1187, (m) Massachusetts.—As to all the world except the mortgagee, the mortgagor is the owner, at least until the mortgagee enters for possession. A mortgagor cannot affect the rights of his mortgagee after they are fixed, without the latter's consent, by giving a lease. An action for waste was brought by a junior mortgagee out of possession. Held, the plaintiff had an interest in the property such as would support such an action; he could sue the mortgagor and hence the mortgagor's tenant: Delano v. Smith, 206 Mass. 365, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 474, 92 N. E. 500. The mortgagee's interest is an interest in real estate, which is taxable as such on his death: Hawkridge v. Burrill, 223 Mass. 134, 111 N. E. 707. is a general agreement in the jurisprudence of all the states which compose this first class; but with regard to other and incidental matters there is a divergence in their rules which

system has been followed in other states, and have been inclined to represent the Massachusetts type as adopted throughout the entire country, with the exception of a *very few* states, and they have thus conveyed an erroneous impression concerning the general American doctrine. See, for example, the chapters on mortgages in Professor Washburn's great work on real property.

Mississippi.-This state, like Delaware, should be placed in the second class, were it not for a single feature of the system. As against all third persons, and as against the mortgagee himself until a breach of the condition, the legal estate, both in law and in equity, remains in the mortgagor, and the interest of the mortgagee is merely an equitable lien. But upon the mortgagor's default in not complying with the condition, the legal title is considered as passing to the mortgagee, and with it the right to recover possession of the land by an action of ejectment: Harmon v. Short, 8 Smedes & M. 433; Hill v. Robertson, 24 Miss. 368; and this rule is established by statute: Rev. Code 1880, sec. 1204. But even after possession has thus heen acquired, the mortgagee's interest is not a full legal estate; it is still a lien or pledge, and is personal rather than real property. The single fact that the mortgagee may thus recover possession by a legal action before foreclosure is the only feature which preserves any resemblance to the old common-law system, and practically the equitable theory seems to prevail over the legal. In Buckley v. Daley, 45 Miss. 338, 345, Peyton, C. J., speaking of the mortgagee's interest after he had thus obtained possession, said: "The relation of debtor and creditor exists, and the equity of redemption is unimpaired. Although the mortgagee has a chattel interest only, yet, in order to render his pledge available, and give him the intended benefit of his security, it is considered as real property to enable him to maintain ejectment for the recovery of the possession of the land mortgaged; when contemplated in every other point of view, it is personal property." See, also, Carpenter v. Bowen, 42 Miss. 28, 49; Buck v. Payne, 52 Miss. 271. It is very plain that the legal estate of the mortgagee in possession is nominal only, and is very different from the mortgagee's estate under the same circumstances in Massachusetts.

Missouri.—The doctrine is similar to that in Mississippi. The mortgagor holds the legal estate against all third persons, and against the mortgagee himself, until a breach of the condition; but upon a default, the legal interest passes to the mortgagee to such an extent that he may recover possession of the premises by a legal action:^{**n**} Walcop v. McKinney's Heirs,

§1187, (n) Missouri.—Bailey v. Until entry by the mortgagee for Winn, 101 Mo. 649, 12 S. W. 1045. condition broken, the mortgage is prevents any further generalization. It should be added, however, that in most of these states the equitable theory is the one which chiefly prevails in practice; mortgagors are

10 Mo. 229; Kennett v. Plummer, 28 Mo. 142; Sutton v. Mason, 38 Mo. 120; Woods v. Hilderhrand, 46 Mo. 284, 2 Am. Rep. 513; Johnson v. Houston, 47 Mo. 227; Reddick v. Gressman, 49 Mo. 389. And if the debt is payable in installments, a failure to pay any one of them is such a default that the mortgagee may at once recover possession by a legal action: Reddick v. Gressman. This legal interest, however, is so far from being a full and complete estate, and it partakes so much of the nature of a mere lien, that upon payment of the debt it is *ipso facto* destroyed, and the mortgagor becomes at once vested with an absolute legal estate, without any reconveyance: Pease v. Pilot Knob Iron Co., 49 Mo. 124. Practically, therefore, the equitable theory prevails in this state.

New Hampshire.-The theory and the practice resemble those in Massachusetts. The mortgage is a conveyance and passes the legal title, the seisin, and the right of possession immediately to the mortgagee. As against him the mortgagor has, before default, the mere legal right to regain the title by a performance of the condition; while after a default he has nothing but an equity of redemption: Brown v. Cram, 1 N. H. 169; McMurphy v. Minot, 4 N. H. 251, 255; Southerin v. Mendum, 5 N. H. 420; Hohart v. Sanborn, 13 N. H. 226, 38 Am. Dec. 483; Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 439. Against all other persons, however, not holding under the mortgagee, the mortgagor is so far the legal owner that he may recover possession of the land by an action at law: Ellison v. Daniels, 11 N. H. 274; Parish v. Gilmanton, 11 N. H. 293, 298; Great Falls Co. v. Worster, 15 N. H. 412, 444; Whittemore v. Gibbs, 24 N. H. 484. The mortgagee, unless prevented by some provision in the mortgage, may recover possession at any time, the possession of the mortgagor being, in theory, a wrongful withholding; but as long as the mortgagee does not exericse his right, and permits the mortgagor to remain in possession, such possession is treated as retained by the mortgagee's permission, and the mortgagor is not accountable for the rents and profits during the continuance of this permissive holding: Chellis v. Stearns, 22 N. H. 312, 315; Furbush v. Goodwin, 29 N. H. 321, 332.

New Jersey.—The legal estate is conveyed to the mortgagee immediately upon the execution of the mortgage; but the legal doctrines have been so modified by equitable principles that he does not obtain a right to enter upon the land, and recover its possession by an action at law, until the

looked on as a lien or security for131 Mo. App. 701, 111 S. W. 631;the debt: Standard Leather Co. v.Jackson v. Johnson, 248 Mo. 680,Mercantile Town Mutual Ins. Co.,154 S. W. 759.

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ordinarily left in possession and treated as the owners, and the common remedy of the mortgagee is a decree of foreclosure and for the sale of the mortgaged premises. In a

mortgagor has made a default: Sanderson v. Price, 21 N. J. L. 646, note; Shields v. Lozear, 34 N. J. L. 496, 3 Am. Rep. 256, per Depue, J. But the mortgage is still regarded so much as a mere security for the debt, and the mortgagee's legal title as merely a means for enforcing this security, that after a default, and even after the mortgagee's obtaining possession, his estate is destroyed, and the legal title *ipso facto* revests in the mortgagor, by a payment of the debt, without any reconveyance:^o Shields v. Lozear, *supra*; Osborne v. Tunis, 25 N. J. L. 633, 651; Montgomery v. Bruere, 4 N. J. L. 260, 279, per Southard, J.; 5 N. J. L. 865.

North Carolina.—The legal estate of the mortgagee entitling him to possession, and the equitable estate of the mortgagor entitling him to redeem after default, are preserved distinct. If the mortgagor is suffered to retain possession, he is not responsible for the rents and profits received during his holding; Hemphill v. Ross, 66 N. C. 477; Ellis v. Hussey, 66 N. C. 501; State v. Ragland, 75 N. C. 12.^p

Ohio.—As between the parties, the mortgagee acquires a legal estate, and can recover the possession by an action at law after a default, but not before default. As against all persons except the mortgagee and his assigns, the legal estate remains in the mortgagor, and the mortgagee's legal title is merely a security for payment of the deht: Harkrader v. Leiby, 4 Ohio St. 602; Allen v. Everly, 24 Ohio St. 97, 114; Rands v. Kendall, 15 Ohio, 671.^q

Pennsylvania.—As between the parties, the mortgage is a conveyance of the legal estate to the mortgagee, which enables him to enter at once and hold the land, or recover the possession by ejectment, as well before as after default, unless otherwise stipulated in the instrument itself; this

§ 1187, (•) New Jersey.-Wade v. Miller, 32 N. J. L. 296, 303; Marshall's Ex'rs v. Hadley, 50 N. J. Eq. (5 Dick.) 547, 25 Atl. 325.

§ 1187, (P) North Carolina.—Killebrew v. Hines, 104 N. C. 182, 17 Am. St. Rep. 672, 10 S. E. 159, 251; Kiser v. Combs, 114 N. C. 640, 19 S. E. 664 (mortgagee may maintain ejectment); Cauley v. Sutton, 150 N. C. 327, 64 S. E. 4 (mortgagee holds legal estate in trust not only for himself but for the mortgagor); Williams v. Lewis, 158 N. C. 571, 74 S. E. 17 (since the mortgagor has only an equity of redemption, a second mortgagee has only an equitable title, which is subject to prior equities).

§ 1187, (a) Ohio. — Ranney v. Hardy, 43 Ohio St. 157, 1 N. E. 523. As between mortgagor and mortgagee, the legal title is in the latter after condition broken. He may either bring ejectment or sue for foreclosure: Bradfield v. Hale, 67 Ohio St. 316, 65 N. E. 1008.

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few states, however, it is customary for the mortgagee to recover possession, by action at law if necessary, and to cut off the mortgagor's equity of redemption by a strict

legal estate of the mortgagee is full and complete, subject only to the mortgagor's equity: Youngman v. Elmira etc. R. R., 65 Pa. St. 278, 285; Brobst v. Brock, 10 Wall. 519. As to all persons except the mortgagee and his assigns, the mortgage is a lien, and the legal estate remains in the mortgagor both in law and in equity: Brobst v. Brock, supra. In Tryon v. Munson, 77 Pa. St. 250, Agnew, J., very clearly and accurately describes the legal interest of the mortgagee according to this theory: "Thus we perceive an interest or estate in the land itself, capable of enjoyment, and enabling the mortgagee to grasp and hold it actually, and not a mere lien or potentiality to follow it by legal process and condemn it for payment. The land passes to the mortgagee by act of the party himself, and needs no legal remedy to enforce the right. But a lien vests no estate, and is a mere incident of the debt, to be enforced by a remedy at law, which may be limited. It is true, if the mortgagee be held [kept] out, he may have to resort to ejectment; but this is to avoid a conflict and the statutory penalties for a forcible entry, for otherwise he may take peaceable possession, and is not liable as a trespasser." From the absence of a full equitable jurisdiction until very recent legislation, the remedies of the mortgagee in this state have been to a great extent obtained by means of legal actions."

Rhode Island.-The English legal and equitable theory is adopted with the same modifications as in Massachusetts. The mortgage is a true conveyance; the mortgagee obtains a full legal estate, and may recover possession, the mortgagor's interest after a default being a mere equity of redemption. The mortgagee's legal estate is so complete that he may recover at law against the mortgagor for waste to the land during the latter's possession: Carpenter v. Carpenter, 6 R. I. 542; Waterman v. Matteson, 4 R. I. 539, 545. In the latter case, Ames, C. J., said: "Formerly the right of the mortgagor was, upon a breach of the condition, wholly gone at law, and his equity to redeem was recognized only by the tribunal able to enforce such a right. It is true that in modern times the courts of law have, for many purposes, treated the mortgagor in possession as the real owner of the estate, looking upon a mortgage in the same light that a court of equity does, as a mere security for the mortgage debt; but we can see no reason why such courts should recognize in a mortgagor in possession under a forfeited mortgage greater rights over the estate than

§ 1187, (r) Pennsylvania. — The mortgagor, also, may redeem against the mortgagee in possession by means of an equitable action of ejectment: Wells v. Van Dyke, 109 Pa. St. 330.

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foreclosure. The states which have adopted this method in its substantial elements are Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massa-

courts of equity do." It was therefore held that waste done by a mortgagor left in possession was a *legal* wrong, and that the mortgagee could maintain an action of replevin for wood and timber cut on the land in such a manner as to constitute waste.⁸

Tennessee.—The mortgagee obtains the legal title, and may recover possession of the land at once by an action at law; and as against him the mortgagor's interest is wholly equitable:^t Henshaw v. Wells, 9 Humph. 568; Vance's Heirs v. Johnson, 10 Humph. 214.

Vermont.—The mortgagee acquires the legal estate by means of the mortgage itself, but the statute secures the possession of the mortgagor until he makes a default: Gen. Stats. 1870, c. 40, sec. 12. Upon a default, the mortgagee is entitled to possession, and may enter, or may immediately bring ejectment: Lull v. Matthews, 19 Vt. 322; Hagar v. Brainerd, 44 Vt. 294. While the mortgagor is permitted to retain the possession, he is so far the owner that he is not accountable for the rents and profits to the mortgagee, and with respect to all other persons he is regarded as the legal owner for all purposes: *Ibid.*: Hooper v. Wilson, 12 Vt. 695; Wilson v. Hooper, 12 Vt. 653, 36 Am. Dec. 366; Walker v. King, 44 Vt. 601.^m

Virginia and West Virginia.—The distinction between the legal estate of the mortgagee, and the equity of redemption of the mortgagor, is sharply maintained. Unless restrained by the terms of the mortgage itself, the mortgagee may take possession at once, and after a default he may always recover the possession, and is then the legal owner of the land. The mortgagor's only remedy in such case is by a suit to redeem: Faulkner v. Brockenbrough, 4 Rand. 245. \mathbf{v}

§ 1187, (*) *Bhode Island.* — See, also, Manville Covering Co. v. Babcock, 28 R. I. 496, 68 Atl. 421 (mortgage conveys right to possession). Mortgagor holds in subordination to the title of the mortgagee, and this relation continues after foreclosure: First Nat. Bank v. Dispeau, 32 R. I. 396, 79 Atl. 945.

§ 1187, (t) Tennessee. — Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Ewing, 12 Lea, 598; Vaughn v. Vaughn, 100 Tenn. 282, 45 S. W. 677 (upon satisfaction of the mortgage debt, the legal title reverts *eo instanti*). Since the legal title passes at once to the mortgagee, he is entitled to immediate possession unless the mortgage contains a provision to the contrary: Brier Hill Collieries v. Gernt, 131 Tenn. 542, 175 S. W. 560.

§ 1187, (u) Vermont. — Mortgagee in possession: See Lapoint v. Sage, 90 Vt. 560, 99 Atl. 233.

§ 1187, (\mathbf{v}) Virginia.—The mortgagee may pursue his remedies at law upon the debt and in equity upon the mortgage at the same time: Priddy v. Hartsook, 81 Va. 67. chusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.

§ 1188. Second Method—The Equitable Theory Alone.— In this method of treating mortgages, the conflict between the legal and the equitable conceptions is entirely removed. Partly through the adoption of equitable doctrines by the law courts, and partly through the operation of statutes, the legal theory of mortgages has been abandoned, and the equity theory has been left in full force, furnishing a single and uniform collection of rules recognized and administered, so far as necessary, alike by courts of law and of equity.¹ The mortgage is not a conveyance, nor does it

§ 1188, 1 I shall arrange the states and territories composing this class, with a reference to important decisions and statutes in each, so that the extent and workings of the equitable theory may be fully illustrated.

a. b

California.-The equitable theory is carried to its logical consequences. The mortgage creates a lien on the land as security for the debt, and under no circumstances does it convey any legal title or estate to the mortgagee, whose interest is the same in law and equity. The mortgagor retains the full legal estate subject to the lien, until divested by a foreclosure sale. This view, which was originally announced by the courts, has been fully established by statute, and is incorporated into the Civil Code: Cal. Civ. Code, secs. 2920, 2926, 2927, 2936; Practice Act 1851, sec. 260; McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365, 70 Am. Dec. 655; Haffley v. Maier, 13 Cal. 13; Goodenow v. Ewer, 16 Cal. 461, 467, 76 Am. Dec. 540; Boggs v. Fowler, 16 Cal. 559, 76 Am. Dec. 561; Fogarty v. Sawyer, 17 Cal. 589; Dutton v. Warschauer, 21 Cal. 609, 623, 82 Am. Dec. 765; Kidd v. Temple, 22 Cal. 255; Skinner v. Buck, 29 Cal. 253; Bludworth v. Lake, 33 Cal. 255; Jackson v. Lodge, 36 Cal. 28; Mack v. Wetzlar, 39 Cal. 247; Carpentier v. Brenham, 40 Cal. 221; Harp v. Calahan, 46 Cal. 222; Frink v. Le Roy, 49 Cal. 314.º The principles and reasons of this theory have been so

§ 1188, (a) Alaska. — Lewis v. Wells, 85 Fed. 896.

§ 1188, (b) Arizona. — Bryan v. Kales, 162 U. S. 411, 40 L. Ed. 1020, 16 Sup. Ct. 802 (affirming 3 Ariz. 423, 31 Pac. 517); Bryan v. Brasius, 162 U. S. 415, 40 L. Ed. 1022, 16 Sup. Ct. 803 (affirming 3 Ariz. 433, 31 Pac. 519).

§ 1188, (c) California.—See, also, McGurren v. Garrity, 68 Cal. 566, 9 Pac. 839; Tapia v. Demartini, 77 confer upon the mortgagee any estate *in* the land. It creates a lien *on* the land, or, in the apt language already quoted, "a potentiality to follow the land by proper pro-

ably explained and presented by the California supreme court that I shall quote at length some passages from one or two leading decisions, which will apply to all the states of this class, and will form a very appropriate introduction to the general discussion. In McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 365, 407, 70 Am. Dec. 655, Field, J., examined the grounds of the doctrine with great care. After describing the common-law view of the mortgage, he proceeds: "But in equity a mortgage is regarded in a very different light. The settled doctrine of equity is, that a mortgage is a mere security for a debt, and passes only a chattel interest; that the debt is the principal, and the land the incident; that the mortgage constitutes simply a lien or encumbrance, and that the equity of redemption is the real and beneficial estate in the land, which may be sold and conveyed by the mortgagor, in any of the ordinary modes of assurance, subject only to the lien of the mortgage. This equitable doctrine, established to prevent the hardships springing by the rules of law from a failure in the strict performance of the conditions attached to the conveyance, and to give effect to the just intent of the parties in contracts of this description, has been, in most of the states, gradually adopted by the courts of law, although in some instances to a limited extent only." He cites decisions from various states illustrating the foregoing proposition, and proceeds (p. 409): "A provision more extensive in effect than the New York statute is embodied in our Practice Act. Section 260 reads as follows: 'A mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a conveyance, whatever its terms, so as to enable the owner of the mortgage to recover possession of the real property without a foreclosure and sale.' This section takes

Cal. 383, 11 Am. St. Rep. 288, 19 Pac. 641 (declaration of trust in mortgagee's interest may be made by parol); Smith v. Smith, 80 Cal. 323, 21 Pac. 4, 22 Pac. 186, 549; Hall v. Arnott, 80 Cal. 348, 22 Pac. 200 (deed absolute in form but intended as a mortgage, conveys no right of possession); Locke v. Moulton, 96 Cal. 21, 30 Pac. 957 (same). See, also, Anglo-California Baħk v. Cerf, 147 Cal. 384, 81 Pac. 107Z (deed absolute in form but intended as a mortgage creates only a lien); Burns v. Hiatt, 149 Cal. 617, 117 Am. St. Rep. 157, 87 Pac. 196 (mortgagee in possession); Cory v. Santa Ynez Land & Imp. Co., 151 Cal. 778, 91 Pac. 647 (same); Raggio v. Palmtag, 155 Cal. 797, 103 Pac. 312 (same); Shirey v. All Night and All Day Bank, 166 Cal. 50, 134 Pac. 1001 (deed absolute in form but intended as a mortgage passes no title); Faxon v. All Persons, 166 Cal. 707, L. R. A. 1916B, 1209, 137 Pac. 919 (mortgagee in possession); Cameron v. Ah Quong, 175 Cal. 377, 165 Pac. 961, 964 (same). cess, and condemn it for payment" of the debt. The debt is the principal fact, and the mortgage is wholly incidental or collateral thereto, and intended to secure its payment.

from the instrument its common-law character, and restricts it to the purposes of security. It does not, it is true, in terms change the estates at law of the mortgagor and mortgagee, but by disabling the owner from entering for condition broken, and restricting his remedy to a foreclosure and sale, it gives full effect to the equitable doctrine. . . . The just and liberal doctrines of equity respecting mortgages have been adopted in this state, and asserted either directly or indirectly in repeated instances by this court." He quotes, in illustration, passages from several prior cases in the California reports, and adds: "The decisions from which the above citations are taken were made, with one exception, in equity cases; but the language of the court does not appear in any instance to have been governed by a consideration of the tribunal in which the remedy was sought, but entirely from a consideration of the nature of the contract. The mortgage being a mere security for a debt, it must follow that the payment of the debt, whether before or after default, will operate as an extinguishment of the mortgage. Indeed, in those courts, with some few exceptions, where the common-law view of mortgages is the most strictly adhered to, payment of the debt is held to revest the estate without a reconveyance in the mortgagor, though it is difficult to see upon what principle. If the mortgage is a conveyance after default, it must be equally so before; the only difference being that in the one case the estate conveyed is conditional, and in the other absolute. If after default the estate be absolute, it is not easy to perceive how the grantee can be divested without deed, under the statute of frauds; and yet, according to the general doctrine of the modern cases, payment has that effect. This is one of the inconsistencies arising from a partial adoption of the equitable doctrines by the courts of law. In truth, the original character of mortgages has undergone a change. They have ceased to be conveyances, except in form. They are no longer understood as contracts of purchase and sale between the parties, but as transactions by which a loan is made on the one side, and security for its repayment furnished on the other. They pass no estate in the land, but are mere securities; and default in the payment of the money secured does not change their character. Proceedings for the *foreclosure* of mortgages, in the sense in which the term is used in England and in several of the states, by which the mortgagor. after default, is called upon to repay the loan by a specified day, or be forever barred of his equity of redemption, are unknown to our law. The owner of the mortgage in this state can in no case become the owner of the mortgaged premises, except by purchase upon sale under judicial de-

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The right or interest of the mortgagee from being a legal estate is changed into an equitable right enforceable by an equitable proceeding; it is for all purposes and under all

cree consummated by conveyance. A foreclosure suit by our law results only in a legal ascertainment of the amount due, and a decree directing a sale of the premises for its satisfaction, the surplus, if any, going to subsequent encumbrancers, or to the owners of the premises." In Dutton v. Warschauer, 21 Cal. 609, 621, 82 Am. Dec. 765, the same distinguished judge again explains the theory in the clearest and most accurate manner: "'In this state,' as we said in Goodenow v. Ewer, 16 Cal. 467, 76 Am. Dec. 540, 'a mortgage is not regarded as a conveyance vesting in the mortgagee any estate in the land, either before or after condition broken. It is regarded, as in fact it is intended by the parties, as a mere security, operating upon the property as a lien or encumbrance only. Here the equitable doctrine is carried to its legitimate result. Between the view thus taken and the common-law doctrine-that the mortgage is a conveyance of a conditional estate-there is no consistent intermediate ground. In those states where the mortgage is sometimes treated as a conveyance, and at other times as a mere security, there is no uniformity of decision. The cases there exhibit a fluctuation of opinion between equitable and commonlaw views of the subject, and a hesitation by the courts to carry either view to its logical consequences.' . . . The counsel of the defendant do not controvert the doctrine thus stated as applicable to mortgages executed since the statute of 1851 [quoted ante], but appear to consider that it was not intended to embrace mortgages previously executed. In this view, they are only partially correct. The doctrine was established not merely from a consideration of the provisions of the statute, but also from a consideration of the real object and intention of the parties in executing and receiving instruments of this kind. In truth, mortgages had long before lost, for nearly all purposes, their common-law character as conveyances, and been regarded as transactions by which security was furnished hy a pledge of real estate for the payment of debts. Courts of equity, from an early date, had so regarded them; and courts of law. by 'a gradual and almost insensible progress,' had adopted the equitable view of the subject, though, we may add, not always carrying the equitable doctrine to its logical result. The equitable doctrine had prevailed to such an extent that in nearly all the states the interest of the mortgagee was treated by courts of law as real estate only so far as was necessary for the protection of the mortgagee, and to give him the full benefit of his security [citing cases from other states]. It was from a consideration of the character of the instrument, as settled by these decisions and the modern cases generally, that we were induced to adopt the equitable

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circumstances personal assets; it may be assigned, and passes to the mortgagee's personal representatives on his

doctrine as the true doctrine; and it was from a consideration of the provisions of the statute which led us to go beyond those cases, and carry the doctrine to its legitimate and logical result, and regard the mortgage as a security under all circumstances, both at law and in equity. Mortgages, therefore, executed before the statute, can only be treated as conveyances when that character is essential to protect the just rights of the mortgagee; mortgages since the statute are regarded at all times as mere securities, creating only a lien or encumbrance, and not as passing any estate in the premises: Fogarty v. Sawyer, 17 Cal. 592; Lord v. Morris, 18 Cal. 487, 488." In applying these doctrines it is further held that the interest of the mortgagee is not enlarged or affected by the fact that he is in possession under the mortgage; by his obtaining possession his right does not become a legal title. A mortgagee after default, whether in or out of possession, cannot convey a legal title to the land, and his deed of the land, without an assignment of the debt, is a mere nullity. When, however, the mortgagee takes possession after default, with permission of the mortgagor, it will be presumed that such possession was with the understanding that the mortgagee is to receive the rents and profits and apply them on the debt; and unless a limitation on the length of his possession was fixed, it will be considered as extending until the debt is satisfied. This peculiar possessory right thus obtained by the mortgagee may be assigned by an instrument purporting to assign it in express terms, hut will not pass by a mere ordinary deed of the land: Dutton v. Warschauer, supra; Nagle v. Macy, 9 Cal. 426; Frink v. Le Roy, 49 Cal. 314.d These conclusions as to the mortgagee in possession seem to agree with the view taken by the latest New York decisions on the subject: See post, § 1189.

Colorado.—The same doctrine prevails: Drake v. Root, 2 Colo. 685. A mortgagee who obtains peaceable possession will not be dispossessed until the debt is paid, and he may even maintain ejectment against a third person not holding under the mortgagor: Eyster v. Gaff, 2 Colo. 228.^e

Dakota.—Civ. Code, secs. 1722, 1723, 1727, 1731, 1733: Substantially the same as in California.

§ 1188, (d) As against a purchaser from the mortgagor, not made a party to the foreclosure suit, the mortgagee who has purchased at foreclosure sale and taken possession may retain possession: Burns v. Hiatt, 149 Cal. 617, 117 Am. St. Rep. 157, 87 Pac. 196. § 1188, (e) Colorado.—The mortgagee's title is a mere lien, even if the mortgage is by a deed absolute on its face. On the death of the mortgagee, the mortgage, like other choses in action, passes to the administrator: Fehringer v. Martin, 22 Colo. App. 634, 126 Pac. 1131.

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death. The mortgagee is not entitled to possession of the mortgaged premises, and can maintain no legal action for

Florida.—Bush's Dig. of Stats. 1872, pp. 611, 612.⁴ A trust deed to secure a debt is held not to be a mortgage: Soutter v. Miller, 15 Fla. 625.

Georgia.—The mortgage only creates a lien; the mortgagee has no right to the possession, except by means of a foreclosure; the mortgagor is entitled to possession until he is removed after a decree and a sale thereunder; and the rents and profits belong to him: Code 1880, sec. 1954; Burnside v. Terry, 45 Ga. 621; Vason v. Ball, 56 Ga. 268; Davis v. Anderson, 1 Ga. 176; Ragland v. Justices etc., 10 Ga. 65; Elfe v. Cole, 26 Ga. 197; Jackson v. Carswell, 34 Ga. 279; United States v. Athens Armory, 35 Ga. 344; Seals v. Cashin, 2 Ga. Dec. 76.5

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Indiana.—The common-law and equitable theories in combination formerly prevailed; but the equitable theory is now established by statute, which provides that the mortgagor may retain possession until his estate is extinguished by foreclosure; the mortgage creates only a lien; the legal estate, subject thereto, remains in the mortgagor: 2 Gavin and Hord's Rev. Stats. 355;¹ Fletcher v. Holmes, 32 Ind. 497, 513; Grable v. McCulloh, 27 Ind. 472; Morton v. Noble, 22 Ind. 160; Francis v. Porter, 7 Ind. 213; Reasoner v. Edmundson, 5 Ind. 393.¹

Iowa.^k—Similar statute and the same doctrine: Code 1880, sec. 1938; White v. Rittenmyer, 30 Iowa, 268; Courtney v. Carr, 6 Iowa, 238; Hall v. Savill, 3 G. Greene, 37, 54 Am. Dec. 485.

§ 1188, (f) Florida. — McLellan's Digest, 1881, c. 153, sec. 3. See, also, Coe v. Finlayson, 41 Fla. 169, 26 South. 704 (mortgagee has a mere lien and cannot sue for possession until he becomes the owner by purchase at foreclosure salè). See, also, Hull v. Burr, 58 Fla. 432, 50 South. 754 (mortgage, though in form an absolute deed, creates only a lien).

§1188, (g) Georgia.—See, also, Peagler v. Davis, 143 Ga. 11, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 232, 84 S. E. 59.

§1188, (h) Idaho. — A mortgage creates only a lien: Hannah v. Vensel, 19 Idaho, 796, 116 Pac. 115.

§ 1188, (i) Indiana.—1 Rev. Stats. 1888, sec. 1086.

§ 1188, (J) But a mortgagee who obtains possession legally may retain it until paid: Jewett v. Tomlin-

son, 137 Ind. 326, 36 N. E. 1106. See, also, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Broeker, 166 Ind. 576, 77 N. E. 1092 (mortgage only a lien); Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37, 100 N. E. 376 (same: title of mortgagee purchasing on foreclosure depends on the regularity of the foreclosure proceedings). Where the mortgage is in the form of an absolute deed with a collateral agreement, however, the legal estate passes to the mortgagee, and the mortgagor's right of redemption may be released by parol, and may be barred by laches: Ferguson v. Boyd, 169 Ind. 537, 81 N. E. 71, 82 N. E. 1064.

§1188, (14) Iowa.—Harrington v. Foley, 108 Iowa, 287, 79 N. W. 64 (grantee in absolute deed intended

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their recovery, either before or after a breach of the condition; in fact, the mortgagor's default produces no change

Kansas.1-The same: Dassler's Comp. Laws 1881, c. 68, sec. 1; Life Ass'n etc. v. Cook, 20 Kan. 19; Chick v. Willetts, 2 Kan. 384, 391. In this case, Crozier, C. J., stated the doctrine and some of its necessary results with much freedom and force, but with perfect truth: "Some of the states still adhere to the common-law view, more or less modified by the real nature of the transaction; but in most of them practically all that remains of the old theories is their nomenclature. In this state a clear sweep has been made by statute. The common-law attributes of mortgages have been wholly set aside; the ancient theories have been demolished; and if we could consign to oblivion the terms and phrases---without meaning, except in reference to those theories-with which our reflections are still embarrassed, the legal profession on the bench and at the bar would more readily understand and fully realize the new condition of things." There is a profound truth in this remark, which applies to a large part of the American jurisprudence. Nothing has done so much to confuse the minds of judges and lawyers, and to retard the operation of legal reforms, as the constant retention and use of former names and phrases when the facts or rules which they represented have been wholly abrogated. The prejudicial effects of this practice are felt in all the states which have adopted the reformed procedure.

Louisiana.—The jurisprudence of this state being hased upon the civil law, the common-law notions concerning the mortgage were never accepted. The mortgage is a lien, and the whole title subject thereto is left in the mortgagor. Indeed, the law of Louisiana is silent upon any division of estates into legal and equitable: Civ. Code 1875, secs. 3278, 3279, 3290. The ordinary mortgage is a "right granted to the creditor over the property of the debtor for the security of his debt, and gives him the power of having the property seized and sold in default of payment." "Mortgage is a species or pledge, the thing mortgaged being bound for the payment of the debt or fulfillment of the obligation." There is also a

as a mortgage is not entitled to possession). See, also, Whitley v. Barnett, 151 Iowa, 487, 131 N. W. 704 (mortgagor retains legal title and right to possession in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary); Fitzgerald v. Flannagan, (Iowa) 125 N. W. 995 (mortgage a mere lien; when the debt ceases to exist or is unenforceable at law, the mortgage is unenforceable in equity). § 1188, (1) Kansas.—Kelso v. Norton, 65 Kan. 778, 93 Am. St. Rep. 308, 70 Pac. 896. See, also, Walters v. Chance, 73 Kan. 680, 85 Pac. 779 (mortgagee in possession); Jaggar v. Plunkett, 81 Kan. 565, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 935, 106 Pac. 280 (same); Stouffer v. Harlan, 84 Kan. 307, 114 Pac. 385 (same). in the relations of the parties or in the nature of their respective interests, except that the mortgagee thereupon

kind of mortgage known as the "conventional mortgage." In the conception of the civil law a mortgage is a species of alienation, not, however, of the property itself,—the dominion or ownership of the thing,—but of a certain right in respect to the thing, which right is really identical with our "equitable lien" as distinguished from our "common-law lien": See Duclaud v. Rousseau, 2 La. Anu. 168.

Michigan.—A mortgage merely creates a lien, and no estate in the mortgagee, the full legal estate, subject to the lien, remaining in the mortgagor. The statute prohibits the mortgagee or owner of the mortgage from maintaining any action to recover possession of the land, until he has obtained the title through a sale under a foreclosure: Comp. Laws 1871, p. 1775;^m Gorham v. Arnold, 22 Mich. 247; Caruthers v. Humphrey, 12 Mich. 270; Wagar v. Stone, 36 Mich. 364.

Minnesota.—Similar statute and the same doctrine: Gen. Stats. 1878, e. 75, p. 818;ⁿ Adams v. Corriston, 7 Minn. 456; Donnelly v. Simonton, 7 Minn. 167; Berthold v. Holman, 12 Minn. 335, 93 Am. Dec. 233; Berthold v. Fox, 13 Minn. 501, 97 Am. Dec. 243; Rice v. St. Paul etc. R. R., 24 Minn. 464; Parsons v. Noggle, 23 Minn. 328. The opinion of Emmett, C. J., in Adams v. Corriston, gives a very instructive statement of the doctrine.

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Nebraska.—Similar statute and the same doctrine: Gen. Stats. 1873, c. 61, sec. 55;^p Kyger v. Ryley, 2 Neb. 20, 28; Davidson v. Cox, 11 Neb.

§ 1188, (m) Michigan. — Howell's Stats. 1882, sec. 7847. See, also, Dawson v. Peter, 119 Mich. 274, 77 N. W. 997; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ann Arbor R. Co., 90 Fed. 379, 33 C. C. A. 113. See, also, Flynn v. Holmes, 145 Mich. 606, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 209, 108 N. W. 685 (deed absolute in form, intended as a mortgage, merely creates a lien.)

§ 1188, (n) Minnesota. — Kelly's Stats. 1891, sec. 5407. See, also, Johnson v. Sandhoff, 30 Minn. 197, 14 N. W. 889; Meighen v. King, 31 Minn. 115, 16 N. W. 702; Rogers v. Benton, 39 Minn. 39, 12 Am. St. Rep. 613, 38 N. W. 765 (if mortgagee lawfully in possession so remains until right of redemption is barred, he becomes vested with the absolute legal title); Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Stanton, 55 Minn. 211, 43 Am. St. Bep. 491, 56 N. W. 821; Hokanson v. Gunderson, 54 Minn. 499, 40 Am. St. Rep. 354, 56 N. W. 172. See, also, First State Bank of Le Sueur v. Sibley County Bank, 96 Minn. 456, 105 N. W. 485, 489 (a mortgage not being an interest in land, a parol trust may be attached to it that the mortgagee hold it for the benefit of others.)

§ 1188, (•) *Montana.*—A mortgage is a mere lien: Cornish v. Woolverton, 32 Mont. 456, 108 Am. St. Rep. 598, 81 Pac. 41.

§ 1188, (P) Nebraska. -- Comp. Stats. 1891, c. 73, sec. 55. See, also,

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becomes enabled to enforce his lien by a proceeding of foreclosure.^{dd} The mortgagee's interest being a mere lien, it is wholly destroyed, and the mortgagor's estate is left free and unencumbered, by a payment of the debt secured by it

250, 9 N. W. 95; Hurley v. Estes, 6 Neb. 386. A deed of trust to secure payment of a debt is regarded as a mortgage, the legal title remaining in the grantor: Kyger v. Ryley; Webb v. Hoselton, 4 Neb. 308, 19 Am. Rep. 638.

Nevada.^q—Statute borrowed from the legislation of California, and substantially the same; the same doctrine prevails: 1 Comp. Laws, sec. 1323; Hyman v. Kelly, 1 Nev. 179; Whitmore v. Shiverick, 3 Nev. 288.

New York.—This state was one of the earliest to modify the doctrine concerning mortgages, by discarding the old common-law theory and adopting the equitable view alone. Although prior to the Revised Statutes the mortgagee was able after default to recover possession of the premises by ejectment, yet his title was legal only so far as was considered necessary for his security; it did not enable him to convey the land: Waters v. Stewart, 1 Caines Cas. 47, per Kent, J.; Jackson v. Willard, 4 Johns. 41; Runyan v. Mersereau, 11 Johns. 534, 6 Am. Dec. 393; Stanard v. Eldridge, 16 Johns. 254; Jackson v. Bronson, 19 Johns. 325; Waring v. Smyth, 2 Barb. Ch. 119, 135, 47 Am. Dec. 299. The Revised Statutes of 1830 swept away all semblance of legal estate in the mortgagee by depriving him of the right to recover possession even after default; and the doctrine has since become fully established that the mortgage creates a lien only, and no estate, and that the legal title and estate remain in the mortgagor: 2 Rev. Stats., p. 312, sec. 57;^s Astor v. Hoyt,

Burnham v. Doolittle, 14 Neb. 214, 15 N. W. 606; Clark v. Missouri, K. & T. Tr. Co., 59 Neb. 53, 80 N. W. 257 (mortgagor entitled to possession); Pettit v. Louis, 88 Neb. 496, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 356, 129 N. W. 1005 (rights of mortgagee in possession). A deed absolute in form but intended as a mortgage passes the legal title: First Nat. Bank v. Tighe, 49 Neb. 299, 68 N. W. 490; McCague v. Eller, 77 Neb. 531, 124 Am. St. Rep. 863, 110 N. W. 318.

§ 1188, (a) Nevada.—Orr v. Ulyatt, 23 Nev. 134, 43 Pac. 916 (a mere security); Douglass v. Thompson, 35 Nev. 196, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 920, 127 Pac. 561 (mortgagee in possession and entitled to rents and profits by special agreement).

§ 1188, (r) New Mexico.—A mortgage is simply security for the payment of the debt, leaving the legal title in the mortgagor: Cleveland v. Bateman, 21 N. M. 675, 158 Pac. 648.

§1188, (s) New York.—Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1498. In re Kellogg, 113

§ 1188, (dd) The text is quoted in Gillett v. Romig, 17 Okl. 324, 87 Pac. 325. § 1188

at any time before the premises are actually sold under a decree of foreclosure; the estate does not then *revest* in the mortgagor since it has never gone out of him. On the other hand, the mortgagor's interest, instead of being an

5 Wend. 603; Phyfe v. Riley, 15 Wend. 248, 30 Am. Dec. 55; Astor v. Miller, 2 Paige, 68; Bell v. Mayor etc. of N. Y., 10 Paige, 49; Waring v. Smyth, 2 Barb. Ch. 119, 135; Paeker v. Rochester etc. R. R., 17 N. Y. 283; Power v. Lester, 23 N. Y. 527; Merritt v. Bartholick, 36 N. Y. 44; Trimm v. Marsh, 54 N. Y. 599, 13 Am. Rep. 623; Calkins v. Calkins, 3 Barb. 305; Bryan v. Butts, 27 Barb. 503. If the mortgagee, with the consent of the mortgagor, or in any other lawful manner, obtains possession of the land, his possession is protected; the mortgagor cannot recover it by an action at law, hut is left to his equitable remedy by redemption. This apparent anomaly, however, is explained by the latest decisions, and does not require any assumption of a legal estate in the mortgagee;^t Packer v. Rochester etc. R. R., *supra*; Hubbell v. Moulson, 53 N. Y. 225, 13 Am. Rep. 519; Mickles v. Townsend, 18 N. Y. 575, 584; White v. Rittenmyer, 30 Iowa, 268.

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Fed. 120; Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 151, 84 N. E. 75. A deed absolute in form, but intended as a mortgage, conveys no right of possession: Shattuck v. Bascom, 105 N. Y. 39, 12 N. E. 263; Thorn v Sutherland, 123 N. Y. 236, 25 N. E. 362.

§ 1188, (t) Townshend v. Thompson, 139 N. Y. 152, 34 N. E. 891. See, also, Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 151, 84 N. E. 75, reviewing New York cases on mortgagee in possession; Becker v. McCrea, 193 N. Y. 423, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 754, 86 N. E. 463; Reich v. Cochran, 213 N. Y. 416, 107 N. E. 1029 (when mortgagee has taken possession without the consent of the mortgagor, express or implied, the latter has the right to treat him as a mortgagee in possession, and to make use of the usual remedies of accounting, etc.); Herrmann v. Cabinet Land Co., 217 N. Y. 526, 112 N. E. 476 (entry of purchaser on void foreelosure to which heirs of mortgagor were not parties, does not give him rights of mortgagee in possession).

§ 1188, (u) North Dakota. — The mortgage conveys no title or estate in the land; nor does it, either before or after condition broken, entitle the mortgagee to possession: McClary v. Ricks, 11 N. D. 38, 58 N. W. 1042.

§ 1188, (v) Oklahoma.—The grantee in an absolute deed intended as a mortgage is not entitled to possession: Yingling v. Redwine, 12 Okl. 64, 69 Pac. 810. In general, seo Gillett v. Romig, 17 Okl. 324, 87 Pac. 325; Harding v. Garber, 20 Okl. 11, 93 Pac. 539 (mortgagee in possession). equitable estate, or right in equity to redeem the land from the mortgagee's ownership, is, for all purposes, under all circumstances, and between all parties, the legal estate, with all the incidents and qualities of legal ownership, but at

Oregon.—The statute protects the mortgagor's possession and confirms his legal estate until a sale under a decree for a foreclosure: Code Civ. Proc., sec. 323; W Besser v. Hawthorne, 3 Or. 129. If the mortgagee obtains possession with the mortgagor's assent, then, as in California, his possession may continue until the debt is paid out of the rents and profits, or otherwise; until such payment the mortgagor cannot regain possession by an action at law: Roberts v. Sutherlin, 4 Or. 219.*

South Carolina.—Similar statute and same general doctrine: Rev. Stats. 1873, p. 536;^y Thayer v. Cramer, 1 McCord Eq. 395; Nixon v. Bynum, 1 Bail. 148; Annely v. De Saussure, 12 S. C. 488.

Texas.—Wright v. Henderson, 12 Tex. 43; Mann's Ex'x v. Falcon, 25 Tex. 271; Walker v. Johnson, 37 Tex. 127, 129; and a deed of trust to secure a debt is treated in this respect as a mortgage: *Ibid.*^{an}

Oregon.-Code § 1188, (**w**) of Proc. 1891, sec. 539. See Adair v. Adair, 22 Or. 115, 29 Pac. 193; Thomson v. Shirley, 69 Fed. 484. See, also, Kaston v. Storey, 47 Or. 150, 114 Am. St. Rep. 912, 80 Pac. 217 (mortgage creates a lien only); Kinney v. Smith, 58 Or. 158, 113 Pac. 854 (same, though mortgage in . form is an absolute deed); Lambert v. Howard, 49 Or. 342, 90 Pac. 150 (mortgagee in possession); Caro v. Wollenberg, 68 Or. 420, 136 Pac. 866 (same); Bailey v. Frazier, 62 Or. 142, 124 Pac. 643; Higgs v. Mc-Duffie, 81 Or. 256, 157 Pac. 794, 158 Pac. 953; Caro v. Wollenberg, 83 Or. 311, 163 Pac. 94.

§1188, (x) See, also, Bilger v. Nunan, 199 Fed. 549, 118 C. C. A. 23.

§ 1188, (**y**) South Carolina.—Gen. Stats. 1882, c. 91. See, also, Bredenberg v. Landrum, 32 S. C. 215, 10 S. E. 956 (McGowan, J., says, in this case referring to the author's classification: "He very properly places our state in the latter class"); Team v. Baum, 47 S. C. 410, 58 Am. St. Rep. 893, 25 S. E. 275. See, also, Francis v. Francis, 78 S. C. 178, 58 S. E. 804 (mortgagee in possession).

§ 1188, (z) South Dakota.—As to mortgagee in possession, see West v. Middlesex Banking Co., 33 S. D. 465, 146 N. W. 598. A mortgage creates a lien only; Farr v. Semmler, 24 S. D. 290, 123 N. W. 835.

§ 1188, (an) Texas.—Kerr v. Galloway, 94 Tex. 641, 64 S. W. 858. See Poarch v. Duncan, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 275, 91 S. W. 1110 (mortgage is a conveyance of the property by way of pledge); Ferguson v. Dickinson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 138 S. W. 221; Burks v. Burks, (Tex. Civ. App.) 141 S. W. 337 (mortgagor is entitled to possession); Hume v. Le Compte, (Tex. Civ. App.) 142 S. W. 934 (same).

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the same time encumbered by or subject to the lien of the mortgage, and liable, therefore, to be cut off and divested by a sale under a decree of foreclosure if the debt is not paid according to the terms of the mortgage. It is an entire misuse of language to apply the name "equity of redemption" to this *legal* estate of the mortgagor;^{ee} and the continued employment of the phrase in the legal nomenclature of the states which have adopted this theory of the mortgage is to be regretted, since it is the occasion of constant misapprehension and confusion of thought.² It is the natural and inevitable result of this system that in all the states where it prevails the mortgagor is not *ordinarily*, under *ordinary* circumstances, compelled to apply to a court of equity for relief. Being entitled to retain posses-

Utah: Civ. Prac. Act 1870, sec. 260. bb

Wisconsin.—Similar statute and same doctrine: Rev. Stats. 1871, p. 1671;^{cc} Wood v. Trask, 7 Wis. 566, 76 Am. Dec. 230. A mortgagee who after default obtains possession of the land with consent of the mortgagor or in any other lawful and peaceable manner has the right to retain the possession, as in New York, California, Oregon, etc.: Gillett v. Eaton, 6 Wis. 30; Tallman v. Ely, 6 Wis. 244; Fladland v. Delaplaine, 19 Wis. 459; Hennesy v. Farrell, 20 Wis. 42; Avery v. Judd, 21 Wis. 262; Brinkman v. Jones, 44 Wis. 498.

§ 1188, ² See Trimm v. Marsh, 54 N. Y. 599, 13 Am. Rep. 623, per Earl, J.; Chick v. Willetts, 2 Kan. 384, per Crozier, C. J.

§ 1188, (**bb**) Washington.—Dane v. Daniel, 23 Wash. 379, 63 Pac. 268. A mortgage is a mere lien: Jump v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. of London and Edinburgh, 44 Wash. 596, 12 Ann. Cas. 257, 87 Pac. 928; Gerber v. Heath, 92 Wash. 519, 159 Pac. 691; even though created by a deed absolute in form: Clambey v. Copland, 52 Wash. 580, 100 Pac. 1031. A mortgagee has no right to possession in the absence of a stipulation in the mortgage allowing it: State v. Superior Court of Kittitas County, 21 Wash. 564, 58 Pac. 1065; but he may obtain such right by agreement: Brundage v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 11 Wash. 277, 39 Pac. 666.

§ 1188, (cc) *Wisconsin.*—2 Sanborn and Berryman's Stats. 1889, sec. 3095. See McCormick v. Herndon, 78 Wis. 661, 47 N. W. 939. See, also, Gerhardt v. Ellis, 134 Wis. 191, 114 N. W. 495.

§ 1188, (ee) This section is cited to this effect in Bradbury v. Davenport, 114 Cal. 593, 55 Am. St. Rep. 92, 46 Pac. 1062. sion of the premises after a default, he is generally in a position to act on the defensive, and is not obliged to bring a suit in equity for a redemption. On the other hand, the mortgagee, not being permitted to recover possession and hold the land, is compelled to enforce his lien by a suit in equity, in which he obtains a decree for a sale of the mortgaged premises. In several of the states, the remedy of a strict foreclosure has been denied to him by statute. The mode of treating the mortgage thus described has been adopted in the following states and territories: California, Colorado, Dakota, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin.³

The Mortgagee in Possession Under § 1189. This Method.^a—The foregoing system, as it is administered in many of the states, contains one apparent inconsistency which requires a brief explanation. While the mortgagee is declared to have no legal estate, and is unable to recover possession of the land against an unwilling mortgagor or owner of the fee subject to the mortgage, yet if the mortgagee, while the mortgage is still subsisting, does in any lawful manner obtain the possession, the courts have established the doctrine that his interest under the mortgage enables him to retain such possession, and to defend it against the mortgagor or those succeeding to his title.^b In other words, the mortgagor is not permitted to recover back the possession, in an action at law, upon the strength of his own acknowledged legal estate; but his only remedy is in equity by a suit to redeem. Undoubtedly this doctrine, when first

§ 1188, ³ To these might perhaps be added Delaware, Mississippi, and Missouri: See ante, under preceding paragraph.

§ 1189, (a) This section is cited in Kelso v. Norton, 65 Kan. 778, 93 Am. St. Rep. 308, 70 Pac. 896; Cross v. Knox, 32 Kan. 725, 5 Pac. 32.

Knox, 32 Kan. 725, 5 Pac. 32. § 1189, (b) The text is quoted in III---177

Burns v. Hiatt, 149 Cal. 617, 117 Am. St. Rep. 157, 87 Pac. 196; Faxon v. All Persons, 167 Cal. 707, L. R. A. 1916B, 1209, 137 Pac. 919. admitted, was the result of the old common-law notions still lingering in the minds of the judges before the purely equitable theory had become fully developed; but it is certainly difficult to reconcile the doctrine, on principle, with this theory. The more recent decisions have perceived and admitted the incongruity; and the courts, while retaining the doctrine as settled, have guarded against any inference from it that the mortgagee has acquired a legal estate by his possession; his right to retain possession does not depend upon an estate held by him; his possession is protected by his lien. It is certainly more simple and just that the mortgagee should be left in possession, and the mortgagor forced to redeem, than that the mortgagor should be permitted to recover the possession by an action at law, and be immediately liable to the consequences of a foreclosure suit in equity brought by the mortgagee.¹ c

§ 1189, ¹ Hubbell v. Moulson, 53 N. Y. 225, 13 Am. Rep. 519; Mickles v. Townsend, 18 N. Y. 575, 584; Packer v. Rochester etc. R. R., 17 N. Y. 283, 295; Waring v. Smyth, 2 Barb. Ch. 119, 135, 47 Am. Dec. 299; White v. Rittenmyer, 30 Iowa, 268; Frink v. Le Roy, 49 Cal. 314; Nagle v. Macy, 9 Cal. 426; Dutton v. Warschauer, 21 Cal. 609, 82 Am. Dec. 765; Roberts v. Sutherlin, 4 Or. 219; Avery v. Judd, 21 Wis. 262; Hennesy v. Farrell, 20 Wis. 42; Fladland v. Delaplaine, 19 Wis. 459; Gillett v. Eaton, 6 Wis. 30; Brinkman v. Jones, 44 Wis. 498; Martin v. Fridley, 23 Minn. 13.

§1189, (c) Hooper v. Young, 140 Cal. 274, 98 Am. St. Rep. 56, 74 Pac. 140; Spect v. Spect, 88 Cal. 437, 22 Am. St. Rep. 314, 13 L. R. A. 137, 26 Pac. 203; Burns v. Hiatt, 149 Cal. 617, 117 Am. St. Rep. 157, 87 Pac. 196; Cory v. Santa Ynez Land & Improvement Co., 151 Cal. 778, 91 Pac. 647; Raggio v. Palmtag, 155 Cal. 797, 103 Pac. 312; Faxon v. All Persons, 167 Cal. 707, L. R. A. 1916B, 1209, 137 Pac. 919; Cameron v. Ah Quong, 175 Cal. 377, 165 Pac. 961, 964; Jewett v. Tomlinson, 137 Ind. 326, 36 N. E. 1106; Whitley v. Barnett, 151 Iowa, 487, 131 N. W.

704; Stouffer v. Harlan, (Kan.) 74 Pac. 611; Walters v. Chance, 73 Kan. 680, 85 Pac. 779 (having obtained pcaceable possession of unoccupied land, though without consent of mortgagor, may hold possession); Jaggar v. Plunkett, 81 Kan. 565, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 935, 106 Pac. 280 (may have remedy equivalent to strict foreclosure); Stouffer v. Harlan, 84 Kan. 307, 114 Pac. 385; Johnson v. Sandhoff, 30 Minn. 197, 14 N. W. 889; Rogers v. Benton, 39 Minn. 39, 12 Am. St. Rep. 613, 38 N. W. 765; Pettit v. Louis, 88 Neb. 496, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 356. § 1190. Equitable Remedies of the Parties Under This Method.^a—It is plain from the foregoing outline that in the commonwealths named in the second division a complete revolution has been wrought in the equity jurisprudence concerning mortgages. According to the original theory as

129 N. W. 1005; Douglass v. Thompson, 35 Nev. 196, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 920, 127 Pac. 561; Townshend v. Thompson, 139 N. Y. 152, 34 N. E. 891; Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 151, 84 N. E. 75; Becker v. McCrea, 193 N. Y. 423, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 754, 86 N. E. 463; Reich v. Cochran, 213 N. Y. 416, 107 N. E. 1029; Herrman v. Cabinet Land Co., 217 N. Y. 526, 112 N. E. 476; Harding v. Garher, 20 Okl. 11, 93 Pac. 539 (under what circumstances a receiver may be appointed of mortgagee in possession); Lambert v. Howard, 49 Or. 342, 90 Pac. 150 (what acts constitute possession of rented land); Caro v. Wollenberg, 68 Or. 420, 136 Pac. 866 (possession of mortgagee is not adverse: statute of limitations does not run until a repudiation of the trust relationship); Bilger ٧. Nunan, 199 Fed. 549, (Or.) 118 C. C. A. 23; Francis v. Francis, 78 S. C. 178, 58 S. E. 804; West v. Middlesex Banking Co., 33 S. D. 465, 146 N. W. 598; Calhoun v. Lumpkin, 60 Tex. 185; Rodriguez v. Haynes, 76 Tex. 225, 13 S. W. 296. It has been held that the possession of the mortgagee need not be acquired under the mortgage; it is sufficient if it is taken peacefully and lawfully; as where possession was acquired under an invalid tax and the deed, mortgage was purchased afterwards; Jaggar v. Plunkett, 81 Kan. 565, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 935, 106 Pac. 280. But in New York the mortgagor may not take possession without the consent of the mortgagee; having entered as lessee of a lifetenant he cannot continue to hold as mortgagee in possession by assignment of the mortgage: Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 151, 84 N. E. 75 (reviewing New York cases on the subject); see, also, West v. Middlesex Banking Co., 33 S. D. 465, 146 N. W. 598 (cannot occupy the position of mortgagee in possession prior to issuance of deed upon foreclosure, except with consent, express or implied, of mortgagor). That the mortgagee purchasing at void foreclosure sale and going into possession is entitled to the rights of a mortgagee in possession. see Raggio v. Palmtag, 155 Cal. 797, 103 Pac. 312; Burns v. Hiatt, 149 Cal. 617, 117 Am. St. Rep. 157, 87 Pac. 196; West v. Middlesex Banking- Co., 33 S. D. 465, 146 N. W. 598; compare Faxon v. All Persons, 167 Cal. 707, L. R. A. 1916B, 1209, 137 Pac. 919 (entry based upon proceedings for enforcement of the lien after it is extinguished does not constitute mortgagee in possession).

The New York view is thus summed up in a well-considered opinion: "Whenever it appears that the mortgagor has consented, either expressly or impliedly, by contract

^{§ 1190, (}a) This section is cited in Kelso v. Norton, 65 Kan. 778, 93 Am. St. Rep. 308, 70 Pac. 896; Cross v. Knox, 32 Kan. 725, 5 Pac. 32.

it has been administered in England and in a portion of the states, the estate of the mortgagor being wholly equitable, the jurisdiction of equity deals chiefly, almost exclusively, with his interests, by protecting his rights, by enabling him to redeem the land from the mortgagee, and by compelling a reconveyance of the legal title which had been forfeited by his failure to perform the condition, and by thus putting him in a position to regain the possession. On the other hand, the mortgagee, being vested with the legal estate by means of the mortgage itself, and being able to obtain possession of the land by a legal action, is clothed with all the attributes of legal ownership, deals with the land as though it were his own, is amply protected by the legal remedies, and seldom resorts to the equitable remedy of a strict foreclosure by which the mortgagor's right of redemption is extinguished. In the second class of states

or conduct, to the entry of the mortgagee, for purposes, or under eircumstances, not inconsistent with their relative rights under the mortgage, the possession of the mortgagee may properly be regarded as lawful. So, on the other hand, when the entry of the mortgagee is effected by the consent of the mortgagor under a relation that is hostile to, or inconsistent with, the legal rights of the parties under the mortgage, then the mortgagee's possession must stand or fall without reference to his mortgage. The ease at bar is a concrete example of the latter proposition. The appellant entered with the consent of the mortgagee, but under a lease in which she covenanted to surrender the premises at the end of her term. ... Having entered and occupied as lessee, the appellant could not hold over as mortgagee any more than she could acquire lawful possession by force or fraud against the will or consent of the owners": Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 151, 84 N. E. 75, per Werner, J.

The mortgagee lawfully in possession is entitled to retain possession until the debt is paid: Francis v. Francis, 78 S C. 178, 58 S. E. 804; he cannot be ousted or deprived of his rights by force, stealth or fraud, or by mere intrusion of the owner against his will or without his knowledge: Stauffer v. Harlan, 84 Kan. 307, 114 Pac. 385. That he may maintain possession against the mortgagor seeking to quiet title, though the debt is barred by the statute of limitations, see Burns v. Hiatt, 149 Cal. 617, 117 Am. St. Rep. 157, 87 Pac. 196; Cory v. Santa Ynez Land & Improvement Co., 151 Cal. 778, 91 Pac. 647; Raggio v. Palmtag, 155 Cal. 797, 103 Pac. 312; Pettit v. Louis, 88 Neb. 496, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 356, 129 N. W. 1005. See, also, ante, § 386, note (b); § 393, note (b).

and territories, the change is complete; the positions of the two parties are exactly reversed. Equity deals primarily and almost exclusively with the mortgagee. His interest under the mortgage is no longer an estate; it is in all courts, of common law, of probate, and of equity, a mere lien, an appendage of the debt, personal assets, a thing in action assignable with the debt, but incapable of being separated from the debt and transferred by itself. He has no legal remedy on the mortgage, no power to recover possession of the land, and can enforce the lien against the land in no legal action. The remedy which the courts of equity grant is based upon the notion that his interest is a mere equitable lien, and not an estate. The relief no longer consists in an extinguishment of the mortgagor's right, by which the absolute title is left in the mortgagee. Its primary object is an enforcement of the lien by a sale of the mortgaged premises and an application of the proceeds upon the debt. The mortgagor's estate is, of course, destroyed, or, to speak more accurately, is transferred to the purchaser at the judicial sale. The term "foreclosure" is still applied to this process, but is evidently a misnomer when used to describe the effect produced on the mortgagor's interest; no "equity of redemption" is foreclosed or cut off, but a legal estate is taken from the mortgagor and transferred to the purchaser. The mortgagee is permitted to buy in the land at the sale, and may thus acquire the title; but he acquires it, not as mortgagee, but as pur-The mortgagor, on the other hand, retaining the chaser. full legal estate, subject only to the encumbrance, and being entitled to the possession, use, rents, and profits of the land up to the time when his title is finally divested by a judicial sale in a proceeding to enforce the lien, is enabled to defend his estate and possession, not only against third persons, but against the mortgagee himself, by legal actions; and as long as he does not either expressly or impliedly surrender the possession to the mortgagee, he has no need nor occasion to invoke the aid of equity. There is,

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indeed, one situation possible in which he must resort to equity for relief. If, through his express consent, or through any other lawful means, the mortgagee has been permitted to obtain possession of the land, the mortgagor's only remedy is the equitable suit for a redemption, in which an account of the rents and profits received can be adjusted, the amount of the debt ascertained, the mortgage extinguished, and the mortgagor restored.^b The situation which requires this interposition of equity on behalf of the mortgagor is comparatively of very rare occurrence.¹ The foregoing description of the equitable jurisdiction is especially applicable to the commonwealths which I have grouped in the second division: but it is also practically correct with reference to several of those assigned to the first division. A practical and accurate criterion, I think, would be found in the kind of remedy to enforce the mortgagee's rights which commonly prevails. In states where the remedy by strict foreclosure is the ordinary one, the double system of law and equity *must* necessarily exist in practice as well as in theory. Where the remedy by judicial sale under a decree is the usual one, the common-law notions, if they exist at all, must be virtually theoretical.

§1191. Definition of Mortgage.—A concise definition of mortgage which should embrace both its equitable and its legal character is virtually impossible. Considered in its modern character, as stripped of its legal notions and embodying purely equitable principles throughout a large

§ 1190, ¹ The equitable suit which may be brought by a mortgagor who is in undisturbed possession of the land, for the purpose of compelling the mortgagee to accept payment of the debt which is due and to discharge the mortgage, is ordinarily called a "suit for redemption"; but it plainly has nothing in common with the real suit to redeem, by which the mortgagor redeems—or buys back—his lost legal estate; it is simply a suit to remove the encumbrance or cloud upon his legal title.

§ 1190, (b) The text is quoted in Burns v. Hiatt, 149 Cal. 617, 117 Am. St. Rep. 157, 87 Pac. 196. portion of the United States, the definition given by the California Civil Code seems to be complete and accurate.¹ Several forms of definition, regarding the mortgage as a common-law conveyance, are added in the foot-note. These attempted definitions are all erroneous, upon any theory of the instrument; they do not go beyond the literal import of the language in which a mortgage is usually expressed; and they utterly ignore all the equitable elements, which are as much and as truly constituent parts of the mortgage as the legal elements. Any true definition based upon the original common-law and equitable system must embody and express all the double nature of the mortgage,—that it is both a lien in equity and a conveyance at law.

§ 1191, ¹ Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 2920: "A mortgage is a contract by which specific property is *hypothecated* for the performance of an act, without the necessity of a change of possession." The term "hypothecated" is here used in its strict technical sense, and with appropriateness of application.

The following are examples of faulty and defective descriptions: "A mortgage is a conditional conveyance of land designed as a security for the payment of money, the fulfillment of some contract, or the performance of some act, and to be void upon such payment, fulfillment, or performance'': Mitchell v. Burnham, 44 Me. 286, 299. "At common law a mortgage is defined to be a deed conveying lands conditioned to be void upon the payment of a sum of money, or the doing of some other act": Lund v. Lund, 1 N. H. 39, 41, 8 Am. Dec. 29. "A mortgage is defined to be a conveyance of an estate, by way of pledge, to secure a debt or the performance of some act, such as the payment of money or the furnishing of an indemnity, and to become void on payment or performance agreeably to the prescribed condition": Wing v. Cooper, 37 Vt. 169, 179. Sce, also, Erskine v. Townsend, 2 Mass. 493, 495, 3 Am. Dec. 71; Carter v. Taylor, 3 Head, 30; Montgomery v. Bruere, 4 N. J. L. 260, 268. From these definitions no one would obtain even a suggestion of the modifications which equity has made in the nature of the mortgage. The following more full and correct description, as viewed from the double system of the English jurisprudence, is given by a standard text-book: "A mortgage may be described to be a conveyance of lands by a debtor to his creditor as a pledge and security for the repayment of a sum of money borrowed, with a proviso that such conveyance shall be void on payment of the money and interest on a certain day; and in all mortgages,

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SECTION III.

VARIOUS FORMS AND KINDS OF MORTGAGE.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1192. In equity, a mortgage is a security for a debt.
- § 1193. Once a mortgage, always a mortgage.
- § 1194. Mortgage, and conveyance with an agreement of repurchase, distinguished.
- § 1195. The general criterion: the continued existence of a debt.
- §1196. A conveyance absolute on its face may be a mortgage.
- §§ 1197-1199. Mortgage to secure future advances.
 - § 1197. As between the immediate parties.
 - § 1198. As against subsequent encumbrancers and purchasers.
 - § 1199. As affected by the recording act.
- §§ 1200-1203. Mortgages to secure several different notes.
 - § 1200. As between the original parties.
 - § 1201. Assignees of the notes; order of priority among them.
 - § 1202. Effect of an assignment of the notes.
 - § 1203. Priority between an assignee and the mortgagee.

§ 1192. In Equity, a Mortgage is a Security for a Debt.^a In the equitable view, a mortgage may be described in general terms as an assurance or pledge of or charge upon property, real or personal, for an antecedent, present, or future debt or loan, as security for and redeemable on the repayment of such debt.¹ The fundamental principle of equity is, that whenever a conveyance of land is given for the purpose of securing payment of an existing debt, it is a mortgage. If the fact is established that a debt exists between the parties, and the transaction did not amount

although the money be not paid at the time appointed, by which the conveyance of the lands becomes absolute at law, yet the mortgagor has still an equity of redemption,—that is, a right in equity, on payment of the principal, interest, and costs, within a reasonable time, to call for a reconveyance of the lands'': Powell on Mortgages, 4; sec, also, Coote on Mortgages, 1; Fisher on Mortgages, Introduction, p. 2; 1 Washburn on Real Property, c. 16, sec. 1.

§ 1192, ¹ Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265, 273.

§ 1192, (a) The text, §§ 1192-1196, is cited in Watts v. Kellar, 56 Fed. 1, 5 C. C. A. 394, 12 U. S. App. 274.

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to a present payment, satisfaction, or discharge of that debt, but recognized it as still continuing, to be paid at some future time, and was intended to be a security for such payment, then the instrument is always regarded in equity as a mortgage, whatever be its form.²

§ 1193. Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage.^a—In general, all persons able to contract are permitted to determine and control their own legal relations by any agree-

§ 1192, ² A court of equity will look beyond the external form, at the real relations between the parties, and will protect the debtor's equity of redemption, if necessary, in opposition to the literal terms of the instrument. This principle lies at the base of the entire equitable doctrine, and is applied to mortgages in the ordinary form, to deeds with a separate defeasance, to deeds absolute on their face, to deeds with accompanying agreements to reconvey, and to every other form of assurance which is in reality a security: b Stinchfield v. Milliken, 71 Me. 567; Moors v. Albro, 129 Mass. 9; Hassam v. Barrett, 115 Mass. 256; Campbell v. Dearborn, 109 Mass. 130, 12 Am. Rep. 671; MeIntier v. Shaw, 6 Allen, 83; French v. Burns, 35 Conn. 359; Budd v. Van Orden, 33 N. J. Eq. 143; Judge v. Reese, 24 N. J. Eq. 387; Sweet v. Parker, 22 N. J. Eq. 453; Vanderhaize v. Hugues, 13 N. J. Eq. 244, 411; Danzeisen's Appeal, 73 Pa. St. 65; Sweetzer's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 264; Harper's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 315; Houser v. Lamont, 55 Pa. St. 311, 93 Am. Dec. 755; Baugher v. Merryman, 32 Md. 185; Anthony v. Anthony, 23 Ark. 479; Church v. Cole, 36 Ind. 34; Hunter v. Hateh, 45 Ill. 178; Ewart v. Walling, 42 Ill. 453; Reigard v. McNeil, 38 Ill. 400; Wilson v. Patrick, 34 Iowa, 362; Holliday v. Arthur, 25 Iowa, 19; Richardson v. Barrick, 16 Iowa, 407; Holton v. Meighen, 15 Minn. 69.

If the instrument be in fact a mortgage, it is entirely immaterial that there is no provision for a redemption, or no day fixed for the payment: Joynes v. Statham, 3 Atk. 388; Bell v. Carter, 17 Beav. 11.

§ 1192, (b) This note is quoted in Fort v. Colby, 165 Iowa, 95, 144 N. W. 393. Section 1192 is cited in Mc-Guire v. Halloran, (Iowa) 160 N. W. 363. See, also, Hoile v. Bailey, 58 Wis. 434, 448, 17 N. W. 322; Swift v. Lumber Co., 71 Wis. 482, 37 N. W. 441.

§1193, (a) The text, §§ 1193-1219,

is cited in Jackson v. Lynch, 129 Ill. 72, 22 N. E. 246. Sections 1193– 1197 are cited in Phillips v. Jackson, 240 Mo. 310, 144 S. W. 112. This section is cited in Lounsbury v. Norton, 59 Conn. 170, 22 Atl. 153; Harrington v. Foley, 108 Iowa, 287, 79 N. W. 64; and in McGuire v. Halloran, (Iowa) 160 N. W. 363. ments which are not illegal, or opposed to good morals or to public policy; but the mortgage forms a marked exception to this principle. The doctrine has been firmly established from an early day that when the character of a mortgage has attached at the commencement of the transaction, so that the instrument, whatever be its form, is regarded in equity as a mortgage, that character of mortgage must and will always continue. If the instrument is in its essence a mortgage, the parties cannot by any stipulations. however express and positive, render it anything but a mortgage, or deprive it of the essential attributes belonging to a mortgage in equity. The debtor or mortgagor cannot, in the inception of the instrument, as a part of or collateral to its execution, in any manner deprive himself of his equitable right to come in after a default in paying the money at the stipulated time, and to pay the debt and interest, and thereby to redeem the land from the lien and encumbrance of the mortgage; the equitable right of redemption, after a default is preserved, remains in full force, and will be protected and enforced by a court of equity, no matter what stipulations the parties may have made in the original transaction purporting to cut off this right.^{1 b}

§ 1193, ¹ This doctrine is based upon the relative situation of the debtor and the creditor; it recognizes the fact that the creditor necessarily has a power over his debtor which may be exercised inequitably; that the debtor is liable to yield to the exertion of such power; and it protects the debtor absolutely from the consequences of his inferiority, and of his own acts done through infirmity of will. The doctrine is universal in its application, and underlies many special rules of equity. It extends to stipulations limiting the time of redemption, or the parties who may redeem; notwithstanding all such stipulations, the right to redeem is general:^e Howard v. Harris, 1 Vern. 33; Newcomb

§ 1193 (b) This paragraph of the text is quoted at length in Fort v. Colby, 165 Iowa, 95, 144 N. W. 393; in Hamilton v. Hamer, 99 S. C. 31, 82 S. E. 997, and in Plummer v. Ilse, 41 Wash. 5, 111 Am. St. Rep. 997, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 627, 82 Pac. 1009; and cited in Worley v. Carter, 30 Okl. 642, 121 Pac. 669; McGuire v. Halloran, (Iowa) 160 N. W. 363.

§1193, (c) This note is cited in Stoutz v. Rouse, 84 Ala. 309, 4 South. 170. This portion of the note is quoted in Jackson v. Lynch, 129 Ill.

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§ 1194. Mortgage, and Conveyance With Agreement of Repurchase, Distinguished.—The principle that equity looks beneath the external form in determining questions connected with mortgage has frequently been applied to a par-

v. Bonham, 1 Vern. 7; Willett v. Winnell, 1 Vern. 488; Jennings v. Ward, 2 Vern. 520; East I. Co. v. Atkyns, Comyn, 346; Spurgeon v. Collier, 1 Eden, 55; Jason v. Eyres, 2 Ch. Cas. 33; Floyer v. Lavington, 1 P. Wms. 268; Goodman v. Grierson, 2 Ball & B. 274, 278; Cowdry v. Day, 1 Giff. 316; Pritchard v. Elton, 38 Conn. 434; Henry v. Davis, 7 Johns. Ch. 40; Clark v. Henry, 2 Cow. 324; Rankin v. Mortimere, 7 Watts, 372; Jaques v. Weeks, 7 Watts, 261, 275; Woods v. Wallace, 22 Pa. St. 171; Hiester v. Maderia, 3 Watts & S. 384, 388; Johnston v. Gray, 16 Serg. & R. 361, 365, 16 Am. Dec. 577; Clark v. Condit, 18 N. J. Eq. 358; Vanderhaize v. Hugues, 13 N. J. Eq. 244, 410; Robinson v. Farrelly, 16 Ala. 472; Heirs of Stover v. Heirs of Bounds, 1 Ohio St. 107; Cherry v. Bowen, 4 Sneed, 415; Burrow v. Henson, 2 Sneed, 658; McNees v. Swaney, 50 Mo. 388, 391; Wilson v. Drumrite, 21 Mo. 325; Pierce v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 116, 125; Lee v. Evans, 8 Cal.

72, 22 N. E. 246, and in Fort v. Colby, 165 Iowa, 95, 144 N. W. 393. See, also, Morgan v. Jeffreys, [1910] 1 Ch. 620 (provision against redemption for twenty-eight years, while the mortgagee may enforce the mortgage at any time, unreasonable); Fairclough v. Swan Brewery Co., Ltd., [1912] App. Cas. (Priv. Coun.) 565 Ann. Cas. 1912D, 957 (provision against redemption of mortgage of a lease until within six weeks of termination of lease makes the mortgage, for all practical purposes, irredeemable, and is invalid); Parmer v. Parmer, 74 Ala. 285; Reed v. Reed, 75 Me. 264; Marshall v. Russell, 61 Colo. 417, 158 Pac. 141 (deed in escrow to be delivered on default); Halbert v. Turner, 233 Ill. 531, 84 N. E. 704 (provision that if payment be not made on a certain day the conveyance shall be absolute); Mc-Guire v. Hallorah, (Iowa) 160 N. W. 363; Jones v. Gillett, 142 Iowa, 506, 118 N. W. 314, 121 N. W. 5 (cove nant limiting time of redemption, void); Holden Land & Live Stock Co. v. Interstate Trading Co., 87 Kan. 221, L. R. A. 1915B, 492, 123 Pac. 733 (escrow, to be delivered on non-payment of the debt); Burns v. Hunnewell, 217 Mass. 106, 104 N. E. 494; Sheppard v. Wagner, 240 Mo. 409, 144 S. W. 394, 145 S. W. 420 (clause limiting right of redemption to three years, void); Griffin v. Cooper, 73 N. J. Eq. 465, 68 Atl. 1095; Wilson v. Fisher, 148 N. C. 535, 62 S. E. 622 (provision in the mortgage that upon default the mortgagor should sell his equity of redemption for \$50, void); Worley v. Carter, 30 Okl. 642, 121 Pac. 669, citing the text; Williams v. Purcell, 45 Okl. 489, 145 Pac. 1151; Grover v. Hawthorne Estate, 62 Or. 77, 114 Pac. 808, 121 Pac. 808; Plummer v. Ilse, 41 Wash. 5, 111 Am. St. Rep. 997, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 627, 82 Pac. 1009 (deed in escrow to be delivered on mortgagor's default): Boyer v. Paine, 60 Wash. 56, 110 Pac. 682.

ticular mode of dealing with real property. Where land is conveyed by an absolute deed, and an instrument is given back as a part of the same transaction, not containing the condition ordinarily inserted in mortgages, but being an

424; Rogan v. Walker, 1 Wis. 527; but see Glendenning v. Johnston, 33 Wis. 347. And stipulations inserted in a mortgage, giving the mortgagee a collateral advantage not properly belonging to the contract of mortgage, are invalid:^d Chambers v. Goldwin, 9 Ves. 254, 271;

§ 1193, (d) "Clogging" the Equity of Redemption .--- This rule has been thoroughly re-examined in a series of recent English cases, the most important of which is Noakes & Co., Ltd., v. Rice, [1902] App. Cas. 24, affirming Rice v. Noakes, [1900] 2 Ch. 445. The stipulation condemned in that case was a covenant on the part of a mortgagor of a leasehold to buy liquors of the mortgagee only, the covenant to continue after the. mortgage debt was paid and during the continuance of the term of the lease. Speaking of the principle, "Once a mortgage, always a mortgage," Lord Davey says (p. 33), "The meaning of that is, that the mortgagee shall not make any stipulation which will prevent a mortgagor, who has paid principal, interest and costs, from getting back the mortgaged property in the condition in which he parted with it." See, also, Bradley v. Carritt, [1903] App. Cas. 253, reversing Carritt v. Bradley, [1901] 2 K. B. 550, and disapproving Santley v. Wilde, [1899] 1 Ch. 747; Jarrah Timber & Wood Paving Co., Ltd., v. Samuel, [1902] 2 Ch. 479, [1903] 2 Ch. 1; Samuel v. Jarrah Timber & Wood Paving Co., [1904] App. Cas. 323 (option given to the mortgagee in the mortgage contract to purchase the mortgaged property at a price named, at any time within twelve months); Biggs v. Hoddinott, [1898] 2 Ch. 307, 67

Law J. (Ch.) 540, 78 Law T. (N. S.) 201. 47 Wkly. Rep. 84. See, also, these recent cases in the House of Lords: De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd., v. British South Africa Co., [1912] App. Cas. 52, reversing [1910] 2 Ch. 502 (the exclusive privilege granted to the mortgagee was not a part of the mortgage transaction, but came into existence before the mortgage, and hence was not a "clog" on redemption). The matter came to a head in Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Co., Ltd., [1914] App. Cas. 25. A meatpreserving company mortgaged all its property to a firm of wool brokers, to secure a loan of \$10,000. The loan could not be called in by the mortgagee until five years from the date of the mortgage, but redemption might be had by the mortgagor at any time. The mortgage instrument contained a stipulation giving the mortgagee the option of pre-emption, at the best price offered. of all sheepskins produced as a byproduct by the mortgagor, for a period of five years. The mortgagor redeeming in about two years, the question arose whether this stipulation came to an end on redemption. as did the covenant in Noakes v. Rice, supra. It was held that this stipulation was a mere collateral contract, fair and reasonable, entered into as a condition of the company obtaining the loan; that it was

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agreement that the grantee will reconvey the premises if the grantor shall pay a certain sum of money at or before a specified time, the two taken together may be what on their

Langstaffe v. Fenwick, 10 Ves. 405; Leith v. Irvine, 1 Mylne & K. 277; Broad v. Selfe, 9 Jur., N. S., 885; Barrett v. Hartley, L. R. 2 Eq. 789, 795; Matthison v. Clarke, 3 Drew. 3; Chapple v. Mahon, 5 I. R. Eq. 225; Comyns v. Comyns, 5 I. R. Eq. 583. On the other hand, an agreement with the mortgagor that the mortgagee shall have a preference of purchasing—a pre-emption—in case of a sale by the mortgagor is valid: Orby v. Trigg, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 599, pl. 24; 9 Mod. 2; Cookson v. Cookson, 8 Sim. 529. The mortgagor may, at any time after the execution of the mortgage, by a separate and distinct transaction, sell or release his equity of redemption to the mortgagee: Trull v. Skinner, 17 Pick. 213; Remsen v. Hay, 2 Edw. Ch. 535; Hicks v. Hicks, 5 Gill & J. 75; McKinstry v. Conly, 12 Ala. 678; Wynkoop v. Cowing, 21 Ill. 570.^e This is a transaction, however, which a court of equity

not a clog on the equity of redemption or repugnant to the right to redeem; and that it survived the redemption, therefore, and was enforceable by injunction against the mortgagor.

It is impossible, in a few sentences, to sum up the results of this notable series of decisions. The judgments must be read consecutively, and with careful reference to the facts involved. It is apparent that the statement in the author's note relating to collateral advantages has been considerably narrowed, and that there is a disposition not to extend the boundaries of the maxim, "Once a mortgage, always a mortgage." Possibly the following distinction in the facts of the three leading cases may be worth noting, and may serve to show to what extent Lord Davey's definition in the Noakes case, quoted above, needs recasting. In the Kreglinger case the property came back to the mortgagor not, to be sure, "in the condition in which he parted with it," since the business was affected by the pre-emption stipulation; it did,however, come back undiminished in value, since the stipulation for sale of woolskins at the best price offered merely restricted the mortgagor in its choice of customers. In the Noakes case, on the other hand, the stipulation restricting the saloonkeeper to dealing in the product of the mortgagee's brewery would, if enforced, have greatly impaired the value of his business; and in Bradley v. Carritt, we are told, the restrictive stipulation rendered the property, after redemption, practically unsalable, under the peculiar circumstances of the case.

§ 1193, (e) Sale of Equity of Redemption to Mortgagee, After Execution of the Mortgage.—See, also, Reeves v. Lisle, [1902] App. Cas. 461, affirming Lisle v. Reeves, [1902] 1 Ch. 53 (subsequent agreement giving mortgagee the option to purchase the property); Stoutz v. Rouse, 84 Ala. 309, 4 South. 170; McMillan v. Jewett, 85 Ala. 476, 5 South. 145; Rodgers v. Burt, 157 Ala. 91, 47 South. 226; Shaner v. Rathdrum face they purport to be,—a mere sale with a contract of repurchase,—or they may constitute a mortgage. In the first case, where the transaction is merely a sale and a con-

will examine strictly, in order to be satisfied that it is a perfectly fair and independent proceeding, entirely unconnected with the original contract of mortgage:^f Webb v. Rorke, 2 Schoales & L. 661, 673;

State Bank, 29 Idaho; 576, 161 Pac. 90; Holden Land & Live Stock Co. v. Interstate Trading Co., 87 Kan. 221, L. R. A. 1915B, 492, 123 Pac. 733, citing above note; Cassem v. Heustis, 201 Ill. 208, 94 Am. St. Rep. 160, 66 N. E. 283; Seymour v. Mackay, 126 Ill. 341, 18 N. E. 552; Scholl v. Hopper, 134 Ky. 83, 119 S. W. 770 (waiver of right to redeem held to be based on an adequate consideration even though price paid was not full value of land); Greenlaw v. Eastport Savings Bank, 106 Me. 205, 76 Atl. 485; Grannis v. Hitchcock, 118 Minn. 462, 137 N. W. 186; Kirkendall v. Weatherley, 77 Neb. 421, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 515, 109 N. W. 757; Miller v. Smith, 20 N. D. 96, 126 N. W. 499 (mortgagor may convey to mortgagee subject to an option to repurchase on fixed terms); Raski v. Wise, 56 Or. 72, 107 Pac. 984; Harmon v. Grant's Pass Banking & Trust Co., 60 Or. 69, 118 Pac. 188; Bailey v. Frazier, 62 Or. 142, 124 Pac. 643 (mortgagee not a trustee). In Illinois it is held that when land has been transferred by a deed absolute in form, though intended as a security for the payment of a debt, the payment of the debt may be abandoned, and the deed treated as an absolute conveyance, although originally intended as a mortgage, and that such arrangement may be made by parol, and he binding: Cramer v. Wilson, 202 Ill. 83, 66 N. E. 869; Maxfield v. Patchen, 29 Ill. 39. The same rule is laid down in Kentucky: Scholl v. Hopper, 134

Ky. 83, 119 S. W. 770; in Massachusetts: Sears v. Gilman, 199 Mass. 384, 85 N. E. 466; and in Indiana: Ferguson v. Boyd, 169 Ind. 537, 81 N. E. 71, 82 N. E. 1064; Raub v. Lemon, 61 Ind, App. 59, 108 N. E. 631 (mortgage by deed with contract to reconvey; contract canceled by act of parties); and see Froidevaux v. Jordon, 64 W. Va. 388, 131 Am. St. Rep. 911, 62 S. E. 686 (proof insufficient). In Texas a contrary conclusion is reached: Keller v. Kirby, (Tex. Civ. App.) 79 S. W. 82; Ullman v. Devereux, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 459, 102 S. W. 1163. In Sears v. Gilman, 199 Mass. 384, 85 N. E. 466, supra, it is held that where the "equities of the grantor to have it [the absolute deed] held for security lie only in parol, these equities may be discharged by a subsequent parol agreement, which leaves the title absolute in accordance with the terms of the deed"; and even where there is a separate bond of defeasance, the equity of redemption may he given up by a cancellation or redelivery of the bond. In this case the determination of the parties to treat the conveyance as absolute was acted upon by them for nearly thirty years. A sufficient consideration was found in the fact that the grantor's debt exceeded the value of the land.

§ 1193, (f) Such Sale must be Fair, etc.—Shaw v. Lacy, (Ala.) 74 South. 933; Franklin v. Ayer, 22 Fla. 654; Connor v. Connor, 59 Fla. 467, 52 South. 727; Cassem v. Heustis, 201

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tract of repurchase, the agreement must be fulfilled according to its terms. If the grantor fails to pay the money at the stipulated time, all his rights, either at law or in equity, under the contract are gone; there is no equity of redemp-

Villa v. Rodriguez, 12 Wall. 323, 20 L. Ed. 406; Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139, 154, 13 L. Ed. 927; Hyndman v. Hyndman, 19 Vt. 9, 46 Am. Dec. 171; Mills v. Mills, 26 Conn. 213; Holridge v. Gillespie, 2 Johns. Ch. 30; Baugher v. Merryman, 32 Md. 185; Locke's Ex'r v. Palmer, 26 Ala. 312, 323; Brown v. Gaffney, 28 Ill. 149.

Ill. 208, 94 Am. St. Rep. 160, 66 N. E. 283; Ferguson v. Boyd, (Ind. App.) 79 N. E. 549 (burden on mortgagee to show adequate consideration); Fort v. Colby, 165 Iowa, 95, 144 N. W. 393, citing note 1 (release sustained only on clear and satisfactory showing that the agreement is perfectly fair, and is free from any element of advantage or oppression; and every doubt is resolved against the mortgagee); Linnell v. Lyford, 72 Me. 280; Williams v. Bolt, 170 Mich. 517, 136 N. W. 472; Niggeler v. Maurin, 34 Minn. 118, 24 N. W. 369; Grannis v. Hitchcock, 118 Minn. 462, 137 N. W. 186 (conveyance of equity with oral agreement reserving right to redeem; relation of mortgagor and mortgagee continued); Leach v. Hirshman, 90 Miss. 723, 44 South. 33; Gassert v. Strong, 38 Mont. 18, 98 Pac. 497 (in doubtful cases, courts will hold mortgage still exists); Wagner v. Phillips, 78 N. J. Eq. 33, 78 Atl. 806; Pritchard v. Smith, 159 N. C. 636, 75 S. E. 803; Wagg v. Herbert, 19 Okl. 525, 92 Pac. 250 (importance of adequacy of consideration); Caro v. Wollenberg, 68 Or. 420, 136 Pac. 866 (burden on mortgagee to show voluntary transfer, fair price, and propriety of whole transaction); Hall v. Hall, 41 S. C. 163, 44 Am. St. Rep. 696, 19 S. E. 305; Earle's Adm'r v. Blanchard, 85 Vt. 288, 81 Atl. 913 (conveyance to mortgagee regarded as a mere change in the form of the security, unless it clearly and unequivocally appears that both parties intended that it should operate as a bar to the equity of redemption; rule that absolute deed can be shown to be a mortgage only by evidence which establishes it beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to the transaction); Vangilder v. Hoffman, 22 W. Va. 1; Liskey v. Snyder, (W. Va.) 49 S. E. 515; Lynch v. Ryan, 132 Wis. 271, 111 N. W. 707, 112 N. W. 427 (must be clearly shown that the conveyance or release was voluntary, was based on adequate consideration, was untainted by fraud, and that no advantage was taken of debtor's necessities to drive a hard bargain); Young v. Miner, 141 Wis. 501, 124 N. W. 660 (same); Coates v. Marsden, 142 Wis. 106, 124 N. W. 1057 (same). See, however, Melbourne. Banking Co. v. Brougham, 7 App. Cas. (Priv. Coun.) 307, where it is said that, inasmuch as the relation between the parties is not a confidential one, the burden of justifying the release does not rest upon the mortgagee. See, also, De Martin v. Phelan, 115 Cal. 538, 56 Am. St. Rep. 115, 47 Pac. 356. To the effect that the relation is not confidential, see Adler v. Van Kirk L. & C. Co., 114 Ala. 551, 62 Am. St. Rep. 133, 21 South. 490.

tion.^{1 a} In the second case, if the transaction be a mortgage, all the qualities and incidents of a mortgage attach, whatever be its external form, and whatever be the collateral stipulations. The maxim, Once a mortgage, always a mortgage, applies to this condition of fact with especial emphasis. The rights of the two parties are reciprocal: that of the grantor to redeem after a default in payment at the specified time is complete; that of the grantee to

§1194, ¹ Barrell v. Sabine, 1 Vern. 268; Davis v. Thomas, 1 Russ. & M. 506; Williams v. Owen, 5 Mylne & C. 303; Perry v. Meadowcroft, 4 Beav. 197; Alderson v. White, 2 De Gex & J. 97; French v. Sturdivant, 8 Me. 246; Rich v. Doane, 35 Vt. 125; Macaulay v. Porter, 71 N. Y. 173; Morrison v. Brand, 5 Daly, 40; Glover v. Payn, 19 Wend. 518; Holmes v. Grant, 8 Paige, 243; Brown v. Dewey, 2 Barb. 28; Merritt v. Brown, 19 N. J. Eq. 286; Haines v. Thomson, 70 Pa. St. 434; Ransone v. Frayser's Ex'rs, 10 Leigh, 592; Moss v. Green, 10 Leigh, 251, 34 Am. Dec. 731; Kelly v. Bryan, 6 Ired. Eq. 283; MeLaurin v. Wright, 2 Ired. Eq. 94; Haynie v. Robertson, 58 Ala. 37; Pearson v. Seay, 35 Ala. 612; 38 Ala. 643; McKinstry v. Conly, 12 Ala. 678; Johnson's Ex'r v. Clark, 5 Ark. 340; Turner v. Kerr, 44 Mo. 429; Holmes v. Fresh, 9 Mo. 200, 206; Lane v. Dickerson, 10 Yerg. 373; Slutz v. Desenberg, 28 Ohio St. 371; Wilson v. Carpenter, 62 Ind. 495; Cornell v. Hall, 22 Mieh. 377; Price v. Karnes, 59 Ill. 276; Hanford v. Blessing, 80 Ill. 188; Carr v. Rising, 62 Ill. 14; Pitts v. Cable, 44 Ill. 103; Smith v. Crosby, 47 Wis. 160, 2 N. W. 104; McNamara v. Culver, 22 Kan. 661; Farmer v. Grose, 42 Cal. 169; Page v. Vilhac, 42 Cal. 75; Henley v. Hotaling, 41 Cal. 22; Conway's Ex'rs v. Alexander, 7 Cranch, 218, 3 L. Ed. 321; and see Tufts v. Tapley, 129 Mass. 380.

§ 1194, (a) Transaction a Conveyance With Agreement of Repurchase. Quoted in Bigler v. Jack, 114 Iowa, 667, 87 N. W. 700; also, in Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 Pac. 27; Williams v. McManus, 90 S. C. 490, 73 S. E. 1038. This section is cited in Keithley v. Wood, 151 Ill. 566, 42 Am. St. Rep. 265, 38 N. E. 149; Casper Nat. Bank v. Jenner, 268 Ill. 142, 108 N. E. 998; Jeffreys v. Charlton, 72 N. J. Eq. 340, 65 Atl. 711; Clambey v. Copland, 52 Wash. 580, 100 Pac. 1031. See, also, Manchester, etc., R'y Co. v. North Central, etc., Co., 13 App. Cas. (H. L.) 554, affirming North Central, etc., Co. v. Manchester, etc., R'y Co., 35 Ch. Div. 191, and 32 Ch. Div. 477; Horbach v. Hill, 112 U. S. 144, 28 L. Ed. 670, 5 Sup. Ct. 81; Wallace v. Johnstone, 129 U. S. 58, 32 L. Ed. 619, 9 Sup. Ct. 243; Bogk v. Gassert, 149 U. S. 17, 37 L. Ed. 631, 13 Sup. Ct. 738; Cowell v. Craig, 79 Fed. 685; Arizona Copper Estate v. Watts, 237 Fed. 585, 150 C. C. A. 467; Douglas v. Moody, 80 Ala. 61; Thomas v.

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foreclose and cut off this equity of redemption is no less clear.² b

§ 1194, ² Goodman v. Grierson, 2 Ball & B. 274; Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139, 13 L. Ed. 927; Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sum. 486, Fed. Cas. No. 4847; Wing v. Cooper, 37 Vt. 169; Carpenter v. Snelling, 97 Mass. 452; Rice v. Rice, 4 Pick. 349; Peterson v. Clark, 15 Johns. 205; Sweetzer's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 264; McClurkan v. Thompson, 69 Pa. St. 305; Spering's Appeal, 60 Pa. St. 199; Houser v. Lamont, 55 Pa. St. 311, 93 Am. Dec. 755; Kellum v. Smith, 33 Pa. St. 158; Rankin v. Mortimere, 7 Watts. 372; Hiester v. Maderia, 3 Watts & S. 384; Baugher v. Merryman, 32 Md. 185; Artz v. Grove, 21 Md. 456; Dougherty v. McColgan, 6 Gill & J. 275; Klinck v. Price, 4 W. Va. 4, 6 Am. Rep. 268; Robinson v. Willoughby, 65 N. C. 520; Lindsay v.

Livingston, 155 Ala. 546, 46 South. 851; Hubert v. Sistrunk, (Ala.) 53 South. 819; Copenny v. Southern Realty Co., 174 Ala. 378, 56 South. 721; Shaner v. Rathdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho, 576, 161 Pac. 90; Eames v. Hardin, 111 Ill. 634; Carroll v. Tomlinson, 192 Ill. 399, 85 Am. St. Rep. 344, 61 N. E. 484; Cold v. Beh, 152 Iowa, 368, 132 N. McGuire Halloran, W. 73; ν. (lowa) 160 N. W. 363; Yost v. First, Nat. Bank, 66 Kan. 605, 72 Pac. 209; Sheffield v. Hurst, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 890, 104 S. W. 350; Charles v. Thacker, 167 Ky. 835, 181 S. W. 611; Stahl v. Dehn, 72 Mich. 645, 40 N. W. 922; Buse v. Page, 32 Minn. 111, 19 N. W. 736, 20 N. W. 95; Duell v. Leslie, 207 Mo. 658, 106 S. W. 489; Donovan v. Boeck, 217 Mo. 70, 116 S. W. 543; Branham v. Peltzer, (Mo.) 177 S. W. 373; Samuelson v. Mickey, 73 Neb. 852, 103 N. W. 671, 106 N. W. 461; Miller v. Smith, 20 N. D. 96, 126 N. W. 499; Elliott v. Bozorth, 52 Or. 391, 97 Pac. 632; Rotan Grocery Co. v. Turner, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 534, 102 S. W. 932; Middleton v. Johnston, (Tex. Civ. App.) 110 S. W. 789; Stringfellow v. Braseltor, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 117 S. W. 204; Hesser v. Brown, 40 III-178

Wash. 688, 82 Pac. 934 (though agreement recites that conveyance was for better security); Mittlesteadt v. Johnson, 75 Wash. 550, 135 Pac. 214; Johnson v. National Bank of Commerce, 65 Wash. 261, L. R. A. 1916B. 4, 118 Pac. 21; Kegley v. Skillman, 68 Wash. 637, 123 Pac. 1081; Kerr v. Hill, 27 W. Va. 576; Mankin v. Dickinson, 76 W. Va. 128, 85 S. E. 74.

§1194, (b) Transaction a Mortgage .--- The text is quoted in Williams v. McManus, 90 S. C. 490, 73 S. E. 1038. See, also, Lanahan v. Sears, 102 U. S. 318, 26 L. Ed. 180; Watts v. Kellar, 56 Fed. 1, 5 C. C. A. 394, 12 U. S. App. 274; Turner v. Wilkinson, 72 Ala. 361; Thomas v. Livingston, 147 Ala. 200. 40 South. 504; Irwin v. Coleman, 173 Ala. 175, 55 South. 492; Nelson v. Wadsworth, 171 Ala. 603, 55 South. 120; Van Henvel v. Long, (Ala.) 75 South. 339; Reitze v. Humphreys, 53 Colo. 177, 125 Pac. 518; Hull v. Burr, 58 Fla. 432, 50 South, 754; Connor v. Connor, 59 Fla. 467, 52 South. 727: Terwilliger v. Ballard, 64 Fla. 158, 59 South. 244 (to secure debt of third person); Wofford v. Wyly, 72 Ga. 863; Helbreg v. Schumann, 150 Ill. 12, 41 Am. St. Rep. 339, 37 N. E.

§ 1195. The General Criterion—The Continued Existence of a Debt.—Whether any particular transaction does thus amount to a mortgage or to a sale with a contract of repurchase must, to a large extent, depend upon its own

Matthews, 17 Fla. 575; McNeill v. Norsworthy, 39 Ala. 156; Locke's Ex'r v. Palmer, 26 Ala. 312; Weathersley v. Weathersley, 40 Miss. 462, 469, 90 Am. Dec. 344; Scott v. Henry, 13 Ark. 112; Heath v. Williams, 30 Ind. 495; Watkins v. Gregory, 6 Blackf. 113; McKinney v. Miller, 19 Mich. 142; Bishop v. Williams, 18 Ill. 101; 15 Ill. 553; Miller v. Thomas, 14 Ill. 428; White v. Lucas, 46 Iowa, 319; Wilson v. Patrick, 34 Iowa, 362, 370; Hughes v. Sheaff, 19 Iowa, 335, 342; Trucks v. Lindsey, 18 Iowa, 504; Hickox v. Lowe, 10 Cal. 197; Polhemus v. Trainer, 30 Cal. 685. A grantor may, however, lose his right of redemption from a purchaser of the grantee by his fraudulent conduct: Tufts v. Tapley, 129 Mass. 380.

99; Keithley v. Wood, 151 Ill. 566, 42 Am. St. Rep. 265, 38 N. E. 149; Halbert v. Turner, 233 Ill. 531, 84 N. E. 704 (sale with option to repurchase any time before grantor's death); White v. Redenbaugh, 41 Ind. App. 580, 82 N. E. 110; Beidleman v. Koch, 42 Ind. App. 423, 85 N. E. 977; Wysong v. Sells, 44 Ind. App. 238, 88 N. E. 954; Rubelman v. Rummel, 72 Iowa, 40, 33 N. W. 354; Keeline v. Clark, 132 Iowa, 360, 106 N. W. 257; Kinkead v. Peet, 137 Iowa, 692, 114 N. W. 616; Fort v. Colby, 165 Iowa, 95, 144 N. W. 393; McRobert v. Bridget, 168 Iowa, 28, 149 N. W. 906; Overstreet v. Baxter, 30 Kan. 55, 1 Pac. 825; Wiswell v. Simmons, 77 Kan. 622, 95 Pac. 407; Sheffield v. Day, (Ky.) 90 S. W. 545; Sebree v. Thompson, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 1146, 104 S. W. 781; Tucker v. Witherbee, 130 Ky. 269, 113 S. W. 123; Scholl v. Hopper, 134 Ky. 83, 119 S. W. 770; Snow v. Pressey, 82 Me. 552, 20 Atl. 78; Bunker v. Barron, 79 Me. 62, 1 Am. St. Rep. 282, 8 Atl. 253; Burns v. Hunnewell, 217 Mass. 106, 104 N. E. 494; Restrick Lumber Co. v. Wyrem-

bolski, 164 Mich. 71, 128 N. W. 1083; Ferry v. Miller, 164 Mich. 429, 129 N. W. 721; Maginn v. Cashin, (Mich.) 162 N. W. 1009: Phillips v. Jackson, 240 Mo. 310, 144 S. W. 112; Sheppard v. Wagner, 240 Mo. 409, 144 S. W. 394, 145 S. W. 420; Reich v. Cochran, 213 N. Y. 416, 107 N. E. 1029; Smith v. Jensen, 16 N. D. 408, 114 N. W. 306; Pearce v. Wilson, 111 Pa. St. 14, 56 Am. Rep. 243, 2 Atl. 99; Francis v. Francis, 78 S. C. 178, 58 S. E. 804; Hamilton v. Hamer, 99 S. C. 31, 82 S. E. 997; Hall v. Jennings, (Tex. Civ. App.) 104 S. W. 489; Moorhead v. Ellison, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 444, 120 S. W. 1049 (deed placed in escrow, to be delivered to grantee if debt not paid); Mitchell v. Morgan, (Tex. Civ. App.) 165 S. W. 883; Duerden v. Solomon, 33 Utah, 468, 94 Pac. 978; Plummer v. Ilse, 41 Wash. 5. 111 Am. St. Rep. 997, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 627, 82 Pac. 1009; Hoover v. Bouffleur, 74 Wash. 382, 133 Pac. 602; Gibson v. Hopkins, (W. Va.) 93 S. E. 826; Falbe v. Caves, 151 Wis. 54, 138 N. W. 87. Of course, where the instrument given by the

special circumstances; for the question finally turns, in all cases, upon the real intention of the parties as shown upon the face of the writings, or as disclosed by extrinsic evidence.^a A general criterion, however, has been established by an overwhelming consensus of authorities, which furnishes a sufficient test in the great majority of cases; and whenever the application of this test still leaves a *doubt*, the American courts, from obvious motives of policy, have generally leaned in favor of the mortgage. This criterion is the continued existence of a debt or liability between the parties, so that the conveyance is in reality intended as a security for the debt or indemnity against the liability. If there is an indebtedness or liability between the parties, either a debt existing prior to the conveyance, or a debt arising from a loan made at the time of the conveyance, or from any other cause, and this debt is still left subsisting, not being discharged or satisfied by the convey-

grantee is a defeasance, in terms, the transaction is clearly a mortgage: Dubuque Nat. Bank v. Weed, 57 Fed. 513; Reilly v. Cullen, 101 Mo. App. 32, 74 S. W. 370; Grogan v. Grass Valley Trading Co., (Mont.) 76 Pac. 211; Knowles v. Knowles, (R. I.) 56 Atl. 775; Turner v. Cochran, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 549, 70 S. W. 1024. See, also, Collier v. Smaltz, 149 Iowa, 230, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1007, 128 N. W. 396; Calhoun v. Anderson, 78 Kan. 746, 98 Pac. 274; Wilson v. Fisher, 148 N. C. 535, 62 S. E. 622; Raski v. Wise, 56 Or. 72, 107 Pac. 984; Ordway v. Farrow, 79 Vt. 192, 118 Am. St. Rep. 951, 64 Atl. 1116; Froidevaux v. Jordon, 64 W. Va. 388, 131 Am. St. Rep. 911, 62 S. E. 686 (contemporaneous sealed contract shows that deed was executed for forbearance of loan).

§ 1195, (a) The Question is One of Intention. — Quoted in Bigler v. Jack, 114 Iowa, 667, 87 N. W. 700;

Williams v. McManus, 90 S. C. 490. 73 S. E. 1038; Boyer v. Paine, 60 Wash. 56, 110 Pac. 682; Mittlesteadt v. Johnson, 75 Wash. 550, 135 Pac. 214; Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 Pac. 27. This section is cited in Irwin v. Coleman, 173 Ala. 175, 55 South. 492; Morton v. Allen, 180 Ala. 279, L. R. A. 1916B, 11, 60 South. 866; Blackstock v. Robertson, 42 Colo. 472, 94 Pac. 336; Hamilton v. Hamer, 99 S. C. 31, 82 S. E. 997; Holladay v. Willis, 101 Va. 274, 43 S. E. 616. See, also, Beidleman v. Koch, 42 Ind. App. 423, 85 N. E. 977; Cold v. Beh, 152 Iowa, 368, 132 N. W. 73; Fort v. Colby, 165 Iowa, 95, 144 N. W. 393 (deed with lease by grantee to grantor containing option to repurchase); Duerden v. Solomon, 33 Utah, 468, 94 Pac. 978; Johnson v. National Bank of Commerce, 65 Wash. 261, L. R. A. 1916B, 4, 118 Pac. 21; Gibson v. Hopkius, (W. Va.) 93 S. E. 826.

ance, but the grantor is regarded as still owing and bound to pay it at some future time, so that the payment stipulated for in the agreement to reconvey is in reality the payment of this existing debt, then the whole transaction amounts to a mortgage, whatever language the parties may have used, and whatever stipulations they may have inserted in the instruments.^b On the contrary, if no such relation whatsoever of debtor and creditor is left subsisting, then the transaction is not a mortgage, but a mere sale and contract of repurchase.¹^c The writings *may* show on

§ 1195, 1 The practical test is, whether there is a liability, notwithstanding or independent of the conveyance and contract of reconveyance, which the grantee can enforce against the grantor.^d If a loan is made to the grantor at the time of executing the conveyance, and the continued existence of his indebtedness therefor is evidenced by some collateral engagement given by the grantor, such as a note or bond, the case would be simple, and the transaction clearly a mortgage. In the second place, if the conveyance is given in consideration of an antecedent debt due from the grantor, and this debt yet remains, so that the grantee may enforce his claim at some time or another against the grantor, the transaction is also a mortgage. But if this antecedent debt is wholly satisfied and extinguished by the conveyance, so that no liability remains under any circumstances against the grantor, then there is no mortgage, since there is no debt to be secured thereby. In such a case the surrender up by the grantee of the written evidences of original indebtedness, or his cancellation thereof, would be very material circumstances. Thirdly, there may be neither a present loan nor an antecedent debt, but the grantee may

§ 1195, (b) Quoted in Lounsbury v. Norton, 59 Conn. 170, 22 Atl. 153; Hodge v. Weeks, 31 S. C. 276, 9 S. E. 953; Keithley v. Wood, 151 Ill. 566, 42 Am. St. Rep. 265, 38 N. E. 149; American Mortgage Co. v. Williams, 103 Ark. 484, 145 S. W. 234; Ferguson v. Boyd, (Ind. App.) 79 N. E. 549; Worley v. Carter, 30 Okl. 642, 121 Pac. 669; Farrow v. Work, 39 Okl. 734, 136 Pac. 739; Hamilton v. Hamer, 99 S. C. 31, 82 S. E. 997; Hall v. Jennings, (Tex. Civ. App.) 104 S. W. 489; Boyer v. Paine, 60 Wash. 56, 110 Pac. 682; Mittlesteadt v. Johnson, 75 Wash. 550, 135 Pac. 214.

§1195, (c) Quoted in American Mortgage Co. v. Williams, 103 Ark. 484, 145 S. W. 234; Jeffreys v. Charlton, 72 N. J. Eq. 340, 65 Atl. 711; Worley v. Carter, 30 Okl. 642, 121 Pac. 669; Farrow v. Work, 39 Okl. 734, 136 Pac. 739; Hall v. Jennings, (Tex. Civ. App.) 104 S. W. 489.

§ 1195, (d) Quoted in Jeffreys v. Charlton, 72 N. J. Eq. 340, 65 Atl. 711. their face that the relation of debtor and creditor still continues, and that its existence and consequences are contemplated by the parties; or they may entirely fail to show any such fact, and may consist simply of an absolute conveyance and of a naked agreement to reconvey. While in the former case parol evidence is clearly inadmissible to contradict the terms of the writings, and to destroy their necessary character as a mortgage, in the latter case extrinsic parol evidence is always admissible to show the real situation of the parties, the existence of a debt, their intention to secure payment of that debt, and the actual character of the instruments as constituting a mortgage. While each case must involve its own special facts, the following circumstances are regarded by the courts as important, and

undertake to assume some outstanding liability of the grantor, or to pay off some claim against the grantor, so that an obligation to reimburse him would rest upon the grantor, and the conveyance may be intended to indemnify the grantee and to secure the performance of the grantor's future continuing obligation, in which case it would clearly be a mortgage. These conclusions are fully sustained by the course of modern decision.

Cases in which the transaction has amounted to a mortgage: French v. Burns, 35 Conn. 359; McIntier v. Shaw, 6 Allen, 83; Pardee v. Treat, 18 Hun, 298; Horn v. Keteltas, 46 N. Y. 605; Fiedler v. Darrin, 50 N. Y. 437, 441, 59 Barb. 651; Tibbs v. Morris, 44 Barb. 138; Marvin v. Prentice, 49 How. Pr. 385; Phillips v. Hulsizer, 20 N. J. Eq. 308; Sweet v. Parker, 22 N. J. Eq. 453; Harper's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 315; Danzeisen's

§ 1195, (e) Cases in which the transaction has amounted to a mortgage: Watts v. Kellar, 56 Fed. 1, 5 C. C. A. 394, 12 U. S. App. 274; Nelson v. Wadsworth, 171 Ala. 603, 55 South. 120; Whittemore v. Fisher, 132 Ill. 243, 24 N. E. 636; Helbreg v. Schumann, 150 Ill. 12, 41 Am. St. Rep. 339, 37 N. E. 99; Keithley v. Wood, 151 Ill. 566, 42 Am. St. Rep. 265, 38 N. E. 149; White v. Redenbaugh, 41 Ind. App. 580, 82 N. E. 110; Beidleman v. Koch, 42 Ind. App. 423, 85 N. E. 977; Wiswell v. Simmons, 77 Kan. 622, 95 Pac. 407; Sebree v. Thompson, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 1146, 104 S. W. 781; Tucker v. Witherbee, 130 Ky. 269, 113 S. W. 123; Burns v. Hunnewell, 217 Mass. 106, 104 N. E. 494; Francis v. Francis, 78 S. C. 178, 58 S. E. 804; Hall v. Jennings, (Tex. Civ. App.) 104 S. W. 489; Plummer v. Ilse, 41 Wash. 5, 111 Am. St. Rep. 997, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 627, 82 Pac. 1009; Gibson v. Hopkins, (W. Va.) 93 S. E. 826; Rockwell v. Humphrey, 57 Wis. 410, 15 N. W. 394; Manufacturers' Bank v. Rugee, 59 Wis. 223, 18 N. W. 251.

as throwing much light upon the real intent and nature of the transactions: The existence of a collateral agreement by the grantor to pay money; his liability to pay interest; where a debt existed antecedent to the conveyance, the sur-

Appeal, 73 Pa. St. 65; Sweetzer's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 264; Davis v. Demming, 12 W. Va. 246; Klinck v. Price, 4 W. Va. 4, 6 Am. Rep. 268; Clark v. Lyon, 46 Ga. 202; Lindsay v. Matthews, 17 Fla. 575; Crews v. Threadgill, 35 Ala. 334; Freeman v. Wilson, 51 Miss. 329; Sharkey v. Sharkey, 47 Mo. 543; Davis v. Clay, 2 Mo. 161; Wilson v. Giddings, 28 Ohio St. 554; Cotterell v. Long, 20 Ohio, 464; Ehert v. Chapman, 8 Baxt. 27; Blizzard v. Craigmiles, 7 Lea, 693; Bennett v. Union Bank, 5 Humph. 612; Heath v. Williams, 30 Ind. 495; Church v. Cole, 36 Ind. 34; Clark v. Finlon, 90 Ill. 245; Carr v. Rising, 62 Ill. 14; Hunter v. Hatch, 45 Ill. 178; Smith v. Doyle, 46 Ill. 451; Dwen v. Blake, 44 Ill. 135; Ragan v. Simpson, 27 Wis. 355; Yates v. Yates, 21 Wis. 473; Plato v. Roe, 14 Wis. 453; Knowlton v. Walker, 13 Wis. 264; White v. Lucas, 46 Iowa, 319; Scott v. Mewhirter, 49 Iowa, 487; Wilson v. Patrick, 34 Iowa, 362; Richardson v. Barrick, 16 Iowa, 407; Brush v. Peterson, 54 Iowa, 243, 6 N. W. 287; Archambau v. Green, 21 Minn. 520; Weide v. Gehl, 21 Minn. 449; Holton v. Meighen, 15 Minn. 69; Phœnix v. Gardner, 13 Minn. 430; Moore v. Wade, 8 Kan. 380; Leahigh v. White, 8 Nev. 147; Sears v. Dixon, 33 Cal. 326; Polhemus v. Trainer, 30 Cal. 685; Hickox v. Lowe, 10 Cal. 197. Cases of sale and contract to repurchase:¹ Williams v. Owen, 5 Mylne & C. 303; Alderson v. White, 2 De Gex & J. 97; Conway's Ex'rs v. Alexander, 7 Cranch, 218; Lund v. Lund, 1 N. H. 39, 8 Am. Dec. 29; Macaulay v. Porter, 71 N. Y. 173; Randall v. Sanders, 87 N. Y. 578; Morrison v. Brand, 5 Daly, 40; Glover v. Payn, 19 Wend. 518; Galt v. Jackson, 9 Ga. 151; Haynie v. Robertson, 58 Ala. 37; Slutz v. Desenberg, 28 Ohio St. 371; Wilson v. Carpenter, 62 Ind. 495; Price v. Karnes, 59 Ill. 276;

§ 1195, (f) Cases of sale and contract to repurchase.—Bogk v. Gassert, 149 U. S. 17, 37 L. Ed. 631, 13 Sup. Ct. 738; Cowell v. Craig, 79 Fed. 685; Arizona Copper Estate v. Watts, 237 Fed. 585, 150 C. C. A. 467; Vincent v. Walker, 86 Ala. 333, 5 South. 465; Mitchell v. Wellman, 80 Ala. 16; Thomas v. Livingston, 155 Ala. 546, 46 South. 851; Lounsbury v. Norton, 59 Conn. 170, 22 Atl. 153; Shaner v. Rathdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho, 576, 161 Pac. 90; Carroll v. Tomlinson, 192 Ill. 399, 85 Am. St. Rep. 344, 61 N. E. 484;
Cold v. Beh, 152 Iowa, 368, 132
N. W. 73; Yost v. First Nat. Bank,
66 Kan. 605, 72 Pac. 209; Fabrique
v. Cherokee & P. C. & M. Co., (Kan.)
77 Pac. 584; Thomas v. Holmes Co.,
67 Miss. 754, 7 South. 552; Duell
v. Leslie, 207 Mo. 658, 106 S. W.
489; Donovan v. Boeck, 217 Mo. 70,
116 S. W. 543; Branham v. Peltzer,
(Mo.) 177 S. W. 373; Morrison v.
Jones, (Mont.) 77 Pac. 507; Rotan
Grocery Co. v. Turner, 46 Tex. Civ.
App. 534, 102 S. W. 932.

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render or cancellation of the evidences of such indebtedness, or the suffering them to remain outstanding and operative, or the substitution of others in their place; the price of the conveyance being inadequate; the grantor still left in possession; an application or negotiation for a loan preceding or pending the transaction.^{2 h}

Smith v. Crosby, 47 Wis. 160, 2 N. W.-104; Turner v. Kerr, 44 Mo. 429; McNamara v. Culver, 22 Kan. 661; Farmer v. Grose, 42 Cal. 169; Page v. Vilhac, 42 Cal. 75; Henley v. Hotaling, 41 Cal. 22.

Antecedent debt.—If left existing, the conveyance is a mortgage; if satisfied, it is not a mortgage:²⁵ Henry v. Davis, 7 Johns. Ch. 40; Clark v. Henry, 2 Cow. 324; Slee v. Manhattan Co., 1 Paige, 48; Holmes v. Grant, 8 Paige, 243; Rice-v. Rice, 4 Pick. 349; Todd v. Campbell, 32 Pa. St. 250; Hamet v. Dundass, 4 Pa. St. 178; Robinson v. Willoughby, 65 N. C. 520; McKinstry v. Conly, 12 Ala. 678; Hoopes v. Bailey, 28 Miss. 328; Mason v. Moody, 26 Miss. 184; Ruffier v. Womack, 30 Tex. 332; Honore v. Hutchings, 8 Bush, 687; Slowey v. McMurray, 27 Mo. 113, 116, 72 Am. Dec. 251; Sutphen v. Cushman, 35 Ill. 186, 197; Goulding v. Bunster, 9 Wis. 513.

§ 1195, ² McNamara v. Culver, 22 Kan. 661; Clark v. Finlon, 90 III. 245; Davis v. Demming, 12 W. Va. 246; Smith v. Crosby, 47 Wis. 160, 2 N. W. 104; Freeman v. Wilson, 51 Miss. 329; Price v. Karnes, 59 III. 276; Henley v. Hotaling, 41 Cal. 22; Horn v. Keteltas, 46 N. Y. 605; Klinck v. Price, 4 W. Va. 4, 6 Am. Rep. 268. It is held in Price v. Karnes and Henley v. Hotaling, supra, that where the writings do not show on their face the existing relation of debtor and creditor, but appear to be absolute, the evidence, in order to establish their character as a mortgage, must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing. This ruling seems to be inconsistent with the doctrine that in case of doubt the court will lean strongly in favor of the mortgage. In fact, the tendency of the recent decisions, in some of the states at least, is decidedly opposed to any such doctrine.¹

§ 1195, (**z**) Antecedent debt.—Perdue v. Bell, 83 Ala. 396, 3 South. 698; Rapier v. Gulf City Paper Co., 77 Ala. 126; Thomas v. Livingston, 155 Ala. 546, 46 South. 851; Shaner v. Rathdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho, 576, 161 Pac. 90; Duell v. Leslie, (Mo.) 106 S. W. 489; Donovan v. Boeck, 217 Mo. 70, 116 S. W. 543 (fact that note was not surrendered does not prove transaction a mortgage, since the instrument recites that the debt was canceled); Pace v. Bartles, 47 N. J. Eq. 170, 20 Atl. 352; Rotan Grocery Co. v. Turner, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 534, 102 S. W. 932; Middleton v. Johnston, (Tex. Civ. App.) 110 S. W. 789; Stringfellow v. Braselton, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 117 S. W. 204.

§ 1195, (h) The text is quoted in Worley v. Carter, 30 Okl. 642, 121 Pac. 669; Farrow v. Work, 39 Okl. 734, 136 Pac. 739.

§1195, (1) Leaning of Courts in Favor of Mortgage.—See Franklin § 1196. A Conveyance Absolute on Its Face may be a Mortgage.^a—Any conveyance of land absolute on its face, without anything in its terms to indicate that it is otherwise than an absolute conveyance, and without any accompanying written defeasance, contract of repurchase, or other agreement, may, in equity, by means of extrinsic and parol

v. Ayer, 22 Fla. 654, 661; Carveth v. Winegar, (Mich.) 94 N. W. 381; De Bruhl v. Maas, 54 Tex. 464, 472, See, also, affirming such inclination of the courts, Thomas v. Livingston, 147 Ala. 200, 40 South. 504; Hubert v. Sistrunk, (Ala.) 53 South. 819 (rule only means that if weight of evidence pro and con is about equally balanced, the court will not hesitate to pronounce the transaction a mortgage); Nelson v. Wadsworth, 171 Ala. 603, 55 South. 120; Irwin v. Coleman, 173 Ala. 175, 55 South. 492; Mortar v. Allen, 180 Ala. 279, L. R. A. 1916B, 11, 60 South. 866; Van Heuvel v. Long, (Ala.) 75 South. 339; Hull v. Burr, 58 Fla. 432, 50 South. 754; Connor v. Connor, 59 Fla. 467, 52 South. 727; White v. Redenbaugh, 41 Ind. App. 580, 82 N. E. 110; Jones v. Gillett, 142 Iowa, 506, 118 N. W. 314, 121 N. W. 5; Fort v. Colby, 165 Iowa, 95, 144 N. W. 393; McRobert v. Bridget, 168 Iowa, 28, 149 N. W. 906; Sheffield v. Day, (Ky.) 90 S. W. 545; Tucker v. Witherbee, 130 Ky. 269, 113 S. W. 123; Charles v. Thacker, 167 Ky. 835, 181 S. W. 611 (conditional sale); Donovan v. Boeck, 217 Mo. 70, 116 S. W. 543 (conditional sale); Phillips v. Jackson, 240 Mo. 310, 144 S. W. 112; Smith v. Jensen, 16 N. D. 408, 114 N. W. 306; Elliott v. Bozorth, 52 Or. 391, 97 Pac. 632 (conditional sale); Bickel v. Wessinger, 58 Or. 98, 113 Pac. 34 (policy of the rule); Kinney v. Smith, 58 Or. 158, 113 Pac. 854;

Harmon v. Grant's Pass Banking & Trust Co., 60 Or. 69, 118 Pac. 188; Duerden v. Solomon, 33 Utah, 468, 94 Pac. 978; Gibson v. Hopkins, (W. Va.) 93 S. E. 826.

Cases requiring the evidence to prove a mortgage to be clear, unequivocal, and convincing: Shaner v. Rathdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho, 576, 161 Pac. 90; Hill v. Saunders, 115 Va. 60, 78 S. E. 559; Hesser v. Brown, 40 Wash. 688, 82 Pac. 934; Johnson v. National Bank of Commerce, 65 Wash. 261, L. B. A. 1916B, 4, 118 Pac. 21; Kegley v. Skillman, 68 Wash. 637, 123 Pac. 1081; Hoover v. Bouffleur, 74 Wash. 382, 133 Pac. 602 (mortgage).

In Maxwell v. Herzfeld, 149 Ala. 67, 42 South. 987, the instrument was construed to be a conditional sale, for the reason that if held to be a mortgage it would be void, as an attempt by a wife to secure her husband's debt, and the grantee would lose the money advanced.

§ 1196, (a) This section is quoted in Oberdorfer v. White, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1629, 78 S. W. 436; and cited generally in Bigler v. Jack, 114 Iowa, 667, 87 N. W. 700; Acme Food Co. v. Meier, 153 Fed. 74, 82 C. C. A. 208; Arizona Copper Estate v. Watts, 237 Fed. 585, 150 C. C. A. 467; Casper Nat. Bank v. Jenner, 268 Ill. 142, 108 N. E. 998; Fort v. Colby, 165 Iowa, 95, 144 N. W. 393; Stitt v. Rat Portage Lumber Co., 96 Minn. 27, 104 N. W. 561; Hamilton v. Hamer, 99 S. C. 31, 82 S. E. 997. evidence, be shown to be in reality a mortgage as between the original parties, and as against all those deriving title from or under the grantee, who are not bona fide purchasers for value and without notice. The principle which underlies this doctrine is the fruitful source of many other equitable rules:¹ that it would be a virtual fraud for the grantee to insist upon the deed as an absolute conveyance of the title, which had been intentionally given to him, and which he had knowingly accepted, merely as a security, and therefore in reality as a mortgage.^b The general doctrine is fully established, and certainly prevails in a great majority of the states, that the grantor and his representatives are always allowed in equity to show, by parol evidence, that a deed absolute on its face was only intended to be a security for the payment of a debt, and thus to be a mortgage, although the parties deliberately and knowingly executed the instrument in its existing form, and without any allegations of fraud, mistake, or accident in its mode of execution.^c As in the last preceding case, the sure test and the essential requisite are the continued existence of a debt. If there is no indebtedness, the conveyance cannot be a mortgage; if there is a debt existing, and the conveyance was intended to secure its payment, equity will regard and treat the absolute deed as a mortgage. The presumption, of course, arises that the instrument is what it purports on its face to be, an absolute conveyance of the land: to overcome this presumption, and to establish its character as a mortgage, the cases all agree that the evidence must

§ 1196, ¹ Among others, of the familiar doctrine concerning the specific performance of verbal contracts for the sale of land which have been part performed. The principle, in its broadest generality, prohibits statutes and legal rules designed to prevent fraud from being so used as to produce equitable fraud.

§1196, (b) The text is quoted in Smith v. Smith, 153 Ala. 504, 45 South. 168.

§1196, (c) The text is quoted in Hobbs v. Rowland, 136 Ky. 197, L. R. A. 1916B, 1, 123 S. W. 1185; Rosenstock v. Keyser, 104 Md. 380, 65 Atl. 37; Funk v. Harshman, 110 Md. 127, 72 Atl. 665.

be clear, unequivocal, and convincing, for otherwise the natural presumption will prevail.^{2 d} Whenever a deed

§ 1196, ² There are some decisions which limit the operation of this doctrine, even in equity, to cases where the absolute form of the conveyance is the result of fraud, mistake, or accident. This narrow view seems to have resulted from an erroneous conception of the principle upon which

§1196, (d) The text is guoted in Rushton v. McIllvene, 88 Ark. 299, 114 S. W. 709; Rosenstock v. Keyser, 104 Md. 380, 65 Atl. 37; Funk v. Harshman, 110 Md. 127, 72 Atl. 665; Miller v. Smith, 20 N. D. 96, 126 N. W. 499. This section is cited to this effect in Rogers v. Beach, 115 Ind. 413, 17 N. E. 609; Edwards v. Wall, 79 Va. 321; Mahoney v. Bostwick, 96 Cal. 53, 31 Am. St. Rep. 175, 30 Pac. 1020; Holladay v. Willis, 101 Va. 274, 43 S. E. 616; Lewis v. Davis, (Ala.) 73 South. 419; Hutchinson v. Turner, 88 S. C. 318, 70 S. E. 410, 70 S. E. 806; Williams v. McManus, 90 S. C. 490, -73 S. E. 1038; Banks v. Frith, 97 S. C. 362, 81 S. E. 677; Bachrach v. Bachrach, 111 Va. 232, 68 S. E. 985. In general, see Satterfield v. Malone, 35 Fed. 445, 1 L. R. A. 35; Lewis v. Wells, 85 Fed. 896; Johnson v. Hattaway, 155 Ala. 516, 46 South. 760; Rodgers v. Burt, 157 Ala. 91, 47 South. 226; McIver v. Roberts, 112 Ark. 607, 165 S. W. 273; Perot v. Cooper, 17 Colo. 80, 31 Am. St. Rep. 258, 28 Pac. 391; Heron v. Weston, 44 Colo. 379, 100 Pac. 1130; Pope v. Marshall, 78 Ga. 635, 4 S. E. 116; Askew v. Thompson, 129 Ga. 325, 58 S. E. 854; Thompson v. Burns, 15 Idaho, 572, 99 Pac. 111; Lavalleur v. Hahn, 152 Iowa, 649, 132 N. W. 877; Winston v. Burnell, 44 Kan. 367, 21 Am. St. Rep. 289, 24 Pac. 477; Abrams v. Abrams, 74 Kan. 888, 88 Pac. 70; Saylor v. Crooker, 89 Kan. 51, 130 Pac. 689;

Seiler v. Northern Bank, 86 Ky. 128, 5 S. W. 536; Knapp v. Bailey, 79 Me. 201, 1 Am. St. Rep. 295, 9 Atl. 122; Hurd v. Chase, 100 Me. 561, 62 Atl. 660; Jackson v. Maxwell, 113 Me. 366, 94 Atl. 116 (deed by A to B, equitable mortgage in favor of C); Alexander v. Grover, 190 Mass. 462, 77 N. E. 487; Jennings v. Demmon, 194 Mass. 108, 80 N. E. 471; Ruch v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N. W. 52; Olney v. Brown, 163 Mich. 125, 128 N. W. 241; Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Jones, 95 Minn. 127, 103 N. W. 1017; Brightwell v. McAfee, 249 Mo. 562, 155 S. W. 820; Alexander v. Cleland, 13 N. M. 524, 86 Pac. 425; Randall v. Sanders, 87 N. Y. 578; Sandlin v. Kearney, 154 N. C. 596, 70 S. E. 942; Culbreth v. Hall, 159 N. C. 588, 75 S. E. 1096; Adams v. McIntyre, 22 N. D. 337, 133 N. W. 915; Wagg v. Herbert, 19 Okl. 525, 92 Pac. 250; Hall v. O'Connell, 52 Or. 164, 95 Pac. 717, 96 Pac. 1070; Elliott v. Bozorth, 52 Or. 391, 97 Pac. 632; Calhoun v. Lumpkin, 60 Tex. 188; Nagle v. Simmank, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 432, 116 S. W. 862; Earle's Adm'r v. Blanchard, 85 Vt. 288, 81 Atl. 913; Bachrach v. Bachrach, 111 Va. 232, 68 S. E. 985; Batchelder v. Randolph, 112 Va. 296, 71 S. E. 533; Hoover v. Bouffleur, 74 Wash. 382, 133 Pac. 602; Beverly v. Davis, 79 Wash. 537, 140 Pac. 696; Vangilder v. Hoffman, 22 W. Va. 1; Davisson v. Smith, 60 W. Va. 413, 55 S. E. 466; Shields v. Simonton, 65 W. Va. 179, 2843

absolute on its face is thus treated as a mortgage, the

the doctrine rests; the equitable notion of fraud in the grantee's insisting upon the conveyance as absolute, when it was given and accepted only as a security, is carried back to the inception of the instrument, and is improperly made to involve the existence of fraud in the very execution of

63 S. E. 972; Smith v. Pfluger, 126 Wis. 253, 110 Am. St. Rep. 911, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 783, 105 N. W. 476; Swift v. Lumber Co., 71 Wis. 482, 37 N. W. 441; McFarlane v. Louden, 99 Wis. 620, 67 Am. St. Rep. 883, 75 N. W. 394.

Deeds Held to be Mortgages in the following cases: Alter v. Clark, (Nev.) 193 Fed. 153; Power & Irr. Co. v. Capay Ditch Co., 226 Fed. 634, 141- C. C. A. 390; Glass v. Hieronymus, 125 Ala. 140, 82 Am. St. Rep. 225, 28 South. 71; Rose v. Gandy, 137 Ala. 329, 34 South. 239; Gerson v. Davis, 143 Ala. 381, 39 South. 198; Shreve v. McGowin, 143 Ala. 665, 42 South. 94; Stollenwerck v. Marks & Gayle, 188 Ala. 587, 65 South. 1024; Griffin v. Welch, 88 Ark. 336, 114 S. W. 710; Husheon v. Husheon, 71 Cal. 412, 12 Pac. 410; Mahoney v. Bostwick, 96 Cal. 53, 31 Am. St. Rep. 175, 30 Pac. 1020; De Leonis v. Walsh, 140 Cal. 175, 73 Pac. 813; Anglo-Californian Bank v. Cerf, 147 Cal. 384, 81 Pac. 1077 (deed as security for future advances); Todd v. Todd, 164 Cal. 255, 128 Pac. 413; Franklin v. Ayer, 22 Fla. 654; De Bartlett v. De Wilson, 52 Fla. 497, 11 Ann. Cas. 311, 42 South. 189; Elliott v. Conner, 63 Fla. 408, 58 South. 241; Hannah v. Vensel, 19 Idaho, 796, 116 Pac. 115; Bergen v. Johnson, 21 Idaho, 619, 123 Pac. 484; Helm v. Boyd, 124 Ill. 370, 16 N. E. 85; Linkemann v. Knepper, 226 Ill. 473. 80 N. E. 1009; Calahan v. Dunker, 51 Ind. App. 436, 99 N. E. 1021;

McElroy v. Allfree, 131 Iowa, 112, 117 Am. St. Rep. 412, 107 N. W. 116; Veeder v. Veeder, 141 Iowa, 492, 120 N. W. 61 (though grantee assumes a prior mortgage); Jones v. Gillett, 142 Iowa, 506, 118 N. W. 314, 121 N. W. 5; Hubbard v. Cheney, 76 Kan. 222, 123 Am. St. Rep. 129, 91 Pac. 793 (deed to wife jointly with husband to secure her advance of part of purchase price); Stratton v. Rotrock, 84 Kan. 198, 114 Pac. 224; Dusenberg v. Bidwell, 86 Kan. 666, 121 Pac. 1098; Holden Land & Live Stock Co. v. Interstate Trading Co., 87 Kan. 221, L. R. A. 1915B, 492, 123 Pac. 733; Barnett v. Williams, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 255, 101 S. W. 1191; Frazier v. Frazier, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 1339, 108 S. W. 889; Funk v. Harshman, 110 Md. 127, 72 Atl. 665; Cullen v. Carey, 146 Mass. 50, 15 N. E. 131; McMillan v. Bissell, 63 Mich. 66, 29 N. W. 737; Miller v. Peter, 158 Mich. 336, 122 N. W. 780; Evans v. Thompson, 89 Minn. 202, 94 N. W. 692; Stitt v. Rat Portage Lumber Co., 96 Minn. 27, 104 N. W. 561 (deed as security for future advances); Baumgartner v. Corliss, 115 Minn. 11, 131 N. W. 638 (deed to secure future advances); Holien v. Slce, 120 Minn. 261, 139 N. W. 493 (conduct of grantee, after grantor's death, inconsistent with absolute ownership); Tenvoorde v. Tenvoorde, 128 Minn. 126, 150 N. W. 396; Hargadine v. Henderson, 97 Mo. 375, 11 S. W. 218; Brightwell v. McAfee, 249 Mo. 562, 155 S. W. 820; State Bank v. Mathews, 45 Neb. 659, parties are clothed with all the rights, are subject

the deed.^e The doctrine as stated in the text is followed by nearly if not quite all the recent decisions: Maxwell v. Lady Mountacute, Prec. Ch. 526; Cotterell v. Purchase, Cas. t. Talb. 61; Walker v. Walker, 2 Atk. 98; Young v. Peachy, 2 Atk. 254, 257; Joynes v. Statham, 3 Atk. 388;

50 Am. St. Rep. 565, 63 N. W. 930; Tanyhill v. Pepperl, (Neb.) 96 N. W. 1005; Lutz v. Hoyle, 167 N. C. 632, 83 S. E. 749; Jasper v. Hazen, 4 N. D. 1, 23 L. B. A. 58, 58 N. W. 454; Omlie v. O'Toole, 16 N. D. 126, 112 N. W. 677; Yingling v. Redwine, 12 Okl. 64, 69 Pac. 810; Kinney v. Heatherington, 38 Okl. 74, 131 Pac. 1078; Messner v. Carroll, (Okl.) 159 Pac. 362; Stephens v. Allen, 11 Or. 188, 3 Pac. 168; Grover v. Hawthorne, 62 Or. 77, 114 Pac. 472, 121 Pac. 808; Gaines v. Brockerhoff, 136 Pa. St. 175, 19 Atl. 958; Stafford v. Stafford, (Tex. Civ. App.) 71 S. W. 984; Texas Southern Ry. Co. v. Harle, (Tex. Civ. App.) 101 S. W. 878; Moorhead v. Ellison, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 444, 120 S. W. 1049; Peck v. Girard F. & M. Ins. Co., 16 Utah, 121, 67 Am. St. Rep. 600, 15 Pac. 255; Tuggle v. Berkeley, 101 Va. 83, 43 S. E. 199; Snyder v. Parker, 19 Wash. 276, 67 Am. St. Rep. 726, 53 Pac. 59; Butler v. Carvin, 33 Wash. 621, 74 Pac. 813; Thacker v. Morris, 52 W. Va. 220, 94 Am. St. Rep. 928, 43 S. E. 141; Hursey v. Hursey, (W. Va.) 49 S. E. 367; Dudley v. Buckley, 68 W. Va. 630, 70 S. E. 376.

Transaction an Absolute Conveyance.—In the following cases the evidence was not sufficiently clear, unequivocal, and convincing to overcome the presumption that an instrument is what it purports to be: Coyle v. Davis, 116 U. S. 109, 29 L. Ed. 583, 6 Sup. Ct. 314; Cadman v. Peter, 118 U. S. 73, 30 L. Ed. 78, 6 Sup. Ct. 957; Bell v. Shiver, 181

Ala. 303, 61 South. 881; Harman v. May, 40 Ark. 146; Rushton v. Mc-Illvene, 88 Ark. 299, 114 S. W. 709; La Cotts v. La Cotts, 109 Ark. 335, 159 S. W. 1111; Falk v. Wittram, 120 Cal. 479, 65 Am. St. Rep. 184, 52 Pac. 707; Emery v. Lowe, 140 Cal. 379, 73 Pac. 981; Armor v. Spalding, 14 Colo. 302, 23 Pac. 789; Baird v. Baird, 48 Colo. 506, 111 Pac. 79; Ensminger v. Ensminger, 75 Iowa, 89, 9 Am. St. Rep. 462, 39 N. W. 208; Wright v. Wright, 122 Iowa, 549, 98 N. W. 472; Greff v. Hobbs, (Iowa) 159 N. W. 429; Rosenstock v. Keyser, 104 Md. 380, 65 Atl. 37; Weise v. Anderson, (Mich.) 96 N. W. 575; Rathbone v. Maltz, 155 Mich. 306, 118 N. W. 991; Sloan v. Becker, 34 Minn. 491, 26 N. W. 730; A. J. Dwyer Pine Land Co. v. Whiteman, (Minn.) 99 N. W. 362; Hutchings v. Terrace City Realty & Securities Co., (Mo.) 175 S. W. 905; Harrington v. Butte & Superior Copper Co., 52 Mont. 263, 157 Pac. 181; Cake v. Shull, 45 N. J. Eq. 208, 16 Atl. 434; Waters v. Crabtree, 105 N. C. 394, 11 S. E. 240; Fisher v. Witham, 132 Pa. St. 488, 19 Atl. 276; Wallace v. Smith, 155 Pa. St. 78, 25 Atl. 807, 32 Wkly. Notes Cas. 470, 35 Am. St. Rep. 868; Hodge v. Weeks, 31 S. C. 276, 9 S. E. 953; Miller v. Price, 66 S. C. 85, 44 S. E. 584; Pumilia v. De George, (Tex. Civ. App.) 74 S. W. 813; El-

§1196, (e) This note is quoted in Gibbons v. Joseph Gibbons Consolidated Min. & Mill. Co., 37 Colo. 96, 11 Ann. Cas. 323, 86 Pac. 94. to all the liabilities, and are entitled to all the reme-

Spurgeon v. Collier, 1 Eden, 55; Dixon v. Parker, 2 Ves. Sr. 219, 225; Holmes v. Mathews, 9 Moore P. C. C. 413; Barnhart v. Greenshields, 9 Moore P. C. C. 18; Langton v. Horton, 5 Beav. 9; Douglas v. Culverwell, 3 Giff. 251; Peugh v. Davis, 96 U. S. 332, 24 L. Ed. 775; Andrews

liott v. Morris, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 527, 121 S. W. 209, affirming 43 Tex. Civ. App. 482, 98 S. W. 220.

The Doctrine Rejected .- In certain states the doctrine stated in the text does not prevail. A deed absolute on its face cannot, in such states, be shown by parol to be a mortgage: Crutcher v. Muir, 90 Ky. 142, 29 Am. St. Rep. 366, 13 S. W. 435; Lohrer v. Russell, 207 Pa. St. 105, 56 Atl. 333 (even a written de-'feasance is not sufficient unless acknowledged and recorded within sixty days from the date of the deed); Safe Deposit & Title Guaranty Co. of Kittaning v. Linton, 213 Pa. 105, 62 Atl. 566 (same point); O'Donnell v. Vandersaal, 213 Pa. 551, 63 Atl. 60 (same); Wingenroth v. Dellubach, 219 Pa. 536, 69 Atl. 84 (same); Stewart v. Stewart, 230 Pa. 475, 79 Atl. 669. And see Eberly v. Shirk, 206 Pa. St. 414, 55 Atl. 1071; Newton v. Clark, (N. C.) 93 S. E. 951. In Kentucky, fraud or mistake in the inception of the transaction was once a requisite; but this state is now in accord with the general rule: Hobbs v. Rowland, 136 Ky. 197, 123 S. W. 1185; Castillo v. McBeath, 162 Ky. 382, 172 S. W. 669; compare Smith v. Berry, 155 Ky. 686, 160 S. W. 247; Crutcher v. Muir, 90 Ky. 142, 29 Am. St. Rep. 356, 13 S. W. 435. In Mississippi, by statute, an absolute deed cannot be declared a mortgage on the parol evidence of the grantor alone: Schwartz v. Lieber, (Miss.) 32South. 954.

Fraud the Foundation of the Rule, the fraud consisting in the grantee's denial of the true character of the instrument. See, also, the following recent cases: Brightwell v. McAfee, 249 Mo. 562, 155 S. W. 820; Wagg v. Herbert, 19 Okl. 525, 92 Pac. 250; Bachrach v. Bachrach, 111 Va. 232, 68 S. E. 985 (not restricted to cases of fraud, accident or mistake); Batchelder v. Randolph, 112 Va. 296, 71 S. E. 533; Beverly v. Davis, 79 Wash. 537, 140 Pac. 696; Smith v. Pfluger, 126 Wis. 253, 110 Am. St. Rep. 911, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 783, 105 N. W. 476. The deed, intended by grantor to be a mortgage, was procured by fraudulent misrepresentation in Guarantee Gold Bond Loan & Savings Co. v. Edwards, 164 Fed. 809, 90 C. C. A. 585.

Continued Existence of a Debt the test, both in cases of absolute deeds and of conveyances with contract to repurchase. See, also, in support of the text, the following recent cases: Smith v. Smith, 153 Ala. 504, 45 South. 168; Johnson v. Hattaway, 155 Ala. 516, 46 South. 760; Thomas v. Livingston, 155 Ala. 546, 46 South. 851; Rodgers v. Burt, 157 Ala. 91, 47 South. 226; Nelson v. Wadsworth, 171 Ala. 603, 55 South. 120; Irwin v. Coleman, 173 Ala. 175, 55 South. 492; Bell v. Shiver, 181 Ala. 303, 61 South. 881; Stollenwerck v. Marks & Gayle, 188 Ala. 587, 65 South. 1024; Todd v. Todd, 164 Cal. 255, 128 Pac. 413 (not necessary that the debt be evidenced by a writing); Elliott v. Connor, 63 Fla. 408, 58 South. 241; Caraway v. Sly, 222 Ill. 203, 78 N. E. 588; Friend v. Beach. 276 Ill. 397, 114 N. E. 911; Beidleman v. Koch, 42 Ind. App. 423, 85

dies of ordinary mortgagors and mortgagees. The

v. Hyde, 3 Cliff. 516, Fed. Cas. No. 377; Amory v. Lawrence, 3 Cliff. 523, Fed. Cas. No. 336; Villa v. Rodriguez, 12 Wall. 323, 20 L. Ed. 406; Morgan's Assignees v. Shinn, 15 Wall. 105, 21 L. Ed. 87; Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139, 13 L. Ed. 927; Babeock v. Wyman, 19 How. 289, 15 L. Ed.

N. E. 977; Calahan v. Dunker, 51 Ind. App. 436, 99 N. E. 1021; Laub v. Romans, 131 Iowa, 427, 105 N. W. 102; Jones v. Gillett, 142 Iowa, 506, 118 N. W. 314, 121 N. W. 5 (the debt may be implied); Henninger v. McGuire, 146 Iowa, 270, 125 N. W. 180; Ridings v. Marengo Savings Bank, 147 Iowa, 608, 125 N. W. 200; Cold v. Beh, 152 Iowa, 368, 132 N. W. 73; Greff v. Hobbs, (Iowa) 159 N. W. 429; Tucker v. Witherbee, 130 Ky. 269, 113 S. W. 123; Smith v. Berry, 155 Ky. 686, 160 S. W. 247; Duell v. Leslie, 207 Mo. 658, 106 S. W. 489; Donovan v. Boeck, 217 Mo. 70, 116 S. W. 543; Gibson v. Morris State Bank, 49 Mont. 60, 140 Pac. 76; Samuelson v. Mickey, 73 Neb. 852, 103 N. W. 671, 106 N. W. 461; Harrah v. Smith, 79 Neb. 51, 112 N. W. 337; Sandlin v. Kearney, 154 N. C. 596, 70 S. E. 942; Miller v. Smith, 20 N. D. 96, 126 N. W. 499; Wagg v. Herbert, 19 Okl. 525, 92 Pac. 250; Worley v. Carter, 30 Okl. 642, 121 Pac. 669; Mansfield v. Hill, 56 Or. 400, 107 Pac. 471, 108 Pac. 1007 (not a mortgage); Harmon v. Grants' Pass Banking & Trust Co., 60 Or. 69, 118 Pac. 188; Grover v. Hawthorne, 62 Or. 65, 116 Pac. 100, 121 Pac. 804; Caro v. Wollenberg, 68 Or. 420, 136 Pac. 866; Jones v. Jones, 20 S. D. 632, 108 N. W. 23; Mitchell v. Morgan, (Tex. Civ. App.) 165 S. W. 883; Dabney v. Smith, 38 Wash. 40, 80 Pac. 199; Spaulding v. Collins, 51 Wash. 488, 99 Pac. 306; Boyer v. Paine, 60 Wash. 56, 110 Pac. 682 (obligation to construct a canal); Johnson v. National Bank of

Commerce of Tacoma, 65 Wash. 261, L. R. A. 1916B, 4, 118 Pac. 21; Mittlesteadt v. Johnson, 75 Wash. 550, 135 Pac. 214; Fridley v. Somerville, 60 W. Va. 272, 54 S. E. 502; Shields v. Simonton, 65 W. Va. 179, 63 S. E. 972; Hudkins v. Crim, 72 W. Va. 418, 78 S. E. 1043. In Caraway v. Sly, 222 Ill. 203, 78 N. E. 588, the understanding of the parties was that the grantor might redeem by paying the indebtedness . secured whenever he became able to do so; held, not a mortgage, since under such an agreement there was no right to foreclose, and the rights of redemption and foreclosure are. reciprocal. Sed quaere.

The Evidence must be Clear, Unequivocal, and Convincing to establish the character of the deed as a mortgage. Among recent cases, see Harper v. T. N. Hays .Co., 149 Ala. 174, 43 South. 360; Rodgers v. Burt, 157 Ala. 91, 47 South. 226; Thornton v. Pinckard, 157 Ala. 206, 47 South. 289; Harrison v. Maury, 157 Ala. 227, 47 South. 724; Tribble v. Singleton, 158 Ala. 308, 48 South, 481; Everett v. Estes, 189 Ala. 60, 66 South, 615 (mere oral admissions by grantee that grantor had a right to redeem not given much weight); Rushton v. McIllvene, 88 Ark. 299, 114 S. W. 709; Griffin v. Welch, 88 Ark. 336, 114 S. W. 710; La Cotts v. La Cotts, 109 Ark. 335, 159 S. W. 1111; Couts v. Winston, 153 Cal. 686, 96 Pac. 357; Beckman v. Waters, 161 Cal. 581, 119 Pac. 922; Butsch v. Smith, 40 Colo. 64, 90 Pac. 61 (beyond reasonable doubt); Baird v.

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grantee may maintain an action for the foreclosure of

644; Stinchfield v. Milliken, 71 Me. 567; Wing v. Cooper, 37 Vt. 169; Campbell v. Dearborn, 109 Mass. 130, 12 Am. Rep. 671; French v. Burns, 35 Conn. 359; Odell v. Montross, 68 N. Y. 499; Morris v. Budlong, 78 N. Y. 543, 552; Carr v. Carr, 52 N. Y. 251; Horn v. Keteltas, 46 N. Y.

Baird, 48 Colo. 506, 111 Pac. 79; Bergen v. Johnson, 21 Idaho, 619, 123 Pac. 484; Shaner v. Rathdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho, 576, 161 Pac. 90; Deadman v. Yantis, 230 Ill. 243, 120 Am. St. Rep. 291, 82 N. E. 592; Friend v. Beach, 276 Ill. 397, 114 N. E. 911; Sharp v. Betts (Betts v. Betts), 132 Iowa, 72, 106 N. W. 928; Jones v. Gillett, 142 Iowa, 506, 118 N. W. 314, 121 N. W. 5; Ridings v. Marengo Sav. Bank, 147 Iowa, 608, 125 N. W. 200; Bradford v. Helsell, 150 Iowa, 732, 130 N. W. 908; Cold v. Beh, 152 Iowa, 368, 132 N. W. 73; Greff v. Hobbs, (Iowa) 159 N. W. 429; Funk v. Harshman, 110 Md. 127, 72 Atl. 665; Jackson v. Maxwell, 113 Me. 366, 94 Atl. 116; Rathbone v. Maltz, 155 Mich. 306, 118 N. W. 991; Stitt v. Rat Portage Lumber Co., 96 Minn. 27, 104 N. W. 561 (evidence must be clear but nced not be beyond a reasonable doubt; grantor's testimony must be corroborated); Brightwell v. McAfec, 249 Mo. 562, 155 S. W. 820; Hutchings v. Terrace City Realty & Securities Co., (Mo.) 175 S. W. 905; Gibson v. Morris State Bank, 49 Mont. 60, 140 Pac. 76; Harrington v. Butte & Superior Copper Co., 52 Mont. 263, 157 Pac. 181; O'Hanlon v. Barry, 87 Neb. 522, 127 N. W. 860; Culbreth v. Hall, 159 N. C. 588, 75 S. E. 1096; Smith v. Jensen, 16 N. D. 408, 114 N. W. 306; Miller v. Smith, 20 N. D. 96, 126 N. W. 499; Adams v. McIntyre, 22 N. D. 337, 133 N. W. 915; Hall v. O'Connell, 52 Or. 164, 95 Pac. 717, 96 Pac. 1070; Elliott v. Bozorth, 52 Or. 391, 97 Pac. 632; Beall v.

Beall, 67 Or. 33, 128 Pac. 835, 135 Pac. 185; Williams v. McManus, 90 S. C. 490, 73 S. E. 1038; Banks v. Frith, 97 S. C. 362, 81 S. E. 677; Jones v. Jones, 20 S. D. 632, 108 N. W. 23; Lowry v. Carter, '46 Tex. Civ. App. 488, 102 S. W. 930; Earle's Adm'r v. Blanchard, 85 Vt. 288, 81 Atl. 913 (evidence must exclude reasonable doubt); Bachrach v. Bachrach, 111 Va. 232, 68 S. E. 985; Batchelder v. Randolph, 112 Va. 296, 71 S. E. 533; Motley's Adm'r v. Carstairs, McCall & Co., 114 Va. 429, 76 S. E. 948; Dabney v. Smith, 38 Wash. 40, 80 Pac. 199; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 42 Wash. 107, 84 Pac. 579; Washington Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Lietzow, 59 Wash. 281, 109 Pac. 1021; Dempscy v. Dempsey, 61 Wash. 632, 112 Pac. 755; Johnson v. National Bank of Commerce of Tacoma, 65 Wash. 261, L. R. A. 1916B, 4, 118 Pac. 21; Mittlesteadt v. Johnson, 75 Wash. 550, 135 Pac. 214; Beverly v. Davis, 79 Wash. 537, 140 Pac. 696.

Indicia of Mortgage or Sale.— Some of the circumstances, mentioned in the text, at the end of § 1195, ante, as throwing light upon the real intent and nature of the transaction, are illustrated in the following recent cases.

Grantor remaining in possession, making improvements, receiving rents, etc.: Gerson v. Davis, 143 Ala. 381, 39 South. 198; Winn v. Fitzwater, 151 Ala. 171; 44 South. 97; Laub v. Romans, 131 Iowa, 427, 105 N. W. 102; Scholl v. Hopper, 134 Ky. 83, 119 S. W. 770; Culbreth v.

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the grantor's equity of redemption; i the grantor may

605; Brown v. Clifford, 7 Lans. 46; Marvin v. Prentice, 49 How. Pr. 385; Budd v. Van Orden, 33 N. J. Eq. 143; Judge v. Reese, 24 N. J. Eq. 387; Kline v. McGuckin, 24 N. J. Eq. 411; Sweet v. Parker, 22 N. J. Eq. 453; Crane v. Decamp, 21 N. J. Eq. 414; Danzeisen's Appeal, 73 Pa. St. 65;

Hall, 159 N. C. 588, 75 S. E. 1096; Fridley v. Somerville, 60 W. Va. 272, 54 S. E. 502; Hudkins v. Crim, 72 W. Va. 418, 78 S. E. 1043. A lease of the premises by the grantee to the grantor does not necessarily disprove the grantor's equitable ownership: Jones v. Gillett, 142 Iowa, 506, 118 N. W. 314, 121 N. W. 5; Holden Land & Live Stock Co. v. Interstate Trading Co., 87 Kan. 221, L. R. A. 1915B, 492, 123 Pac. 733.

Where it is claimed that the debt was created at the same time that the deed was given, the fact that no note or other evidence of indebtedness was given is some evidence that the transaction was intended as a sale, and not a mortgage, but is not of controlling weight: Rodgers v. Burt, 157 Ala. 91, 47 South. 226, and cases cited: Beckman v. Waters, 161 Cal. 581, 119 Pac. 922; Grubb v. Brendie, 52 Ind. App. 531, 100 N. E. 872; Beverly v. Davis, 79 Wash. 537, 140 Pac. 696. On the other hand, if a note was given at the same time as the deed, and the grantor had the same time in which to pay the note as to repurchase the land, the inference is strong in favor of a mortgage: White v. Redenbaugh, 41 Ind. App. 580, 82 N. E. 110.

Disparity between the value of the land and the amount which is claimed by the grantee to be the purchase price and by the grantor to be a debt is a circumstance of considerable, but not of controlling, weight in favor of the grantor's contention: Rodgers v. Burt, 157 Ala. 91, 47 South. 226; Nelson v. Wads-

worth, 171 Ala. 603, 55 South. 120; Irwin v. Coleman, 173 Ala. 175, 55 South. 492; Gibbons v. Joseph Gibbons Consol. Min. & Mill. Co., 37 Colo. 96, 11 Ann. Cas. 323, 86 Pac. 94; Butsch v. Smith, 40 Colo. 64, 90 Pac. 61 (land worth \$10,000, consideration \$3,000); Elliott v. Conner, 63 Fla. 408, 58 South. 241; White v. Redenbaugh, 41 Ind. App. 580, 82 N. E. 110; Calahan v. Dunker, 51 Ind. App. 436, 99 N. E. 1021; Grubb v. Brendel, 52 Ind. App. 531, 100 N. E. 872; Ridings v. Marengo Savings Bank, 147 Iowa, 608, 125 N. W. 200; Fort v. Colby, 165 Iowa, 95, 144 N. W. 393; Smith v. Berry, 155 Ky. 686, 160 S. W. 247; Schmidt v. Barclay, 161 Mich. 1, 20 Ann. Cas. 1194, 125 N. W. 729; Maginn v. Cashin, (Mich.) 162 N. W. 1009; Donovan v. Boeck, 217 Mo. 70, 116 S. W. 543; Brightwell v. McAfee,

§1196, (j) Foreclosure.-The foreclosure must be by the ordinary proceedings and sale. A decree of strict foreclosure will not be made: so held in McCaughey v. McDuffie, (Cal.) 74 Pac. 751. That grantee must enforce his rights by foreclosure, see Lewis v. Davis, (Ala.) 73 South. 419; Reitze v. Humphreys, 53 Colo. 177, 125 Pac. 518; Hannah v. Vensel, 19 Idaho, 796, 116 Pac. 115; Collier v. Smaltz, 149 Iowa, 230, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1007, 128 N. W. 396 (decree does not reconvey land to grantor); Krauss v. Potts, 38 Okl. 674, 135 Pac. 362; Shields v. Simonton, 65 W. Va. 179, 63 S. E. 972.

maintain an action to redeem and to compel a recon-

Sweetzer's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 264; Fessler's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 483; Plumer v. Guthrie, 76 Pa. St. 441, 455; Odenbaugh v. Bradford, 67 Pa. St. 96; McGinity v. McGinity, 63 Pa. St. 38, 45; Baugher v. Merryman, 32 Md. 185; Snavely v. Pickle, 29 Gratt. 27; Gulley v. Macy, 84 N. C. 434; Carter v. Hallahan, 61 Ga. 314; Phillips v. Croft, 42 Ala. 477; Klein v. McNamara, 54 Miss. 90; Littlewort v. Davis, 50 Miss. 403; Nichols v. Cabe, 3 Head, 92; Barnard v. Jennison, 27 Mich. 230; Emerson v. Atwater, 7 Mich. 12; Smith v. Brand, 64 Ind. 427; Graham v. Graham, 55 Ind. 23; Butcher v. Stultz, 60 Ind. 170 (actual fraud); Wright v. Gay, 101 Ill. 233; Bartling v. Brasuhn, 102 Ill. 441; Hancock v. Harper, 86 Ill. 445; Klock v. Walter, 70 Ill. 416; Smith v. Cremer, 71 Ill. 185; Ruckman v. Alwood, 71 Hl. 155; Magnusson v. Johnson, 73 Ill. 156; Wilson v. Mc-Dowell, 78 Ill. 514; Shays v. Norton, 48 Ill. 100; Lindauer v. Cummings, 57 Ill. 195, 200; Wells v. Somers, 4 Ill. App. 297; Butler v. Butler, 46

249 Mo. 562, 155 S. W. 820; Culbreth v. Hall, 159 N. C. 588, 75 S. E. 1096; Hoover v. Bouffleur, 74 Wash. 382, 133 Pac. 602; Fridley v. Somerville, 60 W. Va. 272, 54 S. E. 502; Hudkins v. Crim, 72 W. Va. 418, 78 S. E. . 1043. On the other hand, adequaey of the consideration tends to support the theory that the transaction was a sale: Shaner v. Rathdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho, 576, 161 Pac. 90; Grubb v. Brendel, 52 Ind. App. 531, 100 N. E. 872; Rathbone v. Maltz, 155 Mich. 306, 118 N. W. 991 (value of the property less than amount of indebtedness). The value of the land at the time of filing the course, immaterial: bill is, of Hubert v. Sistrunk, (Ala.) 53 South. 819.

The transaction commencing with a negotiation for a loan; some evidence that a mortgage was intended: Irwin v. Coleman, 173 Ala. 175, 55 South. 492; Elliott v. Conner, 63 Fla. 408, 58 South. 241; Fridley v. Somerville, 60 W. Va. 272, 54 S. E. 502.

Antecedent Debt.—The debt continuing, the transaction held a mortgage: Winn v. Fitzwater, 151 Ala.

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171, 44 South. 97; Gibbons v. Joseph Gibbons Consol. Min. & Mill. Co., 37 Colo. 96, 11 Ann. Cas. 323, 86 Pac. 94 (surrender of prior note not conclusive evidence of sale); Elliott v. Connor, 63 Fla. 408, 58 South. 241; Lipscomb v. Talbott, 243 Mo. 1, 147 S. W. 798 (though land not worth the debt); Gibson v. Morris State Bank, 49 Mont. 60, 140 Pac. 76; Messner v. Carroll, (Okl.) 159 Pac. 362 (original note and mortgage not delivered up); Bickel v. Wessinger, 58 Or. 98, 113 Pac. 34; Harrison v. Hogue, (Tex. Civ. App.) 136 S. W. 118; Shields v. Simonton, 65 W. Va. 179, 63 S. E. 972 (though deed recites cancellation of indebtedness). The debt ceasing to exist, the transaction is a sale: Thomas v. Livingston, 155 Ala. 546, 46 South. 851; Shaner v. Rathdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho, 576, 161 Pac. 90 (note canceled); Duell v. Leslie, 207 Mo. 658, 106 S. W. 489; Harrah v. Smith, 79 Neb. 51, 112 N. W. 337; Rotan Grocery Co. v. Turner, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 534, 102 S. W. 932; Dabney v. Smith, 38 Wash. 40, 80 Pac. 199; see ante, § 1195, note (S).

veyance upon his payment of the debt secured.^k If

Wis. 430, 1 N. W. 70; Wilcox v. Bates, 26 Wis. 465; Zuver v. Lyons, 40 Iowa, 510; Roberts v. McMahan, 4 G. Greene, 34; Weide v. Gehl, 21 Minn. 449; O'Neill v. Capelle, 62 Mo. 202; Moore v. Wade, 8 Kan. 380; Whitsett v. Kershow, 4 Col. 419; Pierce v. Traver, 13 Nev. 526; Montgomery

§ 1196, (k) Redemption in Cases of Mortgage by Absolute Deed.— That the grantor, in such suit, is entitled to a reconveyance either by the grantee or by an officer of the court acting on the grantee's behalf, see Sewell v. Buyek, 162 Ala. 496, 50 South. 127.

Laches.-In the following cases there was held to be no laches on the part of the grantor seeking to redeem: Gerson v. Davis, 143 Ala. 381, 39 South. 198 (ten years; rule as to laches in suits to vacate deeds for fraud has no application); Nelson v. Wadsworth, 171 Ala. 603, 55 South. 120 (grantor remained in possession); Veeder v. Veeder, 141 Iowa, 492, 120 N. W. 61; Fort v. Colby, 165 Iowa, 95, 144 N. W. 393 (three years, grantee being in possession); Dusenbery v. Bidwell, 86 Kan. 666, 121 Pac. 1098 (fifteen years, although land had increased in value); Tucker v. Witherbee, 130 Ky. 269, 113 S. W. 123 (fourteen years); Bickel v. Wessinger, 58 Or. 98, 113 Pac. 34 (no laches until defendants deny or repudiate mortgage); Davisson v. Smith, 60 W. Va. 413, 55 S. E. 466 (value of land has increased, but not through any action of grantee, and grantee has had the rents). In the following cases there was held to be laches, barring relief: Baird v. Baird, 48 Colo. 506, 111 Pac. 79 (twenty-nine years); Deadman v. Yantis, 230 Ill. 243, 120 Am. St. Rep. 291, 82 N. E. 592; Ferguson v. Boyd, 169 Ind. 537, 81 N. E. 71, 82 N. E. 1064; Elling v. Fine, 53 Mont. 481, 164 Pac. 891; Hill v. Saunders, 115 Va. 60, 78 S. E. 559.

Payment or Tender.-As to necessity of payment or tender of the debt; see Smith v. J. R. Newberry Co., 21 Cal. App. 432, 131 Pac. 1055 (in suit to quiet title against purchaser from grantee, need not tender amount due, since the court will adjust the equities by its decree); Reitze v. Humphreys, 53 Colo. 177, 125 Pac. 518 (in suit to enjoin grantee's ejectment, not bound to tender); Shaner v. Rathdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho, 576, 161 Pac. 90 (tender before suit necessary); Holden Land & Live Stock Co. v. Interstate Trading Co., 87 Kan. 221, L. R. A. 1915B, 492, 123 Pac. 733; Tucker v. Witherbee, 130 Ky. 269, 113 S. W. 123 (not necessary to tender amount due as a condition to bringing suit); McMillan v. Davenport, 44 Mont. 23, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 984, 118 Pac. 756 (grantee having conveyed to third person, original grantor cannot quiet title until debt is paid); Lake v. Weaver, (N. J. Eq.) 70 Atl. 81 (grantor not entitled to relief unless he recognizes the debt, although it is barred by the statute of limitations); Merchants' State Bank of Fargo v. Tufts, 14 N. D. 238, 116 Am. St. Rep. 682, 103 N. W. 760; Smith v. Jensen, 16 N. D. 408, 114 N. W. 306 (sufficient tender to allege willingness to pay such sum as may be found due); Eldriedge v. Hoefer, 52 Or. 241, 93 Pac. 246, 94 Pac. 563, 96 Pac. 1105 (tender not essential when other party refuses to recogthe grantee goes into possession, he is in reality a mort-

v. Spect, 55 Cal. 352; Kuhn v. Rumpp, 46 Cal. 299; Raynor v. Lyons, 37 Cal. 452; Vance v. Lincoln, 38 Cal. 586; Pierce v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 116.

It is held, however, that the deed conveys the legal title to the grantee therein: Hughes v. Davis, 40 Cal. 117; Espinosa v. Gregory, 40 Cal. 58;^f and therefore the right of redemption is cut off by a conveyance from the grantee to a *bona fide* purchaser for value and without notice,—he holds the land free from the equity: Brophy Min. Co. v. Brophy and Dale Min. Co., 15 Nev. 101;^g but the right still continues

nize right); Kinney v. Smith, 58 Or. 158, 113 Pac. 854 (plaintiff must show willingness to do equity); Harmon v. Grants Pass Banking & Trust Co., 60 Or. 69, 118 Pac. 188; Erickson v. Thelin, 26 S. D. 441, 128 N. W. 598 (must tender); Shepard v. Vincent, 38 Wash. 493, 80 Pac. 777.

After payment of the debt, the grantee holds the property in trust for the grantor: See post, § 1218; Cooper v. Cooper, 256 Ill. 160, 99 N. E. 871.

§ 1196. (f) Whether Mortgagee by Deed Absolute on Its Face Obtains the Legal Title .- Among the cases holding that the mortgagee acquires the legal title, and not a mere licn, see Groves v. Williams, 69 Ga. 614; Ferguson v. Boyd, 169 Ind. 537, 81 N. E. 71, 82 N. E. 1064; McCague v. Eller, 77 Neb. 531, 124 Am. St. Rep. 863, 110 N. W. 318; Evans v. Brendle, 173 N. C. 149, 91 S. E. 723 (grantor's right to have deed declared a mortgage is not such an equitable estate as can be sold on execution); but see contra, Healy v. O'Brien, 66 Cal. 519, 6 Pac. 386; Raynor v. Drew, 72 Cal. 307, 13 Pac. 866; Booth v. Hoskins, 75 Cal. 271, 17 Pac. 225; Hall v. Arnot, 80 Cal. 348, 22 Pac. 200; Anglo-Californian Bank v. Cerf, 147 Cal. 384, 81 Pac. 1077; Shirey v. All Night and Day Bank, 166 Cal. 50, 134 Pac. 1001; Hull v. Burr, 58 Fla. 432, 50 South. 754; Hannah v. Vensel, 19 Idaho, 796, 116 Pac. 115; Flynn v. Holmes, 145 Mich. 606, 11 L. B. A. (N. S.) 209, 108 N. W. 685; Kinney v. Smith, 58 Or. 158, 113 Pac. 854; Peck v. Girard F. & M. Ins. Co., 16 Utah, 121, 67 Am. St. Rep. 600, 51 Pac. 255; Snyder v. Parker, 19 Wash. 276, 67 Am. St. Rep. 726, 53 Wash. 59; Clambey v. Copland, 52 Wash. 580, 100 Pac. 1031.

§1196, (3) Conveyance by Grantee to Bona Fide Purchaser .--- See, also, Frink v. Adams, 36 N. J. Eq. 485; Pancake v. Cauffman, 114 Pa. St. 113, 7 Atl. 67; Jolivet v. Chavis, 125 La. 923, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1046, 52 South. 99; Breaux v. Royer, 129 La. 894, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 982, 57 South. 164; Harrington v. Butte & Superior Copper Co., 52 Mont. 263, 157 Pac. 181; grantee in such case is liable to the grantor, at the latter's option, for the value of the land, not merely for the amount received on the sale: Van Heuvel v. Long, (Ala.) 75 South. 339. On the other hand, the right to redeem survives the grantor: Clark v. Seagraves, (Mass.) 71 N. E. 813. See, also, Acme Food Co. v. Meier, (Mich.) 153 Fed. 74, 82 C. C. A. 208 (any creditor, vendee, assignee or trustee in bankruptcy of grantor may show the real nature of the transaction and be clothed with the grantor's remedies; citing this paragraph of the text).

gagee in possession, and as such is liable to account for the rents and profits.³

§ 1197. Mortgages to Secure Future Advances.^a—Whatever disinclination may at any time have been felt by courts to sustain this kind of security, it is now well settled that mortgages given in good faith to secure future advances, either in addition to or without a present indebtedness, are valid and binding between the parties. When no claims of subsequent encumbrancers or purchasers have intervened,

against a purchaser from the grantee with notice: Graham v. Graham, 55 Ind. 23.^h

The doctrine of the text is applied under every variety of circumstances where the essential fact exists. If the vendee in a contract for the sale of land assigns the contract to A, as security for a debt which he owes to A, and this assignee afterwards fulfills the contract, and receives an absolute deed of the land from the vendor, such deed is still a mortgage as between the grantee, A, and the original vendee: Carr v. Carr, 52 N. Y. 251; Smith v. Cremer, 71 Ill. $185.^{1}$

§ 1196, ³ It has been held, however, that his liability to account under these circumstances is not so stringent and severe as that of the ordinary mortgagee in possession: See Barnard v. Jennison, 27 Mich. 230.¹

§1196, (h) Calahan v. Dunker, 51 Ind. App. 436, 99 N. E. 1021.

§1196, (1) See, also, McPherson v. Hayward, 81 Me. 329, 17 Atl. 164; but see Mosely v. Mosely, 86 Ala. 289, 5 South. 732. For further cases similar to those mentioned in the author's note, see Bashinski v. Swint, 133 Ga. 38, 65 S. E. 152; Mc-Kenney v. Page, 146 Ky. 682, 143 S. W. 382; Tenvoorde v. Tenvoorde, 128 Minn. 126, 150 N. W. 396; Sandlin v. Kearney, 154 N. C. 596, 70 S. E. 942; Hall v. O'Connell, 52 Or. 164, 95 Pac. 717, 96 Pac. 1070; Bickel v. Wessinger, 58 Or. 98, 113 Pac. 34 (execution debtor as mortgagor). See, also, ante, § 1055, and notes. But the usual tests of a mortgage apply in such a case; the original vendee must become the debtor of the person who furnished the money and received the deed: Stollenwerck v. Marks & Gayle, 188

Ala. 587, 65 South. 1024; Greff v. Hobbs, (Iowa) 159 N. W. 429; and the party claiming to be a mortgagor must at the time of the deed to the third party have had some interest in the land, legal or equitable; it is not enough that he was merely negotiating for the purchase of the land: Bennett v. Harrison, 115 Minn. 342, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 521, and note, 132 N. W. 309 (an instructive case).

§ 1196, (1) De Cazara v. Oreña, 80 Cal. 132, 22 Pac. 74. When the grantee has reconveyed the land, the grantor's action to recover the rents is in equity: Thomas v. Livingston, 147 Ala. 200, 40 South. 504. In general, see Miller v. Peter, 158 Mich. 336, 122 N. W. 780.

§ 1197, (a) This section is cited in Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 11 Am. St. Rep. 288, 19 Pac. 641. there is no longer any doubt that the mortgagee can enforce the security for all the sums which he has advanced to the mortgagor, under the mortgage and within its scope, both when such advances were optional on his part, and when he was bound to make them by some collateral agreement with the mortgagor. If the advances were actually made within the scope of the mortgage, the fact that they were originally optional or obligatory would be wholly immaterial between the parties themselves.^{1 b} The fact that the mortgage is given to secure future advances need not appear on the face of the instrument itself. If it purports to secure the payment of a specified amount, the mortgage need not express the intention or agreement of the parties that this amount of indebtedness is to be made up wholly or in part by future advances; the agreement to that effect may be

§ 1197, 1 Gordon v. Graham, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 598, pl. 16; 7 Vin. Abr. 52, pl. 3; Shaw v. Neale, 20 Beav. 157; 6 H. L. Cas. 581, 608; Hopkinson v. Rolt, 9 H. L. Cas. 514; Daun v. City of London Brewing Co., L. R. 8 Eq. 155; Menzies v. Lightfoot, L. R. 11 Eq. 459; Young v. Young, L. R. 3 Eq. 801; Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; Shirras v. Caig, 7 Cranch, 34, 3 L. Ed. 260; United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch, 73, 2 L. Ed. 370; Scheulenburg v. Martin, 1 McCrary, 348, 2 Fed. 747; Lawrence v. Tucker, 23 How. 14, 16 L. Ed. 474; Kansas Valley Bank v. Rowell, 2 Dill. 371, Fed. Cas. No. 7611; Miller v. Whittier, 36 Me. 577; McDaniels v. Colvin, 16 Vt. 300, 42 Am. Dec. 512; Seymour v. Darrow, 31 Vt. 122; Goddard v. Sawyer, 9 Allen, 78; Joslyn v. Wyman, 5 Allen, 62; Boswell v. Goodwin, 31 Conn. 74, 81 Am. Dec. 169; Pettibone v. Griswold, 4 Conn. 158, 10 Am. Dec. 106; Hubbard v. Savage, 8 Conn. 215; Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N. Y. 43, 39 Am. Rep. 621; Babcock v. Bridge, 29 Barb, 427; Murray v. Barney, 34 Barb. 336; Lansing v. Woodworth, 1 Sand. Ch. 43; Barry v. Merchants' Exch. Co., 1 Sand. Ch. 280; Goodhue v. Berrien, 2 Sand. Ch. 630; Holt v. Creamer, 34 N. J. Eq. 181; Farnum v. Burnett, 21 N. J. Eq. 87; Taylor v. Cornelius, 60 Pa. St. 187; Moroney's Appeal, 24 Pa. St. 372; Bank of Commerce's Appeal, 44 Pa, St. 423; Brooks v.

§ 1197, (b) Jones v. Guaranty Co., 391, 9 Atl. 598; Evans v. Laughton,
101 U. S. 625, 25 L. Ed. 1030; Madigan v. Mead, 31 Minn. 94, 16 N. W.
539; Simons v. First Nat. Bank, 93
N. Y. 269; Keygs v. Bump, 59 Vt.
391, 9 Atl. 598; Evans v. Laughton,
69 Wis. 138, 33 N. W. 573. See,
also, Langerman v. Puritan Dining
Room Co., 21 Cal. App. 637, 132
Pac. 617.

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entirely verbal.² ^c More definiteness and certainty, however, are necessary to render the mortgage operative against subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers.

Lester, 36 Md. 65; Wilson v. Russell, 13 Md. 494, 71 Am. Dec. 645; Alexandria Sav. Inst. v. Thomas, 29 Gratt. 483; McCarty v. Chalfant, 14 W. Va. 531; Moore v. Ragland, 74 N. C. 343; Allen v. Lathrop, 46 Ga. 133; Forsyth v. Preer, 62 Ala. 443; Meeker v. Clinton etc. R. R., 2 La. Ann. 971; Klein v. Glass, 53 Tex. 37; Brewster v. Clamfit, 33 Ark. 72; Kramer v. Farmers' etc. Bank, 15 Ohio, 253; Michigan Ins. Co. v. Brown, 11 Mich. 265; Ladue v. Detroit etc. R. R., 13 Mich. 380, 87 Am. Dec. 759; Brackett v. Sears, 15 Mich. 244; Foster v. Reynolds, 38 Mo. 553; Hendrix v. Gore, 8 Or. 406; Tully v. Harloe, 35 Cal. 302, 95 Am. Dec. 102. In New Hampshire such mortgages appear to be prohibited by statute, although valid so far as given to secure a present indebtedness: See Johnson v. Richardson, 38 N. H. 353; New Hampshire Bank v. Willard, 10 N. H. 210; Leeds v. Cameron, 3 Sum. 488, Fed. Cas. No. 8206. For a full discnssion of the questions arising from these mortgages, see 1 Jones on Mortgages, secs. 364-378.

§ 1197, ² Griffin v. New Jersey Oil Co., 11 N. J. Eq. 49; Bell v. Fleming's Ex'rs, 12 N. J. Eq. 13; Craig v. Tappin, 2 Sand. Ch. 78; Hall v. Crouse, 13 Hun, 557; Bank of Utica v. Finch, 3 Barb. Ch. 293; Foster v. Reynolds, 38 Mo. 553; Forsyth v. Preer, 62 Ala. 443; Hendrix v. Gore, 8 Or. 406. While the rule of the text is operative hetween the parties, more definiteness and certainty in the mortgage are needed, so that it may operate by recording as a constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers of the rights of the mortgagee. Thus a subsequent verbal agreement that subsequent advances should be covered by the mortgage is inoperative: Johnson v. Anderson, 30 Ark. 745; and where the

§ 1197, (c) Agreement for Future Advances may be Parol.—See Kirby v. Raynes, 138 Ala. 194, 100 Am. St. Rep. 39, 35 South. 118; Johnson v. Bratton, 112 Mich. 319, 70 N. W. 1021; Reeves v. Evans, (N. J. Eq.) 34 Atl. 477; Reed v. Rochford, 62 N. J. Eq. 186, 50 Atl. 70; Blackmar v. Sharp, 23 R. I. 412, 50 Atl. 852. See, also, Du Bois v. First Nat. Bank of Denver, 43 Colo. 400, 96 Pac. 169 (mortgage need not state on its face that its purpose was to secure future advances; purpose and amount of security may be established by parol); Openshaw v. Dean, (Tex. Civ. App.) 125 S. W. 989; Langerman v. Puritan Dining Room Co., 21 Cal. App. 637, 132 Pac. 617. A deed absolute in form may, if so intended, constitute a mortgage to secure future advances: Anglo-Californian Bank v. Cerf, 147 Cal. 384, 81 Pac. 1077; Stitt v. Rat Portage Lumber Co., 96 Minn. 27, 104 N. W. 561, and cases eited; Merchants' State Bank of Fargo v. Tufts, 14 N. D. 238, 116 Am. St. Rep. 682, 103 N. W. 760.

§ 1198. The Same. As Against Subsequent Encumbrancers or Purchasers.-As such a mortgage is a valid security between the parties, it is plainly an equally valid and effective security, and gives the holder thereof a prior lien, against subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers, for all advances made before the execution of the subsequent conveyances or mortgages by the mortgagor, or the docketing of the subsequent judgments against him. The only real question to be considered relates to the validity of the mortgage as a security for advances made after the execution or recording of a subsequent mortgage by, or the docketing of a subsequent judgment against, the mortgagor; and in answering this question, there is, to some extent, a direct conflict of opinion among the American decisions. It may be regarded as established that where a mortgage has been given to secure future advances, and advances are made in pursuance thereof after the execution or recording of a

mortgage specified the time within which the future advances should be made, advances made after that time were held not to be secured by it: Miller v. Whittier, 36 Me. 577. A mortgage, to be operative against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers, should certainly specify the total or maximum amount of the indebtedness it is intended to secure: Youngs v. Wilson, 24 Barb. 510; and it may well be doubted whether any mortgage which simply purports on its face to be given for a single specified sum, described as an absolute debt, can be a valid security for future advances as against subsequent claimants who are only affected hy the constructive notice created by its record: North v. Belden, 13 Conn. 376, 35 Am. Dec. 83. This case lays down a rule which seems to be sound, that to render a mortgage for future advances valid as against creditors, etc., of the mortgagor, the real nature of the transaction, so far as can be disclosed. must appear on the record with reasonable certainty, or at least the record must point out a track to ascertain it: See 1 Jones on Mortgages, sees. 374, 375.ª

§1197, (d) Balch v. Chaffee, 73 Conn. 318, 84 Am. St. Rep. 155, 47 Atl. 327; Bullock v. Battenhousen, 108 Ill. 28; Weissman v. Voliuo, 84 Conn. 326, 80 Atl. 81 (description of the debt held sufficient). It is held, however, in Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 11 Am. St. Rep. 288, 19 Pac. 641, that this is not necessary to its validity, if the amount of liability to be incurred under it is expressly limited. See, also, Simons v. First Nat. Bank, 93 N. Y. 269. subsequent mortgage or the docketing of a subsequent judgment, but without any notice to the mortgagee of such subsequent encumbrance, upon the general principles of equity, independently of the recording acts, the subsequent encumbrancer can claim no preference for his own security; in other words, the first mortgage remains prior in effect, as it is prior in time.^{1 a}

§ 1198, 1 In the very recent case of Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N. Y. 43, 47, 39 Am. Rep. 621, Andrews, J., clearly shows the correctness of this conclusion, upon principle, as follows: "It is equally clear that to prefer an intervening encumbrance over the claim of the plaintiff would violate the understanding of the parties to the mortgage at the time it was executed; for the plain intention was, that the interest of the mortgagor in the land, as it existed when the mortgage was given, should be bound as security for all liabilities which the plaintiff might incur as indorser upon the faith of the mortgage. It would have been a clear breach of good faith on the part of the mortgagor if he had, without notice to the mortgagee, voluntarily encumbered the land by liens having priority of the mortgage, and then applied to the plaintiff for and procured further indorsements." Furthermore, it is a well-settled doctrine of equity that an executory agreement to charge a specified parcel of land with a lien does create an equitable lien on such land, which will be enforced not only against the parties, but also against all persons who acquire subsequent interest in the land with notice of the agreement; and the effects of the constructive notice by recording are generally as broad as those of actual notice. The general doctrine of the text is fully sustained by authority. In Gordon v. Graham, 2 Eq. Abr. Cas. 598, pl. 16, 7 Vin. Abr. 52, pl. 3, Lord Chancellor Cowper, is reported to have held that in such a mortgage, the first mortgagee had a prior lien, not only for the advances made before the execution of a second mortgage, but also for the further advances which he made after receiving notice of such second mortgage. The correctness of this latter ruling was doubted, although the

§ 1198, (a) This section is cited in Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 11 Am. St. Rep. 288, 19 Pac. 641. See, also, The Seattle, 170 Fed. 284, 95 C. C. A. 480; In re Sunflower State Refining Co., 183 Fed. 834; Straeffer v. Rodman, 146 Ky. 1, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 549, 141 S. W. 742; Gerrity v. Wareham Sav. Bank, 202 Mass. 214, 88 N. E. 1084; Merchants' State Bank of Fargo v. Tufts, 14 N. D. 238, 116 Am. St. Rep. 682, 103 N. W. 760 (mortgagee not protected as to advances, after actual notice of subsequent encumbrance taken without notice of the contract for advances); Hall v. Williamson Grocery Co., 69 W. Va. 671, 72 S. E. 780 (what is not actual notice of subsequent encumbrance).

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§ 1199. The Same. As Affected by the Recording Acts.^a The general doctrine being thus established that the mortgage constitutes a prior lien for all advances made in pursuance thereof before notice of a subsequent encumbrance or conveyance, the effect of the recording acts remains to be considered. It is at this point that the diversity of opin-

question was not definitely decided, in Shaw v. Neale, 20 Beav. 157, 6 H. L. Cas. 581, 608. In Hopkinson v. Rolt, 9 H. L. Cas. 514, 25 Beav. 461, the house of lords, by a majority decision (Lords Campbell and Chelmsford), overruled Gordon v. Graham, and held that the first mortgagee is not entitled to priority of lien for the advances which he made after receiving notice of the second mortgage. Lord Cranworth dissented, and maintained the correctness of Lord Chancellor Cowper's entire ruling. The whole court, however, distinctly recognized and affirmed the doctrine as stated in the text, that the first mortgagee retains a prior lien for all advances made after the second mortgage, but without notice thereof.^b The leading case in this country is Shirras v. Caig, 7 Cranch, 34, 3 L. Ed. 260, which was decided, like these English cases, upon the general principles of equity, without reference to the recording statutes. The mortgagees had made advances after a conveyance of the land to the defendants, but without notice of such conveyance. The supreme court held that the mortgage created a valid lien upon the land against the defendants as a security for such advances. Chief Justice Marshall said that the mortgage was security for "the payment of debts still remaining due to them, which were either due at the date of the mortgage or were afterwards contracted upon its faith, either by advances actually made or incurred prior to the receipt of actual notice of the subsequent title of the defendants." See also the cases cited ante, under § 1197.

§ 1198, (b) To the same effect are the cases, London etc. Banking Co. v. Ratcliffe, 6 App. Cas. (H. L.) 722, and Bradford Banking Co. v. Briggs, 12 App. Cas. (H. L.) 29, reversing 31 Ch. Div. 19, and restoring 29 Ch. Div. 149. In West v. Williams, [1899] 1 Ch. 132, 68 Law J. Ch. 127, 79 Law T. (N. S.) 575, 47 Wkly. Rep. 308, it was held that the doctrine of Hopkinson v. Rolt applies where the mortgagee, after notice of the subsequent encumbrance, made advances which were obligatory under the terms of the mortgage. To the same effect, Germania Building & Loau Ass'n v. B. Fraenkel Realty Co., 82 N. J. Eq. 49, 88 Atl. 305. For recent applications of Hopkinson v. Rolt. see Hughes v. Brittania Permanent Benefit Building Society, [1906] 2 Ch. 607; Deeley v. Lloyd's Bank, Ltd., [1912] App. Cas. (H. of L.) 756.

§ 1199, (a) This section is cited in Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 11 Am. St. Rep. 288, 19 Pac. 641; Schmidt v. Zahrndt, 148 Ind. 447, 47 N. E. 335. ion among the American courts has chiefly arisen. The following conclusions seem to be in harmony with established principles, and to be sustained by the weight of authority; and they may be regarded, I think, as furnishing the prevailing rule: When a mortgage to secure future advances reasonably states the purposes for which it is given, its record is a constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers; they are thereby put upon an inquiry to ascertain what advances or liabilities have been made or incurred. The record of a subsequent mortgage or conveyance, or the docketing of a subsequent judgment, is not a constructive notice of its existence to such prior mortgagee. The prior mortgage, therefore, duly recorded, has a preference over subsequent recorded mortgages or conveyances, or subsequent docketed judgments, not only for advances previously made, but also for advances made after their recording or docketing without notice thereof. As the record of the second encumbrance does not operate as a constructive notice, it requires an actual notice to cut off the lien of the prior mortgage; and the subsequent encumbrancer may, by giving actual notice, at any time prevent further advances from being made to his own prejudice.^{1 b} There is a group of decisions which adopt a

§ 1199, ¹ The courts which adopted this rule apply it alike, whether the advances were optional or obligatory: Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N. Y. 43, 59 Am. Rep. 621 (overruling the contrary *dicta* in Brinkerhoff v. Marvin, 5 Johns. Ch. 320; Lansing v. Woodworth, 1 Sand. Ch. 43; Barry v.

§ 1199, (b) Quoted in Schmidt v. Zahrndt, 148 Ind. 447, 47 N. E. 335, and in Hall v. Williamson Grocery Co., 69 W. Va. 671, 72 S. E. 780. See, also, Peacock, Hunt & West Co. v. Thaggard, 128 Fed. 1005; 'Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 11 Am. St. Rep. 288, 19 Pac. 641; Williams v. Gilbert, 37 N. J. Eq. 84; Sayre v. Hewes, 32 N. J. Eq. 652; Central Trust Co. v. Continental I. W., 51 N. J. Eq. 605, 40 Am. St. Rep. 539, 28 Atl. 595; Schmidt v. Hedden, (N. J. Eq.) 38 Atl. 843; Simons v. First Nat. Bank, 93 N. Y. 269. See, also, The Seattle, 170 Fed. 284, 95 C. C. A. 480; In re Sunflower State Refining Co., 183 Fed. 834; Straeffer v. Rodman, 146 Ky. 1, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 549, 141 S. W. 742 (mortgagee protected as to his advances against the *lis pendens* of an intervening suit to charge the mortgagor as trustee); Gerrity v. Wareham Sav. Bank, 202 Mass. 214, 88 N. E. 1084 (protected against attachment of

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different view, an opposite conclusion. They seem to regard the lien for securing future advances as only arising, or at all events as only perfected so as to be available, at and from the time when the advance is actually made. An

Merch. Exch. Co., 1 Sand. Ch. 280; and Goodhue v. Berrien, 2 Sand. Ch. 630); Truscott v. King, 6 Barb. 346, 6 N. Y. 147; Robinson v. Williams, 22 N. Y. 380; Craue v. Denning, 7 Conn. 387; Rowan v. Sharps' Rifle Mfg. Co., 29 Conn. 282; Ward v. Cooke, 17 N. J. Eq. 93; Farnum v. Burnett, 21 N. J. Eq. 87; Wilson v. Russell, 13 Md. 494, 71 Am. Dec. 645; Mc-Daniels v. Colvin, 16 Vt. 300, 42 Am. Dec. 512; Brinkmeyer v. Helbling, 57 Ind. 435; Brinkmeyer v. Browneller, 55 Ind. 487; Lovelace v. Webb, 62 Ala. 271; Witczinski v. Everman, 51 Miss. 841; Nelson's Heirs v. Boyce, 7 J. J. Marsh. 401, 23 Am. Dec. 411; Burdett v. Clay, 8 B. Mon. 287; Collins v. Carlisle, 13 Ill. 254; Shirras v. Caig, 7 Cranch, 34, 3 L. Ed. 260; United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch, 73, 2 L. Ed. 370. It is generally held to be necessary, however, in the states where this rule prevails, that the purpose to secure future advances should be sufficiently stated on the face of the first mortgage, so that it may put subsequent encumbrancers upon an inquiry. If the true purpose is not stated at all, or if stated in a too indefinite manner, the advances will not be secured against a subsequent encumbrancer or purchaser: Babcock v. Bridge, 29 Barb. 427; Youngs v. Wilson, 24 Barb. 510; North v. Belden, 13 Conn. 376, 35 Am. Dec. 83; Pettibone v. Griswold, 4 Conn. 158, 10 Am. Rep. 106. The decision in Craig v. Tappin, 2 Sand. Ch. 78, can only be sustained on the ground that the mortgagee had received actual notice of the second encumbrance; otherwise it is directly overruled by Ackerman v. Hunsicker, supra.

the land); Gray v. McClellan, 214 Mass. 92, 100 N. E. 1093 (mechanics' liens); Whelan v. Exchange Trust Co., 214 Mass. 121, 100 N. E. 1095 (same); Merchants' State Bank of Fargo v. Tufts, 14 N. D. 238, 116 Am. St. Rep. 682, 103 N. W. 760 (advances before notice of judgment lien).

In Hall v. Williamson Grocery Co., 69 W. Va. 671, 72 S. E. 780, supra, it was held that notice to a holder of a deed of trust to secure future advances that the debtor intends to give another deed of trust to another creditor does not affect his security for advances made before he has notice of the actual execution of the subsequent deed of trust.

§1199, (c) Balch v. Chaffee, 73 Conn. 318, 84 Am. St. Rep. 155, 47 Atl. 327; Weissman v. Volino, 84 Conn. 326, 80 Atl. 81 (what is sufficient description of the debt). See, however, Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 11 Am. St. Rep. 288, 19 Pac. 641. Where a mortgage is made to secure advances made within a certain time, an intervening recorded mortgage takes priority over advances made after the time limited: Norwood v. Norwood, 36 S. C. 331, 31 Am. St. Rep. 875, 15 S. E. 382,

advance, therefore, although in pursuance of a prior mortgage duly recorded, if made after the record of a subsequent mortgage or conveyance, or the docketing of a subsequent judgment, is affected with constructive notice of such subsequent encumbrance or conveyance, and its lien is consequently postponed to that of the second record. By this rule, a mortgage to secure future advances secures a preference only for those advances actually made before the record of a subsequent encumbrance or conveyance; it loses its precedence for all advances made after such record.² The lien of the prior mortgage will, of course, prevail against all subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers whose rights do not attach until after the advances are made, and against all who are not *bona fide* purchasers for value without notice.³ A distinction has been made, in some of the

§ 1199, ² The fundamental error of this view, in my opinion, consists in its mistaken conception of the nature of an equitable lien, in regarding the lien as arising at and from the act of making the advance, instead of from the previous executory agreement by which the land was bound as security for the future advances: Sce post, chapter on liens. This rule has been adopted in the following cases: Alexandria Sav. Inst. v. Thomas, 29 Gratt. 483; Bank of Montgomery County's Appeal, 36 Pa. St. 170; Ter-Hoven v. Kerns, 2 Pa. St. 96; Ladue v. Detroit etc. R. R., 13 Mich. 380, 87 Am. Dec. 759 (the opinion of Christiancy, J., gives the ablest presentation of this rule); Spader v. Lawler, 17 Ohio, 371, 49 Am. Dec. 463; Meeker v. Clinton etc. R. R., 2 La. Ann. 971 (this decision is based entirely on the peculiar provisions of the code); Brinkerhoff v. Marvin, 5 Johns. Ch. 320; Lansing v. Woodworth, 1 Sand. Ch. 43; Barry v. Merch. Exch. Co., 1 Sand. Ch. 280; Goodhue v. Berrien, 2 Sand. Ch. 630; Craig v. Tappin, 2 Sand. Ch. 78 (these cases, so far as they support the rule, have been expressly overruled by the latest New York decision); Griffin v. N. Y. Oil Co., 11 N. J. Eq. 49; Bell v. Fleming's Ex'rs., 12 N. J. Eq. 13 (these two cases seem to be entirely inconsistent with the later decision in Ward v. Cooke, cited in the last preceding note). The question is also discussed, but not decided, in Boswell v. Goodwin, 31 Conn. 74, 81 Am. Dec. 169.

§ 1199, 3 McCarty v. Chalfant, 14 W. Va. 531; Schulze v. Bolting, 8 Biss. 174; Fed. Cas. No. 12,489 (good against an assignee in bankruptcy); Farnum v. Burnett, 21 N. J. Eq. 87; Lovelace v. Webb, 62 Ala. 271; Kramer v. Farmers' etc. Bank, 15 Ohio, 253; Barry v. Merchants' Exch. Co., 1 Sand. Ch. 280. cases, between optional and obligatory advances. Where the advance is optional with the mortgagee, it has been said that the lien thereof does not attach until it is actually made; and consequently such an advance made after notice of a second encumbrance loses its preference. Here, again, the decisions are not uniform; some require an actual notice in order to cut off the lien even of an optional advance; with others the recording gives a constructive notice which is sufficient.⁴ Finally, there are decisions by most able courts which give the prior mortgage to secure future advances an absolute preference; which maintain the mortgagee's supremacy, and preserve the lien of his mortgage against intervening subsequent encumbrances, even for advances made after receiving actual notice of such encum-This conclusion is based upon the doctrines that brances.⁵

§ 1199, 4 Heintze v. Bentley, 34 N. J. Eq. 562 (first mortgagee having knowledge of a second encumbrance); and see Ward v. Cooke, 17 N. J. Eq. 93; Ripley v. Harris, 3 Biss. 199; Fed. Cas. No. 11,853 (actual notice); Boswell v. Goodwin, 31 Conn. 74, 81 Am. Dec. 169 (actual notice); Frye v. Bank of Illinois, 11 Ill. 367 (actual notice); Bank of Montgomery Co.'s Appeal, 36 Pa. St. 170; McClure v. Roman, 52 Pa. St. 458; Parker v. Jacoby, 3 Grant Cas. 300 (in these three Pennsylvania cases, constructive notice by recording is held to be sufficient). Notwithstanding the ability of the courts which maintain this view, it seems to me very difficult to perceive on what equitable principle concerning priorities the rights of the second encumbrancer can at all depend upon the fact of the advances being either optional or obligatory. The equities of the second encumbrancer must arise from his own position, his own relations with the subject-matter and with the prior parties; it does not seem to be in accordance with settled doctrines of equity that the parties to the prior mortgage should be able to alter the equities of the second encumbrancer by any independent agreement or arrangement between themselves to which he was not a party, and of which he might be completely ignorant.

§ 1199, 5 Some, though not all, of these decisions emphasize the fact that the advances made after notice of the second encumbrance were obligatory. In Witczinski v. Everman, 51 Miss. 841, it was held, after a very able and full discussion, that where such a mortgage expresses on its face the nature and purposes of the security, and the extent to which the advances may be made, so that the record of it would put parties upon an inquiry and enable them by the use of ordinary diligence to ascertain the material facts, its lien will prevail against subsequent purchasers or

the executory agreement of the mortgagee creates a full and perfect lien in equity, effectual against all persons who are charged with notice thereof, and that the record of the "mortgage furnishes such a notice affecting all subsequent encumbrances.

§ 1200. Mortgages to Secure Several Different Notes.— In many of the states the mortgage debt is ordinarily evidenced by a promissory note in place of a bond. A special form of security has thus become common in certain parts of this country which is probably unknown in England; the mortgage debt is represented by a series of several distinct promissory notes, often negotiable in form, all bearing the same date, and generally made payable in a successive order at different times,—as, for example, in one, two, three, and four years from date,—and the mortgage expressly

encumbrancers, for advances made in pursuance of its terms by the mortgagee after he had received actual notice of such purchase or encumbrance, as well as for those made before any notice. No distinction was drawn between advances optional and those obligatory. In Brinkmeyer v. Helbling, 57 Ind. 435, where a mortgage was given to indemnify the mortgagee against his future indorsements which he had agreed to make up to a certain amount, it was held that his indorsements when made related back. and were secured by the lien of the mortgage against subsequent encumbrances; and since he was bound to make the indorsements, his knowledge of the subsequent encumbrances on the property at the time when he made the indorsements did not affect his rights under the mortgage, and did not postpone the lien thereof; and the case of Brinkmeyer v. Browneller, 55 Ind. 487, is substantially to the same effect. In Rowan v. Sharps' Rifle Mfg. Co., 29 Conn. 282, the mortgagee was bound by contract to make advances up to a certain amount; held, that the mortgage created a valid and preferential lien for all advances made before actual notice of a second mortgage; and that after such actual notice was received, the mortgagee still had a right to go on and make all the advances necessary to carry out his contract, and that such advances also took precedence of the second encumbrance. These decisions, it will be seen, reaffirm the ruling of Lord Chancellor Cowper in the early case of Gorden v. Graham; and without entering into any discussion, I would venture to express the opinion that they are based upon the true principle, and formulate the correct doctrine, involved in and derived from the generally accepted construction of the American recording acts.

secures the payment of these notes according to their respective tenors.¹ While all these notes and the mortgage remain in the hands of the mortgagee, or when they are all assigned with the mortgage to and held by the same person, plainly no questions can arise other than those presented by the ordinary form of mortgage. It is only when the mortgagee assigns the notes separately to different persons, or when he assigns a portion of them and retains the others himself, that the special questions arise which are now to be considered; and these questions relate chiefly to the rights of the respective holders, and to the order of priority among them.

§ 1201. Rights of Assignees—Order of Priority Among Them.—Where all the notes stand on the same footing, that is, they are all payable at the same time,—the equities of all the assignees are equal, and there is no preference or priority among them in enforcing the security of the mortgage. All the assignees are entitled to a *pro rata* share of the proceeds of the mortgaged premises, in case there is not sufficient to pay all the notes in full.^{1 a} The notes, however, are commonly made payable at different times, in regular succession, and this condition of fact presents the real difficulty,—a difficulty apparently so great that the courts of various states have reached the most opposite conclusions, and have established several totally unlike

§ 1200, ¹ In the Eastern states, where a bond, instead of a note, is the ordinary evidence of the debt, several separate bonds are sometimes given, payable at different times, each representing a distinct installment of the mortgage debt.

§ 1201, ¹ Swartz's Ex'rs v. Leist, 13 Ohio St. 419. This is the rule prevailing in a great majority of the states; in the very few states where the priority among the assignees depends wholly upon the order of the assignments, it would not, of course, be followed.

§ 1201, (a) Likewise, where a mortgage secures two notes, identical in date, amount, and maturity, but made payable to different persons, the equities of the holders are equal: Chaplin v. Sullivan, 128 Ind. 50, 27 N. E. 425. See, also, Swayze v. Schnyler, 50 N. J. Eq. 75, 45 Atl. 347. rules. Where the notes, payable at different dates, are assigned by the mortgagee to different persons, either at the same or different times, and either with or without an accompanying assignment of the mortgage, the following may be regarded as the *prevailing* general rule determining the right of the respective assignees: Since the assignment of each note is a pro tanto assignment of the mortgage, the holders of the successive notes are regarded as being exactly in the situation of holders of successive mortgages upon the same land; their equities as among themselves, and their rights to enforce the security of the mortgage, are not equal; they are entitled to priority in the mortgage security of their respective notes according to the order of time in which such notes become due and payable. The order of maturing among the notes fixes the order of preference and priority among the respective assignees.² b An-

§ 1201, ² This rule, which is adopted in the greatest number of states and hy a large majority of the decisions, seems to be based upon a correct application of equitable principles and analogies. The rights of the holders are fixed by what expressly appears upon the face of the writings; the mortgage is a common hond uniting all the notes, and the various assignees have through it a clear notice of each other's rights. The order of the respective assignments is thus wholly immaterial upon the rights of priority among the assignees. This rule is sustained by the following cases: Winters v. Franklin Bank, 33 Ohio St. 250; Bank of United States v. Covert, 13 Ohio, 240; People's Sav. Bank v. Finney, 63 Ind. 460; Doss v. Ditmars, 70 Ind. 451; Stanley v. Beatty, 4 Ind. 134; Hongh v. Osborne, 7 Ind. 140; Murdock v. Ford, 17 Ind. 52; Davis v. Langsdale, 41 Ind. 399; Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 30; State Bank v.

§ 1201, (b) Order of Maturity of Notes Fixes Priority.—The text is quoted in Alden v. White (Ind. App.) 66 N. E. 509; and cited in First Nat. Bank v. Andrews, 7 Wash. 261, 38 Am. St. Rep. 885, 34 Pae. 913. See, also, in support of the rule, New York S. & T. Co. v. Lombard Inv. Co., 65 Fed. 271; Schultz v. Plankington Bank, 141 Ill. 116, 33 Am. St. Rep. 290, 30 N. E. 346; Ayers v. Rivers, 64 Iowa, 543, 21 N. W. 23; Leavitt v. Reynolds, 79 Iowa, 348, 7 L. R. A. 365, 44 N. W. 567. The first note has priority although not assigned until after the others: Horn v. Bennett, 135 Ind. 158, 24 L. R. A. 800, 34 N. E. 956. That the rule applies only where the assignces stand equal in equity with reference to the manner of acquisition of the notes, see Shaw v. Crandon State Bank, 145 Wis. 639, 129 N. W. 794.

other rule had been adopted by the courts of several states. Upon the same condition of facts, they hold there is no preference or priority whatever among the various assignees; the terms of their respective assignments, or of the maturing of their notes, are alike immaterial; all the assignees are entitled, as among themselves, to share *pro rata* in the security of the mortgage and in the proceeds of the mortgaged premises, if there is not sufficient to pay all in full.^{3 c}

Tweedy, 8 Blackf. 447, 46 Am. Dec. 486; Herrington v. McCollum, 73 Ill. 476; Funk v. McReynold's Adm'rs, 33 Ill. 481; Kæster v. Burke, 81 Ill. 436; Vansant v. Allmon, 23 Ill. 30; Flower v. Elwood, 66 Ill. 438; Gardner v. Diederichs, 41 Ill. 158; Walker v. Schreiber, 47 Iowa, 529; Grepengether v. Fejervary, 9 Iowa, 163, 74 Am. Dec. 336; Rankin v. Major, 9 Iowa, 297; Hinds y. Mooers, 11 Iowa, 211; Sangster v. Love, 11 Iowa, 580; Massie v. Sharpe, 13 Iowa, 542; Isett v. Lucas, 17 Iowa, 503, 85 Am. Dec. 572; Wood v. Trask, 7 Wis. 566, 76 Am. Dec. 230; Marine Bank v. International Bank, 9 Wis. 57; Lyman v. Smith, 21 Wis. 674; Mitchell v. Ladew, 36 Mo. 526, 88 Am. Dec. 156; Thompson v. Field, 38 Mo. 320; Ellis v. Lamme, 42 Mo. 153; Richardson v. McKim, 20 Kan. 346; Gwathmeys v. Ragland, 1 Rand. 466; Wilson v. Hayward, 6 Fla. 171; Hunt v. Stiles, 10 N. H. 466; but see Gilman v. Moody, 43 N. H. 239; and see, also, Phelan v. Olney, 6 Cal. 478; Grattan v. Wiggins, 23 Cal. 16. For a criticism on this doctrine, see Granger v. Crouch, 86 N. Y. 494, 499, per Finch, J. If the assignee of a note first maturing delays in enforcing his security, even though the second and other subsequent notes should have become due and payable, his priority is not thereby lost: Lyman v. Smith, 21 Wis. 674; People's Sav. Bank v. Finney, 63 Ind. 460 (holder of the first note made a binding agreement with the mortgagor, extending the time of its payment beyond the maturity of the other notes, and his priority was not lost). When a judgment at law has been recovered on a note by its holder, the judgment takes the place of the note in the order of priority, under the mortgage: Funk v. McReynold's Adm'rs, 33 Ill. 481.

§ 1201, 3 According to this rule, it would be impossible for the holder of a note or notes first maturing to foreclose the mortgage entirely, and by a sale of the premises cut off the rights of the other holders. The rule is sustained by the following cases: Cooper v. Ulmann, Walk. Ch. 251; Wil-

§ 1201, (c) Pro Rata Rule.—See, also, Lovell v. Cragin, 136 U. S. 130, 147, 34 L. Ed. 372, 10 Sup. Ct. 1024; Penzel v. Brookmire, 51 Ark. 105, 14 Am. St. Rep. 23, 10 S. W. 15; Georgia Realty Cu. v. Bank of Cov-III—180 ington, 19 Ga. 219, 91 S. E. 267 (an instructive discussion); Jennings v. Moore, 83 Mich. 231, 21 Am. St. Rep. 601, 47 N. W. 127; Wilson v. Eigenbrodt, 30 Minn. 4, 13 N. W. 907; Hall v. McCormick, 31 Minn. 280, In a very few of the states, other still more special rules are adopted in preference to either of these two principal theories.⁴ Finally, the operation of these general rules

cox v. Allen, 36 Mich. 160; Donley v. Hays, 17 Serg. & R. 400; Hancock's Appeal, 34 Pa. St. 155; Dixon v. Clayville, 44 Md. 573; Chew v. Buchanan, 30 Md. 367; Andrews v. Hobgood, 1 Lea, 693; Smith v. Cunningham, 2 Tenn. Ch. 565; Ewing v. Arthur, 1 Humph. 537; Parker v. Mercer, 6 How. (Miss.) 320, 38 Am. Dec. 438; Henderson v. Herrod, 10 Smedes & M. 631; Bank of England v. Tarleton, 23 Miss. 173; Pugh v. Holt, 27 Miss. 461; Trustees of Jefferson College v. Prentiss, 29 Miss. 46; Adams v. Lear, 3 La. Ann. 144; Delespine v. Campbell, 52 Tex. 4; Paris Exch. Bank v. Beard, 49 Tex. 358; Robertson v. Guerin, 50 Tex. 317.

§ 1201, ⁴ According to the first of these rules, when notes maturing at different dates are assigned at different times, the assignees have priority according to the order of the assignments, irrespective of the order of maturing. This peculiar rule is based upon the notion that as between the mortgagee who assigns one note and retains the others, the assignee is entitled to the preference; and the first assignee having thus a priority as against the mortgagee, any subsequent assignee could only succeed to this position of the mortgagee, and so the assignees would all take in the order of their assignments:^d Cullum v. Erwin, 4 Ala. 452; Nelson v. Dunn, 15 Ala. 501. The second of these special rules seems to he confined to certain of the states in which the legal theory of the mortgage still prevails, that it is a conveyance of the legal title, so that it may be transferred

17 N. W. 620; State Bank v. Mathews, 45 Neb. 659, 50 Am. St. Rep. 565, 63 N. W. 930; McLean's Appeal, 103 Pa. St. 255; Fourth Nat. Bank's Appeal, 123 Pa. St. 484, 10 Am. St. Rep. 538, 16 Atl. 779; Nashville Trust Co. v. Smythe, 94 Tenn. 513, 45 Am. St. Rep. 748, 29 S. W. 903 (this case contains an extensive collection of authorities illustrating each of the three main rules stated in the text); Bartlett v. Wade, 66 Vt. 629, 30 Atl. 4; First Nat. Bank v. Andrews, 7 Wash. 261, 38 Am. St. Rep. 885, 34 Pac. 913. For the same rule applied to purchase-money notes secured by grantor's lien, either implied or reserved in the deed, see Levy v. Rudolph, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 258, 56 S. W. 988; Aaron v. Warner, 62 Miss. 370; Nashville Trust Co. v. Smythe, 94 Tenn. 513, 45 Am. St. Rep. 748, 29 S. W. 903; Salmon v. Downs, 55 Tex. 243; Wooters v. Hollingsworth, 58 Tex. 371; Fitch v. Kennard, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 516, 133 S. W. 738; Armstrong v. Parr, (Tex. Civ. App.) 162 S. W. 1003.

§ 1201, (d) Order of Assignment of Notes Fixes Priority.—See, also, Knight v. Ray, 75 Ala. 383; Preston v. Ellington, 74 Ala. 133 (notes secured by grantor's lien); Parsons v. Martin, 86 Ala. 352, 5 South. 467 (same). For special facts making an exception to the rule, see Arnett v. Willoughby, 190 Ala. 530, 67 South. 426.

may be controlled and changed by express provisions contained in the mortgage itself.⁵ Such being the doctrines concerning the rights of assignees arising from the terms of the mortgage and notes themselves, it is generally held by courts adopting either of the two principal rules before stated that the mortgagee in assigning a note may, by express agreement with the assignee thereof, change the order of priority or equality which would otherwise exist, and may establish a different order, giving precedence of lien to a note maturing at a later time, and that such agreement would be binding upon any second or subsequent assignees of other notes.⁶ f

without assigning the debt. When the notes or bonds have been assigned to different persons, A, B, C, and D, and the mortgage is transferred to another, M, and M forecloses and thus acquires the legal title to the land, he holds the land in trust for all the assignees of the notes or bonds in proportion to their various amounts:^e Johnson v. Candage, 31 Me. 28; Moore v. Ware, 38 Me. 496; Bryant v. Damon, 6 Gray, 564; and see Gilman v. Moody, 43 N. H. 239.

§ 1201, ⁵ For example, the mortgage may provide that the notes shall have priority of lien in the *inverse* order of their maturing,—i. e., that the one last to become payable shall have the prior lien, etc.: Ellis v. Lamme, 42 Mo. 153. And when the mortgage provides that upon default in payment of any one note, all the notes shall at once become payable, it is generally held that upon the happening of such event the holders of all the notes become entitled to share *pro rata* in the security, the case being then virtually the same as where all the notes are originally payable at once: Pierce v. Shaw, 51 Wis. 316, 8 N. W. 209; Bushfield v. Meyer, 10 Ohio St. 334; Bank of United States v. Covert, 13 Ohio, 240. In Missouri, however, it is held that the priority resulting from order of maturity is not changed by such a provision: Hurck v. Erskine, 45 Mo. 484; Mitchell v. Ladew, 36 Mo. 526, 88 Am. Dec. 156; Thompson v. Field, 38 Mo. 320.

§ 1201, 6 For example, if there were three notes payable in the order No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3, and the mortgagee first assigned No. 3 to A, he might agree that it should have priority of lien in A's hands over the other two; and a subsequent assignee of No. 1 would be bound by this

§1201, (•) Jordan v. Cheney, 74	Anglo-American Land M. & A. Co.
Me. 359.	v. Bush, 84 Iowa, 272, 50 N. W.
§1201, (f) Romberg v. McCor-	1063; Solberg v. Wright, 33 Minn.
mick, 194 Ill. 205, 62 N. E. 537;	224, 22 N. W. 381; Armstrong v.

§ 1202. Effect of Assigning the Note.—Wherever the equitable theory of the mortgage is admitted, the assignment of one of the notes by itself, without any accompanying transfer of the mortgage, is an assignment of an interest *pro tanto* in the mortgage.^a Each assignee is, through the mortgage, charged with notice of the equitable interests of all the other asignees.¹ In the states which adopt the first general rule as given in the preceding paragraph, the assignee of the note first maturing is entitled to foreclose the mortgage and procure the mortgaged premises to be sold, when his note becomes due, and thus to cut off the liens of the other notes. The holders of the other notes, in order to protect their own interests, are

agreement. Conversely, on assigning No. 1 to A, the parties might agree that it should not have a prior lien, but should only share *pro rata* with the others: Walker v. Dement, 42 Ill. 272; Noyes v. White, 9 Kan. 640; Ellis v. Lamme, 42 Mo. 153; Bank of England v. Tarleton, 23 Miss. 173; Trustees of Jeff. Coll. v. Prentiss, 29 Miss. 46; Chew v. Buchanan, 30 Md. 367; Grattan v. Wiggins, 23 Cal. 16; Lane v. Davis, 14 Allen, 225.

§ 1202, ¹ If the mortgagee should, therefore, assign a part of the notes to A, and the remaining notes, together with the mortgage itself, to B, B would not acquire any precedence from the fact of his holding the mortgage:^b Walker v. Schreiber, 47 Iowa, 529; Sargent v. Howe, 21 Ill. 148; Hough v. Oshorne, 7 Ind. 140; Anderson v. Baumgartner, 27 Mo. 80; Cullum v. Erwin, 4 Ala. 452; Nelson v. Dunn, 15 Ala. 501; Henderson v. Herrod, 10 Smedes & M. 631; Gwathmeys v. Ragland, 1 Rand. 466; Phelan v. Olney, 6 Cal. 478; Stevenson v. Black, 1 N. J. Eq. 338; Keyes v. Wood, 21 Vt. 331; Belding v. Manly, 21 Vt. 550.

Parr, (Tex. Civ. App.) 162 S. W. 1003 (grantor's lien notes; agreement that notes retained shall have priority). The reasons for holding such a preference binding upon subsequent assignees of other notes are well and fully stated in Nashville Trust Co. v. Smythe, 94 Tenn. 513, 45 Am. St. Rep. 748, 29 S. W. 903.

§ 1202, (a) Northern Cattle Co. v. Munro, 83 Minn. 37, 85 Am. St. Rep. 444, 85 N. W. 919 (assignce is entitled to equitable *pro rata* share of proceeds, but is not entitled to foreclose); Cram v. Cotrell, 48 Neh. 646, 58 Am. St. Rep. 714, 67 N. W. 452; New England Loan & Tr. Co. v. Robinson, 56 Neh. 50, 71 Am. St. Rep. 657, 76 N. W. 415; State Bank v. Mathews, 45 Neb. 659, 50 Am. St. Rep. 565, 63 N. W. 930. See, also, Snyder v. Parmalee, 80 Vt. 496, 68 Atl. 649.

§1202, (b) Wilson v. Eigenbrodt, 30 Minn. 4, 13 N. W. 907.

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entitled to redeem from him, before the final sale, in the order of their various notes.²

§ 1203. Priority Between the Assignee and the Mortgagee.—Thus far I have spoken of the rights of assignees among themselves, where all or some of the notes have been assigned to various holders; a different principle may operate between an assignee and the mortgagee. When the mortgagee assigns one or more of the notes, and retains the remainder of the series, it is generally held that the assignee is entitled to a priority of lien as against the mortgagee, with respect to the note or notes so transferred; and this rule operates without regard to the order in which the notes held by the two parties mature.^{1 a}

§ 1202, ² If the land was sold in such a case, without making the holders of the other notes parties to the suit, their rights of redemption would still remain; they could redeem from the purchaser. In fact, according to this view, they stand in exactly the same position as subsequent mort-gagees: Vansant v. Allmon, 23 Ill. 30; Flower v. Elwood, 66 Ill. 438; Hinds v. Mooers, 11 Iowa, 211; Stanley v. Beatty, 4 Ind. 134; Murdock v. Ford, 17 Ind. 52; Doss v. Ditmars, 70 Ind. 451; Grattan v. Wiggins, 23 Cal. 16. Where the first of a series of notes is paid by the mortgagor at maturity, the remaining notes of the series are entitled to preference over it, although the mortgagor has attempted to give it a new life by transferring it to another holder: Bailey v. Malvin, 53 Iowa, 371, 5 N. W. 515.

§ 1203, 1 For example, if there was a series of three notes, and the mortgagee assigned No. 3, then the assignee, having a priority of lien, would be entitled to have his note paid in full, although it matured last, before the proceeds were applied upon the notes remaining in the mortgagee's hands, whenever the proceeds were insufficient to pay all in full. The mortgagee having transferred the note and received the consideration therefor, it would be inequitable for him to deprive the assignee of any part of its value, by insisting upon a priority or even an equality of right

§ 1202, (e) See, also, Bank of Napa v. Godfrey, 77 Cal. 612, 20 Pac. 142; and see Bridges v. Ballard, 62 Miss. 237.

§1203, (a) Quoted in Alden v. White, (Ind. App.) 66 N. E. 509; Douglass v. Blount, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 493, 55 S. W. 526; and in Lawson v. Warren, 34 Okl. 94, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 139, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 183, 124 Pac. 46. The same rule applies where the assignce of all the notes assigns one: Jenkins v. Hawkins, 34 W. Va. 799, 12 S. E. 1090.

SECTION IV.

INTERESTS, RIGHTS, AND LIABILITIES OF THE MORTGAGOR AND OF THE MORTGAGEE.

ANALYSIS.

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in sharing the insufficient proceeds: ^b McClintic v. Wise's Adm'rs, 25 Gratt.	
448, 18 Am. Rep. 694: Stevenson v. Black, 1 N. J. Eq. 338: Salzman v.	

448, 18 Am. Rep. 694; Stevenson v. Black, 1 N. J. Eq. 338; Salzman v. Creditors, 2 Rob. (La.) 241; Ventress v. Creditors, 20 La. Ann. 359; Waterman v. Hunt, 2 R. I. 298; Bryant v. Damon, 6 Gray, 564; Warden v. Adams, 15 Mass. 233; Cullum v. Erwin, 4 Ala. 452; Forwood v. Dehoney, 5 Bush, 174; Clowes v. Dickenson, 5 Johns. Ch. 235; Van Rensselaer v.-Stafford, Hopk. Ch. 569; Pattison v. Hull, 9 Cow. 747; Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Niagara, 9 Wend. 410. But the following cases hold that they both share ratably: Donley v. Hays, 17 Serg. & R. 400; Dixon v. Clay-ville, 44 Md. 573; McClanahan v. Chambers, 1 Mon. 43; and see Belding v. Manly, 21 Vt. 550.

§ 1203, (b) Quoted in Alden v. White, (Ind. App.) 66 N. E. 509. See, also, Parsons v. Martin, 86 Ala. 352, 5 South. 467 (grantor's lien); Preston v. Ellington, 74 Ala. 133 (same); Knight v. Ray, 75 Ala. 383; Georgia Realty Co. v. Bank of Covington, 19 Ga. 219, 91 S. E. 267; Walcott v. Carpenter, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 108, 132 S. W. 981 (same). But this priority of the assignee may be varied by express agreement: Ante, § 1201, note 6, (f); Fitch v. Kennard, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 516, 133 S. W. 738 (assignment "without recourse"; notes payable pro rata); Armstrong v. Parr, (Tex. Civ. App.) 162 S. W. 1003 (priority by agreement to the notes retained).

§1203, (c) Salmon v. Downs, 55 Tex. 243 (grantor's lien); Wooters v. Hollingsworth, 58 Tex. 374 (same); Jolley v. Brown, (Tex. Civ. App.) 191 S. W. 177.

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- § 1215. To whom the doctrine applies in different states.
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 - § 1225. The same; what circumstances disturb these equities and defeat this rule.
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 - § 1227. V. Foreclosure; foreclosure proper or "strict foreclosurc."
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§ 1204. General Interests of Mortgagor and Mortgagee.³ The doctrines which prevail in this country concerning the respective interests of the mortgagor and the mortgagee. and their ordinary rights which arise therefrom, have been explained in the preceding section II. of the present chapter. In equity, the mortgagor's interest continues to be the substantial ownership of the land, subject only to the lien of the mortgage; and in those states where the purely equitable theory has been adopted this ownership is the legal estate; in the others it is equitable,-the equity of redemption. A mortgagor may therefore deal with the land in any lawful manner, subject only to the lien which affects it through all of his subsequent dealings and in all of its subsequent relations. Among the necessary incidents of the mortgagor's ownership are the following: Upon his death intestate, the land, if owned in fee, descends to his heirs; he may devise it by will, and it is subject to

§ 1204, (a) Sections 1204-1228 are Timmonds, 157 Mo. App. 360, 138 cited, generally, in Davenport v. S. W. 349.

dower and to curtesy in all the states where these life estates are preserved. It is generally liable to be levied on and sold on execution issued upon a judgment against the mortgagor.^{1 b} In all the states the mortgagor is entitled to possession against third persons; and in all the states which have adopted the purely equitable theory, he is entitled to possession against the mortgagee and those claiming under him, until the time when a foreclosure sale has been finally consummated. While in possession, according to either theory he may use the premises in any reasonable manner, and is not accountable to the mortgagee for the rents, profits, and income during such possession.^{2 c}

§ 1204, 1 To this liability there is one most important exception. It is the prevailing rule-in some states based upon statute-that where the mortgagee, or other holder of the mortgage, elects to sue at law on the mortgage debt, and recovers a personal judgment against the mortgagor, he cannot, by his execution, levy on and sell the very land itself which is covered by the mortgage, but must satisfy his judgment out of other property (if any) of the mortgagor. The reasons of this rule are obviously just. If the mortgaged land was sold on such a judgment, the purchaser would take it still encumbered by the mortgage; it would not, therefore, sell for its fair value, and thus the mortgagor's property would be unjustly sacrificed. Furthermore, since the mortgagee had a specific lien on the particular tract by his mortgage, he ought not, in equity and justice, to obtain and enforce a general lien by judgment upon the very same tract: See Palmer v. Foote, 7 Paige, 437; Atkins v. Sawyer, 1 Pick. 351, 11 Am. Dec. 188; Washburn v. Goodwin, 17 Pick. 137; Powell v. Williams, 14 Ala. 476, 48 Am. Dec. 105; Barker v. Bell, 37 Ala. 354, 358; Baldwin v. Jenkins, 23 Miss. 206; Thornton v. Pigg, 24 Mo. 249; per contra, Freeby v. Tupper, 15 Ohio, 467; and see Trimm v. Marsh, 54 N. Y. 599, 13 Am. Rep. 623; and Cal. Code Civ. Proc., sec. 726.

§ 1204, ² In very special cases the mortgagor may be restrained from committing waste and thereby endangering the security.^{**d**}

§ 1204, (b) The sale does not extinguish the lien of the mortgage: Whitmore v. Tatum, 54 Ark. 457, 26 Am. St. Rep. 56, 16 S. W. 198.

§ 1204, (c) Georgetown Water Co. v. Fidelity Trust & S. V. Co., 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1739, 78 S. W. 113. Before foreclosure, the mortgagor is entitled to the crops: Caldwell v. Alsop, 48 Kan. 571, 17 L. R. A. 782, 29 Pac. 1150; Simpson v. Ferguson, 112 Cal. 180, 53 Am. St. Rep. 201, 40 Pac. 104, 44 Pac. 484.

§ 1204, (d) See Webber v. Ramsey, 100 Mich. 58, 43 Am. St. Rep. 429, 58 N. W. 625; Verner v. Betz,

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The interest of the mortgagee, in equity, is simply a lien, a thing in action, a mere adjunct or accessory of the debt. It is entirely personal assets, and on his death passes to his executors or administrators, may be bequeathed by will, and is not subject to dower or curtesy. Like other things in action, it is liable to be reached by the creditors of the mortgagee, and may be pledged by him, or given as collateral security for an indebtedness. In fact, the relation of the mortgagee to the mortgagor is purely a conventional one, and not fiduciary. The mortgage is a mere security for a debt, and imposes no duty upon the mortgagee to protect the interests of the mortgagor, unless there is some special covenant creating such a duty.³

§ 1204, 3 Cornell v. Woodruff, 77 N. Y. 203, 206, per Rapallo, J. This case holds that there is no such relation of trust between the mortgagee and the mortgagor as prevents the former from acquiring an adverse claim to or lien upon the mortgaged premises, and enforcing the same with like effect as any stranger could.^e

My limits do not permit any fuller discussion of the doctrines stated in the above *résumé*. Authorities bearing on them for nearly every state will

46 N. J. Eq. 256, 19 Am. St. Rep. 387, 7 L. R. A. 630, 19 Atl. 206; Russell v. Merchants' Bank, 47 Minn. 286, 28 Am. St. Rep. 368, 50 N. W. 228; and Pomeroy Equitable Remedies, chapters on Injunction.

§1204, (e) Whether a mortgagee or his assignee out of possession can become a purchaser at a tax sale of the mortgaged premises, with the same effect as against the mortgagor and other mortgagees as if he were a stranger to the estate, is a question on which the authorities are in conflict. To the effect that he cannot, see Stinson v. Connecticut M. L. Ins. Co., 174 Ill. 125, 66 Am. St. Rep. 262, 51 N. E. 193; Hall v. Westcott, 15 R. I. 373, 5 Atl. 629, and cases cited. See, also, Gilman v. Heitman, 137 Iowa, 336, 113 N. W. 932; National Security Co. v.

Walker, 148 Iowa, 157, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 333, 125 N. W. 338 (mortgagee who has bid in the property at foreclosure under a decree which is subsequently reversed cannot obtain tax title); Cauley v. Sutton, 150 N. C. 327, 64 S. E. 3; Blessett v. Turcotte, 20 N. D. 151, 127 N. W. 505; Shepard v. Vincent, 38 Wash. 493, 80 Pac. 777. That he can, see McLaughlin v. Acorn, 58 Kan. 514, 50 Pac. 441. See, also, Wiswell v. Simmons, 77 Kan. 622, 95 Pac. 407 (but a mortgagee in possession, whose duty it is to pay taxes, cannot acquire tax title); Jones v. Black, 18 Okl. 344, 11 Ann. Cas. 753, and note, 88 Pac. 1052, 90 Pac. 422. To the effect that the relation is not fiduciary, see Adler v. Van Kirk L. & C. Co., 114 Ala. 551, 62 Am. St. Rep. 133, 21 South. 490.

§ 1205

§ 1205.- I. Conveyance by the Mortgagor Subject to the Mortgage.^a—The mortgagor can convey the entire mortgaged premises to a single grantee; or he can convey them in parcels to different grantees simultaneously or successively; or he can convey a portion and retain the residue. Where the mortgagor conveys by a deed absolutely silent with respect to an outstanding mortgage, the grantee, of course, takes the land encumbered by the mortgage, if he has actual notice of it, or constructive notice by record or otherwise.¹ b Where a mortgagor conveys by a deed which

be found in the preceding section II., and for a complete treatment the reader is referred to Mr. Jones's work on mortgages. In the remainder of this section I purpose to examine, in a general manner, certain special but most important doctrines, the nature and application of which are peculiarly equitable, involving broad equitable principles, which frequently come before the American courts in dealing with mortgages. These are the following: Conveyance by the mortgagor, and especially when the grantee assumes the mortgage; assignment of the mortgage, and especially when and in whose favor an equitable assignment takes place; the rights and liabilities of the mortgagee in possession; redemption by the mortgagor and by other persons, and the rights of subrogation and of contribution thence arising; the various modes of foreclosure. In dealing with these topics, I am necessarily confined to a statement of the more general principles, doctrines, and rules, and must refer to Mr. Jones and other writers for an exhaustive treatment.

§ 1205, ¹ See Boxheimer v. Gunn, 24 Mich. 372. Where the mortgage is unrecorded, the subsequent grantee may, by means of a prior record, under the operation of the recording acts, obtain a title free from the lien of the mortgage as a *bona fide* purchaser for value and without notice.

§ 1205, (a) This section is cited in Wade v. Bent, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1294, 71 S. W. 444.

§ 1205, (b) Deed Silent as to the Mortgage.—This portion of the text is quoted in Farmers' Savings & B. & L. Ass'n v. Kent, 117 Ala. 624, 23 South. 757; Swope v. Jordan, 107 Tenn. 166, 64 S. W. 52; Fogarty v. Hunter, 83 Or. 183, 162 Pac. 964. See, also, Kelly v. Staed, 136 Mo. 430, 58 Am. St. Rep. 648, 37 S. W. 1110. It is held in Wadsworth v. Lyon, 93 N. Y. 201, 45 Am. Rep. 190, that when the land is conveyed by a deed silent with respect to the mortgage, and the mortgage debt is not part of the purchase price, the grantor remains the principal debtor, and the land is simply security; that the primary liability of the mortgagor to pay the debt cannot be shifted to the land, save by a conveyance thereof subject to its payment, or by deducting_the amount from the consideration for states simply that the conveyance is "subject to" a certain specified mortgage, or words to that effect, the grantee takes the land burdened with the lien. As between himself and the grantor-mortgagor, the land is the primary fund out of which the mortgage debt should be paid; he cannot claim that the mortgagor should pay off the mortgage and thus exonerate the land.² ^c He does not, however, become personally liable for the mortgage debt, but the mortgagor remains personally liable for any deficiency arising upon

§ 1205, ² Johnson v. Zink, 51 N. Y. 333; Mathews v. Aikin, 1 N. Y. 595; Harris v. Jex, 66 Barb. 232; Cherry v. Monro, 2 Barb. Ch. 618; Russell v. Allen, 10 Paige, 249; Vanderkemp v. Shelton, 11 Paige, 28; Brewer v. Staples, 3 Sand. Ch. 579; Cleveland v. Southard, 25 Wis. 479; Sweetzer v. Jones, 35 Vt. 317, 82 Am. Dec. 639; Stevens v. Church, 41 Conn. 369; Shuler v. Hardin, 25 Ind. 386. The grantee cannot, as against the mortgagor, destroy the lien of the mortgage by a mere tender: Harris v. Jex, supra; nor as between himself and the mortgagor is he a surety with any of the rights belonging to a surety: Brewer v. Staples, supra; Stevens v. Church, supra; Maher v. Lanfrom, 86 Ill. 513; as to the rights of the mortgagor, see Johnson v. Zink, 51 N. Y. 333;^d also ante, §§ 797, 798, and cases cited in notes.

the conveyance, or by some agreement between the parties changing such liability. To the same effect as Wadsworth v. Lyon, see Haley v. Branham, 192 Mo. App. 125, 180 S. W. 423. See, also, Kinney v. Heuring, 44 Ind. App. 590, 87 N. E. 1053, 88 N. E. 865 (on foreclosure sale, such grantee will be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee against the mortgagor); Fitzgerald v. Flannagan, (Iowa) 125 N. W. 995 (fact that covenant of warranty in the deed excepts a mortgage does not make the conveyance "subject to" the mortgage); Kollen v. Sooy, 172 Mich. 214, 137 N. W. 808; Sommers v. Wagner, 21 N. D. 531, 131 N. W. 797 (same; if grantor then pays the mortgage, takes an assignment thereof, and assigns to plaintiff, the payment amounts to a discharge of

the mortgage); Van Valkenburg v. Jantz, 161 Wis. 336, 154 N. W. 373.

§ 1205, (c) Conveyance Subject to the Mortgage; Land the Primary Fund.-The text is quoted in Fogarty v. Hunter, 83 Or. 183, 162 Pac. 964 (grantor paying the mortgage is subrogated); and cited in Henry v. Heggie, 163 N. C. 523, 79 S. E. 982. Sec, also, Drury v. Holden, 121 Ill. 130, 13 N. E. 547; Wilbur v. Warren, 104 N. Y. 192, 10 N. E. 263; Hamilton v. Robinson, 190 Ala. 549, 67 South. 434 (grantor paying the mortgage is subrogated); Marshall Inv. Co. v. Lindley, 156 Iowa, 6, 134 N. W. 853; Fitzgerald v. Flanagan, 155 Iowa, 217, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1104, 135 N. W. 738.

§ 1205, (d) To the extent of the value of the land his relation to his grantee is that of surety towards

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a foreclosure sale of the land.³ ^e A grantee who thus takes a conveyance subject to a mortgage is presumed to have included the mortgage debt in the purchase price, and is not, therefore, permitted to dispute the validity of the mortgage; in this respect he is in the same position as one who expressly assumes the mortgage.^{4 f}

§ 1205, ³ Binsse v. Paige, 1 Abb. App. 138; Belmont v. Coman, 22 N. Y. 438, 78 Am. Dec. 213; Tichenor v. Dodd, 4 N. J. Eq. 454; Cleveland v. Southard, 25 Wis. 479; Johnson v. Monell, 13 Iowa, 300; and see *ante*, § 797, cases cited in note.

§ 1205, 4 Maher v. Langfrom, 86 Ill. 513; Freeman v. Auld, 44 N. Y. 50; 37 Barb. 587; Hardin v. Hyde, 40 Barb. 435; Fuller v. Hunt, 48 Iowa, 163; Green v. Turner, 38 Iowa, 112; Greither v. Alexander, 15 Iowa, 470; and see cases cited *ante*, in note under § 937. In the absence of covenants

the principal debtor, and to that extent he is discharged by a valid agreement, without his knowledge, between the creditor and the grantee, for the extension of the time of payment: Murray v. Marshall, 94 N. Y. 611; Spencer v. Spencer, 95 N. Y. 353; North End Sav. Bank v. Snow, 197 Mass. 339, 125 Am. St. Rep. 368, 83 N. E. 1099. So, if the mortgagor pays off the mortgage, he has the right to subrogation, since the grantee is, to the extent of the value of the land, the principal debtor; Hamilton v. Robinson, 190 Ala. 549, 67 South. 434; Kay v. Castleberry, 99 Ark. 618, 139 S. W. 645; Gregory v. Arms, 48 Ind. App. 562, 96 N. E. 196; North End Savings Bank v. Snow, 197 Mass. 339, 125 Am. St. Rep. 368, 83 N. E. 1099; Fogarty v. Hunter, 83 Or. 183, 162 Pac. 964.

§ 1205, (e) Such Grantee not Personally Liable.—The text is quoted in Fogarty v. Hunter, 83 Or. 183, 162 Pac. 964. See, also, Elliott v. Sackett. 108 U. S. 140, 27 L. Ed. 680, 2 Sup. Ct. 375; Shepherd v. May, 115 U. S. 505, 29 L. Ed. 456, 6 Sup. Ct. 119; Crawford v. Nimmons, 180 Ill. 143, 54 N. E. 209; Robinson Bank v. Miller, 153 Ill. 244, 46 Am. St. Rep. 883, 27 L. R. A. 449, 38 N. E. 1078; Lamka v. Donnelly, 163 Iowa, 255, 143 N. W. 869; Holcomb v. Thompson, 50 Kan. 598, 32 Pac. 1091; Crane v. Hughes, 5 Kan. App. 100, 48 Pac. 865; Clifford v. Minor, 76 Min. 12, 78 N. W. 861; Lang v. Cadwell, 13 Mont. 458, 34 Pac. 957; Loudenslager v. Woodbury Heights Land Co., (N. J. Eq.) 45 Atl. 784; Bennett v. Bates, 94 N. Y. 354; Duke of Cumberland v. Codrington, 3 Johns. Ch. 229, 8 Am. Dec. 492; Van Eman v. Mosing, 36 Okl. 555, L. R. A. 1917C, 590, 129 Pac. 2; Miles v. Miles, 6 Or. 267, 25 Am. Rep. 522; Fisler v. Reach, 202 Pa. St. 74, 51 Atl. 599; Appeal of Moore, 88 Pa. St. 450, 32 Am. Rep. 469; Granger v. Roll, 6 S. D. 611, 62 N. W. 970; Arnold v. Randall, (Wis.) 98 N. W. 239.

§ 1205, (f) Such Grantee cannot Question Validity of Mortgage... The text is quoted in Kay v. Castleherry, 99 Ark. 618, 139 S. W. 345; Fogarty v. Hunter, 83 Or. 183, 162

§ 1206

§ 1206. The Same. Grantee Assumes the Mortgage.— The mortgagor may not only convey the premises "subject to" the mortgage; he may also convey them in such a manner that the grantee assumes the payment of the mortgage

in the deed having a different effect, it is presumed that the grantee actually paid the value of the land, *less* the mortgage debt, so that it is his equitable duty to pay off the mortgage: Shuler v. Hardin, 25 Ind. 386; and if he *does* pay it, he does not thereby acquire any claim, hy way of setoff or otherwise, against his grantor: Atherton v. Toney, 43 Ind. 211. A contrary condition of facts, however, may exist, and may be shown by evidence, in which such presumption would be overcome: Wolbert v. Lucas, 10 Pa. St. 73, 49 Am. Dec. 578. It should be carefully observed that the rights and liabilities of the grantee who takes "subject to" a mortgage, and the equities between himself and the mortgagor who conveys to him, may be modified, controlled, and completely determined by the covenants

Pac. 964. See, also, Central Trust Co. v. Columbus, H. V. & T. R. Co., 87 Fed. 815; Pratt's Ex'r v. Nixon, 91 Ala. 192, 8 South. 751; Patten v. Pepper Hotel Co., 153 Cal. 460, 96 Pac. 296 (want of consideration between the parties to the mortgage); West v. Miller, 125 Ind. 70, 25 N. E. 143 (cannot set up duress, illegality of consideration, or coverture of one of the mortgagees); Foy v. Armstrong, 113 Iowa, 629, 85 N. W. 753; Selby v. Sanford, 7 Kan. App. 781, 54 Pac. 17; Moffatt v. Fouts, 99 Kan. 118, 160 Pac. 1137; Willis v. Terry, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 753, 24 S. W. 621; Johnson v. Thompson, 129 Mass. 398; McNaughton v. Burke, 63 Neb. 704, 89 N. W. 274; Arlington Mill & Elevator Co. v. Yates, 57 Neb. 286, 77 N. W. 677; Pass v. Lynch, 117 N. C. 453, 23 S. E. 357; Simpson v. Hillis, 30 Okl. 561, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 227, 120 Pac. 572 (mortgage defective in form and not recorded); Higbee v. Aetna Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 26 Okl. 327, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 223, 109 Pac. 236 (usury); Mott v. Maris, (Tex. Civ. App.) 29 S. W. 825; Brunswick Realty Co. v. University Inv. Co., 43 Utah, 75, 134 Pac. 608 (no consideration); Washington, etc., R. R. v. Cazenove, 83 Va. 744, 3 S. E. 433. See, however, Magie v. Reynolds, 51 N. J. Eq. 113, 26 Atl. 150; Crawford v. Nimmons, 180 Ill. 143, 54 N. E. 209. If it appears that the encumbrance is not a part of the consideration and has not been deducted from it the grantee is not estopped, although the deed recites that it is subject to the mortgage: Brooks v. Owen, 112 Mo. 251, 19 S. W. 723, 20 S. W. 492. It has been held that the mere withholding of a portion of the purchase price as security against the claim of the mortgagee does not estop the grantee: Steckel v. Standley, 107 Iowa, 694, 77 N. W. 489. See, also, Hallam v. Telleren, 55 Neb. 255, 75 N. W. 560. It is held that where the conveyance is silent as to the mortgage, the grantee is not estopped to set up usury: Camden Fire Ins. Co. v. Reed, (N. J. Eq.) 38 Atl. 667. It is held that one taking a second mortgage expressly subject to a first cannot question the validity of the first: First Nat. Bank v. debt, and thus renders himself personally liable therefor. The element which lies at the bottom of such assumption, and which alone gives it efficacy according to the theory held by some courts, is the fact that the mortgage debt is included in the purchase price as a constituent part thereof, and the grantee actually pays or secures to his grantor only the balance of the gross price after deducting such debt. No particular form of words is necessary to create a binding assumption; it is sufficient that the language shows unequivocally an intent on the part of the grantee to assume the liability of paying the mortgage debt, but this intent must clearly appear.¹^a When the deed executed by

of title on the part of the grantor contained in the deed,—covenants by which the grantor may render himself primarily liable, and may exonerate the land, as between himself and the grantee. If this fact is borne in mind, it will reconcile any apparent discrepancy among the decisions. The effect upon the grantor's covenants of title of a clause stating that the conveyance is subject to a certain mortgage belongs to the law, and not to equity. Where a mortgagor conveys a portion of the premises and retains the residue, and where he conveys in parcels to different grantees, the equities between bimself and his grantee in the one case, and among the various grantees in the other, involve questions of great importance, which will be more appropriately considered under subsequent heads.

§ 1206, 1 Strong v. Converse, 8 Allen, 557, 85 Am. Dec. 732; Drury v. Tremont etc. Co., 13 Allen, 168, 171; Weed Sewing Machine Co. v. Emer-

Reid, 122 Iowa, 280, 98 N. W. 107; General Electric Co. v. Canyon City Ice & Light Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 136 S. W. 78; but that second mortgagee may contest the validity of the first, where that was not assumed, though it was exempted from the covenants of the second mortgage, see Livingstone v. Murphy, (Mass.) 72 N. E. 1012. To the effect that one who purchases subject to a mortgage is estopped to set up an outstanding title against the mortgagec, see Wade v. Bent, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1294, 71 S. W. 444; Washington Loan & Tr. Co. v. McKenzie, 64 Minn. 273, 66 N. W. 976; Landau v. Cottrill, 159 Mo. 308, 60 S. W.

64. See the following miscellaneous cases: National Mnt. B. & L. Ass'n v. Retzman, (Neb.) 96 N. W. 205 (when deduction is enough for legal interest only, grantee may set up usury); Board of Trustces of Westminster College v. Piersol, 161 Mo. 270, 61 S. W. 811 (purchaser cannot question ownership of note when his grantor does not); First Nat. Bank v. Honeyman, 6 Dak. 275, 42 N. W. 771 (purchaser subject to mortgage to secure future advances may question the amount of the advances).

§ 1206, (a) What Language Creates an Assumption.—To the effect that the evidence must be

the grantor contains a clause sufficiently showing such an intent, the acceptance thereof by the grantee consummates the assumption, and creates a personal liability on his part, which inures to the benefit of the mortgagee as though he

son, 115 Mass. 554; Trotter v. Hughes, 12 N. Y. 74, 62 Am. Dec. 137; Belmont v. Coman, 22 N. Y. 438, 78 Am. Dec. 213; Binsse v. Paige, 1 Abb. App. 138; Collins v. Rowe, 1 Abb. N. C. 97; Stebbins v. Hall, 29 Barb. 524; Miller v. Thompson, 34 Mich. 10; Fowler v. Fay, 62 Ill. 375; Dunn v. Rodgers, 43 Ill. 260; Comstock v. Hitt, 37 Ill. 542, 546; Hull v. Alexander, 26 Iowa, 569; Johnson v. Monell, 13 Iowa, 300; Bumgardner v. Allen, 6 Munf. 439. A mere provision in the deed that the conveyance "is subject to" a certain mortgage, even though the mortgage is expressly excepted from the operation of the covenants of title, does not constitute an assumption: Johnson v. Zink, 51 N. Y. 333; Strohauer v. Voltz, 42 Mich. 444; Slater v. Breese, 36 Mich. 77.^b A provision in the deed that

clear, see Holcomb v. Thompson, 50 Kan. 598, 32 Pac. 1091; Hopper v. Calhoun, 52 Kan. 703, 39 Am. St. Rep. 363, 35 Pac. 816. It has been held that a grantee is bound by an agreement of assumption in a contract of sale, although the deed is silent as to it: Whicker v. Hushaw, 159 Ind. 1, 64 N. E. 460. As to what acts or language sufficiently show an intent to assume, see, also, Kenney v. Streeter, 88 Ark. 406, 114 S. W. 923 (shown by correspondence between the parties); Fitzgerald v. Flannagan, (Iowa) 125 N. W. 995 (mere facts that grantee makes payments on the mortgage or seeks an extension of time in which to remove the lien, insufficient); Schimmelpfenning v. Brunk, 153 Iowa, 177, 132 N. W. 838 (mere constructive notice by record has little if any significance in showing an intention to assume); Kollen v. Sooy, 172 Mich. 214, 137 N. W. 808 (acceptance of deed containing assumption clause binds grantee as effectually as though he had signed the instrument); Greer v. Orchard, 175 Mo. App. 494, 161 S. W. 875

(assumption, where grantee agreed to release grantor from debt, though deed contained no assumption clause).

§ 1206, (b) In the following cases, also, the acceptance of a deed "subject to" a mortgage did not constitute an assumption; J. H. Magill Lumber Co. v. Lane White Lumber Co., 90 Ark. 426, 119 S. W. 822; Mott v. American Trust Co., 124 Ark. 70, 186 S. W. 631; Hibernia Savings & Loan Society v. Dickinson, 167 Cal. 616, 140 Pac. 265; Capitol National Bank v. Holmes, 43 Colo. 154, 127 Am. St. Rep. 108, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 470, 95 Pac. 314; Lloyd v. Lowe, (Colo.) 165 Pac. 609. See, however, Canfield v. Shear, 49 Mich. 313, 13 N. W. 605. In Jager v. Vollinger, 174 Mass. 521, 55 N. E. 458, the words "subject to a mortgage claim . . . the payment of which claim is part of the consideration," etc., were held sufficient to show an assumption. In Jehle v. Brooks, 112 Mich. 131, 70 N. W. 440, the words "except a mortgage ... which second party assumes" were held sufficient.

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had himself executed the deed.² ^c When a grantee thus assumes payment of the mortgage debt as a part of the purchase price, the land in his hands is not only made the

the amount of a certain mortgage shall be paid as a part of the purchase price has been held to be an assumption, and to create a personal liability of the grantee: Thayer v. Torrey, 37 N. J. L. 339; Tichenor v. Dodd, 4 N. J. Eq. 454; Heid v. Vreelaud, 30 N. J. Eq. 591. But in Fiske v. Tolman, 124 Mass. 254, 26 Am. Rep. 659, the following clause, "subject, however, to a mortgage held by, etc., for seven thousand dollars, which is part of the above-named consideration," was decided not to be an assumption of the mortgage.

§ 1206, ² Converse v. Cook, 8 Vt. 164; Curtis v. Tyler, 9 Paige, 432, 435; Halsey v. Reed, 9 Paige, 446, 451; King v. Whitely, 10 Paige, 465; Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178, 80 Am. Dec. 327; Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 54 N. Y. 35, 13 Am. Rep. 556; Ricard v. Sanderson, 41 N. Y. 179; Spaulding v. Hallenbeck, 35 N. Y. 204; 39 Barb. 79; Trotter v. Hughes, 12 N. Y. 74, 78, 62 Am. Dec. 137; Huyler's Ex'rs v. Atwood,

§ 1206, (c) Grantee Personally Liable to Mortgagee .-- Quoted in O'Conner v. O'Conner, 88 Tenn. 76, 7 L. R. A. 33, 12 S. W. 447, and in Cady v. Barnes, 208 Fed. 359, 361. This section is cited to this effect in Davis v. Hulett, 58 Vt. 90, 4 Atl. 139; Columbus & S. H. R. Co.'s Appeals, 109 Fed. 177, 208, 48 C. C. A. 275; Skinner v. Harker, 23 Colo. 333, 48 Pac. 648; Baber v. Hanie, 162 N. C. 588, 80 S. E. 57. See, also, Alvord v. Spring Valley Gold Co., 106 Cal. 547, 40 Pac. 27; Burbank v. Roots, 4 Colo. App. 197, 35 Pac. 275; Gage v. Cameron, (Ill.) 72 N. E. 204; Green v. Stone, 54 N. J. Eq. 387, 55 Am. St. Rep. 577, 34 Atl. 1099; Bowen v. Beck, 94 N. Y. 86, 46 Am. Rep. 124; Windle v. Hughes, 40 Or. 1, 65 Pac. 1058; Blood v. Crew Levick Co., 177 Pa. St. 606, 55 Am. St. Rep. 741, 35 Atl. 871; Connor v. Jones, (S. D.) 72 N. W. 463. To the effect that the grantee becomes personally liable, see Johns v. Wilson, 180 U. S. 440, 45 L. Ed. 613, 21 Sup. Ct. 445; North Alabama Dev. Co. v. Orman, 55 Fed. 18, 5 C. C. A. 22, 13 U. S. App. 215; Sherman v. Goodwin, 11 Ariz. 141, 89 Pac. 517; Holmes v. Bennett, 14 Ariz. 298, 127 Pac. 753; Tulare Co. Bank v. Madden, 109 Cal. 312, 41 Pac. 1092; Herd v. Tuohy, 133 Cal. 55, 65 Pac. 139; Farmers & Merchants' Bank v. Copsey, 134 Cal. 287, 66 Pac. 324; Shuey v. Mulcrevy, 34 Cal. App. 218, 166 Pac. 1019; Williams v. Moody, 95 Ga. 8, 22 S. E. 30; Ingram v. Ingram, 172 Ill. 287, 50 N. E. 198 (affirming 71 Ill. App. 497); Thomas v. Home Mutual Building Loan Ass'n, 243 Ill. 550, 90 N. E. 1081; Southern Indiana Loan & Savings Inst. v. Roberts, 42 Ind. App. 653, 86 N. E. 490; Gregory v. Arms, 48 Ind. App. 562, 96 N. E. 196; Beeson v. Green, 103 Iowa, 406, 72 N. W. 555; Corning v. Burton, 102 Mich. 86, 62 N. W. 1040; Pinch v. McCulloch, 72 Minn. 71, 74 N. W. 897; Clement v. Willett, 105 Minn. 267, 127 Am. St. Rep. 562, 15 Ann. Cas. 1053, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1094, 117 N. W. 491; primary fund for payment of the debt, but he himself becomes personally liable therefor to the mortgagee or other holder of the mortgage. The assumption produces its most important effect, by the operation of equitable principles, upon the relations subsisting between the mortgagor, the

26 N. J. Eq. 504; Lenning's Estate, 52 Pa. St. 135, 138; Hoff's Appeal, 24 Pa. St. 200; Miller v. Thompson, 34 Mich. 10; Crawford v. Edwards, 33 Mich. 354; Bishop v. Douglass, 25 Wis. 696; Thompson v. Bertram, 14 Iowa, 476; Corbett v. Waterman, 11 Iowa, 86. It is even held that a verbal promise by the grantee to pay the mortgage creates such a personal liability, even though the conveyance appears on the face of the deed to be merely subject to the mortgage:^d Strohauer v.

Wood v. Johnson, 117 Minn. 267, 135 N. W. 746; Curry v. Lafon, 133 Mo. App. 163, 113 S. W. 246; Keedle v. Flack, 27 Neb. 836, 44 N. W. 34; Rockwell v. Blair Sav. Bank, 31 Neb. 128, 47 N. W. 641; Grand Island etc. Ass'n v. Moore, 40 Neb. 686, 59 N. W. 115; Meehan v. First Nat. Bank, 44 Neb. 213, 62 N. W. 490; Gibson v. Hambleton, 52 Neb. 601, 72 N. W. 1033; Goos v. Goos, 57 Neb. 294, 77 N. W. 687; Martin v. Humphrey, 58 Neb. 414, 78 N. W. 715; Klapworth v. Dressler, 13 N. J. Eq. 62, 78 Am. Dec. 69, and note; Baber v. Hanie, 162 N. C. 588, *80 S. E. 57; Poe v. Dixon, 60 Ohio St. 124, 71 Am. St. Rep. 713, 54 N. E. 86; Brewer v. Maurer, 38 Ohio St. 543, 43 Am. Rep. 436; Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Gates, 33 Or. 388, 72 Am. St. Rep. 724, 54 Pac. 205; Redfearn v. Craig, 57 S. C. 534, 35 S. E. 1024; Fox v. Robbins, (Tex. Civ. App.) 70 S. W. 597; Fant v. Wright, (Tex. Civ. App.) 61 S. W. 514; Ward v. Green, (Tex. Civ. App.) 28 S. W. 574; Hoeldtke v. Horstman, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 148, 128 S. W. 642; Lamoille County Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Belden, 90 Vt. 535, 98 Atl. 1002; Stites v. Thompson, 98 Wis. 329, 73 N. W. 774; Morgan v. South Mil-III - 181

waukee Lake View Co., 97 Wis. 275, 72 N. W. 872. It has been held that an assumption by a trustee does not make the *cestuis* personally liable: Reynolds v. Dietz, 39 Neb. 180, 58 N. W. 89.

See the following cases in which the grantee was held to be not . bound by the covenant of assumption: Drury v. Hayden, 111 U. S. 223, 28 L. Ed. 408, 4 Sup. Ct. 405 (assumption clause inserted by mistake, and grantee released by mortgagor upon discovery); Bogart v. Phillips, 112 Mich. 697, 71 N. W. 320 (clause inserted without grantee's knowledge, and he promptly disaffirmed); Gold v. Ogden, 61 Minn. 88, 63 N. W. 266 (deed taken in grantee's name without his consent); Klemmer v. Kerns, 71 N. J. Eq. 297, 71 Atl. 332 (assumption clause controlled by collateral contract); Raffel v. Clark, 87 Conn. 567, 89 Atl. 184 (assumption clause inserted in the deed without knowledge of grantee); Lloyd v. Lowe, (Colo.) 165 Pac. 609 (clause inserted without knowledge); Llewellyn v. Butler, 186 Mo. App. 525, 172 S. W. 413.

§ 1206, (d) Assumption may be Oral.—To the effect that the promgrantee, and the mortgagee. As between the mortgagor and the grantee, the grantee becomes the principal debtor primarily liable for the debt, and the mortgagor becomes a surety, with all the consequences flowing from the relation of suretyship.^e As between these two and the mortgagee, although he may treat them both as debtors and may enforce the liability against either, still, after receiving notice of the assumption, he is bound to recognize the condition of suretyship, and to respect the rights of the surety in all of his subsequent dealings with them.^{3 f} Payment, there-

Voltz, 42 Mich. 444; Drury v. Tremont etc. Co., 13 Allen, 168; Bowen v. Kurtz, 37 Iowa, 239; Bolles v. Beach, 22 N. J. L. 680; 53 Am. Dec. 263.

The following is substantially the ordinary form of the clause inserted in the deed: "The said premises are conveyed subject to a certain mortgage [describing it], which mortgage the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, hereby assume and agree to pay as a part of the consideration of the said conveyance."

§ 1206, ³ Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211, 215, 29 Am. Rep. 130; 8 Hun, 222; Marshall v. Davies, 78 N. Y. 414, 420, 421; Ayers v. Dixon, 78 N. Y. 318, 323; Russell v. Pistor, 7 N. Y. 171, 57 Am. Dec. 509;

ise may be proved by parol, see Felker v. Rice, 110 Ark. 70, 161 S. W. 162; Hibernia Savings & Loan Society v. Dickinson, 167 Cal. 616, 140 Pac. 265; Dodds v. Spring, 174 Cal. 412, 163 Pac. 351; Southern Indiana Loan & Savings Institution v. Roberts, 42 Ind. App. 653, 86 N. E. 490; Fitzgerald v. Flanagan, 155 Iowa, 217, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1104, 135 N. W. 738; Hopper v. Calhoun, .52 Kan. 703, 39 Am. St. Rep. 363, 35 Pac. 816; Bensieck v. Cook, 110 Mo. 173, 33 Am. St. Rep. 422, 19 S. W. 642; Van Meter v. Poole, 129 Mo. App. 433, 110 S. W. 5; Citizens' Bank of Senath v. Douglass, 178 Mo. App. 664, 161 S. W. 601; Moore v. Booker, 4 N. D. 543, 62 N. W. 607; Society of Friends v. Haines, 47 Ohio St. 423, 25 N. E. 119; Ordway v. Downcy, 18 Wash.

412, 63 Am. St. Rep. 892, 51 Pac. 1047 (the agreement must be established by a clear preponderance of evidence). But this rule is denied in Shepherd v. May, 115 U. S. 505, 29 L. Ed. 456, 6 Sup. Ct. 119; Mott v. American Trust Co., 124 Ark. 70, 186 S. W. 631.

§ 1206, (e) Quoted in Cook v. Berry, 193 Pa. St. 377, 44 Atl. 771; in Cady v. Barnes, 208 Fed. 359, 361; and in McCrery v. Nivin, (Del. Ch.) 67 Atl. 452; cited to this effect iu Latimer v. Latimer, 38 S. C. 379, 16 S. E. 995.

§ 1206, (f) Mortgagee must Respect the Suretyship Relation.—This portion of the text is quoted in Miller v. Kennedy, 12 S. D. 478, 81 N. W. 906; in Cady v. Barnes, 208 Fcd. 359, 361; and in McCrery v. Nivin, (Del. Ch.) 67 Atl. 452. See, fore, by a grantee who has assumed the entire mortgage debt completely extinguishes the mortgage; he cannot be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee, and keep the mortgage alive for any purpose. While the mortgagee may

Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 54 N. Y. 35, 13 Am. Rep. 556; Thorp v. Keokuk etc. Co., 48 N. Y. 253; Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178, 80 Am. Dec. 327; Belmont v. Coman, 22 N. Y. 438, 78 Am. Dec. 213; Trotter v. Hughes, 12 N. Y. 74, 62 Am. Dec. 137; Comstock v. Drohan, 8 Hun, 373; Mills v. Watson, 1 Sweeny, 374; Rubens v. Prindle, 44 Barb. 336; Gilbert v. Averill, 15 Barb. 20; Andrews v. Wolcott, 16 Barb. 21; Jumel v. Jumel, 7 Paige, 591; Blyer v. Monholland, 2 Sand. Ch. 478; Wales v. Sherwood, 52 How. Pr. 413; Townsend Sav. Bank v. Munson, 47 Conn. 390; Waters v. Hubbard, 44 Conn. 340; Huyler's Ex'rs v. Atwood, 26 N. J. Eq. 504; Risk v. Hoffman, 69 Ind. 137; Lilly v. Palmer, 51 Ill. 331; Thompson v. Bertram, 14 Iowa, 476; Corbett v. Waterman, 11 Iowa, 86.

Since such grantee thus becomes the principal debtor, primarily and absolutely liable for the debt, when he pays the mortgage it is completely extinguished, when he takes an assignment of it it is completely merged. He cannot by any form of assignment, legal or equitable, or by subrogation, keep the mortgage alive as against other liens on the land:^s Winans v. Wilkie, 41 Mich. 264; Fowler v. Fay,

also, Pellier v. Gillespie, 67 Cal. 582, 8 Pac. 185; Thompson v. Dearborn, 107 Ill. 87; Dean v. Walker, 107 Ill. 540, 47 Am. Rep. 467; Boice v. Coffeen, 158 Iowa, 705, 138 N. W. 857; Priddy v. Miners & Merchants' Bank, 132 Mo. App. 279, 111 S. W. 865; Citizens' Bank of Senath v. Douglass, 178 Mo. App. 664, 161 S. W. 601; Greer v. Orchard, 175 Mo. App. 494, 161 S. W. 875; Schley v. Fryer, 100 N. Y. 71, 2 N. E. 280; Wilcox v. Campbell, 106 N. Y. 325, 12 N. E. 823; Paris v. Lawyers' Title Ins. & Trust Co., 206 N. Y. 637, 99 N. E. 83; Poe v. Dixon, 60 Ohio St. 124, 71 Am. St. Rep. 713, 54 N. E. 86; Hampe v. Manke, 28 S. D. 501, 134 N. W. 60 (mortgagee failed to record the mortgage, thus enabling the grantee to sell to an innocent purchaser; this negligence releases the mortgagor from his liability for the debt). It has been held that if the grantee dies the mortgagee is under no obligation to present a claim against his estate: Hull v. Hayward, 13 S. D. 291, 79 Am. St. Rep. 890, S3 N. W. 270. It has been held that the bar of the statute of limitations in favor of the grantee does not bar a suit against the mortgagor who has been out of the state: Robertson v. Stuhlmiller, 93 Iowa, 326, 61 N. W. 986.

§ 1206, (3) Grantee, Paying, not Subrogated.—Birke v. Abbott, 103 Ind. 1, 53 Am. Rep. 474, 1 N. E. 485; Goodyear v. Goodyear, 72 Iowa, 329, 33 N. W. 142; Dodds v. Spring, 174 Cal. 412, 163 Pac. 351; Kuhn v. National Bank, 74 Kan. 456, 118 Am. St. Rep. 332, 87 Pac. 551; Paris v. Lawyers' Title Ins. & Trust

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release the mortgagor without discharging the grantee, his release of the grantee, or his valid extension of the time of payment to the grantee, without the mortgagor's consent, would operate to discharge the mortgagor. In short,

62 Ill. 375; McCabe v. Swap, 14 Allen, 188; Converse v. Cook, 8 Vt. 164; and see *ante*, § 797, and cases in notes. On the other hand, when the mortgagor, having become a surety, pays off the mortgage, he is entitled to hold it by equitable assignment or subrogation, for the purpose of reimbursement from the grantee:^h Ayers v. Dixon, 78 N. Y. 318, 323, per Danforth, J.; Risk v. Hoffman, 69 Ind. 137; Lappen v.

Co., 206 N. Y. 637, 99 N. E. 83; Lamoille County Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Belden, 90 Vt. 535, 98 Atl. 1002; contra, Capitol National Bank v. Holmes, 43 Colo. 154, 127 Am. St. Rep. 108, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 470, 95 Pac. 314. This passage of the note is quoted in Cady v Barnes, 208 Fed. 359, 361.

§ 1206, (h) Mortgagor, Paying, is Subrogated .- See, also, Orrick v. Durham, 79 Mo. 174; Travers v. Dorr, 60 Minn. 173, 62 N. W. 269. See, further, Beach v. Waite, 21 Cal. App. 304, 131 Pac. 880; Thomas v. Home Mutual Building Loan Ass'n, 243 Ill. 550, 90 N. E. 1081 to grantor-mortgagor's (successor rights entitled to subrogation, on payment); Howard v. Burns, 279 Ill. 256, 116 N. E. 703; Van Meter v. Poole, 129 Mo. App. 433, 110 S. W. 5; Winans v. Hare, 46 Okl. 741, 148 Pac. 1052; University State Bank v. Steeves, 85 Wash. 55, 147 Pac. 645.

To the effect that the mortgagor who is compelled to pay may recover from the grantee, see Weems v. George, 13 How. (U. S.) 190, 14 **L.** Ed. 108; Williams v. Moody, 95 Ga. 8, 22 S. E. 30; Halstead v. La Rue, 177 Ind. 660, 98 N. E. 638 (mortgagor who has paid deficiency may sue on the assumption clause in the deed); Holland Reform School

Society v. De Lazier, 85 N. J. Eq. 497: 97 Atl. 253; Poe v. Dixon, 60 Ohio St. 124, 71 Am. St. Rep. 713, 54 N. E. 86; Blood v. Crew Levick Co., 171 Pa. St. 328, 33 Atl. 344, 37 Wkly. Notes Cas. 181. See, also, Lamka v. Donnelly, 163 Iowa, 255, 143 N. W. 869 (where grantee has retained part of the purchase price and impliedly agreed to assume the mortgage, and the mortgage thereafter becomes extinct, the grantor may enforce a grantor's lien for the portion of the price retained by the grantee). It has been often held that the mortgagor may sue before he has paid: Neely v. Black, 80 Ark. 212, 96 S. W. 984; Kreling v. Kreling, 118 Cal. 413, 50 Pac. 546; Burbank v. Roots, 4 Colo. App. 197, 35 Pac. 275; Baldwin v. Emery, 89 Me. 496, 36 Atl. 994; Locke v. Homer, 131 Mass. 93, 41 Am. Rep. 199; Walton v. Ruggles, 180 Mass. 24, 61 N. E. 267; Rice v. Sanders, 152 Mass. 108, 23 Am. St. Rep. 804, 8 L. R. A. 315, 24 N. E. 1079; Stichter v. Cox, 52 Neb. 532, 72 N. W. 848; McAbee v. Cribbs, 194 Pa. St. 94, 44 Atl. 1066; Callender v. Edmison, 8 S. D 81, 65 N. W. 425; Perry v. Ward, 69 Vt. 1, 71 Atl. 721. But see, contra, Kearney v. Tanner, 17 Serg. & R. 94, 17 Am. Dec. 648; Blood v. Crew Levick Co., 171 Pa. St. 328,

the doctrines concerning suretyship must control the dealings between these three parties. When land is thus conveyed, with an assumption of a mortgage by the grantee

Gill, 129 Mass. 349; and cases in note under § 797. See, however, Fairchild v. Lynch, 14 Jones & S. 1.

The dealings of the mortgagee with these two parties are also governed by the doctrines of suretyship. He may release the mortgagor, and the grantee or the land will not be thereby discharged, since a release of a surety by the creditor in no way affects the liability of the principal debtor: Tripp v. Vincent, 3 Barb. Ch. 613. On the other hand, in his dealings with the grantee, at least after notice, the mortgagee must respect the rights of the mortgagor-surety. A valid extension of the time of payment, made by the mortgagee to the grantee, without the consent of the mortgagor, will, therefore, discharge the mortgagor from his liability:¹ Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211, 215, 29 Am. Rep. 130; 8 Hun, 222; and a release by the mortgagee of a part of the premises in the hands of the grantee from the

33 Atl. 344, 37 Wkly. Notes Cas. 181. In Abell v. Coons, 7 Cal. 105, 68 Am. Dec. 229, it is held that when the debt becomes due the grantor may file his bill in equity to compel foreclosure and payment.

§1206, (i) Extension of Time of Payment Discharges Mortgagor .---The text is cited to this effect in Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v. Schnose, 19 S. D. 248, 9 Ann. Cas. 255, 103 N. W. 22. See, also, Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hanford, 143 U. S. 187, 36 L. Ed. 118, 12 Sup. Ct. 437; Herd v. Tuohy, 133 Cal. 55, 65 Pac. 139: Travers v. Dorr, 60 Minn. 173, 62 N. W. 269; Merriman v. Miles, 54 Neb. 566, 69 Am. St. Rep. 731, 74 N. W. 861; George v. Andrews, 60 Md. 26, 45 Am. Rep. 706; Spencer v. Spencer, 95 N. Y. 353; Metzger v. Nova Realty Co., 214 N. Y. 26, 107 N. E. 1027; Dillaway v. Peterson, 11 S. D. 210, 76 N. W. 925; Schroeder v. Kinney, 15 Utah, 462, 49 Pac. 894; and when the land is conveyed merely subject to, the mortgage such extension of time will

discharge the mortgagor to the extent of the value of the land: Murray v. Marshall, 94 N. Y. 611; Bunnell v. Carter, 14 Utah, 100, 46 Pac. 755. It is essential, however, that notice be brought home to the mortgagee: Pratt v. Conway, 148 Mo. 291, 71 Am. St. Rep. 602, 49 S. W. 1028. Mere delay in foreclosing does not discharge the mortgagor: Warner v. Williams, 93 Md. 517, 49 Atl. 559; Hull v. Hayward, 13 S. D. 291, 79 Am. St. Rep. 890, 83 N. W. 270. Mere indulgence or even a naked promise to extend the time does not release the mortgagor: Steele v. Johnson, 96 Mo. App. 147, 69 S. W. 1065. In Denison University v. Manning, 65 Ohio St. 138, 61 N. E. 706, it was held that an agreement extending time of payment does not release the mortgagor. In Palmer v. White, 65 N. J. L. 69, 46 Atl. 706, it was held that at law, in a suit on the bond, the mortgagor continues to be the principal debtor, and is therefore not discharged by an extension of time to the grantee.

contained in the deed, subsequent grantees holding under the conveyance are charged with notice, and the land continues to be the primary fund for payment, as though the

lien of the mortgage will also discharge the mortgagor's liability; a fortiori a release of the entire premises:^j Townsend Sav. Bank v. Munson, 47 Conn. 390; but see Knowles v. Carpenter, 8 R. I. 548.

After the grantee has thus assumed payment of a mortgage and incurred an absolute personal liability to the mortgagee, can his grantor, without the knowledge and consent of the mortgagee, release him from his assumption, and discharge him from the liability ereated thereby? It is strange, as it seems to me, that the decisions should be conflicting in their answer to this question. In the following cases it is either expressly held, or an unequivocal opinion is stated by way of dictum, that the grantor cannot thus release the grantee from his assumption and liability to the mortgagee: k Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233, 242, 7 Am. Rep. 440, per Rapallo, J.; Hartley v. Harrison, 24 N. Y. 170; Simson v. Brown, 6 Hun, 251; Douglass v. Wells, 18 Hun, 88; 57 How. Pr. 378 (overruling Stephens v. Cashacker, 8 Hun, 116, and disapproving Crowell v. Hospital of St. Barnahas, 27 N. J. Eq. 650); Ranney v. McMullen, 5 Abb. N. C. 246. On the other hand, a series of cases in New Jersey apparently give the mortgagor-grantor this power to release and discharge his grantee without consent of the mortgagee, unless the grantor himself is insolvent:¹ Crowell v. Hospital

§ 1206, (J) Hyde v. Miller, 168 N. Y. 590, 60 N. E. 1113 (affirming 60 N. Y. Supp. 974, 45 App. Div. 396); Heidahl v. Geiser Mfg. Co., 112 Minn. 319, 140 Am. St. Rep. 493, 127 N. W. 1050.

§ 1206, (**L**) Release of Grantee by Mortgagor-Grantor. — This paragraph of the text is eited to this effect in Hoeldtke v. Horstman, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 148, 128 S. W. 642. See, also, Starbird v. Cranston, 24 Colo. 20, 48 Pae. 652; Bay v. Williams, 112 Ill. 91, 54 Am. Rep. 209; Gifford v. Corrigan, 117 N. Y. 257, 15 Am. St. Rep. 508, 6 L. R. A. 610, 22 N. E. 756; N. Y. L. Ins. Co. v. Aitkin, 125 N. Y. 660, 26 N. E. 732; Hill v. Hoeldtke, 104 Tex. 594, 142 S. W. 871, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 672, and note; Clark v. Fisk, 9 Utah, 94, 33 Pac. 248; Willard v. Worsham, 76 Va. 392.

§1206, (1) Meech v. Ensign, 49 Conn. 191, 44 Am. Rep. 225; Field v. Thistle, 58 N. J. Eq. 339, 43 Atl. 1072 (affirmed, 60 N. J. Eq. 444, 46 Atl. 1099), (the release cannot be made after the grantor is insolvent nor after the mortgagee has adopted the arrangement by bringing suit to foreclose); and see Gilbert v. Sanderson, 56 Iowa, 349, 41 Am. Rep. 103, 9 N. W. 293 (a promise to a mortgagor to pay his mortgage may be released by the mortgagor before it is assented to by the mortgagee): Morrison v. Barry, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 22, 30 S. W. 376 (same); Huffman v. Western Mortg. & Inv. Co.,

fact were recited in their own deeds.^{4 m} In the foregoing statement of the general doctrine, it has been supposed that the grantee assumes payment of the whole mortgage. If

of St. Barnabas, 27 N. J. Eq. 650; O'Neill v. Clark, 33 N. J. Eq. 444; Youngs v. Public School Trustees, 31 N. J. Eq. 290; Public School Trustees v. Anderson, 30 N. J. Eq. 366. When an absolute right has vested in any manner in C. against two parties, A and B, it is difficult to understand upon what principle either of the two can be relieved from his liability by an arrangement entered into between themselves alone. It is even more difficult to perceive how the insolvency of one of them should affect the liability of the other, by rendering it either more or less permanent. If A is bound as a principal debtor and B as a surety, it would be an extraordinary view of equity which should regard the creditor's right against either as depending upon the insolvency of the other. In my opinion, these New Jersey decisions are. not sustained by the established doctrines of equity concerning the relation of suretyship. Judson v. Dada, 79 N. Y. 373, is expressly, distinguished from the foregoing series of New York cases, and does not deal with the mortgagee's rights.

§ 1206, 4 Weber v. Zeimet, 30 Wis. 283; Freeman v. Auld, 44 N. Y. 50; 37 Barb. 587. If the land is conveyed through successive grantees, each in turn assuming payment of the same mortgage, they all become and remain personally liable to the mortgagee, and he may obtain a decree for a deficiency against all. As to the rights of the mortgagee and the provisions of the decree in such cases, see Risk v. Hoffman, 69 Ind. 137; Youngs v. Public School Trustees, 31 N. J. Eq. 290.ⁿ

13 Tex. Civ. App. 169, 36 S. W. 306 (same). As a result of these cases, it has been held that a grantee under a conveyance subject to a mortgage is not estopped to set up a defense of fraud in the obtaining of the mortgage: Magie v. Reynolds, 51 N. J. Eq. 113, 26 Atl. 150.

§ 1206, (m) Quoted in Nelson v. Brown, 140 Mo. 580, 62 Am. St. Rep. 755, 41 S. W. 960; and in McCrery v. Nivin, (Del. Ch.) 67 Atl. 452. See, also, University State Bank v. Steves, S5 Wash. 55, 147 Pac. 645 (original grantor, paying the mortgage in such case, subrogated).

§ 1206, (n) Successive Grantees

Assuming Mortgage .-- In support of the statement of the note, see Baber v. Hanie, 163 N. C. 588, 80 S. E. 57; Union Central Ins. Co. v. Emigh, 82 Ohio St. 251, 92 N. E. 438. If the first grantee pays the mortgage, he is entitled to subrogation against the second grantee: Oglebay v. Todd, 166 Ind. 250, 76 N. E. 238. The second grantee is the primary debtor: Holland Reform School Society v. De Lazier, 85 N. J. Eq. 497, 97 Atl. 253. In Boice v. Coffeen, 158 Iowa, 705, 138 N. W. 857, the first grantee, who had assumed the debt, conveyed to a second grantee, who also assumed the debt, thus incurring the primary liability

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a grantee, in purchasing a part of the mortgaged premises, assumes payment of a part of the mortgage, he becomes personally and primarily liable only for such part.⁵ The general doctrine is well settled that a grantee who thus assumes payment, in whole or in part, of a mortgage as a portion of the purchase price of the land conveyed to him

§ 1206, ⁵ Snyder v. Robinson, 35 Ind. 311, 9 Am. Rep. 738; Torrey v. Bank of Orleans, 9 Paige, 649; 7 Hill, 260; Hilton v. Bissell, 1 Sand. Ch. 407. Although such grantee is only personally liable for a part, yet in order to protect his own land, under the settled doctrine concerning redemption he may be compelled to redeem the entire mortgage. If therefore, he makes a general payment, it will be applied first on that portion of the mortgage debt for which he is personally liable: Snyder v. Robinson, supra. And where he thus redeems the whole mortgage, he becomes subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee in that portion of it which he did not assume-or in other words. he becomes an equitable assignee of that portion-as security for his reimbursement from the rest of the mortgaged premises: Town of Salem v. Edgerly, 33 N. H. 46; Champlin v. Williams, 9 Pa. St. 341. When, however, the grantee of a part of the premises assumes payment of the whole mortgage upon the entire tract, no such right of subrogation exists; he has by his contract charged his own land with the entire mortgage debt, and by his payment the mortgage is completely extinguished: Welch v. Beers, 8 Allen, 151.º

as between himself and the first grantee. The second grantee then conveyed, with full covenants of warranty, to a third, who sought to charge the mortgagor and the first grantee. Held, that as against the mortgagor and the first grantee, the third grantee has no higher rights than the second. Also, the first grantee gave the mortgagee additional security, which was afterwards returned to him. Held, this release did not release the other grantees, since the only person who stood in the relation of surety to the first grantee was the mortgagor.

§ 1206, (•) Grantee of Part As-

sumes Whole Mortgage.-See, also, cases cited, post, § 1225, 1. If he fails to protect the owner of the remaining portion against the mortgage, he becomes liable to such owner for any damages occasioned thereby: Fleming v. Reed, 20 Ind. App. 462, 49 N. E. 1087. The mortgagor is entitled to have such parcel first sold and to have execution for deficiency against the grantee: Mead v. Peabody, 183 Ill. 126, 55 N. E. 719 (affirming 83 Ill. App. 297). See, also, Scott v. Norris, (Okl.) 162 Pac. 1085. See, in general, Miller v. Fasler, 42 Minn. 366, 44 N. W. 256,

cannot contest the validity of the mortgage on any ground and thus evade the liability which he has assumed.⁶ p

§ 1207. Rationale of the Grantee's Liability.—The ground of the grantee's liability adopted by the courts of a large majority of the states is that of contract. It is an application of the general doctrine, so widely prevailing in this country that it may properly be called an American doctrine,—where A makes a promise directly to B, for the benefit of C, upon a consideration moving alone from B, C, being the party beneficially interested, may treat the promise as though made to himself, and may maintain an action at law upon it in his own name against A, the prom-

§ 1206, 6 Ritter v. Phillips, 53 N. Y. 586; Freeman v. Auld, 44 N. Y. 50; 37 Barb. 587; Hardin v. Hyde, 40 Barb. 435; Cox v. Hoxie, 115 Mass. 120; Crawford v. Edwards, 33 Mich. 354; Pidgeon v. Trustees etc., 44 Ill. 501; and see *ante*, § 937, and cases cited in note.

§1206, (p) Grantee cannot Contest Validity of Mortgage .-- The text is cited in Key. West Wharf & Coal Co. v. Porter, 63 Fla. 448, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 173, 58 South. 599. See, also, City of Santa Cruz v. Wykes, 202 Fed. 357 (9th Cir.), 120 C. C. A. 485; Washer v. Independent M. & D. Co., 142 Cal. 702, 76 Pac. 654; Davis v. Davis, 19 Cal. App. 797, 127 Pac. 1051 (cannot set up that the mortgage debt, when he assumed it, was barred by the statute of limitations); Hadley v. Clark, (Idahc) 69 Pac. 319; Lang v. Dietz, 191 Ill. 161, 60 N. E. 841 (affirming 93 Ill. App. 148); Miller v. Wayne International B. & L. Ass'n, (Ind. App.) 70 N. E. 180; Spinney v. Miller, 114 Iowa, 210, 89 Am. St. Rep. 351, 86 N. W. 317; Gowans v. Pierce, 57 Kan. 180, 45 Pac. 586; Dunn v. Shannon, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 138, 51 S. W. 14; Terry v. Durand Land Co., 112 Mich. 665, 71 N. W. 525; Conner v. Howe, 35 Minn. 518, 29 N. W. 314; Scanlon v. Grimmer, 71 Minn. 351, 70 Am.

St. Rep. 326, 74 N. W. 146; Curry v. Lafon, 133 Mo. App. 163, 113 S. W. 246 (lack of consideration); Goos v. Goos, 57 Neb. 294, 77 N. W. 687; Skinner v. Reynick, 10 Neb. 323, 35 Am. Rep. 479, 6 N. W. 369; Cummings v. Jackson, 55 N. J. Eq. 805, 38 Atl. 763; Peterson v. Reid, 80 N. J. Eq. 450, 85 Atl. 250; Parkinson v. Sherman, 74 N. Y. 88, 30 Am. Rep. 268; Cramer v. Lepper, 26 Ohio St. 59, 20 Am. Rep. 756; Midland Savings & Loan Co. v. Neighbor, (Okl.) 154 Pac. 506; Mitchell v. National Ry. B. & L. Ass'n, (Tex." Civ. App.) 49 S. W. 624. Compare Sherman v. Goodwin, 12 Ariz. 42, 95 Pac. 121 (assumption of all liens and mortgages may be construed as confined to those which are valid). But a recital of assumption in a deed does not estop the grantee from showing that the assumption formed no part of the consideration for the conveyance: Logan v. Miller, 106 Iowa, 511, 76 N. W. 1005.

isor. According to this generally accepted view, the liability of the grantee who thus assumes the payment of an outstanding mortgage does not depend upon any extension of the equitable doctrine concerning subrogation; it is strictly legal, arising out of a contract binding at law; the mortgagee, instead of enforcing the liability by a suit in equity for a foreclosure, may maintain an action at law against the grantee upon his promise, and recover a personal judgment for the whole mortgage debt.¹^a Another

§ 1207, ¹ Mr. Jones represents the doctrine formulated in the text as exceptional, and as confined to the courts of New York: See 1 Jones on Mortgages, sees. 755, 758, 762. Mr. Jones has, I think, fallen into an error. In my work upon Remedies by the Civil Action, I have examined this question and collected many authorities, and have shown that the general doctrine of contracts as stated above in the text prevails throughout a majority of the states. In fact, the contrary rule, which forbids the party for whose benefit the promise is made to sue in his own name, is exceptional: See Pomeroy on Remedies, sec. 139, and cases cited.

That the grantee is liable on his contract, and may be sued by the mortgagee at law, or may be compelled to pay the deficiency arising after a sale by a decree in an equity suit for a foreclosure, see Booth v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 43 Mich. 299; Unger v. Smith, 44 Mich. 22; Strohauer v. Voltz, 42 Mich. 444; Carley v Fox, 38 Mich. 387; Miller v. Thompson, 34 Mich. 10; Crawford v. Edwards, 33 Mich. 354; Lamb v. Tucker, 42 Iowa, 118; Schmucker v. Sibert, 18 Kan. 104, 26 Am. Rep. 765. It must be conceded, however, that in the recent cases of Pardee v. Treat, 82 N. Y. 385, 387, 388, and Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280, 283, 25 Am. Rep. 195, the New York court seems to favor the doctrine maintained by the courts of Massachusetts and of New Jersey, that the liability of the grantee depends upon the equitable relation of subrogation.

§ 1207, (a) Quoted in Starbird v. Cranston, 24 Colo. 20, 48 Pac. 652; in Lloyd v. Lowe, (Colo.) 165 Pac. 609; and in Hoeldtke v. Horstman, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 148, 128 S. W. 642. This section is cited in Birke v. Abbott, 103 Ind. 1, 53 Am. Rep. 474, 1 N. E. 485; McKay v. Ward, 20 Utah, 149, 46 L. B. A. 623, 57 Pac. 1024; Marble Sav. Bank v. Mesarvey, 101 Iowa, 286, 70 N. W. 198; also in Baber v. Hanie, 163 N. C. 588, 80 S. E. 57. See, also, North Alabama Dev. Co. v. Orman, 55 Fed. 18, 5 C. C. A. 22, 13 U. S. App. 215; Dean v. Walker, 107 Ill. 540, 47 Am. Rep. 467; Webster v. Fleming, 178 Ill. 140, 52 N. E. 975 (affirming 73 Ill. App. 234); Harts v. Emery, 184 Ill. 560, 56 N. E. 865

and entirely different *rationale* is adopted by the courts of certain states: that the liability of the grantee to the mortgagee does not arise from contract, and does not exist at law; but it results from an application, or more correctly an extension, of the equitable doctrine of subrogation. Since the mortgagor becomes a surety, the creditor is entitled by subrogation to all the securities which he holds from the principal debtor, and is thus entitled in equity to enforce the promise made to him by the grantee.² b According to

§ 1207, ² This theory is adopted by the courts of Massachusetts and New Jersey: Mellen v. Whipple, 1 Gray, 317; Pettee v. Peppard, 120 Mass. 522; Exchange Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37, 41, 9 Am. Rep. 1; Crowell v. Currier, 27 N. J. Eq. 152. The same view was taken by some of the earlier cases in New York, and perhaps in other states: Halsey v. Reed, 9 Paige, 446; King v. Whitely, 10 Paige, 465; Russell v. Pistor, 7 N. Y. 171, 57 Am. Dec. 509; Trotter v. Hughes, 12 N. Y. 74, 62 Am. Dec. 137. According to this theory, the liability of the grantee to the mortgagee always depends upon the fact that his immediate grantor is also personally liable, since there would be no place for the operation of any subrogation, in the absence of such personal liability of the

(affirming 84 Ill. App. 317); Ayres v. Randall, 108 Ind. 595, 9 N. E. 464; Beeson v. Green, 103 Iowa, 406, 72 N. W. 555; Bristol Sav. Bank v. Stiger, 86 Iowa, 344, 53 N. W. 265; Cumberland Nat. Bank v. St. Clair, 93 Me. 35, 44 Atl. 123; Follansbee v. Johnson, 28 Minn. 311, 9 N. W. 882; Goos v. Goos, 57 Neb. 294, 77 N. W. 687; Keedle v. Flack, 27 Neb. 836, 44 N. W. 34; Wager v. Link, 150 N. Y. 549, 44 N. E. 1103 (affirming 134 N. Y. 122, 31 N. E. 213); Campbell v. Smith, 71 N. Y. 26, 27 Am. Rep. 5; McDonald v. Finseth, 32 N. D. 400, 155 N. W. 863; Windle v. Hughes, 40 Or. 1, 65 Pac. 1058; Thompson v. Cheesman, 15 Utah, 43, 48 Pac. 477; and see Gilbert v. Sanderson, 56 Iowa, 349, 41 Am. Rep. 103, 9 N. W. 293; Society of Friends v. Haines, 47 Ohio St. 423, 25 N. E. 119; McCown v. Schrimpf, 21 Tex. 22, 73 Am. Dec. 221; Stites v. Thompson, 98 Wis. 329, 73 N. W. 774. It has been held that when the one assuming is evicted by paramount authority he ceases to be personally liable. The consideration for his promise fails: Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 N. Y. 30, 39 Am. Rep. 617.

§ 1207, (b) This section is cited to this effect in Greene v. McDonald, 75 Vt. 93, 53 Atl. 332; Goff v. Ladd, 161 Cal. 257, 118 Pac. 792. See, also, Winters v. Hub Min. Co., (Idaho) 57 Fed. 287; Green v. Turner, 80 Fed. 41 (affirmed in 86 Fed. 837); Interstate Land & Investment Co. v. Logan, 196 Ala. 196, 72 South. 36; Daniels v. Johnson, 129 Cal. 415, 79 Am. St. Rep. 123, 61 Pac. 1107; Ward v. De Oca, 120 Cal. 102, 52 Pac. 130; Roberts v. Fitzallen, 120 Cal. 482, 52 Pac. 818; Williams v. Naftzger, 103 Cal. 438, 37 Pac. the general theory first above stated, the grantee's assumption and promise are so completely for the benefit of the mortgagee that the grantor can maintain no action thereon merely because the grantee has failed to perform his under-

grantor:^c Norwood v. De Hart, 30 N. J. Eq. 412; Arnaud v. Grigg, 29 N. J. Eq. 482. The grantee's liability at law on his promise, however, does not depend upon any personal liability of his grantor:^{**a**} Thorp v. Keokuk etc. Co., 48 N. Y. 253; but see Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280, 25 Am. Rep. 195.

411; Tulare Co. Bank v. Madden, 109 Cal. 312, 41 Pac. 1092; Creesy v. Willis, 159 Mass. 249, 34 N. E. 265; Brown v. Stillman, 43 Minn. 126, 45 N. W. 2; Green v. Stone, 54 N. J. Eq. 387, 55 Am. St. Rep. 577, 34 Atl. 1099; Biddle v. Pugh, 59 N. J. Eq. 480, 45 Atl. 626; Holland Reform School Society v. De Lazier, 85 N. J. Eq. 497, 97 Atl. 253 (where mortgagor, A, conveyed to B and B to C, both B and C assuming the mortgage, A, on paying the mortgage, may have subrogation against C and join B in the suit, though his right against B alone is purely legal); Woodcock v. Bostic, 118 N. C. 822, 24 S. E. 362; Davis v. Hulett, 58 Vt. 90, 4 Atl. 139; Willard v. Worsham, 76 Va. 392; Osborne v. Cabell, 77 Va. 462; Francisco v. Shelton, 85 Va. 779, 8 S. E. 789.

§ 1207, (c) Where Grantee's Immediate Grantor is not Personally Liable.—Knapp v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 85 Fed. 329; 40 L. R. A. 861, 29 C. C. A. 171; Felker v. Ricc, 110 Ark. 70, 161 S. W. 162; Ward v. De Oca, 120 Cal. 102, 52 Pac. 130; Goodenough v. Labrie, 206 Mass. 599, 138 Am. St. Rep. 411, 92 N. E. 807; Brown v. Stillman, 43 Minn. 126, 45 N. W. 2; Nelson v. Rogers, 47 Minn. 103, 49 N. W. 526; Clement v. Willett, 105 Minn. 267, 127 Am. St. Rep. 562, 15 Ann. Cas. 1053, 17 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1094, 117 N. W. 491; Wood v. Johnson, 117 Minn. 267, 135 N. W. 746; Eakin v. Shultz, 61 N. J. Eq. 156, 47 Atl. 274. It has been held that under this theory the mortgagee has no greater rights against the granteethan the mortgagor has. Hence, the grantee has been allowed to set up want of consideration: Giesy v. Truman, 17 App. D. C. 449.

§1207, (d) Cobb v. Fishel, 15 Colo. App. 384, 62 Pac. 625; Marble Sav. Bank v. Mesarvey, 101 Iowa, 286, 70 N. W. 198; Hare v. Murphy, 45 Neb. 809, 29 L. R. A. 851, 64 N. W. 211; Enos v. Sanger, 96 Wis. 151, 65 Am. St. Rep. 38, 37 L. R. A. 862, 70 N. W. 1069. See, also, Mc-Donald v. Finseth, 32 N. D. 400, 155 N. W. 863. But see Meech v. Ensign, 49 Conn. 191, 44 Am. Rep. 225; Hicks v. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 495, 66 Am. St. Rep. 431, 46 S. W. 432 (resting on ground that there is no consideration); Carrier v. United Paper Co., 73 Hun, 287, 26 N. Y. Supp. 414; Wager v. Link, 150 N. Y. 549, 44 N. E. 1103 (affirming 134 N. Y. 122, 31 N. E. 213); Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Croft, 34 Or. 106, 75 Am. St. Rep. 568, 55 Pac. 439; Fry v. Ausman, 29 S. D. 30, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 842, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 150, 135 N. W. 708 (discussing the above note, and taking; it is only where the grantor has himself paid the mortgage that he becomes subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee, and is entitled to enforce it against the grantee.³ \circ

§ 1208. Assumption by a Mortgagee.—When a second mortgage contains a provision by which the mortgagee assumes the payment of a prior mortgage on the same land, such mortgagee thereby incurs no personal liability to the prior mortgagee. The whole foundation of the grantee's liability in such a case is wanting. Even if the second mortgage is in the *form* of an absolute deed, the result is the same. In either case there is no debt owing by the mortgagee to the mortgagor, which he can pay in whole or in part by assuming and paying a prior mortgage.¹a

§ 1207, 3 Ayres v. Dixon, 78 N. Y. 318, 322, 323; but see Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500, 20 Am. Rep. 341. The mortgagor-grantor's remedy is simply the right of exoneration by a surety against his principal debtor. It is difficult to perceive how the grantor can have any other right of action against his grantee consistently with the settled doctrines of equity concerning suretyship. That he is entitled to this remedy is clear: Lappen v. Gill, 129 Mass. 349; Risk v. Hoffman, 69 Ind. 137. When the agreement of assumption by the grantee is of such a special character that by its terms the grantor still remains the principal debtor, and not a surety, the grantee becomes liable to his grantor only, and not to the mortgagee: Pardee v. Treat, 82 N. Y. 385. As to the extent of the grantee's liability, see Fenton v. Lord, 128 Mass. 466; Emley v. Mount, 32 N. J. Eq. 470; Strohauer v. Voltz, 42 Mich. 444; Waters v. Hubbard, 44 Conn. 340; Marshall v. Davies, 78 N. Y. 414.

§ 1208, 1 Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233, 7 Am. Rep. 440. The opinion of Rapallo, J., contains a clear and convincing explanation of the necessary distinction between assumptions by a grantee and by a mortgagee.

holding the grantee not personally liable, unless there was the intention, required by statute, to benefit the mortgagee by the grantee's promise).

§1207, (e) The text is cited in Tyson v. Austill, 168 Ala. 525, 53 South. 263. See, also, Lamka v. Donnelly, 163 Iowa, 255, 143 N. W. 869 (grantor's lien of grantor-mortgagor in such case).

§1208, (a) Compare Newton v. Evers, 215 N. Y. 198, 109 N. E. 118.

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§ 1209. II. Assignment of the Mortgage.-In the few states which still retain, in the ordinary transactions of business and modes of administering justice, the strict legal . theory according to which the mortgagee obtains and holds the legal estate in the land, an assignment of the mortgage fully efficient and operative must necessarily amount to a conveyance of the legal estate in the mortgaged premises. Such an assignment must, therefore, be an instrument under seal, or at least a written instrument sufficient to convey the legal title.^{1 a} We are only concerned with that mode of assignment which is valid and efficient in equity, which operates to vest the assignee with all the mortgagee's interests, rights, remedies, and liabilities which are recognized and enforced in equity, and are capable of being transferred.² A formal written assignment by which the mortgagee in express terms transfers the mortgage and the debt secured thereby, and the bond, note, or other evidence of the debt, is always proper, and possesses many

§ 1209, ¹ See 1 Jones on Mortgages, secs. 786-790, where the rules cencerning this form of assignment are fully stated. It should be observed that in the cases involving these rules the question is, whether, in accordance with the strict legal theory, the assignment transferred the legal estate *in the land* to the assignee,—a question purely legal, and wholly foreign to the equitable system of mortgage which, practically at least, prevails in the great majority of the states, even in many of those which also retain the legal view.

§ 1209, ² It would, however, be very misleading to call this an "equitable" assignment, as distinguished from that first above mentioned, as though its operation were confined to courts of equity, and it conferred rights recognized only in equity. In England and in Massachusetts, and a few other states, such an assignment is undoubtedly "equitable"; but in most of the states the rights which it confers are protected by all the courts.

§ 1209, (a) See Jones v. Williams, 155 N. C. 179, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 426, 71 S. E. 222. The assignee under an assignment so made is vested with any power of sale contained in the mortgage: Lanier v. McIntosh, 117 Mo. 508, 38 Am. St. Rep. 676, 23 S. W. 787. That an assignment without a conveyance of the land does not authorize the assignee to execute such power of sale, see Morton v. Blades Lumber Co., 154 N. C. 336, 70 S. E. 623. advantages, and should always be adopted, when possible, as a matter of expediency,³ but it is not essential.

§ 1210. Assignment of the Debt Carries With It the Mortgage—What Operates as an Assignment.—The fundamental principle upon which this doctrine of assignment rests is, that the debt is the principal thing, and the mortgage is only an accessory or incident of the debt, and can have no separate independent existence.¹ The doctrine is therefore universal, that any valid operative assignment of the debt, whether evidenced by a bond, note, or otherwise, is also an efficient assignment of the mortgage, and vests the assignee with all the equitable rights, interests, and remedies of the mortgagee.² a In the absence of a contrary

§ 1209, 3 Among these advantages is the power of having the assignment recorded, with the protection which the recording acts give to the assignee: See *ante*, §§ 733, 734.

§ 1210, 1 This principle, as the foundation of assignment, was foreibly stated by Swayne, J., in Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. 271, 275, 21 L. Ed. 313, a case where the mortgage was given to secure a note. "The transfer of the note carries with it the security [the mortgage], without any formal assignment or delivery, or even mention of the latter. If not assignable at law, it is clearly so in equity. Whether the title of the assignee is legal or equitable is immaterial. The result follows irrespective of that question. All the authorities agree that the debt is the principal thing, and the mortgage an accessory. Equity puts the principal and accessory upon a footing of equality, and gives to the assignee of the evidence of the debt the same rights in regard to both. The mortgage can have no separate existence. When the note is paid, the mortgage expires; it cannot survive for a moment the debt which the note represents."

§ 1210, ² This proposition is *universal* in equity. In all the states adopting the *second* system, as described in the previous section II., such assignment is complete and absolute. In some of the states adopting the *first* system, such assignment is regarded as simply equitable,

§ 1210, (a) Converse v. Michigan Dairy Co., 45 Fed. 18; Fish v. First National Bank of Seattle, 150 Fed. 524 (9th Cir.), 80 C. C. A. 266; Arnett v. Willoughby, 190 Ala. 530, 67 South. 426; Duncan v. Hawn, 104 Cal. 10, 37 Pac. 626; Stockwell v. Barmem, 7 Cal. App. 413, 94 Pac. 400; Taylor v. American Nat. Bank of Pensacola, 63 Fla. 631, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 309, 57 South. 678; Van Pelt v. Hurt, 97 Ga. 660, 25 S. E. 489; Sedgwick v. Johnson, 107 Ill. 385; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. statutory requirement, such assignment need not even be in writing; it may be merely verbal with delivery. It also follows, as a necessary consequence of the same principle,

since the assignce does not thereby acquire the legal estate in the mortgaged premises; but in several other states of the same class, I think this form of assignment is treated as practically complete and absolute: Langdon v. Keith, 9 Vt. 299; Pratt v. Bank of Bennington, 10 Vt. 293, 33 Am. Dec. 201; Keyes v. Wood, 21 Vt. 331; Blake v. Williams, 36 N. H. 39; Page v. Pierce, 26 N. H. 317; Downer v. Button, 26 N. H. 338; Rigney v. Lovejoy, 13 N. H. 247; Smith v. Moore, 11 N. H. 55; Southerin v. Mendum, 5 N. H. 420; Whittemore v. Gibbs, 24 N. H.

v. Talbot, 113 Ind. 373, 3 Am. St. Rep. 655, 14 N. E. 586; McConnell v. American National Bank, 59 Ind. App. 319, 103 N. E. 809; Bunker v. International Harvester Co. of America, 148 Iowa, 708, 127 N. W. 1016; Robertson v. United States Live Stock Co., 164 Iowa, 230, 145 N. W. 535; Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Huntington, 57 Kan. 744, 48 Pac. 19; Demuth v. Old Town Bank, 85 Md. 315, 60 Am. St. Rep. 322, 37 Atl. 266; Keller v. McConville, 175 Mich. 479, 141 N. W. 652; Johnson v. Johnson, 81 Mo. 331; Lipscomb v. Talbott, 243 Mo. 1, 147 S. W. 798; Greeley State Bank v. Line, 50 Neb. 434, 69 N. W. 966; Consterdine v. Moore, (Neb.) 96 N. W. 1021; Daniels v. Densmore, 32 Neb. 40, 48 N. W. 906; Salvage v. Haydock, 68 N. H. 484, 44 Atl. 696; Daly v. New York & G. L. Ry. Co., 55 N. J. Eq. 595, 38 Atl. 202 (mere delivery of bond and mortgage sufficient); Cornish v. Wolverton, 32 Mont. 456, 108 Am. St. Rep. 598, 81 Pac. 4; Smith v. Godwin, 145 N. C. 242, 58 S. E. 1089; Hillman v. Young, 64 Or. 73, 127 Pac. 793, 129 Pac. 124; Cooper v. Harvey, 21 S. D. 471, 113 N. W. 717 (void foreclosure sale is an assignment of the mortgage to the purchaser);

Grether v. Smith, (S. D.) 96 N. W. 93; Houston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bremond, 66 Tex. 159, 18 S. W. 448; Bartlett Estate Co. v. Fairhaven Land Co., 49 Wash. 58, 126 Am. St. Rep. 856, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 590, 94 Pac. 900 (assignment of debt passes mortgage, and all rights possessed by assignor, including right to declare whole debt due on default in payment of interest); Emmons v. Hawk, 62 W. Va. 526, 59 S. E. 519 (deed of trust); Franke v. Neisler, 97 Wis. 364, 72 N. W. 887; Milwaukee Trust Co. v. Van Valkenburgh, 132 Wis. 638, 112 N. W. 1083; Roach v. Sanborn Land Co., 135 Wis. 354, 115 N. W. 1102 (trust deed); In re Tobin's Estate (Tobin v. Tobin), 139 Wis. 494, 121 N. W. 144. Under a late statute in Indiana, (Acts 1899, p. 191; Burns' Rev. Stats. 1901, § 1107a, et seq.), the mere assignment of a note does not carry the mortgage: Perry v. Fisher, 30 Ind. App. 261, 65 N. E. 935. An assignment of a debt carries with it an equitable lien: Union Trust Co. v. Walker, 107 U. S. 596, 27 L. Ed. 490, 2 Sup. Ct. 299; Burnham v. Bowen, 111 U. S. 776, 28 L. Ed. 596, 4 Sup. Ct. 675 (right to claim payment out of fund in hands of receiver).

that an assignment of the mortgage alone, without the debt, is wholly nugatory in equity, and passes no equitable rights to the assignee. Even in the states where the legal estate

484; Thorndike v. Norris, 24 N. H. 454; Wolcott v. Winchester, 15 Gray, 461; Green v. Hart, 1 Johns. 580; Runyan v. Mersereau, 11 Johns. 534, 6 Am. Dec. 393; Evertson v. Booth, 19 Johns. 486, 491; Jackson v. Blodgett, 5 Cow. 202; Pattison v. Hull, 9 Cow. 747; Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wend. 80; Gillett v. Campbell, 1 Denio, 520; Parmelee v. Dann, 23 Barb. 461; Partridge v. Partridge, 38 Pa. St. 78; Hyman v. Devereux, 63 N. C. 624; Walker v. Kee, 14 S. C. 142; Cleveland v. Cohrs, 10 S. C. 224; Muller v. Wadlington, 5 S. C. 342; Prout v. Hoge, 57 Ala. 28; Center v. P. & M. Bank, 22 Ala. 743; Graham v. Newman, 21 Ala. 497; Cullum v. Erwin, 4 Ala. 452; Emanuel v. Hunt, 2 Ala. 190; Doe v. McLoskey, 1 Ala. 708; O'Hara v. Haas, 46 Miss. 374; Holmes v. McGinty, 44 Miss. 94; Henderson v. Herrod, 10 Smedes & M. 631; Lewis v. Starke, 10 Smedes & M. 120; Dick v. Mawry, 9 Smedes & M. 448; Perot v. Levasseur, 21 La. Ann. 529; Scott v. Turner, 15 La. Ann. 346; Perkins v. Sterne, 23 Tex. 561, 76 Am. Dec. 72; Paine v. French, 4 Ohio, 318; Burdett v. Clay, 8 B. Mon. 287; Miles v. Gray, 4 B. Mon. 417; French v. Turner, 15 Ind. 59; Burton v. Baxter, 7 Blackf. 297; Slaughter v. Foust, 4 Blackf. 379; Blair v. Bass, 4 Blackf. 539; Briggs v. Hannowald, 35 Mich. 474; Nelson v. Ferris, 30 Mich. 497; Martin v. McReynolds, 6 Mich. 70; Grassly v. Reinback, 4 Ill. App. 341; Mapps v. Sharpe, 32 Ill. 13; Pardee v. Lindley, 31 Ill. 174, 83 Am. Dec. 219; Vansant v. Allmon, 23 Ill. 30; Lucas v. Harris, 20 Ill. 165; Ryan v. Dunlap, 17 Ill. 40, 63 Am. Dec. 334; Andrews v. Hart, 17 Wis. 297; Rice v. Cribb, 12 Wis. 179; Blunt v. Walker, 11 Wis. 334, 78 Am. Dec. 709; Croft v. Bunster, 9 Wis. 503; Vandercook v. Baker, 48 Iowa, 199; Preston v. Morris, 42 Iowa, 549; Swan v. Yaple, 35 Iowa, 248; Bank of Indiana v. Anderson, 14 Iowa, 544, 83 Am. Dec. 390; Crow v. Vance, 4 Iowa, 434; Lindsey v. Bates, 42 Miss. 397; Potter v. Stevens, 40 Mo. 229; Chappell v. Allen, 38 Mo. 213; Anderson v. Baumgartner, 27 Mo. 80; Kurtz v. Sponable, 6 Kan. 395; Bennett v. Solomon, 6 Cal. 134; Ord v. McKee, 5 Cal. 515.

That an assignment of a part of the debt secured carries with it a proportionate part of the mortgage has already been shown: *Ante*, § 1202; and see Muller v. Wadlington, 5 S. C. 342. A verbal assignment with delivery is sufficient, in the absence of a statutory requirement of writing:^b Kamena v. Huelbig, 23 N. J. Eq. 78; Pease v. Warren, 29 Mich. 9, 18 Am. Rep. 58; but when it was intended to have a

§ 1210, (b) Curtis v. Moore, 152 N. Y. 159, 57 Am. St. Rep. 506, 46 N. E. 168.

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in the premises may be conveyed by the mortgagee, such an assignment would only vest the assignee with the naked legal title held by him in trust for the one who owned the debt.^{3 d} The rights of priority acquired by the assignee, as

written assignment, a mere manual delivery will not pass the title: Strause v. Josephthal, 77 N. Y. 622. If the debt is evidenced by a note, a formal assignment of the mortgage, and delivery of the note without indorsement, constitutes a complete and absolute transfer: Pease v. Warren, 29 Mich. 9, 18 Am. Rep. 58; Nelson v. Ferris, 30 Mich. 497.^e A transfer of a negotiable note without indorsement passes a perfect equitable title.

§ 1210, ³ Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. 271; Hutchins v. Carleton, 19 N. H. 487; Bell v. Morse, 6 N. H. 205; Bowers v. Johnson, 49 N. Y. 432; Merritt v. Bartholick, 36 N. Y. 44; 47 Barb. 253; Cooper v. Newland, 17 Abb. Pr. 342; Aymar v. Bill, 5 Johns. Ch. 570; Cleveland v. Cohrs, 10 S. C. 224; Carter v. Bennett, 4 Fla. 283; Doe v. McLoskey, 1 Ala. 708; Johnson v. Cornett, 29 Ind. 59; Bailey v. Gould, Walk. Ch. 478; Hitchcock v. Merrick, 18 Wis. 357; Swan v. Yaple, 35 Iowa, 248; Sangster v. Love, 11 Iowa, 580; Pope v. Jacohus, 10 Iowa, 262; Thayer v. Camphell, 9 Mo. 277, 280; Peters v. Jamestown B. Co., 5 Cal. 334. 63 Am. Dec. 134. In states adopting the second system, such an assignment would be wholly nugatory, conveying no interest to the assignee. In states of the first class, it would be possible at law, but the bare legal interest acquired by the assignee would be controlled by equity for the benefit of the party holding the debt, who would be the person beneficially interested, and the equitable owner of the mortgage. It should be observed, however, that when the mortgage itself, as is ordinarily the case, contains a covenant or promise on the mortgagor's part to pay the debt, or a provision from which such a promise will be implied, an assignment of the mortgage is necessarily, also, an assignment of the debt.

§ 1210, (c) See O'Connor v. Mc-Hugh, 89 Ala. 531, 7 South. 749 (transfer by delivery of note and mortgage conveys the equitable, but not the legal, estate); Barrett v. Hinckley, 124 Ill. 32, 7 Am. St. Rep. 331, 14 N. E. 863 (mortgagee can convey the legal title only by deed under seal); Bailey v. Winn, 101 Mo. 649, 12 S. W. 1045.

§1210, (d) Jordan v. Sayre, 29 Fla. 100, 10 South. 823; Williams v. Teachey, 85 N. C. 402; Dameron v. Eskridge, 104 N. C. 624, 10 S. E. 700. See, also, Orman v. North Alabama Assets Co., 204 Fed. 289 (but court held, on the facts, that assignment of the debt was intended); Lacey v. Pearce, 191 Ala. 258, 68 South. 46; Re Pirie, 198 N. Y. 209, 19 Ann. Cas. 672, 91 N. E. 587 (mortgage has no legal existence when separated from the note and transferred to others than the holder of governed by the original doctrines of equity, and as modified by the recording acts, and how far he takes subject to or freed from existing equities in favor of the mortgagor and others, have already been considered in a previous chapter.⁴

§ 1210, 4 See ante, vol. 2, §§ 703-715. That the assignee takes subject to existing equities (ante, § 704), see Vredenburgh v. Burnet, 31 N. J. Eq. 229; Burbank v. Warwick, 52 Iowa, 493; 3 N. W. 519; Sims v. Hammond, 33 Iowa, 368; Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 163. When a mortgage is given to secure a *negotiable* note, and the note and mortgage are assigned before maturity, the question whether the assignce takes the mortgage free from all equities, as in the case of a bona fide transferee of such a note alone, or whether he takes it subject to all equities, is examined ante, § 704, and cases are cited reaching exactly opposite conclusions. The following cases, also, maintain the rule that such assignee takes the mortgage free from all equities: Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. 271, 21 L. Ed. 313; Kenicott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 452, 21 L. Ed. 319; Beals v. Neddo, 1 McCrary, 206; Gabbert v. Schwartz, 69 Ind. 450; Pierce v. Faunce, 47 Me. 507; Sprague v. Graham, 29 Me. 160; Taylor v. Page, 6 Allen, 86; Gould v. Marsh, 1 Hun, 566; and see Jones v. Smith, 22 Mich. 360. On the other hand, the following additional cases hold such assignment to be controlled by the general rule, and therefore subject to all existing equities: Grassly v. Reinback, 4 Ill. App. 341; Baily v. Smith, 14 Ohio St. 396, 84 Am. Dec. 385; Johnson v. Carpenter, 7 Minn. 176; Bouligny v. Fortier, 17 La. Ann. 121. The reasons for the ruling that such assignee takes free from all equities are stated with as much force as possible by Swayne, J., in Carpenter v. Longan, supra. Reduced to their lowest terms, they amount to this: that the debt is the principal thing, and the mortgage is a mere adjunct of the debt, and has no existence separate from the debt. Admitting the full force of this reasoning, the conclusion is, in my opinion, the result of a false analogy. The answer to it is very short, but, as it seems to me, very complete. The note and the mortgage do not together constitute a promissory note. The conclusion reached by this line of cases not only destroys the uniformity and consistency of the doctrines concerning mortgages, but misapprehends and misapplies the peculiar doctrines concerning negotiable instruments. The most distinctive feature of negotiability-the

the note); Noble v. Watkins, 48 Or. 518, 87 Pac. 771 (deed by mortgagee does not operate as assignment of mortgage and debt, as against third person, where mortgage is a mere lien); In re Tobin's Estate (Tobin v. Tobin), 139 Wis. 494, 121 N. W. 144. § 1211. Equitable Assignment by Subrogation.—Under some circumstances, the payment of the amount due on a mortgage, when made by certain classes of persons, is held in equity to operate as an assignment of the mortgage. By means of the payment, the mortgage is not satisfied and the lien of it destroyed, but equity regards the person making the payment as thereby becoming the owner of the mortgage, at least for some definite purposes, and the mortgage as being kept alive, and the lien thereof as preserved, for his benefit and security.^a This equitable result follows,

rule that the bona fide transferee takes a bill or note free from defenses-had its origin in the customs of merchants. It was first adopted by the courts, and has ever since been maintained, solely with a view to promote the interests of merchants, and to secure the success and freedom of mercantile and commercial dealings. A promissory note accompanied by a mortgage is not in any sense a mercantile or commercial security; all the reasons of the peculiar rule of the law merchant fail in their application to it. The courts which extend this rule to a note and mortgage are misled by a false analogy; in order to reach their conclusion, they are obliged to treat the mortgage as a nullity,-not merely as an *incident* of the note, but as having actually no existence. I am strongly of the opinion that the cases of which the Illinois decisions are an example rest upon a true foundation of principle. It is held in the very recent case of Burhans v. Hutcheson, 25 Kan. 625, 37 Am. Rep. 274, that where a note and mortgage are assigned for value before maturity, and the assignment was not recorded, and no notice of it was given to the mortgagor, payment by the mortgagor to the original mortgagee does not in any way affect the rights of the assignee to enforce the security,--the absence of notice being wholly imma-This decision is certainly inconsistent with a doctrine supposed terial. to be settled and familiar: See ante, vol. 2, § 702. The only possible ground upon which it can be sustained is the rule stated above, which imparts to such mortgages the distinctive characteristics of negotiable paper. This case, I think, well illustrates the correctness of my criticisms: it shows to what extent that rule destroys the consistency and uniformity of the settled doctrines concerning mortgages. See, also, Jones v. Smith, 22 Mich. 360; Van Keuren v. Corkins, 4 Hun, 129.

§ 1211, (a) Quoted in Lashua v. Myhre, 117 Wis. 18, 93 N. W. 811; also, in Young v. Pecos County, 46
Tex. Civ. App. 319, 101 S. W. 1055. Sections 1211 et seq., are cited in Brethauer v. Schorer, 77 Conn. 575, 60 Atl. 125; Murray v. O'Brien, 56 Wash. 361, 28 **L. B. A. (N. S.)** 998, 105 Pac. 840.

although no actual assignment, written or verbal, accompanied the payment, and the securities themselves were not delivered over to the person making payment, and even though a receipt was given speaking of the mortgage debt as being fully paid, and sometimes even though the mortgage itself was actually discharged and satisfied of record.^b This equitable doctrine, which is a particular application of the broad principle of subrogation, is enforced whenever the person making the payment stands in such relations to the premises or to the other parties that his interests, recognized either by law or by equity, can only be fully protected and maintained by regarding the transaction as an assignment to him, and the lien of the mortgage as being kept alive, either wholly or in part, for his security and benefit.¹ c

§ 1211, ¹ It should be carefully observed that this peculiarly equitable doctrine can have application only to persons who, properly speaking, make payment of the mortgage. If a stranger, having no interest whatever in the premises, purchases the mortgage from the holder thereof, and takes an assignment to himself, the doctrine clearly has no application. If, however, persons acquiring subsequent interests in the premises, as purchasers, encumbrancers, and the like, but not being the debtors, pay off the mortgage for the purpose of securing their own interest, their act is properly called a "payment," and they are plainly

§1211, (b) The text is quoted in Barnes v. Cady, 232 Fed. 318, 146 C. C. A. 366.

§ 1211, (c) This section is quoted in extenso in Columbus, S. & H. R. Co. Appeals, 109 Fed. 177, 210, 48 C. C. A. 275; Whiteselle v. Texas Loan Agency, (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 309; also in Young v. Pecos County, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 319, 101 S. W. 1055; and cited in Arnold v. Green, 116 N. Y. 566, 23 N. E. 1; Boevink v. Christiaanse, (Neb.) 95 N. W. 652; Sutton v. Sutton, 26 S. C. 33, 1 S. E. 19; Bank of Ipswich v. Brock, 13 S. D. 409, 83 N. W. 436; First Nat. Bank v. Ackerman, 70 Tex. 315, 8 S. W. 45; Wood v. Wood, 134 Ala. 557, 33 South. 347; Reyburn v. Mitchell, 106 Mo. 365, 27 Am. St. Rep. 350, 16 S. W. 592; Estate of Freud, 131 Cal. 667, 82 Am. St. Rep. 407, 63 Pac. 1080; Kinkead v. Ryan, 64 N. J. Eq. 454, 53 Atl. 1053 (right of subrogation arises from the circumstances of the case, and not out of any notion of contract). Cited, also, in the recent cases, Barnes v. Cady, 232 Fed. 318, 146 C. C. A. 366; Walker v. Mathis, 128 Ark. 317, 194 S. W. 702; Curlett v. Emmons, 9 Del. Ch. 62, 85 Atl. 1079; Pittsburgh-Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Kerr, 220 N. Y. 137, 115 N. E. 465.

§ 1212. In Whose Favor Such Equitable Assignment Exists.—Equity does not admit the doctrine of equitable assignment in favor of every person who pays off a mortgage. Such relations must exist towards the mortgaged premises or with the other parties, that the payment is not a purely voluntary act, but is an equitably necessary or proper means of securing the interests of the one making it from possible loss or injury. The payment must be made by or on behalf of a person who had some interest in the premises, or some claim against other parties, which he is entitled, in equity, to have protected and secured. A mere stranger, therefore, who pays off a mortgage as a purely voluntary act can never be an equitable assignee.^{1 a} In

in a very different position from that of the stranger who purchases the mortgage. The doctrine formulated in the text is an instance of subrogation, and depends upon the same general grounds and considerations. By many writers and judges it is discussed under the name of "subrogation" alone; the person paying is described as being subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee in the mortgage security. I prefer to use the name of "equitable assignment,"-a designation which accurately describes the nature of the transaction and its effects upon the rights of the parties. The classes of persons whose rights are to be considered in connection with this doctrine are the stranger who voluntarily pays the mortgage, the stranger who advances money for its payment at the request of the mortgagor or other person upon whom the liability to pay rests, the mortgagor, his heirs, devisees, and administrators or executors, his grantee who assumes payment of the mortgage, his grantee merely subject to the mortgage, the widow of the mortgagor or of any subsequent owner of the premises, subsequent encumbrancers, subsequent lessees,-in short, all persons who acquire subsequent interests in the mortgaged premises or in any part thereof. This doctrine in connection with the general principle of subrogation is elaborately discussed in the American editor's notes to Aldrich v. Cooper, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 228, 255, et seq., and to Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 120, 134-187; and see section concerning merger, ante, §§ 789-800, vol. 2.

§ 1212, ¹ Such a stranger, having no interest in the premises and no relations with the parties, cannot even compel the mortgagee to accept

 § 1212, (a) The text is quoted in Hughes v. Howell, 152 Ala. 295, 44
 Rice, [1910] 2 Ch. 277; Nelson v.

 South. 410. See; also, Butler v.
 McKee, 53 Ind. App. 344, 99 N. E.

 447, 101 N. E. 651; Ramoneda Bros.

 general, when any person having a subsequent interest in the premises, and who is therefore entitled to redeem for the purpose of protecting such interest, and who is not the principal debtor primarily and absolutely liable for the mortgage debt, pays off the mortgage, he thereby becomes an equitable assignee thereof, and may keep alive and enforce the lien so far as may be necessary in equity for his own benefit; he is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee to the extent necessary for his own equitable protection.² b

payment of the amount due on the mortgage. If the mortgagce voluntarily accepts the money, he cannot be compelled to assign the mortgage to the stranger. If the mortgagee *consents* both to accept the money and to give an assignment, then the transaction becomes an ordinary purchase of the mortgagee by the stranger, which can always be effected with the mortgagee's *consent*, but never without. In no case, therefore, can the stranger voluntarily paying occupy the position of an *equitable* assignee,—he can never claim to be *subrogated* to the rights of the mortgagee.

§ 1212, ² In Muir v. Berkshire, 52 Ind. 149, 151, Biddle, C. J., said: "Subrogation generally takes place between co-creditors, where the junior pays the debt due to the senior, to secure his own claim, or it arises from transactions of principals and sureties, and sometimes between co-sureties or co-guarantors. It is not allowed to voluntary purchasers or strangers, unless there is some peculiar equitable relation

v. Loggins, 89 Miss. 225, 42 South. 669; Journal Publishing Co. v. Barber, 165 N. C. 478, 81 S. E. 694; Rice v. Winters, 45 Neb. 517, 63 N. W. 830.

§ 1212, (b) Quoted in Ohmer v. Boyer, 89 Ala. 273, 7 South. 663; Sutton v. Sutton, 26 S. C. 33, 1 S. E. 19; also in Barnes v. Cady, 232 Fed. 318, 146 C. C. A. 366; Hughes v. Howell, 152 Ala. 295, 44 South. 410; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Napoleon Hill Cotton Co., 108 Ark. 555, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1049, 158 S. W. 1082; Capitol National Bank v. Holmes, 43 Colo. 154, 127 Am. St. Rep. 108, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 470, 95 Pac. 314. This section is cited in Crippen v. Chappel, 35 Kan. 495, 57

Am. Rep. 187, 11 Pac. 453; Bowen v. Gilbert, 122 Iowa, 448, 98 N. W. 273; Bennett v. First Nat. Bank, (Iowa) 102 N. W. 129; Scott v. Mortgage Co., 127 Ala. 161, 28 South. 709; McQueen v. Whetstone, (Ala.) 30 South. 548; Wood v. Wood, 134 Ala. 557, 33 South. 347; Estate of Freud, 131 Cal. 667, 82 Am. St. Rep. 407, 63 Pac. 1080; also in Walker v. Mathis, 128 Ark. 317, 194 S. W. 702; Kollen v. Sooy, 172 Mich. 214, 137 N. W. 808 (payment by grantee who did not assume mort-See, also, McCormick v. gage). Knox, 105 U. S. 126, 26 L. Ed. 940; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Drake, 214 Fed. 556, 131 C. C. A. 82; Obmer v. Boyer, 89 Ala. 273, 7

The doctrine is also justly extended, by analogy, to one who,

in the transaction, and never to mere meddlers. But while this is the rule generally, we think that a person who has paid a debt under a colorable obligation to do so, that he may protect his own claim, should be subrogated to the rights of the creditor." In Ellsworth v. Lockwood, 42 N. Y. 89, 97, Sutherland, J., said: "The subrogation or substitution by operation of law to the rights and interests of the mortgagee in the land is on and by redemption; and redemption is payment of the mortgage debt, after forfeiture by the terms of the mortgage contract; so that really the subrogation or substitution by operation of law arises or proceeds on the theory that the mortgage debt is paid. If the holder of a bond and mortgage assigns them to a party claiming a right to redeem, the latter is subrogated, by the assignment, to the mortgage debt and mortgage security, and to the instruments evidencing such debt and security, and there is no room or occasion for subrogation by operation of law." The class of persons coming within the description of the text who are equitable assignees, and thus subrogated to the mortgagee by the act of payment, include the grantee from the mortgagor or any subsequent grantee who has taken the land

South. 663; Hamilton v. Robinson, 190 Ala. 549, 67 South. 434 (payment by grantee); Spurlock v. Spurlock, 80 Ark. 37, 96 S. W. 753 (wife paying mortgage on homestead); Kay v. Castleberry, 99 Ark. 618, 139 S. W. 645; Swain v. Stockton S. & L. Soc., 78 Cal. 600, 12 Am. St. Rep. 118, 21 Pac. 365; Bristol v. Hershey, 7 Cal. App. 738, 95 Pac. 1040 (junior mortgagee redeems from prior mortgage); Rich v. Smith, 26 Cal. App. 775, 148 Pac. 545 (payment by cotenant); Brethauer v. Schorer, 77. Conn. 575, 60 Atl. 125 (junior mortgagee paying interest in default on prior mortgage); Scanlou v. Parish, 85 Conn. 379, 82 Atl. 969 (co-tenant pays); Peagler v. Davis, 143 Ga. 11, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 232, 84 S. E. 59; Ebert v. Gerding, 116 Ill. 216, 5 N. E. 591; Hazle v. Bondy, 173 Ill. 302, 50 N. E. 671; Illinois Nat. Bank v. Trustees of Schools, (Ill.) 71 N. E. 1070 (subrogation of junior mortgagee paying off senior mortgage); Thomas v. Home Mutual Building Loan Ass'n, 243 Ill. 550, 90 N. E. 1081 (grantee assumes mortgage; one succeeding to grantor's rights subrogated on paying mortgage); Howard v. Burns, 279 Ill. 256, 116 N. E. 703 (payment by grantor, grantee having assumed mortgage); Johnson v. Barrett, 117 Ind. 551, 10 Am. St. Rep. 83, 19 N. E. 199; Gregory v. Arms, 48 Ind. App. 562, 96 N. E. 196 (administrator of deceased mortgagor pays mortgage on property which has been sold subject to the mortgage); Oglebay v. Todd, 166 Ind. 250, 76 N. E. 238 (payment by grantor, grantee having assumed mortgage); Bryson v. Close, 60 Iowa. 357, 14 N. W. 350; Bowen v. Gilbert, 122 Jowa, 448, 98 N. W. 273; Gulick v. Peckenpaugh, 154 Iowa, 380, 134 N. W. 945 (second mortgagee pays interest on first mortgage); Crippen v. Chappel, 35 Kan. 495, 57 Am. Rep. 187, 11 Pac. 453; Olson v. Peterson, 88 Kan. 350, 128 Pac. 191 (person

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having no previous interest, and being under no obligation, pays off the mortgage, or advances money for its payment,

simply subject to the mortgage; the heir or devisee of the mortgagor; the widow of the mortgagor or of any subsequent owner; a subsequent encumbrancer by mortgage, judgment, or otherwise; a subsequent lessee, and the like. The mortgagor himself who has conveyed the premises to a grantee in such manner that the latter has assumed payment of the mortgage debt becomes an equitable assignee on payment, and is subrogated to the mortgagee, so far as is necessary to enforce his equity of reimbursement or exoneration from such grantee; but quære, is he an equitable assignee to any greater extent or against any other parties? See ante, § 1206, and notes; also vol. 2, § 797. The doctrine is also extended to a person who had no subsequent interest in the premises, and was therefore under no obligation or personal necessity of paying the debt, but who at the instance of the debtor pays off the mortgage for his benefit, or advances the money for its payment, under

supposing himself the owner pays off mortgage); Long v. Deposit Bank, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 913, 90 S. W. 961; Todd's Ex'r v. First Nat. Bank, 173 Ky. 60, 190 S. W. 468 (life-tenant); Allen v. Alden, 109 Me. 516, 85 Atl. 3 (redemption by junior mortgagee); Parsons v. Urie, 104 Md. 238, 10 Ann. Cas. 278, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 559, 64 Atl. 927 (co-tenant pays); Hogan v. McMahon, 115 Md. 195, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1260, 80 Atl. 695 (same); Taylor v. Roniger, 147 Mich. 99, 110 N. W. 503 (person supposing himself owner pays off mortgage); Gerdine v. Menage, 41 Minn. 417, 43 N. W. 91; Heisler v. Aultman, 56 Minn. 454, 45 Am. St. Rep. 486, 57 N. W. 1053; Kopp v. Thele, 104 Minn. 267, 15 Ann. Cas. 313, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 981, 116 N. W. 472 (payment by wife); Ramoneda Bros. v. Loggins, (Miss.) 39 South. 1007 (prior lien paid by subsequent lienor); Allen v. Dermott, 80 Mo. 56; Van Meter v. Poole, 129 Mo. App. 433, 110 S. W. 5 (payment by surety of one who has conveyed to a grantee who has assumed the mortgage); Kelly v. Duff, 61 N. H. 435; Vliet v. Cowenhoven, 83 N. J. Eq. 234, 90 Atl. 681 (payment of prior mortgage by mortgagee in possession); Arnold v. Green, 116 N. Y. 566, 23 N. E. 1; Moring v. Privott, 146 N. C. 558, 60 S. E. 509; Journal Publishing Co. v. Barber, 165 N. C. 478, 81 S. E. 694 (purchaser from mortgagor's agent, believing he has good title, pays off mortgage; subrogated); Omlie v. O'Toole, 16 N. D. 126, 112 N. W. 677 (mortgagee by absolute deed pays interest on prior encumbrance); Northwestern Mut. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. White, 31 N. D. 348, 153 N. W. 972; Hopkins Mfg. Co. v. Ketterer, 237 Pa. 285, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 558, 85 Atl. 421; Duffy v. Mc-Guinness, 13 R. I. 595; Sutton v. Sutton, 26 S. C. 33, 1 S. E. 19; Cape Fear Lumber Co. v. Evans, (S. C.) 48 S. E. 108; Sprowls v. Sprowls, 34 S. D. 140, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 830, 147 N. W. 645 (payment by co-tenant); First Nat. Bank v. Ackerman, 70 Tex. 315, 8 S. W. 45; Flynt v. Taylor, 100 Tex. 60, 93 S. W. 423 (mort-

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at the instance of a debtor party and for his benefit; such a person is in no true sense a mere stranger and volunteer.^d

an agreement that he shall have security for his payment or advances.^c Such a person is not a mere stranger and volunteer. The following cases furnish illustrations of the doctrine as applied to various persons belonging to the class as above enumerated: Cobb v. Dyer, 69 Me. 494 (where the mortgage had been actually satisfied and discharged of record on payment by a junior mortgagee); Walker v. King, 45 Vt. 525; 44 Vt. 601; Wheeler v. Willard, 44 Vt. 640; Twombly v. Cassidy, 82 N. Y. 155; Barnes v. Mott, 64 N. Y. 397, 21 Am. Rep. 625 (the mortgage discharged of record); Brainard v. Cooper, 10 N. Y. 356; Russell v. Pistor, 7 N. Y. 171, 57 Am. Dec. 509; Snelling v. McIntyre, 6 Abb. N. C. 469; Dings v. Parshall, 7 Hun, 522; McGiven v. Wheelock, 7 Barb. 22; Rogers v. Traders' Ins. Co., 6 Paige, 583; Klock v. Cronkhite, 1 Hill, 107; Tice v. Annin, 2 Johns. Ch. 125; Mosier's Appeal, 56 Pa. St. 76, 93 Am. Dec. 783; Roddy's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 98; Fiacre v. Chapman, 32 N. J. Eq. 463; Robinson v. Urquhart, 12 N. J. Eq. 515; Carter v. Taylor, 3 Head, 30; Simpson v. Gardiner, 97 Ill. 237 (by one of two owners in common); Young v. Morgan, 89 Ill. 199; Matteson v. Thomas, 41 Ill. 110; Wood v. Smith, 51 Iowa, 156, 50 N. W. 581; White v. Hampton, 13 Iowa, 259; Levy v. Martin, 48 Wis. 198, 4 N. W. 35; Greenwell v. Heritage, 71 Mo. 459; Lockwood v. Marsh, 3 Nev. 138; Carpentier v. Brenham, 40 Cal. 221; and see 1 Jones on Mortgages, secs. 874-885; and ante, vol. 2, §§ 797, 798.

gagee paying off prior liens); James v. Brainard-Jackson & Co., 64 Wash. 175, 116 Pac. 633; University State Bank v. Steeves, 85 Wash. 55, 147 Pac. 645 (payment by grantor, grantee having assumed mortgage); Webb v. Crouch, 70 W. Va. 580, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 728, 74 S. E. 730 (second mortgagee, by absolute deed, who is record owner, pays off first mortgage); Wilton v. Mayberry, 75 Wis. 191, 17 Am. St. Rep. 193, 6 L. R. A. 61, 43 N. W. 901; Stewart v. Stewart, 90 Wis. 516, 48 Am. St. Rep. 949, 63 N. W. 886 (subrogation of grantee who in good faith paid off mortgage, but whose deed was subsequently set aside on ground of non-delivery); Charmley v. Charmley, 125 Wis. 297, 110 Am. St. Rep. 827, 103 N. W. 1106 (wife paving husband's mortgage to protect homestead).

§ 1212, (c) Quoted in Amick v. Woodworth, 58 Ohio St. 86, 50 N. E. 437.

§1212, (d) Subrogation of Person Advancing Money for Payment at Request of Debtor .--- Quoted and applied in Warford v. Hankins, 150 Ind. 489, 50 N. E. 468; Amick v. Woodworth, 58 Ohio St. 86, 50 N. E. 437; In re McGuire, 137 Fed. 967; Bell v. Bell, 174 Ala. 446, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1203, 56 South. 926; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Napoleon Hill Cotton Co., 108 Ark. 555, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1049, 158 S. W. 1082; American Fidelity Co. v. East Ohio Sewer Pipe Co., 53 Ind. App. 335, 101 N. E. 671; Laffranchini v. Clark, 39 Nev. 48, 153 Pac. 250; Mergele v. SUBROGATION ON PAYMENT OF MORTGAGE. § 1213

§ 1213. In Whose Favor Such Equitable Assignment does not Exist.—On the other hand, if payment of the mortgage debt is made to the mortgagee or other holder of the mortgage, by a party who is himself personally and pri-

Felix, (Tex. Civ. App.) 99 S. W. 709; Powers v. Pense, 20 Wyo. 327, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 785, 123 Pac. 925. Cited to this effect in Bank of Ipswich v. Brock, 13 S. D. 409, 83 N. W. 436; Union M., B. & Trust Co. v. Peters, 72 Miss. 1058, 30 L. R. A. 829, 18 South. 497; Merchants & Mechanics' Bank v. Tillman, 106 Ga. 55, 31 S. E. 794; Emmert v. Thompson, 49 Minn. 386, 32 Am. St. Rep. 566, 52 N. W. 31; also, in Woodruff v. Satterfield, (Ala.) 74 South. 948; Cook v. Kelly, (Ala.) 75 South. 953; Kent v. Bailey, (Iowa) 164 N. W. 852. See Home Sav. Bank v. Bierstadt, 168 Ill. 618, 61 Am. St. Rep. 146, 48 N. E. 161. Thus, "where one loans money to another upon the agreement that it is to be used to pay off an existing mortgage on property, and that a new mortgage , is to be executed to the lender therefor, the lender is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the prior mortgagee in case the borrower fails to execute a new mortgage, or in case the new mortgage, when executed, proves to be invalid or defective": Lashua v. Myhre, 117 Wis. 18, 93 N. W. 811; Wilton v. Mayberry, 75 Wis. 191, 6 L. R. A. 61, 17 Am. St. Rep. 193, 43 N. W. 901; Brevink v. Christiaanse, (Neb.) 95 N. W. 652; Scott v. Mortgage Co., 127 Ala. 161, 28 South. 709 (vendor's lien); Western Mortg. & Inv. Co. v. Ganzer, 63 Fed. 647, 11 C. C. A. 371, 23 U. S. App. 608 (vendor's lien); Merchants & Mechanics' Bank v. Tillman, 106 Ga. 55, 31 S. E. 794; Whitselle v. Texas Loan Agency, (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 309; Heu-

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ser v. Sharman, 89 Iowa, 355, 48 Am. St. Rep. 390, 56 N. W. 525; Haverford Loan & B. Ass'n v. Fire Ass'n, 180 Pa. St. 522, 57 Am. St. Rep. 654, 37 Atl. 179; Baker v. Baker, 2 S. D. 261, 39 Am. St. Rep. 776, 49 N. W. 1064; Sproal v. Larsen, (Mich.) 101 N. W. 213. In Seeley v. Bacon. (N. J. Eq.) 34 Atl. 139, it is said: "It is entirely settled that one who advances money to pay a claim for the security of which there exists a lien, in default of an agreement, cannot be subrogated to the rights of the lienor. Conventional subrogation can only result from an express agreement either with the debtor or the creditor." Compare Bohn, etc., Door Co. v. Case, 42 Neb. 281, 60 N. W. 576; Rice v. Winters. 45 Neb. 517, 63 N. W. 830. On the other hand, it is held in Wilkins v. Gibson, 113 Ga. 31, 84 Am. St. Rep. 204, 38 S. E. 374, that the agreement may be implied.

See, also, in support of the text, Crosbie-Hill v. Sayer, [1908] 1 Ch. 866; Re Lee, 182 Fed. 579, 105 C. C. A. 117; Platte Valley Cattle Co. v. Bosserman-Gates Live Stock & Loan Co., 202 Fed. 692, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1137, 121 C. C. A. 102; Arnett v. Willoughby, 190 Ala. 319, 67 South. 426; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Napoleon Hill Cotton Co., 108 Ark. 555, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1049, 158 S. W. 1082; Thomas v. Hall, (Me.) 100 Atl. 502; Nestor v. Davis, 100 Miss. 199, 56 South. 347; Petty v. Tucker, 166 Nev. App. 98, 148 S. W. 142; Frederick v. Gehling, 92 Neb. 204, 137 N. W. 998; Commercial & Farmers' Bank v. Scotland Neck Bank, (N. C.) marily liable for the debt, who is in any manner and by any means the actual primary debtor, whose duty it is to pay the debt absolutely, and before all others, such payment operates *ipso facto* as an end of the mortgage, and the lien is completely destroyed. The party so paying is not subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee; there is no equitable assignment to him of the mortgage security; even if he should receive a formal assignment, the mortgage could not be thus kept alive, but would be wholly merged and ended.¹a

§ 1213, ¹ In this description are included the mortgagor himself, so long as he remains the principal debtor, and has not changed his relations by

73 S. E. 157; Sprague v. Lovett, 20 S. D. 328, 106 N. W. 134; Manning v. Green, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 579, 121 S. W. 721; Parker v. Bushong, (Tex. Civ. App.) 143 S. W. 281; Hill v. Ritchie, 90 Vt. 318, 98 Atl. 497. Where the mortgagor wrongfully applied money belonging to A to the payment of the mortgage, it has been held that A is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee to the extent of the payment: Young v. Pecos County, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 319, 101 S. W. 1055; Buist v. Williams, 88 S. C. 252, 70 S. E: 817; Heller Aller Co. v. Ries, 164 Mich. 501, 129 N. W. 724; see post, Pom. Eq. Rem., § 921, note 81. If the person advances money to pay off the old mortgage and receives as security for his loan a new mortgage, which turns out to be invalid, he is generally subrogated to the original mortgage: See post, Pom. Eq. Rem., § 921, note 82; Davies v. Pugh, 81 Ark. 253, 99 S. W. 78; Gato v. Christian, 112 Me. 427, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 592, 92 Atl. 489; Ligon v. Barton, 88 Miss. 135, 40 South. 555; Helm v. Lynchburg Trust & Savings Bank, 106 Va. 603, 56 S. E. 598; Wilson v. Hubbard, 39 Wash. 671, 82 Pac. 154; Hughes v. Thomas, 131 Wis. 315, 11

Ann. Cas. 673, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 744, 111 N. W. 474; Powers v. Pense, 20 Wyo. 327, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 785, 123 Pac. 925; contra, Capen v. Garrison, 193 Mo. 335, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 368, 92 S. W. 368; Boley v. Daniel, 72 Fla. 121, 72 South. 644. See Berry v. Stigalt, 253 Mo. 690, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 118, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489, 162 S. W. 126.

In a considerable number of cases, it is held that the rule of the text is confined to instances where there was an express agreement between the person paying the debt and the person liable for the debt to keep the mortgage alive for the former's benefit: Nelson v. McKee, 53 Ind. App. 344, 99 N. E. 447, 101 N. E. 651; Employees' Building & Loan Ass'n v. Crafton, (Okl.) 164 Pac. 473; and see Handford v. Edwards, 89 Ark. 151, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 190, 115 S. W. 1143 (statutory); Lackawanna Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Gomeringer, 236 Pa. 179, 84 Atl. 757: Davis v. Davis, 81 Vt. 259, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1035, and note, 69 Atl. 876; Murphy v. Baldwin, 159 Wis. 567, 150 N. W. 957.

§ 1213, (a) Quoted in Birke v. Abbott, 103 Ind. 1, 53 Am. Rep. 474, 1 N. E. 485; Columbus, S. H. & R. Co.

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SUBROGATION ON PAYMENT OF MORTGAGE. § 1214

§ 1214. The Right to Compel an Actual Assignment.— Whether the equitable assignee may compel an actual assignment is a question which has received conflicting answers from different courts. Some cases hold that every

a conveyance, and also the grantee from the mortgagor who has assumed payment of the mortgage debt, and thus rendered himself the principal and primary debtor therefor.^b When a grantee has thus become the principal debtor, the mortgagor, as his surety, upon payment, is an equitable assignee of the mortgage, and is subrogated to the mortgagee, so far as is necessary to enforce his right of exoneration by the grantee; but it by no means follows that he is an equitable assignee of the mortgage, and entitled to enforce its lien against all subsequent encumbrancers and other parties interested. In like manner, if A and B are co-owners of land, and jointly give a mortgage thereon, and A pays off the entire debt, he is an equitable assignee of the mortgage to the extent of compelling a contribution from B; but this may not entitle him to keep the mortgage alive as against all other parties subsequently and independently interested in the premises. As illustrations of the text, see Moody v. Moody, 68 Me. 155 (mortgage paid by the mortgagor-debtor, and although procured by him to

Appeals, 109 Fed. 177, 210, 48 C. C. A. 275; Cook v. Berry, 193 Pa. St. 377, 44 Atl. 771; Cady v. Barnes, 208 Fed. 359, 361; Smith v. Cooley, (Tex. Civ. App.) 164 S. W. 1050. This section is cited in McQueen v. Whetstone, 127 Ala. 417, 30 South. 548. See, also, Shirk v. Whitten, 131 Ind. 455, 31 N. E. 87; Stastny v. Pease, (Iowa) 100 N. W. 483; Campbell v. Foster Home Ass'n, 163 Pa. St. 609, 30 Atl. 222; Polk County National Bank v. Darrah, 52 Fla. 581, 42 South. 323; Gregory v. Arms, 48 Ind. App. 562, 96 N. E. 196 (no subrogation where payment by mortgagor, who had sold with agreement to pay the debt); Heaton v. Grant Lodge No. 335, I. O. O. F., 55 Ind. App. 100, 103 N. E. 488 (payment by grantee who had assumed); Kuhn v. National Bank, 74 Kan. 456, 118 Am. St. Rep. 332, 87 Pac. 551 (payment by grantee who had assumed); Avon-by-the-Sea Land & Imp. Co. v.

MeDowell, 71 N. J. Eq. 116, 62 Atl. 865; Kahn v. McConnell, 37 Okl. 219, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1189, 131 Pac. 682; Lackawanna Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Gomeringer, 236 Pa. 179, 84 Atl. 757; McDowell v. M. T. Jones Lumber Co., 42 Tex. Civ. App. 260, 93 S. W. 476; Lamoille County Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Belden, 90 Vt. 535, 98 Atl. 1002; Poluckie v. Wegenke, 137 Wis. 433, 119 S. W. Van Valkenburg v. Jantz, 188; 161 Wis. 336, 154 N. W. 373: but see Capitol Nat. Bank v. Holmes, 43 Colo. 154; 127 Am. St. Rep. 108, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 470, 95 Pac. 314; Peagler v. Davis, 143 Ga. 11, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 91, 84 S. E. 59 (subrogation by agreement).

§ 1213, (b) This note is quoted in Cady v. Barnes, 208 Fed. 359, 361, and cited in McDowell v. M. T. Jones Lumber Co., 42 Tex. Civ. App. 260, 93 S. W. 476.

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person who, on payment, becomes an equitable assignee is entitled to compel the execution of a formal assignment of the mortgage by the mortgagee or other holder, for the purpose of perfecting his own equitable right of subrogation.¹ By other cases the position is maintained that such person must, in general, rely upon his equitable assignment and right of subrogation, and cannot compel the execution of a formal assignment; that only a technical surety is entitled to perfect his right of subrogation by calling for an assignment in writing.² a

§ 1215. III. Rights and Liabilities of the Mortgagee in Possession.^a—It has been shown in the preceding section II. that in a portion of the states adopting the first or legal system the mortgagee is entitled to possession at once upon the execution of the mortgage; that in the remaining states of the same class he is entitled to possession only upon the mortgagor's default; and that in either case, upon thus acquiring the possession, he can retain it until the mortgage

be assigned to a third person, it was held to be extinguished); Willson v. Burton, 52 Vt. 394 (payment by a grantee who had assumed the mortgage); Dickason v. Williams, 129 Mass. 182, 37 Am. Rep. 316 (ditto); and see 1 Jones on Mortgages, secs. 864, 865; also *ante*, vol. 2, section on merger, §§ 793, 796-798.^e

§ 1214, ¹ Twombly v. Cassidy, 82 N. Y. 155; Ellsworth v. Lockwood, 42 N. Y. 89; Johnson v. Zink, 52 Barb. 396; Tompkins v. Seely, 29 Barb. 212; Pardee v. Van Anken, 3 Barb. 534; McLean v. Tompkins, 18 Abb. Pr. 24; Mount v. Suydam, 4 Sand. Ch. 399; Baker v. Terrell, 8 Minn. 195; and see Lyon's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 15; Bishop v. Ogden, 9 Phila. 524.

§ 1214, ² Lamb v. Montague, 112 Mass. 352; Lamson v. Drake, 105 Mass. 564; Butler v. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. It seems, however, that he is entitled to have the mortgage delivered up to himself uncanceled: Hamilton v. Dohbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227.

§ 1213, (c) See, further, Birke v. Abbott, 103 Ind. 1, 53 Am. Rep. 474, 1 N. E. 485.

§ 1214, (a) The text is cited in Boice v. Conover, 69 N. J. Eq. 580, 61 Atl. 159. See Hopkins Mfg. Co. v. Ketterer, 237 Pa. 285, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 558, 85 Atl. 421; Holland v. Citizens' Sav. Bank, 16 B. I. 734, 8 L. B. A. 553, 19 Atl. 654.

§ 1215, (a) The text, §§ 1215-1217, is cited in Whitney v. Adams, 66 Vt. 679, 44 Am. St. Rep. 875, 25 L. R. A. 598, 30 Atl. 32. is redeemed. In all the states adopting the second system, the mortgagee is not entitled to possession, either before or after a breach of the condition. If, however, he actually acquires possession, with the consent of the mortgagor, or in any other lawful manner, although the nature of his interest is not thereby altered, he is entitled to retain such possession until the mortgage is redeemed or paid.¹ The rights and consequent liabilities of the mortgagee who is actually and lawfully in possession, as against the mortgagor and those claiming under or through him, are thus virtually the same in all the states, as well in those adopting the second as in those adopting the first system, as heretofore described. In order, however, that these special rights and liabilities may arise from his possession, it must be a possession taken and held by him as mortgagee.² b

§ 1216. With What He is Chargeable—Rents.—The general duty of the mortgagee in possession towards the premises is that of the ordinary prudent owner. He must account, in general, for their rents and profits, or for their occupation value.^a When the land is in the occupation of tenants, he is chargeable with the gross actual rents and

§ 1215, 1 See ante, § 1189.

§ 1215, ² Parkinson v. Hanbury, L. R. 2 H. L. 1; 2 De Gex, J. & S. 450; Sanford v. Pierce, 126 Mass. 146; Lamson v. Drake, 105 Mass. 564; Davenport v. Turpin, 41 Cal. 100.

§ 1215, (b) Quoted in Compton v. Jesup, 68 Fed. 263, 15 C. C. A. 397, 31 U. S. App. 486, and in Armistead v. Bishop, 110 Ark. 172, 161 S. W. 182 (in possession as tenant of mortgagor). See Daniel v. Coker, 70 Ala. 260; Rogers v. Benton, 39 Minn. 39, 12 Am. St. Rep. 613, 38 N. W. 765; Banning v. Sabin, 45 Minn. 431, 48 N. W. 8; Anglo-Californian Bank v. Field, 154 Cal. 513, 98 Pac. 267 (in possession under deed of equity of redemption); Fuhrman v. Power, 43 Wash. 533, 86 Pac. 940 (mere constructive possession of purchaser of unoccupied timber land on void foreclosure); but see Reich v. Cochran, 213 N. Y. 416, 107 N. E. 1029 (if mortgagee is in possession as a trespasser, mortgagor may waive the trespass and hold him accountable as a mortgagee in possession).

§ 1216, (a) The text is quoted in Gillett v. Romig, 17 Okl. 324, 87 Pac. 325. Sec, also, in general, Keeline v. Clark, 132 Iowa, 360, 106 N. W. 257; Blessett v. Turcotte, 23 N. D. 417, 136 N. W. 945. profits received, and with no more, unless he has been guilty of a willful default.^{1 b} When the land is occupied by the mortgagee himself, he is chargeable with the fair annual

§ 1216, ¹ Some of the American cases make him chargeable, under these circumstances, with the amount of rent which he might with reasonable diligence have received; but this extensive liability, which is that of fiduciary persons, is not sustained by the weight of authority: Parkinson v. Hanbury, L. R. 2 H. L. 1; Hughes v. Williams, 12 Ves. 493; Chaplin v. Young, 33 Beav. 330; Blum v. Mitchell, 59 Ala. 535; Barron v. Paulling, 38 Ala. 292; Adkins v. Lewis, 5 Or. 292; Cook v. Ottawa University, 14 Kan. 548; Freytag v. Hoeland, 23 N. J. Eq. 36, 41; Shaeffer v. Chambers, 6 N. J. Eq. 548, 47 Am. Dec. 211; Van Buren v. Olmstead, 5 Paige, 9; Quin v. Brittain, 3 Edw. Ch. 314; Milliken v. Bailey, 61 Me. 316; Harper v. Ely, 70 Ill. 581; Moore v. Titman, 44 Ill. 367; Strang v. Allen, 44 Ill. 428; Pierce v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 116; Hidden v. Jordan, 28 Cal. 301; 32 Cal. 397.

§1216, (b) Mortgagee Generally Chargeable With Actual Rents and Profits .--- Quoted in Steen v. Mark, 32 S. C. 286, 11 S. E. 93; and cited to this effect in Emil Kiewert Co. v. Juneau, 78 Fed. 708, 24 C. C. A. 294. See, also, Gresham v. Ware, 79 Ala. 192; Murdock v. Clarke, 90 Cal. 427, 27 Pac. 275; Pinneo v. Goodspeed, 120 Ill. 524, 533, 12 N. E. 196; Whitley v. Barnett, 151 Iowa, 487, 131 N. W. 704; Rohertson v. Bear, 83 Kan. 468, 112 Pac. 101; Walter v. Calhoun, 88 Kan. 801, 129 Pac. 1176 (as to liability for interest on the rent); Young v. Omohundro, 69 Md. 424, 16 Atl. 120; Merriam v. Goss, 139 Mass. 83, 28 N. E. 449; Brown v. South Boston Sav. Bank, 148 Mass. 300, 19 N. E. 382; Watson v. Perkins, 88 Miss. 64, 40 South. 643; Baker v. Cunningham, 162 Mo. 134, 85 Am. St. Rep. 490, 62 S. W. 445; Toole v. Weirick, 39 Mont. 359, 133 Am. St. Rep. 576, 102 Pac. 590 (chargeable only with value of rents actually received, when he

exercises reasonable care, through an agent, to keep the property rented). For the more extensive liahility, see Still v. Buzzell, 60 Vt. 478, 12 Atl. 209. That he is liable to account for the rental value of tl : premises, where the proofs show tha. he was negligent and careless, leasing the premises for an inadequate rent, see Mills v. Day, 206 Mass. 53° 92 N. E. 803. On the other han. he is not charged with rents and profits when he was unable to find a tenant because of the hostility of the mortgagor; La Forest v. Wm. L. Blake Co., 100 Me. 218, 60 Atl. 899; and where the mortgagor notified the tenant not to pay rent to the mortgagee, the latter is not obliged to account for rent which he did not collect: Griffin v. Cooper, 73 N. J. Eq. 465, 68 Atl. 1095. That the mortgagee is not justified in making, and cannot be compelled to make, long-term leases, see Eldridge v. Hoefer, 52 Or. 241, 93 Pac. 246, 94 Pac. 563, 96 Pac. 1105.

value as an occupation rent.² ^c *Willful default*: He is also chargeable with losses occasioned by his willful default.³

§ 1216, ² Smart v. Hunt, 1 Vern. 418, note; Trulock v. Robey, 15 Sim. 265; 2 Phill. Ch. 395; Wilson v. Metcalfe, 1 Russ. 530; Dawson v. Drake, 30 N. J. Eq. 601; Moore v. Degraw, 5 N. J. Eq. 346; Barnett v. Nelson, 54 Iowa, 41, 37 Am. Rep. 183, 6 N. W. 41; Montgomery v. Chadwick, 7 Iowa, 114; Van Buren v. Olmstead, 5 Paige, 9; Sanders v. Wilson, 34 Vt. 318.

§ 1216, ³ This includes losses by his willful or negligent failure to collect rent, or to obtain a better rent, or suffering the premises to remain in the possession of an insolvent tenant, and the like: Parkinson v. Hanbury; Hughes v. Williams, and other cases cited in the last note but one;^d Montague v. Boston etc. R. R., 124 Mass. 242; Miller v. Lincoln, 6 Gray, 556. Also committing or suffering acts of waste or spoliation:^e Sandon v. Hooper, 6 Beav. 246; Hood v. Easton, 2 Giff. 692; Hornby v. Matcham, 16 Sim. 325; Lord Midleton v. Eliot, 15 Sim. 531, 536; Woodman v. Higgins, 14 Jur. 846; Barnett v. Nelson, 54 Iowa, 41, 37 Am. Rep. 183, 6 N. W. 41; Scott v. Webster, 50 Wis. 53, 6 N. W. 363; Onderdonk v. Gray, 19 N. J. Eq. 65. He is also charged with the loss resulting from unsuccessful speculation with the property: Hughes v. Williams, 12 Ves. 493; Marriott v. Anchor etc. Co., 3 De Gex, F. & J. 177; Palmer v. Hendrie,

§1216, (c) When Mortgagee Himself in Occupation.-See Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Galeton Cotton Mills, 94 Fed. 269, 36 C. C. A. 236 (although ohliged to account, he is entitled to credits for that portion of the gross rental value which is referable to betterments made); Robertson v. Read, 52 Ark. 381, 20 Am. St. Rep. 188, 14 S. W. 387 (same); Hatch v. Falconer, (Neb.) 93 N. W. 172; Felino v. Newcomb Lumber Co., 64 Neb. 335, 97 Am. St. Rep. 646, 89 N. W. 755. See, also, Holmes v. Holt, 90 Kan. 774, 136 Pac. 246 (mortgagee not accountable for value of crops raised, but only for rental value of the property); Grannis v. Hitchcock, 118 Minn. 462, 137 N. W. 186; Green v. Rodman, 150 N. C. 176, 63 S. E. 732; Blessett v. Turcotte, 23 N. D. 417, 136 N. W. 945; Liskey v. Snyder, 66 W. Va. 149. 66 S. E. 702. But it has been III—183

held that a mortgagee, put in possession of a going concern which by the terms of the mortgage he is required to keep in operation, cannot be charged with the rental value: Briggs v. Neal, 120 Fed. 225, 56 C. C. A. 572.

§ 1216, (d) Negligently leasing premises for inadequate rental: Mills v. Day, 206 Mass. 530, 92 N. E. 803.

§ 1216, (e) Liability for Waste.— Pollard v. American Freehold Land Mortgage Co., (Ala.) 35 Sonth. 767; Toole v. Weirick, 39 Mont. 359, 133 Am. St. Rep. 576, 102 Pac. 590; Mc-Michael v. Webster, 57 N. J. Eq. 295, 73 Am. St. Rep. 630, 41 Atl. 714; Whiting v. Adams, 66 Vt. 679, 44 Am. St. Rep. 875, 25 L. R. A. 598, 30 Atl. 32. The text is cited in Penney v. Miller, 134 Ala. 593, 33 South. 668. § 1217. Allowances and Credits, Repairs, Disbursements. The mortgagee is allowed, and credited in his account, with the cost of all ordinary, reasonably necessary repairs made to the premises, and with all reasonable disbursements and expenses necessary for their proper management and protection.¹ a *Improvements*: The mortgagee will be allowed for permanent improvements, increasing the value of the estate, if made with the consent or acquiescence of the mortgagor; but he cannot be allowed for such expenditures when made without the mortgagor's consent. He is bound to keep the property without unreasonable deterioration, and is therefore credited with necessary repairs; but he has no right to enhance the value of the estate, and thus render

27 Beav. 349. As to the opening or working mines by the mortgagee, see Millett v. Davey, 31 Beav. 470; Rowe v. Wood, 2 Jacob & W. 553; Norton v. Cooper, 25 L. J. Ch. 121; Irwin v. Davidson, 3 Ired. Eq. 311.

§ 1217, ¹ What repairs and expenses are reasonable must depend largely upon the circumstances of each case. The payment of taxes is a proper dishursement:^b Sandon v. Hooper, 6 Beav. 246; Neeson v. Clarkson, 4 Hare, 97; Hardy v. Reeves, 4 Ves. 466, 480; Blum v. Mitchell, 59 Ala. 535 (taxes); Adkins v. Lewis, 5 Or. 292; Cook v. Ottawa Univ., 14 Kan. 548; Hidden v. Jordan, 28 Cal. 301; 32 Cal. 397; Quin v. Brittain, Hoff. Ch. 353; Moore v. Cahle, 1 Johns. Ch. 385, 387; Clark v. Smith, 1 N. J. Eq. 121, 139. The mortgagee in possession is only bound to make *necessary* repairs. Godfrey v. Watson, 3 Atk. 517; Russel v. Smithies, 1 Anstr. 96. He must not commit waste, but is not in a fiduciary position: See Benham v. Rowe, 2 Cal. 387, 56 Am. Dec. 342; Shaeffer v. Chambers, 6 N. J. Eq. 548, 47 Am. Dec. 211.^e

§ 1217, (a) Necessary Repairs, Expenses, etc.—This section is cited in Raynor v. Drew, 72 Cal. 307, 13 Pac. 866. The text is quoted in Gillett v. Romig, 17 Okl. 324, 87 Pac. 325. See, also, Green v. Maddox, 97 Ark. 397, 134 S. W. 931; Lynch v. Ryan, 137 Wis. 13, 129 Am. St. Rep. 1040, 118 N. W. 174; Miller v. Ward, 111 Me. 134, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 122, 88 Atl. 400 (expenditures to make uncompleted building tenantable).

§1217, (b) Raynor v. Drew, 72 Cal. 307, 13 Pac. 866; Sidenberg v. Ely, 90 N. Y. 263, 43 Am. Rep. 163 (taxes); Pollard v. American Freehold Land Mortgage Co., (Ala.) 35 South. 767 (mortgagee is entitled to interest on amounts so paid for taxes); Baker v. Cunningham, 162 Mo. 134, 85 Am. St. Rep. 490, 62 S. W. 445; Robertson v. Bcar, 83 Kan. 468, 112 Pac. 101.

§ 1217, (c) If he claim adversely to the mortgagor, as absolute owner, he is entitled to no allowances; Booth v. Steam Packet Co., 63 Md. 39; and see Gresham v. Ware, 79 Ala. 192.

it more difficult for the mortgagor to redeem.^{2 d} Compensation: The mortgagee cannot charge any commissions or

§ 1217, ² Lord Trimleston v. Hamill, 1 Ball & B. 377, 385; Powell v. Trotter, 1 Drew. & S. 388; Sandon v. Hooper, 6 Beav. 246, 248; Adkins v. Lewis, 5 Or. 292; Cook v. Ottawa Univ., 14 Kan. 548; Hidden v. Jordan, 28 Cal. 301; 32 Cal. 397; Ruby v. Portland, 15 Me. 306; Russell v. Blake, 2 Pick. 505; Quin v. Brittain, Hoff. Ch. 353; Moore v. Cable, 1 Johns. Ch. 385; Bell v. The Mayor, 10 Paige, 49; Benedict v. Gilman, 4 Paige, 58; Mickles v. Dillaye, 17 N. Y. 80; Clark v. Smith, 1 N. J. Eq. 121, 138; Harper's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 315; Givens v. McCalmont, 4 Watts, 460; Dougherty v. McColgan, 6 Gill & J. 275; Neale v. Hagthrop, 3 Bland, 551, 590; Lowndes v. Chisholm, 2 McCord Eq. 455, 16 Am. Dec. 667; McCarron v. Cassidy, 18 Ark. 34. But when the mortgagee is not credited with the cost of improvements, he is not charged with the increase of rent or occupation value resulting from such improvements: Moore v. Cable; Bell v. The Mayor; Clark v. Smith; and Hidden v. Jordan, supra.^e

The general rule of the text has been relaxed, in its application to certain special conditions of fact, by many American cases, which hold that the mortgagee is allowed for such improvements when made by him under a *bona fide* but mistaken supposition that he was the absolute owner, and that the equity of redemption had been barred:^f Miner v. Beekman, 50

§ 1217, (d) Improvements. - The text is quoted in Gillett v. Romig, 17 Okl. 324, 87 Pac. 325 (allowance for improvements made with acquiescence of mortgagor). See, also, Whetstone v. McQueen, 137 Ala. 301, 34 South. 229; Whiting v. Adams, 66 Vt. 679, 44 Am. St. Rep. 875, 25 L. B. A. 598, 30 Atl. 32; Robertson v. Read, 52 Ark. 381, 20 Am. St. Rep. 188, 14 S. W. 387; Beckman v. Wilson, 61 Cal. 335; Raynor v. Drew, 72 Cal. 307, 13 Pac. 866; Bradley v. Merrill, 88 Me. 319, 34 Atl. 160; Barnard v. Patterson, (Mich.) 100 N. W. 893 (no. allowance for unnecessary repairs); Green v. Maddox, 97 Ark. 397, 134 S. W. 931; Whitley v. Barnett, 151 Iowa, 487, 131 N. W. 704 (cannot charge for repairs not necessary to save the estate from loss or injury); Fort v. Colby, 165 Iowa, 95, 144 N. W. 393 (may charge for improvements if the contract contemplates his so doing, and provides for his reimbursement on redemption); Shelley v. Cody, 187 N. Y. 166, 79 N. E. 994; Caro v. Wollenberg, 83 Or. 311, 163 Pac. 94; Lynch v. Ryan, 137 Wis. 13, 129 Am. St. Rep. 1040, 118 N. W. 174 (reimbursed for improvements acquiesced in by mortgagor). In Shepard v. Jones, 21 Ch. Div. 469, it was held that the mortgagee may be allowed for reasonable improvements, although the mortgagor had no notice of the expenditure. See, also, Henderson v. Astwood, [1894] App. Cas. 150.

§1217, (e) See, also, Wilson v. Fisher, 148 N. C. 535, 62 S. E. 622.

§ 1217, (f) Improvements Made Under Mistake as to Ownership.— This note is cited to this effect in Bradley v. Merrill, 88 Me. 319, 34 Atl. 160; and in Gillett v. Romig, 17 Okl. 324, 87 Pac. 325. See, also, other compensation for his services, since they are rendered primarily for his own benefit.^{3 h}

§ 1218. Liability to Account.—The mortgagee in possession is bound to account, upon the basis of charges and allowances above described, not only to the mortgagor, but to subsequent mortgagees, if he has notice of their encumbrances.^{1 a} This accounting belongs exclusively to the

N. Y. 337; Mickles v. Dillaye, 17 N. Y. 80; Benedict v. Gilman, 4 Paige, 58; Putnam v. Ritchie, 6 Paige, 390; Fogal v. Pirro, 10 Bosw. 100; Troost v. Davis, 31 Ind. 34; Roberts v. Fleming, 53 Ill. 196, 198; Montgomery v. Chadwick, 7 Iowa, 114; and also when made by a person who, although in reality a mortgagee, has reason to believe from the form of his conveyance or other circumstances of his purchase that he is the absolute owner:²⁶ McSorley v. Larissa, 100 Mass. 270; Bright v. Boyd, 1 Story, 478; Vanderhaise v. Hugues, 13 N. J. Eq. 410; Harper's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 315; Barnard v. Jennison, 27 Mich. 230; Green v. Wescott, 13 Wis. 606; Green v. Dixon, 9 Wis. 532; Bacon v. Cottrell, 13 Minn. 194.

§ 1217, ³ Chambers v. Goldwin, ⁹ Ves. 254, 271; Langstaffe v. Fenwick, 10 Ves. 405; Nicholson v. Tutin, ³ Kay & J. 159; French v. Baron, ² Atk. 120; Godfrey v. Watson, ³ Atk. 517; Bonithon v. Hockmore, ¹ Vern. 316; Elmer v. Loper, 25 N. J. Eq. 475; Clark v. Smith, ¹ N. J. Eq. 121, 137; Moore v. Cable, ¹ Johns. Ch. 385, 388; Benham v. Rowe, ² Cal. 387, 56 Am. Dec. 342. In Massachusetts he is allowed a commission on the rents, as a compensation: Gerrish v. Black, 104 Mass. 400; Adams v. Brown, 7 Cush. 220; Tucker v. Buffum, 16 Pick. 46; and see Waterman v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 241.

§ 1218, ¹ Berney v. Sewell, ¹ Jacob & W. 647, 650; Archdeacon v. Bowes, 13 Price, 353; Harrison v. Wyse, 24 Conn. 1, 63 Am. Dec. 151; Shields v. Kimbrough, 64 Ala. 504.

Liskey v. Snyder, 66 W. Va. 149, 66 S. E. 702. Where a purchaser at a judicial sale buys in good faith, believing that he is getting a perfect title, he is entitled to a credit for improvements: Higginbottom v. Benson, 24 Neb. 461, 8 Am. St. Rep. 211, 39 N. W. 418; Cram v. Cotrell, 48 Neb. 646, 58 Am. St. Rep. 714, 67 N. W. 452 (dictum).

§ 1217, (3) This note is cited to this effect in Bradley v. Merrill, 88 Me. 319, 34 Atl. 160.

§ 1217, (h) Compensation. - The

text is cited to this effect in Moss v. Odell, 141 Cal. 335, 74 Pac. 999. See, also, Whiting v. Adams, 66 Vt. 679, 44 Am. St. Rep. 875, 25 L. R. A. 598, 30 Atl. 32; Barnard v. Patterson, (Mich.) 100 N. W. 893, and eases cited. See, further, Caro v. Wollenberg, 83 Or. 311, 163 Pac. 94. But the rule is not inflexible: Walter v. Calhoun, 88 Kan. 801, 129 Pae. 1176 (ten per cent for collection held reasonable).

§1218, (a) To Whom Mortgagee must Account.—This section is cited

equitable jurisdiction, and can be enforced only in a suit to redeem, brought by the mortgagor or subsequent encumbrancer.² b Whenever the net amount of annual rents or occupation; value received by the mortgagee exceeds the interest then due, the accounting is taken with annual rests.³

§ 1218, ² Farrant v. Lovel, 3 Atk. 723; Chapman v. Smith, 9 Vt. 153; [•] Seaver v. Durant, 39 Vt. 103; Bell v. The Mayor, 10 Paige, 49; Givens v. McCalmont, 4 Watts, 460, 464; Gordon v. Hobart, 2 Story, 243, Fed. Cas. No. 5608; Dexter v. Arnold, 2 Sum. 108, Fed. Cas. No. 3858; Watford v. Oates, 57 Ala. 290. Even in the states adopting the second or equitable system, the mortgagor cannot recover the land by an action of ejectment, but must sue in equity for a redemption, in which an accounting can be had: Hubbell v. Moulson, 53 N. Y. 225, 13 Am. Rep. 519; and see *ante*, § 1189.^e

§ 1218, ³ This rule applies both to a mortgagee who receives rents from tenants, and to one who actually occupies the land: Gould v. Tancred, 2 Atk. 533; Shephard v. Elliot, 4 Madd. 254; Morris v. Islip, 20 Beav. 654; Wilson v. Metcalfe, 1 Russ. 530; Blum v. Mitchell, 59 Ala. 535; Watford v. Oates, 57 Ala. 290; Elmer v. Loper, 25 N. J. Eq. 475; Gladding v. Warner, 36 Vt. 54; Reed v. Reed, 10 Dick. 398; Gordon v. Lewis, 2 Sum. 143, 147, Fed. Cas. No. 5613; Shaeffer v. Chambers, 6 N. J. Eq. 548, 47 Am. Dec. 211; Green v. Wescott, 13 Wis. 606. The fundamental object of the rule governing the mode of accounting is to prevent the compounding of interest, to prevent the adding of interest to principal, and the computing interest on this sum: See cases last cited, and also Connecticut v.

in Compton v. Jesup, 68 Fed. 263, 31 U. S. App. 486, 15 C. C. A. 397; in Penney v. Miller, 134 Ala. 593, 33 South. 668 (to the effect that he owes no duty to subsequent encumbrancers of whom he has no notice). See, also, Long v. Richards, 170 Mass. 120, 64 Am. St. Rep. 281, 48 N. E. 1083; Hatch v. Falconer, (Neb.) 93 N. W. 172; New England Mortgage Security Co. v. Fry, 143 Ala. 637, 111 Am. St. Rep. 62, 42 South. 57; Armistead v. Bishop, 110 Ark. 172, 161 S. W. 182 (but not required so to account where he is in possession as tenant of the mort-. gagor); Anglo-Californian Bank v. Field, 154 Cal. 513, 98 Pac. 267 (not accountable where his possession is

under a deed of the equity of redemption).

§ 1218, (b) Accounting Only in Equity Suit.—See Farris v. Houston, 78 Ala. 250; Harris v. Jones, 188 Ala. 633, 65 South. 956; Dailey v. Abbott, 40 Ark. 275; Green v. Thornton, 8 Cal. App. 160, 96 Pac. 382; Reich v. Cochran, 213 N. Y. 416, 107 N. E. 1029. In Morgan v. Morgan, 48 N. J. Eq. 399, 22 Atl. 545, it is held that if the mortgagee fails to account when such a suit is brought, his mortgage will be declared satisfied.

§ 1218, (c) See, also, Posten v. Miller, 60 Wis. 494, 19 N. W. 540; Nash v. Northwest Land Co., 15 N. D. 566, 108 N. W. 792. If the mortgagee remains in possession after the mortgage debt has been fully paid, he becomes a trustee for the mortgagor,^f and is chargeable with interest on the net excess of rents received by him; but the mortgagor can only enforce his rights to the land by an equitable action for an account and to redeem.⁴ g

§ 1219. IV. Redemption—By the Mortgagor.^a—As has already been shown, the right of redemption is the very essential element of the equitable conception of a mortgage. If an instrument is once a mortgage, nothing, in general, can destroy the equitable right of redemption except a valid and complete foreclosure, or the bar arising expressly or by analogy from the statute of limitations, or conduct of the mortgagor amounting to an estoppel. Strictly speaking, redemption is the "buying back" and recovering the legal estate by the mortgagor after it has passed to the mortgagee. Under the original common-law theory, the redemption by the mortgagor took place, not only after the mortgagee had acquired the legal estate by the mortgage,

Jackson, 1 Johns. Ch. 13, 17, 7 Am. Dec. 471; Stone v. Seymour, 15 Wend. 19, 24; Jencks v. Alexander, 11 Paige, 619, 625; Bennett v. Cook, 2 Hun, 526; Van Vronker v. Eastman, 7 Met. 157;^d for illustrations of English mode of accounting, see Thorneycroft v. Crockett, 2 H. L. Cas. 239, 256; Binnington v. Harwood, Turn. & R. 477; Heighington v. Grant, 5 Mylne & C. 258; Thompson v. Hudson, L. R. 10 Eq. 497.^e By the English rule, annual rests are not directed when the interest was in arrear at the time the mortgagee took possession: Finch v. Brown, 3 Beav. 70; Wilson v. Cluer, 3 Beav. 136; Nelson v. Booth, 3 De Gex & J. 119.

§ 1218, 4 Quarrell v. Beckford, 1 Madd. 269; Lloyd v. Jones, 12 Sim. 491; Bennington v. Harwood, Turn. & R. 477, 485; Hubbell v. Moulson, 53 N. Y. 225, 13 Am. Rep. 519; Green v. Turner, 38 Iowa, 112; Pierce v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 116.

§ 1218, (d) See, also, Lynch v. Ryan, 137 Wis. 13, 129 Am. St. Rep. 1040, 118 N. W. 174.

§1218, (e) See, also, Wrigley v. Gill, [1905] 1 Ch. 241, and cases there discussed.

§1218, (f) The text is cited to this effect in Cooper v. Cooper, 256 Ill. 160, 99 N. E. 871 (mortgagee by absolute deed, after payment of the debt).

§1218, (g) See, also, Mills v. Day, 206 Mass. 530, 92 N. E. 803.

§ 1219, (a) This section is cited in McQueen v. Whetstone, 127 Ala. 417, 30 South. 548. but after he had taken possession of the mortgaged prem-The same conditions of the redemption still substanises. tially exist in all the states which have adopted the first system as described in the preceding section II.¹ In those states which have adopted the second system, the mortgagor may have the same suit and the same relief whenever the mortgagee has actually taken possession; but such cases are quite rare, for the mortgagor is generally left in possession. It is, however, a settled doctrine in all these states that the mortgagor in possession may maintain a similar equitable suit whenever, from a dispute as to the amount due or any other cause, the mortgagee refuses to accept payment and to discharge the mortgage. The mortgagor can always come into a court of equity and obtain a decree removing the lien of the mortgage.^b Although this suit is uniformly termed a "suit to redeem," and the relief is called "redemption," yet it is really one to free the mortgagor's land from the encumbrance, to compel the mortgagee to accept the amount actually due, if any, and to discharge the mortgage of record.² ^c The essential requisites of main-

§ 1219, ¹ At any time before his right is cut off hy foreclosure or barred by the statute of limitations, the mortgagor may maintain a suit for a redemption, in which an accounting is had, the amount of the debt still due is ascertained, and upon payment of this amount the mortgagee is decreed to reconvey. In several of the states adopting this general system, the original doctrine is so far relaxed that no reconveyance from the mortgagee is necessary, but the legal estate vests in the mortgagor *ipso facto* of his payment: See *ante*, § 1187.

I would remark that in all the discussions of the text I am speaking only of the *equity* of redemption, which exists solely as a part of the equitable conception of mortgage. The *statutory* right of redeeming *after* foreclosure or execution sale, given by the legislation of certain states, forms no part of *equity* jurisprudence.

§ 1219, ² The true nature of the relief, according to the system prevailing in the states of this second class, was recognized in Daubenspeck v. Platt, 22 Cal. 330, 335, per Norton, J.: "It is urged that an action to re-

§1219, (b) The text is quoted in Reich v. Cochran, 213 N. Y. 416, 107 N. E. 1029. Gerhold, (Ind. App.) 70 N. E. 546, and in Burks v. Burks, (Tex. Civ. App.) 141 S. W. 337.

§1219, (c) Quoted in Bowen v.

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taining the suit are, that the mortgage debt should be due and payable, that the mortgagor should offer to pay whatever amount is due, and should pay the same when ascertained and fixed by the decree, and that the relief should be sought in equity.^{3 d}

deem does not lie in this state before foreclosure. There is no peculiarity in the laws of this state in reference to mortgages which takes from a mortgagor the right to redeem which exists in other states. Our statute enables a mortgagor to hold possession as owner until his title is divested by a foreclosure, but does not take from him the right to disencumber the land by a voluntary payment after a default to pay at the time provided in the mortgage. Although a redemption may not now be necessary after default in order to repurchase the legal title, it is still an important right in order to the full beneficial enjoyment of the property. Mortgages have long heen treated as only liens, whether before or after default, and a bill to redeem has practically only been a proceeding to remove the encumbrance." See, also, Cowing v. Rogers, 34 Cal. 648, 654; Koch v. Briggs, 14 Cal. 256, 262, 73 Am. Dec. 651; Cunningham v. Hawkins, 24 Cal. 403, 410, 85 Am. Dec. 73.

§ 1219, 3 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1967, 2006, notes to Thornbrough v. Baker; 2 Jones on Mortgages, sec. 1052; Tasker v. Small, 3 Mylne & C. 63; Gleaves v. Paine, 1 De Gex, J. & S. 87; Pearce v. Morris, L. R. 5 Ch. 227; Harding v. Pingey, 10 Jur., N. S., 872; Hughes v. Cook, 34 Beav. 407; Brown v. Cole, 14 Sim. 427; Burrowes v. Molloy, 2 Jones & L. 521; Randall v. Bradley, 65 Me. 43; Hall v. Gardner, 71 Me. 233; Welch v. Stearns, 69 Me. 192; Rowell v. Jewett, 69 Me. 293; Nevius v. Eghert, 31 N. J. Eq. 460; Parks v. Allen, 42 Mich. 482, 4 N. W. 227; Walker v. Carleton, 97 Ill. 582; Wylie v. Welch, 51 Wis. 351, 8 N. W. 207; Grigg v. Banks, 59 Ala. 311 (where the mortgagee has paid off a

§ 1219, (d) Requisites of Redemption.—The text is quoted in Burks v. Burks, (Tex. Civ. App.) 141 S. W. 337. This paragraph of the text is cited in Calahan v. Dunker, 51 Ind. App. 436, 99 N. E. 1021 (as to allegations of tender); Justice v. Button, 89 Neb. 367, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1, 131 N. W. 736 (payment of debt a condition of relief, without regard to length of time that debt has remained unpaid). See, also, Rumbarger v. Yokum, (W. Va.) 174 Fed. 55; Johnson v. Smith, 190 Ala. 521, 67 South. 401 (tender excused); Peak v. Peak, 228 Mo. 536, 137 Am. St. Rep. 638, 128 S. W. 981 (tender not a prerequisite to suit); Toole v. Weirick, 39 Mont. 359, 133 Am. St. Rep. 576, 102 Pac. 590 (previous tender not necessary); Kaylor v. Kelscy, 91 Neb. 404, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 839, 136 N. W. 54; Marshall v. Porter, 71 W. Va. 330, 76 S. E. 653 (equity has power to determine amount due). See, further, Tukey v. Reinholdt, (Iowa) 130 N. W. 727. § 1220. The Same-By Other Persons.^a-Any person who holds a legal estate in the mortgaged premises, or in any part thereof, derived through, under, or in privity with the mortgagor, and any person holding either a legal or equitable lien on the premises, or any part thereof, under or in privity with the mortgagor's estate, may also in like manner redeem from the prior mortgage.^b No such redemption, however, is possible unless the mortgage debt is due and payable,^c nor unless the mortgage is wholly redeemed by payment of the entire amount of the mortgage debt. The debt being a unit, no party interested in the whole premises, or in any portion of them, can compel the mortgagee to accept a part of the debt, and to relieve the property *pro tanto* from the lien.^d Furthermore, if the

prior encumbrance); Beach v. Cooke, 28 N. Y. 508, 86 Am. Dec. 260; Koch v. Briggs, 14 Cal. 256, 262, 73 Am. Dec. 651; Cunningham v. Hawkins, 24 Cal. 403, 410, 85 Am. Dec. 73; Daubenspeck v. Platt, 22 Cal. 330, 335; Cowing v. Rogers, 34 Cal. 648, 654; Lorenzana v. Camarillo, 45 Cal. 125 (a mortgagor's right to redeem is not lost because he is no longer the owner of the premises). If a mortgagee pays off prior encumbrances he is subrogated to the rights of the holders thereof, and when the mortgagor redeems, he must pay them also: Grigg v. Banks, 59 Ala. 311; Arnold v. Foot, 7 B. Mon. 66; Harper v. Ely, 70 Ill. 581; Robinson v. Ryan, 25 N. Y. 320; Silver Lake Bank v. North, 4 Johns. Ch. 370; Weld v. Sabin, 20 N. H. 533, 51 Am. Dec. 240; Page v. Foster, 7 N. H. 392; Jenness v. Robinson, 10 N. H. 215. The right of redeeming can only be cut off by a valid, complete, strict foreclosure, or by a valid, complete foreclosure by

§ 1220, (a) This section is cited in Buser v. Shepard, 107 Ind. 417, 8 N. E. 280; Sellwood v. Gray, 11 Or. 534, 5 Pac. 196; McQueen v. Whetstone, (Ala.) 30 South. 548; Howser v. Cruikshank, 122 Ala. 256, 82 Am. St. Rep. 76, 25 South. 206; First Nat. Bank v. Elliott, 125 Ala. 646, 82 Am. St. Rep. 268, 47 L. R. A. 742, 27 South. 7 (in dissenting opinion); Kelly v. Longshore, 78 Ala. 203; Dougherty v. Kubat, (Neb.) 93 N. W. 317; Hays v. Cretin, 102 Md. 695, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1039, 62 Atl. 1028; Davenport v. Timmonds, 157 Mo. App. 360, 138 S. W. 349.

§ 1220, (b) The text is quoted in Kent Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Middleton, 112 Md. 10, 75 Atl. 967.

§ 1220, (c) Bernard v. Toplitz, 160 Mass. 162, 39 Am. St. Rep. 465, 35 N. E. 673 (suit by mortgagor); Smiddy v. Grafton, 163 Cal. 16, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 921, 124 Pac. 433.

§ 1220, (d) No Partial Redemption.—The text is quoted in Smith v. Simpson, 129 Ark. 275, 195 S. W. 1067. See, also, McGough v. Sweetperson redeeming has only a partial interest in the premises, and there are other partial owners also interested in having the lien of the mortgage removed from their estates,

sale: Thompson v. Com'rs, 79 N. Y. 54; Bennett v. Austin, 81 N. Y. 308; Pell v. Ulmar, 18 N. Y. 139; Olmsted v. Elder, 5 N. Y. 144; Sherwood v. Reade, 7 Hill, 431; Ward v. Seymour, 51 Vt. 320; Gilson v. Whitney, 51 Vt. 552; Winton's Appeal, 87 Pa. St. 77; Parks v. Allen, 42 Mich. 482, 4 N. W. 227; Wylie v. Welch, 51 Wis. 351, 8 N. W. 207; Hull v. McCall, 13 Iowa, 467. Persons otherwise entitled, who were not made parties to the suit, may therefore redeem after and notwithstanding a foreclosure and sale: Ibid.; Miner v. Beekman, 50 N. Y. 337; Noyes v. Hall, 97 U. S. 34, 24 L. Ed. 909; Endel v. Leibrock, 33 Ohio St. 254; Avery v. Ryerson, 34 Mich. 362; Hasselman v. McKernan, 50 Ind. 441; Shaw v. Heisey, 48 Iowa, 468; Gower v. Winchester, 33 Iowa, 303; Hodgen v. Guttery, 58 Ill. 431; Strang v. Allen, 44 Ill. 428; Pratt v. Frear, 13 Wis. 462; Green v. Dixon, 9 Wis. 532; Chandler v. Dyer, 37 Vt. 345; Wiley v. Ewing, 47 Ala. 418. The purchaser at the foreclosure sale may maintain an action against a subsequent mortgagee who was not made a party, to compel him to redeem within a certain time or he foreclosed: Shaw v. Heisey, supra."

ser, 97 Ala. 361, 19 L. R. A. 470, 12 South. 162; Francis v. White, 160 Ala. 523, 49 South. 334; Ferry v. Miller, 164 Mich. 429, 129 N. W. 721; Key West Wharf & Coal Co. v. Porter, 63 Fla. 448, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 173, 58 South. 599. It has been held that the mortgagor cannot, in his suit to redeem, sct off a personal demand against the mortgage: Brown v. Coriell, 50 N. J. Eq. 753, 35 Am. St. Rep. 789, 21 L. R. A. 321, 26 Atl. 915.

§ 1219, (e) It survives until the statute of limitation has run: Caro v. Wollenberg, 68 Or. 420, 136 Pac. 866; Lipscomh v. Talhott, 243 Mo. 1, 147 S. W. 798; Lindberg v. Thomas, 137 Iowa, 48, 114 N. W. 562; but see Casebolt v. Courtney, (Mo.) 195 S. W. 746 (estoppel).

§ 1219, (1) Redemption by Persons not Parties to Foreclosure.—Johnson v. Hosford, 110 Ind. 572, 10 N. E. 407; American Buttonhole, etc., Co.

v. Loan Ass'n, 61 Iowa, 464, 16 N. W. 527; Bunce v. West, 62 Iowa, 81, 17 N. W. 179; Spurgin v. Adamson, 62 Iowa, 661, 18 N. W. 293; Tucker v. Jackson, 60 N. H. 214; Hunt v. Makemson, 56 Tex. 9; Rodman v. Quick, (Ill.) 71 N. E. 1087; Jones v. Williams, 155 N. C. 179, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 426, 71 S. E. 222; Froelich v. Swafford, 33 S. D. 142, 144 N. W. 925. See, further, Tukey v. Reinholdt, (Iowa) 130 N. W. 727. See, however, Worthington v. Wilmot, 59 Miss. 608. That a person of whose interest the mortgagee had no notice, as the holder, by unrecorded assignment, of a junior encumbrance. may have no such right to redeem, see Reel v. Wilson, 64 Iowa, 13, 19 N. W. 814.

§ 1219, (\$) To the same effect, Donovan v. Smith, (N. J. Eq.) 88 Atl. 167; Horr v. Herrington, 22 Okl. 590, 132 Am. St. Rep. 648, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 47, 98 Pac. 443.

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—such as co-owners, life tenants, reversioners, remaindermen, and the like,—he cannot compel them in the first instance to advance their proportionate shares for the purpose of paying off the debt; he must himself redeem the whole mortgage, and his only equity against them consists in his right to enforce the mortgage upon *their* estates as a security for obtaining a *subsequent* contribution.^{1 j}

§ 1220, 1 In its most general terms, the doctrine may be briefly stated that all persons interested in the premises, and who would be prejudiced by a foreclosure, have a right to redeem. Persons who claim under a title paramount or adverse to the mortgagor's would not he affected by a foreclosure, and cannot redeem. It is plain, also, that there can be no complete redemption until the whole mortgage debt is due and payable. If one prior installment is due, and the mortgagee is entitled to foreclose for its non-payment, he cannot be compelled to accept the installments not yet due; the only possible redemption would be a payment of the amount then due, leaving the mortgage in full force with respect to the subsequent installments. In illustration of the text, see 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1967-1969, 2006; 2 Jones on Mortgages, secs. 1055-1069 (who may redeem); 1070-1081 (requisites of redemption). The following list will show the various classes of persons who may redeem as well in this country as in England: Grantees or assignees of the mortgagor, even when volunteers: Howard v. Harris, 1 Vern. 190; Winterbottom v. Tayloe, 2 Drew. 279; devisees: Lewis v. Nangle, 2 Ves. Sr. 431; Catley v. Sampson, 33 Beav. 551; heirs: Pym v. Bowremare, 3 Swanst. 241, note; Lloyd v. Wait, 1 Phill. Ch. 61; a joint tenant, who must redeem the whole: Waugh v. Land, Coop. 129; Wynne v. Styan, 2 Phill. Ch. 303, 306; a tenant in common: Wynne v. Styan, supra; a tenant for life: Wicks v. Scrivens, 1 Johns. & H. 215; a tenant in tail: Playford v. Playford, 4 Hare, 546; remaindermen or reversioners:" Rafferty v. King, 1 Kcen, 601, 617; a dowress: Swannock v. Lyford, Amb. 6; Jackson v. Parker, Amb. 687; the superior lord, or the crown, in case of escheat or forfeiture: Viscount Downe v. Morris, 3 Hare, 394; Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 177, 210, 256; Beale v. Symonds, 16 Beav. 406; Att'y-Gen. v. Crofts, 4 Brown Parl. C. 136: a creditor who is plaintiff in a creditor's suit, after a decree: Christian v. Field, 2 Hare, 177; judgment creditors: Stonehewer v. Thompson, 2 Atk. 440; Neate v. Duke of Marlborough, 3 Mylne & C. 407; Jefferys v. Dickson, L. R. 1 Ch. 183; Mildred v. Austin, L. R. 8 Eq. 220; In re Cowbridge R'y, L. R. 5 Eq. 413; Guest v. Cowbridge R'y, L. R. 6 Eq. 619;

§ 1220, (e) *Remaindermen.*—Prout v. Cook, [1896] 2 Ch. 808. v. Watson, (Iowa) 159 N. W. 761.

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§ 1221. Rights of Contribution and of Exoneration upon Redemption.^a—In general, whenever redemption by one of the above-mentioned persons operates as an equitable as-

Thornton v. Finch, 4 Giff. 505; subsequent mortgagees: Fell v. Brown, 2 Brown Ch. 276; Palk v. Lord Clinton, 12 Ves. 48; Rhodes v. Buckland, 16 Beav. 212; Smith v. Green, 1 Coll. C. C. 555; lunatic's committee: Ex parte Grimstone, Amb. 706; legatees whose legacies are charged on the mortgaged premises: Faulkner v. Daniel, 3 Hare, 199; Batchelor v. Middleton, 6 Hare, 75; any person having even a partial interest: Pearce v. Morris, L. R. 5 Ch. 227. American cases: Persons having an estate in the land as heirs, devisees, grantees, tenants for life, dowress, co-owners, etc.: f Smith v. Manning, 9 Mass. 422; Lamson v. Drake, 105 Mass. 564; Davís v. Wetherell, 13 Allen, 60, 90 Am. Dec. 177; Beach v. Cooke, 28 N. Y. 508, 86 Am. Dec. 260; Mills v. Van Voorbies, 20 N. Y. 412; Bell v. The Mayor, 10 Paige, 49; Denton v. Nanny, 8 Barb. 618; Mills v. Van Voorhis, 23 Barb. 125; Cunningham v. Knight, 1 Barb. 399; Opdyke v. Bartles, 11 N. J. Eq. 133; McArthur v. Franklin, 16 Ohio St. 193; Beach v. Shaw, 57 Ill. 17. Persons having subsequent encumbrances: Judgment creditors: Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. 485; Niagara Bank v. Rosevelt, 9 Cow. 409; Dabney v. Green, 4 Hen. & M. 101, 4 Am. Dec. 503. Subse-

§ 1220, (1) Persons having an estate in the land .- Butts v. Broughton, 72 Ala. 294; Ohmer v. Boyer, 89 Ala. 273, 7 South. 663; Howser v. Cruikshank, 122 Ala. 256, 82 Am. St. Rep. 76, 25 South. 206; Kenyon v. Segar, 14 R. I. 490. See, also, Hays v. Cretin, 102 Md. 695, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1039, 62 Atl. 1028 (citing text; widow who joined in mortgage in release of dower); Fitcher v. Griffiths, 216 Mass. 174, 103 N. E. 471 (wife having inchoate right of dower); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Hoboken & M. R. Co., 71 N. J. Eq. 14, 63 Atl. 273 (tenant for years); Mackenna v. Fidelity Trust Co., 184 N. Y. 411, 112 Am. St. Rep. 620, 6 Ann. Cas. 471, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1068, 77 N. E. 721 (wife having inchoate dower); Dickerson v. Simmons, 141 N. C. 325, 8 Ann. Cas. 361, 53 S. E. 850 (tenant in common); Harding v. Gillett, 25 Okl. 199, 107 Pac. 665; Wunderle v. Ellis, 212 Pa. 618, 4 Ann. Cas. 806, 62 Atl. 106 (when tenant for years may redeem); Murray v. O'Brien, 56 Wash. 361, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 998, 105 Pac. 840.

§ 1220, (2) Judgment creditors.— See Cramer v. Watson, 73 Ala. 127; Fitch v. Wetherbee, 110 III. 475; Kelly v. Longshore, 78' Ala. 203 (purchaser at execution sale of equity of redemption); Kent Building & Loan Co. v. Middleton, 112 Md. 10, 75 Atl. 967.

§ 1221, (a) This section is cited in Peck v. Peck, 110 N. Y. 64, 17 N. E. 383; Beck v. Tarrant, 61 Tex. 402; Wood v. Wood, 134 Ala. 557, 33 South. 347; Napieralski v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 260 Ill. 628, 103 N. E. 547 (assessment lien); Justice v. Button, 89 Neb. 367, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1, 131 N. W. 736. signment of the mortgage to himself, he can keep the lien of it alive as security against others who are also interested in the premises, and who are bound to contribute their proportionate shares of the sum advanced by him, or are bound, it may be, to wholly exonerate him from and reimburse him for the entire payment.^b The doctrine has already been stated, that where a party interested in the premises, who is not personally and primarily liable as the principal debtor for the whole mortgage debt, pays the mortgage to the holder thereof, he is entitled to regard the transaction as an equitable assignment of the mortgage to himself, and to keep it alive as security of his own rights

quent mortgagees: h Frost v. Yonkers Sav. Bank, 70 N. Y. 553, 26 Am. Rep. 627; Twombly v. Cassidy, 82 N. Y. 155; Haines v. Beach, 3 Johns. Ch. 459; Rogers v. Herron, 92 Ill. 583; Hodgen v. Guttery, 58 Ill. 431; Beach v. Shaw, 57 Ill. 17; Sager v. Tupper, 35 Mich. 134; Avery v. Ryerson, 34 Mich. 362; Hasselman v. McKernan, 50 Ind. 441; Renard v. Brown, 7 Neb. 499; Manning v. Markel, 19 Iowa, 103; Scott v. Henry, 13 Ark. 112; Wiley v. Ewing, 47 Ala. 418; Hill v. White, 1 N. J. Eq. 435; but see Bigelow v. Cassedy, 26 N. J. Eq. 557. Any person having an interest in the premises subsequent to the mortgage: Averill v. Taylor, 8 N. Y. 44; Bogut v. Cobnrn, 27 Barb. 230; Platt v. Squire, 12 Met. 494; Farnum v. Metcalf, 8 Cush. 46.¹ The whole debt must be paid: 2 Jones on Mortgages, sec. 1072; Palk v. Lord Clinton, 12 Ves. 48; Marquis of Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 Jacob & W. 1, 189; Johnson v. Candage, 31 Me. 28; Lamb v. Montague, 112 Mass. 352; Lanning v. Smith, 1 Pars. Cas. 13; Knowles v. Rablin, 20 Iowa, 101; Gliddon v. Andrews, 14 Ala, 733; and see cases cited above, in this note.

§ 1220, (h) Subsequent mortgagees. Johnson v. Hosford, 110 Ind. 572, 10 N. E. 407; Hunt v. Makemson, 56 Tex. 9; but see Tillman v. Stewart, 104 Ga. 687, 69 Am. St. Rep. 192, 30 S. E. 949; Jones v. Williams, 155 N. C. 179, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 426, 71 S E. 222; Froelich v. Swafford, 33 S. D. 142, 144 N. W. 925; Stoeckle v. Rosenheim, (Del. Ch.) 87 Atl. 1006.

§ 1220, (1) Any person having an interest in the premises subsequent to

the mortgage.—Buser v. Shepard, 107 Ind. 417, 8 N. E. 280; Sellwood v. Gray, 11 Or. 534, 5 Pac. 196; West v. Middlesex Banking Co., 33 S. D. 465, 146 N. W. 598 (assignee or grantee of mortgagor); but he must show that he derived his title through the mortgagor: Hazen v. Nicholls, 126 Cal. 327, 58 Pac. 816.

§ 1221, (b) The text is quoted in Gordon v. Deavitt, 84 Vt. 59, 78 Atl. 113. against others who are owners of or interested in the land.¹ c Any such person who redeems, no matter how small a portion of the premises he may own, or how partial may be his interest, must redeem the entire mortgage by paying the whole mortgage debt. The doctrine of contribution among all those who are interested in having the mortgage redeemed, in order to refund the redemptor the excess of his payment over and above his own proportionate share. and the doctrine of equitable assignment in order to secure such contribution, are the efficient means by which equity completely and most beautifully works out perfect justice and equality of burden, under these circumstances. The right of contribution arises only after a redemption, and necessarily depends upon the equities subsisting between all those persons who have an interest in the premises subject to the mortgage, and who therefore have a common, but not necessarily an equal, interest in being relieved from the burden of the mortgage.^{2 d}

§ 1221, ¹ See ante, §§ 1211, 1212. This doctrine has its simplest and most frequent application in cases of redemption by a person who is owner of or interested in a part of the mortgaged premises,—as by a co-owner, an owner of a separate parcel of the land, etc.; or hy a person who has only a *partial* interest in the premises,—as by a life tenant, a dowress, a reversioner, a tenant for years, etc.

§ 1221, ² The nature and extent of the liability to contribute are primarily independent of the mortgagee, and depend upon or are controlled by the equities subsisting, between the various parties interested in having the mortgage redeemed, which equities primarily arise from their several relations with the mortgagor, or from their dealings with each other.^e The mortgagee may, however, by releasing some one of these parties, modify or restrict his own right of enforcing the mortgage against the others, and may thus disturb the equities otherwise subsisting among them, and as a necessary consequence may alter their normal liability of contribution. Any adequate statement of the doctrine concerning contri-

§ 1221, (c) Sections 1221 et seq. cited to this effect in Lang v. Cadwell, 13 Mont. 458, 34 Pac. 957 subrogation of tenant in common paying mortgage).

- § 1221, (d) The text is quoted in

Gordon v. Deavitt, 84 Vt. 59, 78 Atl. 113, dissenting opinion.

§ 1221, (e) The note is quoted in Gordon v. Deavitt, 84 Vt. 59, 78 Atl. 113, dissenting opinion.

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§ 1222. 1. Where Their Equities are Equal.^a—It is a general doctrine of equity that where a common charge rests upon a fund which belongs to several owners, who stand upon a footing of equality with respect to their individual titles and relations with the holder of the charge, the burden should rest ratably upon each separate portion of the fund; and if the owner of one portion, for the purpose of protecting his own interest, pays off the common charge, he is entitled to call upon the other owners to contribute their proportionate shares of the amount thus paid. This doctrine is a simple application of the maxim, Equality is equity.^{1 b} Whenever, therefore, a mortgage rests upon land which is owned by several persons in such a manner that their equities as between themselves are equal, and one of them redeems from the mortgage, he is entitled to a pro rata contribution from the other owners, and may keep the lien of the mortgage alive, by equitable assignment, as security for such contributions.² ^c In order, however, that this lia-

bution requires, therefore, some examination of the rules determining the equities between the various persons who are owners of or interested in the mortgaged premises, and of the effects upon these equities produced by a release from the mortgagee to any one or more of them. I shall briefly discuss the three following cases: 1. Where the equities among the owners are equal; 2. Where their equities are unequal; 3. The effect in either ease of a release by the mortgagee given to one of such parties.

§ 1222, 1 Sce ante, vol. 1, §§ 405, 406, 407, 411.

§ 1222, ² Among the instances where the equities are equal, and which fall within this rule, are the following: Two or more persons, co-owners of land, jointly give a mortgage thereon; land covered by a mortgage, on the death of the mortgagor, descends to his several heirs, or is devised by him to several devisees, who take it as co-owners; a mortgagor conveys the premises by one deed to several grantees, who become co-owners of undivided shares; a mortgagor, by separate, similar, and simultaneous deeds,

§1222, (a) This section is cited in Beck v. Tarrant, 61 Tex. 402.

§ 1222, (b) The text is quoted in Davenport v. Timmonds, 157 Mo. App. 360, 138 S. W. 349; Hiller v. Nelson, (Ky.) 118 S. W. 292. See, also, Senft v. Vanek, 209 Ill. 361, 70 N. E. 720 (equities between two persons purchasing separate parcels at same judicial sale are equal).

§1222, (c) The text is quoted in Davenport v. Timmonds, 157 Mo. App. 360, 138 S. W. 349; Hiller v. Nelson, (Ky.) 118 S. W. 292. § 1223

bility to a ratable contribution may exist under such a condition of ownership, it is essential that the equities of all the owners should be equal.³

§ 1223. 2. Where Their Equities are Unequal—Tenants for Life or for Years.^a—In the preceding case the titles of

conveys all the mortgaged premises, in separate and distinct parcels, to several separate grantees, neither of whom assumes payment of the whole mortgage, nor any part thereof, so as to disturb the equality of the equities between them, and the like:^d Bailey v. Myrick, 50 Me. 171; Aiken v. Gale, 37 N. H. 501, 505; Town of Salem v. Edgerly, 33 N. H. 46; Towle v. Hoit, 14 N. H. 61; Taylor v. Bassett, 3 N. H. 294; Wheeler v. Willard, 44 Vt. 640; Gibson v. Crehore, 5 Pick. 146; Saunders v. Frost, 5 Pick. 259, 16 Am. Dec. 394; Allen v. Clark, 17 Pick. 47; Parkman v. Welch, 19 Pick. 231; Chase v. Woodbury, 6 Cush. 143; Taylor v. Porter, 7 Mass. 355; Young v. Williams, 17 Conn. 393; Lyon v. Robbins, 45 Conn. 513; Stevens v. Cooper, 1 Johns. Ch. 425, 7 Am. Dec. 499; Cheesebrough v. Millard, 1 Johns. Ch. 409, 7 Am. Dec. 494; Lawrence v. Cornell, 4 Johns. Ch. 542; Sawyer v. Lyon, 10 Johns. 32; Johnson v. White, 11 Barb. 194; Stroud v. Casey, 27 Pa. St. 471; Simpson v. Gardiner, 97 Ill. 237; Briscoe v. Power, 47 Ill. 447; Kingsbury v. Buckner, 70 Ill. 514; Blue v. Blue, 38 Ill. 9, 87 Am. Dec. 267; McLaughlin v. Estate of Curts, 27 Wis. 644; Bates v. Ruddick, 2 Iowa, 423, 65 Am. Dec. 774; Beall v. Barclay, 10 B. Mon. 261.

§ 1222, ³ The equality may be disturbed in various ways. If the mortgagor should convey the land by three simultaneous deeds to A, B, and C, and A should in his deed assume payment of the whole mortgage as a part of the consideration, A's parcel would not only be primarily chargeable with the entire mortgage, but he would himself become the principal debtor. If A should pay off the mortgage, he would have no right of contribution against the others; on the contrary, if either B or C should redeem, he would be entitled to a complete exoneration as against A: See Zabriskie v. Salter, 80 N. Y. 555. The equality might also be lost if the grantee of one parcel neglected to put his deed on record, and those of the other grantees being recorded, one of them conveyed his portion to a second grantee for value and without notice: Chase v. Woodbury, 6 Cush. 143; and see Layman v. Willard, 7 Ill. App. 183.

§1222, (d) Hall v. Morgan, 79 Mo. 47; Peck v. Peck, 110 N. Y. 64, 74, 17 N. E. 383; Beck v. Tarrant, 61 Tex. 402 (vendor's lien). in Ohmer v. Boyer, 89 Ala. 273, 7 South. 663; Tindall v. Peterson, (Neb.) 99 N. W. 659; Currier v. Teske, 93 Neb. 7, 139 N. W. 622.

§1223, (a) This section is cited

the several owners are simultaneous in their time of acquisition, and are the same in kind, the only difference being in the value of their respective interests. In the case now to be considered, the titles are also simultaneous,¹ and the inequality consists in the fact that the estate held in the mortgaged premises by one party is only partial, while that held by the other is absolute or in fee. The particular inequality referred to exists when the land subject to the mortgage is held by A as a tenant for life or for years, and by B as a remainderman or reversioner in fee.² The general doctrine of contribution applies to such owners, but is modified in its operation by the new element of inequality in the nature of their respective estates. As has already been shown, the holder of a partial interest is always compelled to redeem the whole mortgage.³ b By a settled rule

§ 1223, 1 The inequality of equities resulting from the fact that the titles of the several owners are not simultaneous is examined in the next subsequent paragraphs; and it will be seen that *such* inequality prevents any common ratable contribution.

§ 1223, ² This general condition of ownership includes the following particular cases: When the land subject to the mortgage is conveyed or devised by the mortgagor to A for life, and on his death to B in fee; also, when a part of the land subject to the mortgage is conveyed to or held by A for life, while the reversion of such part, together with all the residue of the land, are conveyed to or held by B in fee; as, for example, when, on the death of the mortgage passes to his heirs or devisees, and his widow is entitled to dower in one third thereof, or when the mortgagor is a married woman, and on her death her husband becomes tenant for life of the whole land by the curtesy, while the reversion in fee descends to her heirs; and finally, when the land, or a part thereof, is held by A as a tenant for years, and the reversion in fee by B.

§ 1223, ³ See ante, § 1220; Lyon v. Robbins, 45 Conn. 513; Spencer v. Waterman, 36 Conn. 342; Lamson v. Drake, 105 Mass. 564, 567; McCabe v. Bellows, 7 Gray, 148, 66 Am. Dec. 467; Brown v. Lapham, 3 Cush. 551; Bell v. The Mayor, 10 Paige, 49.

§ 1223, (b) The text is quoted in fredemption unite in the same Engel v. Ladewig, 153 Mich. 8, 116 persor, a dowress may redeem her \overline{N} . W. 550. But it is held that dower by paying only her portion when the mortgage and the equity of the debt; because if she paid the III-184

of the law, the life tenant, A, is bound to pay the annual interest on the mortgage accruing during his own lifetime, ---or if a tenant for years, during his term. This is his own debt, and for what he thus pays in keeping down the interest he is not entitled to any contribution from B, the owner in fee.⁴ ^c When, therefore, A redeems the mortgage, a certain part of the money paid to the mortgagee would be the equivalent of the annual interest on the mortgage which A was obliged to pay at all events, and this part, being his own debt, need not be refunded to him by B; but all of the mortgage debt over and above such part equitably belongs to B to pay; it is the share which should fall upon him by virtue of his reversionary interest. The problem then is to ascertain what portion of the total mortgage debt represents the annual interest on the mortgage which A is bound to pay during his life; subtracting that amount from the total sum, the balance is the share which B must contribute, and for which A may hold the mortgage as a lien on the land. An element of uncertainty-the duration of A's life-is inherent in the problem; but the courts, both of England and of this country, have adopted the standard "life tables" as the basis of calculation in all such cases. The rule is settled, that the present worth of an annuity equal to the annual interest running during the number of years which constitute his expected life represents the sum which A is liable to pay as his individual indebtedness; the balance, after subtracting this sum from the mortgage debt actually paid to the mortgagee, is the amount which B is liable to contribute.^{5 d} When the life tenant, A, is a dow-

§ 1223, 4 Ibid.; Squire v. Compton, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 387; Swaine v. Perine, 5 Johns. Ch. 482, 9 Am. Dec. 318.

§ 1223, ⁵ Knowing A's age, the "life tables" give the number of years he has yet to live, which, for the purposes of the rule, are taken as abso-

whole debt, she would be immediately entitled, by subrogation, to have all above her proportional part refunded: Kenyon v. Segar, 14 R. I. 490.

§1223, (c) The text is quoted in

Engel v. Ladewig, 153 Mich. 8, 116 N. W. 550. See, also, Ohmer v. Boyer, 89 Ala. 273, 7 South. 663; Wheeler v. Addison, 54 Md. 41.

§1223, (d) The text is quoted in Engel v. Ladewig, 153 Mich. 8, 116

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ress, the present worth is calculated upon the basis of one third of the annual interest accruing on the mortgage of the entire premises. If the remainderman or reversioner, B, redeems, the rule is the exact converse of the one above stated.

lutely certain and correct. He is therefore bound to pay the annual interest on the mortgage for the number of years disclosed by the tables. Knowing the amount of interest due each year, and the number of years it must be paid, the "annuity tables" will give the present worth of such sum payable annually for the required number of years. This present worth is A's proper share; subtracting it from the whole amount paid to the mortgagee, the balance is the sum payable by B. The rule thus formulated applies whenever the entire premises subject to the mortgage are held by A for life and the fee in remainder or reversion is held by B; as, for example, when A is the husband, tenant by the curtesy, and B represents the heirs. Where A is a widow-doweress, a slight modification in the rule is necessary. Since she is entitled to dower in only one third of the mortgaged premises, she is bound to keep down only one third of the interest on the mortgage. The present worth of an annuity for her expected life equal to one third of the annual interest represents the amount of her individual liability. This modification indicates the rule applicable to all life tenants of a portion only of the mortgaged premises. When A i_i is a tenant for years, no resort to the life tables is necessary. The present worth of the annuity must be calculated for the number of years constituting the residue of his term. Whenever the reversioner or remainderman, B, redeems the mortgage, the rule is plainly the exact converse of that above stated: Carll v. Butman, 7 Me. 102, 105; Houghton v. Hapgood, 13 Pick. 154, 158; Gibson v. Crehore, 5 Pick. 146; Swaine v. Perine, 5 Johns. Ch. 482, 490, 9 Am. Dec. 318; Bell v. The Mayor, 10 Paige, 49; Jones v. Sherrard, 2 Dev. & B. Eq. 179, 189; Foster v. Hilliard, 1 Story, 77, 90, Fed. Cas. No. 4972; Lyon v. Robbins, 45 Conn. 513; Raynor v. Raynor, 21 Hun, 36. As to use of "life tables," see Graves v. Cochran, 68 Mo. 74; Unger v. Leiter, 32 Ohio St. 210; Nye v. Patterson, 35 Mich. 413.

N. W. 550; and cited, as to the method of valuing a life interest, in Donovan v. Smith, (N. J. Eq.) 88 Atl. 167. See, also, Damm v. Damm, 109 Mich. 619, 63 Am, St. Rep. 601, 67 N. W. 984; Tindall v. Peterson, (Neb.) 99 N. W. 659. See, further, Abney v. Abney, 182 Ala. 213, 62 South. 64; Engel v. Ladewig, 153 Mich. 8, 116 N. W. 550 (redemption by remainderman): Draper v. Clayton, 87 Neb. 443, 29 L. B. A. (N. S.) 153, 127 N. W. 369, citing the text.

§ 1224. 3. Inequality of Equities Where Titles are not Simultaneous-Between Mortgagor and His Grantee of a Parcel-Between Successive Grantees - Inverse Order of Alienation.^a—Where the owners of the premises subject to the mortgage hold under the mortgagor by titles not simultaneous, but successive in order of time, an entirely different inequality of equities among them is introduced; a priority results which not only destroys the right of ratable contribution when one of them redeems, but even creates in favor of some a right of *exoneration* as against the others. The foundation of this doctrine is found in the equities subsisting between the mortgagor and his grantee of a part of the mortgaged premises. Whenever the mortgagor conveys a portion of the land "subject to" a mortgage by a warranty deed, and retains the residue of the land in his own hands, that portion of the land retained by the mortgagor becomes, as between himself and his grantee at all events, the fund primarily liable for the whole mortgage debt. The form of the deed shows that the grantee not only assumed payment of no portion of the mortgage debt, but did not buy his parcel even *subject to* the mortgage: and the entire burden was therefore left upon the portion of land remaining in the ownership of the mortgagor. Whatever be the rights of the mortgagee to resort to either or both of the parcels, it is plainly the equitable duty of the mortgagor to assume the whole debt, and thus to free the grantee's parcel from the lien.^b If, therefore, the mortgagor pays off the mortgage, its lien is ended, and he can claim no contribution from the grantee; if, on the other hand, the grantee redeems, he is entitled to keep the lien

§ 1224, (a) This section is cited in Howser v. Cruikshank, 122 Ala. 256, 82 Am. St. Rep. 76, 25 South. 206; Steinmeyer v. Steinmeyer, 55 S. C. 9, 33 S. E. 15. Sections 1224-1226 are cited in Woodward v. Brown, 119 Cal. 283, 63 Am. St. Rep. 108, 51 Pac. 2, 542.

§1224, (b) The text is quoted in

Newby v. Fox, 90 Kan. 317, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 302, 133 Pac. 890; Chancellor of New Jersey v. Towell, 80 N. J. Eq. 223, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 710, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 359, 82 Atl. 861; Interstate Land & Investment Co. v. Logan, 196 Ala. 196, 72 South. 36.

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alive for the purpose of enforcing an exoneration by the mortgagor, at least to the extent of the value of the premises remaining in the mortgagor's hands and subject to the encumbrance. This view of the equities subsisting between the mortgagor and his own grantee seems to be universally adopted.¹ The doctrine being thus established that the grantee obtains an equitable priority as against the mortgagor, and the portion of the mortgaged premises left in the mortgagor's hands is primarily chargeable with the whole mortgage, the inference is natural, even if not necessary, that the same burden follows this portion, when subsequently conveyed by the mortgagor to a second grantee.^c If the mortgagor conveys one half of the mortgaged premises by a warranty deed to A, his own half is equitably charged with the entire debt, and A has as against him the priority. When the mortgagor afterwards conveys his half by a similar deed to B, that transaction cannot affect A's pre-existing priority, with respect to the parcel thus conveyed as the primary fund for payment, and B cannot acquire any higher equities than those possessed by his immediate grantor; he succeeds to the exact position of the mortgagor towards the first grantee, A. As between the two grantees, therefore, the parcel conveyed to the second grantee, B, is primarily liable for the whole mortgage debt;

§ 1224, 1 2 Washburn on Real Property, 4th ed., p. 202, sec. 5; 2 Jones on Mortgages, secs. 1091, 1092; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 291, 305, notes to Aldrich v. Cooper. The rule applies not only to the mortgagor, but also to his heir: Harbert's Case, 3 Coke, 11 b; Wallace v. Stevens, 64 Me. 225; Hahn v. Behrman, 73 Ind. 120; Clowes v. Dickenson, 5 Johns. Ch. 235; Beard v. Fitzgerald, 105 Mass. 134; Chase v. Woodbury, 6 Cush. 143; Kilborn v. Robbins, 8 Allen, 466; Bradley v. George, 2 Allen, 392; Cheever v. Fair, 5 Cal. 337; Root v. Collins, 34 Vt. 173 (mortgagor and his vendee in a land contract); and cases in next following note; see Judson v. Dada, 79 N. Y. 373.

§ 1224, (c) The text is quoted in 7 Newby v. Fox, 90 Kan. 317, 47 L. 8 R. A. (N. S.) 302, 133 Pac. 890; C Chancellor of New Jersey v. Towell, 3 80 N. J. Eq. 223, Ann. Cas. 1914A,

710, 39 L. B. A. (N. S.) 359, 82 Atl. 861; Interstate Land & Investment Co. v. Logan, 196 Ala. 196, 72 South. 36. he can claim no contribution from A, but on the other hand, A may be entitled to exoneration against the portion held by him. If this reasoning is correct, it necessarily applies to any number of successive grantees to whom the mortgagor has conveyed separate parcels of the mortgaged premises, and determines these equities among them, whether the mortgagor has conveyed away all the land covered by the mortgage, or retains a portion himself, and whether their respective parcels are of equal or unequal In most of the states, though not in quite all, the values. courts have adopted this reasoning, and have settled the equities of the parties in such a condition of fact by a general rule: Whenever the mortgagor has conveyed separate parcels of the mortgaged premises by warranty deeds to successive grantees, and there are no special provisions in any of their deeds, and no other dealings between themselves or with the mortgagor which disturb the equities otherwise existing, a priority results, depending upon the order of conveyance.^d As between the mortgagor and all the grantees, the parcel in his hands, if any, is primarily liable for the whole mortgage debt, and should be exhausted before having recourse to any of theirs; as between the grantees, their parcels are liable in the inverse order of their alienation, and any parcel chargeable first in order must be exhausted before recourse is had to the second.² e This inequality of equities plainly destroys all

§ 1224, ² In many of these states the rule is applied directly to the mortgagee, and regulates his mode of foreclosure; either by statute, or by rule of court, or by decisions, he is compelled to frame his decree of sale, and to sell the mortgaged premises in compliance with this rule. In other states, the mortgagee is not thus directly controlled, but the rule is applied

§ 1224, (d) The text is quoted in Chancellor of New Jersey v. Towell, 80 N. J. Eq. 223, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 710, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 359, 82 Atl. 861; Interstate Land & Investment Co. v. Logan, 196 Ala. 196, 72 South. 36. § 1224, (e) The text^{*} is quoted in Farmers' Savings & B. & L. Ass'n v. Kent, 117 Ala. 624, 23 South. 757, and in Interstate Land & Investment Co. v. Logan, 196 Ala. 196, 72 South. 36. The text is cited in

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right and liability of *ratable contribution*. If the mortgagor pays off the mortgage, or if the parcel remaining in his hands is sold in full satisfaction of it, he cannot

to the other parties, and regulates the mode in which their equities are worked out, as among themselves, by redemption and exoneration. A single simple case will illustrate. A mortgagor divides the land subject to the mortgage into five lots. He conveys lot 1 by warranty deed to A, and afterwards, by successive deeds, lots 2, 3, and 4, to B, C, and D, and retains lot 5 himself. Lot 5 is then the primary fund, and must be first sold, and if it fully satisfies the mortgage debt, the four other lots are freed. If its proceeds are not sufficient, then lot 4 must be sold; and only so far as is necessary to satisfy the mortgage debt, lots 3, 2 and 1

Harvison v. Griffin, 32 N. D. 188, 155 N. W. 655. See, also, Stephens v. Clay, 17 Colo. 489, 31 Am. St. Rep. 328, 30 Pac. 43; Citizens' Nat. Bank of Middletown v. Trustees, 5 Del. Ch. 596; Diamond Flint Glass Co. v. Boyd, 30 Ind. App. 485, 66 N. E. 479; Case Threshing-Machine Co. v. Mitchell, 74 Mich. 679, 42 N. W. 151; Mahagan v. Mead, 63 N. H. 570, 3 Atl. 919; Ingersoll v. Somers Land Co., 82 N. J. Eq. 476, 89 Atl. 288; Welling v. Ryerson, 94 N. Y. 98; Milligan's Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 503; Hawkins v. Potter, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 126, 130 S. W. 643; First State Bank of Teague v. Cox, (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 1; Powell v. Stephens, (Tex. Civ. App.) 163 S. W. 672; Biswell v. Gladney, (Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S. W. 1168; Deavitt v. Judevine, 60 Vt. 695, 17 Atl. 410; Jamaica Sav. Bank v. Howard's Ex'r, 79 Vt. 372, 65 Atl. 92; Black v. Suydam, 81 Wash. 279, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1113, 142 Pac. 700 (rule not defeated by statutory provision giving sheriff discretion to sell together or in parcels). For application of the rule to enforcement of other liens, see Neely v. Williams, (Neb.) 149 Fed. 60, 79 C. C. A. 82 (land devised charged with annu-

ities is sold in parcels); Ritter v. Cost, 99 Ind. 80; Merritt v. Richey, 97 Ind. 236 (judgment lien); Hunt v. Ewing, 12 Lea, 519 (judgment lien); Brown v. Harding, 170 N. C. 253, 86 S. E. 1010 (judgment lien); Watson v. Van Sickle, (Tex. Civ. App.) 114 S. W. 1160 (vendor's lien); Miller v. Holland, 84 Va. 652, 5 S. E. 701; Clark v. Harper's Ferry Timber Co., 70 W. Va. 312, 73 S. E. 919 (vendor's lien). If prior purchasers fail to invoke the protection of this rule before foreclosure it is not binding on the courts: Prickett v. Sibert, 75 Ala. 315; Threefoot Bros. & Co. v. Hillman, 130 Ala. 244, 89 Am. St. Rep. 39, 30 South. 513; Dobbins v. Wilson, 107 Ill. 17. In determining the order of priorities, the date when the legal title vested is the test; and although a contract is first made with A, if B gets the deed of his parcel first, he may insist that A's land be first charged with the encumbrance: Watson v. Van Sickle, (Tex. Civ. App.) 114 S. W. 1160. In Gray v. H. M. Loud & Sons Lumber Co., 128 Mich. 427, 8 Detroit Leg. N. 714, 54 L. R. A. 731, 87 N. W. 376, the question was raised as to the order of liability between a prior grantee under an call upon his grantees for any reimbursement. In like manner, if the parcel belonging to a grantee who was a later purchaser is sold, he can claim no contribution from

are sold in the inverse order of their alienation: 1.2 Washburn on Real Property, 4th ed., pp. 202-206, secs. 5, 5a; 2 Jones on Mortgages, secs. 1620-1632; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 291-305, notes to Aldrich v. Cooper; Randall v. Mallett, 14 Me. 51; Holden v. Pike, 24 Me. 427; Cushing v. Ayer, 25 Me. 383; Sheperd v. Adams, 32 Me. 63; Town of Salem v. Edgerly, 33 N. H. 46; Aiken v. Gale, 37 N. H. 501; Brown v. Simons, 44 N. H. 475, 45 N. H. 211; Gates v. Adams, 24 Vt. 70; Lyman v. Lyman, 32 Vt. 79, 76 Am. Dec. 151; Root v. Collins, 34 Vt. 173; Chase v. Woodbury, 6 Cush. 143; George v. Kent, 7 Allen, 16; Kilborn v. Robbins, 8 Allen, 466; George v. Wood, 9 Allen, 80, 85 Am. Dec. 741; Beard v. Fitzgerald, 105 Mass. 134; Sanford v. Hill, 46 Conn. 42; Gill v. Lyon, 1 Johns. Ch. 447; Clowes v. Dickenson, 5 Johns. Ch. 235; James v. Hubbard, 1 Paige, 228, 234; Jenkins v. Freyer, 4 Paige, 47; Guion v. Knapp, 6 Paige, 35, 29 Am. Dec. 741; Jumel v. Jumel, 7 Paige, 591; Skeel v. Spraker, 8 Paige, 182; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Malthy, 8 Paige, 361; Patty v. Pease, 8 Paige, 277, 35 Am. Dec. 683; Schryver v. Teller, 9 Paige, 173; Rathbone v. Clark, 9 Paige, 648; Kellogg v. Rand, 11 Paige, 59; Stuyvesant v. Hall, 2 Barb. Ch. 151; Ferguson v. Kimhall, 3 Barb. Ch. 616; Ex parte Merrian, 4 Denio, 254; Howard Ins. Co. v. Halsey, 4 Sandf. 565; Weaver v. Toogood, 1 Barb. 238; La Farge Ins. Co. v. Bell, 22 Barb. 54; Crafts v. Aspinwall, 2 N. Y. 289; Howard Ins. Co. v. Halsey, 8 N. Y. 271, 59 Am. Dec. 478; Ingalls v. Morgan, 10 N. Y. 178; Belmont v. Coman, 22 N. Y. 438, 78 Am. Dec. 213; Zabriskie v. Salter, 80 N. Y. 555; Hopkins v. Wolley, 81 N. Y. 77; Kendall v. Niebuhr, 58 How, Pr. 156; 13 Jones & S. 542; Coles v. Appleby, 22 Hun, 72, 87 N. Y. 114, 121; Cowden's Estate, 1 Pa. St. 267; Carpenter v. Koons, 20 Pa. St. 222; Hiles v. Coult, 30 N. J. Eq. 40; Hill's Adm'rs v. McCarter, 27 N. J. Eq. 41; Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Boughrum, 24 N. J. Eq. 44; Mount v. Potts, 23 N. J. Eq. 188; Weatherby v. Slack, 16 N. J. Eq. 491; Keene v. Munn, 16 N. J. Eq. 398; Gaskill v. Sine, 15 N. J. Eq. 400, 78 Am. Dec. 105; Winters v. Henderson, 6 N. J. Eq. 31; Black v. Morse, 7 N. J. Eq. 509; Wikoff v. Davis, 4 N. J. Eq.

unrecorded deed and a subsequent grantee without notice, whose deed was first recorded. It was held that the land included in the unrecorded deed was liable first. "As the prior grantee has failed to record his deed and thus give notice of the true state of the title, the subsequent grantee, unless otherwise notified, may rightfully regard the land, which is thus apparently in the hands of the mortgagor, as primarily liable for the whole debt." § 1224, (1) This illustration is quoted in Farmers' Savings & B. & L. Ass'n v. Kent, 117 Ala. 624, 23 South. 757. any grantee who was prior in time, since his parcel is itself primarily liable as between the two. In place of contribution, a right of exoneration may arise. It has already been shown, how the grantee, under such circumstances,

224; Britton v. Updike, 3 N. J. Eq. 125; Shannon v. Marselis, 1 N. J. Eq. 413, 421; Jones v. Myrick's Ex'rs, 8 Gratt. 179; Henkle's Ex'x v. Allstadt, 4 Gratt. 284; Conrad v. Harrison, 3 Leigh, 532; Stoney v. Shultz, 1 Hill Eq. 465, 27 Am. Dec. 429; Meng v. Houser, 13 Rich. Eq. 210; Norton v. Lewis, 3 S. C. 25; Cumming v. Cumming, 3 Ga. 460; Ritch v. Eichelberger, 13 Fla. 169; P. & M. Bank v. Dundas, 10 Ala. 661; Mobile etc. Co. v. Huder, 35 Ala. 713; Miller v. Rogers, 49 Tex. 398; Hall v. Edwards, 43 Mich. 473; McKinney v. Miller, 19 Mich. 142; Ireland v. Woolman, 15 Mich. 253; Cooper v. Bigly, 13 Mich. 463; Mason v. Payne, Walk. Ch. 459; Hahn v. Behrman, 73 Ind. 120; Evansville Gas-light Co. v. State, 73 Ind. 219, 38 Am. Rep. 129; McCullum v. Turpie, 32 Ind. 146; Aiken v. Bruen, 21 Ind. 137; Day v. Patterson, 18 Ind. 114; Marshall v. Moore, 36 Ill. 321, 326; Matteson v. Thomas, 41 Ill. 110; Iglebart v. Crane, 42 Ill. 261; Dodds v. Snyder, 44 Ill. 53; Lock v. Fulford, 52 Ill. 166, 169; Tompkins v. Wiltberger, 56 Ill. 385, 391; Sumner v. Waugh, 56 Ill. 531; Niles v. Harmon, 80 Ill. 396; Hawhe v. Snydaker, 86 Ill. 197; Meacham v. Steele, 93 Ill. 135; Warner v. De Witt Co. Bank, 4 Ill. App. 305; Erlinger v. Boul, 7 Ill. App. 40; Layman v. Willard, 7 Ill. App. 183; Aiken v. Milwaukee, etc., R'y, 37 Wis. 469; State v. Titus, 17 Wis. 241; Worth v. Hill, 14 Wis. 559; Ogden v. Glidden, 9 Wis. 46; Johnson v. Williams, 4 Minn. 260, 268; Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 2899. The doctrine also applies where the mortgagor has conveyed the whole land subject to the mortgage to A, and A in turn conveys in parcels to successive grantees: See Guion v. Knapp, 6 Paige, 35, 29 Am. Dec. 741; Wikoff v. Davis, 4 N. J. Eq. 224. This rule is rejected by the courts of Iowa and of Kentucky, which hold that the equities of the grantees as between themselves are equal, as though their deeds were simultaneous, and that they are all liable to contribute ratably:²⁵ Barney v. Myers, 28 Iowa, 472; Massie v. Wilson, 16 Iowa, 391; Bates v. Ruddick, 2 Iowa, 423, 65 Am. Dec. 774; Dickey v. Thompson, 8 B. Mon. 312; Campbell v. Johnston, 4 Dana, 177, 182; Poston v. Eubank, 3 J. J. Marsh. 42; and the same view seems to be taken in Ohio: Green v. Ramage, 18 Ohio, 428, 51 Am. Dec. 458; but see Cary v. Folsom, 14 Ohio, 365; Comm. Bank v. West. R. Bank, 11 Ohio, 444, 38 Am. Dec. 739.

§ 1224, (2) See Huff v. Farwell, 67 Iowa, 298, 25 N. W. 252; but that a parcel retained by the mortgagor is first chargeable, see Windsor v. Evans, 72 Iowa, 692, 34 N. W. 481; Mickley v. Tomlinson, 79 Iowa, 383, 41 N. W. 311, 44 N. W. 684; Dillivan v. German Savings Bank, (Iowa) 124 N. W. 350. may be exonerated by the mortgagor; in like manner, a right of exoneration may arise among the successive grantees in favor of one whose conveyance was earlier against those who were later in point of time. The exoneration will be complete or partial, according to the circumstances of the case.³

§ 1225. The Same. What Circumstances Disturb These Equities and Defeat This Rule.^a—The doctrine stated in the foregoing paragraph is one of purely equitable origin, and is not an absolute rule of law, and if the peculiar equitable reasons on which it rests are wanting, it ceases to operate.¹ b Whether it does or does not apply to any particu-

§ 1224, ³ It should be constantly remembered that the mortgagee possesses the absolute right to enforce the security of the mortgage for the whole amount thereof, if necessary, against all the parcels in the hands of all the grantees. A single simple case will illustrate this equity of exoneration. A mortgagor conveys one half the premises by warranty deed to A, and afterwards the other half to B. As between the two grantees, the mortgage must be first enforced against B's parcel, but if its proceeds are not sufficient to satisfy the debt, then resort must be had to A's half. In other words, A's parcel continues liable for so much of the mortgage debt as exceeds the value of B's parcel. This liability indicates the true measure and extent of A's right of exoneration against B. If A redeems the mortgage, or if A's parcel is sold first by the mortgagee, he is not necessarily entitled to a complete exoneration by B; he is only entitled to a complete exoneration when B's parcel equals or exceeds in value the amount of the mortgage debt, so that it would have satisfied the mortgage and freed A's land from the burden. If the mortgage debt exceeds the value of B's parcel, A is entitled to exoneration from such an amount thereof as equals the value of B's land; the balance of the debt over and above that amount is A's individual burden, chargeable on his own land. The same reasoning clearly applies to any number of successive grantees and determines the rights of exoneration among them: See cases in the last preceding note.

§ 1225, 1 See Kendall v. Woodruff, 87 N. Y. 1, 7, per Folger, C. J.

§ 1225 (a) This section is cited in Ohmer v. Boyer, 89 Ala. 273, 7 South. 663; Howser v. Cruikshank, 122 Ala. 256, 82 Am. St. Rep. 76, 25 South. 206; Gerdine v. Menage, 41 Minn. 417, 43 N. W. 91; Stephens v. Clay, 17 Colo. 489, 31 Am. St. Rep. 328, 30 Pac. 43.

§1225, (b) The text is quoted in Chancellor of New Jersey v. Towell,

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lar case may be certainly determined by a careful consideration of the following principles. The doctrine in its full scope and operation primarily depends upon the relation subsisting between the mortgagor, or other owner of the entire mortgaged premises, and his grantee of a parcel of the land. This relation, in turn, results from the form of conveyance, which, being a warranty deed, or equivalent to a warranty, shows conclusively an intention between the two that the grantor is to assume the whole burden of the encumbrance as a charge upon his own parcel, while the grantee is to take and hold his portion entirely free.^c Secondly, the conveyance may be of a different character; by its special provisions it may expressly show, or by its general form it may impliedly indicate, that the grantee himself either assumes the whole mortgage debt and charges his parcel with the entire burden of the mortgage, or else takes and holds his parcel subject to and chargeable with its proportionate share of the encumbrance.^d Thirdly, although the deeds are warranties, so that the doctrine will otherwise apply, any particular grantee may by his subsequent omissions, or by his subsequent dealings with other grantees, disturb the order of the equities in his own favor, and create equities in behalf of other owners, and even render his own parcel primarily liable as between all the grantees. Finally, whenever the equities of any original grantee towards the other parties have been fixed, either by the form of his deed, or by his own omissions or dealings, then any subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer from such grantee takes the parcel sub-

80 N. J. Eq. 223, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 710, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 359, 82 Atl. 861; Biswell v. Gladney, (Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S. W. 1168.

§ 1225, (c) Quoted in Howser v. Cruikshank, 122 Ala. 256, 82 Am. St. Rep. 76, 25 South. 206; and in Biswell v. Gladney, (Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S. W. 1168. That the intent may be presumed even in the absence of a warranty is held in Gray v. H. M. Loud & Sons Lumber Co., 128 Mich. 427, 8 Detroit Leg. N. 714, 54 L. R. A. 731, 87 N. W. 376. § 1225, (d) Stephens v. Clay, 17 Colo. 489, 31 Am. St. Rep. 328, 30 Pac. 43; Jackson v. Condict, 57 N. J. Eq. 522, 41 Atl. 374 (no circumstances from which an agreement could be implied).

ject to the same equities which originally attached to it; the same equities follow the parcel in its devolutions.². The equities among successive grantees, as determined by the general doctrine of the preceding paragraph, will therefore be disturbed in the following instances: 1. Whenever a grantee of any parcel either expressly assumes the payment of the mortgage, or his deed is of such a form that he takes the parcel conveyed to himself subject to the mortgage as a part of the consideration, then, as has already been shown, the parcel thus purchased becomes, in the hands of himself and of those holding under him, primarily chargeable with the mortgage debt as against the mortgagor-grantor, and consequently as against all subsequent grantees of other parcels from the mortgagor. By such an express or implied assumption, the doctrine of liability in the inverse order of alienation, and all of its consequences, are defeated with respect to the mortgagor and the subsequent grantees.³ ^e 2. In like manner, when the deeds to the suc-

§ 1225, ² An examination of the state reports discloses the fact that no single equitable doctrine more frequently arises before the American courts, or produces a greater number of decisions, than that which adjusts the rights of separate owners of land encumbered with the same mortgage, or adjusts the liens of different mortgages resting upon the same parcel or parcels of land. This doctrine in the form as presented in the text is almost exclusively American; very little aid in its application can be obtained from English decisions. The cases which involve it are often exceedingly complicated in their facts, and present great apparent difficulties. However complicated such cases may he, their solution will always be comparatively easy and certain by keeping steadily in view and applying the few well-settled equitable principles formulated in the text. Any detailed examination of the decided cases involving these principles would occupy more space than my limits permit, since each case presents its own peculiar facts, which are often numerous and complicated. I have preferred to formulate the principles, with such explanation as should render them simple and plain; they will, I trust, furnish the correct solution of every case.

§ 1225, ³ See ante, § 1205; ² Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 303; Zabriskie v. Salter, 80 N. Y. 555; Erie Co. Sav. Bank v. Roop, 80 N. Y. 591; Hop-

§ 1225, (e) The text is quoted and Jersey v. Towell, 80 N. J. Eq. 223, followed in Chancellor of New Ann. Cas. 1914A, 710, 39 L. B. A.

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cessive grantees are not warranty or equivalent thereto, but simply purport to convey the mortgagor's right, title, and interest in the parcels, the intention is clear that the grantees respectively assume their portions of the burdens. Their several parcels are all liable ratably, and not in the inverse order.^{4 f} 3. Where the conveyances were such that the rule of inverse order would otherwise have applied, a grantee of a parcel prior in point of time may, by neglecting to record his deed, lose his precedence as against the subsequent grantees of other parcels, and those holding under them, whose deeds and mortgages are recorded without any notice of his title. The absence of the record in such case may, however, be supplied by other

kins v. Wolley, 81 N. Y. 77; Coles v. Appleby, 22 Hun, 72; Sanford v. Hill, 46 Conn. 42; Evansville Gas-light Co. v. State, 73 Ind. 219, 38 Am. Rep. 129; Kilborn v. Robbins, 8 Allen, 466, 471; Chapman v. Beardsley, 31 Conn. 115; Engle v. Haines, 5 N. J. Eq. 186, 632, 43 Am. Dec. 624; Caruthers v. Hall, 10 Mich. 40; Halsey v. Reed, 9 Paige, 446; Torrey v. Bank of Orleans, 9 Paige, 649; Warren v. Boynton, 2 Barb. 13; Hoy v. Bramhall, 19 N. J. Eq. 563, 97 Am. Dec. 687; Pancoast v. Duvall, 26 N. J. Eq. 445; Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Boughrum, 24 N. J. Eq. 44; Briscoe i v. Power, 47 Ill. 447.

§ 1225, 4 As examples, where the mortgagor conveys by quitclaim deeds, or where the mortgaged premises are sold in parcels by execution on a judgment recovered for some debt other than the mortgage debt: 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 304; Erlinger v. Boul, 7 Ill. App. 40; Aiken v. Gale, 37 N. H. 501; Carpenter v. Koons, 20 Pa. St. 222; and see Sanford v. Hill, 46 Conn. 42; Hoy v. Bramhall, 19 N. J. Eq. 563, 97 Am. Dec. 687.

(N. S.) 359, 82 Atl. 861. See, also, Drury v. Holden, 121 Ill. 130, 13 N. E. 547; Burger v. Greif, 55 Md. 518; Michigan State Ins. Co. v. Soule, 51 Mich. 312, 16 N. W. 662; Savings Investment & Trust Co. v. United Realty & Mortgage Co., (N. J. Eq.) 94 Atl. 588; Browne v. Lynde, 91 N. Y. 92; Tarbell v. Durant, 61 Vt. 516, 17 Atl. 44.

§ 1225, (f) Quoted in Aderholt v. Henry, 87 Ala. 415, 6 L. R. A. 451, 6 South. 625; Chancellor of New Jersey v. Towell, 80 N. J. Eq. 223, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 710, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 359, 82 Atl. 860; Biswell v. Gladney, (Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S. W. 1168; and cited to this effect in Interstate Land & Investment Co. v. Logan, 196 Ala. 196, 72 South. 36. See, also, Gerdine v. Menage, 41 Minn. 417, 43 N. W. 91. Biswell v. Gladney, *supra*, in an instructive opinion, holds that it is a question of the intention of grantor and grantee, rather than of the form of their deed. kind of notice, actual or constructive.⁵ g 4. Finally, any grantee otherwise entitled to precedence may, by his agreements or dealings with other grantees, render his own parcel primarily liable for the mortgage debt, as between himself and such other grantees; and the liability thus attached to the land would follow it in the hands of subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers.⁶ h

§ 1226. 4. A Release by the Mortgagee of One or More Parcels.^a—Although the equities between the subsequent owners of various parcels of the mortgaged premises, whether equal or unequal, do not prevent the mortgagee from enforcing the mortgage security, if necessary, against all these parcels, yet after the mortgagee has received no-

§ 1225, ⁵ If the mortgagor conveys one half to A, and afterwards the other half to B, and A's deed is not recorded, and B has no other notice of it, B has a right to assume that he himself is the first grantee, and that one half of the land remains in the mortgagor's hands primarily liable for the mortgage debt. By putting his own deed on record, B thus obtains a precedence over A, which avails on behalf of purchasers and mortgagees of the same parcel holding under him. B might, however, be charged with notice of A's deed, although unrecorded; and if A were in open, exclusive possession of his parcel, this would generally operate as notice: 2 Lead Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 297; Layman v. Willard, 7 Ill. App. 183; Brown v. Simons, 44 N. H. 475; Chase v. Woodbury, 6 Cush. 143; Chapman v. West, 17 N. Y. 125; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cutler, 3 Sand. Ch. 176; La Farge F. Ins. Co. v. Bell, 22 Barb. 54.

§ 1225, 6 See Zabriskie v. Salter, 80 N. Y. 555; Erie Co. Sav. Bank v. Roop, 80 N. Y. 591; Hopkins v. Wolley, 81 N. Y. 77.

§ 1225, (g) See, also, Interstate Land & Investment Co. v. Logan, 196 Ala. 196, 72 South. 36.

§ 1225, (h) Aderholt v. Henry, 87 Ala. 416, 6 L. E. A. 451, 6 South. 625; Moore v. Shurtleff, 128 Ill. 370, 21 N. E. 775. It is held that where the mortgagor reacquires the first parcel after selling the second to A, the priority of the first parcel is gone, and a subsequent purchaser from the mortgagor of the first parcel must bear the burden of the mortgage ahead of A: Hawkins v. Potter, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 126, 130 S. W. 643.

§ 1226, (a) This section is cited in Hazle v. Bondy, 173 Ill. 302, 50 N. E. 671; Lynchburg P. B. & L. Co. v. Fellers, 96 Va. 337, 70 Am. St. Rep. 851, 31 S. E. 505; Cohn v. Souders, 175 Mo. 455, 75 S. W. 413; Bridgewater Roller Mills Co. v. Strough, 98 Va. 721, 37 S. E. 290; Skinner v. Harker, 23 Colo. 333, 48 Pac. 648. tice of the subsequent conveyances, the equities affect him to such an extent that he cannot deal with the whole premises, or with any parcel thereof, or with the owner of any parcel, by release or agreement, so as to disturb the equities subsisting among the various owners, or to destroy their rights of precedence in the order of liability, or to defeat their rights of ratable contribution, or of complete or partial exoneration.^b No such obligation, however, rests upon the mortgagee, nor is he prevented from dealing with the mortgaged premises in any manner consistent with his general rights as a mortgagee, unless he has received notice of the conveyances to the subsequent owners whose interests could be affected by his dealings; but notice of their conveyances would be a notice of all the equities which arise therefrom. Since his mortgage is a prior lien, and creates an encumbrance alike upon all parts of the land subject to it, no subsequent change in the ownership of the mortgaged premises, of which he is ignorant, can in any degree control or limit his original rights and power conferred by the security. It is settled, therefore, that notice must be given to the mortgagee of any subsequent conveyance of a parcel of the mortgaged premises, so as to prevent him from affecting the equities of the grantee therein by his dealings with other portions of the same premises.^{1 c} It is also

§ 1226, ¹ Hall v. Edwards, 43 Mich. 473; Hawhe v. Snydaker, 86 Ill. 197; Meacham v. Steele, 93 Ill. 135; Warner v. De Witt Co. Bank, 4 Ill. App. 305; Kendall v. Niehuhr, 58 How. Pr. 156; 13 Jones & S. 542; Birnie v. Main, 29 Ark. 591; Cheesebrough v. Millard, 1 Johns. Ch. 409, 7 Am. Dec. 494; Guion v. Knapp, 6 Paige, 35, 29 Am. Dec. 741; Patty v. Pease, 8 Paige, 227, 35 Am. Dec. 683; Aiken v. Gale, 37 N. H. 501, 511; Iglehart v. Crane, 42 Ill. 261; Deuster v. McCamus, 14 Wis. 307, 311; Straight v. Harris, 14 Wis. 509, 513; McLean v. Lafayette Bank, 3 McLean, 587, Fed. Cas. No. 8888; and cases in next following notes.

§ 1226, (b) The text is quoted in Wood v. O'Hanlon, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 642, 111 S. W. 178; and in Interstate Land & Investment Co. v. Logan, 196 Ala. 196, 72 South. 36. § 1226, (c) The text is quoted in Interstate Land & Investment (o. v. Logan, 196 Ala. 196, 72 South. 36. See, also, Bridgewater Roller Mills Co. v. Receivers of Baltimore B. &

settled, in this connection, that a record of the subsequent conveyance is not a constructive notice to the prior mortgagee, so as to prevent him from dealing in any manner with the mortgaged premises.^{2 d} The effect of a partial release by the mortgagee who is charged with notice differs in the two cases where the equities of the various owners are equal and where they are unequal. In the first case, where the mortgaged premises have been conveyed to or are held by various owners, in such manner that their equities are equal, and all their parcels or shares are liable to a ratable contribution, if the mortgagee, having notice of such condition, releases one of the parcels or shares, he thereby discharges a part of the mortgage debt, equal to the ratable portion thereof chargeable upon the lot released, while the balance of the debt alone remains a burden upon the other parcels or shares of the premises. The release of one parcel or share would release all the other parcels from the same proportionate amount of their respective original liabilities which the value of the part re-

§ 1226, ² This is a special instance of the general rule that a record is notice only to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers, and does not operate as a notice to prior parties: See *ante*, § 657, and cases cited in note; also King v. McVickar, 3 Sand. Ch. 192; Wheelwright v. De Peyster, 4 Edw. Ch. 232; Lyman v. Lyman, 32 Vt. 79, 76 Am. Dec. 151; Shannon v. Marselis, 1 N. J. Eq. 413; Carter v. Neal, 24 Ga. 346, 71 Am. Dec. 136; Ritch v. Eichelberger, 13 Fla. 169.

L. Ass'n, 124 Fed. 718; Hardy v. Beverly Sav. Bank, 175 Mass. 112, 78 Am. St. Rep. 479, 55 N. E. 811; Clarke v. Cowan, 206 Mass. 252, 138 Am. St. Rep. 388, 92 N. E. 474; Balen v. Lewis, 130 Mich. 567, 97 Am. St. Rep. 499, 90 N. W. 416; Cogswell v. Stout, 32 N. J. Eq. 240; Association to Provide and Maintain a Home for the Friendless v. Traders' Inv. Co., 77 N. J. Eq. 580, 78 Atl. 158; Turner v. Flenniken, 164 Pa. St. 469, 44 Am. St. Rep. 624, 30 Atl. 486, 35 Wkly. Notes Cas. 366. See, also, Watson v. Van Sickle, (Tex. Civ. App.) 114 S. W. 1160.

§ 1226, (d) Woodward v. Brown, 119 Cal. 283, 63 Am. St. Rep. 103, 51 Pac. 2, 542; Clarke v. Cowan. 206 Mass. 252, 138 Am. St. Rep. 388, 92 N. E. 474; Snyder v. Crawford, 98 Pa. St. 414; Biswell v. Gladney, (Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S. W. 1168 (but such record held to be notice to subsequent assignce of mortgage); Lynchburg P. B. & L. Co. v. Fellers, 96 Va. 337, 70 Am. St. Rep. 851, 31 S. E. 505; Schaad v. Robinson, 50 Wash. 283, 97 Pac. 104.

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leased bears to the total value of the mortgaged premises; one owner being released, all the others are entitled to a *pro rata* abatement.³ • When the equities of the various owners are unequal, so that their respective parcels are liable in the inverse order of alienation, if the mortgagee, having notice of this situation, releases a parcel which is primarily liable, he thereby discharges or releases all those parcels which are subsequently liable, *in the order of their several liabilities*, from an amount of the mortgage debt *equal to the value of the parcel released.*^{4 f} If the value

§ 1226, ³ Hall v. Edwards, 43 Mich. 473; Birnie v. Main, 29 Ark. 591; Stevens v. Cooper, 1 Johns. Ch. 425, 7 Am. Dec. 499; Stuyvesant v. Hall, 2 Barh. Ch. 151; Johnson v. Rice, 8 Me. 157; Parkman v. Welch, 19 Pick. 231; Paxton v. Harrier, 11 Pa. St. 312; Taylor v. Short's Adm'r, 27 Iowa, 361, 1 Am. Rep. 280.

§ 1226, ⁴ Warner v. De Witt Co. Bank, ⁴ Ill. App. 305; Meacham v. Steele, 93 Ill. 135; Hawhe v. Snydaker, 86 Ill. 197; Iglehart v. Crane, 42 Ill. 261; Briscoe v. Power, 47 Ill. 447; Cheesebrough v. Millard, 1 Johns. Ch. 409, 7 Am. Dec. 494; Guion v. Knapp, 6 Paige, 35, 29 Am. Dec. 741; Patty v. Pease, 8 Paige, 277, 35 Am. Dec. 683; Stuyvesant v. Hall, 2 Barb. Ch. 151; Stuyvesant v. Hone, 1 Sand. Ch. 419; Kendall v. Niebuhr, 58 How. Pr. 156; 13 Jones & S. 542; Mickle v. Rambo, 1 N. J. Eq. 501; Shannon v. Marselis, 1 N. J. Eq. 413; Blair v. Ward, 10 N. J. Eq. 119, 126; Reilly v. Mayer, 12 N. J. Eq. 55; Gaskill v. Sine, 13 N. J. Eq. 400, 78 Am. Dec. 105; Vanorden v. Johnson, 14 N. J. Eq. 376, 82 Am. Dec. 254; Hoy v. Bramhall, 19 N. J. Eq. 563, 97 Am. Dec. 687; Mount v. Potts, 23 N. J. Eq. 188; Harrison v. Guerin, 27 N. J. Eq. 219; Paxton v. Har-

§ 1226, (e) The text is quoted in Wood v. O'Hanlon, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 642, 111 S. W. 178; Interstate Land & Investment Co. v. Logan, 196 Ala. 196, 72 South. 36. See, also, Brooks v. Benham, 70 Conn. 92, 66 Am. St. Rep. 87, 38 Atl. 908, 39 Atl. 1112; Clarke v. Cowan, 206 Mass. 252, 138 Am. St. Rep. 388, 92 N. E. 474.

§ 1226, (f) The text is quoted in Wood v. O'Hanlon, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 642, 111 S. W. 178 (vendor's lien); Interstate Land & Investment Co. v. Logan, 196 Ala. 196, 72 South. 36. See, also, Boone v. Clark, 129 Ill. 466, 5 L. R. A. 276, 21 N. E. 850;
Libby v. Tufts, 121 N. Y. 172, 24
N. E. 12; Martin's Appeal, 97 Pa.
St. 85; Schrack v. Shriner, 100 Pa.
St. 451; Turner v. Flenniken, 164
Pa. St. 469, 44 Am. St. Rep. 624, 30
Atl. 486, 35 Wkly. Notes Cas. 366;
Burson v. Blackley, 67 Tex. 5, 2
S. W. 668; Watson v. Van Sickle,
(Tex. Civ. App.) 114 S. W. 1160
(vendor's lien); First State Bank of
Teague v. Cox, (Tex. Civ. App.)
139 S. W. 1 (vendor's lien); Schaad
v. Robinson, 50 Wash. 283, 97 Pac.
104; 59 Wash. 346, 109 Pac. 1072.

of the parcel released equals the mortgage debt, then all the subsequent parcels are wholly relieved from liability; if the value is less than the mortgage debt, the subsequent parcels can, at most, be liable, in their order, only for the excess of the debt over such value.^h In any case, this effect of a release may be obviated by the consent of the

rier, 11 Pa. St. 312; Johnson v. Rice, 8'Me. 157, 161; Brown v. Simons, 44 N. H. 475; Town of Salem v. Edgerly, 33 N. H. 46, 50; Parkman v. Welch, 19 Pick. 231; George v. Wood, 9 Allen, 80, 85 Am. Dec. 741; James v. Brown, 11 Mich. 25; Deuster v. McCamus, 14 Wis. 307; Johnson v. Williams, 4 Minn. 260, 268. This rule may be illustrated by an example: A mortgagor has conveyed all the premises in five lots, successively, to A, B, C, D, and E; these lots are liable to be sold in the order, E, D, C, B, A. If the mortgagee should release A's lot, his right to enforce the mortgage in their order against the others would not be affected. If he should release E, and the value of his lot equaled the mortgage debt, the whole mortgage would be discharged. If the value of E's lot was less than the mortgage debt, the mortgagee could then resort to D's lot for the excess only, and if its proceeds equaled that excess, all the remaining lots would be free; if there was a balance still due after the sale of D's lot, C's could be sold for that balance, and so on. If the mortgagee should first release C's lot, the situation would be more complicated. The mortgagee could still enforce the whole mortgage against E's lot first, and then for any excess against D's. If a balance was still due after the sale of these two lots, B's would not be liable for all of that balance. The value of C's lot which was released must be added to the proceeds of E's and D's, and this sum subtracted from the gross mortgage debt, and if any excess remained, B's lot, and finally A's, would be liable only for that excess: if there was no excess, B's and A's lots would be free. It should be observed that a release does not always thus operate as a discharge; it is not a technical discharge; it is a discharge only where, on principles of equity and justice, it ought to produce that effect: See Kendall v. Woodruff, 87 N. Y. 1, 7, per Folger, C. J.; Patty v. Pease, 8 Paige, 277, 35 Am. Dec. 683. The statute of limitations as applied to the right of redemption is discussed in a very exhaustive manner in 2 Jones on Mortgages, sccs. 1144-1173; and in 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1969-1977, 2006, notes to Thornbrough v. Baker.

§ 1226, (g) See Libby v. Tufts, 121 N. Y. 172, 24 N. E. 12.

§ 1226, (h) The text is quoted in Wood v. O'Hanlon, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 642, 111 S. W. 178; Schaad v. Robinson, 50 Wash. 283, 97 Pac. 104; Interstate Land & Investment Co. v. Logan, 196 Ala. 196, 72 South. 36. other owners, and perhaps by special equities arising from the provisions of the mortgage, to which all of their parcels are subject.

§ 1227. V. Foreclosure.—The only equitable remedies of the mortgagee for enforcing the lien of the mortgage when it has become due are the two actions to both of which the name "foreclosure" is ordinarily given.¹ These two actions are the "strict foreclosure" and "foreclosure by judicial sale." The strict foreclosure is a remedy based upon the original conception that the mortgage vests the mortgagee with the legal estate in the mortgaged premises, and its object is to carry out that conception by rendering the mortgagee's legal estate and title absolute, and cutting off the equity of redemption held by the mortgagor and others claiming or holding under him. It is the common form of remedy in England. In this country it is confined as an ordinary remedy to states which have adopted the first or legal theory of mortgages as heretofore described; and even in many of the states belonging to this class the foreclosure by judicial sale seems to be the form of remedy most frequently used.^a The strict foreclosure is inconsistent with the theory which regards the mortgage as creating only an equitable lien and as conveying no legal estate. In some of the states which have adopted this system, it is expressly prohibited by statute; in others, it has become practically obsolete, or is resorted to only under special circumstances, where the foreclosure by sale would be insufficient or impracticable.^{2 b} The strict fore-

§ 1227, 1 The subject of foreclosure is so extensive, and involves so many matters of detail, and is so much regulated by statute in many states, that I shall not attempt here to enter upon its discussion. The reader is referred to treatises upon mortgages, and especially to Mr. Jones's work (vol. 2, c. 25-38).

§ 1227, ² For example, where a mortgage is in the form of an absolute deed of conveyance, and the grantee-mortgagee is in possession, a strict

§ 1227, (a) See Shepard v. Barrett, 84 N. J. Eq. 408, 93 Atl. 852 (circumstances under which strict foreclosure permitted). § 1227, (b) Bradburn v. Roberts, 148 N. C. 214, 61 S. E. 617.

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closure assumes that the mortgagee is already in possession by virtue of his legal title. The decree ascertains and fixes the amount of the debt due and payable, after an accounting, if necessary; prescribes a period—say six months—within which redemption must be made by payment of this sum; and declares that upon default of payment within the specified period, the legal estate and title of the plaintiff shall be absolute, and the equity of redemption of the mortgagor and of all other persons claiming under him, subsequent to the mortgage, who were made defendants in the suit, shall be forever barred, cut off, and foreclosed.^c By operation of this decree, the mortgagee's legal title to the land, acquired by the mortgage as a conveyance, is finally confirmed and established, free from all equities of redemption.^d

§ 1228. Foreclosure by Judicial Sale.—This form of remedy, which is by far the most common in our own country, is based upon the notion that the mortgage simply creates an equitable lien upon the premises, as a security for the mortgage debt, and its object is to enforce that lien by a

foreclosure may be appropriate for the purpose of making his title absolute; although even in this case the foreclosure by sale is frequently adopted. The strict foreclosure is also proper in case of a land contract, in order to cut off the vendee's equitable right. Also, where the land had been actually sold under a decree rendered in a suit for a foreclosure by sale, and some subsequent encumbrancer or other person interested in the premises was not made a party defendant to that suit, so that his rights of redemption are not cut off by the sale, the purchaser may maintain an action in the nature of a strict foreclosure against such person, for the purpose of cutting off his rights, unless he comes in and redeems within a prescribed time.^e

§ 1227, (c) The text is quoted in Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 Pac. 27 (strict foreclosure of vendor's lien on contract of salē).

§ 1227, (d) This paragraph is cited in Jefferson v. Coleman, 110 Ind. 515, 11 N. E. 465; Crouch v. Dakota, W. & M. R. R. Co., (S. D.) 101 N. W. 722. § 1227, (e) The author's note is quoted in Donovan v. Smith, (N. J. Eq.) 88 Atl. 167. See Jaggar v. Plunkett, 81 Kan. 565, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 935, 106 Pac. 280 (mortgagee in possession may quiet title against the mortgagor, a sufficient period being given for redemption).

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sale of the premises, in order that the proceeds may be applied in satisfaction of the debt. The decree ascertains the amount due, and orders that the mortgaged premises be sold at public auction by judicial sale, and the proceeds be applied in payment of the amount thus ascertained, after satisfying the expenses of the sale itself. In many of the states, preparatory to the decree, the court orders an inquiry to be made into the present situation and ownership of the premises, so that the equities of the owners may be provided for, and as far as possible secured by the terms of the decree. If the land has been conveyed in successive parcels to different owners, the decree may order that the premises be sold in such parcels in the inverse order of their alienation; even when there are no such equities among the different owners of the premises, the court may order the premises sold in parcels, and not in one gross amount, if that method will best protect the interests of the owner as well as the security of the plaintiff. When the sale is consummated, a deed is given by the sheriff, master, or other officer who conducts the sale to the purchaser, who may be the mortgagee himself, or other holder of the mortgage; and such purchaser is therefore entitled to possession, and will be put into possession, if necessary, by process of the court.^a The effect of this deed, when given in pursuance of a valid decree and sale, is to convey to the purchaser whatever title the mortgagor had at the time of executing the mortgage, and whatever title he may subsequently have acquired down to the time of the foreclosure.^b But the sale does not affect the right of any one holding by or claiming under a title paramount to that of the mortgagor.

§ 1228, (a) The text is cited in Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 Pac. 27 (purchaser on foreclosure of land contract entitled to be put into possession).

§1228, (b) See Arterburn v. Beard, 86 Neb. 733, 126 N. W. 379 (purchaser takes free from easement granted by mortgagor); Currier v. Teske, 93 Neb. 7, 139 N. W. 622 (mortgage of life estate); Kiernan v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 80 N. J. L. 273, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1023, 78 Atl. 228 (purchaser takes free from attempted dedication to public by mortgagor). In the states where no statutory right of redemption after a sale is given, the sale under a valid decree immediately cuts off, bars, and forecloses the rights of the mortgagor, and of all subsequent grantees, owners, encumbrancers, and other persons interested, who were made parties defendant, and of all grantees, owners, and encumbrancers subsequent to the filing of a notice of *lis pendens*, although not made defendants.^c Where the proceeds of the premises sold, after paying the expenses, are not sufficient to fully satisfy the amount of the debt as fixed by the decree, the deficiency, of course, remains a personal debt owing and payable by the mortgagor and by his grantee who has assumed payment of the mortgage debt, and has thus made himself personally liable therefor. When such deficiency is officially certified by the report of the officer conducting the sale, upon confirmation of the report the plaintiff is allowed, generally by statutory authority, to enter and docket a personal judgment for the amount of the deficiency, without further suit, against the mortgagor and other persons who are personally liable for the mortgage debt, and who were made defendants in the suit. This judgment, like every other legal money judgment, is enforceable by execution against the general property of the judgment debtors. On the other hand, after defraying the expense of the sale and satisfying the decree, there may be a surplus of the proceeds remaining, as shown by the report of the officer conducting the sale. If the mortgagor remains sole owner of the premises, and there were no other persons interested therein, nor encumbrances thereon, this surplus would clearly belong to him. If there were subsequent encumbrances, or subsequent grantees, or owners, or persons interested in the premises, they would or might be entitled to the surplus in the order of their respective liens or interests. Upon the report, therefore.

§ 1228, (c) Quoted in Simmons v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 159 U. S. 278, 40 L. Ed. 150, 16 Sup. Ct. 1; Julian v. Central Trust Co., 115 Fed. 956, 53 C. C. A. 438.

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showing such a surplus remaining, the court directs a reference to ascertain the situation of the premises, the persons interested therein or having liens thereon, the order of their claims or liens, and to determine who are entitled to the surplus, and the several shares therein. Upon the confirmation of the referee's report, the court will make an order directing the surplus to be paid or distributed in accordance with its conclusions.

CHAPTER SIXTH.

MORTGAGES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND PLEDGES.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1229. General nature of, at law.
- § 1230. Jurisdiction and remedies in equity.
- § 1231. Pledges: Equitable jurisdiction and remedies.
- § 1232. Chattel mortgages in California.

8 1229. General Nature of, at Law.-In most of the states, as well as in England, a personal or chattel mortgage is, at law, a conditional sale of the things mortgaged, passing the legal title to the mortgagee, which becomes absolute on the mortgagor's failure to perform the condition. As between the parties, a delivery of the possession to the mortgagee is not essential, although the absence of such delivery may raise a presumption that the transaction was a fraud upon the rights of the mortgagor's creditors, and may thus endanger the validity of the mortgagee's title as against their claims. A pledge, on the other hand, is a delivery of the thing into the actual or constructive possession of the creditor, to be retained by him until the debt is paid. The pledgee acquires only a special property, which is not enlarged by the mere fact that the pledgor fails to pay the debt at the time specified; whereas by such a failure the legal estate of the mortgagee becomes

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ipso facto complete and absolute.¹ Upon a breach of the condition contained in the mortgage, the legal title vests so completely in the mortgagee that all the rights incident to ownership and possession in law at once arise.² ^b By taking possession of the property and selling it at public sale upon due notice, he will then extinguish every right and interest at law of the mortgagor.³ ^c

§ 1230. Jurisdiction and Remedies in Equity.—While the legal title of the mortgagee is thus made absolute by a failure to perform the condition, the doctrine is well settled

§ 1229, ¹ As to the nature of a chattel mortgage, and especially its differences from a pledge,^a see Jones v. Smith, 2 Ves. 372, 378; Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 165, 166, 167; Cortelyou v. Lansing, 2 Caines Cas. 200, 210, 213; Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258, 4 Am. Dec. 354; Strong v. Tompkins, 8 Johns. 98; McLean v. Walker, 10 Johns. 471; Wilson v. Little, 2 N. Y. 443, 51 Am. Dec. 307; Haskins v. Kelly, 1 Rob. (N. Y.) 160; Parshall v. Eggart, 52 Barb. 367; Winchester v. Ball, 54 Me. 558; Walcott v. Keith, 22 N. H. 196; Whittle v. Skinner, 23 Vt. 531; Wright v. Ross, 36 Cal. 414; Heyland v. Badger, 35 Cal. 404; Dewey v. Bowman, 8 Cal. 145; Waldie v. Doll, 29 Cal. 555; Goldstein v. Hort, 30 Cal. 372; Gay v. Moss, 34 Cal. 125; Ponce v. McElvy, 47 Cal. 154; Meyerstein v. Barber, L. R. 2 Com. P. 38, 51; L. R. 4 H. L. 317.

§ 1229, ² Burdick v. McVanner, ² Denio, 170; Case v. Boughton, 11 Wend. 106, 109; Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wend. 80; Patchin v. Pierce, 12 Wend. 61; Fuller v. Acker, 1 Hill, 473. The chattels may be taken upon execution against him: Ferguson v. Lee, 9 Wend. 258; Porter v. Parmly, 43 How. Pr. 445.

§ 1229, ³ Hart v. Ten Eyck, ² Johns. Ch. 62, 100, 101; Cortelyou v. Lansing, ² Caines Cas. 200, 210, 213; Dane v. Mallory, 16 Barb. 46; Parker v. Brancker, ²² Pick. 40, 46; Doane v. Russell, ³ Gray, 382, 384; Freeman v. Freeman, 17 N. J. Eq. 44; Bryant v. Carson River L. Co., ³ Nev. 313, 93 Am. Dec. 403. See Davenport v. McChesney, 86 N. Y. 242.

§ 1229, (a) See, also, as to the general nature of a chattel mortgage, Waterman v. Mackenzic, 138 U. S. 252 34 L. Ed. 923, 11 Sup. Ct. 334; Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank v. Alexander Stewart Lumber Co., 119 Wis. 54, 94 N. W. 777; what agreements eonstitute chattel mortgages: Merrill v. Ressler, 37 Minn. 82, 5 Am. St. Rep. 822, 33 N. W. 117. § 1229, (b) As to mortgagee's right to possession, see Cline v. Libby, (Wis.) 49 N. W. 832.

§ 1229, (c) It is held that if no time is fixed for payment, the implied power of sale may be exercised on the expiration of a reasonable time fixed by notice by the mortgagec: Deverges v. Sandeman, Clark & Co., [1902] 1 Ch. 579. that the mortgagor retains an equity of redemption notwithstanding his default, which he may enforce by an equitable suit to redeem, even though the mortgagee has taken possession of the chattels, at any reasonable time before his right has been cut off by a valid public sale of the property; and even after such sale, if there has been any element of inequitable conduct, or bad faith or fraud on the mortgagee's part, the mortgagor may maintain an equitable action for an accounting against the mortgagee, and hold him responsible for the real value of the property, or what might have been obtained for it by a fair and reasonable sale.^{1 a} On the other hand, although a foreclosure in equity is not necessary, yet equity has undoubted jurisdiction to entertain a suit on behalf of the mortgagee, and to decree a foreclosure by a judicial sale of the mortgaged chattels, as in the case of a mortgage of land.² b

§1230, 1 Kemp v. Westbrook, 1 Ves. Sr. 278; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns Ch. 62, 100, 101; Stoddard v. Dennison, 7 Abb. Pr., N. S., 309; Flanders v. Chamberlain, 24 Mich. 305; Heyland v. Badger, 35 Cal. 404; Blodgett v. Blodgett, 48 Vt. 32; Landers v. George, 49 Ind. 309; Halstead v. Swartz, 1 Thomp. & C. 559; Pulver v. Richardson, 3 Thomp. & C. 436; Porter v. Parmly, 43 How. Pr. 445. See Davenport v. Mc-Chesney, 86 N. Y. 242. After the mortgagee has taken possession upon a default, a tender of the amount due by the mortgagor will not revest the title in himself; his only remedy is by an equity suit to redeem: Blodgett v. Blodgett; Halstead v. Swartz. When the chattels are sold at public sale on default, and purchased by the mortgagee himself, the mortgagor's equitable remedy of redemption still exists: Pulver v. Richardson. Cases of accounting and personal judgment against the mortgagee when his sale or conversion of the chattels has rendered their redemption impossible: Blodgett v. Blodgett; Flanders v. Chamberlain. Where the mortgage expressly provides that the mortgagee may take possession and sell the chattels whenever he may deem himself insecure, a court of equity will not interfere on behalf of the mortgagor to restrain the mortgagee from exercising such option: Cline v. Libby, 46 Wis. 123, 32 Am. Rep. 700, 49 N. W. 832.

§ 1230, 2 Under some circumstances, this remedy is not only preferable, but the only practicable one; as, for example, in mortgages of

§ 1230, (a) See, also, Boyd v. § 1230, (b) This paragraph of the Beaudin, 54 Wis. 193, 11 N. W. 521. text is cited in McCormick v.

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§ 1231. Pledges.—A like equitable jurisdiction exists in cases of pledges. As a general rule, the pledgor may undoubtedly obtain complete relief at law by a tender and by an action to recover the chattel or its value; but under special circumstances, as where an accounting or a discovery is needed, or where the pledge has been assigned, the pledgor may certainly maintain an equitable suit for a redemption.¹^a The modern decisions have generally settled the rule that, in ordinary pledges of chattels, the pledgee may enforce his security and cut off the pledgor's

things in action, of railroad rolling stock, etc.: Dyson v. Morris, 1 Hare, 413, 422, per Wigram, V. C.; Kemp v. Westbrook, 1 Ves. Sr. 278; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 62, 100; Lansing v. Goelet, 9 Cow. 372, per Jones, C.; Charter v. Stevens, 3 Denio, 33, 45 Am. Dec. 444; Huntington v. Mather, 2 Barb. 538; Mattison v. Baueus, 1 N. Y. 295; Briggs v. Oliver, 68 N. Y. 336; Porter v. Parmly, 43 How. Pr. 445; Stoddard v. Denison, 7 Abb. Pr., N. S., 309; Gregory v. Cable, 26 N. J. Eq. 178; Marx v. Davis, 56 Miss. 745; 55 Miss. 376. See Putnam v. Reynolds, 44 Mich. 113; Wylder v. Crane, 53 Ill. 490.

§ 1231, ¹ Jones v. Smith, ² Ves. 372; Bartlett v. Johnson, ⁹ Allen, 530; Merrill v. Houghton, 51 N. H. 61; White Mts. R. R. v. Bay State Iron Co., 50 N. H. 57; Hasbrouek v. Vandervoort, ⁴ Sand 74; Conyngham's Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 474; and see Brown v. Runals, 14 Wis. 693.

Hartley, 107 Ind. 248, 6 N. E. 357 (injunction to protect mortgagee's interest). See, also, Brown v. Russell, 105 Ind. 46, 4 N. E. 428 (the suit is of equitable cognizance); Clark v. Baker, 6 Mont. 153, 9 Pac. 911; Lembeck & Betz Eagle Brewing Co. v. Sexton, 184 N. Y. 185, 77 N. E. 38; Gresens v. Martin, 27 N. D. 231, 145 N. W. 823; Davis v. Childers, 45 S. C. 133, 55 Am. St. Rep. 757, 22 S. E. 784 (when the legal title has not passed, the mortgage can be enforced only in equity).

§ 12319 (a) See, also, Nelson v. Owen, 113 Ala. 372, 21 South. 75; Keeble v. Jones, 187 Ala. 207, 65 South. 384 (suit governed by equitable rules); Minge v. Clark, 196 Ala. 617, 72 South. 167 (bill to redeem

will not lie in absence of some other equitable ground); Colburn v. Riley, 11 Colo. App. 184, 52 Pac. 684; Tennant v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 133 Mo. App. 345, 112 S. W. 754 (where pledgee buys in the property at sale without public notice, remedy at law for conversion is adequate); Demars v. Hudon, 33 Mont. 170, 82 Pac. 952 (suit for account of proceeds derived from use of property); Treadwell v. Clark, 190 N. Y. 51, 82 N. E. 505 (accounting to ascertain amount of indebtedness furnishes ground of jurisdiction); The necessity for an accounting, urged as ground for redemption in equity, must be a real necessity: De Bevoise v. H. & W. Co., (N. J. Eq.) 58 Atl. 91.

right of redemption without any action, by means of a public sale of the pledged article, after a demand of payment made upon and notice of the sale given to the pledgor. The equitable jurisdiction, however, still exists, and the pledgee may enforce his security by a suit in equity for a foreclosure and judicial sale; and this mode by suit in equity must be resorted to when the pledged articles are negotiable instruments, or other things in action having no market price or value, and also, whenever, in case of any kind of article pledged, it is impossible to make demand of or give notice to the pledgor as necessary preliminaries to a foreelosure by sale.² b

§ 1231, ² In some of the states a foreclosure by suit in equity seems to be the ordinary remedy in all cases: Ex parte Mountfort, 14 Ves. 606; Carter v. Wake, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 605; Boynton v. Payrow, 67 Me. 587; Freeman v. Freeman, 17 N. J. Eq. 44; Dupuy v. Gibson, 36 Ill. 197; Donohoe v. Gamble, 38 Cal. 340, 99 Am. Dec. 399; Strong v. Nat. Mech. Bkg. Ass'n, 45 N. Y. 718; Booth v. Eighmic, 60 N. Y. 238, 19 Am. Rep. 171; Stearns v. Marsh, 4 Denio, 227, 47 Am. Dec. 248; Diller v. Brubaker, 52 Pa. St. 498, 502, 91 Am. Dec. 177; Worthington v. Tormey, 34 Md. 182. If personal notice cannot be given to the pledgor, or if the articles are things in action,—except government bonds, and stocks, etc., which have a regular market value, and can therefore be sold for their real value at an auction,—the pledgee must resort to equity: Stearns v. Marsh, *supra*; Wheeler v. Newbould, 16 N. Y. 392 (negotiable paper); Gay v. Moss, 34 Cal. 125; Donohoe v. Gamble, 38 Cal. 340, 99 Am. Dec. 399; Cal. Civ. Code, secs. 3006, 3011.

§ 1231, (b) The text is cited in Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 178 Ill. 107, 69 Am. St. Rep. 290, 52 N. E. 898; Cleghorn v. Minnesota T. I. & T. Co., 57 Minn. 341, 47 Am. St. Rep. 615, 59 N. W. 320; Hall v. Bell, 143 Wis. 296, 127 N. W. 967. See, also, 32 Am. St. Rep. 729, note; Stokes v. Dimmick, 157 Ala. 237, 48 South. 66; Jones v. Dimmick, 178 Ala. 296, 59 South. 623 (statutory remedy is merely cumulative); Potter v. Whitten, 161 Mo. App. 118, 142 S. W. 453; White River Sav. Bank v. Capital Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 77 Vt. 123, 107 Am. St. Rep. 754, 59 Atl. 197 (foreclosure peculiarly appropriate where neither time of redemption nor manner and time of sale are specified in the contract, and the pledgee's rights or powers are being questioned or denied by the corporation which issued the stock pledged, itself claiming a prority of lien thereon; in a court of equity the pledgee's trust can be made available with proper regard for the rights of all concerned); Wilson v. Johnson, 74 Wis. 337, 43 N. W. 148.

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§ 1232. Chattel Mortgage in California.—By the Civil Code of California, and of the other states and territories which have adopted the same type of legislation, the common-law view of the chattel mortgage as a conditional sale has been wholly abandoned; the mortgage itself has been assimilated to the mortgage of lands as creating only a lien, the legal ownership and all its incidents, including the right of possession, being left in the mortgagor until the lien is enforced and his interest is extinguished either by an equitable suit for foreclosure or by a public sale. The personal mortgage, however, is only permitted to be given upon certain kinds and classes of chattels specified in the statute.¹ a

§ 1232, 1 The same definition and the same description of its incidents and of the rights of the two parties apply alike to the mortgage of chattels and to that of land. The form of the chattel mortgage given in the code excludes all notion of a sale, and plainly indicates nothing but a lien. The following is the form: "This mortgage, made etc., by etc., witnesseth that the mortgagor mortgages to the mortgagee (description of the property) as security for the payment to him of (statement of the amount, time, and terms)." Possession by the mortgagee is not required; the notion that possession by the mortgagor raises any presumption of an intent to defraud his creditors or subsequent purchaser is wholly rejected; in place thercof, the code provides that the mortgage shall be void as against such creditors and purchasers, unless it is accompanied by an affidavit of all the parties that it is made in good faith and without intent to defraud them, and unless it is properly acknowledged and recorded. The code specifies the kinds of chattels upon which a mortgage may be given, and a mortgage upon other species of personal property would be nugatory: See Cal. Civ. Code, secs. 2920, 2923, 2927, 2931, 2936, 2956, 2957, 2967-2970, 3000-3002.

§ 1232, (a) Demers v. Graham, 36 93 Pac. 268 (mortgage of cattle, Mont. 402, 122 Am. St. Rep. 384, 13 therefore, does not cover increase). Ann. Cas. 97, 14 L. B. A. (N. S.) 431,

CHAPTER SEVENTH. EQUITABLE LIENS.

SECTION I.

THEIR GENERAL NATURE.

ANALYSIS.

\$ 1233. What are included in this term; what is an equitable lien.\$ 1234. Origin and rationale of the doctrine.

§ 1233. What are Included in This Term—What is an Equitable Lien.—Analogous to mortgages considered from the purely equitable point of view are the important class of interests embraced under the denomination of "equitable liens"; and I include within this general term those interests which are not regarded by the American juris-prudence as true mortgages but which are commonly called by English writers and judges "equitable mortgages."¹a

§ 1233, 1 The most important species of "equitable mortgages," according to the English theory, are, in all the states of this country, *legal* mortgages. In England certain mortgages are called "equitable," because no legal estate is transferred by them to the mortgagee; for example, every mortgage of the equity of redemption,—that is, every second or other subsequent mortgage is "equitable," since the legal estate has already been conveyed by the first mortgage. In this country no such distinction is recognized. In the states adopting the legal system,—the first class heretofore described,—every successive mortgage conveys a legal estate to the mortgagee; while in the states of the second class every mortgage simply creates a lien. In England the deposit of title deeds as security is called an "equitable mortgage." It is better to include all cases of such liens which are not proper mortgages within the general class of "equitable liens"; this division is both simple and natural.

§ 1233, (a) The text, §§ 1233-1237, is cited in Wood v. Holly Mfg. Co., 100 Ala. 326, 46 Am. St. Rep. 56, 13 South. 948. This section is cited in Hovey v. Elliott, 118 N. Y. 124, 136, 23 N. E. 475; in Beebe Stave Co.
v. Austin, 92 Ark. 248, 135 Am. St.
Rep. 172, 122 S. W. 482; and in Kelsay v. Kelsay Land Co., (Okl.)
166 Pac. 173.

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An equitable lien is not an estate or property in the thing itself nor a right to recover the thing,-that is, a right which may be the basis of a possessory action; it is neither a jus ad rem nor a jus in re^2 It is simply a right of a special nature over the thing, which constitutes a charge or encumbrance upon the thing, so that the very thing itself may be proceeded against in an equitable action, and either sold or sequestered under a judicial decree, and its proceeds in the one case, or its rents and profits in the other, applied upon the demand of the creditor in whose favor the lien exists.³ It is the very essence of this condition that while the lien continues the possession of the thing remains with the debtor or the person who holds the proprietary interest subject to the encumbrance.⁴ The equitable lien differs essentially from the common-law lien, which is simply a right to retain possession of the chattel until some debt or demand due to the person thus retaining is satisfied; and possession is such an inseparable element. that if it be voluntarily surrendered by the creditor, the lien is at once extinguished.^{5 b}

1233, ² See Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 620, 12 L. Ed. 841, per Grier, J.

§ 1233, 3 The equitable lien is strictly analogous to, and is undoubtedly derived from, the hypotheca of the Roman law. Hypotheca was the right given to a creditor over a thing belonging to another, in order to secure the payment of a debt, while the property and possession remained in the debtor. It was thus distinguished from pignus, in which the possession was delivered to the creditor, and he thus acquired a special property. Hypotheca was generally created by agreement, express or implied, between the parties; but in some cases it was ereated by operation of law, and then called hypotheca tacita, as over the property of a tutor in favor of his ward, and in favor of a wife over her dowry in the hands of the husband: See Sandars's Institutes of Justinian, 205, 206.

§ 1233, 4 Brace v. Duchess of Marlborough, 2 P. Wms. 491; Ex parte Knott, 11 Ves. 609, 617.

§ 1233, ⁵ Heywood v. Waring, 4 Camp. 291, 295, per Lord Ellenborough; Hammonds v. Barelay, 2 East, 227, 235; Ex parte Heywood,

§ 1233, (b) This paragraph is Register Co., 174 Fed. 579, 98 C. C. A. quoted in In re National Cash 425; Garrison v. Verment Mills, 154.

§ 1233

§ 1234. Origin and Rationale of the Doctrine.—The doctrine of equitable liens is one of great importance and of wide application in administering the rights and remedies peculiar to equity jurisprudence. There is perhaps no doctrine which more strikingly shows the difference between the legal and the equitable conceptions of the juridical results which flow from the dealings of men with each other, from their express or implied undertakings.^a A brief explanation of the foundation and reasons upon which this branch of the equity jurisprudence rests is essential to a full understanding of the subject. It is sometimes, although I think unnecessarily and even incorrectly, spoken of as a species of implied trusts.¹ If any reference to the

2 Rose, 355, 357. In some instances of the common-law lien the creditor acquires no right but that of simple detention,—e.g., the lien of an attorney on the papers of his client. In most, however, he may have a remedy against the thing itself, and in some cases equity will aid the creditor by its more efficient remedy of foreclosure by judicial sale:^c See Oxenham v. Esdaile, 2 Younge & J. 493; Gladstone v. Birley, 2 Mer. 401, 404.

§ 1234, ¹ Incorrectly, in my opinion, because the very essence of every real trust, express, resulting, or constructive, is the existence of two *estates* in the same thing,—a legal estate vested in the trustee, and an equitable estate held by the beneficiary. In an equitable lien there is a legal estate with possession in one person, and a special

N. C. 1, 31 **L. R. A. (N. S.)** 450, 69 S. E. 743; Klaustermeyer v. Cleveland Trust Co., 89 Ohio 142, 105 N. E. 278.

§ 1233, (e) Foreclosure of Common-law Liens.—Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U. S. 638, 44 L. Ed. 921, 20 Sup. Ct. 824; Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 178 Ill. 107, 69 Am. St. Rep. 290, 52 N. E. 898 (bailee's lien); Brigel v. Creed, 65 Ohio St. 40, 60 N. E. 991 (suit to foreclose a lien created by pledge); Powell v. Nolan, 27 Wash. 318, 67 Pac. 712, 68. Pac. 389 (foreclosure of mechanic's lien). But see Aldine Mfg. Co. v. Phillips, 118 Mich. 162, 74 Am. St. Rep. 380, 76 N. W. 371; Burrough v. Ely, (W. Va.) 46 S. E. 371. The title reserved by a vendor of a chattel by a contract of conditional sale is regarded in equity as a lien, which may be enforced by foreclosure; one may have an independent equitable interest in a subject-matter of which he holds the legal title: In re National Cash Register Co., 174 Fed. 579, 98 C. C. A. 425, quoting the above section of the text.

§ 1234, (a) This sentence is quoted in Society of Shakers v. Watson, 68 Fed. 730, 15 C. C. A. 632, 37 U. S. App. 141. This paragraph is cited in Carmichael v. Arms, 51 lnd. App. 689, 100 N. E. 302.

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theory of trust is made, it is more accurate to describe these liens as analogous to trusts; for while the two have some similar features, they are unlike in their essential elements. The common-law remedies upon all contracts except those which transfer a legal estate or property, such as conveyances of land and sales or bailments of chattels ("real" contracts, contractus reales), are always mere recoveries of money; the judgments are wholly pecuniary and personal, enforced in ancient times against the person of the judgment debtor by imprisonment, and in modern times against his property by means of an execution. This species of remedy is seldom granted by equity, and is opposed to its general theory. The remedies of equity are, as a class, specific. Although it is commonly said of them that they are not in rem, because they do not operate by the inherent force of the decree in an equitable suit to change or to transfer the title or estate in controversy, yet these remedies are, as a general rule, directed against some specific thing; they give or enforce a right to or over some particular thing,—a tract of land, personal property, or a fund,-rather than a right to recover a sum of money generally out of the defendant's assets. Remedies in equity. as well as at law, require some primary right or interest of the plaintiff which shall be maintained, enforced, or redressed thereby. When equity has jurisdiction to enforce rights and obligations growing out of an executory contract, this equitable theory of remedies cannot be carried out, unless the notion is admitted that the contract creates some right or interest in or over specific property, which . the decree of the court can lay hold of, and by means of

right over the thing held by another; but here the resemblance, which at most is external, ends. This special right is not an estate of any kind; it does not entitle the holder to a conveyance of the thing nor to its use; it is merely a right to secure the performance of some outstanding obligation, by means of a proceeding directed against the thing which is subject to the lien. To call this a trust, and the owner of the thing a trustee for the lien-holder, is a misapplication of terms which have a very distinct and certain meaning. which the equitable relief can be made efficient. The doctrine of "equitable liens" supplies this necessary element; and it was introduced for the sole purpose of furnishing a ground for the specific remedies which equity confers, operating upon particular identified property, instead of the general pecuniary recoveries granted by courts of law. It follows, therefore, that in a large class of executory contracts, express and implied, which the law regards as creating no property right, nor interest analogous to property, but only a mere personal right and obligation, equity recognizes, in addition to the personal obligation, a peculiar right over the thing concerning which the contract deals, which it calls a "lien," and which, though not property, is analogous to property,^b and by means of which the plaintiff is enabled to follow the identical thing, and to enforce the defendant's obligation by a remedy which operates directly upon that thing. The theory of equitable liens has its ultimate foundation, therefore, in contracts, express or implied, which either deal with or in some manner relate to specific property, such as a tract of land, particular chattels or securities, a certain fund, and the like.^c It is necessary to divest one's self of the purely legal notion concerning the effect of such contracts, and to recognize the fact that equity regards them as creating a charge upon or hypothecation of the specific thing, by means of which the personal obligation arising from the agreement may be more effectively enforced than by a mere pecuniary recovery at law.d

§ 1234, (b) Quoted by Bradley, J., in Hovey v. Elliott, 118 N. Y. 124, 139, 23 N. E. 475; quoted, also, in Braddock v. Hinchman, 78 N. J. Eq. 270, 79 Atl. 419 (concurring opinion); Parlin & Orendorf Implement Co. v. Moulden, 228 Fed. 111, L. B. A. 1917B, 130, 142 C. C. A. 517.

§ 1234, (c) The text is quoted in Williams v. Vanderbilt, 145 III. 238, 251, 36 Am. St. Rep. 486, 494, 34 N. E. 476; in Braddock v. Hinchman, 78 N. J. Eq. 270, 79 Atl. 419; III-186 in Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321; and in Parlin & Orendorf Implement Co. v. Moulden, 228 Fed. 111, L. R. A. 1917B, 130, 142 C. C. A. 517.

§ 1234, (d) The text is quoted in Braddock v. Hinchman, 78 N. J. Eq. 270, 79 Atl. 419 (concurring opinion); Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321.

SECTION II.

ARISING FROM EXPRESS CONTRACT.

ANALYSIS.

§ 1235. The general doctrine; requisites of the contract.

§ 1236. On property to be acquired in future.

\$1237. The form and nature of the agreement; illustrations of particular agreements; agreements to give a mortgage; defective mortgages; assignments; bills of exchange, etc.

§ 1235. The General Doctrine — Requisites of the Contract.—The doctrine may be stated in its most general form, that every express executory agreement in writing, whereby the contracting party sufficiently indicates an intention to make some particular property, real or personal, or fund, therein described or identified, a security for a debt or other obligation, or whereby the party promises to convey or assign or transfer the property as security, creates an equitable lien upon the property so indicated, which is enforceable against the property in the hands not only of the original contractor, but of his heirs, administrators, executors, voluntary assignees, and purchasers or encumbrancers with notice. Under like circumstances, a merely verbal agreement may create a similar lien upon personal property.¹^a The ultimate grounds and

§ 1235, ¹ Ex parte Wills, ¹ Ves. 162; ² Cox, 233; Brown v. Heathcote, ¹ Atk. 160, 162; Russel v. Russel, ¹ Brown Ch. 269; Card v. Jaffray, ² Schoales & L. 374, 379; Berrington v. Evans, ³ Younge & C. 384, 392; Collyer v. Fallon, Turn. & R. 459, 475, 476; Countess of Mornington v. Keane, ² De Gex & J. 292, 313; Gibson v. May, ⁴ De Gex, M. & G. 512; Meyers v. United etc. Co., ⁷ De Gex, M. & G. 112; Twynam v. Hudson, ⁴ De Gex, F. & J. 462; Hastie v. Hastie, L. R. ² Ch. Div. 304; Husted v. Ingraham, 75 N. Y. 251, 257; Hale v. Omaha

§ 1235, (a) The text is quoted in Fourth St. Nat. Bank v. Millbourne Mills Co.'s Trustee, 172 Fed. 177, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 552, 96 C. C. A. 629, dissenting opinion; In re Pittsburgh Industrial Iron Works, 179 Fed. 151; Parlin & Orendorf Implement Co. v. Moulden, 228 Fed. 111, L. R. A. 1917B, 130, 142 C. C. A. 517; Edwards v. Scruggs, 155 Ala. 568, 46 South. 850; Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. California Development

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motives of this doctrine are explained in the preceding section; but the doctrine itself is clearly an application of the maxim, equity regards as done that which ought to be

Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 626; 64 N. Y. 550; Payne v. Wilson, 74 N. Y. 348; Chase v. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581; Stevens v. Watson, 4 Abb. App. 302; Lanning v. Tompkins, 45 Barb. 308, 316; Williams v. Ingersoll, 23 Hun, 284; Burdick v. Jackson, 7 Hun, 488; Arnold v. Morris, 7 Daly, 498; In re Howe, 1 Paige, 125, 19 Am. Dec. 395; Mitchell v. Winslow, 2 Story, 630; Bank of Washington v. Noek, 9 Wall. 373; Skiddy v. Atlantic etc. R. R., 3 Hughes, 320; Pinch v. Anthony, 8 Allen, 536; Gilson v. Gilson, 2 Allen, 115; Bank of Muskingum v. Carpenter's Adm'rs, 7 Ohio, 21, 28 Am. Dec. 616; Cotterell v. Long, 20 Ohio, 464; Monticello Hydraulie Co. v. Loughry, 72 Ind. 562; Boorman v. Wiseonsin etc. Co., 36 Wis. 207; Delaire v. Keenan, 3 Desaus. Eq. 74, 4 Am. Dec. 604; Kirksey v. Means, 42 Ala. 426; Morrow v. Turney's Adm'r, 35 Ala. 131; Petrie v. Wright, 6 Smedes & M. 647; Adams v. Johnson, 41 Miss. 258; Daggett v. Rankin, 31 Cal. 321; Love v. Sierra Nevada Co., 32 Cal. 639, 652, 91 Am. Dec. 602; and other cases in the subsequent notes. An equitable lien passes to the assignce of the debt, although not named in the instrument of assignment: Payne v. Wilson, 74 N. Y. 348; and such a specific lien on land is preferred to a subsequent legal lien by judgment: Stevens v. Watson, 4 Abb. App. 302.

Co., 171 Cal. 173, 152 Pac. 542; Godwin v. Murchison Nat. Bank, 145 N. C. 320, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 935, 59 S. E. 154; Garrison v. Vermont Mills, 152 N. C. 643, 68 S. E. 142, dissenting opinion; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 49 Okl. 398, 153 Pac. 195; Southern Ice & Coal Co. v. Alley, 127 Tenn. 173, 154 S. W. 536; Atlanta Nat. Bank v. Four States Grocer Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 135 S. W. 1135; Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321; Brown v. Ford, 120 Va. 233, 91 S. E. 145. See, also, Hauselt v. Harrison, 105 U. S. 401, 26 L. Ed. 1075; Gest v. Packwood, 39 Fed. 525; Root Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 219 Fed. 397, 135 C. C. A. 139; Smith v. Hiles-Carver Co., 107 Ala. 272, 18 South. 37; Steägall-Cheairs Fertilizer Co. v. Bethune Mule Co., 181 Ala. 250, 61 South. 274 (no lien); Averyt Drug Co. v. Ely-Robertson-Barlow Drug Co., 194 Ala. 507, 69 South. 931 (lien expressly reserved on sale of chattel); Ward v. Stark Bros., 91 Ark. 268, 121 S. W. 382; Arkansas Cypress Shingle Co.v. Meto Valley Ry. Co., 97 Ark. 534, 134 S. W. 1195 (lien reserved to seller of chattel); Fresno C. & I. Co. v. Rowell, 80 Cal. 114, 13 Am. St. Rep. 112, 22 Pac. 53 (lien of irrigation company for water furnished under contract); Fresno C. & I. Co. v. Dunbar, 80 Cal. 530, 22 Pac. 275; Higgins v. Higgins, 121 Cal. 487, 66 Am. St. Rep. 57, 53 Pac. 1081 (lien on husband's property resulting from separation agreement); Margarum v. J. S. Christie

done.^{2 b} In order, however, that a lien may arise in pursuance of this doctrine, the agreement must deal with some particular property, either by identifying it, or by so de-

§ 1235, ² Daggett v. Rankin, 31 Cal. 321, 326, per Currey, C. J.; see the admirable statement of this truth in the passage quoted *ante*, in note under § 373.

Orange Co., 37 Fla. 165, 19 South. 637; Gage v. Cameron, (Ill.) 72 N. E. 204; Reardon v. Higgins, 39 Ind. App. 363, 79 N. E. 208 (on chattel); Kean v. Rogers, (Iowa) 118 N. W. 515 (lien reserved on proceeds of sale); Cincinnati Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Leslie & Whitaker's Trustee, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1570, 78 S. W. 413 (licn on personal property for advances made); Lee v. Lee's Adm'r, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 619, 99 S. W. 306 (lien acknowledged in correspondence of parties); Bradley v. Merrill, 88 Me. 319, 34 Atl. 160; Coram v. Davis, 209 Mass. 229, 95 N. E. 298 (agreement for compensation from proceeds of suit); Westall v. Wood, 212 Mass. 540, 99 N. E. 325; Sibley v. Ross, 88 Mich. 315, 50 N. W. 379; Whitney v. Foster, 117 Mich. 643, 76 N. W. 114; Piper v. Sawyer, 73 Minn. 332, 76 N. W. 57; Hyde v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., (Neb.) 97 N. W. 629 (lien on proceeds of fire insurance policy taken by mortgagor under terms of mortgage); Cummings v. Jackson, 55 N. J. Eq. 805, 38 Atl. 763; Wilson v. Seeber, 72 N. J. Eq. 523, 66 Atl. 909 (agreement for compensation from proceeds of suit); Hovey v. Elliott, 118 N. Y. 124, 26 N. E. 475 (lien on personal property); Smith v. Smith, 125 N. Y. 224, 26 N. E. 259; Bank v. Johnson, 47 Ohio St. 306, 8 L. **R.** A. 614, 24 N. E. 503; Armstrong v. Burkitt, (Tex. Civ. App.) 34 S. W. 759; Galbraith v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 63 Tex. Civ. App. 179, 133 S. W. 300 (equitable lien, by oral agreement, on chattels affixed to realty); Atlanta National Bank v. Four States Grocer Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 135 S. W. 1135 (equitable lien on timber); Cole v. Smith, 24 W. Va. 287 (lien expressly reserved of vendor of real and personal property for a gross sum for both); Feely v. Bryan, (W. Va.) 47 S. E. 307. That the express agreement creating a lien on land must be in writing, see Kelly v. Kelly, 54 Mich. 30; 19 N. W. 580; Tucker v. Ottenheimer, 46 Or. 585, 81 Pac. 360.

§1235, (b) This portion of the text is quoted in Walker v. Brown, 165 U. S. 654, 41 L. Ed. 865, 17 Sup. Ct. 453; Walker v. Brown, 63 Fed. 204, 11 C. C. A. 135, 27 U. S. App. 291 (affirming 58 Fed. 23); Howard v. Delgado, 121 Fed. 26, 57 C. C. A. 270; Chattanooga Nat. Bank v. Rome Iron Co., 102 Fed. 755; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Pennsylvania Plate Glass Co., 103 Fed. 132, 56 L. R. A. 710, 43 C. C. A. 114; In re Pittsburgh Industrial Iron Works, 179 Fed. 151; Parlin & Orendorf Implement Co. v. Moulden, 228 Fed. 111, L. R. A. 1917B, 130, 142 C. C. A. 517; Garrison v. Vermont Mills, 152 N. C. 643, 68 S. E. 142, dissenting opinion; Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321; Knott v. Shepherdstown Mfg. Co., 30 W. Va. 790, 5 S. E. 266. This section is cited in Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U. S. 574, 37 L. Ed. 853, 13 Sup.

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scribing it that it can be identified, and must indicate with sufficient clearness an intent that the property so described, or rendered capable of identification, is to be held, given, or transferred as security for the obligation.^{3 c}

§ 1235, ³ Countess of Mornington v. Keane, 2 De Gex & J. 292; Fremoult v. Dedire, 1 P. Wms. 429; Williams v. Lucas, 2 Cox, 160; Ravenshaw v. Hallier, 7 Sim. 3; Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 Mylne & C. 561; Adams v. Johnson, 41 Miss. 258; Pinch v. Anthony, 8 Allen, 536. Thus an agreement to give security by mortgage on lands, when called upon to do so, does not constitute an equitable lien upon any land which the covenantor owned: Williams v. Lucas, 2 Cox, 160; nor an agreement to give a mortgage on sufficient lands: Adams v. Johnson, 41 Miss. 258; nor a general covenant to give security on or before a specified day on lands or on the covenantor's lands: Countess of Morn-

Ct. 936: Gest v. Packwood, 39 Fed. 525; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Penn Plate Glass Co., 103 Fed. 132, 151, 43 C. C. A. 114 (lien of mortgagee upon proceeds of fire insurance policy taken out by mortgagor must be based on express contract); Columbus, S. & H. R. Co. Appeals, 109 Fed. 177, 196, 48 C. C. A. 275; United Cigarette Mach. Co. v. Winston Cigarette Mach. Co., 194 Fed. 947, 114 C. C. A. 583; In re Silver, 208 Fed. 797; Curtis v. Walpole Tire & Rubber Co., 218 Fed. 145, 134 C. C. A. 140; In re Imperial Textile Co., 239 Fed. 775; In re Cross, 244 Fed. 844; Higgins v. Manson, 126 Cal. 467, 77 Am. St. Rep. 192, 59 Pac. 907; James Bradford Co. v. United Leather Co., (Del. Ch.) 97 Atl. 622; In re New Glenwood Canning Co., 150 Iowa, 696, 130 N. W. 800; Delval v. Gagnon, 213 Mass. 203, 99 N. E. 1095 (agreement for compensation from proceeds of suit); Kelly v. Kelly, 54 Mich. 30, 19 N. W. 580; Bank v. Johnson, 47 Ohio St. 306, 8 L. R. A. 614, 24 N. E. 503; Klaustermeyer v. Cleveland Trust Co., 89 Ohio, 142, 105 N. E. 278; Meridian Oil Co. v. Randolph, 26 Okl. 634, 110 Pac. 722; Carter v. Sapulpa & I. Ry. Co., 49 Okl. 471, 153 Pae. 853; 'Howard v. Iron & Land Co., 62 Minn. 298, 64 N. W. 896; Smith v. Smith, 125 N. Y. 224, 26 N. E. 259; Davis v. Billings, 254 Pa. 574, 99 Atl. 163; Industrial Lumber Co. v. Texas Pine Land Ass'n, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 375, 72 S. W. 875; Gardner v. Planters' Nat. Bank. 54 Tex. Civ. App. 572, 118 S. W. 1146 (agreement for repayment of loan from proceeds of sale of eattle). Sections 1235-1237 are eited in Galbraith v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 63 Tex. Civ. App. 179, 133 S. W. 300; Carmichael v. Arms, 51 Ind. App. 689, 100 N. E. 302.

§ 1235, (c) Lien Only on Identified Property.—This portion of the text is quoted in Lee v. Cole, 17 Or. 559, 21 Pac. 819; in Fourth St. Nat. Bank v. Millbourne Mills Co.'s Trustee, 172 Fed. 177, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 552, 19 C. C. A. 629, dissenting opinion; in In re Pittsburgh Industrial Iron Works, 179 Fed. 151; in Parlin & Orendorf Implement Co. v. Moulden, 228 Fed. 111, L. R. A. 1917B, 130, 142 C. C. A. 517; in Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. § 1236. On Property to be Acquired in Future.—The doctrine is carried still further, and applied to propertynot yet in being at the time when the contract is made. It is well settled that an agreement to charge, or to assign, or to give security upon, or to affect property not yet in existence, or in the ownership of the party making the contract, or property to be acquired by him in the future, although, with the exception of one particular species of things, it creates no legal estate or interest in the things when they afterwards come into existence or are acquired by the promisor,¹ a does constitute an equitable lien upon

ington v. Kcane, 2 De Gex & J. 292; and see ante, § 583; but a covenant that all the land which the covenantor shall have on a certain day shall be charged or be security will create a lien, since the description enables the particular land to be identified: Countess of Mornington v. Keene, 2 De Gex & J. 292, 313; and see Roundell v. Breary, 2 Vern. 482; Pinch v. Anthony, 8 Allen, 536, 539; as further example of no lien, see Person v. Oberteuffer, 59 How. Pr. 339; Chamberlin v. Peltz, 1 Mo. App. 183; Bank of Washington v. Nock, 9 Wall. 373, 19 L. Ed. 717; Goembel v. Arnett, 100 Ill. 34; Cook v. Black, 54 Iowa, 693, 7 N. W. 121.^d

§ 1236, ¹ Otis v. Sill, 8 Barb. 102, and cases cited. The excepted case is that of an agreement to sell chattels not yet in existence, which are of the kind said to have a "potential existence," the most familiar example of which is an expected crop: Andrew v. Newcomb, 32 N. Y. 417, 420; Grantham v. Hawley, Hob. 132; Trull v. Eastman, 3 Met. 121, 37 Am. Dec. 126; Jones v. Richardson, 10 Met. 481, 488; Smith v. Atkins, 18 Vt. 461; Van Hoozer v. Cory, 34 Barb. 9, 12; Conderman

W. 321. See, also, In re Imperial Textile Co., 239 Fed. 775 (sufficient identification); Lighthouse v. Third Nat. Bank, 162 N. Y. 336, 56 N. E. 738; Jones v. Kennedy, (Miss.) 35 South. 465 (intent is to be determined from evidence aliunde the writing). Compare Klaustermeyer v. Cleveland Trust Co., 89 Ohio, 142 105 N. E. 278 (said to be sufficient that securities be indicated from which a selection may be made).

§ 1235, (d) Agreement to mortgage all property of a particular kind that a person may acquire title to, sufficiently certain: Collerd v. Tully, 77 N. J. Eq. 439, 77 Atl. 1079. A general charge on all the existing property of the mortgagor is not void for uncertainty, if the property to which it attaches can be ascertained at the time of enforcement: In re Kelcey, [1899] 2 Ch. 530.

§ 1236, (a) The text is quoted in Meridian Oil Co. v. Randolph, 26 Okl. 634, 110 Pac. 722. See, also, France v. Thomas, 86 Mo. 80.

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the property so existing or acquired at a subsequent time, which is enforced in the same manner and against the same parties as a lien upon specific things existing and owned by the contracting party at the date of the contract.² b

v. Smith, 41 Barb. 404; Arques v. Wasson, 51 Cal. 620, 21 Am. Rep. 718; Phila. etc. R. R. v. Woelpper, 64 Pa. St. 366, 371, 3 Am. Rep. 596; Forman v. Proctor, 9 B. Mon. 124.

§ 1236, ² Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191; Wellesley v. Wellesley, 4 Mylne & C. 561, 579, per Lord Cottenham; Metcalfe v. Archbishop of York, 6 Sim. 224; 1 Mylne & C. 547, 556; Lyde v. Mynn, 4 Sim. 505; 1 Mylne & K. 683; Lewis v. Madocks, 17 Ves. 48; Tooke v. Hastings, 2 Vern. 97; Curtis v. Auber, 1 Jacob & W. 526; Douglas v. Russell, 4 Sim. 524; 1 Mylne & K. 488; Alexander v. Duke of Wellington, 2 Russ. & M. 35; eited in 1 Mylne & C. 556; Williams v. Winsor, 12 R. I. 9; Clay v. East Tenn. etc. R. R., 6 Heisk. 421; McClure v. McDearmon, 26 Ark. 66. This subject is more fully treated in the

§1236, (b) The text is quoted in Meridian Oil Co. v. Randolph, 26 Okl. 634, 110 Pac. 722. This section is cited in Curtis v. Walpole Tire & Rubber Co., 218 Fed. 145, 134 C. C. A. 140; Higgins v. Manson, 126 Cal. 467, 77 Am. St. Rep. 192, 58 Pac. 907; Leopuld v. Wecks, 96 Md. 280, 53 Atl. 937; Howard v. Iron & Land Co., 62 Minn. 298, 64 N. W. 896; Sporer v. McDermott, (Neb.) 96 N. W. 232, and in Bacot v. Varnado (Adkinson & Bacot Co. v. Varnado), 91 Miss. 825, 47 South. 113; Smith & Ricker v. Hill Bros., 17 N. M. 415, 134 Pac. 243; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 49 Okl. 398, 153 Pac. 195. See, also, Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U. S. 117, 58 L. Ed. 530, 34 Sup. Ct. 276 (agreement to pay, for services to be rendered, one-third of a contingent fee, creates a lien on the fund); Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Denver L. & G. R. Co., 126 Fed. 46, 60 C. C. A. 588; Central Trust Co. v. Washington Co. R. Co., 124 Fed. 813: Knowles Loom Works v. Ryle, 97 Fed. 730, 38 C. C. A. 494; Harris v. Youngstown Bridge Co., 93 Fed. 355, 35 C. C. A. 341; Grape Creek Coal Co. v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 63 Fed. 891, 12 C. C. A. 350, 24 U. S. App. 38; Goodnough Mercantile & Stock Co. v. Galloway, 171 Fed. 940; Gage Lumber Co. v. McEldowney, 207 Fed. 255, 124 C. C. A. 641; Sicg v. Greene, 225 Fed. 955, 141 C. C. A. 79; Howze v. Dew, 90 Ala. 178, 24 Am. St. Rep. 783, 7 South. 239; Patrick v. Morrow, 33 Colo. 509, 108 Am. St. Rep. 107, 81 Pac. 242; In re Frederica Water, Light & Power Co., (Del. Ch.) 93 Atl. 376; Brady v. Johnson, 75 Md. 445, 20 L. R. A. 737, 26 Atl. 49; Delval v. Gagnon, 213 Mass. 203, 99 N. E. 1095 (but compare Dudley v. Nickerson, 214 Mass. 274, 101 N. E. 465); Pere Marquette R. Co. v. Graham, (Mich.) 99 N. W. 408; St. Joseph, St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 170 Mo. 328, 70 S. W. 700; Monmouth Co. Elect. Co. v. Central § 1237. Form and Nature of the Agreement—Illustrations of Particular Agreements.—The form or particular nature of the agreement which shall create a lien is not very material, for equity looks at the final intent and purpose rather than at the form; and if the intent appear to give, or to charge, or to pledge property, real or personal, as a security for an obligation, and the property is so described that the principal things intended to be given or charged can be sufficiently identified, the lien follows.¹ a Among the

subsequent chapter upon assignments: See *post*, §§ 1283, 1288. The most common examples of such contracts in this country are chattel mortgages, and leases containing a clause in the nature of a chattel mortgage, which purport to embrace future-acquired property of the mortgagor or lessee. These instruments, although creating no legal interest in the property thus described, constitute an equitable lien between the immediate parties, and also against subsequent volunteers and persons affected with notice, except so far as local statutes concerning the filing or recording of chattel mortgages may interfere.^{\circ}

§ 1237, 1 Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sum. 486, 533, Fed. Cas. No. 4847, per Story, J.: "If a transaction resolve itself into a security, whatever may be its form, and whatever name the parties may choose to give it, it is in equity a mortgage [lien]."

R. Co., (N. J. Eq.) 54 Atl. 140; Collerd v. Tully, 77 N. J. Eq. 439, 77 Atl. 1079; Chester v. Jumel, 125 N. Y. 237, 251, 252, 26 N. E. 297; Hickson Lumber Co. v. Gay Lumber Co., 150 N. C. 282, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 843, 63 S. E. 1045; Taylor v. Huck, 65 Tex. 238; Barron v. San Angelo Nat. Bank, (Tex. Civ. App.) 138 S. W. 142; Brown v. Ford, 120 Va. 233, 91 S. E. 145; Triumph Electric Co. v. Empire Furniture Co., 70 W. Va. 164, 73 S. E. 325. Contra, in Massachusetts, see Taylor v. Barton-Child Co., (Mass.) 117 N. E. 43.

§ 1236, (c) See Reynolds v. Ellis, 103 N. Y. 116, 57 Am. Rep. 701, 8 N. E. 392, for example of such lease; and see Moulder-Holcomb Co. v. Glasgow Cooperage Co., 173 Ky. 519, 191 S. W. 275; and cases cited in the preceding note.

§1237, (a) This passage of the text is quoted in Columbus, S. & H. R. Co. Appeals, 109 Fed. 177, 196, 48 C. C. A. 275; in Lewis v. Davis, (Ala.) 33 South. 419; in James Bradford Co. v. United Leather Co., (Del. Ch.) 97 Atl. 622; in Charpie v. Stout, 88 Kan. 318, 128 Pac. 396; in Carter v. Sapulpa & I. Ry. Co., 49 Okl. 471, 153 Pac. 853; in Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321. This section is cited in Hovey v. Elliott, 118 N. Y. 124, 23 N. E. 475; Woodruff v. Adair, 131 Ala. 530, 32 South. 515; Bell v. Pelt, 51 Ark. 433, 14 Am. St. Rep. 57, 4 L. R. A. 247, 11 S. W. 684; Allis v. Jones, 45 Fed. 148; Allen v. Gates, 73 Vt. 222, 50 Atl. 1092; Society of Shakers v. Watson, 68 Fed. 730, 15 C. C. A. 632, 37 U. S. App. 141; Higgins v. Manson, 126 kinds of agreement from which liens have been held to arise, the following are some important examples: Executory agreements which do not convey or transfer any legal estate in the property, but which stipulate that the property shall be security, or which pledge it, for the performance of an obligation.^{2 b} As an agreement to give a mortgage cre-

§ 1237, ² An agreement by which the maker incurs an obligation, and pledges the produce of certain land, or the land itself, or "gives a lien on land" as security for the performance: Chase v. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581; Gilson v. Gilson, 2 Allen, 115; Kirksey v. Means, 42 Ala. 426; a clause in a lease that the lessor "is to have a lien" upon certain property for the rent: Whiting v. Eichelberger, 16 Iowa, 422; an agreement to give a mortgage on the party's share of his father's estate under a will when a division was made: Lynch v. Utica Ins. Co., 18 Wend. 236. And generally a written agreement to give a mortgage on certain land, or even a verbal agreement to give a mortgage on chattels, or a fund of securities, will create an equitable lien:^e Husted

Cal. 467, 77 Am. St. Rep. 192, 58 Pac. 907; Harrigan v. Gilchrist, (Wis.) 99 N. W. 909, 981; Sporer v. McDermott, (Neb.) 96 N. W. 232; also, in Curtis v. Walpole Tire & Rubber Co., 218 Fed. 145, 134 C. C. A. 140. See, also, In re New Glenwood Canning Co., 150 Iowa, 696, 130 N. W. 800 (lien from giving ineffective warchouse receipt).

§ 1237, (b) The text is quoted in James Bradford Co. v. United Leather Co., (Del. Ch.) 97 At. 622; in Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321.

§ 1237, (c) Agreement to Give a Mortgage.—The text is cited in Foster Lumber Co. v. Harlan Co. Bank, 71 Kan. 158, 114 Am. St. Rep. 470, 6 Ann. Cas. 44, 80 Pac. 49; Gardner v. Planters' Nat. Bank, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 572, 118 S. W. 1146 (agreement to give mortgage of chattel). See, also, Bridgeport Electric & Ice Co. v. Meader, 72 Fed. 115, 18 C. C. A. 451; Augusta Trust Co. v. Federal

Trust Co., 153 Fed. 157, 82 G. C. A. 309 (agreement to issue mortgage bonds); In re Farmers' Supply Co., 170 Fed. 502; Edwards v. Scruggs, 155 Ala. 568, 46 South. 850 (oral agreement to mortgage lands is within statute of frauds); King v. Williams, 66 Ark. 333, 50 S. W. 695; Lohmeyer v. Durbin, 206 Ill. 574, 69 N. E. 523; Foster Lumber Co. v. Harlan Co. Bank, 71 Kan. 158, 114 Am. St. Rep. 470, 6 Ann. Cas. 44, 80 Pac. 49 (oral agreement to mortgage land, upheld); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 97 Kan. 408, 155 Pac. 791; Wickes v. Hynson, 95 Md. 511, 52 Atl. 747; Carter v. Sapulpa & I. Ry. Co., 49 Okl. 471, 153 Pac. 853; Davis v. Childers, 45 S. C. 133, 55 Am. St. Rep. 757, 22 S. E. 784 (agreement to give chattel mortgage); Poarch v. Duncan, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 275, 91 S. W. 1110 (oral agreement to mortgage land, unenforceable). That an agreement to give a chattel mortgage cannot be enforced in equity. where the mortgage itself, if unfiled,

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ates a lien, so a mortgage which, through some informality or defect in its terms or mode of execution, is not complete and valid as a true and proper mortgage, will nevertheless generally create an equitable lien upon the property

v. Ingraham, 75 N. Y. 251, 257; Hale v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 626; 64 N. Y. 550; Boorman v. Wisconsin etc. Co., 36 Wis. 207; Monticello etc., v. Loughry, 71 Ind. 562. For further illustrations of such agreements, see Skiddy v. Atlantic etc. R. R., 3 Hughes, 320, Fed. Cas. No. 12,922; Arnold v. Morris, 7 Daly, 498; Williams v. Ingersoll, 23 Hun, 284; Stewart v. Hutchins, 6 Hill, 143; Jackson v. Carswell, 34 Ga. 279; Mobile etc. R. R. v. Talman, 15 Ala. 472; Racouillat v. Sansevain, 32 Cal. 376; De Leon v. Higuera, 15 Cal. 483; Barroilhet v. Battelle, 7 Cal. 450.^d

would have heen worthless, see Bell v. New York Safety Steam Power Co., 183 Fed. 274. In Sprague v. Cochran, 144 N. Y. 104, 38 N. E. 1000, a verbal agreement to give a mortgage was held to bind property which by mistake was omitted from the mortgage subsequently executed in pursuance of the agreement.

§ 1237, (d) Gest v. Packwood, 39 Fed. 525; O'Neal v. Seixas, 85 Ala. 80. 4 South. 745; Bush v. Garner, 73 Ala. 162 (equitable lien on crop); Jackson v. Rutherford, 73 Ala. 155 (parol agreement by debtor that certain personal property "should stand good for his indebtedness"); Bell v. Pelt, 51 Ark. 433, 14 Am. St. Rep. 57, 4 L. R. A. 247, 11 S. W. 684; Parks v. O'Connor, 70 Tex. 385, 8 S. W. 104; and see Boehl v. Wadgymar, 54 Tex. 589; Perry v. Board of Missions, 102 N. Y. 99, 6 N. E. 116. See, as further illustrations, cases cited ante, notes to § 1235; and Wilder v. Watts, 138 Fed. 426 (agreement to assign insurance policy as security for a loan); In re J. F. Grandy & Son, 146 Fed. 318 (same); Ward v. First Nat. Bank of Ironton. 202 Fed. 609, 120 C. C. A. 655 (same); In re Zitron, 203 Fed. 79 (same); Bank of Florala v. Smith, 11 Ala. App. 358, 66 South. 832; Earle v. Sunnyside Land Co., 150 Cal. 214, 88 Pac. 920; Dufur Oil Co. v. Enos. 59 Or. 528, 117 Pac. 457 (lien on machinery). See, also, Hanson v. W. L. Blake & Co., 155 Fed. 342 (lien upon proceeds of insurance policy, where mortgagor is bound to insure for benefit of mortgagee); In re Imperial Textile Co., 239 Fed. 775 (agreement to assign accounts as security for advances).

Equitable Pledge. - Whether an agreement to pledge specific chattels, or a pledge of identified chattels imperfect for lack of delivery, may be treated as an equitable lien, is a question on which the cases are by no means agreed. In the following cases the lien was sustained: Sexton v. Kessler & Co., 225 U. S. 90, 56 L, Ed. 995, 32 Sup. Ct. 657 (securities deposited in a tin box in the pledgor's possession); In re Pittsburgh Industrial Iron Works, 179 Fed. 151 (Pennsylvania); James Bradford Co. v. United Leather Co., (Del. Ch.) 97 Atl. 622 (boxes marked as property of lender); Garrison v. Vermont Mills, 154 N. C. 1, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 450, 69 S. E.

described. The intent to give a security being clear, equity will treat the instrument as an executory agreement for such security.^{3 f} An assignment of the rents and profits of land as security for a debt is another mode of creating

Any agreement that certain property shall be appropriated as security for or for the payment of an indebtedness;^e e. g., an agreement written on the back of a note that it should be a charge upon certain land was held to create a lien on the land; Peckham v. Haddock, 36 Ill. 38; and see Chadwick v. Clapp, 69 Ill. 119; Blackburn v. Tweedie, 60 Mo. 505.

§ 1237, ³ Payne v. Wilson, 74 N. Y. 348; Daggett v. Rankin, 31 Cal. 321; Remmington v. Higgins, 54 Cal. 620; Newlin v. McAfee, 64 Ala. 357; Lewis v. Small, 71 Me. 552; In re Howe, 1 Paige, 125, 19 Am. Dec.

743 (goods stored by borrower in separate warehouses); Davis v. Billings, 254 Pa. 574, 99 Atl. 163. In the following cases the lien was denied: Fourth St. Nat. Bank v. Millbourne Mills Co.'s Trustee, 172 Fed. 177, 30 L. B. A. (N. S.) 552, 19 C. C. A. 629, affirming 162 Fed. 988; In re Cross, 244 Fed. 844.

§ 1237, (e) Butts v. Broughton, 72 Ala. 294 (declaration in notes that they are "covered by" or "subject to" a prior mortgage); Prickett v. Sibert, 71 Ala. 194 (the fact that lands conveyed are described in the purchase-money note does not create an equitable mortgage, as distinguished from the grantor's lien); Tedder v. Steele, 70 Ala. 347 (same, overruling Bryant v. Stephens, 58 Ala. 636); Cummings v. Jackson, 55 N. J. Eq. 805, 38 Atl. 763.

An agreement to pay A from the proceeds of the sale of certain property does not necessarily give A a lien upon the property. The general test is, Did the agreement contemplate that A might compel a sale of the property? See Quinton v. Neville, 152 Fed. 879, 81 C. C. A. 673 (lien, notwithstanding provision requiring consent of all parties); Smith v. Rainey, 9 Ariz. 360, 83 Pac. 463 (no lien); Gregory v. Chapman, 119 Md. 495, 87 Atl. 523 (no lien); Jenuings v. Whitney, 224 Mass. 138, 112 N. E. 655 (mere personal promise to pay creditor from a particular fund).

§ 1237, (f) Imperfect Mortgage.----This sentence is quoted in Hackett v. Watts, 138 Mo. 502, 40 S. W. 113; Markham v. Wallace, 147 Ala. 243, 41 South. 304 (unattested mortgage); Lewis v. Davis, (Ala.) 73 South. 419; Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321. This paragraph is cited in Standorf v. Shockley, 16 N. D. 73, 14 Ann. Cas. 1099, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 869, 111 N. W. 622. See, also, Society of Shakers v. Watson, 68 Fed. 730, 15 C. C. A. 632, 37 U. S. App. 141; Courtner v. Etheredge, 149 Ala. 78, 43 South. 368; Stiewell v. Webb Press Co., 79 Ark. 45, 116 Am. St. Rep. 62, 94 S. W. 915; Margarum v. J. S. Christie Orange Co., 37 Fla. 165, 19 South. 637; Howard v. McPhail, 37 R. I. 21, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 186, 91 Atl. 12 (chattel mortgage, not recorded, where no delivery of the property); Wayt v. Carwithen, 21 W. Va. 516.

an equitable lien on the land in favor of the assignee, and the assignment of a lease by way of security produces the

395; Bank of Muskingum v. Carpenter's Adm'rs, 7 Ohio, 21, 28 Am. Dec. 616; Nelson v. Hagerstown Bank, 27 Md. 51, 76; Dow v. Ker, 1 Speers Eq. 414, 417; Massey v. McIlwain, 2 Hill Eq. 421, 428; Welsh v. Usher, 2 Hill Eq. 167, 170, 29 Am. Dec. 63; Delaire v. Keenan, 3 Desaus. Eq. 74, 4 Am. Dec. 604; Read v. Gaillard, 2 Desaus. Eq. 552, 2 Am. Dec. 696. Examples: Where the seal was accidentally omitted: McClurg v. Phillips, 49 Mo. 315; 57 Mo. 214; Dunn v. Raley, 58 Mo. 134; Harrington v. Fortner, 58 Mo. 468; Gill v. Clark, 54 Mo. 415;5 where the instrument omitted to state that it was sealed: Jones v. Brewington, 58 Mo. 210; where there was no valid acknowledgment: Black v. Gregg, 58 Mo. 565; where the instrument was not properly witnessed:^h Lake v. Doud, 10 Ohio, 415; Abbott v. Godfroy's Heirs, 1 Mich. 178; where in a trust deed in the nature of a mortgage the name of the trustee was omitted:¹ McQuie v. Peay, 58 Mo. 56; Burnside v. Wayman, 49 Mo. 356; where a mortgage purporting to be given by a corporation was not executed in its name nor attested by its corporate seal, but was executed in the names of its officers, they having authority, however, to bind the corporation by executing the mortgage in its name, it was held to create an equitable lien: Love v. Sierra Nevada Co., 32 Cal. 639, 652, 653, 91 Am. Dec. 602, per Shafter, J.: "It was urged that the defective execution of the mortgage was caused by a mistake of law, and that therefore it cannot be aided. The answer is, that where there is a defective execution of a power, it is a matter of no equitable moment whether the error came of a mistake of law or a mistake of fact. It is enough that the power existed, and that there was an attempt to act under it. The relief is not so much by way of reforming the instrument as by aiding its defective execution; which aid is administered through or by the application of the maxims already quoted. Or, as in the class of cases to which this belongs, the instrument defectively executed as a deed is considered properly executed as a contract for a deed, and therefore as requiring neither reformation nor aid, but as ripe for enforcement according to the methods peculiar to courts of equity." £

§ 1237, (g) Allis v. Jones, 45 Fed. 148; Atkinson v. Miller, 34 W. Va. 115, 9 L. R. A. 544, 11 S. E. 1007.

§ 1237, (h) Longdon v. Wakeley, 62 Fla. 530, 56 South. 408.

§ 1237, (1) Dulaney v. Willis, 95 Va. 606, 64 Am. St. Rep. 815, 29 S. E. 324; Bensimer v. Fell, 35 W. Va. 15, 29 Am. St. Rep. 775, 12 S. E. 1078.

§ 1237, (J) Where the trust deed was properly acknowledged, but the signature of the grantor was omitted by mistake: Martin v. Nixon, 92 Mo. 26, 4 S. W. 503; where a mortgage was executed to

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same effect.⁴ k The assignment for a similar purpose of a contract for the purchase and sale of land may in like manner operate to create an equitable lien in favor of the assignee.⁵ 1 The equitable liens which arise from such

§ 1237, 4 Ex parte Wills, 1 Ves. 162 (in which Lord Thurlow, speaking of assignments of rents and profits as a security, said: "It is an odd way of conveying, but it amounts to an equitable lien"); Jackson v. Green, 4 Johns. 186; Smith v. Patton, 12 W. Va. 541 (a contract charging the rents and profits of land as security). A provision in a lease that a building erected by the lessee "is mortgaged as security" for the rent was held to constitute an equitable lien: Barroilhet v. Battelle, 7 Cal. 450.

§ 1237, 5 The assignment of a contract for the purchase of land, made by the vendee therein, as security for a debt or other obligation,

a partnership in the firm name of the partnership, instead of the separate partners: Bank v. Johnson, 47 Ohio St. 306, 8 L. R. A. 614, 24 N. E. 503; Stark v. Kirkley, 129 Mo. App. 353, 108 S. W. 625; where a purchase-money mortgage was given by minors to secure part of the price of land conveyed to them: Peers v. McLaughlin, 88 Cal. 294, 22 Am. St. Rep. 306, 26 Pac. 119. But "in order that a lien may arise by reason of a defectively executed mortgage, it must appear that the instrument was attempted to be executed by the mortgagor, or his duly authorized agent, in pursuance of an agreement indicating an intent that the property described, or rendered capable of identification, is to be held, given, or transferred as security for an obligation or debt of the mortgagor": Brown v. Farmers' Supply Depot Co., 23 Or. 541, 32 Pac. 548. A corporation mortgage executed without authority creates no lien: Bernard v. Lea, 210 Fed. 583, 127 C. C. A. 219.

§ 1237, (k) Assignment of Rents and Profits, or of Lease, as Security. This sentence is quoted in Gest v. Packwood, 39 Fed. 525, and in Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321. See, also, Smith Co. v. Mc-Guinness, 14 R. I. 59 (irrevocable power of attorney to collect rents given as security for money loaned); Allen v. Gates, 73 Vt. 222, 50 Atl. 1092. Likewise, an assignment of a lease as security may amount to an equitable lien: Commercial Bank v. Pritchard, 126 Cal. 600, 59 Pac. 130. But an agreement by an owner of real estate to collect the rents and turn them over to his creditor in payment of a debt, even though the money represented by the debt was expended to increase the value of the property, does not create a lien in such creditor's favor, in the absence of language clearly showing such an intention: Elmore v. Symonds, (Mass.) 67 N. E. 314, citing many cases.

§ 1237, (1) Assignment of Contract for Purchase of Land.—The text is quoted in Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321. See, also, assignment must largely depend upon a performance of the conditions and stipulations contained in the original contracts, whatever be their form, which are assigned. An equitable lien may sometimes be created upon bills of ex-

will thus create a lien: Brockway v. Wells, 1 Paige, 617; Fessler's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 483; Fitzhugh v. Smith, 62 Ill. 486; Purdy v. Bullard, 41 Cal. 444. In Dwen v. Blake, 44 Ill. 135, land-warrants were thus transferred into the creditor's name as security. A formal mortgage of land by one who only holds the equitable title as vendee under a contract of purchase is, in effect, an assignment of the contract, and constitutes an equitable mortgage or lien: Alden v. Garver, 32 Ill. 32.

The assignment of a bond conditioned for the conveyance of landa form of land contract in general use in several of the states-produces the same effect: Sinclair v. Armitage, 12 N. J. Eq. 174; Neligh v. Michenor, 11 N. J. Eq. 539; Alderson v. Ames, 6 Md. 52; Fenno v. Sayre, 3 Ala. 458; Newhouse v. Hill, 7 Blackf. 584; Baker v. Bishop Hill Colony, 45 Ill. 264; Bull v. Sykes, 7 Wis. 449; Jones v. Lapham, 15 Kan. 540; Christy v. Dana, 34 Cal. 548.^m A bond conditioned to convey by deed upon payment of the purchase price is in its operation tantamount to an agreement to convey, and the liens arising from it are identical with the liens of the vendor and the vendee arising from the ordinary contract for the sale of land described in a subsequent section: See Lewis v. Boskins, 27 Ark. 61; Shall v. Biscoe, 18 Ark. 142; Graham v. McCampbell, Meigs, 52, 33 Am. Dec. 126; Tanner v. Hicks, 4 Smedes & M. 294; Button v. Schroyer, 5 Wis. 598. The assignment by a vendee of a partial interest under his contract of purchase also creates an equitable lien to the extent of such interest: Northrup v. Cross, Seld. Notes, 111. The assignment of certificates of purchase of public lands issued by a state as security of a debt in like manner constitutes an equitable lien: Wright v. Shumway, 1 Biss. 23; Heirs of Stover v. Heirs of Bounds, 1 Ohio St. 107; Dodge v. Silverthorne, 12 Wis. 644; Mowry v. Wood, 12 Wis. 413; Jarvis v. Dutcher, 16 Wis. 307; Hill v. Eldred, 49 Cal. 398;ⁿ also, of certificates of stock in a joint-stock company, where such certificates represent land held by the company or its stockholders: Durkee v. Stringham,

Shipman v. Lord, 58 N. J. Eq. 380,
44 Atl. 215 (affirmed, 46 Atl. 1101);
Scharman v. Scharman, 38 Neb. 39,
56 N. W. 704; Burrows v. Hovland,
40 Neb. 464, 58 N. W. 947; Lovejoy
v. Chapman, 23 Or. 571, 32 Pac. 687;
Hackett v. Watts, 138 Mo. 502, 40
S. W. 113.

§ 1237, (m) See, also, Trader v. Jarvis, 23 W. Va. 100; Morris v. Nyswanger, 5 S. D. 307, 58 N. W. 800.

§ 1237, (n) Stewart v. McLaughlin, 11 Colo. 458, 18 Pac. 619.

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change or upon a consignment upon which bills of exchange are drawn, by means of a specific appropriation, at all events where the drawers or acceptors have become insolvent.⁶ The foregoing instances are sufficient to illustrate

8 Wis. 1. The lien acquired by the assignce in all these cases is, of course, subject to the payment of the amount due on the contract, bond, or certificate: Dodge v. Silverthorne, 12 Wis. 644.

§ 1237, 6 In the leading case of Ex parte Waring, 19 Ves. 345, Lord Eldon rested his decision involving this rule upon the fact that both the drawers and acceptors were insolvent. This view was criticised in Powles v. Hargreaves, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 430, but in all the cases in which the rule has been applied it will be found that one or both these parties had become insolvent. In Ex parte Imbert, 1 De Gex & J. 152, A bought ten bills of exchange drawn by L. & Co., on a firm in Liverpool. Some time after, L. & Co. sent other bills to the Liverpool firm, with a letter specifically appropriating them to meet the ten firstmentioned bills, held by A. L. & Co., the drawers, the Liverpool firm, the drawees, became insolvent. Held, that A had a lien on the bills last sent, and was entitled as against the assignees in bankruptcy that their proceeds should be applied upon the bills which he held; and see Bock v. Gorrissen, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 434. In Frith v. Forbes, 4 De Gex, F. & J. 409, A consigned a cargo to defendant, and at the same time wrote him that he had drawn a bill of exchange on said cargo in favor of B, "which please protect." On the same day he gave B a bill of exchange drawn on defendant, informing B that it was drawn against the cargo. Defendant refused to accept the bill when presented by B, and A soon after failed. Held, that B had a lien on the proceeds of the cargo in defendant's hands, and was entitled to prior payment out of such proceeds. In the subsequent cases of Robey etc. Iron Works v. Ollier, L. R. 7 Ch. 695, and Ex parte Lambton, L. R. 10 Ch. 405, the court held that the mere drawing of a bill of exchange against a cargo or consignment did not of itself create a lien upon the goods or their proceeds in favor of the holder of the bill; and the decision in Frith v. Forbes was somewhat criticised. But in the still later case of Ranken v. Alfaro, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 786, the lien was upheld upon facts quite analogous to those of Frith v. Forbes. The following cases also involve the question as to such a lien: Vaughan v. Halliday, L. R. 9 Ch. 561; Ex parte Dewhurst, L. R. 8 Ch. 965; Ex parte Smart, L. R. 8 Ch. 220; City Bank v. Luckie, L. R. 5 Ch. 773; Ex parte Alliance Bank, L. R. 4 Ch. 423; In re New Zealand Bkg. Co., L. R. 4 Eq. 226; see, also, post, § 1284.º

§ 1237, (o) The authority of Frith v. Forbes has been greatly weakof Phelps v. Comber, 29 Ch. Div. the doctrine of equitable lien arising from express contract. They show that the form is immaterial, if the intent appears to make any identified property a security for the fulfillment of an obligation.^P

SECTION III.

ARISING FROM IMPLIED CONTRACTS.

ANALYSIS.

§ 1238.	Nature of "implied contract" in equity.
§ 1239.	General doctrine as to liens arising ex æquo et bono.
§ 1240.	Expenditure by one joint owner.
§ 1241.	Expenditure for the benefit of the true owner.
§ 1242.	Expenditure by a life tenant.
§ 1243.	In other special cases.

§ 1238. Nature of "Implied Contract" in Equity.-The term "implied contract" is a pure fiction of the commonlaw system of pleading, invented so that certain equitable liabilities, not arising from express promise, but recognized as existing by the courts of law, might be consistently enforced by the action of assumpsit. The phrase is not only a misnomer in equity, but it violates equitable conceptions. There is no necessity for resorting to the notion of "implied contract" to account for the existence of any equitable rights and liabilities which do not arise from express promise. The class of equitable rights and liabilities which at law are referred to the fiction of "implied contract" really exist ex æquo et bono; they arise wholly from considerations of right and justice, and from the application to particular conditions of fact of those maxims which lie at the foundation of equity jurisprudence.^a

813, and Brown v. Kough, 29 Ch. Div. 848.

§1237, (p) The text is quoted in Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321.

§ 1238, (a) The text is quoted in Carmichael v. Arms, 51 Ind. App. 689, 100 N. E. 302.

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§ 1239. General Doctrine as to Liens Arising Ex Æquo et Bono.—In addition to the general doctrine that equitable liens are created by executory contracts which, in express terms, stipulate that property shall be held, assigned, or transferred as security for the promisor's debt or other obligation, there are some further instances where equity raises similar liens, without agreement therefor between the parties, based either upon general considerations of justice (ex æquo et bono), or upon the particular equitable principle that he who seeks the aid of equity in enforcing some claim must himself do equity,^a—that is, must recognize and admit the equitable rights of the opposite party directly connected with or arising out of the same subjectmatter. I shall briefly describe the most important instances which belong to this species of equitable liens.

§ 1240. Expenditure by One Joint Owner.—Where two or more persons are joint purchasers or owners of real or other property, and one of them, acting in good faith and for the joint benefit, makes repairs or improvements upon the property which are permanent, and add a permanent value to the entire estate, equity may not only give him a claim for contribution against the other joint owners, with respect to their proportionate shares of the amount thus expended, but may also create a lien as security for such demand upon the undivided shares of the other proprietors.¹ a

§ 1240, 1 Lake v. Gibson, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 290, pl. 3; Lake v. Craddock, 3 P. Wms. 158; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 264, 268; Gladstone v. Birley, 2 Mer. 401, 403; Scott v. Nesbitt, 14 Ves. 437, 444; Rathburn v. Colton, 15 Pick. 471. If one joint owner makes such expenditures, and the other sues in equity for a partition, allowance will be made for the outlays: Swan v. Swan, 8 Price, 518.

§ 1239, (a) The text is quoted in Carmichael v. Arms, 51 Ind. App. 689, 100 N. E. 302. This section is cited, but held inapplicable, in Patt v. Perry, 39 R. I. 442, 98 Atl. 101.

§1240, (a) The text is quoted in III-187 Williams v. Harlan, 88 Md. 1, 71 Am. St. Rep. 394, 41 Atl. 51, holding also that a third person lending money to the co-tenant for the purpose of making the improvements is subrogated to his lien. See, also, § 1241. Expenditure for the Benefit of the True Owner. Such an equitable lien has not always been confined to cases in which a contract to reimburse could be implied at law. The right to a contribution or reimbursement from the owner, and the equitable lien on the property benefited as a security therefor, have been extended to other cases where a party innocently and in good faith, though under a mistake as to the true condition of the title, makes improvements or repairs or other expenditures which permanently increase the value of the property, so that the real owner, when he seeks the aid of equity to establish his right to the property itself, or to enforce some equitable claim upon it, having been substantially benefited, is required, upon principles of justice and equity, to repay the amount expended.¹ a

§ 1241, ¹ In Neesom v. Clarkson, 4 Hare, 97, it was said that while a person expending money through mistake on another's property has no elaim in equity for reimbursement, as an *actor*, against the owner, who was ignorant of the expenditure, and did nothing to encourage

Gavin v. Carling, 55 Md. 530; Alexander v. Ellison, 79 Ky. 148. It has been held that a joint tenant has no lien for rents collected by his cotenant: Burch v. Burch, 82 Ky. 622; but see Scott v. Guernsey, 60 Barb. 163, 180, affirmed, 48 N. Y. 106, 124; Vaughan v. Langford, 81 S. C. 282, 128 Am. St. Rep. 912, 16 Ann. Cas. 91, 62 S. E. 316; if such a lien, as distinguished from a mere equity to an accounting, exists, it does not come into operation until the filing of the bill for partition, so as to override a prior mortgage executed by a co-tenant upon his interest: Omohundro v. Elkins, 109 Tenn. 711, 71 S. W. 590, and cases cited; and see Vaughan v. Langford, 81 S. C. 282, 128 Am. St. Rep. 912, 16 Ann. Cas. 91, 62 S. E. 316. That a cotenant who has paid more than his share of the purchase-money for the property is entitled to a lien on the shares of the other co-tenants on partition, see Funk v. Seehorn, 99 Mo. App. 587, 74 S. W. 445; and that a co-tenant paying taxes is entitled to a lien, see Stone v. Marshall, 52 Wash. 375, 100 Pac. 858.

§1241, (a). The text is quoted in Hunter v. McDevitt, (N. D.) 97 N. W. 869; and cited in Howard v. Massengale, 13 Lea, 577; Putnam v. Tyler, 117 Pa. St. 570, 12 Atl. 43: Ensign v. Batterson, 68 Conn. 298, 36 Atl. 51; Anderson v. Reid, 14 App. D. C. 54, 73; Lagger v. Mutual Union L. & B. Ass'n, 146 Ill. 283, 33 N. E. 946; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 145 Ill. 238, 251, 36 Am. St. Rep. 486, 494, 21 L. R. A. 489, 34 N. E. 476; Floyd v. Mackey, 112 Ky. 646, 66 S. W. 518; Green v. Mc-Donald, 75 Vt. 93, 53 Atl. 332; Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 563, 64

§ 1242. Expenditure by a Life Tenant.—In pursuance of the same general doctrine, if a tenant for life, holding

it: Nicholson v. Hooper, 4 Mylne & C. 179; b yet whenever it is necessary for the true owner himself, under such circumstances, to proceed in equity, the principle that he who seeks equity must do equity will be applied, and he will only be entitled to seek the aid of the court upon making compensation for the outlays. In pursuance of this doctrine, when a person in peaceable possession under claim of lawful title, but really under a defective title, has in good faith made permanent improvements, the true owner, who seeks the aid of equity to establish his own title, will be compelled, it has been held, to reimburse the occupant for his expenditure: Robinson v. Ridley, 6 Madd. 2; Att'y-Gen. v. Baliol College, 9 Mod. 407, 411; Bright v. Boyd, 1 Story, 478; Fed. Cas. No. 1875; 2 Story, 605; Fed. Cas. No. 1876; Rathburn v. Colton, 15 Pick. 471; Miner v. Beekman, 50 N. Y. 337; Smith v. Drake, 23 N. J. Eq. 302; McLaughlin v. Barnum, 31 Md. 425; Sale v. Crutchfield, 8 Bush, 636; and see Preston v. Brown, 35 Ohio St. 18; but, per contra, this doctrine seems to be wholly rejected in Pennsylvania: Appeal of Cross and Gault, 97 Pa. St. 471.d And if the true r

Am. St. Rep. 891, 38 L. R. A. 694, 707, 27 S. E. 411; Keller v. Fenske, (Wis.) 101 N. W. 378. The text is cited, also, in McDonald v. Rankin, 92 Ark. 173, 122 S. W. 88; Mc-Kinney v. McCullar, 95 Ark. 164, 128 S. W. 1043; Foltz v. Alford, 102 Ark. 191, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 236, 143 S. W. 905; Diederich v. Rose, 228 Ill. 610, 81 N. E. 1140; Wakefield v. Van Tassell, 218 Ill. 572, 75 N. E. 1058; Carmichael v. Arms, 51 Ind. App. 689, 100 N. E. 302; Richmond v. Ashcraft, 137 Mo. App. 191, 117 S. W. 689; Williams v. Finley, 99 Tex. 468, 90 S. W. 1087; McMillan v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 151 Wis. 48, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 53, 138 N. W. 94.

§ 1241, (b) See Diederich v. Rose, 228 Ill. 610, 81 N. E. 1140, citing the text.

§ 1241, (c) Quoted by Ruger, C. J., in Thomas v. Evans, 105 N. Y. 614, 59 Am. Rep. 519, 12 N. E. 571; quoted, also, in Lyons Nat. Bank v. Shuler, 199 N. Y. 405, 92 N. E. 800. See, also, Canal Bank v. Hudson, 111 U. S. 66, 4 Sup. Ct. 303, 28 L. Ed. 354; Hicklin v. Marco, 46 Fed. 424; Hutson v. Wood, 263 Ill. 376, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 587, 105 N. E. 343 (purchaser at void execution sale who pays off encumbrances, taxes and special assessments, and makes improvements, entitled to be reimbursed); Sunter v. Sunter, 190 Mass. 449, 77 N. E. 497; Lyons Nat. Bank v. Shuler, 199 N. Y. 405, 92 N. E. 800 (purchaser from trustce with power of sale under n void trust); Parnell v. Goff, 32 Okl. 470, 122 Pac. 653; Skiles's Appeal, 110 Pa. St. 248, 20 'Atl. 722; Folk v. Brooks, 91 S. C. 7, 74 S. E. 46.

§1241, (d) In Skiles's Appeal, 110 Pa. St. 248, 20 Atl. 722, and Putnam v. Tyler, 117 Pa. St. 570, 12 Atl. 43, the general rule was recognized and followed. under a will, expends money in completing permanently beneficial improvements to the property, which had been

owner stands by and suffers the occupant, without notice of his title, and acting in innocent mistake, to make repairs and improvements, he will be compelled in equity to repay the amount thus expended, and the claim for repayment will constitute an equitable lien on the property: See ante, vol. 2, §§ 807, 821, and cases cited; Shine v. Gough, 1 Ball & B. 436, 444; Lord Cawdor v. Lewis, 1 Younge & C. 427; Preston v. Brown, 35 Ohio St. 18; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 77, 78, 5 L. Ed. 547; Bright v. Boyd, 1 Story, 478, 493; Fed. Cas. No. 1875. In all these cases, however, the element of good faith and innocent mistake is essential; for if a person lays out money on another's property, with knowledge or notice of the true state of the title,-e g., a purchaser with notice of another's title,-he has no claim to be reimbursed, and of course no lien:^e Rennie v. Young, 2 De Gex & J. 136; Ramsden v. Dyson, L. R. 1 H. L. 129; Cook v. Kraft, 3 Lans. 512; Davidson v. Barclay, 63 Pa. St. 406; Dart v. Hercules, 57 Ill. 446; Cannon v. Copeland, 43 Ala. 252. Finally, in order that there may be a claim for reimbursement and a lien as security therefor in any case of this general kind, either the aid of a court of equity must be requisite on behalf of the owner against whom the claim for reimbursement is made, so that he can be compelled to do equity, or else there must be some element of fraud in the transaction as ground of equitable interference.^f If, therefore, the true owner can recover his land by an action at law, equity will not, in the absence of fraud, compel him to reimburse the occupant even in good faith for disbursements made in repairs and improvements:" See ante, §§ 807, 821; Moore v.

§1241, (e) Good Faith and Innocent Mistake Essential .- See, also, Gordon v. Tweedy, 74 Ala. 232, 49 Am. Rep. 813; Gresham v. Ware, 79 Ala. 192; Tibbetts v. Terrill, 26 Colo. App. 64, 140 Pac. 936; Ensign v. Batterson, 68 Conn. 298, 36 Atl. 51; Anderson v. Reid, 14 App. D. C. 54 (constructive notice by record); Cable v. Ellis, 120 Ill. 136, 11 N. E. 188; Loeb v. Conley, 160 Ky. 91, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 49, 169 S. W. 575; Bryan v. Councilman, 106 Md. 380, 14 Ann. Cas. 1175, 67 Atl. 279; Dehn v. Dehn, 170 Mich. 407, 136 N. W. 453; Godwin v. Parker, 152 N. C.

672, 68 S. E. 208; Hunter v. Mc-Devitt, (N. D.) 97 N. W. 869 (constructive notice by record did not defeat the lien); Effinger v. Hall, 81 Va. 94; McMillan v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 151 Wis. 48, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 53, 138 N. W. 94, eiting the text.

§ 1241, (1) This sentence of the note is quoted in Parker v. Daly, 58 Or. 564, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 545, 114 Pac. 926, 115 Pac. 723.

§ 1241, (5) See, also, McDonald v. Rankin, 92 Ark. 173, 122 S. W. 88; Foltz v. Alford, 102 Ark. 191, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 236, 143 S. W. 905;

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commenced by the testator, such an outlay is held to constitute a valid claim for reimbursement against the reversioner, and an equitable lien upon the property as security for its repayment; while outlays for altogether new and original improvements, being made with full knowledge of the title, would create no such claims.^{1 a}

§ 1243. In Other Special Cases.—Where a person, not being owner of a policy of life insurance, nor bound to pay the premium, but having some claim or color of interest in it, voluntarily pays the premiums thereon, and thus keeps it alive for the benefit of a third party, he may thereby acquire an equitable lien on the proceeds of the policy as security for the repayment of his advances.^{1 a}

Cable, 1 Johns. Ch. 385; Green v. Winter, 1 Johns. Ch. 26, 39, 7 Am. Dec. 475; Putnam v. Ritchie, 6 Paige, 390, 403; Bright v. Boyd, 1 Story, 478, 494; Fed. Cas. No. 1875. This rule has been changed by statute in several of the states, which allow compensation to defendants, even in actions of ejectment, when the land is recovered from them for the "betterments" which they have added to the land.^h

§ 1242, ¹ Hibbert v. Cooke, 1 Sim. & St. 552; Dent v. Dent, 30 Beav. 363 (a life tenant allowed for certain improvements, but not for others); Dunne v. Dunne, 3 Smale & G. 22; In re Leigh's Estate, L. R. 6 Ch. 887; Sohier v. Eldredge, 103 Mass. 345; see Floyer v. Bankes, L. R. 8 Eq. 115; Taylor v. Foster's Adm'r, 22 Ohio St. 255; and Todd v. Moorhouse, L. R. 19 Eq. 69.

§ 1243, ¹ Norris v. Caledonian Ins. Co., L. R. 8 Eq. 127; Gill v. Downing, L. R. 17 Eq. 316. Mr. Snell, on the authority of these eases, lays down as a general rule that when *any* person pays the premiums in order to keep a policy alive, he becomes entitled to a lien on the

Anderson v. Reid, 14 App. D. C. 54; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 145 Ill. 238, 251, 36 Am. St. Rep. 486, 494, 21 L. R. A. 489, 34 N. E. 476; Taylor v. Roniger, 147 Mich. 99, 110 N. W. 503.

§ 1241, (h) See Jones on Liens, secs. 1140-1146; Griswold v. Bragg, 18 Blatchf. 204, 48 Fed. 519, 520, 48 Conn. 579; Sengfelder v. Hill, 21 Wash. 371, 58 Pac. 250.

§1242, (a) This paragraph is quoted in Patt v. Perry, 39 R. I.

442, 98 Atl. 101; and cited in Carmichael v. Arms, 51 Ind. App. 689, 100 N. E. 302. See, also, Gavin v. Carling, 55 Md. 530; Missouri Central Building & Loan Ass'n v. Eveler, 237 Mo. 679, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 486, and note, 141 S. W. 877. § 1243, (a) The text is quoted in Stockwell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 140 Cal. 198, 98 Am. St. Rep. 25, 73 Pac. 833. There are certain maritime liens which have sometimes been recognized and enforced by courts of equity in England, but which in this country would rather belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty.² Another equitable lien, recognized and enforced by courts of equity, is that ordinarily known as "the partners' lien,"—a lien which each partner has upon the entire firm assets, as a security that those assets shall be applied in discharge of the firm debts, and that he shall receive his just share of the surplus remaining after all the firm debts are paid.³

proceeds: Snell's Equity, 115. The cases certainly fall very far short of establishing such a general rule.^b It is doubtful, indeed, whether they lay down any *rule* at all, certainly none more extensive than that given above in the text.

In Todd v. Moorhouse, L. R. 19 Eq. 69, it was held that where a life tenant, under a settlement comprising shares in stock companies, at the request of the trustees pays the calls on the shares, and thus prevents their forfeiture and loss to the estate, he has a lien on the shares for his advances, with interest.

§ 1243, ² They are the liens which materialmen have for repairs or supplies furnished to a foreign ship in a domestic port: See The Aurora, 1 Wheat. 96, 105, 4 L. Ed. 45; The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438, 4 L. Ed. 609, and similar cases; and that which the part owner of a ship may have for his advances towards her outfit, on the proceeds of her voyage, or on the ship itself: See Doddington v. Hallet, 1 Ves. Sr. 497, per Lord Hardwicke; Ex parte Young, 2 Ves. & B. 242, per Lord Eldon; Nicoll v. Mumford, 4 Johns. Ch. 522; 20 Johns. 611. As these particular liens are wholly maritime, and belong to the admiralty jurisdiction, any discussion of their nature and extent is unnecessary.

§ 1243, 3 This lien is mentioned here in order to complete the general survey: See West v. Skip, 1 Ves. Sr. 239, 456; Lake v. Gibson, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 264, 268; Mycock v. Beatson, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 384; Nicoll v. Mumford, 4 Johns. Ch. 522.

§ 1243, (b) Meier v. Meier, 15 Mo. App. 68; affirmed, 88 Mo. 566.

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SECTION IV.

ARISING FROM CHARGES BY WILL OR BY DEED.

ANALYSIS.

§ 1244. General doctrine; nature of a charge.

§ 1245. What amounts to a charge creating such a lien.

§ 1246. The same; express charge.

- § 1247. The same; implied charge; English and American rules stated in foot-note.
- § 1248. Observations upon the rules adopted by American courts.

§ 1244. General Doctrine-Nature of a "Charge."-Another species of equitable lien not growing out of contract directly between the parties arises when specific property -a lot of land, a fund of securities, or the land contained in a residuary devise—is conveyed, devised, or bequeathed subject to or charged with the payment of debts, legacies. portions, or annuities in favor of third persons given by the same instrument. The legal title to the property vests in the grantee, devisee, or other recipient, but a lien thereon is created in favor of the beneficiary named, which can be enforced in equity. Where, for example, land is devised charged with the payment of the testator's debts generally, a lien arises in favor of the creditors, and any one or more of these can enforce it against the land so devised; or where a lot is devised charged with the payment of a particular legacy, the legatee can in like manner enforce his lien against such tract in the hands of the devisee.¹ There is a plain distinction pointed out in the

§ 1244, 1 Such charges may be contained in conveyances *inter vivos*, and are sometimes found in family settlements, real estate settled upon sons being charged with the payment of portions in favor of daughters, and the like. They are much more frequently, especially in this country, found in wills. When real estate given by will is thus charged with the payment of debts and legacies, the effects may be various. The first, and perhaps the most important, result from the ordinary form of such charge is, to break over the common-law rule which makes the personal property the fund out of which debts and legacies are § 1244

primarily payable, and to render the real estate of the testator liable pari passu with the personal for such payment. Still the charge may be made in such terms as to exonerate the personalty, and thus to admit the doctrine of marshaling. When the charge is of the ordinary form, not exonerating the personalty, the creditor or legatee is not precluded from enforcing his demand in the usual manner against the executor in the regular course of administration. But in addition to that ordinary mode of compelling payment of his debt or legacy, he is also entitled to enforce his lien upon the land or other specific fund charged with its payment, against the devisee or person deriving title from or under the devisee, by means of a suit in equity. In the very recent case of Brown v. Knapp, 79 N. Y. 136, which was a suit in equity to enforce such a lien in favor of a legatee, the court said: "The executor also contended that his legacy was payable only out of the personal estate, and that there was not sufficient of such estate to pay the two legacies given in the will. It is claimed on the part of the plaintiff that the legacy was charged upon the real estate; and I am of that opinion. It is well settled that when a legacy is given and is directed to be paid by the person to whom real estate is devised, such real estate is charged with the payment of the legacy. And the rule is the same when the legacy is directed to be paid by the executor who is the devisee of real estate [citing many cases]. If the devisee in such case accepts the devise, he becomes personally bound to pay the legacy, and he becomes thus bound even if the land devised to him proves to be less in value than the amount of the legacy. If he desires to escape responsibility, he must refuse to accept the devise. If he does accept, he becomes bound to pay the whole amount of the legacy. which he is directed to pay. The payment of such a legacy can be enforced by a suit in equity against the real estate, or by a commonlaw action directly against the devisee upon the implied promise to pay it,-a promise implied by his acceptance of the devise." It should be remarked, however, in this connection, that every charge does not thus render the devisee personally liable. Where the charge consists, as above stated, in a direction that the devisee shall pay a legacy or debt, his acceptance creates a personal liability.ª But where there is

§ 1244, (a) Williams v. Nichol, 47 Ark. 254, 1 S. W. 243. See, also, Dixon v. Helena Society, (Okl.) 166

Pac. 114; Shired v. Nesbit, 90 S. C. 20, 72 S. E. 545.

§ 1245. What Amounts to a Charge Creating Such a Lien.—Since, according to the settled general doctrine, the personalty is ordinarily the primary fund for the payment of debts, and is the primary and even only fund for the

no such direction, and the land is given simply subject to the payment, or the charge is in any manner made upon the land alone, the devisee assumes no personal liability;^b the remedy of the legatee or creditor, based upon such charge, is confined to his enforcement of the lien upon the land. In enforcing the lien on behalf of a legatee, the English courts will determine whether it should be done by a sale or by a mortgage of the lands.^c As illustrations of the text, see King v. Denison, 1 Ves. & B. 260, 272, 276; Hill v. Bishop of London, 1 Atk. 618, 620; Graves v. Graves, 8 Sim. 43; Bright v. Larcher, 4 De Gex & J. 608; Makings v. Makings, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 355; Richardson v. Morton, L. R. 13 Eq. 123 (legatee held not entitled on the special facts); Pearson v. Helliwell, L. R. 18 Eq. 411; Metcalfe v. Hutchinson, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 591; Hoyt v. Hoyt, 85 N. Y. 142; Finch v. Hull, 24 Hun, 226; Dill v. Wisner, 23 Hun, 123; Ferris v. Van Vechten, 9 Hun, 12; Loder v. Hatfield, 4 Hun, 36; Horning v. Wiederspalen, 28 N. J. Eq. 387; Grode v. Van Valen, 25 N. J. Eq. 95; Gardenville etc. Ass'n v. Walker, 52 Md. 452; Siron v. Ruleman's Ex'r, 32 Gratt. 215; Burch v. Burch, 52 Ind. 136; Rhoades v. Rhoades, 88 Ill. 139. And the lien may be enforced not only against the devisee, but also against his grantees, mortgagees, etc.: Perkins v. Emory, 55 Md. 27; Donnelly v. Edelen, 40 Md. 117 (against purchaser of the land at an execution sale); Blauvelt v. Van Winkle, 29 N. J. Eq. 111;^d and a record of the will and probate is notice to such grantee: Wilson v. Piper, 77 Ind. 437.e Where a legacy was charged upon a fund of personal property bequeathed to testator's widow, the decree held her personally liable for its payment, and as a security for its payment sequestered the rents and profits of her lands: Talbot v. Rountree, 3 Ill. App. 275. The

§ 1244, (b) The text is cited to this effect in Clift v. Moses, 116 N. Y. 144, 22 N. E. 393.

§ 1244, (c) See, as to this discretionary jurisdiction, Hambro v. Hambro, [1894] 2 Ch. 565; In re Tucker, [1893] 2 Ch. 323.

§ 1244, (d) Nudd v. Powers, 136 Mass. 273; Low v. Ramsey, 135 Ky. 333, 135 Am. St. Rep. 459, 122 S. W. 167; if sold in parcels, these are subject in the inverse order of alienation: Scott v. Patchin, 54 Vt. 253; Lovejoy v. Raymond, 58 Vt. 509, 2 Atl. 156; Mallery v. Facer, 181 N. Y. 567, 74 N. E. 487. See ante, § 1224.

§ 1244, (e) Scott v. Pattison, 54 Vt. 253; Lovejoy v. Raymond, 58 Vt. 509, 2 Atl. 156. See, also, Low v. Ramsey, 135 Ky. 333, 135 Am. St. Rep. 459, 122 S. W. 167. payment of legacies as between the legatees and the **de**visees, it follows that an intention on the part of the testator to change this natural order by a charge upon lands devised, which should render them primarily or even ratably liable for the payment of all or of any particular debts or legacies, must clearly appear, either from the express language of the will or by fair and necessary implication from the various dispositions made by the testator.^{1 a} A charge of debts or legacies upon lands devised may be either express or implied.

§ 1246. The Same. Express Charge.—A testator may in express terms charge the payment of all his debts, or any individual debt, and all his legacies, or any of them, either upon the lands devised by a residuary clause, or upon any particular lot or parcel of land specifically devised, and the charge may be upon the *corpus* of the land, or upon the rents and profits alone. The same is true of an express charge upon any particular fund of personal property bequeathed, or upon the residue given to the residuary legatee. What language will amount to an express charge must always be a matter of construction and interpretation, depending upon the terms employed in reach individual

remedy of the legatee may be defeated by his laches in enforcing the lien,—here a delay of fifty-three years after the testator's death: Smiley v. Jones, 3 Tenn. Ch. 312. As to the distinction between a gift in trust to pay debts or legacies, and a gift merely subject to or charged with such payment, see ante, § 1033, note. Such charge is not a trust: Dill v. Wisner, 88 N. Y. 153, 158; In re Fox, 52 N. Y. 530, 536, 537, 11 Am. Rep. 751.^f

§ 1245, ¹ Hoyt v. Hoyt, 85 N. Y. 142; Taylor v. Dodd, 58 N. Y. 335; Owens v. Claytor, 56 Md. 129; Steele v. Steele's Adm'r, 64 Ala. 438, 38 Am. Rep. 15; Taylor v. Harwell, 65 Ala. 1; Heslop v. Gatton, 71 Ill. 528; Kirkpatrick v. Chesnut, 5 S. C. 216.

 § 1244, (f) Merchants' Nat. Bank
 § 1245, (a) See, also, Matter of

 v. Crist, 140 Iowa, 308, 132 Am. St.
 Powers, 124 N. Y. 361, 26 N. E. 940;

 Rep. 267, 23 L. B. A. (N. S.) 526.
 Clift v. Moses, 116 N. Y. 144, 22 N.

 118 N. W. 394 (direction for support).
 E. 393; Arnold v. Dean, 61 Tex. 249.

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case. Some examples of express charges are given in the foot-note.¹

§ 1246, 1 The express charges here referred to all arise independently of the nature and form of the general dispositions of his property made by the testator. The charge may be in the most positive and certain terms; as, "I hereby direct that the debt due to A, or the legacy given to A, shall be a charge upon the land herein devised to B"; or "the land herein devised to B is subject to or charged with the payment of the debt-or the legacy-to A," and the like; or "I direct that the payment of all my debts-or of all the legacies herein given-be charged upon the real estate devised by my will," etc. Again, an express charge may be personal. If testator devises a parcel of land to A, and then directs that A shall pay a certain debt due to B, or a certain legacy given to B, or uses language of like import, the land devised to A is not only charged with the payment, but the devisee himself, by accepting the gift, becomes personally liable therefor to the creditor, or legatee, B:^a Brown v. Knapp, 79 N. Y. 136, 143; Dodge v. Manning, 1 N. Y. 298; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 16 N. Y. 257; Gridley v. Gridley, 24 N. Y. 130; McLachlan v. McLachlan, 9 Paige, 534; Harris v. Fly, 7 Paige, 421; Mensch v. Mensch, 2 Lans. 235; Wood v. Wood, 26 Barb. 356; Olmstead v. Brush, 27 Conn. 530. It should be observed, however, in this connection, that the courts of several states virtually require every charge upon land devised to be express, and hold that a direction to a devisee, A, that he shall pay a certain legacy or debt does not, without further language of the testator showing such an intention, create a charge on the land devised to A: See Cable's Appeal, 91 Pa. St. 327; Owens v. Claytor, 56 Md. 129.^b On the other hand, a mere charge on the land devised, or devise of the land merely subject to or charged with a debt or legacy, does not create a personal liability upon the devisee,---that is, a liability beyond the value of the land in his hands." The following are examples of express charges found in recent decisions: In re Cooper's Trusts, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 757; Kempe v. Kempe, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 346; Makings v. Makings, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 355; Maskell v. Farrington, 3 De Gex, J. & S. 338, (a general charge of all debts and all legacies upon the whole of testator's real estate charges the legacies upon lands specifically devised); Phillips v. Gutteridge, 3 De Gex, J. & S. 332 (a legacy charged upon

§ 1246, (a) Couch v. Eastham, 29 W. Va. 784, 3 S. E. 23, citing the text. See, also, Dixon v. Helena Society, (Okl.) 166 Pac. 114; Shired v. Nesbit, 90 S. C. 20, 72, S. E. 545. § 1246, (b) Penny's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 323. In Virginia, the realty must be expressly charged: Allen v. Patton, 83 Va. 255, 2 S. E. 143.

§ 1246, (c) Clift v. Moses, 116 N. Y. 144, 22 N. E. 393. § 1247. The Same. Implied Charge.—The intention of a testator to charge debts and legacies upon the real estate devised may also be implied from the general dispositions of the will,—from the mode in which the real and the per-

rents and profits is charged upon the corpus); Earl of Portarlington v. Damer, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 161; Brook v. Badley, L. R. 4 Eq. 106; 3 Ch. 672 (a legacy thus charged is an interest in land); In re Hill's Trusts, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 173 (same); Mannox v. Greener, L. R. 14 Eq. 456; Taylor v. Taylor, L. R. 17 Eq. 324 (on rents and profits, not on the corpus);^d Birch v. Sherratt, L. R. 2 Ch. 644; Kermode v. Macdonald, L. R. 3 Ch. 584; Metcalfe v. Hutchinson, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 591 (charge on rents and profits is prima facie a charge on the corpus); a testatrix devised to each of her three daughters one third of her estate, "provided there shall be set apart from her share" a certain legacy to each of her children payable when such children reached the age of twentyone; held, that these legacies to the grandchildren were charged respectively on each parent's share: Frampton v. Blume, 129 Mass. 152; a farm being devised to testator's son "upon condition that he shall keep, provide for, and support" the testator's widow, the land is thereby charged in hands of the devisee and of his grantee: Gardenville etc. Ass'n v. Walker, 52 Md. 452; Donnelly v. Edelen, 40 Md. 117;e lands devised subject to testator's debts, his widow's allowance, and the rebuilding of certain houses on vacant lots, creates a charge: Caruthers v. McNeill, 97 Ill. 256; a bequest of the use of a certain room in a house devised to another creates a charge on the devise: Ogle v. Tayloe, 49 Md. 158; a devise of land, and then a direction to the devisee to pay a certain legacy bequeathed to another, creates a charge on the land so devised: Ogle v. Tayloe, supra; Horning v. Wiederspalen, 28 N. J. Eq. 387; Merrill v. Bickford, 65 Me. 118; Wilson v. Piper, 77 Ind. 437; Markillie v. Ragland, 77 Ill. 98;¹ per contra, such a direction does not constitute a charge:^s Kirkpatrick v. Chesnut, 5 S. C. 216;

§ 1246, (d) Irwin v. Wollpert, 128 Ill. 527, 21 N. E. 501 (same); but Taylor v. Taylor was doubted in In re Tucker, [1893] 2 Ch. 323, where the annuity was charged on the corpus. See, also Stroh v. O'Hearn, 176 Mich. 164, 142 N. W. 865 (charge on "proceeds" of land held a charge on corpus).

§ 1246, (e) See, also, Bank of Florence v. Gregg, 46 S. C. 169, 24 S. E. 64. Devise upon condition that the devisee pay an annuity to a certain church creates a charge upon the land: Merritt v. Bucknam, 78 Me. 504, 7 Atl. 383, citing the author's note.

§ 1246, (1) Dudgeon v. Dudgeon, 87 Mo. 218; Yearly v. Long, 40 Ohio St. 27.

§ 1246, (5) Canal Bank v. Hudson, 111 U. S. 66, 28 L. Ed. 354, 4 Sup. Ct. 303. See, also, Low v. Ramsey, 135 Ky. 333, 135 Am. St. sonal property are donated. The English and the American decisions all recognize this fact, but they are not all agreed upon the effects produced by particular dispositions. In England, a number of general rules on this subject have been definitely settled as a part of the law concerning property.¹ These rules are based upon three

Cable's Appeal, 91 Pa. St. 327; Owens v. Claytor, 56 Md. 129. See, also, Talbot v. Rountree, 3 Ill. App. 275; Bayless v. Bayless, 6 Baxt. 324; Hoyt v. Hoyt, 85 N. Y. 142; Dill v. Wisner, 23 Hun, 123; Perkins v. Emory, 55 Md. 27; Siron v. Ruleman's Ex'r, 32 Gratt. 215; Harkins v. Hughes, 60 Ala. 316; Burch v. Burch, 52 Ind. 136.

§ 1247, ¹ The following is a brief summary of the most important of these rules. In general, the same rules apply alike to charges of debts and of legacies: Wheeler v. Howell, 3 Kay & J. 198.

1. Where a testator directs, in terms however general, that his debts or legacies shall be paid, not saying by his executors, and afterwards devises his real estate, the devisees take the land devised charged with the payment; and it is not necessary that the direction to pay should be accompanied with such words as "in the first place," "imprimis," and the like, although in some of the early cases they were treated as important: Shalleross v. Finden, 3 Ves. 738; Graves v. Graves, 8 Sim. 43, 55; Cook v. Dawson, 29 Beav. 123; Harris v. Watkins, Kay, 438, 447; Harding v. Grady, 1 Dru. & War. 430; Ronalds v. Feltham, Turn. & R. 418; Douce v. Lady Torrington, 2 Mylne & K. 600; Taylor v. Taylor, 6 Sim. 246; Jones v. Williams, 1 Coll. C. C. 156; Coxe v. Basset, 3 Ves. 155.

2. The same result follows when *executors* are directed to pay the debts or legacies, and real estate is devised to them, either personally or as executors; in either case the land so devised is charged: Henvell v. Whitaker, 3 Russ. 343; Cross v. Kennington, 9 Beav. 150; Gallimore v. Gill, 2 Smale & G. 158; 8 De Gex, M. & G. 567; Preston v. Preston, 2 Jur., N. S., 1040; Dormay v. Borradaile, 10 Beav. 263; Hartland v. Murrell, 27 Beav. 204; In re Tanqueray-Willaume, L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 465; In re Bailey, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 268; Parker v. Fearnley, 2 Sim. & St. 592, *contra*, is overruled. But a devise to only one of two or more executors does not operate to charge his estate: Warren v. Davies, 2 Mylne & K. 49; unless the devise to him is expressly *subject* to the debts: Dowling v. Hudson, 17 Beav. 248.

Rep. 459, 122 S. W. 167 (gift Estate, 226 Pa. St. 9, 74 Atl. 611; to son "with the understanding Greene v. Rathbun, 32 R. I. 145, 78 he shall take and raise my children N. and J. until they are fifteen years old"); In re Gingrich's of widow). main considerations or motives of interpretation: 1. That a gift of personal property, in terms, *after* the payment of debts or legacies indicates that the debts or legacies are to be paid out of the real as well as the personal estate;

3. But where executors are simply directed to pay debts or legacies, and no real estate is devised to them, the lands devised to others are not charged, since it is always the duty of the executors to pay debts and legacics out of the personalty: Powell v. Robins, 7 Ves. 209; Willan v. Lancaster, 3 Russ. 108.

4. Where legacies are given generally, and this is followed by a residuary devise of the rest or residue of the real and personal property as one mass, the legacies are charged upon this residue of the real as well as the personal estate:^a Cole v. Turner, 4 Russ. 376; Greville v. Browne, 7 H. L. Cas. 689; Wheeler v. Howell, 3 Kay & J. 198; Gyett v. Williams, 2 Johns. & H. 429; In re Bellis's Trusts, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 504; Bray v. Stevens, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 162; In re Brooke, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 630. Such a general charge, however, of legacies on the residue of real and personal property does not charge property which is *specifically* devised or hequeathed: Castle v. Gillett, L. R. 16 Eq. 530; Spong v. Spong, 3 Bligh, N. S., 84; Conron v. Conron, 7 H. L. Cas. 168; but it is otherwise when *both debts and legacies* are thus charged: Maskell v. Farrington, 8 Jur., N. S., 1198; 3 De Gex, J. & S. 338.

5. Where legacies are generally given, and this is followed by a direction to convert the real estate, and that its proceeds shall be deemed a part of the residuary personal estate, the legacies are thereby charged on the entire fund, notwithstanding the residue may be specifically bequeathed: Field v. Peckett, 29 Beav. 568.

6. A devise of real estate, followed by a bequest of personal estate after payment of debts, operates to charge the debts on the real as well as the personal property: b Withers v. Kennedy, 2 Mylne & K. 607; Soames v.

§ 1247, (a) "Mixed Residue" Rule. See In re Balls (Trewby v. Balls), [1909] 1 Ch. 791. The rule applies words "rest" or although the "residue" are not used: In re Bawden, [1894] 1 Ch. 693 ("all the real and personal estate not otherwise disposed of"; explaining Gainsford v. Dunn, L. R. 17 Eq. 405, 408 (Jessel, M. R.), and following Hassel v. Hassel, 2 Dick. 527. But the legaeies are payable primarily out of the personalty, unless \mathbf{the} testator directs that they are to be paid out

of the mixed fund, in which ease they are payable ratably out of realty and personalty: Elliott v. Dearsle, 16 Ch. Div. 322; In re Boards, [1895] 1 Ch. 499, overruling *dictum* of Jessel, M. R., in Gainsford v. Dunn, L. R. 17 Eq. 405, to the effect that without such direction the legacies are payable ratably out of personalty and realty.

§ 1247, (b) The author's note is quoted in full and approved in Hutchinson v. Gilbert, 86 Tenn. 464, 7 S. W. 126.

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2. That a direction in any form to a devisee to pay debts or legacies indicates an intention that the payment must or may be made out of the real estate devised to him; and 3. That a gift of legacies or a direction to pay debts, followed by a gift of the residue of the real and personal estate, indicates an intention that the former are to be paid out of the testator's real as well as his personal estate, since otherwise there could not be any residue of the real estate.^c These general canons of interpretation, and the several rules based upon them, as formulated in the footnote, have not been fully adopted and acted upon by the courts of the American states.² The doctrine that a de-

Robinson, 1 Mylne & K. 500; Shakels v. Richardson, 2 Coll. C. C. 31; and see Jones v. Price, 11 Sim. 557; Bright v. Lareher, 3 De Gex & J. 148; and see 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 369–372, note to Silk v. Prime.

§ 1247, ² The very recent case of Hoyt v. Hoyt, 85 N. Y. 142, 146, 149, discloses so clearly the condition of the American law, and indicates so plainly the points of difference between it and the English rules, that I shall quote some passages from the opinion of Folger, C. J. He says (p. 146): "There is no express direction in this will that these legacies shall be charged upon the real estate. Yet legacies may be charged upon real estate without express direction in the will, if the intention of the testator so to do can be fairly gathered from all the provisions of the will; and extraneous circumstances may be considered in aid of the terms of the will. The will, in this case, is lean of the clauses and expressions that have been mainly rested upon in the earlier adjudications of this state as showing that intention. It does not direct the legacies to 'be first paid,' and then devise the real estate; it does not devise the real estate, nor the remainder of the real and personal estate, 'after the payment of the legacies'; it does not devise the real estate to a person in his own right, or as executor, and expressly direct him to pay the legacies; it does not make a residuary devise of 'all not herein otherwise disposed of.' These several forms of expressions have been held to indicate an intention in the testator to charge the payment of the legacies upon the real estate devised. None of them are here." The same judge further said (p. 149): "It is a rule in England that if legacies are given generally, and the residue of the real and personal estate is afterwards given in one mass, the legacies are a charge on the residuary real as well as the personal estate [citing English cases

§ 1247, (c) The text is quoted in Seegabarth, 98 Neb. 272, 152 N. W.
Hutchinson v. G'lbert, 86 Tenn. 464, 385.
7 S. W. 126, and cited in Klug v.

vise to the executors or to third persons, accompanied by a direction to pay debts or legacies, and that a devise, sub-

quoted in the last note]. Such is the rule in some of the states of the Union, and in the United States supreme court [citing several cases quoted subsequently in this note]. We were urged to adopt this rule in deciding Bevan v. Cooper, 72 N. Y. 317; but while we did not undertake to question the soundness of the reasoning in the decisions there cited, we had in mind the remarks of the chancellor in Lupton v. Lupton, 2 Johns. Ch. 614, 623, and of Potter, J., in Myers v. Eddy, 47 Barb. 263; and as we could dispose of the case then without adopting or rejecting the rule, we did neither. Nor is it needed in the case at hand that we adopt the close rule above given, or question the correctness of Lupton v. Lupton and Myers v. Eddy. As we understand them, they assert that, unaided and alone, the words which make up the usual residuary clause of a will are not enough to evince an intention in the testator to charge a general legacy upon real estate." I would remark that, so far as I am aware, no case holds that the words of a residuary clause, unaided and alone, can, of themselves, produce such an effect. The rule, as settled by English decisions, is certainly very different.

The following collection of American cases, mostly recent, will furnish a *general* view of the condition of the law on this subject in the various states; but still, for a perfectly accurate notion, the decisions of each state must be separately examined.

1. The English rules, that a devise, either to the executors or to third persons, accompanied by a direction to pay debts or legacies, creates a charge upon the lands devised, and that a devise "after payment of" debts or legacies, or with the debts or legacies "to be first paid," and the like, also creates a charge, have been generally adopted by the courts of this country. Many cases illustrating these conclusions have already been cited in the foregoing notes under § 1247. See, also, Chapin v. Waters, 116 Mass. 140; Lapham v. Clapp, 10 R. I. 543; Hoyt v. Hoyt, supra; Guelich v. Clark, 3 Thomp. & C. 315; Corwine v. Corwine, 24 N. J. Eq. 579; 23 N. J. Eq. 368; Bynum v. Hill, 71 N. C. 319; Finch v. Hull, 24 Hun, 226; Stoddard v. Johnson, 13 Hun, 606; Smith v. Fellows, 131 Mass. 20 (after payment of legacies, etc.); O'Donnell v. Barbey, 129 Mass. 453 (same);d Hill v. Jones, 65 Ala. 214; Ogle v. Tayloe, 49 Md. 158 (devisee directed to pay a legacy); Turner v. Turner, 57 Miss. 775 (same); Merrill v. Bickford, 65 Me. 118 (same); Tuohy v. Martin, 2 McAr. 572 (after payment, etc.); but per contra, in Alabama, a devise after payment of debts does not create a charge: Starke v. Wilson, 65 Ala. 576.e

§ 1247, (d) Pond v. Allen, 15 B. I.
 § 1247, (e) See, also, Thayer v.
 171, 2 Atl. 302.
 Finnegan, 134 Mass. 62, 45 Am. Rep.

stantially, in terms, "after payment of debts or legacies," indicate an intention of the testator to charge the lands so

2. Gift of the residue of real and personal estate. The English doctrine as to the effect of a gift of the residue of real and personal property in one mass, after general legacies, is the one which the American courts have been most reluctant to adopt, and in respect of which there is the greatest diversity of opinion among their decisions. In New York the court of last resort has neither accepted nor rejected the English rule, while the decisions of lower courts-the supreme court and the court of chancery—are directly conflicting. The doctrine thus far settled hy weight of authority in New York is as follows: When legacies are given generally, and the residue of the real and personal estate is afterwards devised in one mass, and it appears from other provisions on the face of the will that the testator must have contemplated, from the known condition of his property, that the personal estate would not be sufficient to pay his legacies, and that they could not be paid without resorting to the real estate embraced within the terms of the residuary clause, then an intention on his part will be implied that the legacies shall be payable out of such real estate as well as out of the personalty; or in other words, the residue of the real estate will be charged with their payment. In Hoyt v. Hoyt, above quoted, Folger, C. J., said (p. 147): "It is assumed that no man, in making a final disposition of his estate, will make a legacy, save with the honest, sober-minded intention that it shall he paid. Hence when, from the provisions of a will prior to the gift of legacies, it is seen that the testator must have known that he had already so far disposed of his personal estate as that there would not be enough left to pay the legacies, it is reasoned that the bare fact of giving a legacy indicates an intention that it shall be met from real estate. So it was reasoned in Goddard v. Pomeroy. Courts have been urged to go a step further, and say, when the facts of the estate, aliunde the will, show that the testator must have known that if a legacy was to be paid only from personal estate it would he a barren gift, he must have intended to subject the real estate to a liability for it. We were so urged in Bevan v. Cooper, but could not yield to it": Bevan v. Cooper, 72 N. Y. 317; Le Fevre v. Toole, 84 N. Y. 95; Kalbfleisch v. Kalbfleisch, 67 N. Y. 354; Taylor v. Dodd, 58 N. Y. 335; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 16 N. Y. 257; Lupton v. Lupton, 2 Johns. Ch. 614; Myers v. Eddy, 47 Barb. 263; Shulters v. Johnson, 38 Barb. 80; Goddard v. Pomeroy, 36 Barb. 546, 556; Finch v. Hull, 24 Hun, 226; Stoddard v. Johnson, 13 Hun, 606;¹ but in the following cases the supreme court seems 285 (devise to executor); Cram v.

235 (devise to executor); Gram V. Cram, 63 N. H. 35 (same); but see Cunningham v. Parker, 146 N. Y. 29, 48 Am. St. Rep. 765, 40 N. E. 635. III-188 § 1247, (f) Scott v. Stebbins, 91 N. Y. 605; McCorn v. McCorn, 100 N. Y. 511, 3 N. E. 480. See, also, Brill v. Wright, 112 N. Y. 129, 8 rather to have followed the English rule without limitation: Forster v. Civill, 20 Hun, 282; Hall v. Thompson, 23 Hun, 334; Ragan v. Allen, 7 Hun, 537; Buckley v. Buckley, 11 Barb. 43, 77. The conclusions maintained as above by the New York court of appeals have been substantially adopted in Connecticut: Canfield v. Bostwick, 21 Conn. 550; Gridley v. Andrews, 8 Conn. 1.^g In New Jersey, a series of cases finds the intent to charge legacies upon the real estate given with the personal in one mass by the residuary clause from facts and circumstances outside of the provisions of the will, from the fact that the legacies are given to children, that the personal property is actually insufficient, and the like: Van Winkle v. Van Houten, 3 N. J. Eq. 172, 187; Leigh v. Savidge, 14 N. J. Eq. 124; Dev v. Dev's Adm'r, 19 N. J. Eq. 137; Corwine v. Corwine's Ex'rs, 23 N. J. Eq. 368; Massaker v. Massaker, 13 N. J. Eq. 264. But in the later case of Corwine v. Corwine, 24 N. J. Eq. 579, the English rule seems rather to have been followed.^h In Johnson v. Poulson, 32 N. J. Eq. 390, the testator gave legacies to his three daughters, and then devised to his sons "all the rest and residue of my property, suhject, nevertheless, to certain payments to be made by them hereinafter mentioned," and finally gave an annuity and another legacy. Held, that these latter dispositions showed an intent that the first legacies to the three daughters were not to be charged upon the residue.

In the United States supreme court and in several of the states, the English rule as to legacies being charged on the residuary real estate is adopted without modification:¹ Lewis v. Darling, 16 How. 1; Hays v. Jack-

Am. St. Rep. 717, 19 N E. 628; Briggs v. Carroll, 117 N. Y. 288, 22 N. E. 1054; Irwin v. Teller, 188 N. Y. 25, 80 N. E. 376.

§ 1247, (g) See, also, White v. Kaufmann, 66 Md. 89, 5 Atl. 865. For the rule in Virginia, see Armentrout v. Armentrout's Legatees, 111 Va. 348, 69 S. E. 333 (residue "of my personal estate and real estate" shows the testator expected there would be a residue of personal estate, hence no charge).

§ 1247, (h) See, also, Vernon v. Mabbett, (N. J. Eq.) 58 Atl. 298; Paterson General Hospital Ass'n v. Blauvelt, 72 N. J. Eq. 725, 66 Atl. 1055; Tyler v. Tallman, 29 R. I. 57, 68 Atl. 948.

(i) "Mixed Residue": § 1247, English Rule Followed .- See, also, Atmore v. Walker, 46 Fed. 429; Lewis v. Ford, 67 Ala. 143; Ferris v. Ferris, (Del. Ch.) 98 Atl. 215; Simonsen v. Hutchinson, 231 Ill. 508, 83 N. E. 183; Lacey v. Collins, 134 Iowa, 583, 112 N. W. 101 (though legacy is by codicil); Lafferty v. People's Savings Bank, 76 Mich. 35, 43 N. W. 34; Fecht v. Henze, 162 Mich. 52, 127 N. W. 26; Heatherington v. Lewenberg, 61 Miss. 372; Klug v. Seegabarth, 98 Neb. 272, 152 N. W. 385, citing the ception in a few of the states.^k Our courts have shown a much greater reluctance to adopt the English doctrine con-

son, 6 Mass. 149; Adams v. Brackett, 5 Met. 280, 282; Wilcox v. Wilcox, 13 Allen, 252; Smith y. Fellows, 131 Mass. 20; Gallagher's Appeal, 48 Pa. St. 121; Becker v. Kehr, 49 Pa. St. 223; McGlaughlin v. McGlaughlin, 24 Pa. St. 20; Davis's Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 348; Wertz's Appeal, 69 Pa. St. 173; Brishen's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 405; Robinson v. McIver, 63 N. C. 645, 649; Hart v. Williams, 77 N. C. 426; Moore v. Beckwith's Ex'r, 14 Ohio I St. 129, 135; Clyde v. Simpson, 4 Ohio St. 445, 459; Knotts v. Bailey, 54 Miss. 235, 28 Am. Rep. 348; Lapham v. Clapp, 10 °R. I. 543; Derby v. Derby, 4 R. I. 414, 431; Corwine v. Corwine, 24 N. J. Eq. 579; and see Hall v. Thompson, 23 Hun, 334; Forster v. Civill, 20 Hun, 282; Ragan v. Allen, 7 Hun, 537; Buckley v. Buckley, 11 Barb. 43, 77.

In the following cases no charge, it was held, is created: A will contained a general direction for paying debts; an equal share of the whole estate was given to each child; and a codicil gave pecuniary legacies, directing them to be paid without delay; the land held not charged with the legacies: Power v. Davis, 3 McAr. 153. In Alabama a power to sell lands for payment of debts contained in the will does not create a charge on the lands; the court leans strongly against an interpretation which would create a charge of either debts or legacies; the general rules of charges by implication do not seem to be followed: Steele v. Steele's Adm'r, 64 Ala. 438, 38 Am. Rep. 15; Taylor v. Harwell, 65 Ala. 1. Even a devise or bequest "after payment of debts" does not charge the debts: Starke v. Wilson, 65 Ala. 576. A will, "after all my debts are paid," gave the widow her support from the home farm, then several pecuniary legacies, then a specific tract of land to one son, A., then to another son, F., "all the residue of my lands in T. and U. counties," and finally divided the residue of the personal estate among all the children, and appointed F. executor; held, that the legacies were not charged on any of the lands

text; Cook v. Petty, 108 Pa. St. 138; Sloan's Appeal, 168 Pa. St. 422,⁴ 47 Am. St. Rep. 889, 32 Atl. 42; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 27 R. I. 520, 63 Atl. 804; Jaudon v. Ducker, 27 S. C. 295, 3 S. E. 465; Hutchinson v. Gilbert, 86 Tenn. 464, 7 S. W. 126, quoting this paragraph of the text; Thomas v. Rector, 23 W. Va. 26; Bird v. Stout, 40 W. Va. 43, 20 S. E. 852:

§ 1247, (J) See, also, Newsom v. Thornton, 82 Ala. 402, 60 Am. Rep. 743, 8 South. 261. Charge by implication not recognized in Virginia: Allen v. Patton, 83 Va. 255, 2 S. E. 143.

§ 1247, (k) The text is cited to this effect in Worley v. Taylor, 21 Or. 589, 28 Am. St. Rep. 771, 28 Pac. 903. See, also, Roll v. Roll, 68 N. J. Eq. 227, 59 Atl. 296 (devise to executors charged with legacies directed to be paid); Haldeman v. Openheimer, 103 Tex. 275, 126 S. W. 566 (same). cerning the effect of a gift of the residue of the real and personal property in one mass, made after a bequest of general legacies. By the United States courts, and by the courts of several states, the doctrine has been fully accepted. In certain states it has been directly rejected; while in still another group a modification of it has been suggested, according to which the question in each particular case depends upon the testator's whole property, as indicated by other clauses of his will, or as actually shown by extrinsic evidence of circumstances outside of the will.

§ 1248. Observations upon the American Rules. — In concluding the foregoing survey of this important subject, I would venture to express the conviction that the unwillingness of American judges to accept and apply these English doctrines seems to be remarkable and even inexplicable. The rules as established by the English equity, when carried out to their fullest extent, completely accord with the fundamental conceptions of our American jurisprudence concerning real property, with all the tendencies of our modern state legislation, and with the sentiments of our people in regard to landed ownership. The tendency of our legislation, the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence, and the sentiments of our landed proprietorship, all agree in breaking down the superiority of real over

devised, and that the appointment of F. as executor did not operate to charge the lands devised to him: Read v. Cather's Adm'rs, 18 W. Va. 263 (this case seems to conflict with the general course of authorities). No charge of the legacy results from a simple devise of real estate after the gift of a general legacy, without other language indicating such an intent: Chase v. Davis, 65 Me. 102. A will directed that the debts should be paid by the executors, and then gave to testator's two sons all the real estate in equal moieties, "and also my personal estate, after paying the legacies hereinafter mentioned," and finally gave certain legacies; these legacies were not charged upon the real estate: Gilder v. Gilder, 1 Del. Ch. 331.

The rule is settled that if a charge on lands depends upon some contingency which fails, the charge thereby sinks for the benefit of whoever may be entitled to the principal estate; that is, such person takes the estate free from the charge: Whitehead v. Thompson, 79 N. C. 450. personal property, and in establishing the ownership of both upon a perfect equality. That English courts should formulate rules in such direct opposition to the feudal dogmas, and to the supremacy of land ownership, is perhaps remarkable; but it is certainly more strange that any American courts should refuse to adopt these rules which so fully express the conceptions and tendencies of our national civilization.

SECTION V.

THE GRANTOR'S LIEN ON CONVEYANCE.

ANALYSIS,

- §§ 1249-1254. The ordinary grantor's lien for unpaid purchase price.
 - \$1249. General doctrine; in what states adopted or rejected; states elassified in foot-notes.
 - § 1250. Origin and rationale; Ahrend v. Odiorne discussed.
 - § 1251. Requisites, extent, and effects of this lien; great uncertainty and conflict in the results of judicial opinion.
 - § 1252. How discharged or waived; effect of taking other security, etc.
 - § 1253. Against whom the lien avails.
 - § 1254. In favor of whom the lien avails; whether or not assignable.
- §§ 1255-1259. Grantor's lien by reservation.
 - § 1255. General description.
 - § 1256. What creates a lien by reservation.
 - § 1257. Essential nature of the lien.
 - § 1258. Its operation and effect.
 - § 1259. The grantor's dealing with this lien; waiver; assignment.

§ 1249. General Doctrine.—In What States Adopted or Rejected.—Although the grantor's and the vendor's lien are ordinarily treated of together by one and the same description and discussion, yet they are essentially different, producing different consequences, and governed in many important and practical respects by different rules. By presenting them separately, more accuracy and certainty will result, and much unnecessary confusion will, I think, be avoided.¹ It is a firmly established doctrine of the

§ 1249, 1 The grantor's lien is purely equitable, exists only in the equitable jurisprudence, and is exclusively of equitable cognizance, the entire

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English equity, that the grantor of land, who has sold and conveyed and delivered possession to the grantee, as well as the vendor in a contract for the sale and purchase of land who has delivered possession to his vendee, retains an equitable lien upon the land for the unpaid purchasemoney, although he has taken no distinct agreement or separate security for it, and even though the deed recites that the consideration has been fully paid.² a The grantor's

legal estate with the possession being vested in the grantee. The vendor's lien, on the other hand, is accompanied by the legal title and estate. Although in equity the vendee acquires the equitable estate, and the vendor is said to have a lien thereon, still the legal estate and title are remaining in the vendor, and the vendee's estate is only equitable. Here is, at the outset, a fundamental difference between the position of the grantor and that of the vendor. This distinction runs through all the relations between these parties and third persons acquiring interest in or claims on the land. The method of regarding the two liens as one and the same has produced much unnecessary confusion and apparent conflict of decision.

§ 1249, ² Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 447; Blackburn v. Gregson, 1 Brown Ch. 420; Smith v. Hibbard, 2 Dick. 730; Chapman v. Tanner, 1 Vern. 267; Austen v. Halsey, 6 Ves. 475; Smith v. Evans, 28 Beav. 59; Rose v. Watson, 10 H. L. Cas. 672. In the leading case of Mackreth v. Symmons, *supra*, Lord Eldon thus states the doctrine in his own peculiar dialect: "The settled doctrine is, that where the vendor conveys, without more, though the consideration is upon the face of the instrument expressed to be paid, and by a receipt indorsed upon the back, if it is the simple case of a conveyance, the money or part of it not being paid, as between the vendor and vendee and persons claiming as volunteers, upon the doctrine of this court, which, when it is settled, has the effect of contract, though perhaps no actual contract has taken place, a lien shall prevail; in the one case for the whole con-

§ 1249, (a) This portion of the text is quoted in Brisco v. Minah Consol. Min. Co., 82 Fed. 952. This section is cited in Hammond v. Peyton, 34 Minn. 529, 27 N. W. 72; First Nat. Bank v. Salem C. F. M. Co., 39 Fed. 89; Gee v. McMillan, 14 Or. 268, 58 Am. Bep. 315, 12 Pac. 417; Hooper v. Central Trust Co., 81 Md. 559, 29 L. B. A. 262, 32 Atl. 505; Maroney v. Boyle, 141 N. Y. 462, 38 Am. St. Rep. 821, 36 N. E. 511; cited, also, in Schneider v. Martens, 127 Md. 547, 96 Atl. 673 (although deed recites payment of consideration). Sections 1249 et seq. are cited in McKinnon v. Johnson, 54 Fla. 538, 45 South. 451; Larscheid v. Kittell (Larscheid v. Hashek Mfg. Co.), 142 Wis. 172, 20 Ann. Cas. 576, 125 N. W. 442.

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lien exists in the following states and territories: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Dakota, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin.³

sideration, in the other for that part of the money which was not paid." As to the vendor's lien on a sale of chattels, see Coman v. Lakey, 80 N. Y. 345, 350, 351.^b

§ 1249, ³ Alabama: Haley v. Bennett, 5 Port. 452; Roper v. McCook, 7 Ala. 318; Burns v. Taylor, 23 Ala. 255; Bradford v. Harper, 25 Ala. 337; Griffin v. Camack, 36 Ala. 695, 76 Am. Dec. 344; Dennis v. Williams, 40 Ala. 633; Wood v. Sullens, 44 Ala. 686; Gordon v. Bell, 50 Ala. 213; Flinn v. Barber, 61 Ala. 530; Terry v. Keaton, 58 Ala. 667; Dugger v. Tayloe, 60 Ala. 504; Bryant v. Stephens, 58 Ala. 636; Moore v. Worthy, 56 Ala. 163; Simpson v. McAllister, 56 Ala. 228; Bizzell v. Nix, 60 Ala. 281, 31 Am. Rep. 38; Bankhead v. Owen, 60 Ala. 457; Thames v. Caldwell, 60 Ala. 644; Pylant v. Reeves, 53 Ala. 132, 25 Am. Rep. 605; Barnett v. Riser's Ex'rs, 63 Ala. 347; Thurman v. Stoddard, 63 Ala. 336; Chapman v. Lee, 64 Ala. 483; Burgess v. Greene, 64 Ala. 509; Shorter v. Frazer, 64 Ala. 74; Carver v. Eads, 65 Ala. 190; Walker v. Carroll, 65 Ala. 61.°

§ 1249, (b) Vendor's Lien on Sale of Personal Estate .-- See Dunn v. Hastings, 54 N. J. Eq. 503, 34 Atl. 256, per Pitney, V. C.: "The doctrine of vendor's lien, as far as I can find, has never been extended to personal chattels beyond the exercise of the right of stoppage in transitu. The suggestions to the contrary by Prof. Pomeroy (3 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 1249 et seq.) rest upon cases where the original contract of sale provided for a lien for a portion of the and the formal purchase-money means adopted for insuring it were defective. Coman v. Lakey, 80 N. Y. 345; Amerman v. Wiles, 24 N. J. Eq. 13." Modern English cases, distinctly recognize however, a vendor's equitable lien on the sale of personal estate: In re Stucley (Stucley v. Kekewich), [1906] 1 Ch. 67. To what classes of personal estate the lien applies is not defined; *dicta* by two of the judges would limit it to cases where the personal property is of such a nature as to be a proper subjectmatter of a suit for specific performance. The note to this case in 3 B. R. C. confuses this lien with the vendor's common-law possessory lien, and is wholly misleading. For example of an express lien on the sale of personal property, see Dansk Rekylriffel Syndikat Aktieselskab v. Snell, [1908] 2 Ch. 127.

§ 1249, (c) Alabama.-See, also, Craft v. Russell, 67 Ala. 9; Ware v. Curry, 67 Ala. 274; Wilkinson v. May, 69 Ala. 33; McCarty v. Williams, 69 Ala. 174; Hooper v. Armstrong, 69 Ala. 343; Walker v. Struve, 70 Ala. 167; Tedder v. 70 Ala. 347; Donegan's Steele, Admr v. Hentz, 70 Ala. 437; Hooper v. Strahan, 71 Ala. 75; Prickett v. Sibert, 71 Ala. 194;

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In several of these commonwealths the lien has been recognized by statute; and in a few of them it seems, under a

Arkansas: English v. Russell, Hemp. 35; Scott v. Orbison, 21 Ark. 202; Shall v. Biscoe, 18 Ark. 142; Harris v. Hanks, 25 Ark. 510, 517; Refield v. Ferrell, 27 Ark. 534; Campbell v. Rankin, 28 Ark. 401; Turner v. Horner, 29 Ark. 440; Lavender v. Abbott, 30 Ark. 172; Neal v. Speigle, 33 Ark. 63; Mayes v. Hendry, 33 Ark. 240; Swan v. Benson, 31 Ark. 728; Blevins v. Rogers, 32 Ark. 258; Johnson v. Nunuerly, 30 Ark. 153; Linthieum v. Tapscott, 28 Ark. 267; Holman v. Patterson's Heirs, 29 Ark. 357; Stroud v. Pace, 35 Ark. 100; Young v. Harris, 36 Ark. 162; Harris v. Hanie, 37 Ark. 348.^d

California: Civ. Code, sec. 3046; Truebody v. Jacobson, 2 Cal. 269; Cahoon v. Robinson, 6 Cal. 225; Walker v. Sedgwick, 8 Cal. 398; Sparks v. Hess, 15 Cal. 186; Williams v. Young, 17 Cal. 403; Taylor v. McKinney,

Stringfellow v. Ivie, 73 Ala. 209; Preston v. Ellington, 74 Ala. 133; Williams v. McCarty, 74 Ala. 295; Daily's Adm'r v. Reid, 74 Ala. 415; Dickerson v. Carroll, 76 Ala. 377; McDonald v. Elyton Land Co., 78 Ala. 382; Kyle v. Bellenger, 79 Ala. 516; Kelly v. Karsner, 81 Ala. 500, 2 South. 164; Betts v. Sykes, 82 Ala. 378, 2 South. 648; Crampton v. Prince, 83 Ala. 246, 3 Am. St. Rep. 718, 3 South. 519; Chapman v. Peebles, 84 Ala. 283, 4 South. 273; Woodall v. Kelly, 85 Ala. 368, 7 Am. St. Rep. 57, 5 South. 164; Jackson v. Stanley, 87 Ala. 270, 6 South. 193; Weaver v. Brown, 87 Ala. 533, 6 South. 354; Davis v. Smith, 88 Ala. 596, 7 South. 159; Jones v. Lockard, 89 Ala. 575, 8 South. 103; Parrish v. Hastings, 102 Ala. 414, 48 Am. St. Rep. 50, 14 South. 783; Hood v. Hammond, 128 Ala. 569, 86 Am. St. Rep. 159, 30 South. 540. See, further, Nance v. Gray, 143 Ala. 234, 5 Ann. Cas. 55, 38 South. 916; Jones v. Laird, (Ala.) 42 South. 26; Spears v. Taylor, 149 Ala. 180, 13 Ann. Cas. 867, 42 South. 1016; McCrory v. Guyton, 154 Ala. 355, 45 South. 658; Burroughs v. Burroughs, 164 Ala. 329, 137 Am. St. Rep. 59, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 607, 50 South. 1025; Cook v. Atkins, 173 Ala. 363, 56 South. 224; Bell v. Bell, 174 Ala. 446, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1203, 56 South. 926; Zirkle v. Hendson, 180 Ala. 209, 60 South. 834; Hanvey v. Gaines, 181 Ala. 288, 61 South. 883; Hunter v. Briggs, 184 Ala. 327, 63 South. 1004; Campbell v. Goldthwaite, 189 Ala. 1, 66 South. 483; Fowler v. Falkner, (Ala.) 73 South. 980; Russell v. Stockton, (Ala.) 74 South. 225; In re V. & M. Lumber Co., 182 Fed. 231.

§ 1249, (d) Arkansas.—Chapman v. Liggett, 41 Ark. 292; Waddell v. Carlock, 41 Ark. 523; Stephens v. Shannon, 43 Ark. 464; Rodman v. Sanders, 44 Ark. 504; Springfield, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stewart, 51 Ark. 285, 10 S. W. 767. See, further, Cox v. Smith, 93 Ark. 371, 137 Am. St. Rep. 89, 125 S. W. 437; Jarratt v. Langston, 99 Ark. 438, 138 S. W. 1003; Miller v. Mattison, 105 Ark. 201, 150 S. W. 710; Priddy v. Smith, 106 Ark. 79, 152 S. W. 1028; Bothe v. Gleason, 126 Ark. 313, 190 S. W. 562. somewhat modified form, to be the ordinary mode of securing payment in conveyances of land on credit. In the

20 Cal. 618; Baum v. Grigsby, 21 Cal. 172, 81 Am. Dec. 153; Burt v. Wilson, 28 Cal. 632, 87 Am. Dec. 142; Gallagher v. Mars, 50 Cal. 23; Wells v. Harter, 56 Cal. 342.^e

Colorado: Francis v. Wells, 2 Col. 660.4

Dakota: Civ. Code, sec. 1801.

District of Columbia: Ford v. Smith, 1 McAr. 592.

Florida: Bradford v. Marvin, 2 Fla. 463; Woods v. Bailey, 3 Fla. 41.^s h

Illinois: Dyer v. Martin, 4 Scam. 146; Trustees v. Wright, 11 Ill. 603; Keith v. Horner, 32 Ill. 524; McLaurie v. Thomas, 39 Ill. 291; Boynton v. Champlin, 42 Ill. 57; Wilson v. Lyon, 51 Ill. 166; Kirkham v. Boston, 67 Ill. 599; Wing v. Goodman, 75 Ill. 159; Moshier v. Meek, 80 Ill. 79; Andrus v. Coleman, 82 Ill. 26, 25 Am. Rep. 289; Henson v. Westcott, 82 Ill. 224; Small v. Stagg, 95 Ill. 39; Manning v. Frazier, 96 Ill. 279.ⁱ

Indiana: Lagow v. Badollet, 1 Blackf. 416, 12 Am. Dec. 258; Evans v. Goodlet, 1 Blackf. 246; Deibler v. Barwick, 4 Blackf. 339; McCarty v. Pruett, 4 Ind. 226; Merritt v. Wells, 18 Ind. 171; Mattix v. Weand, 19 Ind. 151; Cox's Adm'r v. Wood, 20 Ind. 54; Yaryan v. Shriner, 26 Ind. 364; Anderson v. Donnell, 66 Ind. 150; Haskell v. Scott, 56 Ind. 564; Fouch v. Wilson, 60 Ind. 64, 28 Am. Rep. 651; Nichols v. Glover, 41 Ind.

§1249, (e) California.-See, also, Fitzell v. Leaky, 72 Cal. 477, 14 Pac. 198; Bancroft v. Crosby, 74 Cal. 583, 16 Pac. 504; Avery v. Clark, 87 Cal. 619, 22 Am. St. Rep. 272, 25 Pac. 919; Gessner v. Palmateer, 89 Cal. 89, 13 L. R. A. 187, 24 Pac. 608, 26 Pac. 789; Selna v. Selna, 125 Cal. 357, 73 Am. St. Rep. 47, 58 Pac. 16. See, further, Finnell v. Finnell, 156 Cal. 589, 134 Am. St. Rep. 143, 105 Pac. 740; Royal Consolidated Min. Co. v. Royal Con. Mines, 157 Cal. 737, 137 Am. St. Rep. 165, 110 Pac. 123; Womble v. Womble, 14 Cal. App. 739, 113 Pac. 353; Rogers Development Co. v. Southern Cal. Real Estate Inv. Co., 159 Cal. 735, 35 L. B. A. (N. S.) 543, 115 Pac. 934; Jones v. Allert, 161 Cal. 234, 118 Pac. 794; Braun v. Kahn, (Cal.) 167 Pac. 869.

§ 1249, (1) Colorado. — Fostoria Gold Min. Co. v. Hazard, 44 Colo. 495, 99 Pac. 758.

§ 1249, (2) Florida.—McKeown v. Collins, 38 Fla. 276, 21 South. 103; Rewis v. Williamson, 51 Fla. 529, 41 South. 449; Johnson v. Mc-Kinnon, 54 Fla. 221, 127 Am. St. Rep. 135, 14 Ann. Cas. 180, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874, 45 South. 23; Mc-Kinnon v. Johnson, 54 Fla. 538, 45 South. 451; Bowen v. Grace, 64 Fla. 28, 59 South. 563; De Long v. Marshall, 66 Fla. 410, 63 South. 723.

§ 1249, (h) Idaho.—See Smith v. Schultz, 23 Idaho, 144, 129 Pac. 640.

§ 1249, (i) Illinois.—See, also, Ilett v. Collins, 103 Ill. 74; Ryhiner v. Frank, 105 Ill. 326; Chicago, etc., Land Co. v. Peck, 112 Ill. 408, 451; Sidwell v. Wheaton, 114 Ill. 267, 2 N. E. 183; Beal v. Harrington, 116 remaining states of the union the doctrine has either been condemned by the courts, or after having been judicially accepted, has been abrogated by statute, or the question as

24; Martin v. Cauble, 72 Ind. 67; Higgins v. Kendall, 73 Ind. 522; Richards v. McPherson, 74 Ind. 158.^j

Iowa: Peirson v. David, 1 Iowa, 23; Grapengether v. Fejervary, 9 Iowa, 163, 74 Am. Dec. 336; Hays v. Horine, 12 Iowa, 61, 79 Am. Dec. 518; Rakestraw v. Hamilton, 14 Iowa, 147; Patterson v. Linder, 14 Iowa, 414; Tupple v. Viers, 14 Iowa, 515; Poler v. Dubuque, 20 Iowa, 440; McDole v. Purdy, 23 Iowa, 277; Johnson v. McGrew, 42 Iowa, 555;^L Rev. Laws 1860, p. 653; but by the Code of 1873, sec. 1940, the lien must be reserved in the deed to the grantee, in order to avail against his conveyance: Tinsley v. Tinsley, 52 Iowa, 14; Stuart v. Harrison, 52 Iowa, 511; Allen v. Loring, 34 Iowa, 499; Escher v. Simmons, 54 Iowa, 269.¹

Kentucky: Fowler v. Heirs of Rust, 2 A. K. Marsh. 294; Thornton v.

Ill. 113, 4 N. E. 664; Strong v.
Strong, 126 Ill. 301, 18 N. E. 665;
Gruhn v. Richardson, 128 Ill. 178, 21
N. E. 18. See, further, Ross v.
Clark, 225 Ill. 326, 80 N. E. 275.

§ 1249, (i) Indiana.-See, also, Mc-Clellan v. Coffin, 93 Ind. 456; Bakes v. Gilbert, 93 Ind. 70; Lowry v. Smith, 97 Ind. 466; Barrett v. Lewis, 106 Ind. 120, 5 N. E. 910; Otis v. Gregory, 111 Ind. 504, 13 N. E. 39; Yetter v. Fitts, 113 Ind. 34, 14 N. E. 707; Strohm v. Good, 113 Ind. 93, 14 N. E. 901; Brower v. Witmeyer, 121 Ind. 83, 22 N. E. 975; Petry v. Ambrosher, 100 Ind. 510; Mulky v. Karsell, 31 Ind. App. 595, 68 N. E. 689; Fleece v. O'Rear, 83 Ind. 200; Dwenger v. Branigan, 95 Ind. 221; Upland Land Co. v. Ginn, 144 Ind. 434, 55 Am. St. Rep. 181, 43 N. E. 443; Reeder v. Nay, 95 Ind. 164; Masters v. Templeton, 92 Ind. 447; Himes v. Langley, 85 Ind. 77. See, further, Buffalo Oölitic Limestone Quarries Co. v. Davis, 45 Ind. App. 116, 90 N. E. 327; Malon v. Scholler, 48 Ind. App. 691, 96 N. E. 499; Simmons v. Parker (Simmons ν. Meyers), 61 Ind. App. 403, 112 N. E. 31; Essig v. Porter, (Ind. App.) 112 N. E. 1005.

§ 1249, (k) Iowa .- Sce, also, Kendrick v. Eggleston, 56 Iowa, 128, 41 Am. Rep. 90, 8 N. W. 786; Gnash v. George, 58 Iowa, 492, 12 N. W. 546; Webster v. McCollough, 61 Iowa, 496, 16 N. W. 578; Cutler v. Ammon, 65 Iowa, 281, 21 N. W. 604; Erickson v. Smith, 79 Iowa, 374, 44 N. W. 681; Fisher v. Shropshire, 147 U.S. 133, 37 L. Ed. 109, 13 Sup. Ct. 201; Brown v. Byam, 65 Iowa, 374, 21 N. W. 684; Kendrick v. Eggleston, 56 Iowa, 128, 41 Am. Rep. 90, 8 N. W. 786; Akers v. Luse, 56 Iowa, 346, 9 N. W. 303. See, further, Hodgson v. Smith Bros., 136 Iowa, 515, 114 N. W. 39.

§ 1249, (1) Iowa.—See, also, Dean v. Scott, 67 Iowa, 233, 25 N. W. 147; Prouty v. Clark, 73 Iowa, 55, 34 N. W. 614; Chrisman v. Hay, 43 Fed. 552. But this rule has been abolished by amendment to the statute: Hodgson v. Smith Bros., 136 Iowa, 515, 114 N. W. 39. See State Bank of Iowa Falls v. Brown, 142 Iowa, 190, 134 Am. St. Rep. 412, 119 N. W. 81; Spindler v. Iowa & O. S. L. Ry. Co., 173 Iowa, 348, 155 N. W. 271. to its existence does not seem to have been finally determined. The following states belong to this class, in which

Knox's Ex'r, 6 B. Mon. 74; Muir v. Cross, 10 B. Mon. 277; Tiernan v. Thurman, 14 B. Mon. 224; Gritton v. McDonald, 3 Met. (Ky.) 252; Burrus v. Roulhac's Adm'x, 2 Bush, 39; Maupin v. McCormick, 2 Bush, 206; Ledford v. Smith, 6 Bush, 129; Emison v. Risque, 9 Bush, 24. The lien has been somewhat limited by statute as against *bona fide* purchasers from and creditors of the grantee: Gen. Stats. 1873, p. 589;^m Phillips v. Skinner, 6 Bush, 662.

Maryland: Moreton v. Harrison, 1 Bland, 491; Iglehart v. Armiger, 1 Bland, 519; Ringgold v. Bryan, 3 Md. Ch. 488; White v. Casenave's Heirs, 1 Har. & J. 106; Ghiselin v. Fergusson, 4 Har. & J. 522; Pratt v. Vanwyck's Ex'rs, 6 Gill & J. 495; Magruder v. Peter, 11 Gill & J. 217; Repp v. Repp, 12 Gill & J. 341; Carr v. Hobbs, 11 Md. 285; Hummer v. Schott, 21 Md. 307; Hall v. Jones, 21 Md. 439; Bratt v. Bratt, 21 Md. 578; Carrico v. Farmers' etc. Bank, 33 Md. 235; Gen. Laws, art. 16, sec. 130; Rev. Code 1878, art. 66, sec. 5.ⁿ

Michigan: Carroll v. Van Rensselaer, Harr. (Mich.) 225; Sears v. Smith, 2 Mich. 243; Converse v. Blumrich, 14 Mich. 109, 90 Am. Dec. 230; Payne v. Avery, 21 Mich. 524; Merrill v. Allen, 38 Mich. 487; Palmer v. Sterling, 41 Mich. 218; Clark v. Stilson, 36 Mich. 482; Hiscock v. Norton, 42 Mich. 320; Brown v. Porter, 2 Mich. N. P. 12.^o

Minnesota: Selby v. Stanley, 4 Minn. 65; Daughaday v. Paine, 6 Minu. 443; Duke v. Balme, 16 Minn. 306; Dawson v. Girard L. Ins. Co., 27 Minn. 411.**P**

§ 1249, (m) Kentucky. — Gen. Stats., c. 63, sec. 24. See, also, Brown v. Ferrell, 83 Ky. 417; Exchange Bank v. Stone, 80 Ky. 109. See, further, Elswick v. Matney, 132 Ky. 294, 136 Am. St. Rep. 180, 116 S. W. 718; Webster v. Cadwallader, 133 Ky. 500, 134 Am. St. Rep. 470, 118 S. W. 327; Hopper v. Hopper, 151 Ky. 120, 151 S. W. 359; Pace v. Berry, 176 Ky. 61, 195 S. W. 131.

§ 1249, (n) Maryland.—Pub. Gen. Laws 1888, art. 16, sec. 193. See, also, Dance v. Dance, 56 Md. 433; Thompson v. Corrie, 57 Md. 197; Christopher v. Christopher, 64 Md. 583, 3 Atl. 296; Baltimore & Liberty Turnpike Co. v. Moale, 71 Md. 353, 18 Atl. 658; Hooper v. Central Trust Co., 81 Md. 559, 29 L. R. A. 262, 32 Atl. 505.

§ 1249, (•) Michigan. — See, also, Ortmann v. Plummer, 52 Mich. 76, 17 N. W. 703; Dunton v. Outhouse, 64 Mich. 419, 31 N. W. 411; Waterfield v. Wilber, 64 Mich. 642, 31 N. W. 553; Bichards v. Shingle, etc., Co., 74 Mich. 57, 41 N. W. 860; Curtis v. Clarke, 113 Mich. 458, 71 N. W. 845; Lyon v. Clark, (Mich.) 94 N. W. 4. See, further, Shaw v. Tabor, 146 Mich. 544, 109 N. W. 1046; Zeigler v. Valley Coal Co., 150 Mich. 82, 13 Ann. Cas. 90, 113 N. W. 775.

§ 1249, (p) Minnesota.—See, also, Hammond v. Peyton, 34 Minn. 529, 27 N. W. 72; Peters v. Turrell, 43

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the lien does not exist, either because rejected or not

Mississippi: Stewart v. Ives, 1 Smedes & M. 197; Tanner v. Hicks, 4 Smedes & M. 294; Dunlap v. Burnett, 5 Smedes & M. 702, 45 Am. Dec. 269; Upshaw v. Hargrove, 6 Smedes & M. 286; Trotter v. Erwin, 27 Miss. 772; Servis v. Beatty, 32 Miss. 52; Littlejohn v. Gordon, 32 Miss. 235; Richardson v. Bowman, 40 Miss. 782; Harvey v. Kelly, 41 Miss. 490, 93 Am. Dec. 267; Russell v. Watt, 41 Miss. 602, 93 Am. Dec. 270; Dodge v. Evans, 43 Miss. 570; Pitts v. Parker, 44 Miss. 247; Rutland v. Brister, 53 Miss. 683; Perkins v. Gibson, 51 Miss. 699, 24 Am. Rep. 644; Tucker v. Hadley, 52 Miss. 414; McLain v. Thompson, 52 Miss. 418; Walton v. Hargroves, 42 Miss. 18, 97 Am. Dec. 429; Lindsey v. Bates, 42 Miss. 397.9

Missouri: McKnight v. Brady, 2 Mo. 110; Marsh v. Turner, 4 Mo. 253; Delassus v. Poston, 19 Mo. 425; Davis v. Lamb, 30 Mo. 441; Bledsoe v. Games, 30 Mo. 448; Pratt v. Clark, 57 Mo. 189; Stevens v. Rainwater, 4 Mo. App. 292; Davenport v. Murray, 68 Mo. 198; Pearl v. Hervey, 70 Mo. 160.^r

New Jersey: Vandoren v. Todd, 3 N. J. Eq. 397; Brinkerhoff v. Vansciven, 4 N. J. Eq. 251; Herhert v. Scofield, 9 N. J. Eq. 492; Dudley v. Matlack, 14 N. J. Eq. 252; Armstrong v. Ross, 20 N. J. Eq. 109; Corlies v. Howland, 26 N. J. Eq. 311; Graves v. Coutant, 31 N. J. Eq. 763; Ogden v. Thornton, 30 N. J. Eq. 569.^t

Minn. 473, 19 Am. St. Rep. 252, 45 N. W. 867.

§ 1249, (a) Mississippi.—See, also, Parker v. McBee, 61 Miss. 134; Cummings v. Moore, 61 Miss. 184; Louisiana Nat. Bank v. Knapp, 61 Miss. 485; Tate v. Bush, 62 Miss. 145; Lissa v. Posey, 64 Miss. 352, 1 South. 500. See, further, Elmslie v. Thurman, 87 Miss. 537, 40 South. 67; Burroughs v. Gilliland, 90 Miss. 127, 43 South. 301.

§ 1249, (r) Missouri.—See, also, Orrick v. Durham, 79 Mo. 174; Bennett v. Shipley, 82 Mo. 448; Zoll v. Carnahan, 83 Mo. 35; Bronson v. Wanzer, 86 Mo. 408; Christy v. Mc-Kee, 94 Mo. 241, 6 S. W. 656; Green v. Betts, 1 Fed. 289; Johnson v. Burks, 103 Mo. App. 221, 77 S. W. 133; Williams v. Crow, 84 Mo. 298; Boyer v. Austin. 75 Mo. 81; Hunt v. Marsh, 80 Mo. 396; Thomas v. Bridges, 73 Mo. 530; Funk v. Seehorn, 99 Mo. App. 587, 74 S. W. 445; Sloar v. Campbell, 71 Mo. 387, 36 Am. Rep. 493; Williams v. Baker, 100 Mo. App. 284, 73 S. W. 339. See, further, Spence v. Palmer, 115 Mo. App. 76, 90 S. W. 749; Eubank v. Finnell, 118 Mo. App. 535, 94 S. W. 591; Majors v. Maxwell, 120 Mo. App. 281, 96 S. W. 731; Bradbury v. Donnell, 136 Mo. App. 676, 119 S. W. 21; Marchand v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 147 Mo. App. 619, 127 S. W. 387; Barnhart v. Little, (Mo.) 185 S. W. 174; Lenox v. Earls, (Mo. App.) 185 S. W. 232; McTernan v. Mason, (Mo. App.) 188 S. W. 923.

§ 1249, (s) Nevada.—See Jensen v. Wilslef, 36 Nev. 37, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1220, 132 Pac. 16.

§ 1249, (*) New Jersey.—See, also, Porter v. Woodruff, 36 N. J. Eq. 174; Butterfield v. Okie, 36 N. J. Eq.

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adopted by the courts, or abolished by statutes: Connecti-

New York:^{**u**} Champion v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 398, 402, 10 Am. Dec. 343; Garson v. Green, 1 Johns. Ch. 308; Stafford v. Van Rensselaer, 9 Cow. 316; White v. Williams, 1 Paige, 502; Fish v. Howland, 1 Paige, 20; Warner v. Van Alstyne, 3 Paige, 513; Shirley v. Sugar Ref. Co., 2 Edw. Ch. 505; Warren v. Fenn, 28 Barb. 333; Dubois v. Hull, 43 Barb. 26; Smith v. Smith, 9 Abb. Pr., N. S., 420; Chase v. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581; Hazeltine v. Moore, 21 Hun, 355; Lamberton v. Van Voorhis, 15 Hun, 336; Gaylord v. Knapp, 15 Hun, 87.

Ohio: V Tiernan v. Beam, 2 Ohio, 383, 15 Am. Dec. 557; Williams v. Roberts, 5 Ohio, 35; Brush v. Kinsley, 14 Ohio, 20; Mayham v. Coombs, 14 Ohio, 428; Neil v. Kinney, 11 Ohio St. 58; Anketel v. Converse, 17 Ohio St. 11, 91 Am. Dec. 115; Whetsel v. Roberts, 31 Ohio St. 503.

Oregon: Pease v. Kelly, 3 Or. 417.*

Tennessee: Eskridge v. McClure, 2 Yerg. 84; Ross v. Whitson, 6 Yerg. 50; Campbell v. Baldwin, 2 Humph. 248; Marshall v. Christmas, 3 Humph. 616, 39 Am. Dec. 199; Uzzell v. Mack, 4 Humph. 319, 40 Am. Dec. 648;

482; Acton v. Waddington, 46 N. J. Eq. 16, 18 Atl. 356; Harter v. Capital City Brewing Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 155, 53 Atl. 560; Traphagen v. Hand, 36 N. J. Eq. 384. See, further, Campbell v. Perth Amboy Shipbuilding & Engineering Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 40, 62 Atl. 319; Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Carteret Steel Co., 79 N. J. Eq. 501, 82 Atl. 146; Improved Building & Loan Ass'n v. Larkin, (N. J. Eq.) 101 Atl. 1043.

§ 1249, (u) New York.—Maroney v. Boyle, 141 N. Y. 462, 38 Am. St. Rep. 821, 36 N. E. 511; Hubbell v. Henrickson, 175 N. Y. 175, 67 N. E. 302; Ten Eick v. Simpson, 1 Sand. Ch. 244; Hare v. Van Deusen, 32 Barb. 92; Hulett v. Whipple, 58 Barb. 224; Camp v. Gifford, 67 Barb. 434; Walrath v. Abbott, 75 Hun, 445, 454, 27 N. Y. Supp. 529; Fisk v. Potter, 2 Keyes, 64; Benedict v. Benedict, 85 N. Y. 625. See, also, Bach v. Kidansky, 186 N. Y. 368, 78 N. E. 1088; Zeiser v. Cohn, 207 N. Y. 407, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 493, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 186, 101 N. E. 184.

§ 1249, (v) Ohio.—Dietrich v. Folk, 40 Ohio St. 635. See, also, Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Emigh, 82 Ohio St. 251, 92 N. E. 438.

§ 1249, (w) Oklahoma.-See Rhodes v. Arthur, 19 Okl. 520, 92 Pac. 244. §1249, (x) Oregon.-The existence of the lien in Oregon was doubted in Kelly v. Ruble, 11 Or. 75, 4 Pac. 593, but was recognized in Gee v. McMillan, 14 Or. 268, 58 Am. Rep. 315, 12 Pac. 417; Coos Bay W. Co. v. Crocker, 4 Fed. 577, 6 Sawy. 574; First Nat. Bank of Salem v. Salem C. F. M. Co., 39 Fed. 89. In Frame v. Sliter, 29 Or. 121, 54 Am. St. Rep. 781, 34 L. R. A. 690, 45 Pac. 290, the court met the question squarely and decided that the lien does not exist. "The whole doctrine is inconsistent with the general policy prevailing in this country of making all matters of title depend upon record evidence."

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cut, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,

Medley v. Davis, 5 Humph. 387; Norvell v. Johnson, 5 Humph. 489; Taylor v. Hunter, 5 Humph. 569; Brown v. Vanlier, 7 Humph. 239; Ellis v. Temple, 4 Cold. 315, 94 Am. Dec. 200; Choate v. Tighe, 10 Heisk. 621; Durant v. Davis, 10 Heisk. 522; Irvine v. Muse, 10 Heisk. 477; Russell v. Dodson, 6 Baxt. 16.⁹

Texas: Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 1 Tex. 326, 46 Am. Dec. 108; Pinchain v. Collard, 13 Tex. 333; Glasscock v. Glasscock's Adm'r, 17 Tex. 480; Wheeler v. Love, 21 Tex. 583; McAlpine v. Burnett, 23 Tex. 649; Burford v. Rosenfield, 37 Tex. 42; White v. Downs, 40 Tex. 225; Yarborough v. Wood, 42 Tex. 91, 19 Am. Rep. 44; Robinson v. McWhirter, 52 Tex. 201; Baker v. Compton, 52 Tex. 252; Dibrell v. Smith, 49 Tex. 474; Burgess v. Millican, 50 Tex. 397; Ball v. Hill, 48 Tex. 634; Irvin v. Garner, 50 Tex. 48; Wasson v. Davis, 34 Tex. 159; De Bruhl v. Maas, 54 Tex. 464; Waldrom v. Zacharie, 54 Tex. 503.^z

Wisconsin: Tobey v. McAllister, 9 Wis. 463; Willard v. Reas, 26 Wis. 540; Madden v. Barnes, 45 Wis. 135, 30 Am. Rep. 703; De Forest v. Holum, 38 Wis. 516.^{na}

§1249, (**y**) Tennessee.—Cate v. Cate, 87 Tenn. 41, 9 S. W. 231; Jackson v. Rutledge, 3 Lea, 626, 31 Am. Rep. 655; Jarman v. Farley, 7 Lea, 141; Jobe v. Chedister, 5 Lea, 346; Bowman v. Faw, 5 Lea, 472. See, also, Leiberman, Loveman & O'Brien v. Bowden, 121 Tenn. 496, 119 S. W. 64; Boshwitz v. Lawhorn, 131 Tenn. 705, 176 S. W. 1037.

§1249, (z) Texas. - See, also, Salmon v. Downs, 55 Tex. 243; Hunt v. Makemson, 56 Tex. 9; Thorn v. Dill, 56 Tex. 145; Hicks v. Morris, 57 Tex. 658; Wooters v. Hollingsworth, 58 Tex. 374; Senter v. Lambeth, 59 Tex. 259; Joiner v. Perkins, 59 Tex. 300; Bailey v. Tindall, 59 Tex. 540; Porterfield v. Taylor, 60 Tex. 264; Slaughter v. Owens, 60 Tex. 668; Brooks v. Young, 60 Tex. 32; Russell v. Kirkbride, 62 Tex. 455; Cresap v. Manor, 63 Tex. 485; Houston v. Dixon, 66 Tex. 79, 1 S. W. 375; Bynum v. Preston, 69 Tex. 287, 5 Am. St. Rep. 49, 6 S. W. 428; Hamblen v. Folts, 70 Tex. 132,

7 S. W. 834; Ballard v. Carter, 71 Tex. 161, 9 S. W. 92; Howe v. Harding, 76 Tex. 17, 18 Am. St. Rep. 17, 13 S. W. 41; Oury v. Saunders, 77 Tex. 278, 13 S. W. 1030; Johnson v. Townsend, 77 Tex. 639, 14 S. W. 233; Johnson v. Dyer, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 602, 47 S. W. 727. See, further, Cecil v. Henry, (Tex. Civ. App.) 93 S. W. 216; Paris Grocer Co. v. Burks, 101 Tex. 106, 105 S. W. 174; Springman v. Hawkins, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 249, 113 S. W. 966; Noblett v. Harper, (Tex. Civ. App.) 136 S. W. 519; Bowles v. Belt, (Tex. Civ. App.) 159 S. W. 885; Fennimore v. Ingham, (Tex. Civ. App.) 181 S. W. 513.

§ 1249, (aa) Wisconsin.—See, also, Carey v. Boyle, 53 Wis. 574, 11 N. W. 47, 56 Wis. 145, 14 N. W. 32; Evans v. Enloe, 70 Wis. 345, 34 N. W. 918, 36 N. W. 22. But such a lien cannot be acquired on a homestead: Berger v. Berger, 104 Wis. 282, 76 Am. St. Rep. 877, 80 N. W. 585. See, further, Poole v. Tannis, 137 Wis. 363, 118 S. W. 188, 864;

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THE GRANTOR'S LIEN ON CONVEYANCE.

Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia.⁴

Rhode Island.—A recent decision in Rhode Island recognizes and enforces the lien, at least under the circumstances of the case': Kent v. Gerhard, 12 R. I. 92, 34 Am. Rep. 612.

§1249, 4 bb

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Connecticut.—Not adopted; leaning of the courts strongly against it; but the question not perhaps finally settled: Watson v. Wells, 5 Conn. 468; Dean v. Dean, 6 Conn. 285; Meigs v. Dimock, 6 Conn. 458, 464; Atwood v. Vincent, 17 Conn. 575; Chapman v. Beardsley, 31 Conn. 115.

Delaware.—Not adopted; question still left open: Budd v. Busti, 1 Harr. (Del.) 69.^{cc}

Georgia.—Abolished by statute: Code 1882, sec. 1997; Jones v. Janes, 56 Ga. 325; but see Drinkwater v. Moreman, 61 Ga. 395. Former dccisions had established it: Mims v. Macon etc. R. R., 3 Ga. 333; Mounce v. Byars, 16 Ga. 469; Mims v. Lockett, 23 Ga. 237, 68 Am. Dec. 521; Chance v. McWhorter, 26 Ga. 315; Still v. Mayor etc., 27 Ga. 502, 504.

Kansas.—Existence denied: Simpson v. Mundee, 3 Kan. 172; Brown v. Simpson, 4 Kan. 76; Smith v. Rowland, 13 Kan. 245; Greeno v. Barnard, 18 Kan. 518.

Maine.—Entirely rejected: Philbrook v. Delano, 29 Me. 410, 415; Gilman v. Brown, 1 Mason, 191, 210.

Massachusetts.—Entirely rejected: Abrend v. Odiorne, 118 Mass. 261, 19 Am. Rep. 449; Gilman v. Brown, supra.

Nebraska.-Rejected : Edminster v. Higgins, 6 Neb. 265.

New Hampshire.—Not adopted; its existence questioned: Buntin v. French, 16 N. H. 592; Arlin v. Brown, 44 N. H. 102.

North Carolina.—Held not to exist; but sustained by earlier cases: Mc-Gahee v. Sneed, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 333; Womble v. Battle, 3 Ired. Eq. 182; Henderson v. Burton's Ex'r, 3 Ired. Eq. 259; Cameron v. Mason, 7 Ired. Eq. 180. See Mast v. Raper, 81 N. C. 330; McKay v. Gilliam, 65 N. C. 130.^{dd}

Latton v. McCarty, 142 Wis. 190, 125 N. W. 430; Larscheid v. Kittel (Larscheid v. Hashek Mfg. Co.), 142 Wis. 172, 20 Ann. Cas. 576, 125 N. W. 442.

§ 1249, (**bb**) Arizona.—See Consolidated Arizona Smelting Co. v. Hinchman, 212 Fed. 813, 129 C. C. A. 267; Baker v. Fleming, 6 Ariz. 418, 2 Ann. Cas. 370, 59 Pac. 101 (no lien).

§ 1249, (ec) Delaware. — See, also, Rice v. Rice, 36 Fed. 860.

§ 1249, (dd) North Carolina.—See, also, Moore v. Ingram, 91 N. C. 376; White v. Jones, 92 N. C. 388; Peck v. Culberson, 104 N. C. 425, 10 S. E.

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§ 1250

§ 1250. Origin and Rationale.^a—With regard to the origin and *rationale* of the grantor's lien, there has been a

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Pennsylvania.—Does not exist under its ordinary form: Kauffelt v. Bower, 7 Serg. & R. 64, 10 Am. Dec. 428; Semple v. Burd, 7 Serg. & R. 286; Megargel v. Saul, 3 Whart. 19; Bear v. Whisler, 7 Watts, 144, 147; Cook v. Trimble, 9 Watts, 15; Hepburn v. Snyder, 3 Pa. St. 72; Springer v. Walters, 34 Pa. St. 328; Stephen's Ex'rs' Appeal, 38 Pa. St. 9; Hiester v. Green, 48 Pa. St. 96, 86 Am. Dec. 569; Heist v. Baker, 49 Pa. St. 9; Strauss's Appeal, 49 Pa. St. 353; but a lien may be created by an express and appropriate provision in the deed: Heist v. Baker, supra.

Rhode Island.---Not adopted; its existence questioned: Perry v. Grant, 10 R. I. 334; but in the recent case of Kent v. Gerhard, 12 R. I. 92, 34 Am. Rep. 612, the lien is admitted and enforced under the facts of the sase.

South Carolina.—Does not exist: Wragg v. Comptroller-General, 2 Desaus. Eq. 509, 520.

Vermont.—Abolished by statute: Laws 1851, c. 47; Gen. Stats. 1862, c. 65, sec. 33; had been approved in Manly v. Slason, 21 Vt. 271, 52 Am. Dec. 60, per Redfield, C. J.

Virginia.—Abrogated by statute, unless expressly reserved in the deed: Code 1873, c. 115, sec. 1; Yancey v. Manck, 15 Gratt. 300; prior decisions had adopted it: Cole v. Scot, 2 Wash. 141; Tompkins v. Mitchell, 2 Rand. 428; Redford v. Gibson, 12 Leigh, 332; Kyles v. Tait's Adm'r, 6 Gratt. 44.

West Virginia.—Abrogated, unless expressly reserved in the deed: Code 1870, c. 75, sec. 1; Hempfield R. E. v. Thornburg, 1 W. Va. 261.55

United States.—Courts of the United States have recognized and enforced the lien, but in this, as in all other questions of real-property law, they follow the doctrines established in the particular state where the land

511. See, further, Bernard v. Lea,
210 Fed. 583, 127 C. C. A. 219; Hickson Lumber Co. v. Gay Lumber Co.,
150 N. C. 282, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.)
843, 63 S. E. 1045.

§1249, (ee) Oregon. — Frame v. Sliter, 29 Or. 121, 54 Am. St. Rep. 781, 45 Pac. 290.

§ 1249, (11) Washington.—The lien does not exist unless it has been reserved by the deed or by an agreement between the parties: Smith v. Allen. 18 Wash. 1, 63 Am. St. Rep. 864, 50 Pac. 783. § 1249, (SS) West Virginia.—See, also, Poe v. Paxton, 26 W. Va. 607; McNeil v. Miller, 29 W. Va. 480, 2 S. E. 335.

§ 1250, (a) This section is cited in First Nat. Bank v. Salem C. F. M. Co., 39 Fed. 89; Gee v. McMillan, 14 Or. 268, 58 Am. Rep. 315, 12 Pac. 417; Burroughs v. Burroughs, 164 Ala. 329, 137 Am. St. Rep. 59, 20 Ann. Cas. 926, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 607, 50 South. 1025. great diversity of opinion. It has been accounted for as a trust; as an equitable mortgage; as arising from a natural equity; and as a contrivance of the chancellors to evade the unjust rule of the early common law by which land was free from the claims of simple contract creditors.¹ b Notwithstanding all these differing theories, as

is situated and the controversy arises: Gilman v. Brown, 1 Mason, 191; Fed. Cas. No. 5441; Brown v. Gilman, 4 Wheat. 255, 4 L. Ed. 272; Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 46, 5 L. Ed. 393; McLearn v. Wallace, 10 Pet. 625, 640, 9 L. Ed. 559; Galloway v. Finley, 12 Pet. 264, 9 L. Ed. 1079; Bush v. Marshall, 6 How. 284, 12 L. Ed. 440; Chilton v. Braiden's Adm'x, 2 Black, 458, 17 L. Ed. 304; Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wall. 1, 5, 21 L. Ed. 587.^{hh}

§ 1250, 1 The commonly received opinion regards the lien as wholly referable to the doctrine of trnsts, and as constituting a species of constructive trusts: Blackburn v. Gregson, 1 Brown Ch. 420, per Lord Loughborough; Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329, per Lord Eldon; Ringgold v. Bryan, 3 Md. Ch. 488; Moreton v. Harrison, 1 Bland, 491; Iglehart v. Armiger, 1 Bland, 519, 524, 525; 2 Story's Eq. Jur., secs. 1218 et seq.; Snell's Equity, 5th ed., 136; Perry on Trusts, secs. 231, 232. Notwithstanding the array of authority in support of this opinion, it is the one, as it seems to me, having the least foundation of fact, of principle, or of analogy. It is an instance of the tendency, frequently mentioned in previous chapters, to refer all equitable rights and interests to the doctrine

§ 1249, (hh) United States. - See, also, Green v. Betts, 1 Fed. 289, 1 McCrary, 72; Coos Bay Wagon Co. v. Crocker, 6 Sawy. 574, 4 Fed. 577; First Nat. Bank of Salem v. Salem C. F. M. Co., 39 Fed. 89. See, further, Griffin v. Smith, 143 Fed. 865, 75 C. C. A. 73; Welch v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 165 Fed. 561, 91 C. C. A. 399; Wilson v. Plutus Mining Co., 174 Fed. 317, 98 C. C. A. 189; In re V. & M. Lumber Co., 182 Fed. 231; Bernard v. Lea, 210 Fed. 583, 127 C. C. A. 219; Fraser v. Cole, 214 Fed. 556, 131 C. C. A. 102. It will not be enforced by federal courts in any state, unless it has been previously adopted by the state laws, or is recognized by the courts of the state in which the land sought to be charged is situated: Rice v. Rice, 36 Fed. 860. See, also, Bernard v. Lea, 210 Fed. 583, 127 C. C. A. 219 (North Carolina); Consolidated Arizona Smelting Co. v. Hinchman, 212 Fed. 813, 129 C. C. A. 267 (Arizona). But in Wilson v. Plutus Mining Co., 174 Fed. 317, 98 C. C. A. 189 (Utah), it was held that the lien will be enforced by a federal court of equity until it has been rejected by the state. The decision in Rice v. Rice, supra, is ignored; and the Supreme Court cases relied upon give no support, as in each of them the state had already recognized the existence of the grantor's lien.

§ 1250, (h) Quoted in Hammond v. Peyton, 34 Minn. 529, 27 N. W. 72.

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illustrated by the quotations in the foot-notes, the original and true ground of this lien appears to me very simple and obvious. It is clearly one of the many instances to be found in the early English jurisprudence, whether legal or equitable, of the higher importance, consideration, and value given to real than to personal property. It is a most natural judicial conception that upon the sale of *any* thing on credit, the very identical thing sold should be regarded in some sort as a special fund out of which payment of the price was to be obtained, or at least secured, and that the seller should not be considered as parting *absolutely* with his whole interest and dominion until the price was fully paid. This natural conception would undoubtedly have manifested itself in a universal rule, applicable to the sales of all things, had not other considerations and motives of

of trusts,-a tendency which has produced much unnecessary confusion throughout the whole domain of equity jurisprudence. There is, in fact, not a single element really in common between this or any other equitable lien and a trust: See remarks ante, at the commencement of the present chapter, §§ 1233, 1234. Some writers and judges have considered the lien to be a species of equitable mortgage; but this is merely to give it another name, and not to explain its origin: See Wilson v. Davisson, 2 Rob. (Va.) 384, 404; Adams's Equity, 127. It has also, with much more reason, been said to arise from a natural equity that the land shall he charged with the unpaid purchase-money: Chapman v. Tanner, 1 Vern. 267; Warren v. Fenn, 28 Barb. 333, per Potter, J. Finally, all of these theories have been rejected, and the existence of the lien has been ascribed to the fact that, by the common law, land was free from the claims of simple contract creditors, and that it was invented by the chancellors from a desire to evade this unjust rule, and to give the grantor a security for his unpaid purchase-money. In the quite recent case of Ahrend v. Odiorne, 118 Mass. 261, 266, 19 Am. Rep. 449, Mr. Chief Justice Gray, as the result of an elaborate examination, maintains this view. He rejects the theory of natural equity, because that would apply to a sale of chattels as well as of land, and the theory of a trust, because, if true, that would include too many other cases to which confessedly the doctrine had not been extended, and reaches the following conclusions: "The most plausible foundation of the English doctrine would seem to be: that justice required that the vendor [grantor] should be enabled, by some form of judicial process, to charge the land in the hands of the vendee [grantee] policy prevented. Such considerations and motives did interfere and prevail in the case of chattels and all personal property. The interests of trade and commerce required that the transmission of these things should be free, and that ownership should go or appear to go with possession. These reasons, joined with the comparatively slight importance given to the ownership of personal property resulting from feudal institutions, prevented the application of the principle to the sale of chattels and things in action, in the same manner as, at a later day, the same reasons were applied with even greater force to the transfer of negotiable instruments. Land, however, not being looked upon as a subject of commerce, being closely associated with family interests and social distinction. its free transmission not being considered as essential, and its ownershp being highly favored and surrounded with senti-

as security for the unpaid purchase-money. And the restriction of the doctrine to real estate suggests the inference that the court of chancery was induced to interpose by the consideration that by the law of England real estate could neither be attached on mesne process, nor, except in certain cases or to a limited extent, be taken in execution for debt." The American editors of the Leading Cases in Equity reach a somewhat similar conclusion: 4th Am. ed., 500. Rejecting the theory of a mortgage because there is no semblance of a contract for a security on the land, and that of a trust because a constructive trust cannot arise from a mere breach of contract to pay, without any element of fraud, they say: "The true nature of the claim appears to be this: It had its origin in a country where lands were not liable, both during and after the life of the debtor, for all personal obligations, including debts by simple contract; and it seems to be an original and natural equity that the creditor, whose debt was the consideration of the land, should, by virtue of that consideration, be allowed to charge the land upon a failure of the personal assets." The force of Mr. Justice Gray's argument is very much weakened, even if not destroyed, by the fact that the lien does, under some circumstances, extend to a sale The reason why it has not generally been applied to chattels of chattels. must be found in considerations of convenience and expediency. The explanation suggested in the foregoing quotations is, in my opinion, altogether too narrow and partial as a rationale of the entire doctrine, although the common-law mode of dealing with land may have entered as one element into the motives operating upon the minds of the chancellors.

ments of peculiar feudal honor, it was inevitable that the natural principle which I have described should have been allowed its full force and effect upon the sale of real estate. Its ownership being so high and almost sacred a right, the proprietor selling on credit was not considered as parting with every interest or dominion over the particular tract, although he had delivered possession, until he had received full payment of the price which had been agreed upon as a substitute for the land itself. As the common-law rules furnished no means for working out this idea, it was both natural and inevitable that equity should make the conception practical under the familiar form of an equitable lien.² In later times, the equity judges, attempting to give some explanation of the doctrine, invented the theories of trust, mortgage, and the like. The correctness of this rationale further appears from the fact that under some circumstances the lien has been extended by modern judges to sales of personal property.

§ 1250, ² It is evident from the foregoing account that the theory of trust is utterly without foundation, while that lately advanced by the Massachusetts court is imperfect and unsatisfactory,--substituting, in fact, an effect for a cause. The absence of any power at the common law to make land liable for ordinary debts, instead of being the source of the grantor's lien, was itself only another instance and consequence of the same general superiority given to' the ownership of land; both were incidents of one common mode of treating real estate as compared with personal. I venture the opinion that it is also obvious from the explanation of the text that the original grounds and reasons for admitting the grantor's lien do not exist in our own country, and the lien itself is not in harmony with our general real-property law. The tendency both of our legislation and of our social customs is to make land a subject of commerce, and its transmission as free as possible; while the rights of grantors can be fully protected by mortgages which, in nearly all the states, are widely different from the instrument bearing the same name in England.c

§ 1250, (c) Quoted in Frame v. Sliter, 29 Or. 121, 54 Am. St. Rep. 781, 34 L. R. A. 690, 45 Pae. 290, and in Jensen v. Wilslef, 36 Nev. 37, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1220, 132 Pac. 16. See, also, to the effect that the lien is viewed with disfavor, and that the grantor's rights must be clearly made out, and should not be extended, Ross v. Clark, 225 Ill. 326, 80 N. E. 275.

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§ 1251. Requisites, Extent, and Effect of This Lien.— Uncertain and Conflicting Results of Judicial Opinion.— The grantor's lien, wherever recognized, is only permitted as a security for the unpaid purchase price, and not for any other indebtedness nor liability. There must be a certain, ascertained, absolute debt owing for the purchase price; the lien does not exist in behalf of any uncertain, contingent, or unliquidated demand.¹^a No other single topic

§ 1251, ¹ Harris v. Hanie, 37 Ark. 348; Toombs v. Con. Poe Min. Co., 15 Nev. 444; Hiscock v. Norton, 42 Mich. 320; Young v. Harris, 36 Ark. 162 (when allowed for personal services); De Forest v. Holum, 38 Wis. 516 (if future contingency happens); Clark v. Stilson, 36 Mich. 482; Palmer v. Sterling, 41 Mich. 218; Sears v. Smith, 2 Mich. 243; Payne v. Avery, 21 Mich. 524; Vandoren v. Todd, 3 N. J. Eq. 397; Patterson v. Edwards, 29 Miss. 67; as, for example, an agreement to assume a debt or

§ 1251, (a) No Lien for Uncertain, Contingent or Unliquidated Demand. The text is quoted in Jarratt v. Langston, 99 Ark. 438, 138 S. W. 1003; Lee v. McMorries, 107 Miss. 889, L. R. A. 1915B, 1069, 66 South. 278. The text is cited to this effect in Betts v. Sykes, 82 Ala. 378, 2 South. 648; in Gerstell v. Shirk, 210 Fed. 223, 127 C. C. A. 41; in Burroughs v. Burroughs, 164 Ala. 329, 137 Am. St. Rep. 59, 20 Ann. Cas. 926, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 607; 50 South. 1025; in Ross v. Clark, 225 Ill. 326, 80 N. E. 275; in Marchand v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 147 Mo. App. 619, 127 S. W. 387; in Zeiser v. Cohn, 207 N. Y. 407, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 493, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 186, 101 N. E. 184. See, also, Stringfellow v. Ivie, 73 Ala. 209 (gross sale of real and personal property; presumption against the lien); Wilkinson v. Parmer, 82 Ala. 367, 3 South. 4 (same); Peters v. Turrell, 43 Minn. 473, 19 Am. St. Rep. 252, 45 N. W. 867, (same); see, however, Cole v. Smith, 24 W. Va. 287 (if the lien in such a case is expressly reserved in the writing it may be enforced); Doty v. Deposit Bldg. & L. Ass'n, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 625, 46 S. W. 219, 47 S. W. 433. Further instances of the sale of land and other property for an undivided consideration; no lien: Welch v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 165 Fed. 561, 91 C. C. A. 399 (sale of land and release of a judgment); Hanvey v. Gaines, 181 Ala. 288, 61 South. 883; Fostoria Gold Mining Co. v. Hazard, 44 Colo. 495, 99 Pac. 758 (sale of two tracts for a lump sum, one owned by A, the other owned by A and B). No lien for personal services: See infra, note (c); and Womble v. Womble, 14 Cal. App. 739, 113 Pac. 353; Marchand v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 147 Mo. App. 619, 127 S. W. 387, citing the text. In general, Parrish v. Hastings, 102 Ala. 414, 48 Am. St. Rep. 50, 14 South. 783 (agreement to fence not secured by grantor's lien); McDonald v. Elyton Land Co., 78 Ala. 382 (agreement to erect building on land creates no lien); Waterfield v. Wilbur, 64 Mich. 642, 31 N. W. 553: belonging to the equity jurisprudence has occasioned such a diversity and even discord of opinion among the American courts as this of the grantor's lien. Upon nearly every question that has arisen as to its operation, its waiver or

encumbrance:^b Lea v. Fabbri, 13 Jones & S. 361; Chapman v. Beardsley, 31 Conn. 115; or an agreement to support the grantor for life:^c Chase v. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581; McKillip v. McKillip, 8 Barb. 552; Arlin v. Brown, 44 N. H. 102; Brawley v. Catron, 8 Leigh, 522. With respect to the lien arising on an exchange of lands, see^d Drinkwater v. Moreman, 61 Ga. 395; Bryant v. Stephens, 58 Ala. 636; Pratt v. Clark, 57 Mo. 189; Dawson v.

Ortmann v. Plummer, 52 Mich. 76, 17 N. W. 703 (where the purchase price of one parcel of land is so blended in a mortgage with that of another that it cannot be separated, no lien beyond the mortgage can be enforced); Cox v. Smith, 93 Ark. 371, 137 Am. St. Rep. 89, 125 S. W. 437; Burroughs v. Gilliland, 90 Miss. 127, 43 South. 301. Where the consideration for land sold is other land or personal property, with no monetary price fixed, for which the land or personal property shall be delivered, there can be no lien: Harter v. Capital City Brewing Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 155, 53 Atl. 560. See, also, Ross v. Clark, 225 Ill. 326, 80 N. E. 275 (if part of price was personal property, it must have an agreed value). The lien does not exist for unliquidated damages resulting from the vendee's fraudulent misrepresentations as to the value of personal property which formed part of the price: Graham v. Moffett, 119 Mich. 303, 75 Am. St. Rep. 393, 78 N. W. 132. See, also, Ross v. Clark, 225 Ill. 326, 80 N. E. 275. Sec, however, Jarratt v. Langston, 99 Ark. 438, 138 S. W. 1003 (as the personal property was worthless, claim was not for unliquidated damages). That the doctrine of the text does not apply where the plaintiff's claim has been reduced to judgment, see Zeiser v.

Cohn, 207 N. Y. 407, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 493, 47 L. B. A. (N. S.) 186, 101 N. E. 184.

§ 1251, (b) Agreement to assume encumbrance.—See, however, Woodall v. Kelly, 85 Ala. 368, 7 Am. St. Rep. 57, 5 South. 164; Williams v. Crow, 84 Mo. 298.

§ 1251, (c) Agreement to support grantor for life.—The text is cited in Burroughs v. Burroughs, 164 Ala. 329, 137 Am. St. Rep. 59, 20 Ann. Cas. 926, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 607, 50 South. 1025 (though consideration is recited to be a certain sum of money). See, also, Peters v. Turrell, 43 Minn. 473, 19 Am. St. Rep. 252, 45 N. W. 867; Lee v. McMorries, 107 Miss. 889, L. R. A. 1915B, 1069, 66 South. 278, quoting the text. Contra, see Webster v. Cadwallader, 133 Ky. 500, 134 Am. St. Rep. 470, 118 S. W. 327.

§ 1251, (d) Lien arising on an exchange of lands.—Betts v. Sykes, 82 Ala. 378, 2 South. 648; Beal v. Harrington, 116 Ill. 113, 4 N. E. 664; Ross v. Clark, 225 Ill. 326, 80 N. E. 275 (no lien where land is taken in exchange); Louisiana Nat. Bank v. Knapp, 61 Miss. 485; Johnson v. Burks, 103 Mo. App. 221, 77 S. W. 133; Bennett v. Shipley, 82 Mo. 448; McTernan v. Mason, (Mo. App.) 188 S. W. 923. discharge, the parties against whom it avails, and the parties in whose favor it exists, the decisions in different states, and sometimes even in the same state, are directly conflicting. It is practically impossible to formulate any general rules representing the doctrine as established throughout the whole country.² g The subjects to be con-

Girard Life Ins. Co., 27 Minn. 411; McDole v. Purdy, 23 Iowa, 277; Coit v. Fougera, 36 Barb. 195; Hare v. Van Deusen, 32 Barb. 92. On conveyances to married women, see^e Haskell v. Scott, 56 Ind. 564; Moore v. Worthy, 56 Ala. 163; Davenport v. Murray, 68 Mo. 198; McLain v. Thompson, 52 Miss. 418; Pylant v. Reeves, 53 Ala. 132, 25 Am. Rep. 605; Carver v. Eads, 65 Ala. 190; Martin v. Cauble, 72 Ind. 67. For special circumstances under which the lien has been held to exist,^f see Manning v. Frazier, 96 Ill. 279 (on minerals); Perkins v. Gibson, 51 Miss. 699, 24 Am. Rep. 644; Rutland v. Brister, 53 Miss. 683; Merrill v. Allen, 38 Mich. 487 (from fraud).

§ 1251, ² The decisions of each state court must be separately examined, in order to obtain any accurate results; and for this reason I have collected and arranged the most important cases according to the order of the states in preceding notes. In Fisk v. Potter, 2 Abb. App. 138, 2 Keyes, 64, Mr. Justice Potter described the lien as follows, and his description is not overdrawn: "Its existence depends upon and is controlled by no well-settled rules; but on the contrary, the existence of the lien is generally made to depend upon the peculiar state of facts and circumstances

§ 1251, (e) Conveyances to married women.—Crampton v. Prince, 83 Ala. 246, 3 Am. St. Rep. 718, 3 South. 519; Ogle v. Ogle, 41 Ohio St. 359; Jackson v. Rutledge, 3 Lea, 626, 31 Am. Rep. 655.

§ 1251, (f) Howe v. Harding, 76 Tex. 17, 18 Am. St. Rep. 17, 13 S. W. 41 (on grant of right of way). That the lien may arise on the sale of an *equitable interest* as well as of a legal interest or title, see Fleece v. O'Rear, 83 Ind. 200; Dwenger v. Branigan, 95 Ind. 221; Ortmann v. Plummer, 52 Mich. 76, 17 N. W. 703, per Campbell, J.; Poe v. Paxton, 26 W. Va. 607; Carey v. Boyle, 53 Wis. 574, 11 N. W. 47. See, to the same effect, Rogers Development Co. v. Southern Cal. Real Estate Inv. Co., 159 Cal. 735, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 543, 115 Pac. 934 (conditional vendee, his default being waived by vendor, conveys his equitable interest to vendor; lien exists to secure the price of this conveyance); Essig v. Porter, (Ind. App.) 112 N. E. 1005 (contract vendée, who had deed made to A, entitled to lien against A for unpaid price); Pace v. Berry, 176 Ky. 61, 195 S. W. 131 (similar facts).

§ 1251, (g) Quoted in Hammond v. Peyton, 34 Minn. 529, 27 N. W. 72; Frame v. Sliter, 29 Or. 121, 54 Am. St. Rep. 781, 34 L. R. A. 690, 45 Pac. 290; Jensen v. Wilslef, 36 Nev. 37, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1220, 132 Pac. 16; and cited to the same effect in Parrish v. Hastings, 102 Ala. 414, 48 Am. St. Rep. 50, 14 South. 783. sidered in the further treatment are: 1. When the lien is discharged or waived; 2. Against whom it avails; and 3. In favor of whom it avails.

§ 1252. How Discharged or Waived.—It is a generally settled rule that the lien, if otherwise existing, is not waived or destroyed by the grantor's giving a receipt in full for the purchase price, or by a recital to that effect in the deed, nor by the grantee's giving his own personal security—his bond, note, bill—for the price.^{1 a} If, however, the grantee's

surrounding the particular case; that is, whether or not a case of natural equity is established, and if so, whether it is not made to yield to higher or superior equities in some other person; whether the party is not to he regarded as having waived it, or as having intended to waive or postpone it to another equity; or whether hy the acts or omissions to act, or by the neglect of the party claiming such lien to enforce it within a reasonable time, the right is not lost as being the superior claim. These considerations control and vary the result as equity demands."

§ 1252, ¹ Some of the English cases seem to go further, and to hold that the mere personal security of a *third* person does not discharge the lien: Grant v. Mills, 2 Ves. & B. 306; Winter v. Lord Anson, 3 Russ. 488; 1 Sim. & St. 434; Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329; Tardiffe v. Serughan, cited 1 Brown Ch. 422; Hughes v. Kearney, 1 Schoales & L. 132; Clarke v. Royle, 3 Sim. 499; Matthew v. Bowler, 6 Hare, 110; Collins v. Collins, 31 Beav. 346; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 464, 465. Receipt in full or acknowledgment of payment in the deed:^b Ogden v. Thornton, 30 N. J.

§1252, (a) This section is cited in Kelly v. Karsner, 81 Ala. 500, 2 South. 164; Brisco v. Minah Consol. Min. Co., 82 Fed. 952; Marchand v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 147. Mo. App. 619, 127 S. W. 387. The subject of waiver of the grantor's lien was carefully examined in the valuable opinion in Finnell v. Finnell, 156 Cal. 589, 134 Am. St. Rep. 143, 105 Pac. 740, holding that the presumption is against a waiver, and the burden of proving it is on grantee; and that the grantor's ignorance of the existence of the lien and his request for a mortgage do not show a waiver. See, also, Royal Consolidated Min. Co. v. Royal Con. Mines, 157 Cal. 737, 137 Am. St. Rep. 165, and note, 110 Pac. 123.

§ 1252, (b) Receipt in full or acknowledgment of payment in the deed .- Thompson v. Corrie, 57 Md. 197; Hooper v. Central Trust Co., 81 Md. 559, 29 L. R. A. 262, 32 Atl. 505; also, Cook v. Atkins, 173 Ala. 363, 56 South. 224; Miller v. Mattison, 105 Ark. 201, 150 S. W. 710; Keathley v. Keathley, 115 Ark. 605, 170 S. W. 564; Cecil v. Henry, (Tex. Civ. App.) 93 S. W. 216; Springman v. Hawkins, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 249, 113 S. W. 966; but such acknowledgment is, of course, prima facie evidence of payment: Kelly v. Karsner, 81 Ala. 500, 2 South. 164.

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own bond, note, or other promise is given, not as a security for the price, but as a substitute for or in novation of the purchase price, so that no debt for the price any longer exists, the lien is destroyed, and a fortiori this result follows where the bond, or note, or engagement of a third per-

Eq. 569; Simpson v. McAllister, 56 Ala. 228; Bankhead v. Owen, 60 Ala. 457; Shorter v. Frazer, 64 Ala. 74; Holman v. Patterson's Heirs, 29 Ark. 357; Walton v. Hargroves, 42 Miss. 18, 97 Am. Dec. 429; Dodge v. Evans, 43 Miss. 570. A judgment recovered for the debt:^c Graves v. Coutant, 31 N. J. Eq. 763; Ball v. Hill, 48 Tex. 634; Waldrom v. Zacharie, 54 Tex. 503. The grantee's own note, bill, etc.: d Kent v. Gerhard, 12 R. I. 92, 34 Am. Rep. 612; Dibrell v. Smith, 49 Tex. 474; Irvin v. Garner, 50 Tex. 48; Madden v. Barnes, 45 Wis. 135, 30 Am. Rep. 703; Moore v. Worthy, 56 Ala. 163 (note of husband and wife on deed to the wife); Davenport v. Murray, 68 Mo. 198 (same); Lavender v. Abhott, 30 Ark. 172; Corlies v. Howland, 26 N. J. Eq. 311; Nichols v. Glover, 41 Ind. 24; Brown v. Porter, 2 Mich. N. P. 12. In Alabama the lien remains and may be enforced, although the debt is barred by the statute of limitations:^e Flinn v. Barber, 61 Ala. 530; Bizzell v. Nix, 60 Ala. 281, 31 Am. Rep. 38; Chapman v. Lee, 64 Ala. 483; Shorter v. Frazer, 64 Ala. 74; contra, f Linthieum v. Tapscott, 28 Ark. 267. See, also, as further illustrations of the text, White v. Williams, 1 Paige, 502; Garson v. Green, 1 Johns. Ch. 308; Warren v. Fenn, 28 Barb. 333; Vandoren v. Todd, 3 N. J. Eq. 397; Brinkerhoff v. Vansciven, 4 N. J. Eq. 251; Thornton v. Knox's Ex'r, 6 B. Mon. 74; Denny v. Steakly, 2 Heisk. 156; Aldridge v. Dunn, 7 Blackf. 249, 41 Am. Dec. 224; Tobey v. McAllister, 9 Wis. 463; Baum v. Grigsby, 21 Cal. 172, 81 Am. Dec. 153.

§ 1252, (c) Judgment recovered for the debt.—Braun v. Kahn, (Cal), 167 Pac. 869; Elswick v. Matney, 132 Ky. 294, 136 Am. St. Rep. 180, 116 S. W. 718; Zeigler v. Valley Coal Co., 150 Mich. 82, 13 Ann. Cas. 90, 113 N. W. 775; Cecil v. Henry, (Tex. Civ. App.) 93 S. W. 216. The lien is not waived, however, by the filing of a claim against the grantee's estate: Selna v. Selna, 125 Cal. 357, 73 Am. St. Rep. 47, 58 Pac. 16.

§ 1252, (d) The grantee's own note, bill, etc.—Nance v. Gray, 143 Ala. 234, 5 Ann. Cas. 55, 38 South. 916; Russell v. Stockton, (Ala.) 74 South. 225; Elswick v. Matney, 132 Ky. 294, 136 Am. St. Rep. 180, 116 S. W. 718; Dance v. Dance, 56 Md. 433; Lyon v. Clark, (Mich.) 94 N. W. 4; Eubank v. Finnell, 118 Mo. App. 535, 94 S. W. 591; Majors v. Maxwell, 120 Mo. App. 281, 96 S. W. 731; Maroney v. Boyle, 141 N. Y. 462, 38 Am. St. Rep. 821, 36 N. E. 611.

§ 1252, (e) See, also, Hood v. Hammond, 128 Ala. 569, 86 Am. St. Rep. 159, 30 South. 540; Ware v. Curry, 67 Ala. 274.

§ 1252, (f) That the lien does not remain when the debt is barred by son is thus given.²g The complementary doctrine is also generally settled, that the acceptance of distinct independent security for the purchase price, other than the grantee's own personal undertaking, destroys or discharges the lieu, unless the continued existence of the lien is agreed upon by the parties. While this doctrine is generally accepted, there is much conflict of opinion in its application to particular conditions of fact.³ The securities which ordinarily

§ 1252, ² The sure criterion is the question whether any indebtedness for the purchase price any longer exists. If such debt has been discharged, the grantor thereby shows an intention to rely wholly upon the personal undertaking which he has accepted, in place of the original debt and the lien by which it would have been secured: 1 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 466-470; Parrott v. Sweetland, 3 Mylne & K. 655; Buckland v. Pocknell, 13 Sim. 406; Dixon v. Gayfere, 21 Beav. 118; 1 De Gex & J. 655; Dyke v. Rendall, 2 De Gex, M. & G. 209; Keith v. Wolf, 5 Bush, 646; Thames v. Caldwell, 60 Ala. 644 (draft of a third person taken in payment); Moshier v. Meek, 80 Ill. 79 (notes of grantee taken under such circumstances as to show that there really was no debt).

§ 1252, 3 The parties may undoubtedly agree that the lien shall exist, notwithstanding any security taken for its payment:^h Fonda v. Jones,

the statute of limitations, see Shaylor v. Cloud, 63 Fla. 608, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 277, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1171, and note, 57 South. 666; Johnson v. Dyer, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 602, 47 S. W. 727.

§1252, (g) The text is cited in Williams v. McCarty, 74 Ala. 295. See, also, Acton v. Waddington, 46 N. J. Eq. 16, 18 Atl. 356; Cummings v. Moore, 61 Miss. 184 (substituting note of a sub-grantee is not necessarily a novation); Boyd v. Jackson, 82 Ind. 525 (same); Spindler v. Iowa & O. S. L. Ry. Co., 173 Iowa, 348, 155 N. W. 271 (promise to take payment in stock of grantee corporation, waiver); but that the mere taking of a new note does not waive the lien, see Joiner v. Perkins, 59 Tex. 300; Slaughter v. Owens, 60 Tex. 668; Walker v. Struve, 70 Ala. 167; Upland Land Co. v. Ginn, 144 Ind. 434, 55 Am. St. Rep. 181, 43 N. E. 443 (taking two new notes, one in favor of grantor and one in favor of third person, in place of one old, does not waive the lien); Reeder v. Nay, 95 Ind. 164; Eubank v. Finnell, 118 Mo. App. 535, 94 S. W. 591; nor does the giving of a mortgage to the grantor deprive him of his priority over an intervening mortgagee: Jones v. Davis, 121 Ala. 348, 25 South. 789.

§ 1252, (h) Hood v. Hammond, 128 Ala. 569, 86 Am. St. Rep. 159, 30 South. 540; Boyer v. Austin, 75 Mo. 81; Briscoe v. Callahan, 77 Mo. 134; Cresap v. Manor, 63 Tex. 485. See, also, Bradbury v. Donnell, 136 Mo. App. 676, 119 S. W. 21 (such agreement need not appear in the mortgage which is taken as indeproduce this effect are, the grantee's mortgage on the very land conveyed; his mortgage on other land; the note, bill, bond, or undertaking of a third person; the note or bill of the grantee indorsed or guaranteed by a third person, and the like; but the decisions are not unanimous.⁴ j Finally,

42 Miss. 792, 2 Am. Rep. 669; Durette v. Briggs, 47 Mo. 356; Sanders v. McAffee, 41 Ga. 684. Some cases hold that, even in the absence of any such express agreement, the acceptance of independent security is not conclusive; that it merely raises a *prima facie* presumption of an intention to give up the lien, and that this presumption may be overcome and the lien established:¹ Mayes v. Hendry, 33 Ark. 240; Stroud v. Pace, 35 Ark. 100; Lavender v. Abbott, 30 Ark. 172; De Forest v. Holum, 38 Wis. 516; Fonda v. Jones, 42 Miss. 792, 2 Am. Rep. 669; Sanders v. McAffee, 41 Ga. 684; Irvine v. Muse, 10 Heisk. 477. The weight of authority, however, seems to be in plain accordance with the statement of the text, that such security *ipso facto* destroys the lien, unless such effect is prevented by agreement.

§ 1252, 4 The general doctrine.^k Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329; Nairn v. Prowse, 6 Ves. 752, 760 (mortgage on other land); Bond v.

pendent security); Buffalo Oölitic Limestone Quarries Co. v. Davis, 45 Ind. App. 116, 90 N. E. 327 (if the lien is waived by taking collateral security, it cannot be revived subsequently by parol agreement).

§1252, (1) See, also, Griffin v. Smith, 143 Fed. 865, 75 C. C. A. 73; Tedder v. Steele, 70 Ala. 347; Woodall v. Kelly, 85 Ala. 368, 17 Am. St. Rep. 57, 5 South. 164; Spears v. Taylor, 149 Ala. 180, 13 Ann. Cas. 867, and note, 42 South. 1016 (not waived by secretly signing note, where note states that it was given for certain described land, thus showing intention not to waive); Cook v. Atkins, 173 Ala. 363, 56 South. 224; Gnash v. George, 58 Iowa, 492, 12 N. W. 546; Hunt v. Marsh, 80 Mo. 396; Jarman v. Farley, 7 Lea, 141; Slaughter v. Owens, 60 Tex. 668; Noblett v. Harper, (Tex. Civ. App.) 136 S. W. 519. See Zeigler v. Valley Coal Co., 150 Mich. 82, 13 Ann. Cas. 90, 113 N. W. 775 (burden on purchaser to show waiver by clear and convincing proof).

§ 1252, (j) The text is quoted in Improved Building & Loan Ass'n v. Larkin, (N. J. Eq.) 101 Atl. 1043. § 1252, (1x) General doctrine.---Kyle v. Bellenger, 79 Ala. 516; Mc-Keown v. Collins, 38 Fla. 276, 21 South. 103; Bowen v. Grace, 64 Fla. 28, 59 South. 563; Ilett v. Collins, 103 Ill. 74; Masters v. Templeton. 92 Ind. 447; Hunt v. Marsh, 80 Mo. ; 396; Jensen v. Wilslef, 36 Nev. 37, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1220, 132 Pac. 16; Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Carteret Steel Co., 79 N. J. Eq. 501, 82 Atl. 146; Maroney v. Boyle, 141 N. Y. 462, 38 Am. St. Rep. 821, 36 N. E. 511; Dietrich v. Folk, 40 Ohio St. 635; Noblett v. Harper, (Tex. Civ. App.) 136 S. W. 519.

after the lien has risen against the grantee, it may be waived as against third persons by the laches or affirmative

Kent, 2 Vern. 281; Hughes v. Kearney, 1 Schoales & L. 132, 135; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 471, 472; Anderson v. Donnell, 66 Ind. 150; Clark v. Stilson, 36 Mich. 482; Perry v. Grant, 10 R. I. 334; Walker v. Carroll, 65 Ala. 61; Brown v. Gilman, 4 Wheat. 255, 290, 4 L. Ed. 564; Fish v. Howland, 1 Paige, 20, 30. Mortgage by the grantee: According to the general current of decisions, a mortgage by the grantee on the land conveyed or on other land destroys the lien:¹ Tinsley v. Tinsley, 52 Iowa, 14; Stuart v. Harrison, 52 Iowa, 511; Escher v. Simmons, 54 Iowa, 269; Neal v. Speigle, 33 Ark. 63; Gaylord v. Knapp, 15 Hun, 87; Pease v. Kelly, 3 Or. 417; Wells v. Harter, 56 Cal. 342; Camden v. Vail, 23 Cal. 633; Richards v. McPherson, 74 Ind. 158; Little v. Brown, 2 Leigh, 353; Young v. Wood, 11 B. Mon. 123; Johnson v. Sugg, 13 Smedes & M. 346. It seems, however, to be the settled rule in Texas that a mortgage by the grantee on the premises conveyed does not defeat the grantor's lien: Burgess v. Millican, 50 Tex. 397; Wasson v. Davis, 34 Tex. 159; De Bruhl v. Maas, 54 Tex. 464; and there are decisions in some other states which either hold the same, or that the lien was not defeated by the mortgage, under the particular circumstances: Armstrong v. Ross, 20 N. J. Eq. 109; De Forest v. Holum, 38 Wis. 516; Anketel v. Converse, 17 Ohio St. 11, 91 Am. Dec. 115; Boos v. Ewing, 17 Ohio, 500, 49 Am. Dec. 478; Linville v. Savage, 58 Mo. 248; Morris v. Pate, 31 Mo. 315. If for any reason, however, the mortgage is void, the lien is not defeated; as where it was given by a married woman, and was therefore a nullity: Kent v. Gerhard, 12 R. I. 92. 34 Am. Rep. 612; Martin v. Cauble, 72 Ind. 67;^m or where it was

§ 1252, (1) Mortgage by the grantee .- Walker v. Struve, 70 Ala. 167; Avery v. Clark, 87 Cal. 619, 22 Am. St. Rep. 272, 25 Pac. 919; Improved Building & Loan Ass'n v. Larkin, (N. J. Eq.) 101 Atl. 1043. See, also, Chicago, etc., Land Co. v. Peck, 112 Ill. 408, 451; Orrick v. Durham, 79 Mo. 174 (mortgage for a portion of the purchase-money waives the lien for the remainder); Ryhiner v. Frank, 105 Ill. 326; Mc-Clellan v. Coffin, 93 Ind. 456; Masters v. Templeton, 92 Ind. 447 (mortgage on other land of grantees).

See, however, Campbell v. Goldth-

waite, 189 Ala. 1, 66 South. 483 (where part of price secured by mortgage of part of land, no waiver as to the rest); Bradbury v. Donnell, 136 Mo. App. 676, 119 S. W. 21 (mortgage of part does not necessarily waive lien).

§ 1252, (m) Mortgage void.—Russel v. Stockton, (Ala.) 74 South. 225; Simmons v. Parker (Simmons v. Meyers), 61 Ind. App. 403, 112 N. E. 31; Barnhart v. Little, (Mo.) 185 S. W. 174 (mortgage on land not owned by grantee); Boshwitz v. Lawhorn, 131 Tenn. 705, 176 S. W. 1037. See, however, Jackson v. Stanley, 87 Ala. 270, 6 South. 193. acts of the grantor himself. In other words, the grantor may, by his negligence or other acts, postpone his lien, or

forged:ⁿ Fouch v. Wilson, 60 Ind. 64, 28 Am. Rep. 651; the decision in Camden v. Vail, 23 Cal. 633, is opposed to these cases, but seems to be unsupported in this respect either by principle or by authority. It is an altogether different case when the mortgage, being valid, merely turns out to be an insufficient security.^o Undertakings of third persons: It is generally held by the American courts that his acceptauce of the bond, note, bill, or other personal undertaking of a third person, or the note or bill of the grantee with the indorsement or guaranty of a third person defeats the lien:^D Hazeltin v. Moore, 21 Hun, 355; Vail v. Foster, 4 N. Y. 312; Stevens v. Rainwater, 4 Mo. App. 292; Durette v. Briggs, 47 Mo. 356; Durham v. Heirs of Daugherty, 30 La. Ann., pt. 2, 1255; Haskell v. Scott, 56 Ind. 564; Carrico v. Farmers' etc. Bank, 33 Md. 235 (grantee's note with indorser); Mc-

§ 1252, (n) Or where the taking of the additional security is *induced by fraud:* Thomas v. Bridges, 73 Mo. 530; Gnash v. George, 58 Iowa, 492, 12 N. W. 546; Brown v. Byam, 65 Iowa, 374, 21 N. W. 684; Himes v. Langley, 85 Ind. 77; Rhodes v. Arthur, 19 Okl. 520, 92 Pac. 244; Fowler v. Falkner, (Ala.) 73 South. 980; Jarratt v. Langston, 99 Ark. 438, 138 S. W. 1003.

§ 1252, (•) Valid mortgage, insufficient security.—In such case the lien is waived: Kendrick v. Eggleston, 56 Iowa, 128, 41 Am. Rep. 90, 8 N. W. 786; Akers v. Luse, 56 Iowa, 346, 9 N. W. 303.

A pledge of shares of stock is also presumptively a waiver: Jackson v. Stanley, 87 Ala. 270, 6 South. 193. See, also, Buffalo Oölitic Limestone Quarries Co. v. Davis, 45 Ind. App. 116, 90 N. E. 327; Jensen v. Wilslef, 36 Nev. 37, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1220, 132 Pac. 16.

§ 1252, (**p**) Undertakings of third persons.—Rice v. Rice, 36 Fed. 858 (note with indorsement); Walker v. Struve, 70 Ala. 167; Donegan's Adm'r v. Hentz, 70 Ala. 437 (bill of exchange with indorsers); Spears v. Taylor, 149 Ala. 180, 42 South. 1016, 13 Ann. Cas. 867, and note on this subject (but signature of surety not " a waiver when intention otherwise); Springfield, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stewart, 51 Ark. 285, 10 S. W. 767; Jones v. Allert, 161 Cal. 234, 118 Pac. 794; Royal Consolidated Min. Co. v. Royal Con. Mines, 157 Cal. 737, 137 Am. St. Rep. 165, 110 Pac. 123 (an instructive opinion; price of mining property to be paid by sale of shares in corporation to be formed, and by profits of the mines; existence of the lien wholly inconsistent with the success of the scheme); Hazard v. Fostoria Gold Mining Co., 27 Colo. App. 118, 146 Pac. 1072; Christy v. McKee, 94 Mo. 241, 6 S. W. 656; Spence v. Palmer, 115 Mo. App. 76, 90 S. W. 749; Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Carteret Steel Co., 79 N. J. Eq. 501, 82 Atl. 146; Jobe v. Chedister, 5 Lea, 346. But see Campbell v. Goldthwaite, 189 Ala. 1, 66 South. 483 (agreement to take bonds of corporation to be formed, not a waiver, when corporation was never formed).

estop himself from asserting it against third persons who have acquired title under the grantee.^{5 s}

Donigal v. Plummer, 30 Md. 422; Campbell v. Henry, 45 Miss. 326; Sanders v. McAffee, 41 Ga. 684; Baum v. Grigsby, 21 Cal. 172, 81 Am. Dec. 153; when land is really bought by the husband, but by his direction the conveyance is made to his wife, it is held that the acceptance of his note for the price does not destroy the lien: Moore v. Worthy, 56 Ala. 163; Davenport v. Murray, 68 Mo. 198;^q but, per contra, see Andrus v. Coleman, 82 Ill. 26, 25 Am. Rep. 289. The decisions on the general rule are not uniform, and it has been held that personal security of a third person does not defeat the lien:^r Stroud v. Pace, 35 Ark. 100 (grantee's note secured by a third person); McClure v. Harris, 12 B. Mon. 261; Tiernan v. Thurman, 14 B. Mon. 224; Burrus v. Roulhac's Adm'x, 2 Bush, 39. As to notes given by subgrantees and the lien against them, see Wasson v. Davis, 34 Tex. 159; Gordon v. Manning, 44 Miss. 756; Wood v. Sullens, 44 Ala. 686; Burgess v. Greene, 64 Ala. 509; McLaurie v. Thomas, 39 Ill. 291; Effinger v. Ralston, 21 Gratt. 430.

§ 1252, ⁵ Laches.—Where the grantor delivered the deed with a receipt of payment in full indorsed thereon to the grantee, and the grantee, by depositing the deed as security, obtained a loan from a person who had no notice of the grantor's rights, the grantor's lien was held postponed to the equitable mortgage of the lender: Rice v. Rice, 2 Drew. 73; the grantor, by aiding and encouraging the grantee to sell the land as though it was free from encumbrance, and failing to disclose his own lien, may estop himself from setting it up as against

§1252, (9) Land bought by husband but conveyance made to wife .---See, also, Hunt v. Marsh, 80 Mo. 396; Williams v. Crow, 84 Mo. 298; see, also, Parker v. McBee, 61 Miss. 134 (no waiver from fact that the note was signed also by the husband of the grantee); Crampton v. Prince, 83 Ala. 246, 3 Am. St. Rep. 718, 3 South. 519; Chapman v. Peebles, 84 Ala. 283, 4 South. 273; Jackson v. Stanley, 87 Ala. 270, 6 South. 193; Davis v. Smith, 88 Ala. 596, 7 South. 159; Bakes v. Gilbert, 93 Ind. 70; Smith v. Schultz, 23 Idaho, 144, 129 Pac. 640 (no waiver from fact that note was indersed by vendee's wife; indorsement void as debt not for her own benefit; or if it be contended that land became community property, then wife is one of the purchasers and her note not additional security).

§ 1252, (r) Personal security of third person does not defeat lien.— Loomis v. D. & St. P. R. R. Co., 17 Fed. 301, 3 McCrary, 301 (grantee's accepted draft).

§ 1252, (s) See, also, Welch v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 165 Fed. 561, 91 C. C. A. 399; Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Carteret Steel Co., 79 N. J. Eq. 501, 62 Atl. 146; Larscheid v. Kittel (Larscheid v. Hashek Mfg. Co.), 142 Wis. 172, 20 Ann. Cas. 576, 125 N. W. 442. § 1253. Against Whom the Lien Avails.—The grantor's lien once arising, and not waived by any act or default of his, avails against the grantee himself, his heirs, devisees, and other immediate successors in interest.^{1 a} It also avails against all subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers of the land under the grantee who are not *bona fide* purchasers for a valuable consideration and without notice.^{2 d}

such purchaser: Henson v. Westcott, 82 Ill. 224; Reily v. Miami etc. Co., 5 Ohio, 333; Atkinson v. Lindsey, 39 Ind. 296; Thompson v. Dawson, 3 Head. 384; Burns v. Taylor, 23 Ala. 255; also, when there is no such concealment, the grantor, by joining with the grantee in mortgaging or conveying the land, or in otherwise dealing with it, may waive his original lien against the parties who thus obtain interest under the grantee: Tinsley v. Tinsley, 52 Iowa, 14 (joining in a mortgage on the land); Burgess v. Greene, 64 Ala. 509.

§ 1253, 1 Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 329; Simpson v. McAllister, 56 Ala. 228; Bankhead v. Owen, 60 Ala. 457; Shorter v. Frazer, 64 Ala. 74; Walton v. Hargroves, 42 Miss. 18, 97 Am. Dec. 429; against grantee's heirs: Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 46, 4 L. Ed. 393; Warner v. Van Alstyne, 3 Paige, 513; Shirley v. Sugar Ref. Co., 2 Edw. Ch. 505; against his widow's dower:^b Fisher v. Johnson, 5 Ind. 492; and against her homestead right: McHendry v. Reilly, 13 Cal. 75.^e

§ 1253, 2 The lien prevails, therefore, against mere volunteers, purchasers, or encumbrancers not paying value, although without notice, and all purchasers and encumbrancers with notice who have paid value: 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 477-481; Graves v. Coutant, 31 N. J. Eq.

§1253, (a) This section is cited in Funk v. Seehorn, 99 Mo. App. 587, 74 S. W. 445.

§ 1253, (b) Against dower right.— See, also, Sarver v. Clarkson, 156 Ind. 316, 59 N. E. 933, and cases cited; Bothe v. Gleason, 126 Ark. 313, 190 S. W. 562.

§ 1253, (e) The lien prevails against a homestedd declared on the land by the grantee: Brown v. Ennis, 69 Ark. 123, 86 Am. St. Rep. 171, 61 S. W. 379, and note, pp. 174-182, Am. St. Rep.

§ 1253, (d) The text is quoted in Mihoover v. Walker, (Colo.) 164 Pac. 504.

§ 1253, (e) Against volunteers .---

See, also, Mitchell v. Dawson, 23 W. Va. 86; Poindexter v. Rawlings, 106 Tenn. 97, 82 Am. St. Rep. 869, 59 S. W. 766. See, further, Miller v. Mattison, 105 Ark. 201, 150 S. W. 710 (against grantee's equitable mortgage to secure his anteccdent debt); De Long v. Marshall, 66 Fla. 410, 63 South. 723; Simmons v. Parker (Simmons v. Meyers), 61 Ind. App. 403, 112 N. E. 31. It prevails against a provision in the grantee's earlier mortgage covering afteracquired property: Knickerbocker Tenst Co. v. Carteret Steel Co., 79 N. J. Eq. 501, 82 Atl. 146 (since both are equitable liens, and the grantor's attaches first).

It does not prevail against a subsequent *bona fide* purchaser or mortgagee of the land for a valuable consideration and without notice of the grantee's equity.³g Whether

763; Simpson v. McAllister, 56 Ala. 228; Bankhead v. Owen, 60 Ala. 457; Gordon v. Bell, 50 Ala. 213; Shorter v. Frazer, 64 Ala. 74; Walton v. Hargroves, 42 Miss. 18, 97 Am. Dec. 429; Stafford v. Van Rensselaer, 9 Cow. 316; Magruder v. Peter, 11 Gill & J. 217. Volunteers: Grant v. Mills, 2 Ves. & B. 306; Frail v. Ellis, 16 Beav. 350; Tueker v. Hadley, 52 Miss. 414; McLain v. Thompson, 52 Miss. 418; Pylant v. Reeves, 53 Ala. 132, 25 Am. Rep. 605; Carver v. Eads, 65 Ala. 190 (deed to wife where husband was the real purchaser); Higgins v. Kendall, 73 Ind. 522 (a subsequent grantee who did not pay until after receiving notice). Purchasers with notice:^f Hughes v. Kearney, 1 Schoales & L. 132; Norris v. Chambers, 29 Beav. 246; Mast v. Raper, 81 N. C. 330; Whetsel v. Roberts, 31 Ohio St. 503; Swan v. Benson, 31 Ark. 728 (knowledge that part of the original purchase-money remains unpaid is a sufficient notice).

§ 1253, ³ Cator v. Earl of Pembroke, 1 Brown Ch. 302; Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 46, 4 L. Ed. 393; Dagger v. Taylor, 60 Ala. 504

§ 1253, (f) Purchasers with notice. See, also, Butterfield v. Okie, 36 N. J. Eq. 482; Mitchell v. Dawson, 23 W. Va. 86; Chapman v. Liggett, 41 Ark. 292; Stephens v. Shannon, 43 Ark. 464; Hooper v. Strahan, 71 Ala. 75; Woodall v. Kelly, 85 Ala. 368, 7 Am. St. Rep. 57, 5 South. 164; Craft v. Russell, 67 Ala. 9; Strohm v. Good, 113 Ind. 93, 14 N. E. 901; Acton v. Waddington, 46 N. J. Eq. 16, 18 Atl. 356; Christopher v. Christopher, 64 Md. 583, 3 Atl. 296; Petry v. Ambrosher, 100 Ind. 510; Beal v. Harrington, 116 Ill. 113, 4 N. E. 664; Thomas v. Bridges, 73 Mo. 530; Orrick v. Durham, 79 Mo. 174 (an unrecorded deed which was essential to the purchaser's claim of title showed by its recitals that purchase-money had not been paid); Dickinson v. Worthington, 10 Fed. 860 (recitals in the order of court authorizing the sale); Exchange Bank v. Stone, 80 Ky. 109 (assignee in bankruptcy of grantee is a volunteer); Lyon v. Clark, (Mich.) 94 N. W. 4 (same). See, further, In re V. & M. Lumber Co., 182 Fed 231 (corporation formed of the vendees and their wives); Rewis v. Williamson, 51 Fla. 529, 41 South. 449; Bowen v. Grace, 64 Fla. 28, 59 South. 563; De Long v. Marshall, 66 Fla. 410, 63 South. 723 (enforced against a sub-grantee in so far as he has still unpaid a portion of his purchase price when he has notice of the lien); Malon v. Scholler, 48 Ind. App. 691, 96 N. E. 499 (burden of proof as to notice on grantor claiming the licn); Hodgson v. Smith Bros., 136 Iowa, 515, 114 N. W. 39. The lien is not defeated by a conveyance to a purchaser after suit has been brought, although such conveyance was made in pursuance of a contract made before: Fisher v. Shropshire, 147 U. S. 133, 37 L. Ed. 109, 13 Sup. Ct. 201.

§ 1253, (g) See, also, First Nat. Bank v Tompkins, 57 Fed. 20, 6 C. C. A. 237; Dance v. Dance, 56 Md.

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the grantor's lien is or is not superior to that of subsequent judgments recovered against the grantee is a question upon which the American decisions are in direct conflict; nor is it possible by any interpretation to reconcile their opposing views. On principle, however,—and especially when considered in connection with the universal system of registry, —it seems to me clear that the subsequent judgment liens are entitled to precedence.⁴ j

(a subgrantee); Burgess v. Greene, 64 Ala. 509 (same); Thurman v. Stoddard, 63 Ala. 336; Shorter v. Frazer, 64 Ala. 74; Simpson v. Mc-Allister, 56 Ala. 228; Bankhead v. Owen, 60 Ala. 457; Gordon v. Bell, 50 Ala. 213; Russell v. Dodson, 6 Baxt. 16; Walton v. Hargroves, 42 Miss. 18, 97 Am. Dec. 429; Higgins v. Kendall; 73 Ind. 522; as to what constitutes notice by recitals in deed, by possession, etc., see ante. vol. 2, §§ 626, 628. Where a legal lien, by mortgage or otherwise, on the land, or a part thereof, is created at the same time as the grantor's equitable lien, such legal lien has the preference: Robinson v. Mc-Whirter, 52 Tex. 201; Dugger v. Tayloe, 60 Ala. 504; Fisk v. Potter, 2 Abb. App. 138.^h The premises subject to the lien in the hands of the original grantee, A, being conveyed to a second grantee, B, who is a bona fide purchaser without notice, if the purchase-money due from B to A is still unpaid, the original grantor's lien may, it seems, be enforced against it as a fund substituted in place of the land: Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 511.1

§ 1253, ⁴ Of course, it is assumed in this statement that the judgment creditors have no notice of the grantor's prior lien; if they have notice, they are governed by the general rule which applies to all subsequent encumbrancers with notice. The divergent and often uncertain conclusions reached by text-writers, and the conflicting deci-

433; Traphagen v. Hand, 36 N. J. Eq. 384; Welch v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 165 Fed. 561, 91 C. C. A. 399.

§ 1253, (h) But on a contest between a grantor's lien and a mortgage of after-acquired property, given by the vendee and embracing the land sold, since both liens are purely equitable, the grantor's lien prevails; so held in Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Carteret Steel Co., 79 N. J. Eq. 501, 82 Atl. 146. §1253, (1) See Taylor v. Callaway, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 461, 27 S. W. 934, quoting the last sentence of the author's note, and holding that the relief against the substituted fund can be had only on proper pleading.

§ 1253, (j) This portion of the text is quoted in Cutler v. Ammon, 65 Iowa, 281, 21 N. W. 604, and in Hood v. Hogue, 131 Tenn. 421, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 383, 175 S. W. 531.

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§ 1254. In Favor of Whom the Lien Avails.^a—In England the prevailing opinion regards the lien not as merely

sions of the courts, upon this question, are undoubtedly due in great measure to the method, which has unfortunately prevailed, of describing and treating the grantor's lien upon conveyance and the vendor's lien upon a mere agreement to convey, in the same terms by the same formula. Two interests which are essentially unlike in their nature and in many of their incidents are thus confounded, and dealt with as one and the same. The radical difference between these two socalled "liens," on principle, appears in the clearest manner with regard to their respective effects upon subsequent judgments. The vendor under a land contract retains the legal title and estate; the vendee, although admitted to possession, has only an equitable interest. If the contract is not recorded, the records show the legal estate in the vendor; if the contract is recorded, the record still shows that the vendee's interest is wholly equitable. In no case, therefore, can a judgment creditor be misled by the records to suppose that the vendee has obtained the legal title. The judgment recovered against the vendee is then a lien upon a more equitable interest, obtained under such circumstances that the judgment creditor must have notice of the legal title and estate being vested in another person. This legal title and estate of the vendor should, therefore, prevail against the subsequent judgment lien upon the equitable interest of the vendee, and the judgment creditor is not and cannot be prejudiced thereby. In fact, it is a complete misuse of legal terms to call the interest of the vendor, as against such third persons claiming under the vendee, a lien, when it is the full legal estate. Between the vendor and the vendee themselves, for the purpose of working out the purely equitable conception as to the effects of an agreement to convey, the vendor's interest is properly called a lien in equity; but when the legal rights of third persons intervene, they should not be interfered with or sacrificed to such special nomenclature. The condition of the grantor's lien is radically different. The grantee holds the full legal title and estate, and he appears by the records to be the legal owner. The grantor's interest is purely an equitable lien, secret, undisclosed by the record. A judgment creditor of the grantee has a right to regard him as the complete owner in reliance upon the records; he has no knowledge, and ordinarily no means of knowledge, of the grantor's secret equitable The judgment against the grantee is a legal lien upon the legal lien.

§ 1254, (a) This section is cited in Hammond v. Peyton, 34 Minn. 529, 27 N. W. 72; First Nat. Bank v. Salem C. F. M. Co., 39 Fed. 89; Cate v. Cate, 87 Tenn. 41, 9 S. W. 231; Brisco v. Minah Consol. Min. Co., 82 Fed. 952. personal to the grantor, but as an interest in land of which other parties may avail themselves by subrogation or mar-

estate in his hands. It is not the case of two successive equitable liens of the same nature, where priority of time gives precedence. It is true that a prior equitable estate may sometimes prevail against a subsequent legal lien by judgment; but this doctrine is confined by the strong tendency of American decisions to true equitable estates. The grantor's interest is in no sense an equitable estate; it is a mere lien, not essentially of a higher nature than that of a judgment, while that of the judgment possesses the superiority of being legal. The doctrine that between a prior equitable interest and a subsequent legal interest of equal character, the legal will prevail, seems to be controlling. In my opinion, it is plain from this analysis, on principle, that the prior grantor's equitable lien must succumb to the subsequent legal lien of the judgment against the legal estate of the grantee, when the judgment is recovered for a valuable consideration and without notice. Among the great number of cases, the following illustrate the foregoing conclusion that the grantor's lien does not prevail against such judgment:k Allen v. Loring, 34 Iowa, 499; Dawson v. Girard L. Ins. Co., 27 Minn. 411; Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 46; Cook v. Banker, 50 N. Y. 655; Robinson v. Williams, 22 N. Y. 380; Hulett v. Whipple, 58 Barb. 224; Taylor v. Baldwin, 10 Barb. 626; Cook v. Kraft, 3 Lans. 512; Johnson v. Cawthorn, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 32, 27 Am. Dec. 250; Webb v. Robinson, ⁶14 Ga. 216; Roberts v. Rose, 2 Humph. 145, 147; Gann v. Chester, 5 Yerg. 205. On the same ground, the lien is held not to prevail against attaching creditors of the grantee without notice: Allen v. Loring, supra; Porter v. Dubuque, 20 Iowa, 440; Adams v. Buchanan, 49 Mo. 64.

On the other hand, the following cases give the grantor's lien the precedence: Lamberton v. Van Voorhis, 15 Hun, 336; Tucker v. Hadley, 52 Miss. 414 (against a purchaser at execution sale); Walton v. Hargroves, 42 Miss. 18, 97 Am. Dec. 429; Parker v. Kelly, 10 Smedes & M. 184; Thompson v. McGill, Freem. (Miss.) 401; Lewis v. Caperton's Ex'r, 8 Gratt. 148; Aldridge v. Dunn, 7 Blackf. 249, 41 Am. Dec. 224.¹

§ 1253, (k) Cutler v. Ammon, 65 Iowa, 281, 21 N. W. 604; Hood v. Hogue, 131 Tenn. 421, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 353, 175 S. W. 531.

§ 1253, (1) See, also, Dickerson v. Carroll, 76 Ala. 377 (notice of the grantor's lien received by the judgment creditor before he obtains an order of sale defeats the statutory priority of the judgment lien); Lissa v. Posey, 64 Miss. 352, 1 South. 500 (against a purchaser at execution sale); Bowman v. Faw, 5 Lea, 472; Powles v. Belt, (Tex. Civ. App.) 159 S. W. 885. shaling, as legatees or judgment creditors of the grantor, or by direct assignment. In this country the strong tendency of the court has been, for reasons difficult to be understood, to treat the lien as strictly personal to the grantor, and as incapable of being transferred, either by direct assignment or by equitable subrogation. It may, of course, be enforced by the grantor himself, and by his heirs or immediate successors.¹ In England it may be enforced by an assignee, and an assignment of the debt, it seems, carries also the lien.² The English doctrine is followed in a portion of the states, but in most of them the lien is held personal to the grantor, and not assignable.³ By this

§ 1254, 1 By his heirs: Lavender v. Abbott, 30 Ark. 172. Devisee: Tiernan v. Beam, 2 Ohio, 383, 15 Am. Dec. 557.

§ 1254, ² Dryden v. Frost, 3 Mylne & C. 670; Lacey v. Ingle, 2 Phill. Ch. 413; Rayne v. Baker, 1 Giff. 241.

§1254, 3 In the following states it cannot be transferred by assignment nor by subrogation:—

Arkansas: Shall v. Biscoe, 18 Ark. 142, 162; Williams v. Christian, 23 Ark. 255; Hutton v. Moore, 26 Ark. 382, 396; Jones v. Doss, 27 Ark. 518; Carlton v. Buckner, 28 Ark. 66.^b But an assignment as collateral security is permitted: Blevins v. Rogers, 32 Ark. 258; Crawley v. Riggs, 24 Ark. 563; Carlton v. Buckner, supra.^c

California: Baum v. Grigsby, 21 Cal. 172, 81 Am. Dec. 153; Williams v. Young, 21 Cal. 227; Ross v. Heintzen, 36 Cal. 313.^d

Georgia: Wellborn v. Williams, 9 Ga. 86, 52 Am. Dec. 427; Webb v. Robinson, 14 Ga. 216.

Illinois: Small v. Stagg, 95 Ill. 39; Wing v. Goodman, 75 Ill. 159; Moshier v. Meek, 80 Ill. 79; Carpenter v. Mitchell, 54 Ill. 126.^e

§ 1254, (b) Arkansas. — But see Rodman v. Sanders, 44 Ark. 504 (one who pays the debt at the request of the debtor-vendee, and with the latter's consent retains the note and deed, and thus manifests an intention to keep the lien alive, is subrogated thereto).

§ 1254, (c) Arkansas.—Assignment as collateral security permitted: Chapman v. Leggett, 41 Ark. 292.

§ 1254, (d) California.—Avery v. Clark, 87 Cal. 619, 22 Am. St. Rep. 272, 25 Pac. 919. But if the grantor is obliged to take up the note by reason of its non-payment, the lien is revived: Bancroft v. Cosby, 74 Cal. 583, 16 Pac. 504. So, where the grantor assigned the note for purpose of collection and on non-payment resumes collection of the note: Nolan v. Nolan, 155 Cal. 476, 132 Am. St. Rep. 99, 17 Ann. Cas. 1056, 101 Pac. 520.

§ 1254, (e) Illinois. — Gruhn v. Richardson, 128 Ill. 178, 21 N. E. 18;

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theory, an assignment of the debt, either with or without an express assignment of the lien, does not carry the lien • so that it may be enforced by or on behalf of the assignee.

Maryland: Dixon v. Dixon, 1 Md. Ch. 220; Iglehart v. Armiger, 1 Bland, 519.

Mississippi: Rutland v. Brister, 53 Miss. 683; Pitts v. Parker, 44 Miss. 247; Lindsey v. Bates, 42 Miss. 397 (but if grantor is compelled to take up the note assigned, the lien revives in his favor); Stratton v. Gold, 40 Miss. 778; see Perkins v. Gibson, 51 Miss. 699, 24 Am. Rep. 644.5

Missouri: Pearl v. Hervey, 70 Mo. 160; Adams v. Cowherd, 30 Mo. 458.^h

New York: White v. Williams, 1 Paige, 502; and see Smith v. Smith, 9 Abb. Pr., N. S., 420.

Ohio: Brush v. Kinsley, 14 Ohio, 20; Horton v. Horner, 14 Ohio, 437.

Tennessee: Durant v. Davis, 10 Heisk. 522; Tharpe v. Dunlap, 4 Heisk. 674.

In the following states the lien may be assigned with the debt:--

Alabama.—A transfer of the debt carries the lien: Simpson v. Mc-Allister, 56 Ala. 228; Wells v. Morrow, 38 Ala. 125; White v. Stover, 10 Ala. 441;^J but if the grantor assigns the notes for the debt "without recourse," or in any other manner which cuts off all his own liability thereon, the lien is held not to pass: Bankhead v. Owen, 60 Ala. 457; Barnett v. Risser's Ex'rs, 63 Ala. 347; Walker v. Carroll, 65 Ala. 61.^k

Martin v. Martin, 164 Ill. 640, 56 Am. St. Rep. 219, 45 N. E. 1007.

§ 1254, (f) Minnesota.—Hammond v. Peyton, 34 Minn. 529, 27 N. W. 72.

§ 1254, (**c**) Mississippi.—Parker v. McBee, 61 Miss. 134 (if the grantor held title as trustee, he does not waive the lien by indorsing the note in blank and delivering it to his cestui que trust for collection). But by the Code of 1880, section 1124, the rule is changed, and the assignment of the claim for purchase-money carries with it the lien: Louisiana Nat. Bank v. Knapp, 61 Miss. 485.

§ 1254, (h) Missouri.—In Slean v. Campbell, 71 Mo. 387, 36 Am. Rep. 493, however, it was held that the lien is assignable, and passes with the purchase-money note. See, also, Williams v. Baker, 100 Mo. App. 284, 73 S. W. 339.

§ 1254, (1) Oregon. — First Nat. Bank v. Salem C. F. M. Co., 39 Fed. 89.

§ 1254, (J) Alabama. — See, also, Wilkinson v. May, 69 Ala. 33.

§ 1254, (**k**) Alabama. — And **a** transfer by delivery merely of the note did not pass the lien: Prickett v. Sibert, 71 Ala. 194; Preston v. Ellington, 74 Ala. 133; Daily's Adm'r v. Reid, 74 Ala. 415; Weaver v. Brown, 87 Ala. 533, 6 South. 354; but these last two rules are now

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Where an express assignment is thus forbidden, it necessarily follows that no equitable assignment by subrogation

Indiana: Nichols v. Glover, 41 Ind. 24; Johns v. Sewell, 33 Ind. 1; Wiseman v. Hutchinson, 20 Ind. 40; Kern v. Hazlerigg, 11 Ind. 443, 71 Am. Dec. 360.¹ m

Kentucky: Broadwell v. King, 3 B. Mon. 449; Honore's Ex'r v. Bakewell, 6 B. Mon. 67, 43 Am. Dec. 147; Ripperdon v. Cozine, 8 B. Mon. 465.

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Texas: De Bruhl v. Maas, 54 Tex. 464; White v. Downs, 40 Tex. 225; Watt v. White, 33 Tex. 421.ª

Whenever, by an arrangement hetween the parties, a note for the purchase price is given by the grantee to a third person instead of to the grantor, such person is generally held entitled to enforce the lien:" Perkins v. Gibson, 51 Miss. 699, 24 Am. Rep. 644; Nichols v. Glover, 41 Ind. 24; Latham v. Staples, 46 Ala. 462; Campbell v. Roach, 45 Ala. 667; Hamilton v. Gilhert, 2 Heisk. 680; Mitchell v. Butt, 45 Ga. 162; Francis v. Wells, 2 Col. 660.

changed by statute: Code, § 1764; Davis v. Smith, 88 Ala. 596, 7 South. 159. The transferee, however, must be a *purchaser* of the note, in order to obtain the right to enforce the lien: Jones v. Lockard, 89 Ala. 575, 8 South. 103. One who advances money to pay the purchase price is subrogated: Bell v. Bell, 174 Ala. 446, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1203, and note, 56 South. 926.

§ 1254, (1) Indiana.—Otis v. Gregory, 111 Ind. 504, 13 N. E. 39 (subrogation); Lowry v. Smith, 97 Ind. 466; Upland Land Co. v. Ginn, 144 Ind. 434, 55 Am. St. Rep. 181, 43 N. E. 443. See, also, Simmons v. Parker (Simmons v. Meyers), 61 Ind. App. 403, 112 N. E. 31 (subrogation).

§ 1254, (m) Iowa.—Lien passes to assignee as incident of the debt: State Bank of Iowa Falls v. Brown, 142 Iowa, 190, 134 Am. St. Rep. 412, 119 N. W. 81. § 1254, (n) Mississippi.—A transfer of the debt carries the lien: Code 1880, § 1124; Louisiana Nat. Bank v. Knapp, 61 Miss. 485. See, also, Elmslie v. Thurman, 87 Miss. 537, 40 South. 67.

§ 1254, (o) Missouri. — Sloan v. Campbell, 71 Mo. 387, 36 Am. Rep. 493; Williams v. Baker, 100 Mo. App. 284, 73 S. W. 339.

§ 1254, (P) New Jersey. — Where vendee's surety pays the debt, he is subrogated to the lien: Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Carteret Steel Co., 79 N. J. Eq. 501, 82 Atl. 146.

§ 1254, (a) *Texas.* — Brooks v. Young, 60 Tex. 32; Ouroy v. Saunders, 77 Tex. 278, 13 S. W. 1030 (subrogation); Hicks v. Morris, 57 Tex. 658; Fennimore v. Ingham, (Tex. Civ. App.) 181 S. W. 513.

§ 1254, (r) Where Purchase-money Note Given to Third Person.—Tysen v. Wabash R'y Co., 15 Fed. 763, 11 Biss. 510; Woodall v. Kelly, 85 Ala.

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is possible. Notwithstanding this weight of authority, the restrictive rule seems to rest on no ground of principle.

§ 1255. Grantor's Lien by Reservation.—In several of the states the practice has become quite common of reserving a lien, as security to the grantor for the unpaid purchase price, by means of an express clause or stipulation in the deed of conveyance. Such a reservation creates a specific lien which in its essential nature more resembles the ordinary purchase-money mortgage given back by the grantee, than the implied equitable lien of the grantor heretofore described; for since it is contained in and recorded with the deed, it becomes notice to and takes precedence of all subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers holding under or deriving title through the same conveyance; and it generally has the same priority among other outstanding encumbrances which is accorded to the purchase-money mortgage.^{1 a}

§ 1255, 1 It appears, in a previous note, that the state statutes which have abolished the ordinary equitable grantor's lien have excepted from their operation this lien arising from reservation. It is not unusual in some states for the grantee to give notes for the unpaid price, which notes are specifically described in the deed and made liens on the land conveyed for their respective amounts, so that their holder has a virtual mortgage on the land, good against all subsequent grantees, mortgagees, judgment creditors, etc.:^b King v. Young Men's Ass'n, 1 Woods, 386; Heist v. Baker,

368, 7 Am. St. Rep. 57, 5 South. 164;
McCrory v. Guyton, 154 Ala. 355, 45
South. 658; Zirkle v. Hendon, 180
Ala. 209, 60 South. 834; Hunter v.
Briggs, 184 Ala. 327, 63 South. 1004;
Fraser v. Cole, 214 Fed. 556, 131
C. C. A. 102 (Illinois); Mize v.
Barnes, 78 Ky. 506; Louisiana Nat.
Bank v. Knapp, 61 Miss. 485; Lenox
v. Earls, (Me. App.) 185 S. W. 232;
Zeiser v. Cohn, 207 N. Y. 407, Ann.
Cas. 1914C, 493, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.)
186, 101 N. E. 184; Johnson v.
Townsend, 77 Tex. 639, 14 S. W.
233; Joiner v. Perkins, 59 Tex. 300.

§ 1255, (a) This section is cited in Dowdy v. Blake, 50 Ark. 205, 7 Am.
St. Rep. 88, 6 S. W. 897; Bank v. Johnson, 47 Ohio St. 306, 8 L. R. A. 614, 24 N. E. 503; Doescher v. Spratt, 61 Minn. 326, 63 N. W. 736. § 1255, (b) Kirk v. Williams, 24 Fed. 437; Sidwell v. Wheaton, 114 Ill. 267, 2 N. E. 183. It seems that one who has contracted, in the ordinary manner, to sell land has a right to reserve such lien in the deed, although the reservation was not contracted for: Findley v. Armstrong, 23 W. Va. 113. At any rate, a lien § 1256. What Creates a Lien by Reservation.—The provision which shall thus create a lien by reservation may be of various forms; but it must be something more than a recital that a specified amount of the purchase price remains unpaid. It must show the amount of the purchasemoney due which is to be secured by the lien, and must in some manner express an intent that the payment of such amount is to be charged upon the land,—that the land is conveyed subject to a definite charge for the payment of the sum.¹

49 Pa. St. 9; Stratton v. Gold, 40 Miss. 778, 781; Davis v. Hamilton, 50 Miss. 213; Pugh v. Holt, 27 Miss. 461; Caldwell v. Fraim, 32 Tex. 310; White v. Downs, 40 Tex. 225; Carpenter v. Mitchell, 54 Ill. 126; Markoe v. Andras, 67 Ill. 34; Carr v. Holbrook, 1 Mo. 240; Dingley v. Bank of Ventura, 57 Cal. 467; Talieferro v. Barnett, 37 Ark. 511; Campbell v. Rankin, 28 Ark. 401; Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wall. 1; Kausler v. Ford, 47 Miss. 289; Moore v. Lackey, 53 Miss. 85; Blaisdell v. Smith, 3 Ill. App. 150; Osborne v. Royer, 1 Lea, 217; Collins v. Richart, 14 Bush, 621; Carr v. Thompson, 67 Mo. 472.

§ 1256, ¹ Heist v. Baker, 49 Pa. St. 9, holds that a provision in a deed of land, "to have and to hold the same under and subject, nevertheless, to the payment" of a certain sum at the death of the grantee, constitutes a valid lien on the land against all subsequent owners, etc.^a In Pugh v. Holt, 27 Miss. 461, a stipulation that the title shall not vest in the grantee until the purchase price specified is paid was held to create such a specific lien. In Carr v. Holbrook, 1 Mo. 240, a clause that the deed shall be absolute upon the payment of certain notes described, but in default of their payment shall be void, produced the same effect. Harvey v. Kelly, 41 Miss. 490, 93 Am. Dec. 267, goes further, and holds that such kind of lien is not confined to the payment of a certain sum of money due, but may be made to secure the performance of any obligation agreed upon by the parties,-for example, to secure an agreement to pay by delivering certain articles. If this decision is followed, the scope of the lien will be much enlarged, and the difference between it and the implied grantor's (vendor's) lien will be much more pronounced.^b The recital in a deed that "said

so reserved cannot be questioned by a third party: Morehead v. Horner, 30 W. Va. 548, 4 S. E. 448.

§ 1256, (a) Eichelberger v. Gitt, 104 Pa. St. 64; Ransom v. Brown, 63 Tex. 188. § 1256, (b) This paragraph of the text is cited in Honaker v. Jones, 102 Tex. 132, 113 S. W. 748 (the lien may secure price of land and chattels sold for a gross sum). § 1257. Essential Nature of This Lien.—This peculiar species of lien differs essentially from that which equity raises by implication in favor of the grantor, since it is based upon and created by express contract. It is in all

land and improvements are held bound for the payment of said two notes" creates a valid lien on the land: Talieferro v. Barnett, 37 Ark. 511; where a deed recited that two thirds of the purchase-money had been paid, and then reserved a lien for all unpaid purchase-money, but in fact only one third had been paid, a lien as between the grantor and the grantee is created for the whole of the two thirds actually remaining unpaid: Ledford v. Smith, 6 Bush, 129; as against subsequent grantees or mortgagees who had only the constructive notice arising from the record and recitals of the deed itself, the lien would certainly not extend beyond the one third. Where a lien has been properly reserved as security for payment of notes, the substitution of a new note in place of one originally given does not disturb the lien: Kausler v. Ford, 47 Miss. 289. Whatever words distinctly convey the idea that the grantor retains or reserves a lien on the land creates an express lien by reservation:^c More v. Lackey, 53 Miss. 85. Two partners, W. and Z., sold their interest to the third, Y.; W. received from Y. cash in full for his share; Z. received notes payable at different times for his; the deed from the two contained the following: "And the said Z. hereby retains a lien on the property hereby conveyed as security for the payment of the above-recited notes received in payment of his interest; the said W. has been paid up in full for his interest." Held, that the lien thus reserved extended to the entire property conveyed by both grantors, and was not confined to that portion of it originally belonging to Z.: Patton v. Hoge, 22 Gratt. 443. A deed describing notes given for the purchase price, and stating "to have and to hold on the payment of the notes hereintofore stated," creates a lien by reservation: Blaisdell v. Smith, 3 Ill. App. 150. And see, also, Carr v. Thompson, 67 Mo. 472; Pillow v. Helm, 7 Baxt. 545; Hobson v. Edwards, 57 Miss. 128 (stipulation in the note); Osborne v. Royer, 1 Lea, 217 (same); French v. Dickey, 3 Tenn. Ch. 302 (substitution of a new note); Dingley v. Bank of Ventura. 57 Cal. 467; Baker v. Compton, 52 Tex. 252.d

§ 1256, (c) Thus, the words "This grant is made upon the express condition that A. B. D. shall pay unto H. D. and H. R. D. the sum of two hundred dollars annually," were held sufficient in Doescher v. Doescher, 61 Minn. 326, 63 N. W. 736. Compare Harris v. Shield's Ex'r, 111 Va. 643, 69 S. E. 933 (deed "in consideration of \$500 secured to be paid and of \$500 cash paid," no lien).

§ 1256, (d) See, also, Kyle v. Bellenger, 72 Ala. 516; Putnam v. Summerlin, 168 Ala. 390, 53 South. 101.

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essential elements a mortgage. The deed is made to embody an informal mortgage or defeasance, and is thus prevented from being absolute so long as the price remains unpaid.^a The lien is made a matter of record, is thus a constructive notice to all subsequent dealers with the land, and it is in fact governed by the rules which regulate the effect of an ordinary mortgage.¹ It is in fact an American mode of realizing the purely equitable conception of a mortgage stripped of all its legal forms and features.

§ 1257, ¹ In King v. Young Men's Ass'n, 1 Woods, 386, Mr. Justice Bradley thus describes it: "The reservation of the vendor's [grantor's] lien in the deed of conveyance is equal to a mortgage taken for the purchase-money contemporaneously with the deed, and nothing more. The purchaser [grantee] has the equity of redemption precisely as if he had received a deed and given a mortgage for the purchase-money." The use of the term "equity of redemption" here is unfortunate. The grantee takes and holds the *legal* title and estate encumbered with the lien; his title is not equitable. The learned judge introduces the legal notions of mortgage with which he is familiar, but which certainly have no place in connection with this lien, which is the equitable notion of the mortgage stripped of all its legal environment. In White v. Downs, 40 Tex. 225, Gray, J., thus contrasts the ordinary "vendor's lien" with the grantor's lien by reservation: "The vendor's [grantor's] lien, properly understood, is not in all respects the same as the express lien often reserved in deeds of conveyance for payment of purchase-money, nor as strict mortgages or deeds of trust for it, nor yet as the security held by a vendor who has only given a bond for the title. These are often confounded with the vendor's lien, because security of the purchase-money is common to all of them. But the vendor's lien arises wholly from inference or implication, which is invisible and cannot be recorded; the others are from express contract, visible to all, and may be recorded. All of the same consequences do not, therefore, necessarily result as to assignees or holders of the debt secured by the vendor's lien, nor as to purchasers of the land liable to it, as between the original parties and privies, which do often occur in the cases of express lien by contract."b See, also, to the same

§ 1257, (a) The text is quoted and followed in Honaker v. Jones, 102 Tex. 132, 113 S. W. 748. This section of the text is cited in Warford v. Hankins, 150 Ind. 489, 50 N. E. 468; also, in Beard v. Payne, (Ind. App.) 115 N. E. 782. § 1257, (b) Later Texas cases have taken a peculiar view of this lien, apparently treating the deed reserving the lien as the equivalent of a contract to convey, and the lien as similar to the "vendor's lien" described in §§ 1260-1262, infra. The

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§ 1258. Operation and Effect of This Lien.—It follows as a necessary consequence that when such a lien is expressly reserved in the deed, the grantee's title is, in a certain sense, imperfect until the price is paid; or, to speak more accurately, the title is encumbered, and all persons holding or claiming under or through the deed are affected with notice of the lien, and their rights are necessarily subordinate to it.^{1a} On principle, the lien by reservation

general effect, that this lien is one by express contract resembling that by a mortgage: Rohinson v. Woodson, 33 Ark. 307; Collins v. Richart, 14 Bush, 621 (is a lien on the land, and not merely on the rents and profits); Peters v. Clements, 46 Tex. 114; Masterson v. Cohen, 46 Tex. 520; Dingley v. Bank of Ventura, 57 Cal. 467; Coles v. Withers, 33 Gratt. 186; Talieferro v. Barnett, 37 Ark. 511.^c As further illustrations of its resemblance to a mortgage, and its difference from the purely equitable lien of the grantor: it is not defeated nor waived by the grantor's taking other security: Carpenter v. Mitchell, 54 Ill. 126; it can be assigned, and passes by a transfer of the note given for the price which it secures:^d Carpenter v. Mitchell; Markoe v. Andras, 67 Ill. 34; it is foreclosed in equity, like a mortgage, and the right of redemption after foreclosure sale, given in case of mortgage by the law of some states, applies also to it: Markoe v. Andras.^e

§ 1258, 1 See, in this connection, as to the notice given to subsequent grantees, purchasers, encumbrancers, etc., by recitals and like provisions

vendor has the "superior title," and the grantee only an equitable title: Hale v. Baker, 60 Tex. 217, and cases cited; Abernethy v. Bass, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 239, 29 S. W. 398 (effect of conveyance of this title by vendor to a third party); White v. Cole, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 277, 29 S. W. 1148 (same). See, also, among numerous cases, Branch v. Taylor, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 248, 89 S. W. 813 (effect of release of express lien); Smith v. Owen, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 411, 97 S. W. 521; Evans v. Ashe, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 54, 108 S. W. 398, 1190; Lacey v. Smith, (Tex. Civ. App.) 111 S. W. 965; Atteberry v. Burnett, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 617, 114 S. W. 159; Hubbell v. Texas Southern Ry. Co., 59 Tex. Civ. App. 185, 126 S. W. 313 (where the land has passed into hands of receiver).

§ 1257, (c) Kirk v. Williams, 24 Fed. 437; Eichelberger v. Gitt, 104 Pa. St. 64; Bank of Bristol v. Bradley, 15 Lea, 279; Gordon v. Rixey, 76 Va. 694.

§ 1257, (d) See infra, § 1259.

§ 1257, (e) Contra, in Arkansas: Priddy & Chambers v. Smith, 106 Ark. 79, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 285, 152 S. W. 1028.

§ 1258, (a) The text is cited in Warford v. Hankins, 150 Ind. 489, 50 N. E. 468. See, also, Sidwell v. Wheaton, 114 Ill. 267, 2 N. E. 183; Eichelberger v. Gitt, 104 Pa. St. 64;

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should give the grantor the same rights of priority over other general encumbrancers which are held by the mortgagee in a purchase-money mortgage.

§ 1259. The Grantor's Dealing With the Lien—Waiver —Assignment.—The grantor's powers of dealing with the lien by reservation are much more extensive than those

contained in the title deeds from, under, or through which they claim, ante, vol. 2, §§ 626, 628, and cases cited in the notes: Stratton v. Gold, 40 Miss. 778; Thompson v. Heffner's Ex'rs, 11 Bush. 353; Collins v. Richart, 14 Bush, 621; Roosevelt v. Davis, 49 Tex. 463; Peters v. Clements, 46 Tex. 114; Caldwell v. Fraim, 32 Tex. 310; Masterson v. Cohen, 46 Tex. 520; Moore v. Lackey, 53 Miss. 85; Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wall. 1 (binds subsequent grantees, etc.); Ledford v. Smith, 6 Bush, 129 (between the grantor and the grantee; see facts ante, in note under § 1256); Dingley v. Bank of Ventura, 57 Cal. 467; Talieferro v. Barnett, 37 Ark. 511. The lien is a security for the *debt*, and not merely for the bond or note or other instrument by which the debt is evidenced; a surrender and concellation of a hond given for the debt does not, therefore, necessarily extinguish the lien itself: Coles v. Withers, 33 Gratt. 186. For the same reason, a subsequent change in the form of the instrument by which the debt is evidenced, as a substitution of a new note in place of the original one, and the like, does not affect the lien: Kausler v. Ford, 47 Miss. 289; French v. Dickey, 3 Tenn. Ch. 302.b

It has been held that the lien takes precedence over a prior judgment against the grantee: See Parsons v. Hoyt, 24 Iowa, 154.^c This is strictly in agreement with well-settled principle. The doctrine is clearly established that a purchase-money mortgage prevails against the general lien of a prior judgment, and that it prevents the attachment of many other liens upon the premises which might otherwise have affected them: See *ante*, vol. 2, § 725, note. Since the grantor's lien by reservation for the purchase price is tantamount to a purchase-money mortgage given back by the grantee, the same results should necessarily follow from it. In fact, the *notice* of the *lien* embodied in the deed itself is more complete and efficacious than the notice created by the record of a mortgage or the docket of a judgment.

Bank v. Bradley, 15 Lea, 279; Gilbough v. Runge, 99 Tex. 539, 122 Am. St. Rep. 659, 91 S. W. 566; Turk v. Skiles, 45 W. Va. 82, 30 S. E. 234; Jones v. Blankenship, (W. Va.) 91 S. E. 389.

§1258, (b) See, also, Hull's Adm'r

v. Hull's Heirs, 35 W. Va. 155, 29 Am. St. Rep. 800, 13 S. E. 49.

§ 1258, (c) Priority over judgment against grantee: See, also, Dingus v. Minneapolis Imp. Co., 98 Va. 739, 37 S. E. 353. over the equitable lien heretofore described. His acts which would destroy the implied equitable lien, such as taking other security on land from the grantee, or taking notes of third persons as security, and the like, do not thus affect the existence and validity of the express lien.^{1a} The grantor may of course waive his lien; whether he does so is a matter of intention, which must appear either expressly or by acts directly inconsistent with its existence and indicating a clear intent to waive.² ^b The doctrine is established by the great preponderance of authority, that this lien is not personal to the grantor, but may be transferred; that it passes by an assignment of the note, bond, or other evidence of debt given for the purchase price, and may be enforced by the assignee.^{3c} When notes given for install-

§ 1259, ¹ The reasons why the purely equitable lien should be defeated by the acceptance of independent security have no application whatever to the lien by reservation: Carr v. Thompson, 67 Mo. 472; Strickland v. Summerville, 55 Mo. 164; Adams v. Cowherd, 30 Mo. 458; Price v. Lauve, 49 Tex. 74 (taking a trust deed on other lands as security for the price does not affect the lien); Carpenter v. Mitchell, 54 Ill. 126; McCaslin v. State, 44 Ind. 151; Lusk v. Hopper, 3 Bush, 179; Lewis v. Pusey, 8 Bush, 615; Fogg v. Rogers, 2 Cold. 290; Hines v. Perkins, 2 Heisk. 395; Magruder v. Peter, 11 Gill & J. 217; Schwarz v. Stein, 29 Md. 112, 119; Hurley v. Hollyday, 35 Md. 469; Knisely v. Williams, 3 Gratt. 265, 46 Am. Dec. 193; Hatcher's Adm'r v. Hatcher's Ex'rs, 1 Rand. 53; Ludington v. Gabbert, 5 W. Va. 330; Conner v. Banks, 18 Ala. 42, 52 Am. Dec. 209; Bradford v. Harper, 25 Ala. 337; Bozeman v. Ivey, 49 Ala. 75.

§ 1259, ² Coles v. Withers, 33 Gratt. 186; Butler v. Williams, 5 Heisk. 241; French v. Dickey, 3 Tenn. Ch. 302.

§ 1259, ³ Carpenter v. Mitchell, 54 Ill. 126; Markoe v. Andras, 67 Ill. 34; Hobson v. Edwards, 57 Miss. 128; Osborne v. Royer, 1 Lea, 217; Blaisdell v. Smith, 3 Ill. App. 150; Moore v. Lackey, 53 Miss. 85; Kausler v. Ford, 47 Miss. 289; Campbell v. Rankin, 28 Ark. 401; Dingley v. Bank

§ 1259, (a) The text is cited to this effect in Beard v. Payne, (Ind. App.) 115 N. E. 782. See, also, Dowdy v. Blake, 50 Ark. 205, 7 Am. St. Rep. 88, 6 S. W. 897 (judgment on the debt not a waiver); Bank v. Bradley, 15 Lea, 279 (same); Byrns v. Woodward, 10 Lea, 444. §1259, (b) Beard v. Payne, (Ind. App.) 115 N. E. 782; Byrns v. Woodward, 10 Lea, 444; Frazier v. Hendren, 80 Va. 265.

§ 1259, (c) Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U. S. 199, 23 L. Ed. 829; Morris v. Ham, 47 Ark. 293, 1 S. W. 519; Dowdy v. Blake, 50 Ark. 205, 7 Am. ments of the purchase price are secured by a lien reserved in the deed, and these notes are transferable, the lien or quasi mortgage acquires some of the elements of negotiability.⁴ This lien is enforced in equity by a suit and relief similar in all respects to those for the foreclosure of a mortgage.⁵

of Ventura, 57 Cal. 467; Talieferro v. Barnett, 37 Ark. 511; but see Pillow v. Helm, 7 Baxt. 545.

Where a lien was reserved in the deed as security for several notes, and these notes have been assigned to different persons, and the bolder of one note brought a suit in equity making the grantor, the grantee, and the holders of all the other notes parties, and asked that the holders should respectively be subrogated to the rights of the grantor, the court held that the rule that the assignment of a note secured by a lien reserved in the deed does not transfer the lien to the assignee, and does not enable him to enforce the lien by a suit in his own right against the grantee, did not apply. and the relief asked was granted: Campbell v. Rankin, 28 Ark. 401. In Robinson v. Woodson, 33 Ark. 307, it is held that a lien by reservation is transferred to the grantee by a second deed acknowledging payment, when no payment had in fact been made, and that under this second deed the grantor has the ordinary equitable lien as if the first one had not been made; and in Summers v. Kilgus, 14 Bush, 449, it is held that a grantor may release the lien by reservation, although he has previously assigned a note secured by such lien to a third person. It seems difficult to reconcile this decision with those which sustain the assignability of the lien and the rights of the assignee to enforce it.

§ 1259, 4 Where several notes are thus secured by a lien of reservation, the whole seems to be analogous to a mortgage given to secure several notes. If the notes are transferred to different persons, the right of the holders to participate in and enforce the lien would seem to depend upon the same rules which apply to notes secured by a mortgage: See *ante*, §§ 1201–1203.

§ 1259, ⁵ Markoe v. Andras, 67 Ill. 34; Gaston v. White, 46 Mo. 486; King v. Young Men's Ass'n, 1 Woods, 386, Fed. Cas. No. 7811.^d

St. Rep. 88, 6 S. W. 897; Smith v. Butler, (Ark.) 80 S. W. 580; Priddy & Chambers v. Smith, 106 Ark. 79, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 285, 152 S. W. 1028; Hebert v. Fellheimer, 115 Ark. 366, 171 S. W. 144; Beard v. Payne, (Ind. App.) 115 N. E. 782; Hubbell v. Texas Southern Ry. Co., 59 Tex. Civ. App. 185, 126 S. W. 313; Mergele v. Felix, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 55, 99 S. W. 709 (person discharging lien on request is subrogated); Gordon v. Rixey, 76 Va. 694.

§ 1259, (d) The creditor may proceed at law on the note and in equity for enforcement of his lien, at the same time, until he obtains satisfaction in one forum or the other; Post v. W. H. Bailey & Co., 68 W. Va. 434, 69 S. E. 910.

SECTION VI.

THE VENDOR'S, LIEN AND THE VENDEE'S LIEN ON CONTRACT FOR SALE AND PURCHASE.

ANALYSIS.

§§ 1260-1262.	Vendor's lien under contract of sale.
§ 1260.	General doctrine; vendor's lien and grantor's lien distin-
	guished.
§ 1261.	Essential nature and effects; vendor's interest determined by
	doctrine of equitable conversion.
§ 1262.	How enforced.
§ 1263.	Vendee's lien for purchase-money paid.

§ 1260. Vendor's Lien Under Contract of Sale.—It has been said, in English and American decisions, that the vendor's lien may arise before conveyance as well as after; and the interest or right of the vendor under an ordinary contract for the sale of land, or a bond conditioned to sell and convey, or whatever may be the form of the agreement, has been called a vendor's lien, and treated in the same manner as the equitable lien arising in favor of the grantor upon an actual conveyance of the land where the purchase price in whole or in part is left unpaid.¹^a This is an un-

§ 1260, ¹ Smith v. Hibbard, ² Dick. 730; Smith v. Evans, ²⁸ Beav. 59; Whitehurst v. Yandall, ⁷ Baxt. 228; Bizzell v. Nix, 60 Ala. 281, 31 Am. Rep. 38; Johnson v. Nunnerly, 30 Ark. 153; Haughwout v. Murphy, ²² N. J. Eq. 531; Hall v. Jones, ²¹ Md. 439; Yancey v. Mauck, 15 Gratt. 300; Neel v. Clay, 48 Ala. 252; Servis v. Beatty, 32 Miss. 52; English v. Russell, 1 Hemp. 35; Amory v. Reilly, ⁹ Ind. 490; Stevens v. Chadwick, 10 Kan. 406, 15 Am. Rep. 348; Smith v. Rowland, 13 Kan. 245; Hill v. Grigsby, 32 Cal. 55. See, also, as examples of cases when the lien exists,^b In re Patent Carriage Co., L. R. 2 Eq. 349; Lycett v. Stafford etc.

§1260, (a) The text is quoted in Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipman, 47 Mont. 289, 133 Pac. 694. As instance of such confusion, see the opinion in Johnson v. McKinnon, (Fla.) 34 South. 272.

§ 1260, (b) See, also, Williams v. Simmons, 79 Ga. 649, 7 S. E. 133; Walker v. Kee, 16 S. C. 76; Good v. Jarrard, 93 S. C. 229, 43 L. B. A. (N. S.) 383, 76 S. E. 698; Sands v. Stagg, 105 Va. 444, 52 S. E. 633, 54 S. E. 21; Taylor v. Interstate Inv. Co., 75 Wash. 490, 135 Pac. 240; Evans v. Johnson, 39 W. Va. 299, 45 Am. St. Rep. 912, 19 S. E. 623.

Land tortiously taken under eminent domain power.—A vendor's lien, necessary and an incorrect use of terms; it confounds legal notions which are essentially different. There is a plain distinction between the lien of the grantor after a conveyance, and the interest of the vendor before conveyance. The former is not a legal estate, but is a mere equitable charge on the land; it is not even, in strictness, an equitable lien until declared and established by judicial decree.² In the latter, although possession may have been delivered to the vendee, and although under the doctrine of conversion the vendee may have acquired an equitable estate, yet the

R'y, L. R. 13 Eq. 261; Earl St. Germains v. Crystal Palace R'y, L. R. 11 Eq. 568; Wing v. Tottenham etc. R'y, L. R. 3 Ch. 740; Morgan v. Swansea etc. Authority, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 582; Nives v. Nives, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 649; Fry v. Prewett, 56 Miss. 783; Cotten v. McGehee, 54 Miss. 510; Prentice v. Nutter, 25 Minn. 484; Johnson v. Godden, 33 Ark. 600; Martin v. O'Bannon, 35 Ark. 62; Stephenson v. Rice, 12 W. Va. 575; Day v. Hale, 22 Gratt. 146; Vail v. Drexel, 9 Ill. App. 439. Cases in which no lien existed: Dixon v. Gayfere, 1 De Gex & J. 655; Att'y-Gen. v. Sittingbourne etc. R'y, L. R. 1 Eq. 636; Earl of Jersey v. Briton etc. Dock Co., L. R. 7 Eq. 409; Prentice v. Nutter, 25 Minn. 484; Weare v. Linnell, 29 Mich. 224; Willis v. Searcy, 49 Ala. 222; Willard v. Reas, 26 Wis. 540.°

§ 1260, ² Although the right of the grantor is called a lien, yet, as will be more fully shown in the subsequent chapters on remedies, it is rather the potentiality of a lien; it cannot be enforced until the legal remedies against the grantee have been exhausted or are unavailing, and it only acquires its character of a specific encumbrance by the commencement of a suit to enforce it. In Gilman v. Brown, 1 Mason, 191, Fed. Cas. No. 5441, Mr. Justice Story said: "It is, in short, a right which has no existence until it is established by the decree of a court in the particular case." In Hutton v. Moore, 26 Ark. 382, the court said: "His lien is an individual equity, of no force until declared by a court of equity"; and see Camphell v. Rankin, 28 Ark. 401, 406; Moore, v. Anders, 14 Ark. 628, 634, 60 Am. Dec. 551.

securing the owner's damages, has been recognized in such circumstances: Florida Southern R. R. Co. v. Hill, 40 Fla. 1, 74 Am. St. Rep. 124, 23 South. 566 (citing, among other cases Walker v. Ware, etc., Ry. Co., 12 Jur. 18; Kittell v. Missisquoi R. R. Co., 56 Vt. 96; Organ v. Memphis, etc., R. R. Co., 51 Ark.
235, 11 S. W. 96); Southern Ry. Co.
v. Gregg, 101 Va. 308, 43 S. E. 570.
§ 1260, (c) Sykes v. Betts, 87 Ala.
537, 6 South. 428; Johnson v. Mc-Kinnon, (Fla.) 34 South. 272; Cade
v. Jenkins, 88 Ga. 791, 15 S. E. 292. vendor retains the *legal title*, and the vendee cannot prejudice that legal title, or do anything by which it shall be divested, except by performing the very obligation on his part which the retention of such title was intended to secure,—namely, by paying the price according to the terms of the contract.^d To call this complete legal title a lien, is certainly a misnomer. In case of a conveyance, the grantor has a lien, but no title. In case of a contract for sale before conveyance, the vendor has the legal title, and has no need of any lien; his title is a more efficient security, since the vendee cannot defeat it by any act or transfer even to or with a *bona fide* purchaser.³ •

§ 1260, 3 This true nature of the vendor's interest is fully recognized by numerous decisions even while they use the ordinary term of "vendor's lien" in designating that interest. In some of the cases, however, the essential distinction between the grantor's and the vendor's position seems to have been overlooked. The recent case of Vail v. Drexel, 9 Ill. App. 439,

§ 1260, (d) The text is quoted in Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipman, 47 Mont. 289, 133 Pac. 694; Reid v. Gorman, 37 S. D. 314, 158 N. W. 780; and cited in Johnson v. Peterson, 90 Minn. 503, 97 N. W. 384, holding that prior to completion of the contract by payment of the purchase-money the vendee's possession cannot become adverse to the vendor's legal title.

§1260, (e) The text is quoted in Robinson v. Appleton, 124 Ill. 276, 15 N. E. 761, and in Cook-Reynolds Co. v. Chipman, 47 Mont. 289, 133 Pac. 694; Reid v. Gorman, 37 S. D. 314, 158 N. W. 780; and cited in Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 Pac. 27. Text and note are cited in Florida Southern R. R. Co. v. Hill, 40 Fla. 1, 74 Am. St. Rep. 124, 23 South. 566; Stubbs v. Pitts, 84 Ark. 160, 104 S. W. 1110; Mc-Kinnon v. Johnson, 54 Fla. 538, 45 South. 451; Arlington Heights Realty Co. v. Citizens' Ry. & Light III-191

Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 160 S. W. 1109; Sands v. Stagg, 105 Va. 444, 52 S. E. 633, 54 S. E. 21; Olds v. Little Horse Creek Cattle Co., 22 Wyo. 336, 140 Pac. 1004. Sce, also, Lowery v. Peterson, 75 Ala. 109; Moses v. Johnson, 88 Ala. 517, 16 Am. St. Rep. 58, 7 South. 146 (vendor's relation similar to that of mortgagee; may restrain waste by vendee); Beattie v. Dickinson, 39 Ark. 205 (lien superior to equity of any claimant under vendee); Higgs v. Smith, 100 Ark. 543, 140 S. W. 990; Gessner v. Palmateer, 89 Cal. 89, 13 L. R. A. 187, 24 Pac. 608, 26 Pac. 789; Roby v. Bismarck Nat. Bank, 4 N. D. 156, 50 Am. St. Rop. 633, 59 N. W. 719; McCrellis v. Cole, (R. I.) 55 Atl. 196 (vendor has mortgagee's rights as respects fixtures); White v. Blakemore, 8 Lea (Tenn.), 49; Poe v. Paxton, 26 W. Va. 607; Evans v. Johnson, 39 W. Va. 299, 45 Am. St. Rep. 912, 23 L. R. A. 737, 19 S. E. 623.

§ 1261. Essential Nature and Effects.—In fact, the position of the vendor prior to conveyance is defined and determined by the doctrine of equitable conversion, rather than by that of mere equitable lien. He holds the legal title as

presents the doctrine in a very clear, correct, and instructive manner, while using the accustomed phraseology: "Under an agreement for the sale of land, the vendor has an equitable lien on the property for unpaid purchasemoney. In equity the vendee is considered the owner. The lien of the vendor, is in rem, and he may resort to equity in the first instance to enforce it, without first resorting to a suit at law to recover the amount due." See, also, McCaslin v. State, 44 Ind. 151; Moore v. Anders, 14 Ark. 628, 634, 60 Am. Dec. 551; Hutton v. Moore, 26 Ark. 382; Pitts v. Parker, 44 Miss. 247; Wells v. Smith, 44 Miss. 296; Driver v. Hudspeth, 16 Ala. 348; Reese v. Burts, 39 Ga. 565; Hines v. Perkins, 2 Heisk. 395; Sparks v. Hess, 15 Cal. 186, 194, per Field, J.; Church v. Smith, 39 Wis. 492, 496, per Lyon, J. The exact positions of the vendor and vendee have been described by most eminent English judges in recent cases, and their opinions are very instructive. In McCreight v. Foster, L. R. 5 Ch. 604, 610, Lord Hatherley said: "It is quite true that authorities may be cited as establishing the proposition that the relation of trustee and cestui que trust does in a certain sense exist between vendor and purchaser; that is to say, when a man agrees to sell his estate, he is trustee of the legal estate for the person who has purchased it, as soon as the contract is completed, but not before." This case sub nom. Shaw v. Foster, L. R. 5 H. L. 321, was decided on appeal by the house of lords, and all of the law lords delivered opinions. Lord Chelmsford said (p. 333): "According to the well-known rule in equity, when the contract for sale was signed by the parties, Sir W. Foster [the vendor] became a trustee of the estate for Pooley [the vendee], and Pooley a trustee of the purchase-money for Sir W. Foster." Lord Cairns said (p. 338): "Under these circumstances, I apprehend there cannot be the slightest doubt of the relation subsisting in the eye of a court of equity between the vendor and the purchaser. The vendor was a trustee of this property for the purchaser; the purchaser was the real beneficial owner, in the eye of a court of equity, of the property, subject only to this observation, that the vendor, whom I have called the trustee, was not a mere dormant trustee,-he was a trustee having a personal and substantial interest in the property, a right to protect that interest, and an active right to assert that interest if anyhing should be done in derogation of it. The relation, therefore, of trustee and cestui que trust subsisted, but subsisted subject to the paramount right of the vendor and trustee to protect his own interest as a vendor of the property." That interest, Sir George Jessel says, in a subsequent case, is synonymous with his heirs. In equity, his real interest is personal estate; he

security for the performance of the vendee's obligation, and as trustee for the vendee, subject to such performance, and that title may be conveyed or devised, and will descend to

the ordinary term, the "vendor's lien" or charge. Lord O'Hagan said (p. 349): "By the contract of sale the vendor, in the view of the court of equity, disposes of his right over the estate, and on the execution of the contract he becomes constructively a trustee for the vendee, who is thereupon, on the other side, bound by a trust for the payment of the purchase-money." Lord Hatherley said (p. 356): "The moment that a contract for sale and purchase is entered into, and the relation of vendor and vendee is constituted, the vendor becomes a constructive trustee for the vendee. It is but a constructive trust." In Rose v. Watson, 10 H. L. Cas. 672, 678, Lord Westbury said: "When the owner of an estate contracts with a purchaser for the immediate sale of it, the ownership of the estate is in equity transferred by that contract." In Wall v. Bright, 1 Jacob & W. 494, 508, the master of rolls said: "The vendor is not a mere trustee; he is in progress towards it, and finally becomes such when the money is paid, and when he is bound to convey." These extracts show that the ablest judges have found it very difficult to formulate a statement which should exactly reconcile the idea of the vendor having merely a lien with the notion of his being a trustee. In the recent case of Lysaght v. Edwards, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 499, 506, 507, Sir George Jessel, M. R., states the effect of a contract for the sale of land as follows: "It appears to me that the effect of a contract for sale has been settled for more than two centuries; certainly it was completely settled before the time of Lord Hardwicke, who speaks of the settled doctrine of the court as to it. What is that doctrine? It is that the moment you have a valid contract for sale the vendor becomes in equity a trustee for the purchaser of the estate sold, and the beneficial ownership passes to the purchaser, the vendor having a right to the purchase-money, a charge or lien on the estate for the security of that purchase-money, and a right to retain possession of the estate until the purchase-money is paid, in the absence of express contract as to the time of delivering possession. In other words, the position of the vendor is something between what has been called a naked or bare trustee (that is, a person without beneficial interest), and a mortgagee who is not, in equity (any more than a vendor), the owner of the estate, but is, in certain events, entitled to what the unpaid vendor is, viz., possession of the estate, and a charge upon the estate for his purchase-money. Their positions are analogous in another way. The unpaid mortgagee has a right to foreclose,-that is to say, he has the right to say to the mortgagor. 'Either pay me within a limited time, or you lose your estate,' and in debecomes by equitable conversion the owner of the purchasemoney, of which the vendee is his trustee, and this claim for the purchase-money passes on his death to his executors or administrators. On the other hand, the vendee becomes,

fault of payment he becomes absolute owner of it. So although there has been a valid contract of sale, the vendor has a similar right in a court of equity; he has a right to say to the purchaser, 'Either pay me the purchase-money or lose the estate.' Such a decree has sometimes been called a decree for cancellation of the contract; time is given by a decree of the court of equity; and if the time expires without the money being paid, the contract is canceled by the decree or judgment of the court, and the vendor becomes again the owner of the estate [i. e., equitable as well as legal owner]. But that, as it appears to me, is a totally different thing from the contract being canceled, because there was some equitable ground for setting it aside." The judge goes on to discuss the meaning of "valid contract" for the sale of land, when such contract is valid and binding, and then proceeds: "Being a valid contract, it has this remarkable effect, that it converts the estate, so to say, in equity; it makes the purchasemoney a part of the personal estate of the vendor, and it makes the land a part of the real estate of the vendee; and therefore all those cases on the doctrine of constructive conversion are founded simply on this, that a valid contract actually changes the ownership of the estate in equity. That being so, is the vendor less a trustee because he has the rights which I have mentioned? I do not see how it is possible to say so. If anything happens to the estate between the time of sale and the time of completion of the purchase, it is at the risk of the purchaser. If it is a house that is sold, and the house is burned down, the purchaser loses the house. In the same way there is a correlative liability on the part of the vendor in possession. He is not entitled to treat the estate as his own. If he willfully damages or injures it, he is liable to the purchaser; and more than that, he is liable if he does not take reasonable care of it.¹ So far he is treated in all respects as a trustee, subject, of course, to his right to be paid the purchase money, and his right to enforce his security against the estate." See, also, Morgan v. Swansea etc. Authority, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 582, 584. To these admirable expositions nothing need be added by way of comment. They show that the notion of the vendor's lien is simply another mode of expressing the settled doctrine of conversion wrought by a contract for the sale of land. In equity the vendee is regarded as the real beneficial owner, even though he has not paid the purchase price; the vendor holds the legal estate as trustee, and when the terms of the con-

§ 1260, (1) This passage is quoted in Johnson v. McKinnon, (Fla.) 34 South. 272. by conversion, the real beneficial, although equitable, owner of the land; his interest under the contract is, in equity, real estate, and descends to his heirs. The so-called lien of the vendor is only another mode of expressing his equitable interest thus arising from the doctrine of conversion; and so far as it has any distinctive signification, it simply means his right of enforcing his claim for the purchase-money against or out of the vendee's equitable estate by means of a suit in equity.^{1 a}

tract are complied with, he is bound to convey. Until those terms are complied with, the legal title remains in the vendor as his security; or, as it is otherwise expressed, he has a lien upon the vendee's equitable estate as security for payment of the purchase-money according to the terms of the agreement. Practically, this lien consists in the vendor's right to enforce payment of the price. by a suit in equity against the vendee's equitable estate in the land, instead of by means of an ordinary action at law to recover the debt. In England the vendor's equitable remedy consists in a suit in the nature of a strict foreclosure, by which the vendee is decreed to pay the price within a limited time, and in default of such payment the contract is canceled, the vendee's equitable estate is foreclosed, and the vendor's legal estate becomes again absolute. In the United States the same mode of enforcing the lien by a suit in the nature of a strict foreclosure is pursued. Another mode seems to be recognized, at least in some of the states, by which the vendee's equitable estate under the contract is sold in pursuance of a judicial decree. Such a sale would operate as an assignment of the vendee's rights under the contract, and would not be a cancellation of the contract itself.

^{*} § 1261, ¹ See ante, vol. 1, §§ 368, 372, and cases cited; also cases in last preceding note; Lewis v. Hawkins, 23 Wall. 119; Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland, 236; Tuck v. Calvert, 33 Md. 209; Richards v. Fisher, 8 W. Va. 55; Hadley v. Nash, 69 N. C. 162; Harvill v. Lowe, 47 Ga. 214; Scroggins v. Hoadley, 56 Ga. 165; Relfe v. Relfe, 34 Ala. 500, 504, 73 Am. Dec. 467; Shinn v. Taylor, 28 Ark. 523; Lewis v. Boskins, 27 Ark. 61; Holman v.

§ 1261, (a) The text is quoted in Olds v. Little Horse Creek Cattle Co., 22 Wyo. 336, 140 Pac. 1004; Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 Pac. 27. The text is cited in Abbott v. Moldestad, 74 Minn. 293, 73 Am. St. Rep. 348, 77 N. W. 227; White v. Cole, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 277, 29 S. W. 1148: Stubbs v. Pitts, 84 Ark. 160, 104 S. W. 1110; Edmons
v. Graey, 61 Fla. 593, 54 South.
899 (foreclosure); Atteberry v Burnett, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 617, 114
S. W. 159; Sanderson v. Wellsford, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 637, 116 S. W.
382; Arlington Heights Realty Co.
v. Citizens' R'y & Light Co., (Tex.
Civ. App.) 160 S. W. 1109. Sec-

§ 1262. How Enforced.—The equity action to enforce the so-called lien is simply an action to compel the vendee to make payment of the purchase price within a specified time, or else be barred of all rights under the contract, that is, an action to foreclose the contract. In actions at

Patterson's Heirs, 29 Ark. 357; Cochran v. Wimberly, 44 Miss. 503; Money v. Dorsey, 7 Smedes & M. 15, 22; Taylor v. Eckford, 11 Smedes & M. 21; Roherts v. Francis, 2 Heisk. 127; Carter v. Sims, 2 Heisk. 166; Cleveland v. Martin, 2 Head, 128; Sitz v. Deihl, 55 Mo. 17; Seitz v. Union Pae. R'y, 16 Kan. 133; Smith v. Moore, 26 Ill. 392; Greene v. Cook, 29 Ill. 186; Grove v. Miles, 58 Ill. 338; 71 Ill. 376; Button v. Schroyer, 5 Wis. 598; Merritt v. Judd, 14 Cal. 59; Purdy v. Bullard, 41 Cal. 444.

The following recent cases illustrate some particular points decided with respect to this lien: *Waiver*: It is not, in general, waived by the taking of other security for the purchase price, whether personal or on land; in this respect it differs from the "grantor's lien":^b Schorn v. McWhirter, 6 Baxt. 311, 313; Warren v. Branch, 15 W. Va. 21; Bozeman v. Ivey, 49 Ala. 75; McCaslin v. State, 44 Ind. 151; Day v. Hale, 22 Gratt. 146; but see Hollis v. Hollis, 4 Baxt. 524. If the vendee has fully performed all of the con-

tions 1261-1263 are cited in Schenck v. Wicks, (Utah) 65 Pac. 732.

Foreclosure.—As to enforcement of the lien by forcelosure, see, also, Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U. S. 756, 28 L. Ed. 1141, 5 Sup. Ct. 771; Moser v. Johnson, 88 Ala. 517, 16 Am. St. Rep. 58, 7 South. 146; Walker v. Crawford, 70 Ala. 567; Higgs v. Smith, 100 Ark. 543, 140 S. W. 990; Wells v. Francis, 7 Colo. 396, 4 Pac. 49; Johnson v. McKinnon, (Fla.) 34 South. 272 (vendor's right to enforce the lien lost by his neglect of the premises); Johnson v. McKinnon, 54 Fla. 221, 127 Am. St. Rep. 135, 14 Ann. Cas. 180, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874, and note, 45 South. 23 (deficiency decree not permitted in Florida); Schwartz v. Woodruff, (Mich.) 93 N. W. 1067; Keith v. Albrecht, 89 Minn. 247, 99 Am. St. Rep. 566, 94 N. W. 677 (if vendee has declared a homestead, nonexempt portion must be resorted to

first); Patterson v. Mikkelson, 86 Neb. 512, 125 N. W. 1104 (strict foreclosure decreed only under special circumstances); Bates v. Loffler, 28 S. D. 228, 133 N. W. 283; White v. Blakemore, 8 Lea (Tenn.), 49; Wollenberg v. Rose, 41 Or. 314, 68 Pac. 804; In re Clark, 118 Fed. 358 (as to enforcement of the lien under the Pennsylvania practice); Brown v. Canterbury, 101 Tex. 86, 130 Am. St. Rep. 824, 104 S. W. 1055 (as to title acquired on foreclosure sale); Superior Cons. Land Co. v. Nichols, 81 Wis. 656, 51 N. W. 878 (strict foreclosure); Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 Pac. 27 (strict foreclosure proper). §1261, (b) No Waiver.-See, also, Robinson v. Appleton, 124 Ill. 276, 15 N. E. 761; Rogers v. Blum, 56 Tex. 1; Mansfield v. Dameron, 42 W. Va. 794, 57 Am. St. Rep. 884, 26 S. E. 527.

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law to recover the purchase price, it is the uniform rule that the vendor must allege and show that he has tendered a conveyance in pursuance of the terms of the contract. Whether such tender of a deed is a prerequisite to the vendor's maintaining his suit in equity, is a question upon

tract on his part, he is, of course, entitled to a conveyance, even though the purchase price remains partly unpaid; and this, it seems, is what some of the cases mean by "waiving the lien."^e Priority: On principle, the vendor's right should have priority over subsequent judgments recovered against the vendee, irrespective of the question of notice, since he retains the legal title; his position in this respect is entirely different from that of the grantor: Grubbs v. Wisors, 32 Gratt. 127; Shipe v. Repass, 28 Gratt. 716; Wooten v. Bellinger, 17 Fla. 289; Paris Exch. Bank v. Beard, 49 Tex. 358; Jones v. Sackett, 36 Mich. 192.^d Assignment: When notes are given for the price, and these notes are assigned, the lien passes, and may be enforced by the assignee: Martin v. O'Bannon, 35 Ark. 62;^e but the assignee obtains no higher rights: he takes subject to defenses; and if the lien had been otherwise destroyed, he cannot enforce it: McMillen v. Rose, 54 Iowa, 522.

§ 1261, (c) See, also, Sykes v. Betts, 87 Ala. 537, 6 South. 428 (where the consideration is uncertain, as on a sale of real and personal property for a gross sum, no presumption that the retention of the legal title is for the purpose of security); Alexander v. Hooks, 84 Ala. 605, 4 South. 417 (same).

§ 1261, (d) See, also, § 721, notes.

§ 1261, (e) Assignability. — See, also, Lowery v. Peterson, 75 Ala. 109 (assignment by delivery passes the lien); Gessner v. Palmateer, 89 Cal. 89, 13 L. R. A. 187, 24 Pac. 608, 26 Pac. 789; Lamm v. Armstrong, 95 Minn. 434, 111 Am. St. Rep. 479, 5 Ann. Cas. 418, and note, 104 N. W. 304; Murphree v. Countiss, 58 Miss. 712 (not defeated in hands of assignee by vendee's subsequent reception of a deed from the vendor); Majors v Maxwell, 120 Mo. App. 281, 96 S. W. 731; Grames v. Consolidated Timber Co., (Or.) 215 Fed. 785; Russell v. Kirkbride, 62 Tex. 455; National Bank of Commerce v. Lock, 17 Wash. 528, 61 Am. St. Rep. 923, 50 Pac. 478. As to subrogation, see Beattie v. Dickinson, 39 Ark. 205; Ruuth v. Morse Hardware Co., 74 Wash. 361, 133 Pac. 587. That a conveyance of the legal title to a third party, without an assignment of the claim for purchase-money, does not pass the lien, see Schenck v. Wicks, 23 Utah, 576, 65 Pac. 732. In Georgia, there is a rule that where the vendor transfers the purchase-money notes, without recourse against himself, this operates as a payment of the purchase-money, the vendee's equity becomes "complete," and the vendor ceases to hold any interest in the land, while the transferee is a mere unsecured creditor of the vendee: Cade v. Jenkins, 88 Ga. 791, 15 S. E. 292, and cases cited.

which the American decisions are in direct conflict, and the authorities do not seem to preponderate decidedly in favor of either view.^{1 a}

§ 1263. The Vendee's Lien.—The lien of the vendee under a contract for purchase of land for the purchasemoney paid by him before a conveyance is the exact counterpart of the grantor's—or, as it is commonly called, the vendor's—lien, described in the last section but one. In the latter case, the legal title has been conveyed to the grantee, and yet the grantor retains an equitable lien upon

§ 1262, 1 The following cases hold that no tender of a deed by the vendor is necessary: Freeson v. Bissell,*63 N. Y. 168 (but compare Thomson v. Smith, 63 N. Y. 301); Church v. Smith, 39 Wis. 492; De Forest v. Holum, 38 Wis. 516; McKenzie v. Baldridge, 49 Ala. 564. Per contra, such a tender is necessary: Cole v. Wright, 50 Ind. 296; McCaslin v. State, 44 Ind. 151; Turner v. Lassiter, 27 Ark. 662; Wakefield v. Johnson, 26 Ark. 506; Klyce v. Broyles, 37 Miss. 524; and the same rule is stated in Sugden on Vendors. In Thomson v. Smith, 63 N. Y. 301, it was held that the administrators or executors of a deceased vendor could not maintain the action without alleging a tender, or that they are ready, willing, and able to give a deed, unless the person vested with the title, the heir or devisee, is also made a party to the suit so as to be bound by the judgment. The case was distinguished on these facts from Freeson v. Bissell, supra. It is not necessary that the vendor should first exhaust his legal or other remedies: Vail v. Drexel, 9 Ill. App. 439; McCaslin v. State, supra; Schorn v. Mc-Whirter, 6 Baxt. 311, 313. Where a note for purchase-money has been assigned, the assignee may not only enforce the lien against the vendee, but may have appropriate relief against the vendor-assignor: Church v. Smith, 39 Wis. 492; as to enforcement of plaintiff's judgment against rents due the vendee, etc., see Seat v. Knight, 3 Tenn. Ch. 262; for remedy by judicial sale as in the ordinary foreclosure of a mortgage, see Bruce v. Tilson, 25 N. Y. 194.

§ 1262 (a) The first part of this paragraph is quoted in Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 Pac. 27. This paragraph is cited in Edmons v. Gracy, 61 Fla. 593, 54 South. 899; and in Waite v. Stanley, 88 Vt. 407, 92 Atl. 633 (vendor has remedy of foreclosure). As to tender of deed, see Lyons v. Chaffee, 79 Or. 485, 154 Pac. 688 (not a prerequisite); Taylor v. Interstate Inv. Co., (Wash.) 135 Pac. 240 (same). As to foreclosure, see, further, *ante*, § 1261, note (a); Patterson v. Mikkelson, 86 Neb. 512, 125 N. W. 1104; Bates v. Loffler, 28 S. D. 228, 133 N. W. 283. the land as security for the purchase price agreed to be paid. In the former case, the legal title remains in the vendor, who has simply agreed to convey, while the vendee, although having as yet acquired no legal interest in the land by virtue of the contract, does obtain a lien upon it as security for the purchase-money he has paid, and for the performance of the vendor's obligation to convey.^{1 a} In

§ 1263, ¹ The lien exists, of course, only where the vendor is unable or refuses to perform his contract so that the vendee can recover back the purchase-money paid. It does not arise where the contract is illegal, nor where the vendee himself is in default by abandoning the contract: Cator v. Earl of Pembroke, 1 Brown Ch. 301; Wythes v. Lee, 3 Drew. 396, 406; Ewing v. Osbaldiston, 2 Mylne & C. 53, 88; Dinn v. Grant, 5 De Gex & S. 451; Rose v. Watson, 10 H. L. Cas. 672; Turner v. Marriott, L. R. 3 Eq. 744; Torrance v. Bolton, L. R. 14 Eq. 124; Aberaman Ironworks v. Wickens, L. R. 4 Ch. 101; 5 Eq.

§1263, (a) The lien exists, not merely where the contract is determined by reason of the default of the vendor, but wherever it is determined without any default on the vendee's part: Whitbread & Co., Lim., v. Watt, [1902] 1 Ch. 835, affirming [1901] 1 Ch. 911 (lien exists where vendee, in exercise of a power conferred by the contract, rescinded on the happening of a certain event). In general, see Felkner v. Tighe, 39 Ark. 357; Stults v. Brown, 112 Ind. 370, 2 Am. St. Rep. 190, 14 N. E. 230; Coleman v. Floyd, 131 Ind. 330, 31 N. E. 75; Ellison v. Branstrattor, 45 Ind. App. 307, 88 N. E. 963, 89 N. E. 513 (purchaser at invalid tax sale has lien for amount expended); Delano v. Saylor, (Ky.) 113 S. W. 888; Lowe v. Maynard, (Ky.) 115 S. W. 214; Wright v. Yates, 140 Ky. 283, 130 S. W. 1111; Elliott v. Walker, 145 Ky. 71, 140 S. W. 51; Groves v. Stouder, (Okl.) 161 Pac. 239; Cleveland v. Bergen Bldg. & Imp. Co., (N. J. Eq.) 55 Atl. 117, citing the text; Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y. 113, 127 Am. St. Rep. 862, 15 Ann. Cas. 819, and note, 84 N. E. 937; Ihrke v. Continental Life Ins. & Investment Co., 91 Wash. 342, L. R. A. 1916F, 430, 157 Pac. 866; Townsend v. Vanderwerker, 160 U. S. 171, 40 L. Ed. 383, 16 Sup. Ct. 258; Everett v. Mansfield, 148 Fed. 374, 8 Ann. Cas. 956, 78 C. C. A. 188, reversing In re Peasley, 137 Fed. 190; Gerstell v. Shirk, 210 Fed. 223, 127 C. C. A. 41, reviewing cases; Howard v. Linnhaven Orchard Co., 228 Fed. 523. But see Williams v. Shuman, 141 Ga. 114, 80 S. E. 625; Young v. Walker, 224 Mass. 491, 113 N. E. 363 (not recognized in Massachusetts); Davis v. William Rosenzweig Realty Operating Co., 192 N. Y. 128, 127 Am. St. Rep. 890, 20 L. **R. A. (N. S.)** 175, 84 N. E. 943 (no lien, when the suit is by purchaser to rescind for vendor's misrepresentation; the lien does not survive the rescission. Three judges dissented in an opinion the reasoning of which appears unanswerable).

England, therefore, and in the American states where the grantor's lien has been adopted, the vendee's lien upon the lands contracted to be sold as a security for so much of the purchase price as he has paid prior to a conveyance, and for the performance by the vendor of his obligation, exists to the same extent against the same classes of persons, and governed by the same rules, as the corresponding lien of the grantor. The lien only arises, of course, when the vendor is in some default for not completing the contract according to its terms, and the vendee is not in default so as to prevent him from recovering the purchase-money paid.^e

485; Lane v. Ludlow, 2 Paine, 591; Chase v. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581; Clark v. Jacobs, 56 How. Pr. 519; Wright v. Dufield, 2 Baxt. 218; Flinn v. Barber, 64 Ala. 193; Stewart v. Wood, 63 Mo. 252; Cooper v. Merritt, 30 Ark. 686; Shirley v. Shirley, 7 Blackf. 452; Brown v. East, 5 Mon. 405, 407; Wickman v. Robinson, 14 Wis. 493, 80 Am. Dec. 789; Anderson v. Spencer, 51 Miss. 869; Hughes v. Hatchett, 55 Ala. 539. The lien prevails against a subsequent grantee or morgagee of the vendor with notice: Rose v. Watson; Clark v. Jacobs; Stewart v. Wood.^b The Civil Code of California adopts this lien: "Sec. 3050: One who pays to the owner any part of the price of real property, under an agreement for the sale thereof, has a special lien upon the property, independent of possession, for such part of the amount paid as he may be entitled to recover back in case of a failure of consideration."

§ 1263, (b) Whitbread & Co., Lim., v. Watt, [1902] 1 Ch. 835, affirming [1901] 1 Ch. 911; Lowe v. Maynard, (Ky.) 115 S. W. 214. § 1263, (c) This paragraph is quoted in full in Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y. 113, 127 Am. St. Rep. 862, 15 Ann. Cas. 819, 84 N. E. 937.

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SECTION VII.

ARISING FROM A DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEEDS.

ANALYSIS.

§ 1264. The English doctrine.

§ 1265. The doctrine in the United States.

§ 1266. Distinction suggested as a conclusion from American cases.

§ 1267. How this lien is enforced.

§ 1264. English Doctrine.—It is a well-settled doctrine of the English equity that a deposit of title deeds as a security for the payment of money, without any agreement, either verbal or written, to give a mortgage, creates an equitable lien, or, as it is ordinarily called, an equitable mortgage, on the estate of the debtor of which the deeds constitute in whole or in part the title. The exact significance and effect of the transaction is, that the debtor thereby contracts that his estate in the land shall be liable for the debt, and that he will execute such mortgage or conveyance as may be necessary to convey the estate to the creditor as security for the payment. The lien thus created is good between the parties, and as against all subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of the depositor who are affected with notice of the transaction, and all persons holding under him as volunteers.¹

§ 1264, ¹ Russel v. Russel, ¹ Brown Ch. 269; ¹ Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed. 931; Pye v. Daubuz, ² Dick. 759; Ex parte Whitbread, ¹⁹ Ves. 209; Ex parte Wright, ¹⁹ Ves. 255; Ex parte Hooper, ¹ Mer. 7; Ex parte Kensington, ² Ves. & B. 79; Parker v. Housefield, ² Mylne & K. 419; Pryce v. Bury, ² Drew. 41, 42; Lacon v. Allen, ³ Drew. 579; Whitbread v. Jordan, ¹ Younge & C. 303; National Bank of Australia v. Cherry, L. R. ³ P. C. 299. A deposit once made may be extended so as to include further advances in pursuance of a subsequent parol agreement: Ex parte Kensington, ² Ves. & B. 79, 84; Ex parte Langston, ¹⁷ Ves. 227; Baynard v. Woolley, ²⁰ Beav. 583.

English judges have explained the doctrine in different modes, sometimes referring it wholly to precedent, as in Lacon v. Allen, 3 Drew. 579, 582, per Kindersley, V. C.; and sometimes endeavoring to find a § 1265. The Doctrine in the United States.—The basis of fact which exists in England, as described in the footnote, is not found in our law or our practice; and as the doctrine is opposed to all our modes of treating real estate,

basis of principle for it, as in Keys v. Williams, 3 Younge & C. 55, 61, per Lord Abinger. As a matter of fact, the doctrine rests upon the peculiar law and practice of England with reference to conveyancing, and to the use of deeds as evidence of ownership. There is no general system of registration; the possession of deeds is an evidence of ownership; they or their abstracts are exhibited to the intended purchaser for examination in every negotiation for a sale; they are delivered to the grantee almost as a matter of course in all transfers of the fee; no transfer can safely be made without them; and no one is supposed to have a right to their possession unless he has some claim upon the land or estate which they represent. Wherever a supposed owner offers his estate for sale or mortgage, he must produce his title deeds, and their absence from his possession, when demanded, inevitably casts a suspicion on his title, and puts the other party upon an inquiry.^a The doctrine, therefore, has some natural basis of fact in England, and does not produce the difficulties in its actual operation which it would necessarily canse in this country, where the records of deeds, and not the deeds themselves, are the real evidence and security of title and ownership. A prior equitable lien created by a deposit of title deeds is superior to all subsequent claims of mere volunteers, and of parties acquiring rights under the depositor with actual or constructive notice of the lien. The important points which arise in practice are generally connected with this matter of priority, and involve the question as to what constitutes notice to a subsequent mortgagee or other encumbrancer. This subject has already been discussed, and the conclusions of the latest English cases given ante, in § 612. As the same conditions of fact do not arise in this country, and the rules are valuable here only by analogy, it does not seem necessary to go into any further examination of the numerous English decisions. The following cases illustrate these questions: Turner v. Letts, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 243; Roberts v. Croft, 2 De Gex & J. 1; Perry Herrick v. Attwood, 2 De Gex & J. 21; Layard v. Maud, L. R. 4 Eq. 397; Newton v. Newton, L. R. 6 Eq. 135; 4 Ch. 143; Thorpe v. Holdsworth, L. R. 7 Eq. 139; Briggs v. Jones, L. R. 10 Eq. 92; In re Durham etc. Soc., L. R. 12 Eq.

§ 1264, (a) The author's note is cited to this effect in Kelly v. Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co., 98 Va. 405, 81 Am. St. Rep. 736, 36 S. E. 511, holding that in this country the vendee is not, as a matter of law, entitled to his vendor's muniments of title.

and especially to our system of registry, it was inevitable that the doctrine of an equitable lien, resulting from a mere deposit of title deeds with a creditor, should not meet with any general and practical acceptance throughout the United States. Under our system of recording, there is no necessity for the production, nor even for the preservation, of the original title deed; owners look to the records as furnishing the real evidence of title, and as exhibiting the true condition of all interests in and claims upon the land which could affect the rights of purchasers or encumbrancers; and to the records all parties go, as a matter of course, even in preference to the original deeds.¹ In fact, no presumption or inference would, in general, be raised from the mere possession of title deeds by a stranger. It follows that in several of the states, where the question has been judicially examined, the doctrine has been distinctly repudiated or not adopted, as being wholly inconsistent with our statutory system of registry and methods of conveyancing.^{2a} In a few cases, however, the English doctrine

516; Maxfield v. Burton, L. R. 17 Eq. 15; Waldy v. Gray, L. R. 20 Eq. 238; Ratcliffe v. Barnard, L. R. 6 Ch. 652; Dixon v. Muckleston, L. R. 8 Ch. 155; Burton v. Gray, L. R. 8 Ch. 932; Ex parte Holthausen, L. R. 9 Ch. 722; In re Trethowan, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 559; Keate v. Phillips, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 560; In re Morgan, L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 93.

§ 1265, ¹ See Probasco v. Johnson, 2 Disn. 96, 98.

§ 1265, ² Bicknell v. Bicknell, 31 Vt. 498; Shitz v. Dieffenbach, 3 Pa. St. 233; Thomas's Appeal, 30 Pa. St. 378; Edwards's Ex'rs v. Trumbull, 50 Pa. St. 509; Bowers v. Oyster, 3 Penr. & W. 239; Probasco v. Johnson, 2 Disn. 96; Bloom v. Noggle, 4 Ohio St. 45, 56;

§ 1265, (a) See, also, Bloomfield State Bank v. Miller, 55 Neb. 243, 70 Am. St. Rep. 381, 44 L. R. A. 387, 75 N. W. 569, reviewing the cases, and arguing with much force for the repudiation of the doctrine: Parker v. Carolina Sav. Bank, 53 S. C. 583, 69 Am. St. Rep. 888, 31 S. E. 678; Kelly v. Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co., 98 Va. 405, 81 Am. St. Rep. 736, 36 S. E. 511 (vendee is not, as a matter of law, entitled to his vendor's muniments of title); Hutzler v. Phillips, 26 S. C. 136, 4 Am. St. Rep. 687, and note, 1 S. E. 502; Lehman v. Collins, 69 Ala. 127. See, also, Tuller v. Leaverton, 143 Iowa, 162, 136 Am. St. Rep. 756, 121 N. W. 515; In re Snyder, 138 Iowa, 553, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 206, 114 N. W. 615; Grames v. Consolidated Timber Co., (Or.) 215 Fed. 785. has been recognized, treated as a subsisting rule of equity jurisprudence, and acted upon. It cannot be affirmed, in my opinion, notwithstanding these decisions, that the rule has been firmly established in either one of the states where the decisions were made; their authority is hardly sufficient to be considered as having finally settled the question in accordance with their views.³

Vanmeter v. McFaddin, 8 B. Mon. 435, 438; Meador v. Mcador, 3 Heisk. 562; Gothard v. Flynn, 25 Miss. 58; but compare, *per contra*, Williams v. Stratton, 10 Smedes & M. 418.

§ 1265, 3 Hackett v. Reynolds, 4 R. I. 512; Rockwell v. Hobby, 2 Sand. Ch. 9; Griffin v. Griffin, 18 N. J. Eq. 104; Welsh v. Usher, 2 Hill Eq. 167, 170, 29 Am. Dec. 63, per Harper, J.; Williams v. Stratton, 10 Smedes & M. 418, 426; Mowry v. Wood, 12 Wis. 413; Jarvis v. Dutcher, 16 Wis. 307; First Nat. Bank v. Caldwell, 4 Dill. 314; Fed. Cas. No. 4798.^b In Rockwell v. Hobby, supra, the decision was by the assistant vice-chancellor, who said: "In absence of all other proof, the evidence of an advance of money, and the finding of the deeds of the borrower in the possession of the lender, is held to establish an equitable mortgage. In the case before me, the deed went into the possession of the testator [the creditor] for some purpose. None is specifically proved; but there is an advance of money proved,---an advance which went to discharge a mortgage given in truth for a part of the purchase-money of the land described in that deed. The only inference is, that the deed was deposited as a security for such advance." This is the decision of an inferior local equity court, but of an undoubtedly able judge; and although it has been frequently cited by text-writers, it certainly cannot be regarded as having finally established the full English doctrine as a part of the law in New York. The same is true of Welsh v. Usher, supra, in which Harper, J., admitted the doctrine as existing, but this can hardly establish the rule for South Carolina. In Griffin v. Griffin, supra, the chancellor of New Jersey went somewhat further, and said that "courts of equity in England and in this country have for many years recognized the validity of an equitable mortgage by the deposit of title deeds by a debtor with his creditor as security for the repayment of a debt, and have held that the mere fact that a creditor was in possession of the title deeds raised the presumption that they were deposited as a se-

§1265, (b) See, also, Jennings v. ground, since there was a writing Augir, 215 Fed. 658 (but unneceswhereby the transaction was made a sary to rest the decision on this lien).

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§ 1266. Distinction Suggested.—From a comparison of these decisions I venture to suggest a distinction which may partially reconcile the American cases, and may furnish a rule which would perhaps be accepted as correct in nearly all the states. In the first place, a deposit of title deeds with the creditor as security for an indebtedness, even without any accompanying express agreement, certainly means something; it is not a mere empty form; it creates some right both at law and in equity. It is a pledge of the deeds themselves, valid between the parties. The depositor cannot recover the instruments in a legal action until he has paid the debt; and a court of equity will give him no relief until he has done equity to his creditor by discharging the obligation which the deposit was intended to secure. What is thus a pledge of the deeds themselves at law might be regarded in equity as a lien upon the land described in the deeds. It would be carrying out the evident intention of the parties, and would be in complete harmony with our established system of titles, of conveyancing, and of registration, to permit the mere deposit of title deeds as security. without further express agreement, to create an equitable lien on the land, valid and enforceable between the original parties, as against the debtor himself. To this extent the lien created by the deposit might be admitted in all the states.^{1 a} On the other hand, such a lien operating against

curity for the debt, and created an equitable mortgage." It should be observed that this decision was made with reference to New York law. Hackett v. Reynolds, *supra*, goes to the full length of holding that the deposit of title deeds creates an equitable lien or mortgage as between the original parties and other persons subject to their equities, and that the courts will establish this lien, and enforce a sale of the depositor's interest and also of the interest of third persons who are subject to the lien. In Williams v. Stratton, 10 Smedes & M. 418, 426, the question was fully discussed, and the English doctrine admitted to exist, although not applied to the facts of the case. This admission has, however, been overruled in the subsequent case of Gothard v. Flynn, 25 Miss. 58.

§ 1266, ¹ Griffin v. Griffin, 18 N. J. Eq. 104. It is probable that
§ 1266, (a) See, also, Bullowa v. Orgo, 57 N. J. Eq. 428, 41 Atl. 494.

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third persons, as grantees or encumbrancers, even those who have dealt concerning the property with actual notice of the deposit, is an entirely different matter, and is plainly irreconcilable with our methods of conveyancing and system of recording, and does not constitute a doctrine of American equity as it is administered in nearly all of the states. In the second place, another distinction is important to be noticed. The theory of an equitable lien resulting from a deposit of title deeds assumes a simple deposit as security without any express agreement in writing; and, as we have seen, the English equity implies an agreement to give a mortgage. If the deposit should be accompanied by a written agreement expressly stipulating that the debt should be secured by or be a charge on the land described in the deeds, or that the transaction should amount to such a security or charge, this agreement would, under the principles of equity prevailing throughout the entire country, constitute an equitable lien on the land itself.^{2 b} In fact. such an agreement would create a lien independent of any deposit, since it would fall within the general doctrines heretofore stated concerning equitable liens arising from executory contracts.³

§ 1267. How Enforced.—If the lien exists in any of the states, its proper mode of enforcement seems to be by a

most of the American cases which sanction the doctrine do not intend to go further than this limited operation of the rule.

§ 1266, ² Luch's Appeal, 44 Pa. St. 519; Edwards's Ex'rs v. Trumbull, 50 Pa. St. 509.

§ 1266, ³ See ante, §§ 1235, 1237.

§ 1266, (b) The text is cited to this effect in Higgins v. Manson, 126 Cal. 467, 77 Am. St. Rep. 192, 58 Pac. 907; Stewart v. McLaughlin, 11 Colo. 458, 18 Pac. 619. Thus, there is an enforceable lien where the assignee of a mortgage, who has purchased at a sale under power in the mortgage but has not received a conveyance, delivers the certificate of sale and the note and mortgage as security for a loan made to him; but this lien arises from express contract, not from the delivery of the title papers: Woodruff v. Adair, 131 Ala. 530, 32 South. 515. See, also, Martin v. Bowen, 51 N. J. Eq. 252, 26 Atl. 823. See, further, Jennings v. Augir, 215 Fed. 658; In re Snyder, 138 Iowa, 553, 19 **L. R. A.** (N. S.) 206, 114 N. W. 615. suit in equity and a decree for the sale of the land subjected to it, although in England the ordinary remedy is by a suit for a strict foreclosure cutting off the right of redemption.¹

SECTION VIII.

VARIOUS STATUTORY LIENS.

ANALYSIS.

§ 1268. General nature and tendency of American legislation on this subject; various examples.
 § 1269. How such liens are enforced.

§ 1268. General Nature of American Legislation on This Subject.-In addition to the foregoing liens which belong to the general equity jurisprudence, the legislation of many states has created or allowed a variety of other liens, the enforcement of which often comes within the equity jurisdiction, and has thus enlarged its scope as administered throughout a large portion of our country. This legislation differs so much in its details that I shall not attempt to give any circumstantial description of it, nor any abstract of the statutes themselves. The liens are sometimes charged upon real estate and sometimes upon chattels. Their general object is the protection of those who, by their labor, services, skill, or materials furnished, have enhanced the value of the specific property, which thus becomes subject to the lien as security for their compensation. The most familiar instance, which may be taken as the type of

§ 1267, ¹ Hackett v. Reynolds, 4 R. I. 512; Mowry v. Wood, 12 Wis. 413; Jarvis v. Dutcher, 16 Wis. 307. The English remedy proceeds upon the notion that the deposit is, in effect, an agreement to give an ordinary legal mortgage; the relief, therefore, is the same as that ordinarily given in case of a legal mortgage: Backhouse v. Charlton, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 444; Carter v. Wake, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 605; James v. James, L. R. 16 Eq. 153; Pryce v. Bury, L. R. 16 Eq. 153, note.

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the whole class, is that known as the "mechanic's lien," found under some form in nearly every state.^{1 a}

§ 1269. How Enforced.—Many of these liens are enforced by purely legal actions, and their effect resembles that produced by a legal attachment, enabling the lienor to retain or recover possession of the thing, and to sell it at execution sale upon the judgment. Others are enforced by special proceedings authorized and regulated by statute. These two classes have no equitable character, and do not come within the scope of equity jurisdiction. In some of the states, however, these liens, especially those charged upon real estate, as mechanics' liens, mining liens, and the like, are enforced by ordinary equitable actions, resulting in a decree for a sale and distribution of the proceeds, identical in all their features with suits for the foreclosure of mortgages by judicial sale.¹^a It is true that these liens,

§ 1268, 1 It has been the policy in many states to protect in this manner those employed in their peculiar local industries. In the Northwestern states, where lumbering is an important industry, a lien on logs is given to those engaged in "booming," or in cutting trees, and on lumber, to those engaged in sawing. In the mining states and territories of the Pacific coast, a system of liens exists on mines, miningsites, and mineral products, in favor of those engaged in working, "prospecting," or "locating" them. In Southern States, a lien on the plantations, or products thereof, is given to those who by their materials or services aid in raising crops. There is also a strong tendency, especially in the Western states, to protect all artisans, workmen, laborers, etc., by such liens.

§ 1269, 1 Winslow v. Urquhart, 39 Wis. 260 (on logs); Ogg v. Tate, 52 Ind. 159 (mechanics); Ball v. Vason, 56 Ga. 264 (erops and land); Watson v. Columbia Bridge Co., 13 S. C. 433 (mechanics); Gaskill v.

§ 1268, (a) The text is cited in Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc. v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 138 Cal. 257, 71 Pac. 334; Huggins v. Home Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 107 Miss. 650, 65 South. 646.

§1269, (a) The text is cited in De La Vergne, etc., Co. v. Montgomery Brewing Co., 46 Fed. 829 (action is equitable); Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc. v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 138 Cal. 257, 71 Pac. 334; Huggins v. Home Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 107 Miss. 650, 65 South. 646 (lien of mutual fire insurance company for premiums on property inbeing created by statute, are *legal* in their essential nature, rather than equitable; but so far as they are enforced by equitable actions, they have added a peculiar element to

Davis, 63 Ga. 645 (same); Lawton v. Case, 73 Ind. 60; Cummins v. Halsted, 26 Minn. 151; Willer v. Bergenthal, 50 Wis. 474, 7 N. W. 352 (action is equitable); Spink v. McCall, 52 Iowa, 432, 3 N. W. 471; Phillips v. Gilbert, 101 U. S. 721, 25 L. Ed. 833; Burroughs v. Tostevan, 75 N. Y. 567; Kealing v. Voss, 61 Ind. 466. These cases are cited merely as illustrations of actions, equitable in their nature, for the enforcement of such liens.

sured). The text is quoted in Metz v. Critcher, 83 S. C. 396, 65 S. E. 394 (mechanics' liens enforceable only by the statutory proceeding). See, also, Davis v. Alvord, 94 U. S. 545, 24 L. Ed. 283 (mechanics' lien); Gilchrist v. Helena Co., 58 Fed. 708 (labor lien on railroad; where statute provides no method of enforcing lien, remedy is in equity); Healey Ice Mach. Co. v. Green, 181 Fed. 890 (federal equity jurisdiction to enforce mechanics' lien unaffected by state statute); Armstrong Cork Co. v. Merchants' Refrigerating Co., 184 Fed. 199, 107 C. C. A. 93 (mechanics' lien); Greil Bros. Co. v. City of Montgomery, 182 Ala. 291,* Ann. Cas. 1915D, 738, 62 South. 692 (equity has jurisdiction to enforce statutory liens unless legislature by prescribing a method of enforcement has impliedly excluded the equity court); Santa Cruz Rock Pav. Co. v. Bowie, 104 Cal. 286, 37 Pac. 934 (street assessment lien); Goldtree v. City of San Diego, 8 Cal. App. 505, 97 Pac. 216 (mechanics' lien); Los Angeles Pressed Brick Co. v. Higgins, 8 Cal. App. 514, 97 Pac. 414, 420 (equity itself raises no mechanics' lien); Coghlan v. Quartararo, 15 Cal. App. 662, 115 Pac. 664 (mechanics' lien); Dobbins v. Colorado

& S. Ry. Co., (Colo. App.) 75 Pac. 156 (tax lien on railroad established in equity, in absence of statutory provision for its enforcement); Selfridge v. Leonard-Heffner Machinery Co., 51 Colo. 314, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 282, 117 Pac. 158 (mechanics' lien); Albrecht v. C. C. Foster Lumber Co., 126 Ind. 318, 26 N. E. 157 (mechanics' lien); Ward v. Yarnelle, 173 Ind. 535, 91 N. E. 7 (mechanics' lien); Frost v. Clark, 82 Iowa, 298, 48 N. W. 82 (mechanics' lien); Elder Mercantile Co. v. Ottawa Investment Co., 100 Kan. 597, 165 Pac. 279 (mechanics' lien); United States & Canada Land Co. v. Sullivan, 113 Minn. 27, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 51, 128 N. W. 1112 (lien of corporation on unpaid stock, where statute makes no provision for its enforcement, may be foreclosed in equity); Schillinger Fire-Proof Cement & Asphalt Co. v. Arnott, 152 N. Y. 584, 46 N. E. 956 (mechanics' lien); Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 173 N. Y. 492, 66 N. E. 395 (attorney's lien on cause of action); Washington Iron Works v. Jensen, 3 Wash. St. 584, 28 Pac. 1019 (statutory lien on vessel); Milwaukee Structural Steel Co. v. Borun, 164 Wis. 502, 159 N. W. 811, 162 N. W. 424 (mechanics' lien.

the equity *jurisdiction* in several states. It is no part of my design to discuss the rules governing the existence, scope, and operation of such statutory liens; and the general reference is made to them in order to complete a survey of the liens which belong to equity jurisprudence or may fall under the equity jurisdiction.

CHAPTER EIGHTH.

ESTATES AND INTERESTS ARISING FROM ASSIGNMENTS.

SECTION I.

ASSIGNMENTS OF THINGS IN ACTION.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1270. Original doctrines at law and in equity.
- § 1271. Rationale of the equitable doctrine.
- § 1272. Assignment of things in action at common law.
- § 1273. The same; under statutory legislation.
- § 1274. Interpretation of this legislation as contained in the Reformed Procedure.
- § 1275. What things in action are or are not thus legally assignable.
- § 1276. Assignments forbidden by public policy.
- § 1277. The equitable jurisdiction; under the Reformed Procedure.
- § 1278. The equitable jurisdiction; under the common-law procedure.
- § 1279. Incidents of an assignment.

§ 1270. Original Doctrines at Law and in Equity.^a—By the ancient common law, things in action, expectancies, possibilities, and the like were not assignable; an assignee thereof acquired no right which was recognized by a court of law, for the act of assignment was regarded as against public policy, if not actually illegal. Lord Coke states this doctrine as one of the peculiar excellencies of the system which he called the "perfection of human wisdom," but which was at his day in many respects semi-barbarous.¹

§ 1270, ¹ Lampet's Case, 10 Coke, 46b, 48a: "The great wisdom and policy of the sages and founders of our law have provided that no possibility, right, title, nor thing in action shall be granted or assigned to strangers; for that would be the occasion of multiplying of contentions and suits, of great oppression of the people, and the subversion of the due and equal execution of justice!"

§ 1270, (a) Sections 1270-1285 are cited in The Elmbank, 72 Fed. 610.

The court of chancery from an early day rejected this rule as narrow and even absurd. Acting upon the principle that a man may bind himself to do anything not impossible, and that he ought to perform his obligations when not illegal, equity has always held that the assignment of a thing in action for a valuable consideration should be enforced;² and has also given effect to assignments of every kind of future and contingent interests and possibilities in real or personal property, when made upon a valuable consideration.^{3 b} As soon as the assigned expectancy or pos-

§ 1270, ² Row v. Dawson, 1 Ves. Sr. 331; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 153; Wright v. Wright, 1 Ves. Sr. 409, 411; Squib v. Wyn, 1 P. Wms. 378, 381.

§ 1270, ³ Warmstrey v. Lady Tanfield, 1 Ch. Rep. 29; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1530; Goring v. Bickerstaff, 1 Ch. Cas. 4, 8; Jewson v. Moulson, 2 Atk. 417, 421; Wright v. Wright, 1 Ves. Sr. 409, 411; Spragg v. Binkes, 5 Ves. 583, 588; Stokes v. Holden, 1 Keen, 145, 152, 153; Hobson v. Trevor, 2 P. Wms. 191 (the mere expectancy of an heir at law); Bennett v. Cooper, 9 Beav. 252 (the possible interest which a person may take under the will of another who is still living); Lindsay v. Gibbs, 22 Beav. 522 (non-existing property to be acquired at a future time,-e.g., the expected cargo of a ship). The opinion of Lord Hardwicke in Wright v. Wright, supra, is a leading exposition of this equity doctrine. The interest assigned was a possibility under an executory devise. Lord Hardwicke said: "It is now established in this court that a chose in action may be assigned for valuable consideration; and this [the expectancy which was the subject-matter of the suit] may be released as a chose in action may; and then why may it not be put into such a shape as to be disposed of to a stranger, or to make him [the assignor] trustee for a stranger? This court admits the contingent interest of terms for years to be assigned for valuable consideration, though the law does not; and further permits them to be disposed of by will, as in Wind v. Jekyl, 1 P. Wms. 572. . . . But this is said to be a contingent interest or possibility of inheritance, and there is no case of making that good; as to which there is no difference in the reason of the thing between that and the allowing of an assignment of a possibility of a personal thing or chattel real. The Trevor's

§ 1270, (b) A voluntary assignment of an expectancy will not be enforced in equity, even though under seal: In re Ellenborough, [1903] 1 Ch. 697; Meek v. Kettlewell, 1 Hare 464, 1 Phillips' Ch. 342; In re Tilt, 74 L. T. 163. sibility has fallen into possession the assignment will be enforced.⁴

§ 1271. Rationale of the Equitable Doctrine.^a—It followed, therefore, that the assignee of an ordinary thing in action-a debt or demand arising out of contract-acquired at once an equitable ownership therein, as far as it is possible to predicate property or ownership of such a species of right, while the assignee of an expectancy, possibility, or contingency acquired at once a present equitable right over the future proceeds of the expectancy, possibility, or contingency which was of such a certain and fixed nature that it was sure to ripen into an ordinary equitable property right over those proceeds as soon as they came into existence by a transformation of the possibility or contingency into an interest in possession. There was an equitable ownership or property in abeyance, so to speak, which finally changed into an absolute property upon the happening of the future event.^b Equity permitted the creation and transfer of such an ownership, while the original common law rejected every such notion. At an early day this

Case, 2 P. Wms. 191, goes a great way. There was an agreement on marriage to settle all such lands as should come by descent or otherwise from his father, which this court carried into execution, notwithstanding an expectancy of an heir at law in the life of his ancestor is less than a possibility. In that case it was made good by way of agreement for valuable consideration. Then how does an assignment differ from it? An assignment always operates by way of agreement or contract, amounting, in the consideration of this court, to this, that one agrees with another to transfer and make good that right or interest, and, like any other agreement, the court will cause it to be specifically performed (not leaving the assignee to his action for damages for a breach), when the assignor is in a condition to transfer the property, or to cause it to be transferred, to the assignee."

§1270, 4 Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191.

§ 1271, (a) This section is cited in Weller v. Jersey City, H. & P.
St. Ry. Co., (N. J. Eq.) 57 Atl. 730; McCall v. Hampton, 98 Ky. 166, 56
Am. St. Rep. 335, 33 L. R. A. 266, 32 S. W. 406.
§ 1271, (b) The text is quoted in Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 404, 126 Pac. 149.

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species of equitable ownership arising from assignments prohibited by the common law was the occasion of an extensive branch of the equity jurisdiction. This former condition has, however, been greatly modified, and the special jurisdiction based upon it has become very much diminished.

§ 1272. Assignment of Things in Action at Common Law.—The essential validity of the assignments of legal things in action, and the equitable ownership of the assignees thereunder, had long been recognized by the law courts, which permitted the assignee suing in the name of the assignor to have entire control of the action and the judgment, and treated him as the only person having an immediate interest in the recovery.¹ In all ordinary cases, therefore, of assignment of legal things in action—debts, and the like—the assignee had a complete and easy remedy at law, and the necessity of a resort to equity had ceased.² a

§ 1272, 1 The assignee was protected by the court from any interference with the action by the assignor in whose name as plaintiff on the record it was prosecuted; and after notice of the assignment to the debtor, any release to him by the assignor, or payment by him to the assignor, or other matter of discharge between them, was no defense to the action. In fact, the assignee's equitable interest was perfect, even in a court of law, except that he could not sue in his own name. See an account of the law on this subject by Buller, J., in Master v. Miller, 4 Term Rep. 320, 340, 341; Westoby v. Day, 2 El. & B. 605, 624; Edwards v. Parkhurst, 21 Vt. 472; Conway v. Cutting, 51 N. H. 407; Garland v. Harrington, 51 N. H. 409; Briggs v. Dorr, 19 Johns. 95; Raymond v. Squire, 11 Johns. 47; Johnson v. Bloodgood, 1 Johns. Cas. 51; 1 Am. Dec. 93.

§ 1272, ² Hammond v. Messenger, 9 Sim. 327; Keys v. Williams, 3 Younge & C. 462, 466, 467.

§ 1272, (a) See Hayes v. Berdan, 47 N. J. Eq. 567, 21 Atl. 339; Hayward v. Andrews, 106 U. S. 678, 27 L. Ed. 271, 1 Sup. Ct. 544; Gaugler v. Chicago, M. & P. S. Ry. Co., 197 Fed. 79 (where assignor and assignee join in action, the relief sought is purely legal, and equity has no jurisdiction); Timmons v. Citizens' Bank of Waynesboro, 11 Ga. App. 69, 74 S. E. 798; but see Brady v. Ranch Mining Co., 7 Cal. App. 182, 94 Pac. 85.

§ 1273. The Same. Under Statutory Legislation.---Statutes both in England and in the United States have gone much further, and, by allowing the assignee of things in action to sue at law in his own name, have made his interest or ownership to be legal, and no longer equitable. The earliest English statutes were confined to policies of insurance, permitting them to be legally assigned, so that the assignee could sue at law in his own name.¹ Finally, by the supreme court of judicature act, it was provided that debts and all other legal things in action may be assigned at law, if the assignment is in writing and absolute, and not by way of charge only.² The legislation in many of the American states is much broader in its effects, though less specific in its language. In all the states and territories which have adopted the reformed procedure, abolishing the distinction between legal and equitable actions, and introducing one civil action for all purposes, it is provided that "every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided in this statute."³

§ 1274. Interpretation of This Legislation in the Reformed Procedure.—It is the settled interpretation of this provision in all the commonwealths where the reformed procedure prevails, that whenever a thing in action is

§ 1273, 1 30 & 31 Viet., c. 144; 31 & 32 Viet., c. 86.

§ 1273, 2 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, sec. 25, § 6.

§ 1273, ³ The exceptions referred to embrace suits by executors, administrators, trustees of an express trust, and persons in whose names contracts are made for the benefit of others. See the following codes of procedure and practice acts: New York, sec. 111 (449 of new code); Indiana, see. 3; Kansas, see. 26; Minnesota, sec. 26; Missouri, art. 1, see. 2; Wisconsin, c. 122, sec. 12; Oregon, secs. 27, 379; Nevada, sec. 4; Kentucky, sec. 30; Washington, sec. 4; Montana, see. 4; Ohio, sec. 25; California, sec. 367; Iowa, sec. 2543; Nebraska, see. 29; Wyoming, sec. 22; Idaho, sec. 4; Dakota, sec. 74; Colorado, sec. 3; South Carolina, sec. 134; North Carolina, sec. 55. There are also special statutes in some of the states authorizing and regulating the assignment of things in action; e. g., Cal. Civ. Code, secs. 953, 954, 1427, 1428, 1457, 1458.

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assignable, the assignee thereof must sue upon it in his own name; and if the thing in action is itself legal, his right and interest under the assignment have been made legal. The provision itself does not render anything in action assignable; it does not affect in any way the quality of assignability; it simply acts upon things in action which are assignable, and if they are legal in their nature, and if the assignment is one which would have been recognized in a court of law by permitting the assignee to sue in the name of the assignor, then the interest of the assignee is legal.^{1 a}

§ 1275. What Things in Action are or are not Thus Assignable.—It becomes important, then, in fixing the scope of the equity jurisdiction, to determine what things in action may thus be legally assigned. The following criterion is universally adopted: All things in action which

§ 1274, ¹ See Pomeroy on Remedies, secs. 125–138, where the authorities sustaining the above conclusions are fully examined: Devlin v. The Mayor, 63 N. Y. 8; Hardin v. Helton, 50 Ind. 319; Archibald v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 38 Wis. 542. If the thing in action is a claim purely equitable in its nature, or if the assignment is one which courts of equity alone recognized,—as, for example, an order given upon a particular fund, or an assignment of a part of a single demand,—then the assignee's interest is still equitable. A note or bill payable to order may be transferred without indorsement, and the transferee will obtain a good equitable title; such transfer is an equitable assignment:^b Van Riper v. Baldwin, 19 Hun, 344; Hutchinson v. Simon, 57 Miss. 628; Norton v. Piscataqua Ins. Co., 111 Mass. 532; and see *ante*, cases in note under § 1148.

§ 1274, (a) Right of assignee to sue in his own name: Manley v. Park, (Kan.) 75 Pac. 557; Howe v. Mittelberg, 96 Mo. App. 490, 70 S. W. 397; Tennant v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 133 Mo. App. 345, 112 S. W. 754; Close v. Independent Gravel Co., 156 Mo. App. 411, 138 S. W. 81; also, see Michigan Sugar Co. v. Moffett, 183 Mich. 589, 149 N. W. 1025; (Michigan statute also permissive, not mandatory; Mich. Comp. Laws, § 10,054). In Sullivan v. Visconti, (N. J. Eq.) 53 Atl. 598, it was held that the effect of the New Jersey statute is to permit a, suit in the name of the assignce, although such procedure is not mandatory.

§ 1274, (b) Bell v. Moon, 79 Va. 341. Likewise, a non-negotiable note may be equitably assigned by delivery: Johnson v. Hibbard, 27 Utah, 342, 75 Pac. 737. survive and pass to the personal representatives of a decedent creditor as assets, or continue as liabilities against the representatives of a decedent debtor, are, in general, thus assignable; all which do not thus survive, but which die with the person of the creditor or of the debtor, are not assignable.^a The first of these classes, according to the doctrine prevailing throughout the United States, includes all claims arising from contract express or implied, with certain well-defined exceptions;^b and those arising from torts to real or personal property, and from frauds, deceits, and other wrongs, whereby an estate, real or personal, is injured, diminished, or damaged. The second class embraces all torts to the person or character, where the injury and damage are confined to the body and the feelings; and also those contracts, often implied, the breach of which produces only *direct* injury and damage, bodily or mental, to the person, such as promises to marry, injuries done by

§1275, (a) Quoted in Weller v. Jersey City, H. & P. St. Ry. Co., (N. J. Eq.) 57 Atl. 730. This paragraph is quoted in full in Atlantic & N. C. R. Co. v. Atlantic & N. C. Co., 147 N. C. 368, 125 Am. St. Rep. 550, 15 Ann. Cas. 363, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 223, 61 S. E. 185. The text is cited in Bell v. Jovita Heights Co., 71 Wash. 7, 127 Pac. 289; Ingersoll v. Gourley, 72 Wash. 462, 130 Pac. 743. The distinction between the two classes of contracts is stated in Poling v. Condon'-Lane Boom & Lumber Co., (W. Va.) 47 S. E. 279. See, also, Bell v. Jovita Heights Co., 71 Wash. 7, 127 Pac. 289; Conaway v. Co-operative Home Builders, 65 Wash. 39, 117 Pac. 716.

§ 1275, (b) Contracts held assignable.—See the following very recent examples: Houssels v. Jacobs, 178 Mo. 579, 77 S. W. 857; Detroit, etc., Ry. Co. v. Common Council, 125 Mich. 673, 84 Am. St. Rep. 589, 85 N. W. 96, 86 N. W. 809 (contract right to immunity from municipal taxation); Frels v. Little Black Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., (Wis.) 98 N. W. 522 (fire insurance policy after adjustment of loss); Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Comins, 72 N. H. 12, 55 Atl. 191 (life insurance policy to one having no insurable interest); State v. Tomlinson, 16 Ind. App. 662, 59 Am. St. Rep. 335, 45 N. E. 1116 (life insurance policy); Jarvis v. Binkley, 206 Ill. 541, 69 N. E. 582; Minnetonka Oil Co. v. Cleveland Vitrified Brick Co., 27 Okl. 180, 111 Pac. 326; Atlantic & N. C. R. Co. v. Atlantic & N. C. Co., 147 N. C. 368, 125 Am. St Rep. 550, 15 Ann. Cas. 363, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 223, and note, 61 S. E. 185; Conaway v. Co-operative Home Builders, 65 Wash. 39, 117 Pac. 716; Ingersoll v. Gourley, 72 Wash. 462, 130 Pac. 743; Smyre v. Board of Commissioners of Kiowa County, 89 Kan. 664, 132 Pac. 209 (license acted upon).

the want of skill of a medical practitioner, contrary to his implied undertaking, and the like;^{1 c} and also those contracts, so long as they are executory, which stipulate solely for the special *personal* services, skill, or knowledge of a contracting party.^{2 d}

§ 1275, ¹ Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322, 333, 64 Am. Dec. 551, per Denio, J.; Chamberlain v. Williamson, 2 Mylne & S. 408; Meech v. Stoner, 19 N. Y. 26, 29, per Comstock, J.; Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 N. Y. 282, 17 Am. Rep. 250; Smith v. Sherman, 4 Cush. 408; Rice v. Stone, 1 Allen, 566; Lattimore v. Simmons, 13 Serg. & R. 183, 186.

§ 1275, ² The whole subject is examined at length, with full analyses of the cases arising under the reformed procedure, in Pomeroy on Remedies, sees. 144–153, and cases cited; Devlin v. The Mayor, 63 N. Y. 8; Wheelock v. Lee, 64 N. Y. 242; Hoyt v. Thompson, 5 N. Y. 320, 347; Haight v. Hayt, 19 N. Y. 464, 467; Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607, 611; Graves v. Spier, 58 Barb. 349, 386; Butler v. New York etc. R. R., 22 N. Y. 110, 112; Bank of California v. Collins, 5 Hun, 209; Weire v. Daveuport, 11 Iowa, 49, 52, 77 Am. Dec. 132; Tyson v. McGuineas, 25 Wis. 656. In Devlin v. The Mayor, *supra*, a contract with the city of New York for cleaning the streets during a certain period for a certain price was held to be assignable by the contractor; and that the assignee could maintain an action for a breach by the city after the assignment, viz., its refusal to allow the assignee to fulfill the con-

§ 1275, (c) Miller v. Newell, 20 S. C. 123, 47 Am. Rep. 833. A right of action for personal injuries is not assignable even though by statute it survives to the executors or administrators: So held in Weller v. Jersey City, H. & P. St. Ry. Co., (N. J. Eq.) 57 Atl. 730; but see Kitheart v. Kitheart, 145 Iowa, 549, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062, 124 N. W. 305 (claim for personal injuries is assignable under Iowa code).

§ 1275, (d) Griffith v. Tower Pub. Co., [1897] 1 Ch. 21 (agreement between author and publisher); Hole v. Bradbury, 12 Ch. Div. 886; Tifton, T. & G. Ry. Co. v. Bedgood, 116 Ga. 945, 43 S. E. 257; Linn County Abstract Co. v. Beechley, (Iowa) 99 N. W. 702; Tarr v. Veasey, 125 Md. 199, 93 Atl. 428;

Wooster v. Crane & Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 22, 66 Atl. 1093 (contract between author and publisher not assignable by publisher; reviewing cases); Swarts v. Narragansett Electric Lighting Co., (R. I.) 59 Atl. 111 (though the contract purports to be between the parties and "their respective . . . assigns"); also, Atlantie & N. C. R. Co. v. Atlantie & N. C. Co., 147 N. C. 368, 125 Am. St. Rep. 550, 15 Ann. Cas. 363, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 223, and note, 61 S. E. 185 (quoting this paragraph of the text; contract to furnish wood to railroad company; restriction on assignment does not apply when contract is clearly objective and gives clear indication that personality of party is in no way considered).

§ 1276. Assignments Forbidden by Public Policy.^a— While large classes of things in action are thus assignable even at law, there are certain species, belonging to a class otherwise assignable, the assignment of which, either at

tract. Per Allen, J. (pp. 15, 16): "If the service to be rendered is not necessarily personal, and such as can only, and with due regard to the interests of the parties and the rights of the adverse party, be rendered by the original contractor, and the latter has not disqualified himself from performance," the contract is assignable. The following special rules illustrate the general conclusions of the text: A cause of action for fraudulent representations concerning the value of certain property survives: Garland v. Harrington, 51 N. H. 409; Conway v. Cutting, 51 N. H. 407; Edwards v. Parkhurst, 21 Vt. 472; Rice v. Stone, 1 Allen, 566; Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322, 333, 64 Am. Dec. 551; Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607, 611; Boud v. Smith, 4 Hun, 48; Grant v. Ludlow's Adm'r, 8 Ohio St. 1, 37; Beckham v. Drake, 8 Mees. & W. 846; 9 Mees. & W. 79; 11 Mees. & W. 315. The right to recover compensation under a contract which is still executory, and which depends upon the fulfillment of its stipulations by the assignor or by the assignee, may be assigned: Brackett v. Blake, 7 Met. 335, 41 Am. Dec. 442; Hawley v. Bristol, 39 Conn. 26; Field v. The Mayor, 6 N. Y. 179, 57 Am. Dec. 435; Devlin v. The Mayor, 63 N. Y. 8; Parsons v. Woodward, 22 N. J. L. 196; Philadelphia v. Lockhart, 73 Pa. St. 211; St. Louis v. Clemens, 42 Mo. 69; Cochran v. Collins, 29 Cal. 129. This is no less true, although by the terms of the contract, under which the compensation is still to be earned at the time of the assignment, the assignor is not bound to remain in the service, and may be dismissed before the service is rendered and the compensation is earned; of course, in such cases, the assignee must show that he has actually rendered the service and earned the compensation: Taylor v. Lynch, 5 Gray, 49; Hartley v. Tapley, 2 Gray, 565; Wallace v. Heywood etc. Co., 16 Gray, 209; Emery v. Lawrence, 8 Cush. 151; Tripp v. Brownell, 12 Cush. 376; Boylen v. Leonard, 2 Allen, 407; Garland v. Harrington, 51 N. H. 409; Augur v. N. Y. Belting etc. Co., 39 Conn. 536; Field v. The Mayor, 6 N. Y. 179, 57 Am. Dec. 435. An assignment of the right to compensation under a contract with a municipal corporation, if the work is actually performed, is not invalidated by the fact that the contract was informal, and might have been repudiated by the city: Wetmore v. San Francisco, 44 Cal. 294; Philadelphia v. Lockhardt, 73 Pa. St. 211; Brackett v. Blake, 7 Met. 335, 41 Am. Dec. 442. In all the

§ 1276, (a) This section is cited in Weller v. Jersey City, H. & P. St. Ry. Co., (N. J. Eq.) 57 Atl. 730.

law or in equity is prohibited from motives of public policy. Thus in England, those emoluments which are paid by the government to certain officials, which are the rewards for past and future public services, and which are at the same

eases cited in support of the three preceding propositions, it will be observed that at the time of the assignment there was an existing contract, and although the agreement might be conditional, and perhaps capable of being reseinded, or the assignor might not be bound by its terms to go on and perform it, yet, as a matter of fact, the contract was performed and the compensation earned after the assignment, either by the assignor who had merely transferred his right to the compensation, or by the assignee himself who had done the services undertaken to be done by the assignor. The capacity of assigning compensation to be earned is not carried so far as to permit a party to assign (at law) a contract which has not yet been entered into, or the right to compensation for services which he has not yet in any manner stipulated to perform. For example, a person cannot assign compensation which he expects to earn from an employer with whom he has not yet made any agreement, and into whose service he has not yet entered: Mulhall v. Quinn, 1 Gray, 105, 107, 61 Am. Dec. 414, per Shaw, C. J.; Farnsworth v. Jackson, 32 Me. 419; Jermyn v. Moffitt, 75 Pa. St. 399; Skipper v. Stokes, 42 Ala. 255, 94 Am. Dec. 646. How far such an assignment would be effectual in equity is considered in a subsequent section:^e While the right to compensation may thus be assigned even before it is earned, the right of the other party to the personal services of the one agreeing to render them, it is said, cannot be transferred; for a person cannot be compelled to perform personal services on behalf of a different employer from the one to whom he has promised: Bethlehem v. Annis, 40 N. H. 34, 77 Am. Dec. 700; Davenport v. Gentry's Adm'r, 9 B. Mon. 427, 429. Also, where a person has entered into a contract involving a personal trust or confidence in himself, and stipulating to use his own personal skill, knowledge, etc., he cannot, while the agreement is still executory, by assignment substitute another in his place, in order to perform the service, without the consent of the other contracting party. After the contract has been executed by himself he can assign the right to recover compensation: Flanders v. Lamphear, 9 N. H. 201; Bethlehem v. Annis, 40 N. H. 34, 40, 77 Am. Dec. 700; Burger v. Rice, 3 Ind. 125; Lansden v. McCarthy, 45 Mo. 106; Stevens v. Benning, 6 De Gex, M. & G. 223. For limitations on this doctrine, see Devlin v. The Mayor, supra.

§ 1275, (c) See §§ 1283, 1289 note.

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time regarded as honorary, or badges of dignity, cannot be assigned.^{1 b} Also, an assignment which violates the policy of the law against champerty or maintenance, as operating merely to procure or promote litigation, will not be per-

§ 1276, 1 Among the instances are the commissions, pay, and halfpay of military and naval officers: Collyer v. Fallon, Turn. & R. 459; Calisher v. Forbes, L. R. 7 Ch. 109; Addison v. Cox, L. R. 8 Ch. 76; Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 1 Swanst. 79; Priddy v. Rose, 3 Mer. 86, 102; McCarthy v. Goold, 1 Ball & B. 387; Stone v. Lidderdale, 2 Anstr. 533; the salaries of judges and of certain other officials: Arbuthnot v. Norton, 5 Moore P. C. C. 219; Greenfell v. Dean of Windsor, 2 Beav. 544, 549; Tunstall v. Boothby, 10 Sim. 542; Cooper v. Reilly, 2 Sim. 560. There are motives of public policy affecting the English law very different from any which belong to our republican institutions. I doubt much whether the law of this country, from considerations of public policy, prohibits the assignment of any official salary, public emolument, pension, and the like, unless such prohibition arises from statute. The notion that salaries, official emoluments, or even pensions, are merely honorary in the sense of the English law, is entirely foreign to our institutions. Statutes have made certain official and public, emoluments personal to their recipients, and have forbidden their assignment, but I think the American law gocs no further:^c Sce Wanless v. United States, 6 Ct. of Cl. 123; Bates v. United States, 4 Ct. of Cl. 569; Burke v. United States, 13 Ct. of Cl. 231; Spofford v. Kirk, 97 U. S. 484, 24 L. Ed. 1032; Billings v. O'Brien, 45 How. Pr. 392; 14 Abb. Pr., N. S., 238; Heirs of Emerson v. Hall, 13 Pet. 409.

§ 1276, (b) An assignment of the salary of a chaplain in a workhouse is not against public policy. In order that the assignment shall be voidable, the office must be public, and "the public must be interested not only in the performance from time to time of the duties of the office, but also in the fit state of preparation of the party having to perform them": In re Mirams, [1891] 1 Q. B. 594.

§ 1276, (c) The English rule was followed as to assignments of future emoluments in Bliss v. Lawrence, 58 N. Y. 442, 17 Am. Rep. 273; Schloss v. Hewlett, 81 Ala. 266, 1 South. 263; Shannon v. Bruner, 36 Fed. 147,

on the ground of "the necessity of securing the efficiency of the public service, by seeing to it that the funds for its maintenance should be received by those who are to perform the work, at such periods as the law had appointed for their payment." See, also, Stewart v. Sample, 168 Ala. 270, 53 South. 182; Mc-Gowan v. New Orleans, 118 La. 429, 10 Ann. Cas. 633, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1120, 43 South. 40; National Bank v. Fink, 86 Tex. 303, 40 Am. St. Rep. 833, 24 S. W. 256; State v. Williamson, 118 Mo. 146, 40 Am. St. Rep. 358, 23 S. W. 1054; Holt v. Thurman, 111 Ky. 84, 98 Am, St. Rep. 398, 63 S. W. 280, citing many

mitted by a court of equity, even though it may not amount strictly to the criminal offense of champerty or maintenance.^{2 d} For this reason, the assignment of a mere right of action to procure a transaction to be set aside on the ground of fraud is not permitted.^{3 e}

§ 1277. The Equitable Jurisdiction—Reformed Procedure.—The following conclusions as to the equitable jurisdiction may be drawn from the foregoing analysis. In England, and in all of the American states which have adopted the reformed procedure, the direct, absolute, or what may be called legal, assignment of legal things in action which are assignable confers on the assignee a purely legal interest, and he can only sue in his own name by a

§ 1276, ² Reynell v. Sprye, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 660; Strange v. Brennan, 15 Sim. 346; Knight v. Bowyer, 2 De Gex. & J. 421; Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432; Dorwin v. Smith, 35 Vt. 69; Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. 415; Arden v. Patterson, 5 Johns. Ch. 44; Thalimer v. Brinkerhoff, 20 Johns. 386; Slade v. Rhodes, 2 Dev. & B. Eq. 24; Coquillard's Adm'r v. Bearss, 21 Ind. 479, 83 Am. Dec. 362; Martin v. Veeder, 20 Wis. 466.

§ 1276, 3 Powell v. Knowler, 5 Atk. 224, 226; Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Younge & C. 481; De Hoghton v. Money, L. R. 2 Ch. 164, 169; Hill v. Boyle, L. R. 4 Eq. 260; Milwaukee etc. R. R. v. Milwaukee etc. R. R., 20 Wis. 174, 183, 88 Am. Dec. 740.

cases. It has been held, however, that an agreement by a public officer that his salary when earned shall become assets of a partnership of which he is a member is not against public policy; McGregor v. Mc-Gregor, 130 Mich. 505, 97 Am. St. Rep. 492, 90 N. W. 284.

§ 1276, (d) The text is quoted in Ryan v. Miller, 236 Mo. 496, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 540, 139 S. W. 128; see, also, Boogren v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 97 Minn. 51, 114 Am. St. Rep. 691, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 379, 106 N. W. 104. Compare Alexander v. Munroe, 54 Or. 500, 135 Am. St. Rep. 840, 101 Pac. 903, 103 Pac. 514 (assignment of half interest in a suit to an attorney in consideration of his services is enforceable in equity).

§ 1276, (e) This section is cited to this effect in Gruber v. Baker, 20 Nev. 453, 9 L. R. A. 302, 23 Pac. 858; Sanborn v. Doe, 92 Cal. 152, 27 Am. St. Rep. 101, 23 Pac. 105. See, also, Whitney v. Kelley, 94 Cal. 146, 28 Am. St. Rep. 106, 29 Pac. 624; Annis v. Butterfield, (Me.) 58 Atl. 898; Stewart v. Stewart, 154 Ky. 367, 157 S. W. 706; Davis v. McCamman, 168 Mich. 587, 134 N. W. 1028; Ryan v. Miller, 236 Mo. 496, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 540, and note on this subject, 139 S. W. 128; but see Conaway v. Co.-operative Home Builders, 65 Wash. 39, 117 Pac. 716.

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civil action which is to all intents *legal* in its character; so that under these circumstances there is no occasion for the equitable jurisdiction. Where the thing in action assigned is an equitable demand, and where the assignment of even a legal demand is equitable, or such as the courts of law under the former system did not recognize, it might be supposed that the interest of the assignee would be equitable, and that the suit upon it would be within the equitable jurisdiction. But even in these cases the assignee must sue in his own name; and if the remedy is merely a pecuniary judgment, and no accounting is necessary, the action would, in all its elements and features, be legal rather than equitable. If, however, an accounting were necessary, or if the demand were of such a nature that the recovery would depend upon the application of equitable doctrines, the civil action of the assignee would undoubtedly be equitable, and the equitable jurisdiction of the court would be invoked.^{1 a}

§ 1277, ¹ This conclusion follows from the abolition of the distinctive actions at law and suits in equity. If, for example, a person having a particular fund or amount due him in the hands of A should give his creditor, B, an order on A for the whole or for any definite part of the fund, this order would operate as an equitable, and not a legal, assignment. The assignee, B, must bring an action against A in his own name. As this action would be brought for the recovery of a certain sum of money, as it would involve no accounting, and as the recovery would depend upon no equitable doctrines except the equitable character of the assignment, I have no doubt that the action would be, in effect, legal, and governed by the rules applicable to legal actions; as, for example, it would be triable by a jury. In fact, most of the codes of procedure, in prescribing what classes of actions are necessarily triable by a jury, include all those merely for the recovery of money, without any distinction between those based upon an equitable and those upon a legal demand or cause of action. It is obvious, however, that there may be many cases of assignment where

§ 1277, (a) See Winslow v. Dundom, 46 Mont. 71, 125 Pac. 136 (the court intimated that under the Montana statute the contract might be assignable at law, but stated that as in equity it was clearly so, being u contract of option, it was not necessary to bring suit under the statute). .

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§ 1278. The Equitable Jurisdiction—Common-law Procedure.—In those states which retain the two jurisdictions and systems of procedure, whether each is administered by a separate tribunal or both are conferred upon the same court, the jurisdiction at law is complete with respect to the class of assignments first above described,—the legal transfer of a legal thing in action. If the assignee is still compelled to sue in the name of his assignor, or if, as in some states, he is permitted to sue in his own name, in either case the legal remedy is adequate, and there is no ground left for the jurisdiction of equity. It is now the settled rule that a court of equity will not take jurisdiction of a suit by an assignee of a legal thing in action, whenever he may obtain ample remedy by an action at law in the name of his assignor.¹^a With respect, however, to assign-

the demand being wholly equitable, the action by the assignee would fall within the equitable jurisdiction, and depend upon equitable principles. It is undoubtedly growing more and more difficult to draw a clear line between the legal and the equitable jurisdictions in the states where the new procedure prevails; the constant tendency is towards a commingling of the two. This result would be not only harmless, but even beneficial, if in all such cases the doctrines of equity were uniformly allowed to control and to govern the decisions; but, unfortunately for the proper administration of justice, it is in this very class of cases that a tendency appears to follow legal doctrines alone, and to ignore or overlook the rules of equity.

§ 1278, ¹ This rule was fully settled in England while the former systems of courts and jurisdictions still existed: Hammond v. Messenger, 9 Sim. 327, 332; Rose v. Clarke, 1 Younge & C. Ch. 534; Keys v. Williams, 3 Younge & C. 462, 466, 467. In Hammond v. Messenger, Shadwell, V. C., said: "If this case were stripped of all special eircumstances, it would be simply a bill filed by a plaintiff who had obtained from certain persons to whom a debt was due a right to sue in their names for the debt. It is quite new to me that, in such a simple case as that, this court allows, in the first instance, a bill to be filed against the debtor by the person who

§ 1278, (a) Hayward v. Andrews, 106 U. S. 672, 27 L. Ed. 271, 1 Sup. Ct. 544; New York Guaranty Co. v. Memphis Water Co., 107 U. S. 205, 27 L. Ed. 484, 2 Sup. Ct. 279; Smith v. Bourbon Co., 127 U. S. 105, 32 L. Ed. 73, 8 Sup. Ct. 1043. See, also, Illinois Finance Co. v. Interstate Rural Credit Ass'n, (Del.) 101 Atl. 870.

ments of the kinds secondly described above, the transfer of purely equitable demands, or the purely equitable assignment of legal demands, the jurisdiction over the things in action so assigned at the suit of the assignee continues to be exclusively equitable. As the law does not admit in the one case the existence of a legal right or demand, and in the other the existence of a valid transfer, courts of law can have no jurisdiction to entertain actions in which a recovery must be based upon the legal validity of the demand or of the assignment. The ancient jurisdiction of equity over the assignment of things in action has been reduced to these somewhat narrow limits.

§ 1279. Incidents of an Assignment.—It is a familiar doctrine that the assignee of a thing in action, unless it be negotiable, takes it subject to existing equities. It is also the settled rule in England that the assignee must give notice to the debtor party or legal holder of the fund, in order to establish and secure his right of priority over

has become assignee of the debt. I admit that if special circumstances are stated, and it is represented that notwithstanding the right which the party has obtained to sue in the name of the creditor the creditor will interfere and prevent the exercise of that right, this court will interfere for the purpose of preventing that species of wrong being done; and if the creditor will not allow the matter to be tried at law in his name, this court has a jurisdiction, in the first instance, to compel the debtor to pay the debt to the plaintiff, especially in a case where the act done by the creditor is done in collusion with the debtor." This same rule had been established in this country prior to the change in the procedure: Ontario Bank v. Mumford, 2 Barb. Ch. 596, 615; see quotation from the opinion of Walworth, C., ante, § 281, note. The recent case of Walker v. Brooks, 125 Mass. 241, also expressly holds that equity will not assume jurisdiction merely because the assignee cannot sue at law in his own name, but will do so where the assignor refuses to allow his name to be used: See, also, Hagar v. Buck, 44 Vt. 285, 290, 8 Am. Rep. 368; Chicago etc. R'y v. Nichols, 57 Ill. 464; Carter v. United Ins. Co., 1 Johns. Ch. 463; Field v. Maghee, 5 Paige, 539; Rogers v. Traders' Ins. Co., 6 Paige, 583; Adair v. Winchester, 7 Gill & J. 114; Moseley v. Boush, 4 Rand. 392; Lenox v. Roberts, 2 Wheat. 373, 4 L. Ed. 264. As illustrations of assignments purely equitable, the transfer of notes or bills payable to order, but not indorsed, see last note under § 1274.

other assignees of the same demand; but this rule has not been generally adopted by the American courts. These matters have already been discussed in a previous chapter upon priorities.¹

SECTION II.

EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT OF A FUND BY ORDER OR OTHER-WISE.

ANALYSIS.

§ 1280.	The	general	doctrine;	its	requisites,	scope,	operation,	and
	eff	ects.						

- § 1281. Notice to the creditor-assignce, essential.
- § 1282. A mere mandate to a depositary or agent, is not an equitable assignment, but is revocable; an appropriation is necessary.
- § 1283. Funds not yet in existence.
- § 1284. Operation of bills of exchange and checks.

§ 1280. The General Doctrine—Its Requisites, Scope, Operation, and Effects.—It is an ancient doctrine of the common law that no action of contract can be maintained unless there is privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant.¹ It follows that if B is indebted to A, or

§ 1279, 1 As to notice given to the debtor, see vol. 2, §§ 694-702; as to assignments being subject to equities in favor of the debtor, see vol. 2, §§ 703-706; equities in favor of third persons: *Ibid.*, §§ 707-715. When the assignor holds collateral securities of the debt transferred, the assignment will sometimes carry such securities, and entitle the assignee to their benefit: See Pattison v. Hull, 9 Cow. 747; Foster v. Fox, 4 Watts & S. 92; Catheart's Appeal, 13 Pa. St. 416; Hurt v. Wilson, 38 Cal. 263; a guaranty of the demand assigned: Craig v. Parkis, 40 N. Y. 181, 100 Am. Dec. 469; hut upon the question whether and when a guaranty will pass by an assignment of the principal debt, the decisions seem to be conflicting. The rule generally prevails in this country, as has been shown, that a grantor's lien will not pass by an assignment of the claim for unpaid purchase-money: see *ante*, § 1254.

§ 1280, ¹ This extremely technical rule has undoubtedly yielded somewhat to the influence of equitable notions, so that in most of the states an action at law may be maintained by A upon a promise made for his benefit to B, from whom alone the consideration moves; but this is opposed to the original theories of the common law.

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has in his hands a fund belonging to A, and A assigns such debt or fund to C, or gives him an order for it upon B, C can maintain no action at law against B to recover the amount, unless B has assented to the appropriation and promised to pay the money; and the action in such case will not be based upon any property or interest in the fund acquired by C through the assignment or order, but upon B's express or implied promise. The doctrine of equity is very different. Equity recognizes an interest in the fund, in the nature of an equitable property, obtained through the assignment, or the order which operates as an assignment, and permits such interest to be enforced by an action, even though the debtor or depositary has not assented to the transfer.² It is an established doctrine that an equitable assignment of a specific fund in the hands of a third person creates an equitable property in such fund. > If, therefore, A has a specific fund in the hands of B, or in other words, B, as a depositary or otherwise, holds a specific sum of money which he is bound to pay to A, and if A agrees with C that the money shall be paid to C, or assigns it to C, or gives to C an order upon B for the money, the agreement, assignment, or order creates an equitable interest or property in the fund in favor of the assignee, C, and it is not necessary that B should consent or promise to hold it for or pay it to such assignee.^{3 a} In order that the

§ 1280, 2 Some cases and books speak of the interest as merely an equitable lien or charge. That it is more than a lien, and is an equitable *property*, is plain from the remedy allowed. An equitable lien is never enforced by a suit to obtain possession, much less dominion over the thing: the remedy is, at most, a sale of the thing, so that its proceeds may be applied upon the obligation secured. In this case, however, the assignee recovers possession and dominion of the fund as his own. The only equitable feature of the transaction is, in fact, the mode of transfer.

§ 1280, 3 The doctrine, in its full scope and with its principal limitation, is so clearly and accurately stated by Rapallo, J., in the recent case of

 § 1280, (a) This section is cited in
 Harrison v. Wright, 100 Ind. 515, 50

 Harris County v. Campbell, 68 Tex.
 Am. Rep. 805; The Elmbank, 72 Fed.

 22, 2 Am. St. Rep. 467, 3 S. W. 243;
 610; Richardson v. White, 167 Mass.

doctrine may apply, and that there may be an equitable assignment creating an equitable property, there must be a specific fund, sum of money, or debt, actually existing or

Brill v. Tuttle, 81 N. Y. 454, 457, 37 Am. Rep. 315, that I shall quote the passage: "There can be no doubt as to the rule that when, for a valuable consideration from the payee, an order is drawn upon a third party and made payable out of a particular fund, then due or to become due from him to the drawer, the delivery of the order to the payee operates as an assignment pro tanto of the fund, and the drawee is bound, after notice of such assignment, to apply the fund as it accrues to the payment of the order, and to no other purpose, and the payee may, by action, compel such application. It is equally well established that if a draft be drawn generally upon the drawee, to be paid by him in the first instance on the credit of the drawer, and without regard to the source from which the money used for its payment is obtained, the designation by the drawer of a particular fund out of which the drawee is to subsequently reimburse himself for such payment, or a particular account to which it is to be charged, will not convert the draft into an assignment of the fund, and the payee of the draft can have no action thereon against the drawee unless he duly accepts. In all cases, therefore, in which a particular fund to accrue in futuro is designated in the draft, and the language is ambiguous, the turning-point is, whether it was the intention of the parties that the payment should be made only out of the designated fund, when or as it should accrue, or whether the direction to the drawee to pay was intended to be absolute, and the fund was mentioned only as a source of reimburse-

58, 44 N. E. 1072; Bank of Harlem v. City of Bayonne, 48 N. J. Eq. (3 Dick.) 246, 21 Atl. 478 (consent of debtor is not necessary); Columbia Finance & Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank, (Ky.) 76 S. W. 157; Rivers v. A. & C. Wright & Co., 117 Ga. 81, 43 S. E. 499; Hicks v. Roanoke Brick Co., 94 Va. 741, 27 S. E. 596; Preston v. Russell, 71 Vt. 151, 44 Atl. 115 (acceptance by debtor not necessary); McDaniel v. Maxwell, 21 Or. 202, 28 Am. St. Rep. 740, 27 Pac. 952; cited, also, in In re Stiger, 202 Fed. 791; Kithcart v. Kithcart, 145 Iowa, 549, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062, 124 N. W. 305; Day v. Charlton, (Okl.) 160 Pac. 606 (no assignment). Sections 1280-1283 are cited

in Leopuld v. Weeks, 96 Md. 280, 53 Atl. 937; Cameron v. Boeger, 200 Ill. 84, 93 Am. St. Rep. 165, 65 N. E. 690. See in support of the text, Webb v. Smith, 30 Ch. Div. 192; Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Williamson, 18 Cal. App. 324, 123 Pac. 245, 247; Goldman v. Murray, 164 Cal. 419, 129 Pac. 462; Farra v. Braman, (Ind. App.) 82 N. E. 926 (imperfect legal assignment of rights under a benefit certificate, held good in equity); County of Des Moines v. Hinkley, 62 Iowa, 637, 17 N. W. 915; Charles Kellas & Co. v. Slack & Slack Co., 129 Md. 535, 99 Atl. 677; Jennings v. Whitney, 224 Mass. 138, 112 N. E. 655; Kirtland v. Moore, 40 N. J. Eq. 106, 2 Atl. 269;

order, must be, in effect, an assignment of that fund or of

to become so *in futuro*, upon which the assignment may operate, and the agreement, direction for payment, or

ment, or an instruction as to book-keeping": Row v. Dawson, 1 Ves. Sr. 331; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1531, 1562-1565, 1641-1660; Rodick v. Gandell, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 763; Ex parte Imbert, 1 De Gex & J. 152; Jones v. Farrell, 1 De Gex & J. 208; Gurnell v. Gardner, 9 Jur., N. S., 1220; 4 Giff. 626; Burn v. Carvalho, 4 Mylne & C. 690, 702; Watson v. Duke of Wellington, 1 Russ. & M. 602, 605; Ex parte South, 3 Swanst. 392; Lett v. Morris, 4 Sim. 607; Yeates v. Groves, 1 Ves. 280; Adams v. Claxton, 6 Ves. 226, 230; Lepard v. Vernon, 2 Ves. & B. 51; Ex parte Alderson, 1 Madd. 53; Collyer v. Fallon, Turn. & R. 459, 475; Priddy v. Rose, 3 Mer. 86, 102; Diplock v. Hammond, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 320; Myers v. United etc. Co., 7 De Gex, M. & G. 112; McGowan v. Smith, 26 L. J., N. S., (Ch.) 8; Ex parte North Western Bank, L. R. 15 Eq. 69; Ex parte Cooper, L. R. 20 Eq. 762; Ex parte Montagu, L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 554; Ex parte Garrard, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 61; McLellan v. Walker, 26 Me. 114; Legro v. Staples, 16 Me. 252; Robbins v. Bacon, 3 Me. 346; Conway v. Cutting, 51 N. H. 407; Blin v. Pierce, 20 Vt. 25; Cutts v. Perkins, 12 Mass. 206; Kingman v. Perkins, 105 Mass. 111; Taylor v. Lynch, 5 Gray, 49; Ehrichs v. De Mill, 75 N. Y. 370; Risley v. Smith, 64 N. Y. 576; Munger v. Shannon, 61 N. Y. 251; Alger v. Scott, 54 N. Y. 14; Parker v. Syracuse, 31 N. Y. 376; Lowery v. Steward, 25 N. Y. 239, 82 Am. Dec. 346; Lewis v. Berry, 64 Barb. 593; Hall v. Buffalo, 2 Abh. App. 301; Clark v. Mauran, 3 Paige, 373; Richardson v. Rust, 9 Paige, 243; Morton v. Naylor, 1 Hill, 583; Luff v. Pope, 5 Hill, 413; Phillips v. Stagg, 2 Edw. Ch. 108; Superintendent, etc., v. Heath, 15 N. J. Eq. 22; Caldwell v. Hartupee, 70 Pa. St. 74; Lightner's Appeal, 82 Pa. St. 301; Chase v. Petroleum Bank, 66 Pa.

Brokaw v. Brokaw, 41 N. J. Eq. 215,
4 Atl. 66; Shannon v. Hoboken, 37
N. J. Eq. 123; Bradley v. Berns, 51
N. J. Eq. 437, 26 Atl. 908 (consent of debtor unnecessary); Cope v. C.
B. Walton Co., 77 N. J. Eq. 512, 76
Atl. 1044; Lauer v. Dunn, 115 N. Y.
408, 22 N. E. 270; Muller v. Kling, 209 N. Y. 239, 103 N. E. 138; In re
Wood's Estate, 243 Pa. 211, 89 Atl.
975 (an equitable assignment is invalid if the assignor retains a power of revocation); Lee v. Robinson, 15
R. I. 369, 5 Atl. 290; Johnson v.
Bclanger, 85 Vt. 249, 81 Atl. 621;

Shenandoah Valley R. R. Co. v. Miller, 80 Va. 821; Mack Mfg. Co. v. Wm. A. Smoot & Co., (Va.) 47 S. E. 859. As to the necessity of a consideration to support the assignment, see Tallman v. Hoey, 89 N. Y. 537. The assignment need not be in writing: Howe v. Howe, 97 Me. 422, 54 Atl. 908; also, Goldman v. Murray, 164 Cal. 419, 129 Pac. 462; Smith v. Penn-American Plate Glass Co., 111 Md. 696, 77 Atl. 264; Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321.

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some definite portion of it.^b The sure eriterion is, whether the order or direction to the drawee, if assented to by him, would ereate an absolute personal indebtedness payable by him at all events, or whether it creates an obligation only to make payment out of the particular designated fund.⁴ ^c

St. 169; Patten v. Wilson, 34 Pa. St. 299; Nesmith v. Drum, 8 Watts & S. 9, 42 Am. Dec. 260; Gibson v. Finley, 4 Md. Ch. 75; U. S. Bank v. Huth, 4 B. Mon. 423; Newby v. Hill, 2 Met. (Ky.) 530; McWilliams v. Webb, 32 Iowa, 577; Walker v. Mauro, 18 Mo. 564; Wheatley v. Strobe, 12 Cal. 92, 98, 73 Am. Dec. 522; Spain v. Hamilton, 1 Wall. 604; Tiernan v. Jackson, 5 Pet. 580, 598; Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277, 286; and see, also, Papineau v. Naumkeag etc. Co., 126 Mass. 372; Adams v. Willimantic etc. Co., 46 Conn. 320; Bower v. Hadden etc. Co., 30 N. J. Eq. 171; Whitehead v. Fitzpatrick, 58 Ga. 348; Kahnweiler v. Anderson, 78 N. C. 133; Hydraulic etc. Co. v. Saville, 1 Mo. App. 96; Farmers' etc. Bank v. Kansas etc. Co., 3 Dill. 287; Belden v. Meeker, 47 N. Y. 307; Danklessen v. Braynard, 3 Daly, 183; Clafin v. Kimball, 52 Vt. 6.

§ 1280, 4 Ex parte Carrothers, 3 De Gex & S. 570; Malcolm v. Scott, 3 Hare, 39; Kelley v. Mayor etc., 4 Hill, 263; Brill v. Tuttle, S1 N. Y. 454, 457, 37 Am. Rep. 515. In Shaver v. Western U. Tel. Co., 57 N. Y. 459, 464, a clerk in the employ of the company, with the knowledge and assent of the president of the company, gave the plaintiff, for value, the following written order: "Treasurer Western Union Telegraph Company, please pay to D. L. N. fifty dollars, monthly, commencing at, etc., until three hundred dollars is paid, and charge the same to my salary account." He was all the time working at a monthly salary exceeding fifty dollars. The order was presented to the treasurer and filed by him, but was countermanded by the drawer before any payment had been made upon it. The holder sued the company, claiming that the order was an equitable assignment. The commission of appeals held that it did not operate as such an assignment, because it did not direct the payment "to be made out of any designated fund or particular source." The correctness of this decision, upon the ground thus taken, may well be doubted. It seems to carry the

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§ 1280, (b) Quoted in Harlow v. Bartlett, 96 Me. 294, 90 Am. St. Rep. 346, 52 Atl. 638; Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321; Palmer v. Palmer, 112 Me. 149, 91 Atl. 281.

§ 1280, (c) Quoted in McDaniel v. Maxwell, 21 Or. 202, 28 Am. St. Rep. 740, 27 Pac. 952; Leonard v. Marshall, 82 Fed. 396; Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321; Palmer v. Palmer, 112 Me. 149, 91 Atl. 281. See, also, Percival v. Dunn, 29 Ch. Div. 128; Gorringe v. Irwell, etc., Works, 34 Ch. Div. 128; New Castle County Nat. Bank of Odessa v. Taylor, 8 Del. Ch. 456, 68 Atl. 387. The agreement, direction, or order being treated in equity as an assignment, it is not necessary that the entire fund or debt should be assigned; the same doctrine applies to an equitable assignment of any definite part of a particular fund.^{5 d} The doctrine that the equitable assignee obtains,

rule stated in the text beyond its true meaning as established by numerous cases. The fund drawn on seems to be specifically designated without resorting to extrinsic circumstances. The authority of this decision on this point, though not expressly overruled, was, I think, completely shaken by the later case of Brill v. Tuttle, supra. The decision was cited by counsel and relied upon as absolutely controlling; Rapallo, J., commenting upon it, said (p. 460): "The order was drawn in pursuance of a previous special arrangement known to the payee, whereby the drawer was authorized to revoke it, and this was a controlling circumstance. Lott, Com., in delivering the opinion, says: 'Notice was thereby given to the party who advanced money on the faith of the order, that it was not to be considered an absolute assignment, but that it was taken subject to the right of the drawer to revoke it. . . . Any and every person taking it took it subject to the exercise of that right.' The order was revoked by the drawer, and whatever else may have been said is unimportant, as this was the point upon which the case turned." This criticism, I think, destroys the authority of Shaver v. Western U. Tel. Co., upon the point under discussion. It seems also to conflict with Lowery v. Steward, Parker v. Syracuse, Alger v. Scott, and Ehrichs v. De Mill, cited in the previous note. Sce, also, Hutter v. Ellwanger, 4 Lans. 8; Lunt v. Bank of North America, 49 Barb. 221.

§ 1280, ⁵ Watson v. Duke of Wellington, 1 Russ. & M. 602, 605; Lett v. Morris, 4 Sim. 607; Smith v. Everett, 4 Brown Ch. 64; Morton v. Naylor, 1 Hill, 583; Grain v. Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514, 99 Am. Dec. 423; Superintendent, etc., v. Heath, 15 N. J. Eq. 22; Risley v. Phœnix Bank, 11 Hun, 484;

§ 1280, (d) Assignment of Part of Fund.—The text is quoted in Davis & Goggin v. State Nat. Bank of El Paso, (Tex. Civ. App.) 156 S. W. 321; Palmer v. Palmer, 112 Me. 149, 91 Atl. 281; and cited in Rogers v. Penobscot Min. Co., 154 Fed. 606, 83 C. C. A. 380. See, also, The Elmbank, 72 Fed. 610; Dulles v. H. D. Crippen Mfg. Co., (N. J.) 156 Fed. 706; Goldman v. Murray, 164 Cal. 419, 129 Pac. 462; Rivers v. A. & C. Wright & Co., 117 Ga. 81, 43 S. E. 499; Timmons v. Citizens' Bank, 11 Ga. App. 69, 74 S. E. 798 (only equity can enforce a partial assignment); King Bros. & Co. v. Central or Georgia Ry. Co., 135 Ga. 225, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 672, 69 S. E. 113; Columbia Finance & Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 561, 76 S. W. 157; Richardson v. White, 167 Mass. 58, 44 N. E. 1072; James v. Newton, 142 Mass. 366, 56 Am. Rep. 692, 8 N. E. 122; Cogan v. Conover Mfg. Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 358, 60 not simply a right of action against the depositary, mandatary, or debtor, but an equitable property in the fund itself, is carried out into all of its legitimate consequences. Thus the assignee may not only recover the money from

Etheridge v. Vernoy, 74 N. C. 800; Lapping v. Duffy, 47 Ind. 51; Gardner v. Smith, 5 Heisk. 256; Raines v. United States, 11 Ct. of Cl. 648 (void from uncertainty). Some American courts seem to have been troubled with the common-law rule which forbids the assignment of a part of a debt, but the reasons for this rule at law have no application whatever in equity. The main reason for the legal rule is, that the debtor should not be harassed with several different suits to recover parts of one single obligation. In equity no such consequence could result. If parts of a demand are assigned to different persons, the rights of all the assignees must be settled in one suit; in a suit by any one assignee, not only the debtor and the assignor, but all the other assignces, must be made parties, so that the one decree may determine the duty of the debtor towards each claimant. There is no greater nor more unnecessary source of error than the importing *legal* notions as to parties and actions into the discussion of equitable doctrines: See Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277, 286, 5 L. Ed. 87; Palmer v. Merrill, 6 Cush. 282, 287, 52 Am. Dec. 782, per Shaw, C. J.; Bullard v. Randall, 1 Gray, 605, 61 Am. Dec. 433; Buck v. Swazey, 35 Me. 41, 56 Am. Dec. 681; Hopkins v. Beebe, 26 Pa. St. 85, 88; Moore v. Gravelot, 3 Ill. App. 442; Burnett v. Crandall, 63 Mo. 410; Lindsay v. Price, 33 Tex. 280. The leading case of Mandeville v. Welch was an action at law. and this is true of several other cases in which a similar ruling has been made. It will also be noticed that some of these decisions were by courts not possessing a full equity jurisdiction. There is, in fact, no doubt that, on principle, an assignment of a definite part of a fund or demand is valid in equity, whether the assignment be direct or in the form of an order:• See opinion in Grain v. Aldrich, supra.

Atl. 408; Avery v. Popper, 92 Tex. 337, 71 Am. St. Rep. 849, 49 S. W. 219, 50 S. W. 122; Schilling v. Mullen, 55 Minn. 122, 43 Am. St. Rep. 475, 56 N. W. 586; Stillson v. Stevens, (Tex. Civ. App.) 23 S. W. 322; Campbell v. J. E. Grant Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 82 S. W. 794; Foley v. Houston Co-operative & Mfg. Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 106 S. W. 160; Beilharz v. Illingsworth, (Tex. Civ. App.) 132 S. W. 106; Smith v. Bates Mach. Co., 182 Ill. 166, 55 N. E. 69; Wamsley v. Ward, 61 W. Va. 65, 55 S. E. 998; Dudley v. Barrett, 66 W. Va. 363, 66 S. E. 507; Western & A. Ry. Co. v. Union Investment Co., 128 Ga. 74, 57 S. E. 100; but see contra: Bland v. Robinson, 148 Mo. App. 164, 127 S. W. 614 (acceptance of debtor necessary both at law and in equity where part only of fund is assigned).

§1280, (e) See, also, cases reviewed in James v. Newton, 142 Mass. 366, 56 Am. Rep. 692, 8 N. E. the original depositary, the drawee, but may pursue it or its proceeds under any change of form, as long as it can be certainly identified, into the hands of third persons who have acquired possession of it from the depositary as volunteers, or with notice of the assignee's prior right. The fund in this respect resembles a fund impressed with a trust.^f

§ 1281. Notice to the Creditor-Assignee Essential.—Although, whenever a debtor, in the manner above described, makes to his creditor an equitable assignment of a specific fund or debt in the hands of or owing by a third person, the assent of such *third person* is not requisite to the effect of the transfer in equity, yet the assignment, appropriation, direction, or order is not absolute, but may be revoked by the debtor-assignor at any time before the *creditorassignee* has been notified of it, and has expressly or impliedly assented thereto. In such a case notice to and assent by the *creditor-assignee* are essential to an absolute assignment.¹ a

§ 1282. A Mere Mandate to an Agent or Depositary is not an Assignment, but is Revocable.—In all cases, even when the assignee was not a creditor of the assignor, the order must be delivered to the intended payee, or he must be notified of it by the drawer's procurement, in order that it may operate as an equitable assignment. A mere letter, communication, or other mandate to the agent, depositary, or debtor, directing him to pay the fund to a designated

§ 1281, 1 2 Scott v. Porcher, 3 Mer. 652; Wallwyn v. Coutts, 3 Mer. 707, 708; 3 Sim. 14; Acton v. Woodgate, 2 Mylne & K. 492; Garrard v. Lord Landerdale, 2 Russ. & M. 451; Morrell v. Wootten, 16 Beav. 197; Glegg v. Rees, L. R. 7 Ch. 71; and see cases in next note.

122; National Exchange Bank v. Mc-Loon, 73 Me. 498, 40 Am. Rep. 388; Harris County v. Campbell, 68 Tex. 22, 2 Am. St. Rep. 467, 3 S. W. 243 (citing the text); Phillips v. Edsall, 127 Ill. 535, 20 N. E. 801.

§1280, (f) The text is quoted in

Palmer v. Palmer, 112 Me. 149, 91 Atl. 281; and see Cogan v. Conover Mfg. Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 358, 60 Atl. 408, and Bcilharz v. Illingsworth, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 647, 132 S. W. 106. § 1281, (a) Brockmeyer v. National

Bank, 40 Kan. 744, 21 Pac. 300.

person, will not of itself operate as an assignment, but it may be withdrawn or revoked at any time before the arrangement is completed, by information given to the intended payee by or on behalf of the drawer.^{1 a} What shall

§ 1282, 1 Burn v. Carvalho, 7 Sim. 109; 4 Mylne & C. 690; Carvalho v. Burn, 4 Barn. & Adol. 382; 1 Ad. & E. 883. This case will illustrate the difference between the rules of law and of equity on this subject. One Fortunato had goods in the hands of Rego in a foreign port; he wrote to Burn that he would direct Rego to deliver the goods to an agent of Burn to pay a certain liability of his to Burn; soon after, he sent an order or letter to Rego, directing him to deliver the goods as above stated to Burn's agent. F. committed an act of bankruptcy before his letter reached R., and the goods were not delivered by R. to B.'s agent until after F. had been adjudicated a bankrupt. The assignee in bankruptcy then brought an action of trover against B. for the value of the goods, and obtained judgment on the ground that B. had acquired no title to nor lien on the goods previous to the bankruptcy, and his taking possession of them was an unlawful conversion. Burn thereupon filed a bill in chancery; and the court of chancery held that he had obtained an equitable ownership by the equitable assignment resulting from F.'s order of direction to R. and the letter to B. notifying him of the disposition thus made, and the judgment at law was therefore enjoined. The chancellor said: "In equity, an order given by a debtor to his creditor upon a third person having funds of the debtor, to pay the creditor out of such funds, is a binding equitable assignment of so much of the funds. In Row v. Dawson, Lord Hardwicke says: 'It is a credit on the fund, and must amount to an assignment of so much of the debt; and though the law does not admit of an assignment of a chose in action, this court does, and any words will do, no particular words being necessary thereto'; and in Yeates v. Groves, Lord Thurlow says: 'This is nothing but a direction by a man to pay part of his money to another for a valuable consideration. If he could transfer, he had done it; and it being his own money, he could transfer.' In Ex parte South, Lord Eldon says: 'It has been decided in bankruptcy that if a creditor give an order on his debtor to pay a sum of money in discharge of his debt [i. e., the debt owing by the drawer to the payee], and that order is shown to the debtor [the drawee], it binds him. On the other hand, this doctrine has been brought into doubt by some decisions in the courts of law which require that the party receiving the order [the drawee] should in some way enter into a contract. That has been the course of their decisions, but is certainly not the doctrine of this court. In Fitzgerald v. Stewart, 2 Russ. & M. 457, and Lett v. Morris, the same rule was acted upon, and in Wat-

§1282, (a) Andrews v. Frierson, 134 Ala. 626, 33 South. 6.

§ 1282

amount to the present appropriation which constitutes an equitable assignment is a question of intention, to be gathered from all the language, construed in the light of the surrounding circumstances.^b For example, while it is not essential to the existence of an equitable assignment of a fund that the debtor, agent, or depositary should be *expressly* directed to pay over the money to the assignee, the absence of such a direction may tend to show an intention not to transfer a present interest in the fund, but that the arrangement is wholly executory and prospective.²

son v. Duke of Wellington, Sir J. Leach thus defines an equitable assignment: 'In order to constitute an equitable assignment, there must be an engagement to pay out of a particular fund.' Upon this principle it is that assignments of future freight and of non-existing but expected funds have been enforced in equity; but this case is far within the limits of the principle; for here there is an existing fund in an agent's hands, and there is a distinct contract to discharge the liability out of that fund, and to give directions for that purpose. I think, therefore, that the letters of the 4th and 9th of April amounted to an equitable assignment of the fund in the hands of Rego." See, also, as further examples of incomplete directions not amounting to assignments, Malcolm v. Scott, 3 Macn. & G. 29; Ex parte Shellard, L. R. 17 Eq. 109; Tooth v. Hallett, L. R. 4 Ch. 242; Ex parte Hall, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 615; White v. Coleman, 127 Mass. 34; McEwen v. Brewster, 17 Hun, 223.

§ 1282, ² See Rodick v. Gandell, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 763, 778. G. & B., a firm of contractors, were indebted to a bank, and promised it that an amount due them from a railway company should be appropriated in payment of this debt. They then requested the solicitors of the railway company to carry out this arrangement. Although the solicitors notified the hank of this request or instruction, and some partial payments were made to it, the chancellor held that the arrangement did not amount to an equitable assignment.

§ 1282, (b) Quoted in Harrison v. Wright, 100 Ind. 515, 50 Am. Rep. 805; Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 Ill. 301, 40 N. E. 362; and cited in In re Stiger, 202 Fed. 791. See, also, Cope v. C. B. Walton Co., 77 N. J. Eq. 512, 76 Atl. 1044; Cogan v. Conover Mfg. Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 358, 60 Atl. 408; Re Bridgewater's Settlement, [1910] 2 Ch. 342 (assignment good in equity despite faulty title in assignor, if intention clear); and see Goldman v. Murray, 164 Cal. 419, 129 Pac. 462; McEvoy v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bk., 201 Mass. 50, 87 N. E. 465 (power of revocation during life of assignor renders assignment void, as it is not complete during life and does not conform to statute as a testamentary disposi-

§ 1283. Doctrine Extends to a Fund not yet in Existence.—The equitable doctrine with respect to the assignment of property to be acquired in future is extended to this species of equitable transfer. The fund need not be actually in being, if it exists potentially,—that is, if it will in due course of things arise from a contract or arrangement already made or entered into when the order is given,—the order will operate as an equitable assignment of such fund as soon as it is acquired, and will create an interest in it which a court of equity will enforce.¹a

§ 1283, ¹ For example, an order for the proceeds of goods which are about to be sold by an agent of the drawer under an arrangement already made; an order by an employee upon the employer whom he has agreed to serve, directing payment of future wages to be earned; an order by a contractor for future payments to become due, and the like. The fund in all such cases is particular and definite, although only potential: Dickinson v. Marrow, 14 Mees. & W. 713; Brill v. Tuttle, 81 N. Y. 454, 457, 37 Am. Rep. 515, and cases cited; Garland v. Harrington, 51 N. H. 409; Tripp v. Brownell, 12 Cush. 376; Taylor v. Lynch, 5 Gray, 49; Macomber v. Doane, 2 Allen, 541; St. Johns v. Charles, 105 Mass. 262; Augur v. New York Belting etc. Co., 39 Conn.

tion); Slaughter v. Bank of Texline, (Tex. Civ. App.) 164 S. W. 27; Lauerman Bros. Co. v. Riehl, 156 Wis. 12, 145 N. W. 174 (assignment of book accounts not enforceable because books and accounts not transferred and words of transfer not sufficiently definite); Curtis v. Walpole Tire & Rubber Co., 218 Fed. 145, 134 C. C. A. 140; Levins v. Stark, 57 Or. 189, 110 Pac. 980; In re Wood's Estate, 243 Pa. 211, 89 Atl. 975 (if assignment is by its terms revocable, there is no assignment enforceable in equity).

§ 1283, (a) Quoted in Merchants' & M. N. Bank v. Barnes, 18 Mont. 335, 56 Am. St. Bep. 586, 47 L. R. A. 737, 48 Pac. 218. This section is cited in Bank of Harlem v. City of Bayonne, 48 N. J. Eq. (3 Dick.) 246, 21 Atl. 478; Preston v. Russell, 71 Vt. 151, 44 Atl. 115; Mack Mfg. Co. v. Wm. A. Smoot & Co., 102 Va. 724, 47 S. E. 859; City of Seattle v. Liberman, 9 Wasb. 276, 37 Pac. 433; and in Re Stiger, 202 Fed. 791. See, also,-Smedley v. Speckman, 157 Fed. 815, 85 C. C. A. 179; Germania Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. B. Fraenkel Realty Co., 82 N. J. Eq. 49, 88 Atl. 305; Godwin v. Murchison Nat. Bank, 145 N. C. 320, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 935, 59 S. E. 154 (agreement in consideration of a loan to transfer to lender proceeds of a pending sale of real estate when received, a present equitable assignment of such proceeds); Whitcomb v. City of Houston, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 555, 130 S. W. 215; but see Cogan v. Conover Mfg. Co., 69 N, J. Eq. 358, 60 Atl. 408.

§ 1284. Bills of Exchange and Checks not, in General, Assignments.—An ordinary bill of exchange, or draft,

536; Hawley v. Bristol, 39 Conn. 26; Harrop v. Landers etc. Co., 45 Conn. 561; Ruple v. Bindley, 91 Pa. St. 296; Brooks v. Hatch, 6 Leigh, 534. In the following cases, such transaction was held not operative as an equitable assignment. In most instances the decision was placed upon the special circumstances. The New York cases which seem to hold as a general doctrine that such assignments are never operative are clearly overruled by the recent case of Brill v. Tuttle, *supra*; Ex parte Shellard, L. R. 17 Eq. 109; Tooth v. Hallett, L. R. 4 Ch. 242; Papineau v. Naumkeag etc. Co., 126 Mass. 372; Lightbody v. Smith, 125 Mass. 51; White v. Coleman, 130 Mass. 316; Adams v. Willimantic etc. Co., 46 Conn. 320; Brill v. Tuttle, 15 Hun, 289 (reversed); Hutter v. Ellwanger, 4 Lans. 9; Schreyer v. Mayor, 8 Jones & S. 255.

Such a claim for a future fund, wages, proceeds, etc., is in the nature of a possibility coupled with an interest, and in some states is assignable even at law: See next section III.

The order on a future fund which thus operates as an equitable assignment should be carefully distinguished from a mere promise to appropriate an existing or future fund in discharge of an obligation, or a mere promise to give an order on a fund, and the like. The English courts hold that not only a present appropriation by order of a particular fund operates as an equitable assignment, but also a promise or executory agreement to apply a fund in discharge of an obligation has the same effect in equity: Rodick v. Gandell, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 763, per Lord Truro; Riccard v. Prichard, 1 Kay & J. 277; and in Thomson v. Simpson, L. R. 5 Ch. 659, Lord Hatherley and James, L. J., seem to admit that an executory agreement may amount to an appropriation, but require that the evidence of it should be most clear and explicit. The American courts do not generally accept this doctrine. They require a present appropriation by order or otherwise, of a fund, whether existing or future; a mere promise or executory agreement to apply or to appropriate a fund does not, according to the American rule, amount to an equitable assignment:^b Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall. 69; 20 L. Ed. 762; Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441, 22 L. Ed. 623; Ex parte Tremont Nail Co., 16 Bank. Reg. 448; Fed. Cas. No. 14,168; Christmas's Adm'r v. Griswold, 8 Ohio St. 558; Rogers v. Hosack, 18 Wend. 319. It seems to me, however, that the opinions in Thomson v. Simpson, supra, leave very little difference between the English and the American rules.

§ 1283, (b) Williams v. Ingersoll, ley v. Speckman, 157 Fed. 815, 85 89 N. Y. 508. 518. See, also, Smed-C. C. A. 179. drawn generally, and not upon any particular fund, whether accepted or not by the drawee, does not operate as an equitable assignment. Its operation is not changed even when funds have been placed in the drawee's hands as a means of payment; for the drawee may apply these funds to another use, and although this act might violate his duty to the drawer, the payee would obtain no interest in or claim upon the specific fund.^{1 a} According to the great

§ 1284, 1 Watson v. Duke of Wellington, 1 Russ. & M. 602; Shand v. Du Buisson, L. R. 18 Eq. 283; Ex parte Shellard, L. R. 17 Eq. 109; Harris v. Clark, 3 N. Y. 93, 51 Am. Dec. 352; Cowperthwaite v. Sheffield, 3 N. Y. 243; 1 Sand. 416; Marine etc. Ins. Bank v. Jauncey, 3 Sand. 257; Phillips v. Stagg, 2 Edw. Ch. 108; Luff v. Pope, 5 Hill, 413; 7 Hill, 577; Greenfield's Estate, 24 Pa. St. 232, 240; Hopkins v. Beebe, 26 Pa. St. 85; Sands v. Matthews, 27 Ala. 399; Kimball v. Donald, 20 Mo. 577, 64 Am. Dec. 209; Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277, 5 L. Ed. 87; First Nat. Bank v. Dubuque etc. R'y, 52 Iowa, 378, 35 Am. Rep. 280; Jones v. Pacific etc. Co., 13 Nev. 359, 29 Am. Rep. 308. But a bill of exchange drawn on a specific fund may operate as an equitable assignment of it: Kahnweiler v. Anderson, 78 N. C. 133. An agreement between the drawer and payee that certain funds remitted or the proceeds of certain goods consigned to the drawee shall be appropriated in payment of the bill may create an equitable interest in or lien upon the fund or proceeds in favor of the payee so that they shall not be diverted from their appropriated purpose by the drawee: See ante, § 1237, and cases cited; Marine etc. Ins. Bank v. Jauncey, 1 Barb. 486; Lowery v. Steward, 25 N. Y. 239, 82 Am. Dec. 346; Harwood v. Tucker, 18 Ill. 544; Cowperthwaite v. Sheffield, 3 N. Y. 243; Frith v. Forbes. 4 De Gex, F. & J. 409; Robey etc. Iron-works v. Ollier, L. R. 7 Ch. 695; Ranken v. Alfaro, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 786.

§ 1284, (a) Cashman v. Harrison, 90 Cal. 297, 27 Pac. 283; Whitney v. Eliot Nat. Bank, 137 Mass. 351, 50 Am. Rep. 316, and cases cited; Holbrook v. Payne, 151 Mass. 383, 21 Am. St. Rep. 456, 24 N. E. 210; Commonwealth v. American L. I. Co., 162 Pa. St. 586, 42 Am. St. Rep. 844, 29 Atl. 660; Northern Trust Co. v. Rogers, 60 Minn. 208, 51 Am. St. Rep. 526, 62 N. W. 273. See, also, Macy v. Roedenbeck, 227 Fcd. 346, L. R. A. 1916C, 142 C. C. A. 42. A county warrant drawn on a specific fund may amount to an equitable assignment: Jennings v. Taylor, 102 Va. 191, 45 S. E. 913. As to bill of exchange drawn on specific funds see, in addition to cases cited in author's note, those cited in In re Oliver, 132 Fed. 588; and see In re Hollins, 215 Fed. 41, 131 C. C. A. 349, citing this paragraph of the text. preponderance of authority, a check is, in this respect, a bill of exchange, and does not act as an equitable assignment of a portion of the drawer's deposit equal in amount to the face of the check.^{2 b} There are cases, however, which hold that,

§ 1284, ² Hopkinson v. Forster, L. R. 19 Eq. 74; In re Merrill, 71
N. Y. 325, and cases cited; Tyler v. Gould, 48 N. Y. 682; Aetna Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 82, 87, 7 Am. Rep. 314; Chapman v. White, 6 N. Y. 412, 57 Am. Dec. 464; Harris v. Clark, 3 N. Y. 93, 51 Am. Dec. 352; 2 Barb. 94; Winter v. Drury, 5 N. Y. 525; Dykers v. Leather Man. Bank, 11 Paige, 612; Bank of Republic v. Millard, 10
Wall. 152, 19 L. Ed. 897; Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wall. 252, 17
L. Ed. 785; Moses v. Franklin Bank, 34 Md. 574.

In Aetna Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank, supra, Allen, J., said: "The cases all agree that notwithstanding the agreement which hankers make with their customers to pay their checks to the amount standing to their credit, a check-holder can take no benefit from this agreement, and that a check does not operate as a transfer or assignment of any part of the debt, or create a lien at law or in equity upon the deposit [citing Harris v. Clark, Winter v. Drury, Dykers v. Leather M. Bank, supra, and Thornhill v. Hall, 2 Clark & F. 22]. The principle was applied by this court in Cowperthwaite v. Sheffield, 3 N. Y. 243, to a bill of exchange drawn against a consignment of goods, of which the consignces and drawees were advised by letter accompanying a notice of the shipment of the goods. The court held that the bill and letter of advice did not operate as an appropriation of the proceeds of the cotton to the payment of the bill." The language of the learned judge that "the cases all agree" is certainly too strong; for some cases maintain an entirely different view. See next following note.

§1284, (b) This section is cited to this effect in Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bank, 54 Ohio St. 60, 56 Am. St. Rep. 700, 31 L. R. A. 653, 42 N. E. 700; Pennell v. Ennis, 126 Mo. App. 355, 103 S. W. 147; Provident Institution for Savings v. Sisters of the Poor, (N. J. Eq.) 100 Atl. 894. See, also, Florence M. Co. v. Brown, 124 U. S. 385, 31 L. Ed. 424, 8 Sup. Ct. 531; Bowker v. Haight & Freese Co., (N. Y.) 146 Fed. 257; Eastern Milling & Export Co. v. Eastern Milling & Export Co. of Pennsylvania, (Pa.) 146 Fed. 761; Poland **III**---194

v. Love, 164 Fed. 186, 91 C. C. A. 466; In re Yungbluth, (Wash.) 209 Fed. 116; John M. C. Marble Co. v. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. App. 347, 115 Pac. 59; Superior Nat. Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 99 Neb. 833, 157 N. W. 1023; Peters v. Hardin & Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 168 S. W. 1035; Nassano v. Tuolumne County Bank, 20 Cal. App. 603, 130 Pac. 29; Poland v. Love, 7 Ind. Ter. 42, 67 L. E. A. 617 (note), 103 S. W. 759; Lonier v. State Savings Bank, 149 Mich. 483, 112 N. W. 1119; Glenunder the circumstances in which it is ordinarily given, being drawn against an actual deposit, and not expected to be paid unless a sufficient amount stands to the credit of the drawer, a check is to all intents an order upon a particular fund within the meaning of the equitable rule, and assigns a portion of that fund to the payee equal in amount to its face.^{3 c} A check may undoubtedly operate in this

§ 1284, 3 In Bromley v. Brunton, L. R. 6 Eq. 275, a check was held, under the circumstances, to be a sufficient appropriation of the drawer's

nan v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 209 N. Y. 12, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 441, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 302, 102 N. E. 537; First Nat. Bank of Durant v. School Dist. No. 4, 31 Okl. 139, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 655, 120 Pac. 614; Libby Bros. Glass Co. v. Farmers & Mechanics' Bank, 220 Pa. 1, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 519, 69 Atl. 280; Clark v. Toronto Bank, 72 Kan. 1, 115 Am. St. Rep. 173, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 83, and note, 82 Pac. 582; see Central Bank & Tr. Co. v. Davis, (Tex. Civ. App. 149 S. W. 290; McBride v. American R'y & Lighting Co., 60 Tex. Civ. App. 226, 127 S. W. 229, and First Nat. Bk. of Rising Star v. Texas Moline Plow Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 168 S. W. 420; Pullen v. Placer County Bank, 138 Cal. 169, 94 Am. St. Rep. 19, 71 Pac. 83; Donohoe-Kelly Bkg. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 138 Cal. 183, 94 Am. St. Rep. 28, 71 Pac. 93; Reviere v. Chambliss, (Ga.) 48 S. E. 122; Harrison v. Wright, 100 Ind. 515, 50 Am. Rep. 805; Love v. Ardmore Stock Exch., (Ind. Ter.) 82 S. W. 721; Grammel v. Carmer, 55 Mich. 201, 54 Am. Rep. 363, 21 N. W. 418 (per Cooley, J.); Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Coates, 79 Mo. 168; Coates v. Doran, 83 Mo. 337; O'Connor v. Mechanics' Bank, 124 N. Y. 324, 26 N. E. 816; Bank of Marysville v. Brewing Co., 50 Ohio St. 151, 40 Am. St. Rep. 660, 33 N. E. 105; Akin

v. Jones, 93 Tenn. 353, 42 Am. St. Rep. 921, 25 L. R. A. 523, 27 S. W. 669. "While an equitable assignment or lien will not arise against a deposit account solely by reason of a check drawn against the same, yet the authorities establish that if, in the transaction connected with the delivery of the check, it was the understanding and agreement of the parties that an advance about to be made should be a charge on and be satisfied out of a specified fund, a court of equity will lend its aid to carry such agreement into effect as against the drawer of the check, mere volunteers, and parties charged with notice": Fourth Street Nat. Bank v. Yardley, 165 U. S. 634, 41 L. Ed. 855, 17 Sup. Ct. 439; Throop Grain Cleaner Co. v. Smith, 110 N. Y. 83, 17 N. E. 671; First Nat. Bank v. Clark, 134 N. Y. 368, 17 L. R. A. 580, 32 N. E. 38; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson & Wallace, (Tex. Civ. App.) 80 S. W. 1058; Muller v. Kling, 209 N. Y. 239, 103 N. E. 138; McBride v. American R'y & Lighting Co., 60 Tex. Civ. App. 226, 127 S. W. 229. And see Fortier v. Delgado & Co., 122 Fed. 604, 59 C. C. A. 180; Hove v. Stanhope State Bank, 138 Iowa, 39, 115 N. W. 476.

§1284, (c) Niblack v. Park Nat. Bank, 169 Ill. 517, 61 Am. St. Rep. 203, 48 N. E. 438; Abt v. American

manner as an equitable assignment when it is so drawn as to show an unmistakable intention of the drawer to transfer his exact deposit in the bank to the payee.^{4 d}

funds to constitute a valid gift *inter vivos*. The effect of a check generally is not discussed; the decision is placed upon the special circumstances, and seems to conflict with Harris v. Clark, *supra*. See, also, In re Brown, 2 Story, 502, 517; Fed. Cas. No. 1985; Gourley v. Linsenbigler, 51 Pa. St. 345; Rhodes v. Childs, 64 Pa. St. 18; Fogarties v. State Bank, 12 Rich. 518, 78 Am. Dec. 468; Munn v. Burch, 25 Ill. 35; Chicago etc. Ins. Co. v. Stanford, 28 Ill. 168, 81 Am. Dec. 270.

§ 1284, 4 Kingman v. Perkins, 105 Mass. 111; and see Kahnweiler v. Anderson, 78 N. C. 133.

T. & Sav. Bank, 159 Ill. 467, 50 Am. St. Rep. 175, 42 N. E. 856; Wyman v. Fort Dearborn Nat. Bank, 181 Ill. 279, 72 Am. St. Rep. 259, 54 N. E. 946; Brown v. Schintz, 202 Ill. 509, 67 N. E. 172; National Bank of America v. Ind. Banking Co., 114 Ill. 483, 2 N. E. 401; Kuhnes v. Cahill, 128 Iowa, 594, 104 N. W. 1025; Schollmier v. Schoendelen, 78 Iowa, 426, 16 Am. St. Rep. 455, 43 N. W. 282; Boswell v. Citizens' Sav. Bank, 123 Ky. 485, 96 S. W. 797; Commonwealth v. Kentucky D. & W. Co., 132 Ky. 521, 136 Am. St. Rep. 186, 18 Ann. Cas. 1156, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 30, 116 S. W. 766; Wasgatt v. First Nat. Bank of Blue Earth, 117 Minn. 9, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 416, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 109, 134 N. W. 224; Hemphill v. Yerkes, 132 Pa. St. 545, 19 Am. St. Rep. 607, 19 Atl. 342; Loan & Savings Bank v. Farmers & Merchants' Bank, 74 S. C. 210, 114 Am. St. Rep. 991, 54 S. E. 364; Turner v. Hot Springs Nat. Bank, (S. D.) 101 N. W. 348; Pease v. Landauer, 63 Wis. 20, 53 Am. Rep. 247, 22 N. W. 847; Raesser v. National Exchange Bank, 112 Wis. 591, 88 Am. St. Rep. 979, 88 N. W. 618; Dillman v. Carlin, 105 Wis. 14, 76 Am. St. Rep. 902, 80 N. W. 932.

§ 1284, (d) This portion of the text is quoted in Harrison v. Wright, 100 Ind. 515, 50 Am. Rep. 805. See, also, Venturi v. Silvio, 197 Ala. 607, 73 South. 45; Walters Nat. Bank v. Bantock, 41 Okl. 153, L. R. A. 1915C, 531, 137 Pac. 717; Hawes v. Blackwell, 107 N. C. 196, 22 Am. St. Rep. 870, 12 S. E. 245. It may also so operate when the drawer becomes insolvent: Schuler v. Laclede Bank, 27 Fed. 424 (per Brewer, J.).

SECTION III.

ASSIGNMENT OF POSSIBILITIES, EXPECTANCIES, AND PROP-ERTY TO BE ACQUIRED IN FUTURE.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1285. Equitable jurisdiction under modern legislation.
- § 1286. Essential elements and grades of contingencies, expectancies, and possibilities.
- § 1287. Assignment of possibilities.
- § 1288. Assignment of personal property to be acquired in the future; rationale of the doctrine: Holroyd v. Marshall.
- § 1289. Assignment of future cargo or freight.
- § 1290. Requisites of an assignment of property to be acquired in the future,
- § 1291. Extent of the doctrine, to what property and persons it applies.

§ 1285. Equitable Jurisdiction Under Modern Legislation.^a—Modern English statutes have so far changed the common law as to permit the assignment *at law* of contingent and future interests, expectancies, and possibilities coupled with an interest in real estate. The American legislation has generally been broader, and authorizes the assignment at law of such future expectancies and possibilities, when coupled with an interest, whether connected with real or with personal estate.¹ Neither the English nor the

§ 1285, 1 English statute of 8 & 9 Vict., c. 106, sec. 6. This statute does not permit the legal transfer of any contingent interests or expectancies, etc., in personal property, nor of any mere *naked* possibility or expectancy in real estate.

Of the American statutes, that of New York (1 Rev. Stats., p. 725, sec. 35) and that of California (Civ. Code, secs. 693, 699, 700, 1045, 1046) may be taken as examples of the type mentioned in the text: See Lawrence v. Bayard, 7 Paige, 70, 76.^b

§ 1285, (a) Sections 1285-1291 are eited in Bacot v. Varnado (Adkinson & Bacot Co. v. Varnado), 91 Miss. 825, 47 South. 113. The latter half of this paragraph is quoted in Cox v. Hughes, 10 Cal. App. 553, 102 Pac. 956. § 1285, (b) Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 404, 126 Pac. 149 (holding that the statute in no way changed the equitable jurisdiction). American statutes allow the legal assignment of mere naked possibilities or expectancies not coupled with an interest. The jurisdiction of equity continues to be exclusive over all other assignments of contingent, future, expectant interests and possibilities not embraced within this legislation.

§ 1286. Essential Elements and Grades of Contingencies, Expectancies, and Possibilities.^a—In determining the extent and limits of the two jurisdictions, legal and equitable, it is important to determine the essential elements and different grades of contingent interests, expectancies, and possibilities. It should be carefully observed at the outset that they do not include future estates which are vested. A vested remainder is as truly a present fixed property or ownership as is an estate in possession. There may be interests or so-called estates in land or chattels, based upon some existing limitation, conveyance, or will, which are future and contingent, as depending upon the happening of some uncertain event, or limited to some uncertain person, but which are nevertheless interests, and not mere hopes or expectancies without any existing legal founda-The ordinary contingent remainders, executory detion. vises, conditional limitations, and the like are illustrations. Secondly, a lower grade of future interests may be called the *potentiality* of acquiring future property from the performance of some agreement or arrangement already entered into, but which is still executory.¹ Of course, the

§ 1286, ¹ The phrase "*potential* existence" has a specific and technical meaning in formulating the general doctrine of the law concerning the sale of personal property not yet having an *actual* existence: See *ante*, § 1236. As used in the text above, the word "potentiality" is taken in a more general sense; and in this signification it has been employed in several modern decisions.

§ 1286, (a) This section is cited in Read v. Mosby, 87 Tenn. 759, 5 L. R. A. 122, 11 S. W. 940; Riddell v. Riddell, (Neb.) 97 N. W. 609; Metcalf v. Kincaid, 87 Iowa, 443, 43 Am. St. Rep. 391, 54 N. W. 867; Culley v. Elford, 187 Ala. 165, 65 South. 381; Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493, 43 I. B. A. (N. S.) 404, 126 Pac. 149.

mere hope of acquiring future property without any present source from which it may be obtained is neither an interest nor right, nor anything which has value or can be made the subject of legal relations. But when a party has entered into a contract or arrangement by the ordinary and legitimate and natural operation of which he will acquire property, his existing right thereunder is certainly not a mere naked hope; it is a possibility of acquiring property coupled with a legal interest in the contract. The cargo to be obtained or the freight to be earned by a ship on a voyage already contracted for, the wages to be earned under an existing employment, the payment to become due under an existing building contract, are familiar examples.^b Finally, there is a mere expectancy arising from some social or moral relation, and not based upon any limitation, trust, contract, or other legal relation, such as the hope which an heir apparent or presumptive has of inheriting his ancestor's estate, or the hope of a bequest under the will of a living friend.²

§ 1287. Assignment of Possibilities.—Under the statutes described in a preceding paragraph, all future contingent interests in things real or personal, and also all possibilities, *coupled with an interest*, of acquiring property, real or personal, may be granted or assigned at law, so that the

§ 1286, ² See Smith on Real and Personal Property, 249: "The word 'possibility' has a general sense, in which it includes even executory interests, which are the objects of limitations [e. g., contingent remainders, etc.]. But in its more specific sense, it is that kind of contingent benefit which is neither the object of a limitation, like an executory interest, nor is founded in any lost but recoverable scisin, like a right of entry. And what is termed a *bare* or *mere* possibility signifies nothing more than an expectancy, which is specifically applied to a mere hope of succession, unfounded in any limitation, provision, trust, or legal act whatever; such as the hope which an heir apparent or presumptive bas of succeeding to the ancestor's estate."

§ 1286, (b) Quoted in Manley v. v. Andro Bitzer, 91 Ky. 596, 34 Am. St. Rep. Cas. 761 242, 16 S. W. 464, and in Rodijkeit N. E. 74

v. Andrews, 74 Ohio St. 104, 6 Ann. Cas. 761, 5 L. B. A. (N. S.) 564, 77 N. E. 747.

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grantee or assignee acquires a legal right or interest, the enforcement or protection of which comes within the jurisdiction of the law. So far as this legislation has not been adopted, such interests and rights are assignable only in equity; and furthermore, possibilities not coupled with an interest,—*mere* possibilities or expectancies,—which are not embraced within these statutes, are, according to the general course of decision, assignable in equity for a valuable consideration; and equity will enforce the assignment when the possibility or expectancy has changed into a when the possibility or expectancy has changed into 4

§ 1287, ¹ Warmstrey v. Lady Tanfield, ¹ Ch. Rep. 29; ² Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1530, 1559, 1605; Wright v. Wright, ¹ Ves. Sr. 409; Beckley v. Newland, ² P. Wms. 182. The expectancy of an heir to the estate of his ancestor:^b Hobson v. Trevor, ² P. Wms. 191; Stover

§1287, (a) The text is quoted in Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 404, 126 Pac. 149, and in Cox v. Hughes, 10 Cal. App. 553, 102 Pac. 956. This section is cited in Brown v. Brown, 66 Conn. 493, 34 Atl. 490; and in Donough v. Garland, 269 Ill. 565, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1238, 109 N. E. 1015. See, also, Hudnall v. Ham, 183 Ill. 486, 75 Am. St. Rep. 124, 56 N. E. 172; Watson v. Smith, 110 N. C. 6, 28 Am. St. Rep. 665, 14 S. E. 640 (possibility coupled with an interest); Read v. Mosby, 87 Tenn. 759, 11 S. W. 940; Box v. Lanier, (Tenn.) 79 S. W. 1042 (contingent interest in life insurance policy); Schapiro v. Howard, 113 Md. 360, 140 Am. St. Rep. 414, 78 Atl. 58 (contingent remainder); Earle v. Maxwell, 86 S. C. 1, 138 Am. St. Rep. 1012, 67 S. E. 962 (contingent remainder); Re Grattan's Estate, 78 N. J. Eq. 225, 78 Atl. 813 (wife's interest in husband's life insurance); Crockett v. Sibley, 73 N. H. 322, 61 Atl. 469 (agreement by husband to accept a certain sum from wife's estate in

full); Cummings v. Lohr, 246 Ill. 577, 92 N. E. 970 (but a court of equity cannot enforce a contract of assignment before expectancy has changed into a vested interest or into possession). Such an assignment must be in writing if the property affected is land:-Gary v. Newton, 201 Ill. 170, 66 N. E. 267. It must be founded upon a valuable, and not mercly a good, consideration: Lennig's Estate, 182 Pa. St. 485, 61 Am. St. Rep. 725, 38 L. R. A. 378, 38 Atl. 466; Stallcup v. Cronley's Trustee, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1675, 78 S. W. 441 (contingent interest in personalty); Schapiro v. Howard, 113 Md. 360, 140 Am. St. Rep. 414, 78 Atl. 58 (contingent remainder).

§ 1287, (b) Expectancy of heir.-Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 404, 126 Pac. 149; Taylor v. Swafford, 122 Tenn. 303, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 442, 123 S. W. 350; In re Simon, 158 Mich. 256, 17 Ann. Cas. 723, 122 N. W. 544 (note giving the majority and minority rules and jurisdictions; agreement of heir with ancestor, on accepting sometimes given that the assignment operates as a contract by the assignor to convey the legal estate or interest when

v. Eycleshimer, 4 Abb. App. 309; 46 Barb. 84; McDonald v. McDonald, 5 Jones Eq. 211, 75 Am. Dec. 434; Fitzgerald v. Vestal, 4 Sneed, 258. The interest which one may take under the will of another who is still living: Cooper, 9 Beav. 252; In re Wilson's Estate, 2 Pa. St. 325. See, also, Varick v. Edwards, Hoff. Ch. 382; 11 Paige, 289; 5 Denio, 664; MeWilliams v. Nisly, 2 Serg. & R. 507, 7 Am. Dec. 654; Bayler v. Comm., 40 Pa. St. 37, 80 Am. Dec. 551; Nimmo v. Davis, 7 Tex. 26; Graham v. Henry, 17 Tex. 164; Horst v. Dague, 34 Ohio St. 371; Patton v. Coen etc. Co., 3 Col. 265; The Edward Lee, 3 Ben. 114; Sedam v. Cincinnati etc. Canal Co., 2 Disn. 309; In re Irving, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 419. There is not a perfect unanimity among the authorities. Thus it has been held that the mere hope or expectation of receiving that to which the assignor had no right, and which might be withheld from him at pleasure, such as the expectancy of an heir to inherit his ancestor's estate, is not an interest capable of assignment in equity, any more than at law: See Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432, 70 Am. Dec. 85.d The Civil Code of California adopts the same rule: Secs.

an advancement, not to claim anything further); Richey v. Rowland, 130 Iowa, 523, 107 N. W. 423; Hudson v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 527, 78 N. E. 917; Donough v. Garland, 269 Ill. 565, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1238, 109 N. E. 1015; Simmons v. Ross, 270 Ill. 372, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1256, 110 N. E. 507; Edler v. Frazier, 174 Iowa, 46, 156 N. W. 182; Brands v. De Witt, 44 N. J. Eq. 545, 6 Am. St. Rep. 909, 10 Atl. 181, 14 Atl. 894; Hale v. Hollon, 90 Tex. 427, 59 Am. St. Rep. 819, 36 L. R. A. 75, 39 S. W. 287; Fuller v. Parmenter, 72 Vt. 362, 47 Atl. 1079. The expectancy may be released by a covenant not to contest a will: In re Garcelon, 104 Cal. 570, 43 Am. St. Rep. 134, 32 L. R. A. 595, 38 Pac. 414. It has been held, however, that such an assignment is not valid unless the ancestor's consent is obtained: McClure v. Raben, 133 Ind. 507, 36 Am. St. Rep. 558, 33 N. E. 275; contra, Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 404, 126 Pac. 149.

§ 1287, (c) Interest under will of living person.—Re Mudge, [1914] 1 Ch. 115 (holding assignment of expectancy too vague—no particular property referred to; therefore void); Bacon v. Bonham, 33 N. J. Eq. 614; Crum v. Sawyer, 132 Ill. 443, 24 N. E. 956; but see Wylie's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 196.

§ 1287, (d) So held, also, in Kentucky: Elliott v. Leslie, 124 Ky. 553, 124 Am. St. Rep. 418, 99 S. W. 619; Spears v. Spaw, (Ky.) 118 S. W. 275 (during life of ancestor, heir has nothing he can sell or assign); Hall v. Hall, 153 Ky. 379, 155 S. W. 755 (during life of testator, devisees and legatees have nothing to convey); Burton v. Campbell, 176 Ky. 495, 195 S. W. 1091; McCall v. Hampton, 98 Ky. 166, 56 Am. St. Rep. 335, 33 L. R. A. 266, 32 S. W. 406, criticising the author's theory stated ante, in § 1271. It may be

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it vests in him, and that equity will specifically enforce such contract by decreeing a conveyance.

700, 1045. Also, the expected proceeds of a fair intended to be held in future by a society were held not assignable, in Huling v. Cabell, 9 W. Va. 522, 27 Am. Rep. 562; and see Skipper v. Stokes, 42 Ala. 255, 94 Am. Dec. 646. But the very general conclusion of authority, English and American, is in accordance with the doctrine of the text; and this conclusion is in strict conformity with the principle which distinguishes the theory of assignment in equity from that at law. In In re Wilson's Estate, supra, a woman, in consideration of marriage, conveyed to her own use during her life, and after her death to her children, all the estate which she then had or should thereafter acquire. This settlement was held to operate as an equitable assignment of property subsequently bequeathed to her by an uncle. Gibson, C. J., after citing authorities in support of the doctrine and declaring it to be well settled, adds: "Indeed, it is no more than the familiar principle that he who executes a conveyance, on valuable consideration, purporting to pass a title before it is in him, will be bound to make it good whenever he acquires it." The operation of these assignments of expectancies was succinctly stated, according to the usual theory, in two recent cases by the supreme court of Pennsylvania. In East Lewisburg etc. Co. v. Marsh, 91 Pa. St. 96, 99, the court said: "Equity will support assignments of contingent interests and expectancies, things which have no present actual existence, but rest in mere possibility, not, indeed, as a present positive transfer operating in præsenti, for that can only be of a thing in esse, but as a present contract to take effect and attach as soon as

conceded that some expressions there used by the author require modification to render his theory applicable to the assignment of a mere expectancy. But the court, in rejecting the well-settled equitable doctrine in favor of the legal rule, uses arguments and language ("Why should the common law declare such contracts invalid and void if courts of equity have the power to verify and enforce them?" etc.) which afford a striking illustration of the author's observation in his preface to this work, that "in all the states which have adopted the Reformed Procedure there has been, to a greater or

less degree, a weakening, decrease, or disregard of equitable principles in the administration of justice." See, also, in support of the Kentucky rule, Stevens v. Stevens, 181 Mich. 438, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1259, 148 N. W. 225.

§ 1287, (e) It is held, however, that these provisions of the code do not affect the equity doctrines: Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493, 43 **L. R. A. (N. S.)** 404, 126 Pac. 149 (the assignment may be to a stranger, and is valid against the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy); so, in Montana: Winslow v. Dundom, 46 Mont. 71, 125 Pac. 136.

§ 1288. Assignment of Personal Property to be Acquired in the Future-Rationale of the Doctrine.^a-A particular instance of this doctrine is that which deals with the assignment of property to be acquired in the future. I have already referred to this subject in one of its phases,---the equitable lien created by contract upon such property.¹ It is elementary, that a contract for the sale of chattels which the vendor does not own will not take effect upon the goods. when subsequently acquired, so as to pass a legal property in them to the purchaser, without some new act of the vendor after the property is acquired.^{2 b} The doctrine of equity is different. A sale, assignment, or mortgage, for a valuable consideration, of chattels or other personal property to be acquired at a future time, operates as an equitable assignment, and vests an equitable ownership of the articles in the purchaser or mortgagee as soon as they are acquired by the vendor or mortgagor, without any further act on the part of either; and this ownership a court of

the thing comes in esse." In Ruple v. Bindley, 91 Pa. St. 296, 299, the court said: "An assignment for a valuable consideration, of demands, having at the time no actual existence, but which rests in expectancy only, is valid in equity as an agreement, and takes effect as an assignment when the demands intended to be assigned are subsequently brought into existence." In my opinion, this theory of an agreement is hardly adequate to explain the full doctrine, and I prefer the one given, ante, in § 1271.

§ 1288, 1 See ante, § 1236.

§ 1288, ² Lunn v. Thornton, 1 Com. B. 379; Gale v. Burnell, 7 Q. B. 850; Mogg v. Baker, 3 Mees. & W. 195; Head v. Goodwin, 37 Me. 181; Jones v. Richardson, 10 Met. 481; Moody v. Wright, 13 Met. 17, 32, 46 Am. Dec. 706; Pettis v. Kellogg, 7 Cush. 456; Calkins v. Lockwood, 16 Conn. 276, 41 Am. Dec. 143; Otis v. Sill, 8 Barb. 102; Hamilton v. Rogers, 8 Md. 301; Chapman v. Weimer, 4 Ohio St. 481. With reference to the excepted case of chattels having a "potential" existence, see ante, note under § 1236.

§1288, (a) This section is cited in Read v. Mosby, 87 Tenn. 759, 5 L. R. A. 122, 11 S. W. 940.

§1288, (b) France v. Thomas, 86 Mo. 80. The text is quoted in Cox v. Hughes, 10 Cal. App. 553, 102 Pac. 956, and cited in Close v. Independent Gravel Co., 156 Mo. App. 411, 138 S. W. 81.

equity will protect and maintain at the suit of the equitable assignee.³ ^c It is sometimes said that the sale, assign-

§ 1288, ³ Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191; In re Ship Warre, 8 Price, 269, note, 273; Mitchell v. Winslow, 2 Story, 630; Seymour v. Canandaigua etc. R. R., 25 Barb. 284, 303; Philadelphia etc. R. R. v. Woelpper, 64 Pa. St. 366, 372, 3 Am. Rep. 596; Baxter v. Bush, 29 Vt. 465, 469, 70 Am. Dec. 429; Page v. Gardner, 20 Mo. 507; Smithurst v. Edmunds, 14 Pa. St. 408; Williams v. Winsor, 12 R. I. 9; Clay v. East Tenn. etc. R. R., 6 Heisk. 421. Holroyd v. Marshall, supra, is a most important authority. One Taylor assigned the machinery in a mill in trust to secure a debt to Holroyd, and the deed covenanted that all the other machinery which should be placed in the mill during the time should vest in the trustee for the same purposes. T. procured new machinery, which was placed in the mill, and H. was notified of the fact. While this new machinery was in the mill, before H. had taken possession of it under the deed, it was levied upon under execution against T. In a suit between H. and the execu-

§1288, (c) The text is quoted in Cox v. Hughes, 10 Cal. App. 553, 102 Pac. 956, and cited in Smith & Ricker v. Hill Bros., 17 N. M. 415, 134 Pac. 243. See, also, Wood v. Casserleigh, 30 Colo. 287, 97 Am. St. Rep. 138, 71 Pac. 360; Kimball v. Gafford, 78 Iowa, 65, 42 N. W. 583; Ludlum v. Rothschild, 41 Minn. 219, 43 N. W. 137; Rutherford v. Stewart, 79 Mo. 216. See, further, Triumph Electric Co. v. Empire Furniture Co., 70 W. Va. 164, 73 S. E. 325; Barron v. San Angelo Nat. Bank, (Tex. Civ. App.) 138 S. W. 142; Hickson Lumber Co. v. Gay Lumber Co., 150 N. C. 282, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 843, and note, 63 S. E. 1045 (doctrine as to mortgage covering after-acquired property is equally applicable to chattels and real estate); also, see Bacot v. Varnado (Adkinson & Bacot Co. v. Varnado), 91 Miss. 825, 47 South. 113 (husband and wife may make valid mortgage of after-acquired property, though when acquired it is used as a home-

stead); Collerd v. Tully, 77 N. J. Eq. 439, 77 Atl. 1079. Chattel mortgage on crops not sown, held valid in Eckles v. Ray & Lawyer, 13 Okl. 541, 75 Pac. 286; Graves v. Currie, 132 N. C. 307, 43 S. E. 897. See Cheatham v. Tennell's Assignee, 170 Ky. 429, L. R. A. 1917C, 1, 186 S. W. 128. Chattel mortgage on crops not sown, held void in Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, 40 Am. St. Rep. 637, 37 N. E. 632; Brown v. Neilson, 61 Neb. 765, 87 Am. St. Rep. 525, 54 L. R. A. 328, 86 N. W. 498; but an agreement in a lease to give a chattel mortgage on the crops on the fifteenth day of June of each year will be specifically enforced: Ryan v. Donley, (Neb.) 96 N. W. 234. In Townsend B. & C. Co. v. Allen, 62 Kan. 311, 84 Am. St. Rep. 388, 52 L. R. A. 323, 62 Pac. 1008, however, it was held that a mortgage on brick to be manufactured from clay in its natural state when agreement was made, was invalid.

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ment, or mortgage, under these circumstances, operates in equity as a contract, which a court of equity will specifically enforce by decreeing a legal conveyance and delivery of the property to the purchaser or mortgagee, when it is subsequently acquired by the vendor or mortgagor. This view is certainly supported by the very high authority of most

tion creditors, the court of chancery held that the right of the execution creditors under their levy had precedence: 2 De Gex, F. & J. 596; and see Reeve v. Whitmore, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 1; but the house of lords reversed this decree, and held that although there had been no new act intervening, H.'s equitable title was superior to the subsequent legal claim of the judgment creditors. "If the mortgage deed in the present case had contained nothing but the contract which is involved in the aforesaid covenant of Taylor, such contract would have amounted to a valid assignment in equity of the whole of the machinery and chattels in question, supposing such machinery and effects - to have been in existence and upon the mill at the time of the execution of the deed. But it is alleged that this is not the effect of the contract, because it relates to machinery not existing at the time, but to be acquired and fixed and placed in the mill at a future time. It is quite true that a deed which professes to convey property which is not in existence at the time is, as a conveyance, void at law, simply because there is nothing to convey. So in equity, a contract which engages to transfer property which is not in existence cannot operate as an immediate alienation, merely because there is nothing to transfer. But if a vendor or mortgagor agrees to sell or mortgage property, real or personal, of which he is not possessed at the time, and he receives the consideration for the contract, and afterwards becomes possessed of property answering the description in the contract, there is no doubt that a court of equity would compel him to perform the contract, and that the contract would in equity transfer the beneficial interest to the mortgagee or purchaser immediately on the property being acquired. This, of course, assumes that the supposed contract is one of that class of which a court of equity would decree the specific performance. If this be so, then, immediately on the acquisition of the property described, the vendor or mortgagor would hold it in trust for the purchaser or mortgagee, according to the terms of the contract. For if a contract be in other respects good and fit to be performed, and the consideration has been received, incapacity to perform it at the time of its execution will be no answer, when the means of doing so are afterwards obtained. Apply these familiar principles to the present case; it follows that, immediately on the new machinery and effects being fixed or placed in the mill,

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able judges, such as Lord Westbury, and it is undoubtedly true in part. In my opinion, however, it fails to wholly explain the equitable doctrine and jurisdiction, since transfers of personal property to be acquired in future are constantly enforced under the operation of this doctrine where a court of equity would hardly have decreed the specific

they became subject to the operation of the contract, and passed in equity to the mortgagees, to whom Taylor was bound to make a legal conveyance, and for whom he, in the meantime, was trustee of the property in question." In Mitchell v. Winslow, supra, the facts were similar, and the decisions were the same. The mortgagors in 1839, to secure a loan of money, mortgaged all the machinery, tools and implements then in their mill, and all the machinery and tools which they might purchase for the mill during the next four years, and also all the stock which they might manufacture or purchase during that time. Before the four years had expired, and after an act of bankruptcy by the mortgagors, the mortgagees took possession under their mortgage of property, including tools, machinery, and stock purchased or manufactured by the mortgagors after the execution of the mortgage. The assignee in bankruptcy applied for an order compelling the mortgagees to deliver up to him such property, but the order was refused, on the ground that the stipulation concerning after-acquired property operated as an equitable mortgage, which would be enforced against volunteers, and any one who did not stand in the position of a bona fide purchaser without notice. Story, J., said it was established, under "the authorities, that wherever the parties by their contract intend to create a positive lien or charge, either upon real or upon personal property, whether it is then in esse or not, it attaches in equity as a lien or charge upon the particular property as soon as the assignor or contractor acquires a title thereto, against the latter, and all persons asserting a elaim thereto under him, either voluntarily, or with notice, or in bankruptcy." In Smithurst v. Edmunds, supra, the lessee of a hotel assigned all the furniture in the hotel to the lessor as security for the rent, and further covenanted to assign all other furniture which he should thereafter purchase and place on the demised premises during the term; it being declared to be the intent and agreement of the parties that when and as often as any additional furniture should be purchased and placed on the premises, it should be considered as belonging to the lessor as collateral security. The lessee purchased and placed in the hotel a large quantity of additional furniture. The contract was held to be an equitable assignment or mortgage of these chattels, which would be enforced against a subsequent execution creditor of the lessee.

performance of the contract if it had been confined to property then in the ownership and possession of the vendor or assignor.⁴ In other words, the doctrine of equitable assignment of property to be acquired in future is much

§ 1288, 4 This question was examined by Lord Westbury in the case of Holroyd v. Marshall, already quoted, and he maintains the theory which I venture to criticise as insufficient. He says: "In equity, it is not necessary for the alienation of property that there should be a formal deed of conveyance. [This is most certainly correct, and it expresses one of the most radical distinctions between the principles of law and of equity with regard to the acquisition of property: See ante. vol. 1, §§ 366-370.] A contract for valuable consideration, by which it is agreed to make a present transfer of property, passes at once the beneficial interest, provided the contract is one of which a court of equity will decree specific performance. In the language of Lord Hardwicke, the vendor became a trustee for the vendoe, subject, of course, to the contract being one to be specifically performed. And this is true not only of contracts relating to real estate, but also of contracts relating to personal property, provided that the latter are such as a court of equity would direct to be specifically performed. A contract for the sale of goods-as, for example, of five hundred chests of teais not a contract which could be specifically performed, because it does not relate to any chests of tea in particular; but a contract to sell five hundred chests of the particular kind of tea which is now in my warehouse in Gloucester is a contract relating to specific property, and which would be specifically performed. [This statement is certainly opposed to the rule as settled in the United States, and also, as I believe, to that prevailing in England.] The buyer may maintain a suit in equity for the delivery of a specific chattel when it is the subject of a contract, and for an injunction (if necessary) to restrain the seller from delivering it to any other person." To maintain his theory concerning the operation of equitable assignments of future-acquired property, Lord Westhury is here obliged to extend the equitable jurisdiction to compel the specific performance of contracts for the purchase and sale of chattels far beyond the limits as generally established by the courts of England and of the United States. He virtually says, as a universal proposition, that every contract for the purchase and sale of specific, identified chattels, even of such merchaudise as may be bought in the market, will be specifically enforced in equity; and he goes so far as to state that an injunction may be granted to restrain the vendor from violating such contract by delivering the goods to another person than the buyer. This description of the equitable jurisdiction to specifically enforce conbroader than the jurisdiction to compel the specific performance of contracts. In truth, although a sale or mortgage of property to be acquired in future does not operate as an immediate alienation at law, it operates as an equi-

tracts concerning personal property is certainly opposed to the doctrine as settled in our own country, and I believe it is unsupported by English authorities. It is a familiar rule that contracts for the sale of chattels are never specifically enforced by courts of equity unless they involve some extraordinary elements. A contract for the sale of personal property is never specifically enforced by a court of equity, simply because the articles referred to in it are specific and identified; if enforced at all, it is because the articles are of such a peculiar and extraordinary nature that they cannot be replaced or procured in the market, and therefore the remedy of compensation would be inadequate: See Pusey v. Pusey, 1 Vern. 273; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1109, 1114. A contract to sell five hundred chests of a particular kind of tea in the vendor's warehouse would not be specifically enforced by the American courts of equity, and I believe not by the English courts, unless the tea was of a kind which could not possibly be obtained elsewhere in the market. It is certain that a mere contract to sell the existing furniture within a certain hotel, as in Smithurst v. Edmunds, supra, or to sell the existing tools, machinery, and merchandise in a certain mill, as in Mitchell v. Winslow, supra, would not be specifically enforced by a court of equity, because the legal remedy of damages would be fully adequate; yet, as has been seen, these and similar contracts, when relating to such chattels to be acquired in future, are regarded as equitable assignments of the property, and as such are enforced by courts of equity, both English and American. Furthermore, it will be shown in the sequel that the same doctrine of equitable assignment of property to be acquired in future is extended to present assignments of money to arise from existing contracts,-as, for example, of future wages arising under a contract of employment, of future payments to be earned in carrying out a contract for building, and the like, the future cargo or freight to be obtained or earned by a ship on a voyage contracted for, etc.; and it cannot be claimed that a court of equity would decree the specific performance of such agreements. The particular contract in the case of Holroyd v. Marshall would undoubtedly be specifically enforced in equity, because it was embodied in a deed of trust, and created an express trust.

The conclusion seems to me to be very plain, that the jurisdiction of equity with reference to sales, assignments, or mortgages of futureacquired property, although analogous to is not identical with nor

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table assignment of the present possibility, which changes into an assignment of the equitable ownership as soon as the property is acquired by the vendor or mortgagor; and because this ownership thus transferred to the assignee is equitable, and not legal, the jurisdiction by which the right of the assignee is enforced, and is turned into a legal property, accompanied by the possession, must be exclusively equitable; a court of law has no jurisdiction to enforce a right which is purely equitable. This, in my opinion, is the only correct and sufficient rationale of one of the most distinctively equitable doctrines in the whole scope of the equity jurisprudence.^f

wholly explained by the doctrine concerning the specific performance of contracts. There is something beyond the mere enforcement of an executory contract; there is an equitable right which, though at first only a possibility, becomes afterwards a full equitable ownership. It may seem presumptuous thus to differ from so able a judge as Lord Westbury, who, more than any other chancellor since Lord Hardwicke has grasped the *principles* of equity jurisprudence; but the reasons which I have given must be weighed by the reader; to me they appear convincing.^d

There are decisions which say that a mortgage of such tools, machinery, or articles as shall be subsequently used on certain premises, or placed in a certain mill, and the like, cannot be enforced and is inoperative, because the description of the chattels is too vague and uncertain to admit of the specific performance of a contract containing the same terms:^e See Morrill v. Noyes, 56 Me. 458, 471, 96 Am. Dec. 486; Winslow v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 4 Met. 306, 38 Am. Dec: 368. This conclusion might be correct if the rule as to the specific performance of an executory contract was to be taken as the sole criterion; but it is opposed to the overwhelming weight of authority in reference to the validity and effect in equity of sales and mortgages of property to be acquired in future.

§ 1288, (d) The theory announced by Lord Westbury was criticised in Tailby v. Official Receiver, 13 App. Cas. (H. L.) 523.

§ 1288, (e).See Borden v. Croak, 131 Ill. 68, 19 Am. St. Rep. 23, 22 N. E. 793.

§1288, (f) The text is quoted in

Bacot v. Varnado (Adkinson & Bacot Co. v. Varnado), 91 Miss. 825, 47 South. 113; Taylor v. Swafford, 122 Tenn. 303, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 442, 123 S. W. 350.

The author's rationale of the doctrine was finally established as the law of England in the recent case,

§ 1289. Assignment of Future Cargo or Freight.—A particular instance of non-existing property to be acquired in future which may be equitably assigned is the future cargo to be obtained, or the future freight to be earned, by a ship during an existing voyage, or during a contemplated voyage on which she is about to depart. If a charter-party or other form of agreement has already been entered into for the contemplated voyage, the potentiality of obtaining a cargo or of earning freight seems to be a possibility coupled with an interest, and not a bare expectancy; and as such it is probably assignable even at law under statutes and decisions of many states. Whatever may be the rule at law, it is well settled that such possibility is assignable in equity; that an equitable ownership vests in the assignee as fast as the cargo is obtained or the freight is earned; and that his interest or ownership will be protected and

In re Lind (Industrials Finance Syndicate v. Lind), [1915] 2 Ch. 345, affirming [1915] 1 Ch. 744, where it was essential to the decision of the case. A, in 1905, assigned by way of mortgage his expectant share in his mother's estate to B. In 1908 A was adjudicated a bankrupt, and in 1910 received his discharge. B did not prove in the bankruptcy. In 1911 A assigned his expectant share to C. In 1914 the expectancy fell into possession by the death of the mother. It was claimed by C that the assignment to B, under the doc-Holroyd v. Marshall, of trine created only a contractual liability on the part of A, until the death of // his mother, and that this liability, therefore, was discharged by the intervening bankruptcy. The court of appeal held, on a review of the authorities, and in accord with the author's contention, that the assignment to B created a right of property which was unaffected by the

bankruptcy, and which, therefore, took priority over the later assignment to C [P. 364, Phillimore, L. J.]. "If the assurance rest in contract and if by consequence the only way in which equity fastens upon the property be by the opera-. tion of the doctrine of specific performance, then the liability under the contract would be, as it seems to me, discharged by bankruptcy." [P. 360, Swinfen Eady, L. J.] "It is clear from these authorities that an assignment for value of future property actually binds the property itself directly it is acquiredautomatically on the happening of the event and without any further act on the part of the assignorand does not merely vest in, and amount to, a right in contract, giving rise to an action. The assignor, having received the consideration, becomes in equity, on the happening of the event, trustee for the assignee of the property devolving upon or acquired by him."

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enforced by a court of equity.¹ In accordance with this doctrine, it has been held that a mortgage of a railroad and its franchises operates as an equitable assignment of the

§ 1289, ¹ Lindsay v. Gibbs, 22 Beav. 522; In re Ship Warre, 8 Price, 269, note, 273, note; Curtis v. Auber, 1 Jacob & W. 506, 512; Douglas v. Russell, 4 Sim. 524; 1 Mylne & K. 488; Langton v. Horton, 1 Hare, 549; Mitchell v. Winslow, 2 Story, 630; Fed. Cas. No. 9673. In Mitchell v. Winslow, Mr. Justice Story gave an elaborate review of the authorities, which is so instructive that I shall quote from it: "In re Ship Warre, 8 Price, 269, note, Lord Eldon said that he should find it extremely difficult to say that the freight of a future voyage might not become the subject of an equitable agreement, as well as a first intended non-existing voyage, if the effect of the assignment were not to separate the freight and earnings forever from the ship itself, but only to separate it for the temporary purpose of securing a debt, and operating only upon that separation of title until that debt should be paid. Again, in Curtis v. Auber, 1 Jacob & W. 506, 512, where an assignment was made of the present and future earnings of a ship, Lord Eldon supported it, and said: 'In one case I think it was held that although you might assign the wool then growing on the backs of the sheep, you could not assign the *future* fleeces. But still it was a good equitable assignment, and rendered the future earnings liable in equity.' The same doctrine was maintained by Mr. Vice-Chancellor Shadwell in Douglas v. Russell, 4 Sim. 524, and his decree was afterwards affirmed by the lord chancellor (1 Mylne & K. 488) as to an assignment of freight earned and to be earned on an outward and homeward voyage, then about to be undertaken; and it was acted upon and supported in a like assignment of freight to be earned on a particular voyage in the case of Leslie v. Guthrie, 1 Bing. N. C. 697, 708. But the latest case, and certainly one of the most important and satisfactory in its reasoning as well as its conclusions, is that of Langton v. Horton, 1 Hare, 549, before Wigram, V. C. There a deed of assignment by way of mortgage was made of a whole ship and her tackle and appurtepances, and all oil and head-matter and other cargo which might be caught and brought home in the ship on and from her then present voyage; and the question arose between an execution creditor of the assignor and the assignee, whether the assignment was good as to the future cargo obtained in the voyage after the assignment. The learned vice-chancellor decided that it was. Upon that occasion he said: 'Is it true, then, that a subject to be acquired after the date of a contract cannot, in equity, be claimed by a purchaser for value under that contract? It is impossible to doubt, for some purposes at least, that by contract an interest in a thing not in existence at the time of the

rolling stock,—locomotives, cars, and the like,—which are acquired or manufactured by the company after the execution of the instrument, and passes an equitable owner-

contract may in equity become the property of a purchaser for value. The course to be taken by such purchaser to perfect his title I do not now advert to; but cases recognizing the general proposition are of common occurrence. A tenant, for example, contracts that particular things which shall be on the property when the term of his occupation expires shall be the property of the lessor at a certain price, or at a price to be determined upon in a certain manner. This, in fact, is a contract to sell property not then belonging to the vendor; and a court of equity will enforce such contracts when they are founded on valuable considerations, and justice requires that the contract should be specifically performed. The same doctrine is applied in important cases of contracts relating to mines, where the lessee has agreed to leave engines and machinery not annexed to the freehold which shall be on the property at the expiration of the lease, to be paid for at a valuation. The contract applies in terms to implements which shall be there at the time specified; and here neither construction nor decision has confined it to those articles which were on the property at the time the lease was granted. But it is not necessary that I should refer to such cases as these, for Lord Eldon, in the case of the Ship Warre, and in Curtis v. Auber, has decided all that is necessary to dispose of the present argument. Admitting that those cases are not specifically and in terms like the principal case, they are not of less authority for the present purpose; for they remove the difficulty which has been raised in argument, and decide that non-existing property may be the subject of valid assignment. I will suppose the case of the owner of a ship which is going out in ballast, proposing to borrow of another party the sum of five thousand pounds to pay the crew and furnish an outfit, and agreeing that, in consideration of the loan, the homeward cargo should be consigned to the party advancing the money. It cannot reasonably be denied, in the face of the authorities I have just referred to, that a court of equity, upon a contract so framed, would hold that the party advancing the moncy was, as against the owner, entitled to claim the homeward cargo. And if a party may contract for the consignment of a homeward cargo, I cannot see why he may not contract with the owner of a ship engaged in the South Sca fisherics that the fruit of the voyage, the whales taken, or the oil obtained shall be his security for the amount of his advances. I cannot, without going in opposition to many authorities, throw any doubt upon the point that Birnie, the contracting party [the shipowner], would be bound by the assignment to the plaintiffs.'"

ship in or lien on such articles to the mortgagee. Other cases take a different view, and hold that the rolling stock are fixtures, and become part of the realty as soon as acquired, and that being so annexed to the soil, the *legal* title thereto is vested in the mortgagee, or that the lien of the mortgage extends to them.² ^a Other illustrations of the doctrine as applied to particular transactions are given in the foot-note.³

§ 1289, ² Pennock v. Coe, 23 How. 117, 16 L. Ed. 436; Phila. etc. R. R. v. Woelpper, 64 Pa. St. 366, 3 Am. Rep. 596; Morrill v. Noyes, 56 Me. 458, 471, 96 Am. Dec. 486; Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H. 484; Farmers' Loan etc. Co. v. Hendrickson, 25 Barb. 484; Seymour v. Canandaigua etc. R. R., 25 Barb. 284, 303; Phillips v. Winslow, 18 B. Mon. 431, 68 Am. Dec. 729; Clay v. East Tenn. etc. R. R., 6 Heisk. 421.

§ 1289, ³ In some of these instances the assignments are evidently valid at law: Assignments of payments to become due from the performance of an existing contract:^b Ruple v. Bindley, 91 Pa. St. 296; Clafin v. Kimball, 52 Vt. 6; Schreyer v. Mayor of New York, 8 Jones & S. 255; Hall v. Buffalo, 2 Abb. App. 301; Hawley v. Bristol, 39 Conn. 26; but a contract must have been entered into and be existing from which the future payments may arise: Herbert v. Bronson, 125 Mass. 475; Huling v. Cabell, 9 W. Va. 522, 27 Am. Rep. 562; Jermyn v. Moffitt, 75 Pa. St. 399; Skipper v. Stokes, 42 Ala. 255, 94 Am. Dec. 646. Assignment of future wages under existing contract of employment:^e In Massachusetts such assignments are required by statute

§ 1289, (a) Thompson v. Valley R. R. Co., 132 U. S. 73, 33 L. Ed. 256, 10 Sup. Ct. 29. In Steele v. Ashenfelter, 40 Neb. 770, 42 Am. St. Rep. 694, 59 N. W. 361, a mortgage on property to be thereafter acquired by a railroad company was held invalid.

§ 1289, (b) Money to become due. Walton v. Horkan, 112 Ga. 814, 81 Am. St. Rep. 77, 38 S. E. 105; Stott v. Franey, 20 Or. 410, 23 Am. St. Rep. 132, 26 Pac. 271. Money to become due under a building contract: Third Nat. Bank v. Atlantic City, 126 Fed. 413; Brindze v. Atlantic City Policemen's Beneficial Ass'n, 75 N. J. Eq. 405, 72 Atl. 435. § 1289, (c) Future earnings. -Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Provolt, 42 Colo. 103, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 587, 93 Pac. 1126; Rodijkeit v. Andrews, 74 Ohio St. 104, 6 Ann. Cas. 761, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 564, 77 N. E. 747 (though for indefi- \mathbf{nite} term; valuable opinion); Thompson v. Erie R'y Co., 207 N. Y. 171, 100 N. E. 791; First Nat. Bank v. School District No. 1, 77 Neb. 570, 110 N. W. 349; Close v. Independent Gravel Co., 156 Mo. App. 411, 138 S. W. 81 (if contract of employment is existing, assignment of future wages good at law; if not existing

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§ 1290. Requisites of an Assignment of Property to be Acquired in the Future.—It has been assumed through all the foregoing discussion that the instrument *does* amount to a sale, assignment, or mortgage of future-acquired prop-

to be recorded: Harrop v. Landers etc. Co.. 45 Conn. 561; Augur v. New York Belting etc. Co., 39 Conn. 536; Garland v. Harrington, 51 N. H. 409; Murphy v. Murphy, 121 Mass. 167; Sullivan v. Sweeney, 111 Mass. 366; Knowlton v. Cooley, 102 Mass. 233. Assignment of future accounts and demands:^d East Lewisburg etc. Co. v. Marsh, 91 Pa. St. 96; Guthrie and Byles's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 269; Sedam v. Cincinnati etc. Canal Co., 2 Disn. 309 (future tolls); but see Skipper v. Stokes, 42 Ala. 255, 94 Am. Dec. 646; White v. Coleman, 130 Mass. 316. Miscellaneous cases:^e Brown v. Tanucr, L. R. 2 Eq. 806; 3 Ch.

at time of assignment, only enforceable in equity); Leitch v. Northern Pacific R'y Co., 95 Minn. 35, 5 Ann. Cas. 63, 103 N. W. 704 (but not if contract for services is without limit as to amount or time); Cox v. Hughes, 10 Cal. App. 553, 102 Pac., 956; Central of Georgia R'y Co. v. Dover, 1 Ga. App. 240, 57 S. E. 1002. See Citizens' Loan Ass'n v. Boston & Maine R. R., 196 Mass. 528; 124 Am. St. Rep. 584, 13 Ann. Cas. 365, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1025, 82 N. E. 696; Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. Kidwell, (Colo. App.) 76 Pac. 922; Mallin v. Wenham, 209 Ill. 252, 101 Am. St. Rep. 233, 70 N. E. 564; Smith v. Bates Mach. Co., 182 Ill. 166, 55 N. E. 69; Metcalf v. Kincaid, 87 Iowa, 443, 43 Am. St. Rep. 391, 54 N. W. 867; Peterson v. Ball, 121 Iowa, 544, 97 N. W. 79; Millington v. Laurer, 89 Iowa, 322, 48 Am. St. Rep. 385, 56 N. W. 533; Edwards v. Peterson, 80 Me. 367, 6 Am. St. Rep. 207, 14 Atl. 936 (assignment of future wages not yet contracted for uphold). It is held in Steinbach v. Brant, 79 Minn. 383, 79 Am. St. Rep. 494, 82 N. W. 651, however, that an assignment of wages to become due,

indefinite as to amount, unlimited in time, without acceptance by the employer, and without notice to an attaching creditor, is void as to the latter. See, to same effect, Leitch v. Northern Pacific R'y Co., 95 Minn. 35, 5 Ann. Cas. 63, 103 N. W. 704.

§ 1289, (d) Assignment of future book debts, though not limited to book debts in any particular business, valid: Tailby v. Official Receiver, 13 App. Cas. (H. L.) 523, reversing 18 Q. B. Div. 25, and restoring 17 Q. B. Div. 88; overruling In re D'Epineuil, 20 Ch. Div. 758, and approving In re Clarke, 36 Ch. Div. 348. See Lauerman Bros. Co. v. Riehl (Komp), 156 Wis. 12, 145 N. W. 174 (an agreement to assign book accounts unaccompanied by a delivery of the books or abstracts of the accounts or any other act indicating an intention to relinquish control is merely an executory agreement and is not an assignment good as against third parties).

§ 1289, (e) *Miscellaneous cases.* Peugh v. Porter, 112 U. S. 737, 28 L. Ed. 859, 5 Sup. Ct. 361 (of part of a claim against a foreign government, to be determined by a comerty; but it should be carefully observed that every sale or mortgage dealing with future property does not necessarily have that effect; there is a plain distinction between an assignment of property to be acquired in future and a *mere power* to deal with such property. In order to create an equitable assignment, and thus let in the operation of the equitable doctrine, there must be on the face of the instrument expressly, or collected from its provisions by necessary implication, language of *present transfer* directly applying to the future as well as to the existing property, or else language importing a present *contract* or *agreement* between the parties to sell or assign the future property, or that the security of the mortgage should imme-

597 (future freight); In re Irving, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 419 (future dividends from a bankrupt's estate); Swift v. Railway etc. Ass'n, 96 Ill. 309; Gwin v. Biel, 70 Ind. 505 (future rents and profits); Horst v. Dague, 34 Ohio St. 371 (share in the proceeds to arise from sale of real estate to be made by an executor under direction of the will); Patten v. Coen etc. Co., 3 Col. 265; People v. Dayton, 50 How. Pr. 143 (future fees of a public officer); The Edward Lee, 3 Ben. 114; Fed. Cas. No. 4292 (future salvage money by a seaman); McClure v. McDearmon, 26 Ark. 66.

mission); Wright v. Ellison, 1 Wall. 16; The Elmbank, 72 Fed. 610; Phillips v. Edsall, 127 Ill. 535, 20 N. E. 801; Canty v. Latterner, 31 Minn. 239, 17 N. W. 385; Central Trust Co. v. West India Imp. Co., 169 N. Y. 314, 62 N. E. 387; Taft v. Marsily, 120 N. Y. 474, 24 N. E. 926; Jones v. Mayor, 90 N. Y. 387 (assignment of claim against municipality, before the claim was by statute made legally enforceable, upheld); Fairbanks v. Sargent, 104 N. Y. 108, 58 Am. Rep. 490, 9 N. E. 870, 117 N. Y. 320, 6 L. R. A. 475, 22 N. E. 1039 (of interest in proceeds of pending litigation); Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N. Y. 508; Reynolds v. Strong, 10 N. D. 81, 88 Am. St. Rep. 680, 85 N. W. 987 (chattel mortgage on

future earnings of a threshing rig); Collins's Appeal, 107 Pa. St. 590, 52 Am. Rep. 479 (pledge of interest in a partnership to be subsequently formed); Hillsdale Distillery Co. v. Briant, 129 Minn. 223, 152 N. W. 265 (right to a refund on revocation of a liquor license is assignable); Lawson v. Lyon, 136 Ga. 214, 71 S. E. 149 (assignment of discretionary lodge benefit); Alexander v. Munroe, 54 Or. 500, 135 Am. St. Rep. 840, 101 Pac. 903, 103 Pac. 514, (assignment of portion of expected judgment); Harms v. Stern, 229 Fed. 42, 145 C. C. A. 2 (sale of fnture literary property-musical compositions at the time unwritten -a valid equitable assignment).

diately attach to the future property, as the case may be.^a Where an assignment of existing chattels by way of mortgage contains a provision which simply amounts to an authority or license to the mortgagee to take possession of or to enter and seize after-acquired property, this does not operate as an equitable assignment of the after-acquired property, nor create in the mortgagee any present equitable interest in such property. It creates, at most, only a *power*; and a power is very different from an interest,—no interest in the property arises until the power has been exercised.¹

§ 1291. Extent of the Doctrine—To What Property and Persons It Applies.—The general doctrine concerning sales or mortgages of after-acquired property leads to the further conclusion, that when chattels which have been mortgaged or assigned as security are sold or exchanged by the owner, the lien upon the original articles will extend to the resulting fund or the substituted goods; and this lien will be valid in equity, not only against the mortgagee, but also against any person claiming title to such fund or goods under him as a volunteer.^{1a} According to the general doc-

§ 1290, 1 Reeve v. Whitmore, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 1, 16-18, per Lord Westbury; and see Gardner v. McEwen, 19 N. Y. 123; Head v. Goodwin, 37 Me. 181; Chapin v. Cram, 40 Me. 561 Cudworth v. Scott, 41 N. H. 476;
Walker v. Vaughn, 33 Conn. 577; Rowan v. Sharps etc. Co., 29 Conn. 282; Henshaw v. Bank of Bellows Falls, 10 Gray, 568, 571, 572; Rose v. Bevan, 10 Md. 466, 69 Am. Dec. 170; Chapman v. Weimer, 4 Ohio St. 481; Oliver v. Eaton, 7 Mich. 108; Person v. Oberteuffer, 59 How. Pr. 339; Williams v. Winsor, 12 R. I. 9.

§ 1291, 1 It is assumed, of course, that there are no statutes preventing this operation of the doctrine: Legard v. Hodges, 1 Ves. 477; Collyer v.

§ 1290, (a) The text is quoted in Mosier v. Allenbaugh (Cartier v. Mosier), 84 Kan. 361, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1182, 114 Pac. 226 (a quitclaim does not assign an expectancy).

§ 1291, (a) Cited to this effect in Blair v. Smith, 114 Ind. 114, 5 Am. St. Rep. 593, 15 N. E. 817. This paragraph is cited, generally, in Hillsdale Distillery Co. v. Briant, 129 Minn. 223, 152 N. W. 265. See, also, Read v. Mosby, 87 Tenn. 759, 5 L. R. A. 122, 11 S. W. 940; Triumph Electric Co. v. Empire Furniture Co., 70 W. Va. 164, 73 S. E. 325. trine of equity established beyond any doubt by the highest judicial authority, the equitable assignment or the equitable lien upon property to be acquired in the future is valid and enforceable, not only against the contracting party himself, but also against subsequent judgment creditors, assignees in bankruptcy, and all other volunteers holding or claiming under him, and against subsequent purchasers from him with notice of the assignment or lien.² ^b This operation of the equitable doctrine as against other persons than the immediate parties is, however, very much restricted and limited in most of the states by statutes.³ The doctrine of equitable liens resulting from executory contracts, and that of equitable assignment of nonexisting property, constitute

Fallon, Turn. & R. 459; Fletcher v. Morey, 2 Story, 555, 566; and see Davis v. Marx, 55 Miss. 376; Ball v. Vason, 56 Ga. 264; Arnold v. Morris, 7 Daly, 498; contra, Cowart v. Cowart, 3 Lea, 57. A mortgage in the stock in trade of a shopkeeper which purports to cover goods substituted in place of those from time to time sold is certainly valid in equity; it creates an equitable lien upon the after-acquired property as against the mortgagor, and those claiming under him with notice or as volunteers; and the lien would undoubtedly attach to such goods even in the absence of any express clause to that effect in the instrument: Abbott v. Goodwin, 20 Me. 408; but see the next following note.

§ 1291, 2 See ante, cases cited under §§ 1236, 1288.

§ 1291, 3 The statutes referred to are those concerning transfers and mortgages made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud subsequent creditors and purchasers, and those concerning the filing or recording of chattel mortgages. The decisions giving a construction to this legislation have *virtually* abrogated the equitable doctrine in its application to subsequent creditors and purchasers. For example, in many states a chattel mortgage which purports to cover future-acquired goods in place of those which have been sold, and which thus expressly or impliedly permits the mortgagor to sell the original chattels embraced in the instrument, while the lien is extended to the newly acquired articles, is absolutely void as against subsequent creditors of the mortgagor. This statutory system and the rules created by it belong, however, to the domain of the law, rather than to equity.

 § 1291, (b) The text is quoted in
 See, also, Brown v. Ford, 120 Va.

 Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493, 43
 233, 91 S. E. 145; Collins's Appeal,

 L. R. A. (N. S.) 404, 126 Pac. 149,
 107 Pa. St. 590, 52 Am. Rep. 479.

two of the most remarkable and distinctive features of the equity jurisprudence. The particular rules which they involve are all drawn from the fundamental maxims or principles of equity; they exhibit in the most striking manner the opposing theories and methods of equity and of the law.

There is another species or phase of equitable assignment, not alluded to in this chapter, because it depends upon entirely different principles,—equitable assignment by subrogation. I have already described one important application of this peculiar species of equitable assignment in the previous chapter upon mortgages, while dealing with the right of redemption,⁴ and the entire doctrine will be examined in the subsequent and appropriate title of Subrogation.

§ 1291, 4 See ante, §§ 1211-1213.

CHAPTER NINTH. CONTRACTS IN EQUITY.

SECTION I.

GENERAL DOCTRINE CONCERNING CONTRACTS.

ANALYSIS.

- § 1292. Object of this chapter.
- § 1293. What constitutes a contract.
- § 1294. Equitable contract by representations and acts.
- § 1295. Effects of a contract in equity; covenant creating an equitable servitude.
- §1296. Effects of contracts in general.
- § 1297. Enforcement of contracts in equity.

§ 1292. Object of This Chapter.—I purpose to examine, in this chapter, those doctrines only concerning the nature and effects of contracts which are peculiarly and distinctively equitable. I shall not enter upon any discussion of those doctrines and rules relating to contracts which are identical both in equity and in the law.¹ The whole treatment of the subject may therefore be regarded as responsive to three fundamental questions: What constitutes a contract in equity? what primary rights of property or persons arise from a contract in equity? and what remedial rights and remedies does equity recognize and give for the enforcement of a contract? It will be more convenient to answer the latter two inquiries together, and thus to describe the effect of contracts.

§ 1293. What Constitutes a Contract.—Very little need be said under this head. The essential elements of a contract are the same in equity and at law. In general, the same rules prevail in both jurisdictions as to parties and

§ 1292, 1 Such discussion would be unnecessary, even if my limits permitted it; since it may be found in every complete treatise on the law of contracts, and it properly forms no part of equity jurisprudence.

their capacity to contract, as to consideration, and as to the assent or aggregatio mentium. In equity, as well as at law, "an agreement is the result of the mutual assent of two parties to certain terms, and if it be clear that there is no consensus, what may have been written or said becomes immaterial."^{1 a} To this general agreement between the equitable and the legal rules there is one important exception and one modification. While a married woman is as incapable of binding herself personally in equity to the same extent as at law, her contracts relating to or made in view of her separate estate are so far valid and effectual that they are enforceable against such separate estate.² The modification mentioned relates to the requirement of a valuable consideration. Equity will never enforce an executory agreement unless there was an actual valuable consideration; and, unlike the common law, it does not permit a seal to supply the place of a real consideration. Disregarding mere forms, and looking at the reality, it requires an actual valuable consideration as essential in every such agreement, and allows the want of it to be shown, notwithstanding the seal, in the enforcement of covenants, settlements, and executory contracts of every description.^{3 b} In construing and applying the

§ 1293, ¹ Per Lord Westbury, in Chinnock v. Marchioness of Ely, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 638, 643. Until there is an assent on the same terms, the transaction has not passed beyond the condition of negotiation. In equity, as at the law, a contract may be regarded as an offer on one side and an assent on the other. A great number of cases have been decided by courts of equity determining whether a contract had or had not been actually conelnded, and laying down particular rules as to the offer and the assent; but these rules are the same at law and in equity, and the decisions contain nothing peculiar to equity jurisprudence: See Pomeroy on Specific Performance of Contracts, sees. 58-67, and cases cited.

§ 1293, 2 See ante, §§ 1121-1126.

§ 1293, 3 Cochrane v. Willis, 34 Beav. 359; Houghton v. Lees, 1 Jur., N. S., 862; Ord v. Johnston, 1 Jur., N. S., 1063; Jefferys v. Jefferys, Craig

§ 1293, (a) The text is cited to § 1293, this effect in Kaster v. Mason, (N. this effect D.) 99 N. W. 1083. meyer, 55

§ 1293, (b) The text is cited to this effect in Steinmeyer v. Steinmeyer, 55 S. C. 9, 33 S. E. 15, and

statute of frauds, in determining what contracts come within its scope, what memoranda are sufficient to a sale by its requirements, and all other matters of detail, courts of equity and of law adopt and follow the same rules.⁴ c Even when equity seems to depart from or disregard the statute, and specially in its enforcement of verbal contracts for the sale of land which have been part performed, it is only invoking the aid of its most salutary principles for the purpose of carrying out the ultimate objects of the statute. As the primary object of the statute is to prevent. frauds, mistakes, and perjuries, by substituting written for oral evidence in the most important classes of contracts, courts of equity have established the principle, which they apply under various circumstances, that it shall not be used as an instrument for the accomplishment of fraudulent purposes; designed to prevent fraud, it shall not be permitted to work fraud. This principle lies at the basis of the doctrine concerning part performance, but is also enforced wherever it is necessary to secure equitable results.5 d

§ 1294. Equitable Contract by Representations and Acts. All ordinary contracts which consist of an intentional offer

& P. 138; Hervey v. Andland, 14 Sim. 531; Meek v. Kettlewell, 1 Phill. Ch. 342; 1 Hare, 464; Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray, 227; Wason v. Colburn, 99 Mass. 342; Estate of Webb, 49 Cal. 541, 545; Minturn v. Seymour, 4 Johns. Ch. 497; Burling v. King, 66 Barb. 633; Shepherd v. Shepherd, 1 Md. Ch. 244; Vasser v. Vasser, 23 Miss. 378.

§ 1293, 4 See Pomeroy on Specific Performance of Contracts, secs. 71-95, and cases cited.

§ 1293, ⁵ Jervis v. Berridge, L. R. 8 Ch. 351; Haigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch. 469; and see *ante*, vol. 2, § 921, and cases cited.

in Couch v. McCoy, 138 Fed. 696; and quoted in Corbett v. Cronkhite, 239 Ill. 9, 87 N. E. 874; the two latter cases holding or stating that a seal does not, as at common law, render an option without consideration irrevocable—a disputed point. See, also, §§ 370, 1405. § 1293, (c) The text is cited to this effect in Birch v. Baker, 81 N. J. Eq. 264, 86 Atl. 932.

§ 1293, (d) The text is quoted in Halligan v. Frey, 161 Iowa, 185, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 112, 141 N. W. 944. on one side and an intentional acceptance on the other, resulting in a meeting of minds upon the same terms, are thus governed by identical rules, with reference to their creation, in law and in equity. There is, however, a form of contract peculiar to equity which is created by representations made by one party, and acts done by the other party upon the faith of such representations.¹ Where an absolute unconditional representation of something to be done in the future is made by one person, in order to accomplish a particular purpose, and the person to whom it is made, relying upon it, does the acts by which the intended result is obtained and purpose accomplished, a contract is thereby concluded between the parties.² The representation must be absolute in its terms and positive in its nature,-something more than the mere expression of an intention depending upon contingencies, or of a wish, hope, or expectation,-otherwise the obligation, if any, which arises from it will be only moral or honorary.² This

§ 1294, ¹ A representation deliberately and intentionally made, for the purpose of influencing the conduct of another, and then acted upon hy him, is generally the foundation of a right which a court of equity will enforce: Per Lord Cottenham, in Hammersley v. De Biel, 12 Clark & F. 45, 61, note. But in order that the right should be that of contract, the representation must be in some sense promissory,—that is, must be something in the future. Representations of facts as existing or past may be the occasions of rights, but the rights will then be referable to fraud or to equitable estoppel, and not to contract. While the law can only give compensation in damages, equity, as has been shown, will compel the party to make his representations good by specifically performing them: See Bold v. Hutchinson, 20 Beav. 250; 5 De Gex, M. & G. 558; Neville v. Wilkinson, 1 Brown Ch. 543.

§ 1294, 2 In the recent case of Dashwood v. Jermyn, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 776, 781, the court formulated the doctrine as follows: "If a man makes a representation on the faith of which another man alters his position, enters into a deed, incurs an obligation, the man making it is bound to

§ 1294, (a) The text is quoted with approval in McKeegan v. O'Neill, 22 S. C. 454, 460, 468, but the facts did not bring the case within the principle here stated. The text is also quoted in Halligan v. Frey, 161 Iowa, 185, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 112, 141 N. W. 944; Prater v. Prater, 94 S. C. 267, 77 S. E. 936. purely equitable form of contract is distinguishable from the case of an offer accepted by means of acts. Where one party makes an offer, the other party may accept it by acts instead of by words, and a binding contract will re-

perform that representation, no matter what it is, whether it is for present payment or for the continuance of the payment of an annuity, or to make a provision by will. That in the eye of a court of equity is a contract, an engagement which the man making it is bound to perform." This statement of the rule is certainly too broad, since it includes representations of existing and past facts. This language would turn all cases of fraudulent representations and of equitable estoppels into contracts, and that courts of equity have never done. In the case of Maunsell v. White, 4 H. L. Cas. 1039, 1056, Lord Cottenham, speaking of the circumstances as described in the text, said: "There is no middle term, no tertium quid, between a representation so made to he effective for such a purpose, and a contract; they are identical." Most of the cases involving this doctrine are the results of negotiations prior to marriages: De Beil v. Thomson, 3 Beav. 469; 12 Clark & F. 61, note; Hammersley v. De Biel, 12 Clark & F. 45; Saunders v. Cramer, 3 Dru. & War. 87; Moore v. Hart, 1 Vern. 110, 201; 2 Ch. Rep. 284; Cokes v. Mascal, 2 Vern. 34, 200; Luders v. Anstey, 4 Ves. 501; 5 Ves. 213; Croshie v. McDoual, 13 Ves. 148; Montgomery v. Reilly, 1 Bligh, N. S., 364; 1 Dow & C. 62; Payne v. Mortimer, 1 Giff. 118; 4 De Gex & J. 447; Alt v. Alt, 4 Giff. 84; Loffus v. Maw, 3 Giff. 592; Prole v. Soady, 2 Giff. 1; Skidmore v. Bradford, L. R. 8 Eq. 134; Coverdale v. Eastwood, 15 Eq. 121. The representation must he absolute. In Randall v. Morgan, 12 Ves. 67, a father, previous to his daughter's marriage, refused to make a settlement, but said he should allow her the interest of two thousand pounds, and if she married, he might bind himself to do so, and to pay her the principal at his death. This was held not to be a contract, since the representation was not positive and absolute. Again, the representation must he made with the express purpose of bringing about the result which does actually take place, for the purpose of accomplishing an object which is on the faith of it accomplished. In Dashwood v. Jermyn, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 776, a paper was signed by A and given to B, whereby, as a mark of his esteem and friendship, A agreed to allow B five hundred pounds a year, and to bequeath him on his own (A's) death ten thousand pounds. B showed this paper to Mrs. C, who thereupon consented that her daughter should marry B, and they were married. It did not appear that A knew of any such purpose when he gave the paper to B; he was ignorant of any marriage negotiation between B and Mrs. C's daughter, and Mrs. C and daughter were utter strangers to him; and no communication concerning the marriage ever passed between A and B, or between

sult at law as well as in equity. In that case, however, there is an *intention* by the offerer to create a contract, and the acts of the other party are evidence of his intention to accept; so that there is a conscious, intentional

A and Mrs. C or daughter. A paid B one installment of the five hundred pounds, and then died, making no provision whatever for B in his will. Held, that there was no contract which would be enforced against A's estate; and see Loxley v. Heath, 27 Beav. 523; 1 De Gex, F. & J. 489; Jameson v. Stein, 21 Beav. 5; Kay v. Crook, 3 Smale & G. 407; Maunsell v. White, 1 Jones & L. 539, 567.

There is another phase of the doctrine which has occasioned much judicial inquiry. When, during the negotiation, the party expressly refuses to enter into a contract, and only pledges his honor, which he insists should be accepted as sufficient, clearly no obligation arises which will be enforced by the courts; and it seems the result is the same when the representation is of a mere intention. There can be no possible doubt, where the party in so many words refuses to bind himself by a contract, and requires his pledge of honor to be taken instead of a legal obligation. But in regard to the effect of a representation of intention there has been a direct conflict of opinion among some of the very ablest equity judges in England. In Maunsell v. White, 1 Jones & L. 539, 4 H. L. Cas. 1039, a young gentleman being suitor for the hand of a young lady who was yet a minor, her guardians objected to the marriage, unless a suitable settlement was made by him. He applied to an uncle, who wrote the following answer: "My sentiments respecting you continue unalterable; however, I shall never settle any part of my property out of my power so long as I exist. My will has been made for some time, and I am confident that I shall never alter it to your disadvantage. I repeat, that my Tipperary estate will come to you at my death, unless some unforeseen occurrence should take place." The writer thus carefully guarded every positive statement by adding some qualification or contingency; but he directed that his letter should be shown to the lady's guardians. This was done, and the marriage followed. The uncle afterwards changed his mind and failed to devise any property to his nephew. Lord St. Leonards held there was no contract, and his decision was affirmed by the house of lords. In Money v. Jorden, 15 Beav. 372, 2 De Gex, M. & G. 318, 5 H. L. Cas. 185, the effect of a statement of intention was fully discussed, with a great contrariety of opinion. Α gentleman being about to marry, his creditor, to whom he was indebted on a bond, stated that in case of his marriage she would never trouble him about the bond; that she had given it up, and would not enforce its payment; but when asked to actually surrender the bond, she refused, insisting that her own word must be trusted, and that he might rely on her word. meeting of minds of both the parties. But in the equitable contract by representation, the one making the representation may not intend to be bound, may even intend to mislead. Equity thus infers a contract, although there may not be the mutual intention, the conscious, intentional meeting of both the minds, which is an essential element of the legal conception of a contract.

§ 1295. Effects of a Contract in Equity-Covenant Creating an Equitable Servitude.—Before describing the general effects of contracts, I shall notice some particular agreements which create special rights in equity, where no such rights, or perhaps no rights at all, between the same parties, exist at law. When the owner of land enters into a covenant concerning it, when in a deed the grantor or the grantee covenants, or in a lease the lessor or the lessee covenants, concerning the land, concerning its use, restricting certain specified uses, stipulating for certain specified uses, subjecting it to easements or servitudes, and the like, and the land is afterwards conveyed, or sold, or passes to one who has actual or constructive notice of the covenant, the grantee or purchaser will take the premises bound by the covenant, and will be compelled in equity either to specifically execute it, or will be restrained from violating it, at the suit of the original covenantee or of any other person who has a sufficient equitable interest, al-

The gentleman was therefore married, and a suit having been subsequently brought to recover the amount of the bond, he sought to restrain the action by injunction. The relief was granted by the lower courts, but was refused in the house of lords by a majority. Lord St. Leonards held that a representation of intention might be binding, while Lord Cranworth held that it was not. See, also, Moorhouse v. Colvin, 15 Beav. 341; Lord Walpole v. Lord Orford, 3 Ves. 402; Norton v. Wood, 1 Russ. & M. 178; Cross v. Sprigg, 6 Hare, 552; Viscountess Montacute v. Maxwell, 1 P. Wms. 618. The representation would not be enforced, under the rule of the text, unless the acts were done in reliance upon it; e. g., when it was not acted on as a reason for the marriage: Goldicutt v. Townsend, 28 Beav. 445; Jameson v. Stein, 21 Beav. 5; nor where it was waived: Caton v. Caton, L. R. 2 H. L. 127, 142. though perhaps without any *legal* interest, in such performance. It makes no difference whatever, with respect to this equitable liability, and this right to enforce the covenant in equity, whether the covenant is or is not one which in law "runs with the land."¹ Subsequent owners

§ 1295, 1 Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phill. Ch. 774, 777; and see ante, § 689, note, in which a large number of English and American cases illustrating the text are cited.^a This doctrine may be regarded as an equitable substitute for or addition to the legal rule concerning covenants running with the land; or it may be explained by regarding the covenant as creating an equitable easement. The latter theory has been adopted by many able American courts. In either view, the covenant confessedly creates an equitable burden on the land, which follows it into the hands of subsequent holders, with the single qualification that a subsequent owner who acquires the legal estate for value and without notice takes it free from this burden. In no case is it necessary that the covenant should "run with the land," in order that the equitable easement or burden should be created. SirGeorge Jessel, in the passage quoted in the next following note, explains, in his usual accurate manner, the equitable operation of such covenants. He shows that notice to the subsequent owner is not an essential element to the existence of the equitable burden; want of notice simply enables the purchaser of the legal estate for value to be free from the burden. A subsequent holder who acquires only an equitable estate takes it subject to the burden, even in the absence of any notice.

The most frequent condition of facts to which the doctrine has been applied in the United States is the following: A, the owner of a block of land, divides it into lots for sale, and sells all these lots to different grantees. In the deed of lot No. 1 are covenants of the grantee not to build nearer the street than a certain line, or not to build certain kinds of buildings, or not to use the lots for certain purposes, or not to build so as to cut off a certain prospect, or other negative or affirmative covenants. The deeds of all the other lots contain similar covenants. Finally, the whole

§ 1295, (a) See, also, post, § 1342, and Pom. Equitable Remedies, where the subject is more fully treated. This paragraph of the text is cited in Willoughby v. Lawrence, 116 Ill. 11, 56 Am. Rep. 758, 4 N. E. 356 (agreement made between lessees of a driving park and others, whereby the latter are permitted to post advertisements on the fences,

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is binding on assignces of the lease with notice); Stott v. Avery, 156 Mich. 674, 121 N. W. 825; Hartz v. Kales Realty Co., 178 Mich. 560, 146 N. W. 160; Kettle River Ry. Co. v. Eastern Ry. Co., 41 Minn. 461, 6 L. R. A. 111, 43 N. W. 469; Shaw v. Proffitt, 57 Or. 192, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 63, 109 Pac. 584, 110 Pac. 1092.

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deriving title under deeds containing such covenants would, of course, have constructive notice thereof. This equitable

, land is sold, so that A retains no interest whatever. The lots are afterwards conveyed to subsequent grantees. Each subsequent grantee would be charged with constructive notice of the covenants in the original deed under which he claimed title. If the subsequent grantee of any lot-say No. 1-should violate the covenants in the deed of his lot, then plainly there would be no right of action at law against him in favor of the owner of any other lot; for there would be no legal privity whatsoever hetween them. Even if the covenants did run with the land, there would be no action at law, because the grantee of lot No. 2 would not he in any sense an assignce of the reversion,—that is, of the original covenantee's (A's) rights under the covenant. Although no action at law would lie, it is well settled that a snit in equity may be maintained by the original grantee or by the subsequent owner of any lot, to prevent a violation of the covenants by the owner of any other lot. Many of the American cases cited ante, in vol. 2, under § 689, arose out of such a condition of facts. The prevailing theory in the American courts is to regard the covenants as creating an equitable easement or servitude. The following cases also illustrate the doctrine: In Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. St. 289, each grantee of adjoining lots covenanted not to huild on the rear portion of his premises above a certain height, and this was enforced; Schwoerer v. Boylston Market Ass'n, 99 Mass. 285 (a covenant that a strip of land should not be subject to fences, and should be used as a way, was enforced by the subsequent grantee of other land benefited thereby); Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546 (a covenant not to erect a building on the land conveyed was enforced against a subsequent grantee of the covenantor by a subsequent grantee of the original covenantee; the defendant had constructive notice from his title deeds); Whitney v. Union R'y, 11 Gray, 359, 71 Am. Dec. 715 (a covenant not to use the land in a certain manner enforced against a subsequent grantee charged with notice); Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen, 341, 83 Am. Dec. 632 (in conveyances of adjoining lots by same grantor, each grantee covenanted that the lot should only be used for dwellinghonses; held hinding on all subsequent grantees, and enforceable by any subsequent grantee against another); Clark v. New York Life Ins. & T. Co., 64 N. Y. 33 (the doctrine was recognized as fully settled; hut on a construction of the language of the covenants it was held not to apply to defendant's lot).^b In Brewer v. Marshall, 19 N. J. Eq. 537, 97 Am. Dec. 679, there was a covenant by the grantor not to sell off any marl from the

§ 1295, (b) See, also, Joy v. St. 79 Ala. 288; Morris v. Tuskaloosa Louis, 138 U. S. 1, 34 L. Ed. 843, 11 Mfg. Co., 83 Ala. 565, 3 South. 689 Sup. Ct. 243; McMahon v. Williams, (covenant that the land conveyed right would arise where no similar legal right, or perhaps no legal right at all, would exist between the same parties,

premises adjoining the lot conveyed. The court fully recognized and accepted the doctrine of the text, but held that this particular covenant was one which equity would not enforce; if not absolutely illegal, it closely resembled covenants in restraint of trade, which are confessedly illegal. All these cases show that the doctrine is wholly independent of the legal notion concerning covenants which do or do not run with the land. See, also, Phœnix Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 N. Y. 400; Trustees etc. v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 41 Am. Rep. 365.º The equitable jurisdiction to enforce such covenants is subject to one most important limitation. It is not absolute, but is governed by the same general rules-which control the equitable relief of specific performance of contracts. If, therefore, the restrictive covenants in deeds of lots were made with evident reference to the continuance of the existing general condition of the property and its surroundings, but in the lapse of time there has been a complete change in the character of the neighborhood, so as to defeat the purposes of the covenants and to render their enforcement an inequitable and unjust burden on the owner of the lots, then the equitable relief will not be granted, and the plaintiff will be left to his remedy at law. For example, if the covenants restricted the grantees of lots to use for purposes of residence, and since their execution the whole neighborhood had ceased to be used for such purposes, and had been wholly given up to business, manufacturing, and the like: Trustees etc. v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311, 317, 318, 41 Am. Rep. 365, and cases cited by Danforth, J.d

be used for residence purposes only); Fresno Canal & I. Co. v. Rowell, 80 Cal. 114, 13 Am. St. Rep. 112, 22 Pac. 53 (covenant to take water for the use of the land from a certain irrigation company); Sutton v. Head, 86 Ky. 156, 9 Am. St. Rep. 274, 5 S. W. 410 (covenant that no intoxicating liquors be sold on the premises in quantities less than five gallons); Stees v. Kranz, 32 Minn. 313, 20 N. W. 241 (covenant in lease against sale of liquor binding on sublessee); Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N. Y. 252, 1 Am. St. Rep. 816, 17 N. E. 335.

§ 1295, (c) But the covenant "must relate to or concern the land or its use or enjoyment. It is not enough that a covenant affects the use of land, or the enjoyment of an easement therein, in a *collateral* way." Thus an agreement by a land owner that the products of the land be transported exclusively by one company does not so relate to the land as to be binding on purchaser with notice: West Virginia Transp. Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600, 46 Am. Rep. 527; Kettle River Ry. Co. v. Eastern Ry. Co., 41 Minn 461, 6 L. R. A. 111, 43 N. W. 469.

§ 1295, (d) See, also, Page v. Murray, 46 N. J. Eq. 325, 19 Atl. 11.

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in the following instances: 1. Where the covenant is not one which runs with the land, because in such case no legal liability whatever would rest upon the subsequent grantee or owner; 2. Where the covenantee having parted with all interest in the premises, there is no *legal* privity of estate or of contract between the plaintiff who seeks to enforce the covenant and the subsequent owner against whom the enforcement is sought, because in such case no action at law for a breach would lie; 3. Where the stipulations of the covenant and the breach thereof are of such a nature that there is no basis upon which to estimate damages. In all these cases, however, the covenant may be enforced in equity. I have, as it will be seen, continued to state the doctrine in its most general form as applying to affirmative as well as to restrictive covenants, and as rendering the owner liable to the affirmative duty of specifically performing the covenant, as well as to the negative remedy of restraint from violating it, notwithstanding the very recent decisions by the English court of appeal holding that the doctrine applies only to restrictive covenants, and does not extend to those which stipulate for affirmative acts.² In my opinion, the doctrine has been fully estab-

§ 1295, ² Haywood v. Brunswick etc. Soc., L. R. 8 Q. B. Div. 403 (covenant to build and keep in repair some houses); London etc. R'y v. Gomm, L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 562, 582, 583, 586, 587. In this case the covenant was to resell the land. Jessel, M. R., said (pp. 582, 583): "With regard to the argument founded on Tulk v. Moxhay, that case was very much considered by the court of appeal in Haywood v. Brunswick Benefit Society, and the court there decided that they would not extend the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay to affirmative covenants, compelling a man to lay out money or do any other act of what I may call an active character, but that it was to be confined to restrictive covenants. Of course, that authority would be binding upon us, if we did not agree to it, but I most cordially accede to it. I think we ought not to extend the doetrine of Tulk v. Moxhay in the way suggested here. The doctrine of that case, rightly considered, appears to me to be either an extension in equity of the doctrine of Spencer's Case to another line of cases, or else an extension in equity of the doctrine of negative easements; such, for instance, as a right to the access of light, which prevents the owner of the servient tenement from building so as to obstruct the light. The covenant in Tulk v. Moxhay was

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lished, in its most general form, without such limitation, by the overwhelming weight of authority, English and American.⁹

affirmative in its terms, but was beld by the court to imply a negative. Where there is a negative covenant expressed or implied,—as, for instance, not to build so as to obstruct a view, or not to use a piece of land otherwise than as a garden,---the court interferes on one or other of the above grounds. This is an equitable doctrine, establishing an exception to the rules of the common law, which did not treat such a covenant as running with the land, and it does not matter whether it proceeds on analogy to a covenant running with the land or on analogy to an easement. The purchaser took the estate subject to the equitable burden, with the qualification that if he acquired the legal estate for value and without notice, he was freed from the burden.. That qualification, however, did not affect the nature of the burden; the notice was required merely to avoid the effect of the legal estate, and did not create the right; and if the purchaser took only an equitable estate, he took subject to the burden, whether he had notice or not." Hannen, J. (p. 586), and Lindley, J. (p. 587), reached the same conclusion. The numerous English cases cited in vol. 2, under § 689, contain no such limitation. While in most instances the covenants undoubtedly were restrictive or negative merely, yet in several cases the doctrine was applied to covenants in express terms requiring affirmative acts; e. g., to keep up a sea-wall: Moreland v. Cook; to erect a pump and reservoir; Cooke v. Chilcott; and in other cases the covenant was in negative terms, but an injunction restraining its violation necessarily required the doing of affirmative acts; e. g., prohibiting building, except in a specified manner: Coles v. Sims; to use gardens in a certain manner: Western v. Macdermot; by a lessee of an inn to buy all his beer from the lessor: Luker v. Dennis. These, and American cases to the same effect, show, as it seems to me, that the rule in its general scope as stated in the text had been fully settled. I doubt whether American courts would feel themselves bound to follow these latest English decisions which put a limitation upon the rule hitherto unknown. It is proper to remark that the first of these two cases, in which the limitation was for the first time laid down, was an action at law for damages, decided by a court composed of judges trained in legal rather than in equitable doctrines. Finally, the limitation, in my opinion, is wholly arbitrary, for, on principle, there seems to be no distinction between the equitable operation and effect of affirmative and of restrictive covenants. See, however, as partially sustaining this limitation, Brewer v. Marshall, 19 N. J. Eq. 537, 97 Am. Dec. 679.

§ 1295, (e) This passage of the Sharp v. Cheatham, 83 Mo. 498, 57 text is quoted with approval in Am. Rep. 433.

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8 1296. Effects of Contracts in General.—As has already been stated, one of the most distinctive features of equity jurisprudence is its peculiar mode of viewing executory contracts, and the rights arising therefrom. Where a contract stipulates merely for personal acts to be done or omitted, the equitable and the legal notions as to its effects are the same; the resulting rights are strictly personal in equity as well as at law. Where an executory contract deals with or relates to property, real or personal, as its subject-matter, its operation in equity may be the same as at law; under proper circumstances courts of equity may treat the resulting rights and obligations as purely personal.¹ But, in addition to this legal aspect, equity always treats such executory contracts as creating specific, present, equitable interests in the lands, chattels, funds, or other property to which they relate. The nature and extent of the equitable interest depends, of course, upon the provisions of the particular contract; it may be an equitable estate, the virtual, beneficial ownership, or it may be a specific lien or charge, or it may be a burden analogous to a servitude. All the distinctively equitable doctrines with regard to the rights and liabilities arising from and remedies for the enforcement of such contracts are the necessary and logical deductions from this fundamental conception: that an executory agreement creates specific equitable interests in the property which is its subject-

§ 1296, ¹ That is, an executory contract relating to money or to other property may, in equity, as at law, be treated as imposing only the personal obligation of ordinary indebtedness, as creating only the personal right to a pecuniary payment, and as enforced only by the recovery of a general pecuniary judgment. This purely legal aspect of contracts is, however, very uncommon. In almost all cases where there is a personal indebtedness and a pecuniary recovery, as in suits for an accounting, and the like, the ultimate remedy is made more efficient by the notion of some equitable interest, lien, or charge, or some trust attaching to specific funds of money or of securities, by which the actual relief consists in reaching and appropriating such specific fund or other form of property.

§ 1296, ² This equitable conception and its results have been already fully described in previous chapters, and the discussion need not be re-

matter.²

§ 1297. Enforcement of Contracts in Equity.—In the enforcement of contracts, equity may be governed by very different considerations from those which are indispensably requisite at law. The law holds parties strictly and literally to the very terms of their agreements, and demands from the plaintiff an exact performance of all the stipulations on his part which are essential to a recovery, or else no legal right of action can accrue to him on the contract. Also, no action at law can be maintained upon a contract which is not valid in compliance with rules of the common law or of statute. Both of these stringent requirements are relaxed in equity, and contracts may be enforced, where, from some default, or some lack of legal formality or condition, no action at law can be maintained. There are two general classes of such cases. The first embraces those contracts in which the plaintiff, by reason either of some extrinsic circumstance or of his own default. has not performed, or even cannot perform, all the conditions on his part necessary to be performed in order that an action at law may be maintained thereon, but which nevertheless a court of equity regards as binding and will enforce.^{1 a} The second class embraces contracts which are

peated. With regard to the conception in general and the equitable estates created, see *ante*, vol. 1, §§ 365-369, 372; on conversion by contracts, *ante*, vol. 3, §§ 1159, 1161, 1163; on liens created by contract, *ante*, vol. 3, §§ 1235-1237. Other illustrations will be given in the subsequent chapter on the specific performance of contracts.

§ 1297, ¹ Equity distinguishes between those terms and stipulations which are of the essence of a contract, and those which are not, and does not permit the defendant to set up a breach of the latter as complete bar to all relief, or a sufficient reason for wholly refusing to execute the agreement. In these cases, no action at law can be maintained; but equity, if the contract is otherwise a proper one, will compel a performance, with such compensations or allowances as may be just to the parties. In Mortlock v. Buller, 10 Ves. 292, 305, 306, Lord Eldon said: "Lord Thurlow used to refer this doctrine of specific performance to this: that it is scarcely possible that there may not be some small mistake or inaccuracy,

§ 1297, (a) The text is quoted in 284, 289; and cited, Croft v. Peck, Johnson v. Roancke, etc., Co., 82 Va. 64 Tex. 627, 631.

not valid in law, which the law does not treat as contracts at all, but which equity regards as binding in conscience, and enforces by its remedy of specific performance. The legal invalidity may result from the non-observance of some statutory requirements concerning the mode of making the agreement, or from certain doctrines of the common law, irrespective of statute, affecting its terms or its subject-matter. By far the most important and numerous species of contracts contained in this class are those which, being void at law under the statute of frauds, have been part performed by the plaintiff, and will therefore be wholly executed *in specie*, at his suit and for his benefit, by courts of equity.² b Among the agreements which the original

as that a leaschold interest, represented to be for twenty-one years, may be for twenty years and nine months; some of these little circumstances that would defeat an action at law, and yet lie so clearly in compensation that they ought not to prevent the execution of the contract." See, also, Stewart v. Alliston, 1 Mer. 26, 32. Even when the partial failure or inability to perform results directly from the plaintiff's own default, the contract will still be enforced, if the relief is demanded by equitable principles; as, for example, when the plaintiff has performed substantially, but not with such exactness, in respect to all the terms, that he could maintain an action at law; or where the plaintiff has failed to perform at or within the stipulated times, in cases in which time is not of the essence of the contract: Davis v. Hone, 2 Schoales & L. 341, 347; Voorhees v. De Meyer, 2 Barb. 37; Coale v. Barney, 1 Gill & J. 324; McCorkle v. Brown, 9 Smedes & M. 167; Shaw v. Livermore, 2 G. Greene, 338.

§ 1297, ² The theory upon which equity proceeds in administering its specific relief in such cases is, that the defendant, having permitted the plaintiff to treat the agreement as binding, and to do positive acts based upon such assumption, it would he a fraud in him to repudiate his undertaking, and to set up the statute as an obstacle in the way of its completion: See Buckmaster v. Harrop, 7 Ves. 341, 346; Mundy v. Jolliffe, 5 Mylne & C. 177; London etc. R'y v. Winter, Craig & P. 57; Earl of Lindsey v. Great Northern R'y, 10 Hare, 664, 700; Kirk v. Bromley Union, 2 Phill. Ch. 640; Gough v. Crane, 3 Md. Ch. 119; 4 Md. 316; Phillips v.

§1297, (b) The text and note are cited in Wirtz v. Guthrie, 81 N. J. Eq. 271, 87 Atl. 134 (reformation). The text is cited in Wood v. Lett, 195 Ala. 601, 71 South. 177 (rule of text does not apply to contracts of married women void for failure to comply with statute relating to the execution of such contracts). common law treated as invalid, irrespective of statutes, but which equity, in the application of its conscientious principles, regards as binding, and enforces by granting its relief of specific performance, are the following: Agreements for the assignment or disposition of a possibility, expectancy, or hope of succession;³ agreements to assign things in action;⁴ executory agreements made between a man and a woman who afterwards marry, which then became absolutely void at common law, but which equity may specifically enforce against either the husband or wife at the suit of the other;^{5 c} contracts made by an owner to convey his land at some future day named, who dies before the time for completion arrives.⁶ In all of these cases, however, modern statutes have changed the legal rules, so that such contracts would be valid at law.

Thompson, 1 Johns. Ch. 131; Lord v. Underdunck, 1 Sand. Ch. 46; Jervis v. Smith, Hoff. Ch. 470. The verbal contract which is part performed must be such that the court would decree its specific enforcement if it were in writing: Kirk v. Bromley Union, *supra*.

§ 1297, ³ Although void at the common law, such contracts are enforced in equity, if free from overreaching and fair in all respects: See *ante*, § 1287; Wiseman v. Roper, 1 Ch. Rep. 158; Beckley v. Newland, 2 P. Wms. 182; Hyde v. White, 5 Sim. 524; Lyde v. Mynn, 1 Mylne & K. 683; Price v. Winston, 4 Munf. 63.

§ 1297, 4 Agreement to assign certain debts: Adderley v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & St. 607; Wright v. Bell, 5 Price, 325; Cutting v. Dana, 25 N. J. Eq. 265; Tuttle v. Moore, 16 Minn. 123; Woodward v. Harris, 3 Sand. 272; Hughes v. Piedmont etc. Ins. Co., 55 Ga. 111; to sell an annuity: Withy v. Cottle, 1 Sim. & St. 174; Kenney v. Wexham, 6 Madd. 355, 357; Clifford v. Turrell, 1 Younge & C. Ch. 138; to sell a patent right: Cogent v. Gibson, 33 Beav. 557; Corbin v. Tracy, 34 Conn. 325; Somerby v. Buntin, 118 Mass. 279, 19 Am. Rep. 459; Binney v. Annan, 107 Mass. 94, 9 Am. Rep. 10; Ely v. McKay, 12 Allen, 323.

§ 1297, 5 Cannel v. Buckle, 2 P. Wms. 243; Acton v. Acton, Prec. Ch. 237; Gould v. Womack, 2 Ala. 83; Crostwaight v. Hutchinson, 2 Bibb. 407, 5 Am. Dec. 619.

§ 1297, 6 At common law this contract is rendered impossible; the administrator cannot convey, because he acquires no interest whatever in

§ 1297, (c) The text is quoted and Hannon v. Hannon, 46 Mont. 253, followed in Johnston v. Spicer, 107 Ann. Cas. 1914B, 616, 127 Pac. 466. N. Y. 185, 13 N. E. 753, and cited in

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SECTION II.

EQUITABLE DEBTS.

ANALYSIS.

§ 1298.	General nature.
§ 1299.	Husband's liability for wife's necessaries.
§ 1300.	Liability for money advanced to pay debts of a person in-
	capable of contracting.
§ 1301.	On death of one joint debtor.
§ 1302.	On death of a joint surety.

§ 1298. General Nature.—A debt, in its most general conception, is a personal liability for a definite sum of money, arising out of contract, express or implied, or obligation in the nature of contract. A debtor is one who is personally liable for the payment of such sum, and from whom payment can be enforced by means of a personal pecuniary judgment. If the debt is recognized by the law, and can be recovered by an action at law, it is a legal debt; if it is only recognized by equity, and not by the law, and only be recovered by a suit in equity, the debt is equitable. Where there is no personal liability, and no personal pecuniary judgment can be recovered either at law or equity, there is no debt nor debtor.¹ There are many instances in which a pecuniary liability exists in equity, which may not perhaps be recognized at law, growing out of trust relations, where funds of money impressed with a trust may be reached as specific, identified funds, and not as a general personal indebtedness; and the jurisdiction at law,

the land, and no legal obligation devolves upon the heir. Equity enforces the contract against the heir: Milnes v. Gery, 14 Ves. 400, 403, in argument of counsel; Newton v. Swazey, 8 N. H. 9; Saunders v. Simpson, 2 Har. & J. 81; Glaze v. Drayton, 1 Desaus. Eq. 109; Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 1 Desaus. Eq. 201.

§ 1298, 1 Ex parte Jones, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 484, 488, 489, 490, holding that a married woman is not a "debtor," although her contracts may be . enforced against her separate property in equity; see extracts from opinions of James, Brett, and Cotton, LL. JJ., *ante*, under § 1122. by means of the action of assumpsit for money had and received, has been so enlarged, that nearly all cases of *personal* indebtedness, which do not directly conflict with some positive rule of the law, *may* be enforced by legal action. I shall therefore merely state a few particular cases in which the indebtedness is wholly equitable, and no liability at all would exist at law, for the purpose of illustrating the general principle.

§ 1299. Husband's Liability for Wife's Necessaries.— Questions as to the husband's liability for necessaries furnished to his wife usually arise at law and belong to the jurisdiction of law courts. It is, however, settled by the highest authority, ancient and modern, that where a husband has deserted his wife, and a third person advances money to her for the purpose of her maintenance, and the money has been actually applied to such purpose, an equitable, although not a legal, debt is thereby created; the person making the advance is entitled in equity, though not at law, to recover the amount from the husband.¹^a

§ 1299, ¹ Harris v. Lee, ¹ P. Wms. 482; Marlow v. Pitfeild, ¹ P. Wms. 558; Jenner v. Morris, ³ De Gex, F. & J. 45, 51, 52, 55, overruling May v. Skey, ¹⁶ Sim. 588; Deare v. Soutten, L. R. ⁹ Eq. 151, 154. In Jenner v. Morris, the decision by Lord Chancellor Campbell and Turner, L. J., was based upon principle, and npon the authority of the older cases in ¹ Peere Williams. One passage in the opinion of Turner, L. J., relating to the general jurisdiction of equity, is so instructive and so broad in its application that I shall quote it (p. 55): "We are thrown back, therefore, upon the old authorities. In considering them, it must be borne in mind that the decrees of the court very often furnish the best evidence which now can be had of the extent of its jurisdiction and of the principles by

§ 1299, (a) To the same effect, see Leuppie v. Osborn's Ex'rs, 52 N. J. Eq. 637, 29 Atl. 433, citing, in addition to the above English cases, Walker v. Simpson, 7 Watts & S. 83, 42 Am. Dec. 216; Kenyon v. Farris, 47 Conn. 510, 36 Am. Rep. 86. But see Skinner v. Tirrell, 159 Mass. 474, 38 Am. St. Rep. 447, 34 N. E. 692 (citing the text), where tho court declined to follow the English authorities. The rule of the text is recognized in De Brauwere v. Dc Brauwere, 203 N. Y. 460, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 508, 96 N. E. 722 (recovery by mother against father for money expended in support of children) but the case was rested on another ground. This rule applies not only where the husband has actually left and deserted his wife, but also where the separation has been mutual, if without her fault, and without any provision by the husband for her support. The principle which underlies this rule has been extended in some states so far as to assert a general jurisdiction of equity to compel the maintenance of a deserted wife out of the husband's property under the name of "alimony."² b

§ 1300. Liability for Money Advanced to Pay Debts of a Person Incapable of Making a Contract.—This particular

which it is guided, and that in disregarding the older decisions of the court there is great danger of breaking in upon its principles. This case seems to me to present a remarkable instance of that danger. In Lord Redesdale's treatise on pleading I find this statement (Mitford's Eq. Pl., 4th Eng. ed., 112; 5th ed., 134): 'Cases frequently occur in which the principles by which the ordinary courts are guided in their administration of justice give a right; but from accident, or fraud, or defect in their mode of proceeding, those courts can afford no remedy, or cannot give the most complete remedy; and sometimes the effect of a remedy attempted to be given by a court of ordinary jurisdiction is defeated by fraud or accident. In such cases courts of equity will interpose to give those remedies, which the ordinary courts would give if their powers were equal to the purpose. or if their mode of administering justice could reach the evil; and also to enforce remedies attempted to be given by those courts when their effect is so defeated.' It is therefore an ancient head of the jurisdiction of this court to interpose in cases in which the principle of the law gives a right, but the forms of the law do not give a remedy"; and he goes on to show that the law, on principle, admits a right of the creditor, but according to the rules of form there is no legal action by which such right can be. enforced. It is well settled that those who furnish necessaries directly to a deserted wife may sue the husband at law for their value, she being his agent to that extent, with uncountermandable authority to bind him: Gilman v. Andrus, 28 Vt. 241, 67 Am. Dec. 713; Walker v. Laighton, 31 N. H. 111; Rumney v. Keyes, 7 N. H. 571; Kimball v. Keyes, 11 Wend. 33; but courts of law do not recognize any privity between the husband and a person who has supplied his wife with money to purchase necessaries. In Deare v. Soutten, Lord Romilly, M. R., held the same doctrine.

§ 1299, ² See ante, § 1120, and cases cited.

§1299, (b) The text is cited in Hinds v. Hinds, 80 Ala. 225; Ex parte Helmert, 147 S. W. 1143.

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rule concerning married women may be generalized. Wherever money is loaned or advanced to a person under disabilities and incapacitated from making a binding contract, as to an infant, a lunatic, and the like, and the money is thus loaned or advanced and actually used for the purpose of paying for necessaries or necessary expenses of the party borrowing, although no legal debt arises, and the lender can maintain no action at law to recover back the amount, yet, since his money was advanced and used for the purpose of paying debts which would be recoverable at law, he can sue in a court of equity, and stand in the place of those creditors whose debts had been so paid, and recover back the amount of his advance. An equitable debt thus arises under the principle of subrogation.¹^a It might perhaps

§ 1300, 1 Marlow v. Pitfeild, 1 P. Wms, 558; b In re National etc. Building Soc., L. R. 5 Ch. 309, 313, per Giffard, L. J. In this latter case the conrt said: "There was no legal debt, and if no legal debt, the next thing to inquire is, whether there was an equitable debt. A class of cases has been referred to on that subject, the principal of which are In re German Mining Co., 4 De Gex, M. & G. 19, and In re Cork etc. R'y, L. R. 4 Ch. 748, the latter of which was before the lord chancellor and myself a short time ago. I have no hesitation in saying that those cases have gone quite far enough, and that I am not disposed to extend them. They were decided upon a principle recognized in old cases, beginning with Marlow v. Pitfeild, where there was a loan to an infant, and the money was spent in paying for necessaries, and in another, of a more modern date, where there was money actually lent to a lunatic, and it went in paying expenses which were necessary for the lunatic. In such cases it has been held that although the party lending the money could maintain no action at law, yet, inasmuch as his money had gone to pay debts which would be recoverable at law, he could come into a court of equity and stand in the place of those

§ 1300, (a) The text is quoted in Wells v. Town of Salina, 71 Hun, 559, 25 N. Y. Supp. 134; cited in Skinner v. Tirrell, 159 Mass. 474, 38 Am. St. Rep. 447, 34 N. E. 692; in Petty v. Tucker, 166 Mo. App. 98, 148 S. W. 142; in Berry v. Stigall, 253 Mo. 690, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 118, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489, 162 S. W. 126 (dissenting opinion); in Roberts v. W. H. Hughes Co., 86 Vt. 76, 83 Atl. 807.

§ 1300, (b) See, also Rhodes v. Rhodes, 44 Ch. Div. 94; In re Beavan (Davies, Banks & Co. v. Beavan), [1912] 1 Ch. 196. Compare Eastern State Hospital v. Goodman, 155 Ky. 628, 160 S. W. 171, distinguishing the rule of the text. § 1301

be said that all cases in which parties are entitled to sue in equity and recover mere pecuniary demands, upon the principle of subrogation or equitable assignment, were examples of equitable debts.

§ 1301. On Death of One Joint Debtor.—The commonlaw rule had been firmly settled from an early day, that on the death of one or more of several joint debtors, the liability of the deceased absolutely ceased; no action at law could be maintained against their personal representatives; the debt remained that of the survivors only, and they alone could be sued. This rule was a necessary conclusion, drawn by processes of verbal logic, from the intensely technical conception of a *joint* liability or right at the common law, as one, single, indivisible right or liability.¹ There is, however, an equitable debt. The equitable rule

creditors whose debts had been so paid. This is the principle of those cases. It is a very clear and definite principle, and a principle which ought not to he departed from." The doctrine has also been extended, with great caution and within narrow limits, to cases where money has been loaned to a corporation, by a transaction which was *ultra vires* and therefore void, for the purpose of paying off existing and valid liabilities of the corporation. Although no legal debt was thereby created against the eorporation, it has been held that an equitable debt arose, so that the loan could be recovered back in equity: In re German Mining Co.; In re Cork etc. R'y, *supra;* Troup's Case, 29 Beav. 353; Hoare's Case, 30 Beav. 225; In re Magdalena etc. Co., Johns. 690; but see In re National etc. Soc., *supra*.^c

§ 1301, 1 To use a homely metaphor, a joint right was not a bundle of separate rights united together by some external bond; it was one single right, although it might belong to several parties as creditors, or might impose a liability upon several as debtors.

§ 1300, (c) See, also, Wells v. Town of Salina, 71 Hun, 559, 25 N. Y. Supp. 134, quoting the text; Roberts v. W. H. Hughes Co., 86 Vt. 76, 83 Atl. 807, citing the text; Blackburn Building Soc. v. Cunliffe, Brooks & Co., 22 Ch. Div. 71; Portsea Building Soc. v. Barclay, [1895] 2 Ch. 298. In In re Wrexham, etc., Ry. Co., [1899] 1 Ch. 440, the theory of subrogation as applied to such cases was rejected; the lender was held entitled to have his loan treated as valid, so far as the money was applied in discharge of legal debts and liabilities of the company, but was not subrogated to any securities or priorities of the creditors who were paid by means of his money. is now settled in England, professedly based upon the notion that all joint liabilities at law are in equity joint and several, that the creditor has his option at all times either to sue the survivors alone at law, or to sue the representatives of the deceased debtor in equity, whether the survivors are solvent or not, and without attempting, much less exhausting, any legal remedy against the survivors; and this doctrine has been adopted in some of the American states.² The prevailing American rule is not so broad. In most of the states, where no statute has made a change, upon the death of one or more joint debtors, obligors, or promisors, a legal action can be maintained against the survivors alone, and in such action the personal representatives of the deceased cannot be made defendants for any

tives of the deceased cannot be made defendants for any purpose. An equitable action can be maintained against the executors or administrators of the deceased when, and only when, either the legal remedy against the survivors has been exhausted, or such remedy would be absolutely useless. In such equitable action, therefore, the plaintiff must aver and prove either the recovery of a judgment and the issue and return of an execution thereon unsatisfied, against the survivors, or else that the survivors are utterly insolvent.³ In several of the states which have

§ 1301, ² Where the personal representatives of the deceased are thus sued in equity, the survivors must also he joined as defendants: Wilkinson v. Henderson, 1 Mylne & K. 582; Braithwaite v. Britain, 1 Keen, 206, 219; Brown v. Weatherby, 12 Sim. 6, 11; Devaynes v. Nohle, 2 Russ. & M. 495; Thorpe v. Jackson, 2 Younge & C. 553, 561; Freeman v. Stewart, 41 Miss. 138. This particular rule has sometimes been referred to the general jurisdiction over mistake, on the ground that the parties were mistaken in making their contract joint! There cannot, of course, be any real element of truth in such an explanation. The early chancellors in laying down the rule so diametrically opposed to a favorite dogma of the common law may have ventured upon some such explanation to account for their jurisdiction; but it is clearly verbal and formal. The true ground of the jurisdiction must he found, I think, in the general principle laid down by Turner, L. J., quoted in the preceding note under § 1299.

§ 1301, 3 In a large portion of the states which have adopted the reformed procedure, it is held that the codes have not changed either of these adopted the reformed procedure, either from a judicial interpretation of its general principles or from express provisions of the codes, this particular jurisdiction of equity has been wholly abrogated; a legal action may be brought at once against the surviving joint debtors and the administrators or executors of the deceased.⁴ a

conclusions, but the same rules prevail under the code: Voorhis v. Childs's Ex'r, 17 N. Y. 354; Richter v. Poppenhausen, 42 N. Y. 373; Pope v. Cole, 55 N. Y. 124, 14 Am. Rep. 198; Scholey v. Halsey, 72 N. Y. 578; Lane v. Doty, 4 Barb. 530, 534; Morehouse v. Ballon, 16 Barb. 289; Bentz v. Thurber, 1 Thomp. & C. 645; Livermore v. Bushnell, 5 Hun, 285; Yates v. Hoffman, 5 Hun, 113; Masten v. Blackwell, 8 Hun, 313; Maples v. Geller, 1 Nev. 233, 237, 239; Fowler v. Houston, 1 Nev. 469, 472; Lanier v. Irvine, 24 Minn. 116; Cairns v. O'Bleness, 40 Wis. 469; Jones v. Estate of Keep, 23 Wis. 45; People v. Jenkins, 17 Cal. 500; Humphreys v. Crane, 5 Cal. 173; May v. Hanson, 6 Cal. 642; but see Bank of Stockton v. Howland, 42 Cal. 129; Barlow v. Scott's Adm'rs, 12 Iowa, 63; Pecker v. Cannon, 11 Iowa, 20; Marsh v. Goodrell, 11 Iowa, 474; Williams v. Scott's Adm'rs, 11 Iowa, 475; County of Wapello v. Bigham, 10 Iowa, 39, 74 Am. Dec. 370; Childs v. Hyde, 10 Iowa, 294, 77 Am. Dec. 113 (these Iowa cases were decided prior to the Code of 1860). The rule and the foregoing decisions in New York seem to be abrogated by the new Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 758.

§ 1301, 4 Braxton v. State, 25 Ind. 82; Eaton v. Burns, 31 Ind. 390; Voris v. State, ex rel. Davis, 47 Ind. 345, 349; Myers v. State ex rel. Mc-Cray, 47 Ind. 293, 297; Hays v. Crutcher, 54 Ind. 260; Hudelson v. Armstrong, 70 Ind. 99; Owen v. State, 25 Ind. 107; Klussman v. Copeland, 18 Ind. 306. In Indiana there is no express provision of the code, and the decision is based upon the general provisions abolishing the distinctions between legal and equitable actions concerning parties, and providing for a severance in the judgment. In Braxton v. State, supra, the action was against three survivors and the administrators of the deceased obligors on a bond. The court said: "It was manifestly the intent of the legislature in the adoption of these provisions to afford as far as possible a simple and direct means of bringing all the parties having an interest in the controversy before the court, and of settling all their rights in a single litigation, and thereby to avoid a multiplicity of suits." The same result was reached in Ohio, in Burgoyne v. Ohio Life Ins. etc. Co., 5 Ohio St. 586, 587, per Ranney, C. J. I venture to express the opinion that these decisions are in complete accordance with the spirit and intent of the reformed

§1301, (a) See further, on the general subject of this paragraph, §409, ante.

§ 1302. Death of a Joint Surety.—The reasons of the equitable doctrine described in the last paragraph do not apply when the deceased joint debtor is a surety. It is therefore well settled, both at law and in equity, that where a principal debtor and a surety are jointly bound by the contract to the creditor, and the surety has received no benefit from the consideration, on the surety's death his liability is completely ended and gone. His estate is liable neither at law nor in equity.¹ This result only follows

procedure. In the following states the same result is reached by express provisions of the codes: Iowa: Code 1860, sec. 2764; Rev. 1873, sec. 2550; Sellon v. Braden, 13 Iowa, 365; Kentncky: Code, sec. 39; Missouri: Code, art. 1, sec. 7; Kansas: Gen. Stats. 1868, c. 21, secs. 1-4; New York: Code Civ. Proc. (new code), sec. 758. The same result follows from the provisions of the Georgia Code, although it does not adopt the reformed procedure: Anderson v. Pollard, 62 Ga. 46.

§ 1302, 1 Simpson v. Field, 2 Ch. Cas. 22; Sumner v. Powell, 2 Mer. 30; Turn. & R. 423; Other v. Iveson, 3 Drew. 177; Richardson v. Horton, 6 Beav. 185; Jones v. Beach, 2 De Gex, M. & G. 886; Wilmer v. Currey, 2 De Gex & S. 347; Getty v. Binsse, 49 N. Y. 385, 10 Am. Rep. 379; Wood v. Fisk, 63 N. Y. 245, 20 Am. Rep. 528; Risley v. Brown, 67 N. Y. 160; Hauck v. Craighead, 67 N. Y. 432; Davis v. Van Buren, 72 N. Y. 587, 588, 589; Randall v. Sackett, 77 N. Y. 480; United States v. Price, 9 How. 83, 92; Harrison v. Field, 2 Wash. (Va.) 136; Pickersgill v. Lahens, 15 Wall. 140; Weaver v. Shryock, 6 Serg. & R. 262, 264; Waters's Rep's v. Riley's Adm'r, 2 Har. & G. 305, 310, 18 Am. Dec. 302. In Getty v. Binsse, supra, one La Farge and one Lahens were joint makers of a note to plaintiff for fifteen thousand dollars, La Farge being surety. He was under no liability to the plaintiff irrespective of or prior to the making the note. He died, and this action in equity was brought against his executor, Binsse, to recover the amount of the note. The court said (p. 388): "It is a wellsettled principle that in case of a joint obligation, if one of the obligors dies, his representatives are at law discharged, and the survivor alone can he sued: Towers v. Moor, 2 Vern. 98; Simpson v. Vaughan, 2 Atk. 31; Bradley v. Burwell, 3 Denio, 61. It seems to be equally well settled that if the joint obligor so dying be a surety, not liable for the debt, irrespective of the joint obligation, his estate is absolutely discharged both at law and in equity, the survivor only being liable. In such a case, where the surety owed no debt outside and irrespective of the joint obligation, the contract is the measure and the limit of his obligation. He signs a joint contract, and incurs a joint liability, and no other. Dying prior to his

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when the undertaking of the principal debtor and the surety is strictly joint. The very reasons on which it rests prevent it from applying where the undertaking is joint and several or several. It should be observed, however, that by suing all the debtors and obtaining a judgment the creditor might elect to treat a joint and several obligation as a strictly joint one.² Furthermore, the death of one of several co-sureties on a joint undertaking does not at all relieve his estate from the liability of contribution among the co-sureties.³

co-maker, the liability all attaches to the survivor." In United States v. Price, *supra*, there was a *joint and several bond*, but judgment had been recovered against *all* the obligors, and afterwards the surety died. Held, that as the creditor had elected to treat the obligors as joint debtors, he could not now proceed in equity against the surety's estate. This rule and the whole doctrine of the common law upon which it is based seem to have been abrogated in New York by the new Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 758; but this legislation does not affect contracts made prior to its enactment: Randall v. Sackett, 77 N. Y. 480. In Indiana the rule given in the text has never been recognized at all: Hudelson v. Armstrong, 70 Ind. 99; Voris v. State, 47 Ind. 345, 349, 350; see, also, Royal Ins. Co. v. Davies, 40 Iowa, 469, 20 Am. Rep. 581.^a

§ 1302, ² United States v. Price, 9 How. 83, 92.

§ 1302, ³ Dussol v. Bruguiere, 50 Cal. 456. This decision is in entire accordance with the doctrine as settled by the English cases. If, therefore, one co-surety, either before or after the death, pays the debt, he is entitled to a contribution from the estate of the deceased co-surety.

§ 1302, (n) It was held in Richardson v. Draper, 87 N. Y. 337, that where the surety received some incidental benefit from his obligation, his estate should be held liable; as where he guaranteed the bonds of a corporation of whose stock he was the chief owner.

\$1302

CHAPTER TENTH. PERSONS NOT SUI JURIS.

SECTION I.

INFANTS.

ANALYSIS.

§ 1303.	Questions stated.
§ 1304.	Origin of the equitable jurisdiction over infants.
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	court."
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§§ 1308–1310.	How the jurisdiction is excreised.
§ 1308.	Supervision of the guardian.
§ 1309.	Management of property.
§ 1310.	Marriage of infant ward.

§ 1303. Questions Stated.^a—I shall not in this chapter enter upon any discussion of the rights, powers, capacities, and liabilities of infants; nor shall I treat of the different kinds of guardians, their modes of appointment, their powers, duties, and liabilities.¹ I purpose merely to describe in a very brief manner the inherent original jurisdiction of equity, as a part of its general jurisprudence, and independent of the statutory legislation concerning the same subject-matters, over the persons and estates of infants, the general nature and extent of that jurisdiction,

§ 1303, ¹ The general jurisdiction of equity over all guardians as fiduciary persons, for the purpose of compelling them to account, has already been stated: Ante, § 1097.

§ 1303, (a) Sections 1303 et seq. 250 III. 354 are cited in Ex parte Reeves, 100 35 L. R. A. Tex. 617, 103 S. W. 478. Section 345, dissenti 1303 is cited in Thomas v. Thomas,

250 Ill. 354, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 344, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1158, 95 N. E. 345, dissenting opinion. how it is acquired, and how and for what purposes it is exercised.² In England this particular jurisdiction is one of the most important branches of the equity jurisprudence, and hardly any other is more frequently exercised by the courts of chancery. In this country, by reason of statutory legislation, it is relatively of much less importance.³

§ 1304. Origin of This Equitable Jurisdiction.—It is also wholly unnecessary to enter upon any discussion of the mooted questions as to the origin of the jurisdiction. It may, in its very inception, have belonged to the king as a part of his executive power as *parens patriæ* to protect his subjects, and may by him have been transferred to the court of chancery. It is, however, firmly established as a judicial function of the court; it does not belong to the chancellor alone as the personal delegate and representative of the crown; it is exercised by all the judges composing the court of chancery, in the same manner, and governed by the same regulations, as all other confessedly

§ 1303, ² Throughout the United States the modes of appointing guardians, and their rights, powers, and duties, are generally regulated, and in many states very minutely regulated, by statutes. A special, and often_ complete, statutory jurisdiction over them is given to the probate courts, under whatever name, as a part of the general statutory system for the administration and settlement of decedents' estates. In this manner, the original jurisdiction of equity, like that over administrations, has been to a great extent superseded, and in some states probably abrogated, by the special statutory system. On the other hand, as to all matters not included within the statutes, and in many states concurrently with this statutory system, the original equity jurisdiction over infants, like that over administrations, still remains in full force, to be exercised whenever occasion calls for its being set in motion. The very recent American decisions illustrating this original jurisdiction are undoubtedly few; but they are sufficient to show that it has not been generally abrogated nor become entirely obsolete.

§ 1303, ³ For a full and detailed discussion of the jurisdiction in all its phases, see the English and American notes to Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1416, 1446, 1487.

judicial functions.¹ The same inherent jurisdiction is possessed, although not exercised so freely and minutely, by the American courts, unless curtailed or taken away by statute,—a fact very difficult of explanation, on the assumption that the jurisdiction is a part of the executive functions of the crown.² a

§ 1304, ¹ Although the theory that the jurisdiction had its origin in the king's power as *parens patriæ* has been accepted by many of the English judges, and has been constantly repeated by text-writers, English and American, there seem to be almost insuperable difficulties involved in it, and it has been rejected by some of the ablest English jurists. In this country, according to our system of government, the power of *parens patriæ* belongs exclusively to the legislature of each state, and is not possessed by the courts. With regard to the nature and origin of the jurisdiction, see Eyre v. Countess of Shaftshury, 2 P. Wms. 103; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq., 4th Am. ed., 1416, 1446, 1487; Cary v. Bertie, 2 Vern. 333, 342; Morgan v. Dillon, 9 Mod. 135, 139; Butler v. Freeman, Amb. 301; De Manneville v. De Manneville, 10 Ves. 52, 63; Ex parte Phillips, 19 Ves. 118, 122; Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort, 2 Russ. 1, 20, 21; Wellesley v. Wellesley, 2 Bligh, N. S., 124, 129, 136, 142.

§ 1304, ² Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495, 12 L. Ed. 1170; In the Matter of Hubbard, 82 N. Y. 90, 92; Wilcox v. Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 575; Aymar v. Roff, 3 Johns. Ch. 49; Matter of Andrews, 1 Johns. Ch. 99; Ex parte Crumb, 2 Johns. Ch. 439; Matter of Wollstonecraft, 4 Johns. Ch. 80; Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige, 596, 605, 28 Am. Dec. 451; People v. Wilcox, 22 Barb. 178; Matter of Clifton, 47 How. Pr. 172; State v. Stigall, 22 N. J. L. 286, 289; State v. Baird, 18 N. J. Eq. 194; 21 N. J. Eq. 384, 387; In re Harrall, 31 N. J. Eq. 101; Downin v. Sprecher, 35 Md. 474; Armstrong v. Stone, 9 Gratt. 102, 106; Hutson v. Townsend, 6 Rich. Eq. 249; Striplin v. Ware, 36 Ala. 87; Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410, 38 Am. Rep. 13; Johns v. Smith, 56 Miss. 727; Cowls v. Cowls, 3 Gilm. 435, 44 Am. Dec. 708; Miner v. Miner, 11 Ill: 43; Lynch v. Rotan, 39 Ill. 14; McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15; Garner v. Gordon, 41 Ind. 92; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181; Gardenhire v. Hinds, 1 Head, 402.

§ 1304, (a) This paragraph is cited in United States to the Use of Hine v. Morse, 218 U. S. 493, 21 Ann. Cas. 782, 54 L. Ed. 1123, 31 Sup. Ct. 37; Hayes v. Hayes, 192 Ala. 280, 68 South. 351; Coleman v. Coleman, (Ala.) 73 South. 473. See, also, Sutton v. Schonwald, 86 N. C. 198, 41 Am. Rep. 455; Lake v. McDavitt, 13 Lea, 26; Watson v. Henderson, 98 Ark. 63, 135 S. W. 461; Witter v. Cook County Com'rs, 256 Ill. 616, 100 N. E. 148; In re Williams, 77 N. J. Eq. 478, 77 Atl. 350, 79 Atl. 686. § 1305. How Acquired.—In order that the jurisdiction may be acquired in any particular case, the infant must be made a "ward of the court." He thus becomes a ward of the court whenever he is brought before the court for any purpose, as a party plaintiff or defendant to a suit, petition, order, application, or any other proceeding.^{1 a} It has sometimes been said that the infant must have property, in order that he may be a ward of the court and the jurisdiction may attach to him. This is inaccurate. Property is not essential to the *existence* of the jurisdiction; it is, at most, a requisite to the *exercise* of the jurisdiction, since without it the powers of the court could not be fully enforced.^{2 b} Although the existence of property belonging to the infant must therefore be generally alleged,

§ 1305, ¹ Butler v. Freeman, Amb. 301; Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495, 531, 12 L. Ed. 1170. A suit is not necessary; any proceeding or application relating directly to the infant is sufficient: In re Graham, L. R. 10 Eq. 530; In re Hodge's Settlement, 3 Kay & J. 213. The infant must be a ward of the court: In re Potter, L. R. 7 Eq. 484.

§ 1305, ² This view is laid down by Lord Eldon with more than his usual directness, in Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort, 2 Russ. 1, 21: "It is not, however, from any want of jurisdiction that it [the court] does not act where it has no property of an infant, but from want of the means to *exercise* its jurisdiction, because the court cannot take on itself the maintenance of all the children in the kingdom. It can exercise this jurisdiction usefully and practically only where it has the means of doing so,—that is to say, by its having the means of applying property for the use and maintenance of the infants."

§ 1305, (a) The text is cited to this effect in McGowan v. Infborrow, 82 Ga. 523, 14 Am. St. Rep. 178, 9 S. E. 427; Coleman v. Coleman, (Ala.) 73 South. 473; Hayes v. Hayes, 192 Ala. 280, 68 South. 351; and in Thomas v. Thomas, 250 Ill. 354, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 344, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1158, 95 N. E. 345, dissenting opinion. See, also, Murphree v. Hanson, 197 Ala. 246, 72 South. 437; Lloyd v. Kirkwood, 112 Ill. 329 (the court should see that the proper pleadings are made to present any defense the infant may have).

§ 1305, (b) In re McGrath, [1892] 2 Ch. 496, [1893] 1 Ch. 143, citing, also, In re Spence, 2 Ph. 247, 252; Brown v. Collins, 25 Ch. Div. 56, 60; In re Scanlan, 40 Ch. Div. 200; In re Nevin, [1891] 2 Ch. 299. But the jurisdiction in such cases is limited to the removal of one guardian and the appointment of another: In re McGrath, [1893] 1 Ch. 143, 147.

it is a clear deduction from the cases that the allegation is mainly formal; the amount of property is certainly immaterial; and it seems that the allegation cannot be questioned, nor the fact of property as alleged denied, for the purpose of defeating the jurisdiction.³

§ 1306. Its Extent-Appointment of Guardians.-The jurisdiction having thus attached, we may next inquire as to its extent, or what acts may be done in virtue of it. In the first place, it is a firmly settled doctrine that the court of equity can and will appoint a guardian of the person and estate of the infant, when there is no other guardian, or none who will or can act.¹ This is ordinarily the first step which is taken, and the further control of the infant's person or property is usually exerted upon and through this guardian. The power can of necessity only be exercised in respect of persons or property within the territorial jurisdiction of the court,-that is, within the state or country,-but the jurisdiction does not depend upon the legal domicile of the infant. It is sufficient to authorize the appointment of a guardian if the infant is an actual resident within the territorial jurisdiction of the court,that is, within the state, although his property is wholly within another state or country, and even though his

§ 1305, 3 That the allegation is formal results from the fact that the jurisdiction will be exercised although the property is in another country, wholly beyond the reach of the courts. Some of the American cases seem to have gone to the length of sustaining and exercising the jurisdiction where it affirmatively appeared that the infant had no property: Johnstone v. Beattie, 10 Clark & F. 42; Cowls v. Cowls, 3 Gilm. 435, 44 Am. Dec. 708; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181.

§ 1306, 1 This power to appoint guardians exists in the American states, so far as it has not been taken away or restricted by statute:^a Wellesley v. Duke of Beanfort, 2 Russ. 1; Wellesley v. Wellesley, 2 Bligh, N. S., 124; In re Kaye, L. R. 1 Ch. 387; Wilcox v. Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 575; In the Matter of Hubbard, 82 N. Y. 90, 92; Wood v. Wood, 5 Paige, 596, 28 Am. Dec. 451; In the Matter of Wollstonecraft, 4 Johns. Ch. 80; Miner v. Miner, 11 Ill. 43; Magnire v. Magnire, 7 Dana, 181.

§1306, (a) See, also, Lake v. McLavitt, 13 Lea, 26.

legal domicile is elsewhere.² On the other hand, where the infant is both domiciled and actually resident out of the state, but has property within the state, the courts of that state have power to appoint a guardian over the property, and for the maintenance of the infant.³ b If, however, the infant is neither domiciled nor actually resident in the state, and has no property within its territory, the courts of that state have no power to appoint a guardian; there is manifestly no foundation for the exercise of the jurisdiction.⁴ Finally, where an infant domiciled and resident out of the state has been clandestinely and surreptitiously brought within the state for the purpose of giving jurisdiction, the court refuses to exercise its jurisdiction and to appoint a guardian for such infant.⁵

§ 1307. The Same. Custody of Infants.—In addition to its power to appoint guardians, the court of equity will also exercise its jurisdiction, in a proper case, and to promote the highest welfare of the infant, where there is already a guardian, natural or legal, by controlling the *per*son of the infant, and by removing it personally from the

§ 1306, ² Johnstone v. Beattie, 10 Clark & F. 42; an infant was domiciled in Scotland, and all her property was situated there, she having none in England; but she was at the time a resident of England, and it was held that the court of chancery had jurisdiction to appoint her guardian. And see Nugent v. Vetzera, L. R. 2 Eq. 704.

§ 1306, 3 Logan v. Fairlee, Jacob, 193; Stephens v. James, 1 Mylne & K. 627; Salles v. Sayignon, 6 Ves. 572; Hope v. Hope, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 328 (over infants resident abroad).

§ 1306, 4 In the Matter of Hubbard, 82 N. Y. 90, 93.

§ 1306, 5 In the Matter of Hubbard, 82 N. Y. 90, 95; and see Smith v. Meyers, 1 Thomp. & C. 665; Carpenter v. Spooner, 2 Sand. 717; In the Matter of Lagrave, 45 How. Pr. 301, 305; *a fortiori* this is so, where the infant is brought into the state by force. As to the court allowing or compelling the removal of an infant out of its jurisdiction, see Dawson v. Jay, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 764.^e

§ 1306, (b) The text is cited to this effect in In re Sall, 59 Wash. 539, 140 Am. St. Rep. 885, 110 Pac. 32, 626. § 1306, (c) See, also, Elliott v. Lambert, 28 Ch. Div. 186 (case of necessity need not be shown, if it is for the benefit of the infant).

custody of its natural or legal guardian, even from the custody of its own parents.^a. By the common law, as well as by the law of nature, the father is the natural guardian of his infant children. It is not only the father's right, but his imperative duty, to have custody of the persons of his infant children, and to educate and train them so as to promote their future well-being as members of society. The equitable jurisdiction over the persons of infants is based upon this parental duty, and is an indirect means of enforcing it by furnishing a remedy for its violation. The jurisdiction is a delicate one; it rests in the highest degree upon the enlightened discretion of the court, and will only be exercised when plainly demanded as the means of securing the infant's present and future well-being. Iť is well settled, therefore, that a court of equity may interfere on behalf of infants, and remove them from the custody and control of their father or mother, whenever the habits, practices, instruction, or example of the parent, exerting a personal influence on the infants, tend to corrupt their morals and undermine their principles; or when the parent is neglecting their education suitable for their condition in life; or is endangering their property; or is guilty of ill-treatment or cruelty towards them.¹ The court

§ 1307, ¹ I shall not enter upon any discussion of the particular circumstances which do or do not warrant the court in thus interfering; much less examine the respective rights of the father and the mother to the custody of their children. In this country the tendency of the decisions, and especially of the modern statutes, is to place the mother's rights upon an equality with those of the father. My only purpose is to cite authorities establishing the jurisdiction; but these very cases will disclose the circumstances which call for its exercise. There is one fundamental rule, viz., that the exercise of the jurisdiction depends upon the sound and enlightened discretion of the court, and has for its sole object the highest well-being of the infant; it should never, therefore, be influenced by any sentimental considerations in behalf of either the mother or the father:^b

§ 1307, (a) The text is quoted in Ex parte Reeves, 100 Tex. 617, 103 S. W. 478.

§ 1307, (b) See, also, Agar-Ellis v.

Lascelles, 24 Ch. Div. 317 (the court will not interfere with the father in the exercise of his paternal authority, except (1) where by his § 1307

will, of course, under like circumstances, remove infants from the custody of a legal or appointed guardian. When infants are thus removed from the control of their parent or their legal guardian, the court does not generally ap-

Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort, 2 Russ. 1; sub nom. Wellesley v. Wellesley, 2 Bligh, N. S., 124 (the facts of this case are simply astounding); Shelley v. Westbrooke, Jacob, 266, note; De Manneville v. De Manneville, 10 Ves. 52, 62; Whitfield v. Hales, 12 Ves. 492; Creuze v. Hunter, 2 Cox, 242; Kiffin v. Kiffin, cited 1 P. Wms. 705; Warde v. Warde, 2 Phill. Ch. 786; Anonymous, 2 Sim., N. S., 54; Thomas v. Roherts, 3 De Gex & S. 758; In re Besant, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 508 (children removed from mother's custody); Hope v. Hope, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 328; Swift v. Swift, 4 De Gex, J. & S. 710; Matter of Waldron, 13 Johns. 418; People v. Mercein, 8 Paige, 47; 25 Wend. 64.

Mere insolvency of the father is not sufficient ground for interference; there must be further circumstances hazarding the infant's property: In re Fynn, 2 De Gex & S. 457; see Kiffin v. Kiffin, cited 1 P. Wms. 705.

Also, the mere fact that the *father's* conduct is even grossly immoral, even though he is living in adultery, but where his children are not brought into contact with it, and are not subjected to the injurious influence of its example, is not a sufficient ground for removing them from his custody. This jurisdiction is not designed merely as a punishment for the immoral practices of the father, but *solely* as a protection for the well-being of infants: Ball v. Ball, 2 Sim. 35; and see State v. Baird, 21 N. J. Eq. 384; Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn. 520; 2 Serg. & R. 174.

Whatever may be true of fathers, this particular rule certainly should not be applied to a mother guilty of such immorality; for the supposition that her infant children could not be contaminated would simply he impos-

gross moral turpitude he forfeits his rights, or (2) where he has by his conduct abdicated his paternal authority, or (3) where he seeks to remove his children, being wards of court, out of the jurisdiction without the consent of the court); In re Elderton, 25 Ch. Div. 220 (custody of children given to the mother); Smart v. Smart, [1892] App. Cas. (Priv. Coun.) 425; F. v. F., [1902] 1 Ch. 688 (from consideration of child's welfare, court removed child's appointed guardian because of latter's change of religion merely); Richards v. Collins, 45 N. J. Eq. 283, 14 Am. St. Rep. 726, 17 Atl. 831; Heincmann's Appeal, 96 Pa. St. 112, 42 Am. Rep. 532. Some American courts have gone to an extraordinary length in disregarding the wishes of parents who were admittedly competent and suitable persons, out of supposed considerations of the children's welfare: See, for illustration, Washaw v. Gimble, 50 Ark. 355, 7 S. W. 389; Sturtevant v. State, 15 Neb. 459, 48 Am. Rep. 349, 19 N. W. 617. See, also, Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W. Va. 124, 81 S. E. 706.

point another regular guardian; it places them in the custody of a suitable person as an acting guardian.²

§ 1308. How Exercised—Supervision of the Guardian.— An infant having been made a ward of the court, and a guardian being appointed, the further jurisdiction concerning the ward is ordinarily exercised by supervising, directing, and controlling the acts of the guardian in the management of his trust.^a The supervision and control may be summed up as directel chiefly to three distinctmatters: 1. The intellectual, moral, and religious training of the ward; 2. The protection and management of his property, including his maintenance; 3. His marriage. Education of the ward: While the court will undoubtedly require the infant to be suitably educated according to his prospects and condition, the manner and course of the education and all its details are left to the judgment and discretion of the guardian, and the ward will be compelled to comply with his guardian's decision.¹ The English courts exercise some supervision over the religious training of the ward, acting upon the general rule that the ward should be brought up in the religious beliefs, opinions, and practices of his father. This general rule is subject to modification, however, under the particular circumstances of individual cases.² b

sible and absurd. I doubt whether any American court, at the present day, would remove infants from the custody of their father because his opinions and teachings were irreligious, skeptical, or even atheistical, unless they were also positively immoral.

§ 1307, ² Ex parte Mountfort, 15 Ves. 445.

§ 1308, ¹ Hall v. Hall, ³ Atk. 721; Tremain's Case, ¹ Strange, 168; Hope v. Hope, ⁴ De Gex, M. & G. 328.

§ 1308, ² Under what circumstances the religious beliefs of the father may be departed from appears from some of the cases here cited. It is well settled, however, that a guardian is not necessarily bound to bring up

§1308, (a) The text is quoted in Cabin Valley Mining Co. v. Hall, (Okl.) 155 Pac. 570.

§1308, (b) This subject has received much attention from the English courts in recent years. In the following cases the religion of the father was followed: In re Montague, 28 Ch. Div. 82; Jn re Scanlan, 40 Ch. Div. 200; In re Nevin, [1891] § 1309. The Same. Management of Property.—The court will exercise a constant supervision over the guardian in the management of the ward's property. The guardian not only may, but must, use a sound discretion in applying a reasonable amount of the income, or even, if necessary, of the principal, of the personal estate for the maintenance and education of the infant in a manner suitable to his prospects and condition.^{1 a} Independently of statute, the

his ward in the tenets of the established church of England: See Talbot v. Earl of Shrewsbury, 4 Mylne & C. 672; Austin v. Austin, 34 Beav. 257; 4 De Gex, J. & S. 716; Stourton v. Stourton, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 760; In re Newbery, L. R. 1 Ch. 263; 1 Eq. 431; Hawksworth v. Hawksworth, L. R. 6 Ch. 539, 543, 544; Andrews v. Salt, L. R. 8 Ch. 622; In re Agar-Ellis, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 49; In re Besant, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 508.

§ 1309, ¹ The amount allowed for maintenance will depend upon the circumstances of each case: See Pierpoint v. Lord Cheney, 1 P. Wms. 488; Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 1 Jacob & W. 647; Heysham v. Heysham, 1 Cox, 179; Brown v. Smith, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 377; In the Matter of Bostwick, 4 Johns. Ch. 100.

A father is, in general, bound to maintain his infant children. Where the infants have property of their own, an allowance out of it for their maintenance will not, therefore, be ordinarily allowed, even though there is a provision for their maintenance in the will or deed conferring the property; the father, if able, must maintain them out of his own estate: Stocken v. Stocken, 4 Mylne & C. 95, 98; Meacher v. Young, 2 Mylne & K. 490; Ransome v. Burgess, L. R. 3 Eq. 773.^b

2 Ch. 299 (notwithstanding his agreement with the deceased mother that the children should be brought up in her religion); F. v. F., [1902] 1 Ch. 688 (Protestant child's guardian, who had become Catholic, removed). In the following cases the father was held to have abandoned his right to have the children brought up in his own faith: In re Clarke, 21 Ch. Div. 817; In re McGrath, [1892] 2 Ch. 496, [1893] 1 Ch. 143; In re Newton, [1896] 1 Ch. 740. See, also, in general, In re W. (W. v. M.), [1907] 2 Ch. 557.

§1309, (a) See, also, Jenkins v.

Whyte, 62 Md. 427; Pitts v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 21 R. I. 544, 79 Am. St. Rep. 821, 48 L. R. A. 783, 45 Atl. 553 (allowance made, though will directed an accumulation of income); Smith v. Robinson, 83 N. J. Eq. 384, 90 Atl. 1063 (use of principal); as to allowance for past maintenance, Hyland v. Baxter, 98 N. Y. 610; Spidle v. Blakeney, 151 Ala. 194, 44 South. 62.

§ 1309, (b) See, also, National Valley Bank v. Hancock, 100 Va. 101, 107, 93 Am. St. Rep. 933, 938, 57 L. R. A. 729, 40 S. E. 611, and cases cited.

control of the guardian extends only to the personal estate, and the rents and profits of the real estate, and not to the *corpus* of the land. He is not, in general, permitted to change the nature of the property, as by turning personal into real estate; although this may be allowed by the court, when, under the circumstances, it appears to be for the benefit of the infant ward.^{2e} It seems to be a doctrine

There is an exception to this general rule; where the father's means are so small that he is unable to defray the cost of an education suitable to their prospects, an allowance for their maintenance will be made to him . out of *their* estate: Buckworth v. Buckworth, 1 Cox, 80; Wright v. Vanderplank, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 133; Havelock v. Havelock, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 807.^c Also, where the property is not given to the infants simply with a direction for their maintenance, but is conveyed upon an express *trust* for their maintenance, then it must be so applied, irrespective of their father's ability to support and educate them:^a Thompson v. Griffin, Craig & P. 317, 320; In re Dalton, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 265; Ransome v. Burgess, L. R. 3 Eq. 773; In re Hodges, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 754; In re Roper's Trusts, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 272.

§ 1309, ² See Ex parte Grimstone, 4 Brown Ch. 235, note; Amb. 708; Vernon v. Vernon, cited 1 Ves. 456; Ex parte Phillips, 19 Ves. 118, 122; Frith v. Cameron, L. R. 12 Eq. 169; De Witte v. Palin, L. R. 14 Eq. 251; Marquis of Camden v. Murray, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 161. The reason why such change of property is not permitted is, that the rights of the ward's successors—heirs or next of kin—would thereby be entirely altered if the infant should die under age. In order to preserve these rights, when a

§ 1309, (c) See, also, Stephens v. Howard, 32 N. J. Eq. 244, and cases cited. That the mother may have an allowance out of the estate of the child for its past maintenance, see Pierce v. Pierce, 64 Wis. 73, 54 Am. Rep. 581, 24 N. W. 498, and cases cited; In re Besondy, 32 Minn. 385, 50 Am. Rep. 579, 20 N. W. 366.

§ 1309, (d) Quoted, National Valley Bank v. Hancock, 100 Va. 101, 107, 108, 93 Am. St. Rep. 933, 938, 57 L. R. A. 728, 40 S. E. 611.

§ 1309, (e) The text is cited, to the effect the guardian may be allowed, by a court of competent jurisdiction, to invest in land, in Chap-

man v. American Surety Co., 261 Ill. 594, 104 N. E. 247. See, also. McCreary v. Billing, 176 Ala. 314, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 561, 58 South. 311 (guardian may be permitted to change character of property, when manifestly for advantage of infant); Day v. Devitt, 79 N. J. Eq. 342, 81 Atl. 368; Logan Planing Mill Co. v. Aldridge, 63 W. Va. 660, 129 Am. St. Rep. 1035, 15 Ann. Cas. 1087, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1159, 60 S. E. 783 (under general powers, guardian cannot build a house with ward's money, or create a mechanic's lien for the purpose).

sustained by a preponderance of authority, that a court of equity has no power, as a part of its jurisdiction over infants, to order a sale of the infant's real estate for purpose of maintenance, education, or investment.^{3 f} The

conversion was allowed, the court required a declaration that the resulting property should continue to be of its original nature; e. g., if money was invested in land, that it should continue to be personal property: See Ware v. Polhill, 11 Ves. 257, 278; Ex parte Phillips, 19 Ves. 118, 122; Lord Ashburton v. Lady Ashburton, 6 Ves. 6; Steed v. Preece, L. R. 18 Eq. 192; Kelland v. Fulford, L. R. 6 Ch. Div. 491.

§ 1309, ³ Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495, 531; Rogers v. Dill, 6 Hill, 415; Faulkner v. Davis, 18 Gratt. 651, 98 Am. Dec. 698; Kearney v. Vaughan, 50 Mo. 284; *per contra*, Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410, 38 Am. Rep. 13 (a court of chancery has inherent power to order a sale of infants' real estate); and see Sharp v. Findley, 59 Ga. 722; Bulow v. Witte, 3 S. C. 308; Huger v. Huger, 3 Desaus. Eq. 18.

§1309, (f) As to jurisdiction to order a sale of infant's land.-The text is quoted in Northwestern Guaranty Loan Co. v. Smith, 15 Mont. 101, 48 Am. St. Rep. 662, 38 Pac. 224, and in Wilson v. Hubbard (Wilson), 39 Wash. 671, 82 Pac. 154; cited with approval in Messner v. Giddings, 65 Tex. 301 (reviewing the cases); and in United States to the Use of Hine v. Morse, 218 U. S. 493, 21 Ann. Cas. 782, 54 L. Ed. 1123, 31 Sup. Ct. 37; Cabin Valley Mining Co. v. Hall, (Okl.) 155 Pac. 570. See, also, Bayne v. Stratton, 131 Ky. 494, 115 S. W. 728; Ford v. May, 157 Ky. 830, 164 S. W. 88; Melcher v. Yager's Guardian, 159 Ky. 597, 167 S. W. 871; Heady v. Crouse, 203 Mo. 100, 120 Am. St. Rep. 643, 100 S. W. 1052 (sale for reinvestment); Coleman v. Virginia Stave & Heading Co. 112 Va. 61, 70 S. E. 545. Contra, see Thorington v. Thorington, 82 Ala. 489, 1 South. 716; McCreary v. Billing, 176 Ala. 314, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 561, 58 South. 311; Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 20 L. R. A. 247, 33 N. E. 858, and cases cited (an important case); King v. King, 215 Ill. 100, 74 N. E. 89 (estate in danger of being lost by sale for assessments which owners cannot pay); Roberts v. Roberts, 259 Ill. 115, 102 N. E. 239; Sutton v. Schonwald, 86 N. C. 198, 41 Am. Rep. 455; Ricardo v. Gaboury, 115 Tenn. 484, 89 S. W. 98 (also court may direct a longterm lease). That the court may direct the infant's estate to be mortgaged to secure money for necessary repairs, see In re Jackson, 21 Ch. Div. 786. In Northwestern Guaranty Loan Co. v. Smith, 15 Mont. 101, 48 Am. St. Rep. 662, 38 Pac. 224, the court, while conceding the correctness of the author's statement above, held that authority to direct a mortgage of the estate for the purpose of avoiding foreclosure of an existing mortgage could be found in a statute authorizing the guardian to "safely keep the property of the ward, to maintain the same, and to deliver it to his ward at the close of his guardianship in as good condition as he received it." A mortgage for such a purpose does powers and duties of guardians in their management of the property of infant wards, and the powers of courts to direct a sale of their lands, are so much regulated by statutes in the various states, that these general rules of the purely equitable jurisdiction can have little practical application throughout the United States.^g

§ 1310. Marriage.—The English courts of equity exercise a very strict and stern control over the marriage of their infant wards. This special phase of the jurisdiction is based upon the notion that a suitable settlement should always accompany a marriage; and especially that the property of the wife, when she is the ward, should be settled to her sole and separate use. The marriage of an infant ward, even where the parents are living, must receive the approval and sanction of the court. An apprehended marriage, of which the court does not approve, will be restrained by injunction. A marriage of an infant ward without obtaining the consent of the court is a gross contempt, and will be punished as such, although the marriage itself cannot be avoided. If an infant female ward is thus married, the husband and all who aided in procuring it may be punished by fine and imprisonment; and the husband will be compelled to execute a settlement on his wife, to be approved by the court, even though the wife should expressly waive her right to such settlement.¹ This

§ 1310, ¹ Although this subject is of great practical importance in England, and the decisions are numerous, I have not deemed it necessary to enter upon any detailed discussion or classification of the cases; for there is no evidence that any such jurisdiction is exercised at the present day by the American courts: See Smith v. Smith, 3 Atk. 304; Ex parte Mitchell, 2 Atk. 173; More v. More, 2 Atk. 157; Herbert's Case, 3 P. Wms. 115; Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms. 103; 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. 1416; Lord Raymond's Case, Cas. t. Talb. 58; Tombes v. Elers, 1 Dick.

not seem to contravene the spirit of the rule as defined by the English case just cited. But see, criticising the last-named decision, Wilson v. Hubbard (Wilson), 39 Wash. 671, 82 Pac. 154. § 1309, (g) The text is quoted in Northwestern Guaranty Loan Co. v. Smith, 15 Mont. 101, 48 Am. St. Rep. 662, 38 Pac. 224. 1

control over the marriage of wards, if it ever existed in theory, has become practically obsolete in the American states; it is not in harmony with our social habits, customs, and modes of thought.

SECTION II.

PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND.

ANALYSIS.

§ 1311.	Origin of this jurisdiction.
§ 1312.	Mode of exercising the jurisdiction in England.
§ 1313.	Jurisdiction in the United States.
§ 1314.	Jurisdiction in cases of weak or unsound mind.

§ 1311. Origin of This Jurisdiction.—Whatever be the correct theory with respect to the jurisdiction over infants, it is absolutely certain that the corresponding jurisdiction over the person and property of lunatics and idiots, and all others who may be adjudicated *non compotes mentis*, was derived by delegation from the crown; it was a portion of the king's executive power as *parens patriæ*, and did not belong to the court of chancery by virtue of its inherent and general judicial functions. This branch of the regal authority was delegated to the chancellor as the personal representative of the crown, by means of an official instrument called the Sign Manual, signed by the king's own signature, and sealed with his own privy seal, and was exercised by the chancellor alone, and not by the court of chan-

88; Pearce v. Crutchfield, 14 Ves. 206; Leeds v. Barnardiston, 4 Sim. 538; Ball v. Coutts, 1 Ves. & B. 292, 303; Wortham v. Pemberton, 1 De Gex & S. 644; Field v. Moore, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 691; Martin v. Foster, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 98; Att'y-Gen. v. Read, L. R. 12 Eq. 38; White v. Herrick, L. R. 4 Ch. 345; Shipway v. Ball, L. R. 16 Ch. Div. 376.^a

§1310, (a) Buckmaster v. Buckmaster, 33 Ch. Div. 482; Bolton v. [1909] 2 Ch. 260 (diverting facts). Bolton, [1891] 3 Ch. 270. See, also,

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cery.^{1 a} After this special jurisdiction had thus been exercised in any particular case, by adjudicating an individual to be a lunatic, and by appointing a committee of his person and property, a further jurisdiction then arose in the *court of chancery* to supervise and control the official conduct of the committee;^b but this supplementary jurisdiction of the *court* seems to have been a part of its general authority over trusts, trustees, and fiduciary persons.² The jurisdiction in matters of lunacy and all the proceedings thereon in England are now regulated by statute.³

§ 1311, ¹ Ex parte Grimstone, Amb. 706; 4 Brown Ch. 235, note; Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms. 103, 118, 119; Dormer's Case, 2 P. Wms. 265; Cary v. Bertie, 2 Vern. 333, 342, 343; Wigg v. Tiler, 2 Dick. 552; Ex parte Degge, 4 Brown Ch. 235, note; Oxenden v. Lord Compton, 2 Ves. 69, 71; Ex parte Chumley, 1 Ves. 296; Ex parte Baker, 6 Ves. 8; Ex parte Phillips, 19 Ves. 118, 122; Ex parte Pickard, 3 Ves. & B. 127; Lysaght v. Royse, 2 Schoales & L. 151, 153; In re Fitzgerald, 2 Schoales & L. 432; In the Matter of Webb, 2 Phill. Ch. 10; Gillbee v. Gillbee, 1 Phill. Ch. 121; In the Matter of Barker, 2 Johns. Ch: 232, 234.

§ 1311, ² Ibid.; In re Fitzgerald, 2 Schoales & L. 432, 438; Nelson v. Duncombe, 9 Beav. 211; In re Blewitt, 6 De Gex, M. & G. 187. As to maintenance, see In re Sanderson's Trust, 3 Kay & J. 497; In re Baker's Trusts, L. R. 13 Eq. 168; In re Gibson, L. R. 7 Ch. 52; In re Wynne, L. R. 7 Ch. 229; In re Evans, L. R. 21 Ch. Div. 297; Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Mer. 99, 102; In re Blair, 1 Mylne & C. 300, 302; In re Frost, L. R. 5 Ch. 699; In re Weaver, L. R. 21 Ch. Div. 615; In re Leeming, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 43; In re Wharton, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 33.^e

§ 1311, ³ See 16 & 17 Vict., c. 70; 18 & 19 Vict., c. 13; 25 & 26 Vict., c. 86.^a

§ 1311, (a) The text is quoted in Hamilton v. Traber, 78 Md. 26, 44 Am. St. Rep. 258, 27 Atl. 229; also in Bowles v. Troll, 190 Mo. App. 108, 175 S. W. 324; and cited in In re Reeves, 10 Del. Ch. 483, 94 Atl. 511.

§ 1311, (b) The text is quoted in Hamilton v. Traber, 78 Md. 26, 44 Am. St. Rep. 258, 27 Atl. 229; also in Bowles v. Troll, 190 Mo. App. 108, 175 S. W. 324. § 1311, (c) Lunatic's maintenance. See, also, Rhodes v. Rhodes, 44 Ch. Div. 94; In re Plenderleith, [1893] 3 Ch. 332 (creditors not paid until lunatic is provided for); In re Winkle, [1894] 2 Ch. 519 (same, when receiver of property has been appointed).

§ 1311, (d) Also, Lunacy Act of 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 5.

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§ 1312. Mode of Exercising Jurisdiction in England.-The proceedings in which this jurisdiction is exercised are substantially as follows: Some friend of the alleged lunatic addresses a petition to the chancellor personally, or other judge in lunacy; a special commission is thereupon issued. directing a judicial inquisition of the alleged lunacy, which inquisition is made by means of a jury,-a regular trial of the issues before a jury; their finding or verdict, so long as it stands unimpeached, and the inquisition is not superseded, is conclusive as to the status of the party. Upon the return of the commission and inquisition, if the party is found to be a lunatic, the chancellor or judge in lunacy appoints a committee in the nature of a guardian over the person and property of the lunatic. This committee, in his character as trustee, is, of course, under the supervision and control of the court of chancery.² The scope of these proceedings has been enlarged by modern statutes, so that it embraces persons who are not strictly lunatics or idiots, but who are non compotes mentis, and therefore incapable of managing their property.¹

§ 1313. Jurisdiction in the United States.—It necessarily follows from its origin that this special jurisdiction over the persons and property of lunatics is not generally possessed by the courts of equity in the United States as a part of the original inherent equitable jurisdiction.¹ There are a few apparent exceptions, but these exceptions in reality only confirm the truth of my statement. In a very few states the constitutions or statutes, in their general grants of jurisdiction to courts of equity, confer jurisdiction over

§ 1312, ¹ See Sherwood v. Sanderson, 19 Ves. 280, 285; Ex parte Cranmer, 12 Ves. 445; Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266, 273; Ridgeway v. Darwin, 8 Ves. 65; In re Webb, 2 Phill. Ch. 10; Lysaght v. Royse, 2 Schoales & L. 151, 153; In re Fitzgerald, 2 Schoales & L. 432, 438; In re Monaghan, 3 Jones & L. 258.

§ 1313, 1 See Dowell v. Jacks, 5 Jones Eq. 417.

§1312, (a) The text is quoted in Sporza v. German Sav. Bank, 192 N. Y. 8, 84 N. E. 406. lunatics, idiots, and persons non compotes mentis.² The powers of the American courts are conferred and regulated by statutes.³ While there is much variety of detail in this legislation, the proceedings authorized by it, in all their substantal features, resemble those of the English court, as described in the last preceding paragraph. They extend not only to lunatics and idiots, but to confirmed drunkards, and other persons who are so non compotes mentis that they are incapable of managing their own affairs.⁴ When

§ 1313, ² In these states, therefore, the jurisdiction is wholly statutory, and is not included in the general powers belonging to the courts as courts of equity,—powers inherited from the English court of chancery. Among these states are Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Mississippi: See ante, vol. 1, §§ 284–286, in notes.

§ 1313, ³ In some states the power is not given exclusively to courts of equitable jurisdiction.

§ 1313, 4 Ample opportunities are provided for reviewing the finding, and for setting aside or superseding the inquisition. In some states the court seems to have power to direct a new inquisition in a summary manner. As illustrations,^a see Matter of Barker, 2 Johns. Ch. 232, 234; In re Lasher, 2 Barb. Ch. 97; In re Dickie, 7 Abb. N. C. 417; Hirsch v. Trainer, 3 Abb. N. C. 274; In re McAdams, 19 Hun, 292; In re Zimmer, 15 Hun, 214; In re Page, 7 Daly, 155; Matter of Colah, 6 Daly, 308; In re Collins, 18 N. J. Eq. 253; In re Hill, 31 N. J. Eq. 203; In re Fitzgerald, 30 N. J. Eq. 59; In re Conover, 28 N. J. Eq. 330; In re Lawrence, 28 N. J. Eq. 331; Dean's Appeal, 90 Pa. St. 106; Rogers v. Walker, 6 Pa. St. 371, 47 Am. Dec. 470; Dowell v. Jacks, 5 Jones Eq. 417; Walker v. Russell, 10

§1313, (a) See, also, Ashley v. Holman, 15 S. C. 97; In re Harris, 7 Del. Ch. 42, 28 Atl. 329 (injunction to restrain alleged insane person from dealing with his estate pending the inquisition); Equitable Trust Co. v. Garis, 190 Pa. St. 544, 70 Am. St. Rep. 644, 42 Atl. 1022 (as to lunatic's maintenance); Whetstone v. Whetstone's Ex'rs, 75 Ala. 495, 506 (citing the text). See, further, In re Reeves, 10 Del. Ch. 324, 92 Atl. 246; 10 Del. Ch. 483, 94 Atl. 511; Bowles v. Troll, 190 Mo. App. 108, 175 S. W. 324; In re Andrews, 192 N. Y. 514, 85 N. E. 699; Lemly

v. Ellis, 146 N. C. 221, 59 S. E. 683 (maintenance); Lake v. Hope, 116 Va. 687, 82 S. E. 738 (as to removal of committee). For a brief historical sketch of the jurisdiction and procedure both in England and in New York, see the opinion of Vann, J., in Hughes v. Jones, 116 N. Y. 75, 15 Am. St. Rep. 386, 5 L. R. A: 632, 22 N. E. 446; and see opinion in Sporza v. German Sav. Bank, 192 N. Y. 8, 84 N. E. 406; in Maryland, see Hamilton v. Traber, 78 Md. 26, 44 Am. St. Rep. 258, 27 Atl. 229; in Delaware, see In re Wilson, 9 Del. Ch. 332, 82 Atl. 695.

the special statutory jurisdiction has been exercised, a person has been adjudged or "found" a lunatic or otherwise *non compos mentis*, and a committee or guardian has been appointed, the general jurisdiction of equity extends over such committee or guardian, for the purpose of calling him to an account of his trust, in the same manner as over all other strictly fiduciary persons.⁵

§ 1314. Jurisdiction in Cases of Weak or Unsound Mind. The special jurisdiction above described is confined to persons who may be and are adjudicated or found to be lunatics, idiots, or non compotes mentis. The very first step, in order that the court may, through a committee, control the person and property of the particular individual is a proceeding by which he is judicially determined to belong to the status of lunatics or non compos mentis. In addition to this peculiar authority, a court of equity may, in appropriate cases, in pursuance of its inherent general powers, protect the property of persons of weak or unsound mind, who have not been and who even cannot be judicially "found" non compotes mentis.¹ These two

S. C. 82; Morton v. Sims, 64 Ga. 298; Gray v. Obear, 59 Ga. 675; Watson's Interdiction, 31 La. Ann. 757; Francke v. His Wife, 29 La. Ann. 302; Ex parte Dozier, 4 Baxt. 81; Cuneo v. Bessoni, 63 Ind. 524; Meharry v. Meharry, 59 Ind. 257.

1313, 5 See ante, 1097, and cases cited in note; In re Harrall, 31 N. J. Eq. 101.

§ 1314, ¹ In Beall v. Smith, L. R. 9 Ch. 85, 91, James, L. J., said: "The law of the court of chancery undoubtedly is, that in certain cases where there is a person of unsound mind, not found so by inquisition, and therefore incapable of invoking the protection of the court, that protection may in proper cases, and if and so far as may be necessary and proper, be invoked on his behalf by any person as his next friend. . . . It is to be borne in mind that unsoundness of mind gives the court of chancery no jurisdiction whatever. It is not like infancy in that respect. The court of chancery is by law the guardian of infants, whom it makes its wards. The court of chancery is not the curator either of the person or of the estate of a person non compos mentis, whom it does not and cannot make its ward. It is not by reason of the incompetency, but notwithstanding the incompetency, that the court of chancery entertains the proceedings.

jurisdictions are wholly distinct. The former is special; the latter is the general jurisdiction of equity exercised, "not by reason of the incompetency, but notwithstanding the incompetency." The court can only exercise such equi-

It can no more take upon itself the management or disposition of a lunatic's property than it can the management or disposition of the property of a person abroad, or confined to his bed by illness. The court can only exercise such equitable jurisdiction as it could under the same circumstances have exercised at the suit of the person himself if of sound mind." The judge then gives examples of such jurisdiction, viz.: where there is trust property, and the person of unsound mind is interested, or in the case of a partnership in which one partner becomes unsound of mind, or where the incompetent person, by his next friend, seeks to set aside instruments or gifts fraudulently obtained from him. In all these cases the court acts by virtue of its ordinary jurisdiction over trusts, partnership, or fraud. He then adds: "But I know of no authority and no principle for the court of chancery taking into its care the estates or other property of which such a person is the legal owner." In this case the lord justice was looking at the matter negatively, and mainly considering the limitations on the jurisdiction. In Jones v. Lloyd, L. R. 18 Eq. 265, 274, 275, Jessel, M. R., looked at the affirmative, and considered the existence of the jurisdiction. The plaintiff, who sued by a next friend, was lunatic, hut had not been so found by inquisition, and he sought to dissolve a partnership of which he was a member, on the ground of his mental condition. The jurisdiction to entertain the suit hefore the plaintiff had been "found" a lunatic was strenuously denied. On this question the master of rolls said: "Can a suit be instituted by the lunatic, not found so by inquisition, by his next friend? I have no doubt it can. There is authority upon the subject, and it seems to me so distinct that I have no occasion really to refer to the reason; but independently of authority, let us look at the reason of the thing. If this were not the law, anyhody might at his will and pleasure commit waste on a lunatic's property or do damage or serious injury and annoyance to him or his property, without there being any remedy whatever. In the first place, the lords justices or the lord chancellor are not always sitting for applications in lunacy. In the next place, if they were, everybody knows it takes a considerable time to make a man a lunatic by inquisition, and his family sometimes hesitate about making him a lunatic, or hope for his recovery, and take care of him in the meantime without applying for a commission in lunacy. Is it to be tolerated that any person can injure him or his property without there being any power in any court of justice to restrain such injury? Is it to be said that a man may cut down trees on the property of a person in this unfortu§ 1314

table jurisdiction as it could under the same circumstances have exercised at the suit of the person himself, if he were of sound mind.

nate state, and that because no effort of his can be made, no member of his family can file a bill in his name as a next friend, to prevent that injury? Is it to be allowed that a man may make away with the share of a lunatic in a partnership business, or take away the trust property in which he is interested, without this court being able to extend its protection to him by granting an injunction at the suit of the lunatic by a next friend, because he is not found so by inquisition? I take it, those propositions, when stated, really furnish a complete answer to the suggestion that he cannot maintain such a suit. Of course, they do not answer the question as to how far he may carry it; but that he can maintain such a suit for the purpose of obtaining, as in this case, a receiver, I should think there can be no doubt whatever." The case of Light v. Light, 25 Beav. 248, is also directly in point sustaining such jurisdiction.^a

§ 1314, (a) As to the jurisdiction to order payment of income to the foreign committee of a lunatic who resides abroad, see In re Brown, [1895] 2 Ch. 666; In re De Linden, [1897] 1 Ch. 453; Thiery v. Chalmers, Guthrie & Co., [1900] 1 Ch. 80; New York Security & Trust Co. v. Keyser, [1901] 1 Ch. 666; Didisheim v. London & Westminster Bank, [1900] 2 Ch. 15. In the last-named case, Lindley, L. J., mentions as further instances of the jurisdiction, in addition to those in the author's note, Farnham v. Milward & Co., [1895] 2 Ch. 730; In re George Armstrong & Sons, [1896] 1 Ch. 536; Howell v. Lewis, 61 L. J. (Ch.) 89; Wartnaby v. Wartnaby, Jac. 377; Porter v. Porter, 37 Ch. Div. 429. See, also, Edwards v. Edwards, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 87, 36 S. W. 1080; Eowles v. Troll, 190 Mo. App. 108, 175 S. W. 324.

